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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D C 20310

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AGDA-A (M) (2 Aug 71)

FOR OT UT 711113

13 August 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 62d
Engineer Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1971

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 62D ENGINEER BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96491

EGBC-00

14 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion for period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 R3)

THRU Commanding Officer, 159th Engineer Group, ATTN: SGB-OP, APO 96491
Commanding General, USAECV, ATTN: AVCO-MO, APO 96491
Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDC,
APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-DT
APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I. OPERATION: Significant Activities

1. COMMAND

a. Organization. This report covers the activities of the 62D Engineer Battalion from 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971. LTC Robert P. Monfere has commanded the Battalion since 25 July 1970. The 62D Engineer Battalion has been assigned to the 159th Engineer Group since 1 December 1970. The 100th Float Bridge Company is attached to the 62D Engineer Battalion.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TCE</u>	<u>ARRIVAL</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL</u>
100th Engr Co. (FB)	5-78G	1 Dec 70	1 Dec 70

b. Mission. The mission of the 62D Engineer Battalion is:

(1) To destroy or clear extensive dense vegetation in critical areas for the purpose of denying their use by the enemy as bases of operation, supply bases, marshalling areas, ambush sites, and cover and concealment.

(2) To clear dense vegetation from areas adjacent to friendly installations, for the purpose of improving installation's security by providing observation and fields of fire, and to reduce ambush possibility.

c. Area of Responsibility. The 62D Engineer Battalion is responsible for the entire III Corps Area.

d. Force Development

UNIT
HHC/62D Engr Bn
A/62D Engr Bn

LOCATION AND/OR CHANGE
Long Binh Post
Long Binh Post

FOR OT UT
711113
Inclosure

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TERMINATION

EGBC-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lesson Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion
period ending 30 April 1971, RC3 CSFOR - 65(R3)

60th LCC/62D Engr Bn
984th LCC/62D Engr Bn
100th Engr Co (PB)
500th Engr Co (PB)

Long Binh Post
Long Binh Post
Moved from Camp Frenzel Jones to Long Binh
Attached on 1 Dec 70 and deactivated on
15 Mar 71

e. Visitors and Awards. The following visitors were given briefings and/or tours in the 62D Engineer Battalion during the reporting period.

Date	Visitor
8 Jan 71	EG Cooper, COL Brown
8 Jan 71	COL Todd(Thai Liaison Officer)
9 Jan 71	EG Cooper
11 Jan 71	MAJ Church, MAJ Bartlett
11 Jan 71	MG Wagstaff
15 Jan 71	LTC Conover(Chops)
17 Jan 71	EG Cooper
19 Jan 71	MAJ Worthington
20 Jan 71	EG Cooper, EG Flint(Australian)
26 Jan 71	EG Putnam
27 Jan 71	MG Wagstaff, COL Foster
28 Jan 71	COL Todd, LTC McGahose
3 Feb 71	EG Cooper
5 Feb 71	COL Badger(Deputy Commander - 20 Bde)
6 Feb 71	MAJ Jorthing(3rd Bde) MAJ Church(II FF)
10 Feb 71	MG Wagstaff, COL Foster
10 Feb 71	MG Wagstaff
10 Feb 71	EG Cooper
11 Feb 71	COL Badger, LTC Conover
11 Feb 71	COL Badger, LTC Conover
9 Mar 71	EG Cooper, MG, Wagstaff
29 Mar 71	EG Cooper
15 Apr 71	EG Cooper
16 Apr 71	MG Wagstaff
17 Apr 71	EG Cooper

The following awards were presented or pending.

ARCOM - Service	225
ARCOM - Achievement	10
Bronze Star Service	62
Bronze Star Achievement	11 (2 pending)
Purple Heart	6 (70 pending)

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Air Medal	12 (2 pending)
Bronze Star - Valor	4 (24 pending)
ARCOM - Valor	(3 pending)
Soldiers Medal	1
Silver Star	1 (1 pending)

2. PERSONNEL, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE.

a. Personnel.

PERSONNEL	AUTHORIZED			PERCENTS UNDER/OVER STRENGTH					
	Nov	Dec-Feb	Mar-Apr	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
Officers	25	41	25	92%	83%	73%	73%	108%	92%
Warrant Officers	6	7	5	84%	100%	86%	86%	120%	100%
Enlisted Men	498	738	448	97%	86%	90%	84%	116%	100%
TOTAL	529	786	478	91%	90%	90%	81%	115%	97%

b. Morale. 20 men re-enlisted during the reporting period. Battalion chapel attendance rose to 43% during the period.

c. Discipline. Eight special courts-martial and one hundred forty-three Articles-15 were administered.

d. Casualties. KIA: 6; WIA: 70.

3. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Bunker line recons are conducted by teams from the Battalion on an average of three times a month.

b. For detailed summaries of intelligence data, consult the attached after action reports.

4. OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND TRAINING

a. The following projects were completed during the reporting period.

(1) Combat and Operational Support

196-5653-020 Land Clearing 6 Nov 70 - 2 Dec 70 for the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force by the 984th Land Clearing Company.

112-5658-020 Land Clearing 18 Nov 70 - 30 Dec 70 for the First Air Cavalry Division by the 60th Land Clearing Company.

210-6507-020 Bridge Support 29 Dec 70 - 5 Jan 71 for the 34th Engineer Group by the 79th Bridge Company.

EGBC-CO

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175-5679-020 Low Bed Support 29 Jan for the Army of Republic of Vietnam by A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

175-5680-020 Combat Bridge Support 4 Feb 71 for the Army of Republic Vietnam by 79th Bridge Company.

138-5670-020 Land Clearing 5 Jan 71 - 19 Feb 71 for II Field Force Vietnam by 984th Land Clearing Company.

189-5673-020 Land Clearing 17 Jan. 71 - 5 Feb 71 for the 25th Infantry Division by the D-9 Rome Plow Team.

251-6668-020 Reversant Removal 3 Feb 71 - 10 Feb 71 for the 92nd Engineer Battalion.

207-6603-020 Float Repair 18 Nov 70 - Indef for Long Binh Post Depot by the 79th Bridge Company

210-6704-020 Bridge Issue 27 Feb 71 - 10 Mar 71 to 34th Engineer Group by the 79th Bridge Company.

243-6751-020 Bridge Issue 22-23 Mar 71 for II Field Force Vietnam by the 79th Bridge Company.

243-6711-020 Bridge Issue 1-3 Mar 71 for 34th Engineer Group by the 79th Bridge Company.

207-6720-020 Crane Support 1-5 Mar 71 for 20th Engineer Brigade by 79th Bridge Company.

394-6328-020 Technical Assistance 25-30 Jan 71 for 318th Army of Republic of Vietnam Land Clearing Company by the A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

207-6675-020 Low Bed Support 23 Jan for 5th Special Forces by A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

543-0317-1-23 Low Bed Support 3-7 Feb 71 for the 92D Engineer Battalion by A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

275-5607-1-23 Low Bed Support 2-5 Feb 71 for the 31st Combat Engineer Battalion by A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

175-5679-020 Low Bed Support 29 Jan 71 - 1 Feb 71 for the Army of Republic of Vietnam by A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

748-9541-020 Technical Assistance 19 Jan 71 - 1 Feb 71 for the Army Republic of Vietnam by A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

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7. EGBC-C3

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion for period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65(R3)

583-0317-1-23 Low Bed Support 3-7 Feb 71 for 92D Engineer Battalion by A Company, 62D Engineer Battalion.

243-6711-020 Bridge Issue 1-3 Mar 71 for 34th Engineer Group by 79th Bridge Company.

207-6720-020 Crane Support 1-6 Mar 71 for 20th Engineer Brigade by 79th Bridge Company.

207-6741-020 Crane Support 15-20 Mar 71 for 34th Engineer Group by 79th Bridge Company.

243-6751-020 Bridge Issue 22-23 Mar 71 for II Field Force of Vietnam 79th Bridge Company.

1180 Equipment Support 16-20 Apr 71 for 31st Combat Engineer Battalion by A Company 62D Engineer Battalion.

1178 Equipment Support 15-18 Apr 71 for 34th Engineer Group by A Company 62D Engineer Battalion.

(2) Minimum Essential Requirements: None

(3) Lines of Communications: None

(4) Base Construction: None

(5) MACV Adviser Facilities: None

b. Active Projects.

(1) Combat and Operational Support.

(a) 191-5587-0-20 Land Clearing 27 Mar 71 - 13 May 71 for II Field Force of Vietnam by 60th Land Clearing Company.

(b) 225-6650-020 Land Clearing 26 Apr 71 - TBD for 31st Engineer Battalion by D-9 Team.

c. Weather. Rainfall did not affect land clearing operations during the reporting period, however hot, dry weather caused numerous overheating problems with the Rome Flows.

d. Engineer Plans. During the reporting period preliminary testing and evaluation of the D9 Disc Harrow, was completed. The results are enclosed in the report that is listed with after action reports.

e. Training. Formal training was conducted in the Battalion on Sunday mornings. Mandatory DA and USARV classes were taught.

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 62D Engineer Battalion for period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - (R3)

5. LOGISTICS

a. Materials and Repair Parts. The repair parts supply system for the 62D Engineer Battalion is essentially composed of a company level request hand-carried to the Tech Supply located in Company A, 62D Engineer Battalion. From this manual Direct Support Unit it is hand-carried to our supporting Depot at Long Binh Post. From this Depot, the request is forwarded one more step to our control center (ICCV). From ICCV it then goes out of Vietnam.

The basic problems with this system are twofold: One, not getting demand data recorded in sufficient amounts; two, the time element involved is too great from the time the Direct Support Unit (Company A, 62D Engineer Battalion), gives the request to the Depot and the request gets out of country.

Here are some statistics recorded from the DSU.

	<u>JAN 71</u>	<u>FEB 71</u>	<u>MAR 71</u>	<u>APR 71</u>
Total Restock Request Depot Received	306	426	1008	1547
Total Restock Requests Filled	168	62	158	326
Percentage Filled Per Month	55%	15%	16%	21%

This shows that about 80% of the restock orders, the majority of which are on priority 17 are either being canceled, rejected, or lost. When checking the monthly status listing, it was found that the Depot had received around 90% to 95% of the restock requests. Yet when checking on the demand history tapes at ICCV, there was little or no demands for the 62D Engineer Battalion. As a result, the 62D Engineer Battalion is not receiving critical repair parts on low priority reorder requests which makes it necessary to continually put in high priority request. This is necessary to meet the combat needs of the 62D Engineer Battalion.

The second problem area is the time involved to get a request out of country. A high percentage of the request are being canceled due to the lateness of the request. The DSU gets the request to Long Binh Depot within 5 days from the initiating date. The request are checked for corrections but the percentage of cancellations due to lateness still runs around 40% to 50%.

To sum it up, the 62D Engineer Battalion Direct Support Unit is starving for parts because of the inadequate response to low priority requests and the inability to get high priority request (with the exception of Red Ball) out of country in the required time frame.

Solutions recommended: One, make continual inspections on the abuse of high priority requests so that the low priorities will work. Two, even though a cancellation is made, if it has an advice code of 2L (Item has been reviewed and is needed), record the demand! Make sure all demands from a unit are recorded.

b. Maintenance. Deadline rates have fluctuated during the reporting period from a low of 4.5% to a high of 12.5%.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion for period ending 30 April 1971, PCS CSFOR - 65(R3)

6. PIO. Home town news releases were forwarded to the United States in addition to video taped home town news releases. Fifty-five articles were released from the battalion and forty-two of these were printed in one or more publications in Vietnam. CBS and ABC Television Networks covered the 60th Land Clearing Company on two news reports.

7. CIVIC ACTION. The 62D Engineer Battalion spent 90 man days on a land clearing project consisting of a 900 acre cut at Gia Ray.

8. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

a. Land Clearing Operations:

(1) CKEFENCKEE. The 984th Land Clearing Company cut 3217 acres for the Royal Thai Volunteer Force in Vietnam from 5 November 1970 to 20 December 1970. The area was East Bear Cat and the purpose of the mission was to deny the enemy access to an area bounded by N-S grid YS380 on the east, by E-W grid XT874 on the south, E-W grid YT000 on the north, and NS grid YS260 on the west. Tactical cuts were also made to deny the enemy access to streams within the area.

(2) ROUTE 60. The 60th Land Clearing Company cut 3860 acres for 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from 17 Nov 1970 to 1 Jan 71, the operation was a road clearing cut on Highway 309 from Song Te to the II-III Corps Boundary YD423484. Tactical probes were made along the route to deny the enemy activity or cache sites.

(3) THAI CUT. The 984th Land Clearing Company cut 3313 acres from 6 Jan 71 to 20 Feb 71. The mission was to deny the enemy use of area bounded by E-W grid YT21 - YT27 and N-S grid lines YT27 and N-S grid YT02 - YT07. This area was East of Bear Cat in the Royal Thai Army area of operations.

(4) PINH TUY. The 60th Land Clearing Company cut 5541 acres from 17 Jan 71 to 9 Mar 71. The mission of this operation was to clear 3000 acres of jungle adjacent to the village of VO DAT, eliminating enemy infiltration routes to the village. After completing this area cut, the company made a tactical cut east of VO DAT to the vicinity of FSB Apache.

(5) XUAN LOC. The 984th Land Clearing Company cut 3900 acres from 8 Mar 71 to 22 Apr 71. This large area cut was requested by the 25th Infantry Division for the purpose of destroying the 274th NVA Headquarters. The Royal Thai Army completed the operation with the 984th Land Clearing Company after the 25th Infantry Division stood down. The cut was located south of the junction of QL20 and Route 1, 9 kilometers southwest of Xuan Loc.

(6) NHON TRACH, DISTRICT, BINH HOA, PROVINCE. The 1st Platoon, 984th Land Clearing Company cut 527 acres from 18 Mar 71 to 3 Apr 71. This area was requested by II Field Force in Vietnam for the purpose of denying the enemy use of a stronghold and provide easy entry for friendly units. The area is located in Nhon Trach District just east of Phu Hoi.

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EGBC-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion for
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 R3)

(7) HAU NGHIA. At the time that this report is being prepared the 60th Land Clearing Company is conducting a land clearing operation in Hau Nghia Province. The company is operating with heavy enemy resistance in the 18,000 acre cut.

(8) D-9 LAND CLEARING TEAM. Three small land clearing projects were completed during the reporting period. Tactical cutting for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment on Banana Mountain was completed in two weeks from 1 Jan 71 to 15 Jan 71. A 200 meter belt was cut around the Viet Chung Rubber Plantation south of Xuan Loc for the 25th Infantry Division. 900 acres cut civic action project was completed in two weeks. This cut was south of Nui Chau Chan Mountain.

b. Evaluations: The D-9 Disc Harrow was evaluated during the reporting period. On 15 March 1971 the harrow and one D-9 Rome Flow began operations south of Long Than Than and cut for four days. The harrow was satisfactory for secondary clearing operations, however additional testing should be conducted.

SECTION II LESSON LEARNED

a. PERSONNEL: None

b. INTELLIGENCE: None

c. OPERATIONS:

(1) Security of Rome Operations.

(a) Observation: While being secured by one mechanized battalion the 984th Land Clearing Company was mortared one time in the NDP resulting in 1 US KIA and 6 WIA from the Land Clearing Company. After the original security force was replaced by a more aggressive security force, the NDP was not hit during remainder of the operation.

(b) Evaluation: The original security force made little or no effort to take offensive actions against the enemy. The enemy was able to capitalize on this shortcoming and placed deadly mortar fire inside of the NDP. The job of providing security for a Rome Flow operation does not mean that the force be passive and wait for the enemy to set up and to initiate contact. The security force must remain active and aggressive at all times, throwing the enemy off balance thru the use of patrols, ambushes, preplanned fires and H&I fire.

(c) Recommendation: Any force providing security for land clearing operations must be adequate and offensive. The enemy must be convinced that it would be in his best interests to stay away from land clearing operations or be prepared to take heavy casualties.

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// **BZBC-OP**

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion for
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65(R3)**

(d) Commanders Action: LTC Monfore talked with the Security Commander about motivating the armored mechanized unit to take more aggressive and offensive actions.

(2) Security of Land Clearing Operation.

(a) Observation: While being secured by Regional Forces in the Trang Bang Area, the 60th Land Clearing Company has been attacked numerous times. Infantry troops on foot were unable to react with adequate speed or fire power needed to gain fire superiority. The result of this shortcoming was that U.S. Land Clearing casualties were unnecessarily high. 4 KIA and 13 WIA in two contacts.

(b) Evaluation: The Land Clearing personnel were required to take offensive action on their own in order to break contact with the enemy. The Rome Plow is not by itself a tactical offensive weapon and when it becomes necessary to use it as one, the operator and control personnel are extremely vulnerable to enemy fire. The minimum requirement for Land Clearing security should be no less than one company of mechanized infantry or one troop of armored cavalry working directly with the Land Clearing Company.

(c) Recommendation: That Major Unit Commanders insure that mechanized security forces are provided for all clearing operators.

(d) Commanders Action: Arrangements were made to be issued eleven (11) Armor Personnel Carriers to provide direct security to the plow operators. They were manned by Land Clearing personnel. This was not enough security for the enemy situation in the cut area. Major General Wagstaff ordered a mechanized unit into the area and assigned them the task of being the security element for land clearing operators.

d. **ORGANIZATION:** None

e. **TRAINING:**

f. **LOGISTICS:**

(1) LOGISTIC SUPPORT

a. Observation: Land Clearing Companies require increased logistical support when working with ARVN security.

b. Evaluation: When US Land Clearing Companies are working for US Security Force coordination on logistical matters is much easier and requirement can be divided between the two units.

c. Recommendation: Additional logistical problems will be encountered in future land clearing operation. Therefore, prior planning must allow for the increased requirement for the Land Clearing Company to support itself.

EG3B-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion for
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65(R3)

d. Commanders Action: Notified Personnel in the Chain of Command and II Field Force Headquarters the necessity for having the Land Clearing Unit provide the capability of providing its own logistic support capability.

(2) ROME FLOW CAB:

(a) Observation: The new series Rome Flow Cab protects the operator from falling trees. However, the operator is not protected from shrapnel caused by exploding mines and booby traps.

(b) Evaluation: Sheets of steel are bolted on the cab where the heavy wire mesh leaves the operator vulnerable to shrapnel. These sheets should give 270 degrees protection for the operator on the sides and rear of the cab.

(c) Recommendation: Manufacturers of the Rome Flow cab should raise the steel sides of the cab higher so there is only one foot of wire mesh showing on the sides and back.

(d) Commanders Action: Bolted sheets of steel on sides and back, place sheets of steel inside tree Bar of the Blade, and put a half door on the operators side to provide more protection for the operator from shrapnel of mines and booby traps.


g. COMMUNICATIONS: None

h. MATERIAL: None

i. OTHER: None

Incl-7

All maps w/d HQ DA


ROBERT P. MONFORE
LTC, CE
Commanding

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EGB-CF (14 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62nd Engineer Battalion
for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (1.3)

DA, HQ, 159th Engineer Group, APO 96491

3 June 1971

THRU. Commanding General, USAECV, ATTN: AVCC-10, APO 96491
Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96500

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

The significant activities of the 62nd Engineer Battalion have been reviewed and is considered an adequate reflection of the battalion's accomplishments during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


S. C. WATERS
CPT, AGC
Adjutant

AVCC-110 (14 May 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62nd Engineer Battalion,
period ending 30 April 1971, RUS CEFOR-05 (13)

Hq US Army Engineer Command Vietnam, ARU 90491

5 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVMDU-00, ARU 90575

The significant activities and lessons learned have been reviewed and are an adequate reflection of the unit's operation during this period. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Charles M. Peterson

CHARLES M. PETERSON

Lt, CE

Act Asst Adjutant General

CF:

CO, 62nd Engr Bn

CO, 159th Gp

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AVHDO-DO (14 May 71) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 62D Engineer Battalion for
period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 10 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 62d Engineer
Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F.L. HONSOWETZ
CPT, WAC
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
USAECV
62d Engr Bn

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GPOP-FD (14 May 71) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 62d Engineer
Battalion for Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 JUN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. D. CLINE
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
984TH ENGINEER COMPANY (LC), 62D ENGINEER BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96491

EGEB-984

1 January 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Okefenokee

Commanding Officer
62D Engineer Battalion
ATTN: EGEB-3
APO 96491

1. The following is an After Action Report for operation OKEFENOKEE of the 984th Engineer Company for the period 5 November 1970 to 20 December 1970.

- a. Name of Operation: Okefenokee.
- b. Dates of Operation: 5 November 1970 to December 1970.
- c. Terrain: Rolling, with bomb craters, streams, and gullies with light to heavy jungle.
- d. Soil: 60% easily trafficable, 30% silty, 10% rocky.
- e. Weather: Hot humid, afternoon showers five to thirty minutes long.
- f. Location:
 - (1) Area cut bordered by the following: YS 340913, YS 340935, YS 330957, YS 310933, YS 305908, YS 340913.
 - (2) Linear cut from YS 340913 to YS 275910 200 meters North of stream Suci Quit.
 - (3) Linear cut from YS 340913 to YS 287905 200 meters South of stream Suci Quit.
 - (4) Linear cut from YS 287905 to YS 304881 200 meter East of stream Song Ca.
 - (5) Linear cut from YS 300778 to YS 289902. Tactical and stream cut 200 meters West of Song Ca.
- g. Command Headquarters: 62D Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco 96491.

2. Task Organisation:

- a. Organisation Unit: 984th Engineer Company (LC).
- b. Attachments: 18 personnel from 40th ARVN group.
- c. Supporting Units:
 - (1) 1st troop, 1st Thai Armored Cavalry Squadron RTAVF.
 - (2) 2nd troop, 1st Thai Armored Cavalry Squadron RTAVF.
 - (3) HQ troop, 1st Thai Armored Cavalry Squadron RTAVF.
 - (4) A Co 1st Battalion 1st Infantry Brigade RTAVF.

3. Intelligence: Most intelligence items were gathered by security or adjacent units. The enemy on all occasions chose to leave his position without fighting for them. Security and adjacent units were able, in many cases to kill or capture the enemy personnel displaced by the 984th's operations.

- a. 9 Nov 1970, Time 1500 hours - 12 bunkers 2x3x2; 7 foxholes; 4, 50 meter trenches; new 9 man sleeping bunker with fresh leaves for beds YS 333928.
- b. 9 Nov, Time 1800 - M548 at YS 317937 received sniper fire from unknown personnel, no friendly losses.

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- c. 13 Nov 1970, Time 1130 - D7 hit AP mine YS 338927 neg losses or damage.
 - d. 15 Nov 1970, Time 1030 - Found several beaver dam type logbridges YS 334913.
 - e. 16 Nov 1970, Time 1450 - M548 hit a heavy mine at edge of cut. The slapstick initiated the blasting cap and booster but the cast TNT didn't go off. Neg losses or damage.
 - f. 20 Nov 1970, Time 1030 - Found 10 bunkers with sleeping mats 18" overhead cover. YS 331953.
 - g. 22 Nov 1970, Time 0930 - Found one dead VC killed by 50 cal. in a shallow grave 2-3 days old. Found 8 fresh bunkers 2x3x2 with 3 feet overhead cover. Also a flag pole at the site, center of mass YS 330953.
 - h. 27 Nov 1970, Time 0830-0900 - LC 14 hit a 105mm round neg loss, YS 315915. Found 3 old bunkers 2x2x2 18" overhead cover YS 308910.
 - i. 3 Dec 1970, Time 0845 - Found fresh trail at YS 328910. Seven indiv 1 on crutches came up to the cut turned around and left area on same trail.
 - j. 6 Dec 1970, Time 1500 - Found 15 bunkers with recantuse. NVA personnel gear found. Rocks under cooking fire were still hot. YS 338911.
 - k. 6 Dec 1970, Time 1600 - When the Company Commander flew down the trail out of the bunker complex he spotted a VC asleep on a road, wearing rucksack at YS 358900. On the helicopters third pass the individual fled.
 - l. 7 Dec 1970, Time 0730 - On a Vr between sites of J and K 5 campfires were spotted.
 - m. 17 Dec 1970, Time 1300 - Found 4 foxholes with 1 poncho, sump of C ration cans and one 20 pound mine, homemade. YS 295895.
 - n. 17 Dec 1970, Time 1140 - Found 2 bunkers 3x5x2 with 3 with 3 foot overhead cover and 7 bunkers 2x3x2 with 3 feet overhead cover. In the bunkers were the following items: 1 wood saw, 4 claymore mines (US), 2 Red Chinese canteens, 8 B1 30 batteries, 3 first aid bags, 2 ponchos, 1 homemade booby trap, 57 AK rounds, 1 tube of morphin, 1 claymore detonator clacker, 1 Sony FM Radio TR 911 modified to pick up Tactical Radios.

4. Mission: Number 1

To deny the enemy the use of an area bounded by N-S grid YS 340 on the East, by E-W grid 874 on the South, by E-W grid YT 000 on the North, and by N-S grid YS 260 on the West.

Number 2

To deny the enemy use of areas within 200 meters of streams going from YS 340915 to YS 271894, YS 287904 to YS 303880, YS 325956 to YS 293948, YS 324968 to YS 303983 plus tactical cuts from YS 271894 to YS 277882, and YS 293948 to YS 300974.

5. Concept of Operation:

- a. On 5 November 1970 the 984th LCC conveyed from Long Binh to the junction of Q 15 and Bear Cat access road. Were met by security element from 1st Thai Cavalry Squadron RTAF. Then were escorted FSB Taneo YS 283934 and off loaded. From there they walked 6KM to the first NDP 340947.
- b. The company cut south and west for the next 18 days then moved to 2nd NDP at YS 320926.

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- e. After cutting near the 2nd NDP for 3 days the mission was changed. For the next 6 days the 984th cut areas to the SE and SW.
 - d. On 4 December 1970 the 984th moved to YS 299903 the 3rd and final NDP.
 - e. The next 15 days were spent cutting areas to the East, South, and West of the NDP.
 - f. On 20 December the 984th conveyed from the 3rd NDP to FSB Tanoe.
 - g. The rest of the 20th was used in cleaning vehicles and dropping belly pans. On the 21st the company was picked up and returned to Long Binh for maintenance stand down of 15 days.

6. Commanders Comments:

- a. The setup of the security elements was well balanced. The two cavalry troops and infantry company provided good security. The support for Class 1 and Class 2 were exemplary. Everything was delivered directly to us without constant proing as has been the case with several U.S. Units.
- b. Use of PLL trailer at the NDP made things much easier for maintenance because of the good organization, control, and availability of parts.
- c. The shop set at the NDP was even more beneficial. Maintenance could fabricate almost anything but a major assembly.
- d. Bomb craters are an acute problem. First they waste much cutting time. Second they can disable plows due to the quick engine cooling if there is water in the craters. Third, if a plow. The bamboo is usually so thick that a driver is trapped and has difficulty in getting a smoke grenade out for identification. This occurred and resulted in a cab being cut off of the downed plow by the following plow. The driver of the downed plow was not hurt.


7. Recommendation:

- a. We need to be able to show our men a better overall picture of the good they are doing. There are classified reports of various enemy documents that show just how much they fear and respect the Land Clearing Companies. If these could be brought out into the open, it would mean a tremendous boost in moral for the men.

8. Lesson Learned:

- a. Although this formation does put extra hardships on the plows the best formation for close security in light to medium jungle is a echelon right. This formation allows the lead officer and the security elements to stay close behind the lead plow.
- b. The only practical formation for heavy jungle and areas where close security is not essential is a echelon left.
- c. Even though the D9's are the best vehicles to make the first trace, neither bull blades nor security can keep up with D9's on the initial trace.
- d. After the first trace the D9's should be segregated from the D7's and given their own cut.
- e. The best utilization of equipment is in separate cuts. More production can be obtained per tractor. Security elements of one cut should be far enough from the others so that its fields of fire do not include the other cut.
- f. To find out how wet an area is going to be, you can shoot arty at it one or two days ahead of when you want to go in. The amount of water that appears in the hole 12 to 36 hours later is a good indicator of the ground water table.

- g. Drag M548's proved very effective for getting plows back into the cut. The M548's can carry extra parts and mechanics that can expedite the return of plows to the cut.
- h. Security elements in many cases are forced beyond a good reaction distance due to safety of personnel for the uncontrolled fall of large trees.
9. Execution:
- a. Start 5 Nov 1970 convoy to first NDP YS 340947.
 - b. 24 Nov 1970 move to second NDP YS 320926.
 - c. 4 Dec 1970 move to third NDP YS 299903.
 - d. 20 Dec 1970 move to FSB Tanao YS 283934.
 - e. 21 Dec 1970 convoy to Long Binh.
10. Results:
- a. Friendly losses:
 - (1) Personnel: 1 Thai soldier killed by falling tree.
 - (2) Equipment:
 - a. Miscellaneous personal gear.
 - b. 3 incidents of equipment hitting mines (no loss).
 - c. Radios (PRC 25) by falling trees.
 - b. Enemy Losses:
 - (1) Personnel: 1 KIA.
 - (2) Other Losses: See para J, M, and N Intelligence.
 - (3) Bunkers: 1/3.
11. Administration and Logistics:
- a. Rations: Rations were trucked from Long Binh to Bear Cat, then airlifted by Chinook to the NDP. Hot "A" rations were served for breakfast and supper, C rations for lunch.
 - b. Ammunition: None expended.
 - c. POL: Fuel resupplied by security element. Oil supplied by Unit Rear Detachment, and in a few cases by security.
 - d. Uniforms and Equipment: Supplied by Rear Detachment.
 - e. Repair Parts: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment. Some M548 parts were supplied by security elements.


DAVID A. DOBOZSI
CPT, CE
Commanding

91
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
60TH ENGINEER COMPANY (LAND CLEARING)
APO San Francisco 96491

EGEB-60

11 January 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report

Commanding Officer
62d Engineer Battalion
APO San Francisco 96491

The following is an after action report for the "Route 60" Land Clearing operation in which this unit participated during the period 17 November 1970 through 1 January 1971.

- a. Name of operation: Route 60
- b. Dates of operation: 17 November 1970 through 1 January 1971
- c. Location of operation: Highway 309 from Song Be to Hill 882 (YU 510530)
- d. Command headquarters: 62d Engineer Battalion
- e. Task organization:
 - (1) Organizational unit: 60th Engineer Company (LC)
 - (2) Support unit: "A" Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR
- f. Intelligence: Enemy activity greatly reduced in recent months, but capable of initiating stand off attacks, and implacing mines and booby traps. Route intersects two major resupply trail networks from Cambodia to Saigon area. The Adams Trail and the Jolly Trail are used heavily and frequently.
- g. Mission:
 - (1) To open Highway 309 from Song Be to the II-III Corps boundary at YU 423484.

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11 January 1971

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(2) To make six (6) tactical probes along the route at specified locations of suspected enemy activity or cache sites.

(3) As the operation progressed the mission changed:

(a) To drop two (2) of the tactical probes.

(b) To cut the flat areas around Bu Gia Map to facilitate settlement and farming in the area.

(c) To continue the road opening on to Bu Prang.

h. Concept of operation: Clear approximately 5066 acres of jungle and open road described in paragraphs g (1), (2), and (3) above.

i. Movements:

(1) Start:

(a) 17 November 1970 from Long Binh Post to FSB Buttons, RVN.

(b) 18 November 1970 from FSB Buttons to Song Be.
Off load trucks.

(c) 18 November 1970 from Song Be to NDP-1

(2) NDP's:

(a) NDP-1 YU 184143 18 Nov - 20 Nov

(b) NDP-2 YU 183245 20 Nov - 24 Nov

(c) NDP-3 YU 271319 24 Nov - 5 Dec

(d) NDP-4 YU 348368 6 Dec - 19 Dec

(e) NDP-5 YU 397478 19 Dec - 22 Dec

(f) NDP-6 YU 510530 22 Dec - 27 Dec

(g) NDP-7 YU 348388 27 Dec - 30 Dec

(3) Completion:

(a) 30 December 1970 from NDP-7 to FSB Buttons, RVN.

(b) 31 December 1970 from FSB Buttons to Camp Gorvad, RVN.

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11 January 1971

(c) 1 January 1971 from Camp Gorvad to Long Binh Post.

j. Enemy action:

- (1) Enemy losses: Unknown
- (2) Friendly losses:
 - (a) 60th ICC: None
 - (b) Co A, 62d Engr Bn: None
 - (c) Security forces: 1 KIA
- (3) Mines: 2
- (4) Booby traps: 1
- (5) Friendly equipment losses:
 - (a) 60th ICC: 1 D7E damaged/repaired
 - (b) Security forces: 1 APC combat loss
- (6) Enemy equipment captured:
 - (a) 4 - B40 rockets
 - (b) 1 - Chicom claymore
 - (c) 100 rds AK-47 ammunition
 - (d) 1 - SKS rifle
 - (e) 2 - Chicom grenades
- (7) Enemy structures destroyed:
 - (a) bunkers: 75
 - (b) Fighting positions: 32

k. Operational statistics:

- (1) Total cutting days: 32
- (2) Total move days: 6

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- (3) Total holidays: 2 (Thanksgiving and Christmas)
- (4) Total acreage cut: 3860 acres
- (5) Average cut:
 - (a) Cut days only: 120.6 acres
 - (b) All days of operation: 96.5 acres
- (6) Average plows in cut: 21.5
- (7) Type of growth and terrain: Light to medium jungle.
Gently rolling to very steep.
- (8) Average acres/plows/day: 5.1
- (9) Culverts:
 - (a) 2 - 36" X 10' for small stream crossing.
 - (b) 2 - 8' X 24' for large stream crossing.
 - (c) 10 other small streams were crossed by pushing dams across and passing over.
- (10) NDP's: 7 NDP's were constructed.
- (11) Fire support bases:
 - (a) 1 - 155mm Howitzer, 3 tubes on hill 702, YU 397478, FSB Sunday Punch.
 - (b) 1 - 155mm Howitzer, 3 tubes adjacent to FSB Snuffy, YU 347380.
- (12) Roads: Opened 71.5 kilometers of road from vicinity of Phuoc Binh, YU 199120, to vicinity of Bu Krak, YU 510530.

1. Administration and logistics:

- (1) Rations:
 - (a) 60th ICG and A Troop/11th AGR operated a combined mess hall.
 - (b) Hot A rations for breakfast and supper meals.
 - (c) C rations or LRRP rations for dinner meals.

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11 January 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report

- (d) Rations were drawn from 2nd Bde, 1st Air Cav Div.
- (2) Ammunition: Supplied by unit supply.
- (3) Uniforms and equipment: Supplied by unit supply.
- (4) Repair parts: Supplied by unit supply and Tech Supply, A Co, 62d Engr Bn.
- (5) POL: Supplied through 2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div.
- (6) Water: Supplied through 2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div.

m. Commander's evaluation:

(1) "A" Troop, 1/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment did an excellent job of providing security for the operation both on the cut during the day and around the perimeter at night although their force was cut to approximately 70% by detaching one platoon and using it to support another engineer operation at a separate location.

(2) 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division provided excellent logistic support of the operation. Resupply was provided by aircraft and was therefore prompt and reliable. There were no means available to supply by road and distances involved were too large and made ground resupply to slow and dangerous.

(3) Support from 60th ICC Rear Detachment, A Company and Hq Company, 62d Engineer Battalion proved to be both excellent and invaluable to the successful completion of the operation.

n. Lessons learned:

(1) Observation: When cutting light jungle or bamboo on relatively level ground and operating as an entire company the most production was made by cutting a trace around the area to be cut and then cutting towards the center by spiraling in. Requires less security by posting them around the initial trace. Requires less command and control after initial trace is cut.

(2) Observation: When cutting medium to heavy jungle on hilly to steep terrain the maximum production is made by cutting in small groups of 5 to 8 plows. Requires more security because of numerous separate groups. Small number of plows easier to control but more controllers and radios are needed.

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11 January 1971


SUBJECT: After Action Report

(3) Observation: When moving NDP's or going to and re-turning from the cut, if the plows can be cutting as they move, wasted time is eliminated and production is increased.

(4) Observation: When cutting jungle with trees over 8" in diameter, production is increased and damaged plows prevented by cutting the undergrowth, bamboo, and smaller trees with one element or team and leaving the larger material for a following element of D9G's or 3 to 6 D7E's. This prevents the larger trees from becoming obstacles while the lighter material is being cut. The larger trees are exposed and defined and therefore easier to cut. Care must be taken to keep the plows of the tree cutting element dispersed in order that the plows are not damaged by falling trees.

(5) Observation: By supplying all Rome Plow and Bull Dozer operators with, Aural Protector, type PHU-A/T (Ear Protectors) and insuring that they wear them, busted ear drums or other serious hearing damage can be avoided when mines or booby traps are accidentally detonated. One Rome Plow was towing another when it detonated a mine of approximately 40 pounds. The D7E was severely damaged, however, both operators were wearing the ear protectors and neither man was injured.

o. Commander's comment: An AVLB is unreliable and becomes more of a problem than it is worth. Serious consideration should be given to their use with a land clearing company. The AVLB assigned to this operation was not used and was towed from NDP to NDP throughout the entire operation. The land clearing company can cross any small stream by using internal resources. Larger streams can be crossed by emplacing culverts and very large streams will require a bridge to be built or as a last ditch desperation effort an AVLB may be employed.


J A LIER
CPT, CE
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
984TH ENGINEER COMPANY (LC) 62D ENGINEER BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96491

EGBC-984

Commanding Officer
62d Engineer Battalion
ATTN: EGBC-3
APO 96491

1. The following is an After Report for the Thai Cut operation in which the 984th Engineer Company (LC) participated during the period 6 January 1971 to 20 February 1971.

- a. Name of Operation: Thai Cut
- b. Dates of Operation: 6 January 1971 to 20 February 1971.
- c. Terrain: Medium to heavy jungle. Uneven land surface with many hills, gullies, streams, bomb craters, and swampy areas, with very thick bamboo in the southern cut.
- d. Soil: 60% good hard soil, 30% silty, 10% rocky.
- e. Weather: Cold mornings, hot humid afternoons with no rain.
- f. Location:
 - (1) Northern cut bordered by East-West grid lines YT 21 - YT 27 and North-South grid lines YT 02 - YT 07.
 - (a) A tactical cut from YT 218047 to YT 230060. 300 meter wide.
 - (b) A tactical cut from YT 213070 to YT 271047. 300 meters wide.
 - (c) A tactical cut from YT 267066 to YT 268052. 300 meters wide.
 - (d) A tactical cut from YT 250021 to YT 260050. 300 meters wide.
 - (e) A tactical cut due East from YT 260041 to YT 218051. 75 meters wide.
 - (2) Southern cut bordered by East-West grid lines YS 21 - YS 29 and North-South grid lines YS 87 - YS 92.
 - (a) A tactical cut from YS 219872 to YS 290906. 300 meters wide on either side of the Suoi Cau Moi River.
 - (b) A tactical cut from YS 223881 to YS 267913, 200 meters on either side of the intermittent stream which intersects the Suoi Cau Moi River at YS 223881.
 - (c) A tactical cut from YS 261877 to YS 261890, 200 meters on either side of the intermittent stream which intersects the Suoi Cau Moi River at YS 261890.
 - (d) A tactical cut from YS 234873 to YS 234916, 200 meters wide.

2. Task Organization:

- (a) Command Headquarters: 62d Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco 96491
- (b) Organizational Unit: 984th Engineer Company (LC).
- (c) Supporting Units:
 - (1) 1st troop, 1st Thai Armored Cavalry Squadron, RTAVF.
 - (2) 2nd troop, 1st Thai Armored Cavalry Squadron, RTAVF.

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- (3) D Company, 3rd Bn 1st Thai Infantry Brigade, RTAVF, from 6 Jan to 24 Jan 71.
 - (4) A Company, 2nd Bn 2nd Thai Infantry Brigade, RTAVF, from 24 Jan 71 to 28 Jan 71.
 - (5) B Company, 1st Bn 1st Thai Infantry Brigade, RTAVF, from 28 Jan 71 to 20 Feb 71.

3. Intelligence: Most of the valuable intelligence information was gathered by neighboring units. The enemy on all occasions chose to leave his position without fighting for them. The neighboring units were able, in many cases to kill or capture the enemy personnel driven out by the 984th. On several occasions the 984th also recorded enemy KIA's through the use of harassment and interdiction fire.

- (a) 211500 Jan, location YT 252025. Found three old enemy bunkers.
- (b) 221515 Jan, location YT 218051. LC 26 hit fragmentation hand grenade, negative losses.
- (c) 221535 Jan, location YT 218051. LC 21 ran over fragmentation hand grenade returning from out to NDP, negative losses.
- (d) 251400 Jan, location YS 260911. Found 11 bunkers 1x1x2 meters, 2 feet overhead cover, very old and starting to cave in.
- (e) 260840 Jan, location YS 241904. D7E was cutting through a tree and hit anti-personnel mine. Neg casualties, neg damage.
- (f) 270750 Jan, location YS 235901. APC hit buried 155 round, not command detonated. Three WIA on APC with minor injuries. One broken arm. Major structural damage to APC.
- (g) 271015 Jan, location YS 264710. Found and destroyed six old bunkers.
- (h) 291500 Jan, location YS 225868. Found and destroyed 12 recently used bunkers.
- (i) 301410 Jan, location YS 247849. Tree knocked down by LC 21 detonated claymore mine. 1 US WIA.
- (j) 310920 Jan location YS 240887. Found and destroyed 12 old bunkers.
- (k) 311250 Jan, location YS 235389. Found and destroyed VC typed command detonated 105 round and 15 bunkers.
- (l) 010845 Feb, location YS 249888. Found fresh trail leading to 4 bunkers.
- (m) 020930 Feb, location YS 268888. Found and destroyed 19 bunkers.
- (n) 030840 Feb, location YS 244890. LC hit small anti-personnel butterfly mine. Negative injuries or damage.
- (o) 031630 Feb, location YS 233889. Found 26 new bunkers, 14 old bunkers, 6 claymores, 3 documents, small caliber ammunition, fresh food, net in stream, one 82mm mortar prepared as booby trap with other miscellaneous equipment.
- (p) 041400 Feb, location YS 227884. Found 20 spider holes with fresh dirt alongside recently used foot paths. Found 12 bunkers about 2 weeks old.
- (q) 051230 Feb, location YS 254893. Found and destroyed 12 bunkers, one weapons cache containing 6mm mortar rounds, 4 chargers, 1 chi com sub-machine gun, 20 M79 rounds, 4 claymore mines. Also found clothing, eating and cooking utensils.
- (r) 070910 Feb, location YS 267892. Found 3 B40 RPG's 3 fuses for RPG in tunnel approximately 25x1x1 meters.
- (s) 080930 Feb, location YS 261890 and YS 264893. Found 28 bunkers in 2 separated bunker complexes, (including 1 hootch). Found various cooking utensils and fresh food.

- (t) 081430 Feb, location YS 261890. Found 3 bunkers believed to be within 15 minutes of our arrival. At YS 263890, nearby we found 5 freshly vacated bunkers.
- (u) 100945 Feb, location YS 260891. Found 9 bunkers, 1 VC body (approx 6 days since death) in shallow grave 30 meters from tunnel complex. The VC was apparently killed by mortar fire. Found one pair of pliers on body.
- (v) 101045 Feb, location YS 275397. LC hit small anti-personnel mine. Negative damage, negative injuries.
- (w) 130845 Feb, location YS 262897. Found 7 RPG rounds, 1 canteen, 1 coffee pot, 4 food bowls, 1 M79 round. Items were found lying on a road.
- (x) 141515 Feb, location YS 233891. LC 30 hit small anti-personnel mine. Negative damage, negative injuries.
- (y) 171430 Feb, location YS 233891. Found 2 RPG rounds by an old bunker. Also found inside the bunker 1 B40 RPG, 1 RPG propellant charge, 93 M16 rounds, 1/4 block C-4, 1 claymore, 2 claymore wire with blasting cap, 3 feet of detonation cord, 1 RPG fuse, 1 detonator claymore, 1 Vietnamese shirt, and 1 ammo can.
- (z) 181710 Feb, location YS 225875. Sited 3 VC walking across rice paddies. When engaged they fled southeast into bamboo. Security following but did not regain contact.
- (aa) 190845 Feb, location YS 225875. Spotted 6 VC. Security element engaged them. At 1025 one VC KIA was found, results of contact earlier that morning. Negative friendly injuries.

4. Mission: Number 1

To deny the enemy use of an area bounded by East-West grid lines YT 21-YT 27 and North-South grid lines YT 02-YT 07

Number 2

to deny the enemy use of an area bounded by East-West grid lines YS 21-YS 29 and North-South grid lines YS 87-YS 92.

5. Concept of Operation:

- (a) On 6 January 1971 the entire company moved out from Long Binh to the junction QL 15 and the Bear Cat access road. There they were met by security from the 1st Thai Cavalry Squadron RTAVF. They were thence where the plows were unloaded (YT 188031). They cut on both sides of the road eastward across the Song La Buong River. On the eastern side they cut north from this NDP for 3 days.
- (b) The company arrived at the second NDP, located at YT 240056, on 9 January and cut northwest and southwest for the next 3 days.
- (c) On 13 January the company moved to YT 260041 where they set up their third NDP. The cut was to the north and the south, and lasted 8 days.
- (d) Pratiab became the final NDP again to end the northern phase of operation Thai Cut YT 218051. The date of this move was 22 Jan 71. On the following day the company cut fields of fire for FSB Pratiab and pushed back the tree line along the road to Bear Cat.
- (e) The 24th of January the 984th moved moved south to YS 248906 where they remained through the 29th cutting southwest and northeast. The company off loaded from lowboys at Binh Son Airfield, YS 242918 and cut to the NDP at YS 248906. The company cut for 5 days along the intermittent stream.

- (f) On 30 January 1971 the NDP was moved to YS 254093. Here the cut was to the east and west of the NDP on both sides of the Soui Cau Moi River and south along either side of the intermittent stream that intersects the Soui Cau Moi at YS 261889.
- (g) The third NDP in the southern phase was established on 6 February 1971. The location was YS 256391. From here the eastern most portion of the cut was accomplished, as was one remaining section northwest of the NDP.
- (h) On 14 February an NDP was set up at YS 233894. An extension of the area to be cut was made, due to recent success in finding fresh caches, bunkers and completing of the original mission. The area to be cut was 200 meters wide from a southernmost point at YS 234873 due north to YS 234916.
- (i) The last cutting day was 18 February 1971. On the 19th, preparation was made to drop belly pans and pull maintenance before coming back to Long Binh. On the morning of 20 February, all equipment was loaded onto lowboys at Binh Song Airfield, YS 242918, and the company returned to Long Binh.

6. Commanders Comments:

- (a) When the initial mission is planned, there should be enough potential acreage included in the mission to insure that the company does not complete all its assigned tasks ahead of schedule, thereby reducing lost time and insuring proper prior planning. During this cut the company was hampered several times until amendments to the mission were forthcoming. This was caused by the completion of assigned missions several days earlier than anticipated.
- (b) A cut can only operate efficiently when there is a minimum of 10 operational radios in the cut. Three radios would go to each of the platoons, and one radio to the maintenance section. If the mission requires team cuts an additional two radios for each team is necessary for proper control.

7. Lessons Learned:

- (a) Assigning an operational plow with operational winch to act as police and recovery plow worked very well. The plow, when not in use in recovery, would be used in police actions. There was minimal time required to get the plow to assist any downed equipment. This plow should be equipped with a radio.
- (b) In areas where larger trees are interspersed in thick jungle, two or three plows should fall to the rear of the formation solely for the purpose of police actions. This allows the bulk of plows to move through the jungle at a steady rate and not be hampered by one or two large, cumbersome trees.
- (c) Extreme care should be taken by command personnel to insure no routines are set in conducting land clearing operations. When possible cut in different directions on consecutive days.
- (d) Although breaking into teams or three platoons increases total cut areas, control of the cuts is jeopardized since air guidance is often necessary. Security in such cases is extremely thin. Communications also suffers because increased control type traffic must go over the same frequency. It is imperative at times that channels remain open for use by one team (i.e. bustoff, contact, initial trace guidance from the air) thus reducing the proper control of the other teams. Caution should be taken when breaking into small teams to insure that adequate communication and security can be maintained.

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8. Execution:
 - (a) Start: 6 January 1971, convoy to FSB Pratiab.
 - (b) 9 January 1971, move to second NDP IT 260056. (nothern cut)
 - (c) 13 January 1971, move to third NDP at IT 260041. (nothern cut)
 - (d) 22 January 1971, move to FSB Pratiab.
 - (e) 24 January 1971, move to fifth NDP at IS 248906. (southern cut)
 - (f) 6 February 1971, move to sixth NDP at IS 254893. (southern cut)
 - (g) 14 February 1971, move to seventh NDP at IS 266891. (scuthern cut)
 9. Results:
 - (a) Friendly Losses:
 - (1) Personnel:
 - (a) 1 US killed in accident by tree.
 - (b) 3 Thais WIA (see para i, Intelligence).
 - (2) Equipment:
 - (a) Miscellaneous personnel gear.
 - (b) Seven incidents of US equipment hitting mines (minor damage in all cases).
 - (c) One incident of Thai equipment hitting mine (see Parag, Intelligence).
 - (b) Enemy Losses:
 - (1) Personnel:
 - (a) Five KIA, one by contact, four by indirect fire.
 - (2) Other losses:
 - (a) See para k, o, q, r, t, u, w, and y, Intelligence.
 - (3) Bunkers:
 - (a) 205
 - (c) Operational Statistics:
 - (1) Total days of operations: 46
 - (2) Total cutting days: 44
 - (3) Total acres cut: 3313
 - (4) Average plows/day: 23.2
 - (5) Average acres/day: 75.3
 - (6) Average acres/plows: 3.7
 10. Administration and Logistics:
 - (a) Rations: Rations were trucked from Long Binh to Bear Cat, then airlifted by Chinook to NDP. Hot "A" rations were served for breakfast and supper. C rations were supplied for dinner.
 - (b) Ammunition: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment.
 - (c) POL Fuel resupplied by security element. Oil resupplied by Unit Rear Detachment and Security.
 - (d) Uniform and Equipment: Supplies by Unit Rear Detachment.
 - (e) Repair Parts: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment. Some 548 and 578 parts were supplied by Thai Security.
 - (f) Water: Airlifted by Chinook to NDP from Bear Cat.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
60TH ENGINEER COMPANY (LAND CLEARING)
APO San Francisco 96491

EGBC-60

19 March 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report

Commanding Officer
62d Engineer Battalion
APO San Francisco 96491

The following is an after action report for the Binh Tuy Land Clearing operation in which this unit participated during the period 17 January 1971 through 9 March 1971.

- a. Name of operation: Binh Tuy
- b. Dates of operation: 17 January 1971 through 9 March 1971
- c. Location of operation: One kilometer east to 20 kilometers south-east of Vo Dat. (MT 741332)
- d. Command Headquarters: 62d Engineer Battalion
- e. Task organization:
 - (1) Organizational unit: 60th Engineer Company (LC)
 - (2) Support Unit: "E" Troop 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR.
- f. Intelligence: Enemy activity reduced in recent months but still capable of emplacing mines and booby traps and conducting indirect fire attacks.
- g. Mission:
 - (1) Clear approximately 3000 acres of jungle adjacent to the village of Vo Dat to eliminate enemy infiltration routes into the village and provide more land for farming.
 - (2) Make a tactical cut from the area cut east of Vo Dat to the vicinity of Fire Support Base Apache, and a series of three tactical cuts south-east of Gia Ray from QL 1 north to the abandoned rail road.

Incl 4

3?

EGSC-50

19 March 1971

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(3) As the operation progressed the mission was changed:

(a) Cut an additional 500 acres east of Highway 335, north east of Vo Lat.

(b) An area of approximately the same size of the added area was deleted immediately to the south west.

(c) Tactical cuts south of the railroad were omitted due to lack of time.

h. Concept of operation: clear approximately 6219 acres of jungle described in paragraph g (1), (2) and (3) above.

i. Movements:

(1) Start:

(a) 17 January 1971 from Long Binh Post to NDP at YT 760322 by 2/3 of the company.

(b) 18 January 1971 from Long Binh Post to NDP at YT 760322 by remaining 1/3 of the company.

(2) NDP's:

(a) NDP-1	YT 760322	17 Jan - 25 Jan
(b) NDP-2	YT 769357	25 Jan - 17 Feb
(c) NDP-3	YT 776346	17 Feb - 26 Feb
(d) NDP-4	YT 774288	26 Feb - 2 Mar
(e) NDP-5	YT 767227	2 Mar - 8 Mar

(3) Completion:

(a) 8 March 1971 from NDP-5 to Fire Support Base Mace.

(b) 9 March 1971 from Fire Support Base Mace to Long Binh Post.

j. Enemy action:

(1) Enemy losses: Unknown

(2) Friendly losses: 2 U.S. KIA

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- (3) Mines: 4
- (4) Booby traps: 2
- (5) Friendly equipment losses:
 - (a) 60th Engr Co (LC): 2D7E damaged/repared
 - (b) Security Forces: 1 APC combat loss
- (6) Enemy equipment captured:
 - (a) 3 canisters rice
 - (b) misc medical supplies
 - (c) 4 - RPG rockets
- (7) Enemy structures destroyed:
 - (a) Bunkers: 25
 - (b) Fighting positions: 57

k. Operational statistics:

- (1) Total cutting days: 43
- (2) Total move days: 9
- (3) Total holidays: none
- (4) Total acreage cut: 5541 acres
- (5) Average cut:
 - (a) Cut days only: 129 acres
 - (b) All days of operation: 106.5 acres
- (6) Average plows in cut: 26.7
- (7) Type of growth and terrain: Medium to heavy jungle, flat to rolling terrain.
- (8) Average acres Plow day: 4.9

19 March 1971

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(9) Culverts: No culverts were constructed or emplaced nor were there any significant stream crossings.

(10) NDP's: 5 NDP's were constructed.

(11) Roads: Pioneer roads to and through the cut were constructed each day to facilitate movement of security vehicles.

1. Administration and logistics:

(1) Rations:

(a) 60th Eng Co (LC) and E Troop/11th ACR operated a combined mess hall.

(b) Hot "A" rations for breakfast and supper meals.

(c) "C" rations or LRRP rations for dinner meals.

(d) Rations were drawn from 2nd Bde, 1st Air Cav Div.

(2) Ammunition: Supplied by unit supply

(3) Uniforms and equipment: supplied by Unit Supply

(4) Repair parts: Supplied by unit supplied and Tech supply, A Co, 62d Engineer Battalion.

(5) POL: Supplied through 2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div.

(6) Water: Supplied through 2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div.

m. Commander's evaluation:

(1) "E" Troop, 2/11th ACR provided excellent security for the operation both on the cut during the day and around the perimeter at night. Ambush patrols, automatic ambushes and radar surveillance conducted by "E" Troop undoubtedly contributed to the relative lack of mine and booby trap activity in the cut.

(2) 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div provided excellent logistic support of the operation. Re-supply was provided by aircraft and was prompt and reliable. No ground resupply was undertaken due to distances from secure road nets.

(3) (3) Support from 60th Eng Co (LC) Rear Detachment, A Co and HQ Company, 62d Engineer Battalion was responsive and dependable and contributed greatly to the successful completion of the operation.

SUBJECT: After Action Report

n. Lessons learned:

(1) Observation: If the number of separate cuts can be held to two (2) rather than each team having their own cut, the requirement for security vehicles is greatly reduced. This allows the security element to stand down enough vehicles to keep a very low deadline rate and to have elements available for night ambushes and other offensive actions.

(2) Observation: When cutting heavy jungle on level terrain safety is increased by leaving the large trees over 18 inches in diameter for a follow up police team. The large trees are defined and good visibility is obtained by cutting out the under-brush. This allows the operators cutting the large trees to see where they fall.

(3) Observation: A great deal of lost time can be saved by taking a cargo vehicle to the cut with a supply of repair parts and lubricants. Certain breakdowns are fairly predictable and can be fixed in the field rather than walking or towing the blow back to the NDP.

o. Commander's Comment: Once the security element becomes "minority" some loss of production is inevitable. The blows cutting can move ahead faster than one or two bull blades can make a new road for security vehicles and the blows must wait for security to catch up. If the security element would accept as cleared any path that a D/S had just passed over, production could be greatly increased.



EDWIN HEISSE
CPT, CE
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
984TH ENGINEER COMPANY (IC) 62D ENGINEER BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96491

AGHC-984

29 April 1971

Commanding Officer
62d Engineer Battalion
ATTN: AGHC-3

1. The following is an after action report for the Xuan Loc Cut operation in which the 984th Engineer Company (IC) participated during the period 8 March 1971 to 22 April 1971.

- a. Name of Operation: Xuan Loc Cut.
- b. Project Directive No.: 189-5684-0-20.
- c. Dates of Operation: 8 March 1971 to 22 April 1971.
- d. Terrain: Medium to heavy jungle. Uneven land surface with many hills, gullies, streams, ravines, swampy areas.
- e. Soil: 65% good hard soil, 25% silty, 10% rocky.
- f. Weather: Hot, humid, with no rain.
- g. Location: 50 square kilometer area in Quan Xuan Loc region, bordered on North by highway QL 1 and on East by highway ATL 15. Actual boundaries were North-South grid lines YT 33 - 42, and East-West grid lines YT 00 - YT 06.

2. Mission: (1) To deny the enemy use of an area bounded by East-West grid lines YT 00 - YT 06 and North-South grid lines YT 33 - YT 42.
(2) Strip cuts around key locations were to be made prior to ground troops moving in and sweeping them.

3. Task Organization:

- a. Command Headquarters: 62d Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco 96491.
- b. Organizational Unit: 984th Engineer Company (IC).
- c. Supporting Units: (1) 8 - 22 March, 3/22 Inf, 25 Infantry Division with Mech Attachments from 1/5 Mech Inf and two Thai Rifle Companies.
(2) 22 March thru 22 April, 2 Troops of Royal Thai Armored Cavalry, 2 Thai Rifle Companies.

4. Intelligence: Most of the valuable intelligence information was gathered by neighboring units. The enemy on most occasions chose to leave his positions without fighting for them. The neighboring units were able, in many cases to kill or capture the enemy personnel driven out by the 984th. On several occasions the 984th also recorded enemy KIA's through the use of harassment and interdiction Artillery fire and air strikes called in on areas of contact. Intelligence reports received prior to the start of the operation indicated the primary enemy units operating in the area were members of the 274th NVA Infantry Regiment. The area was believed to contain the regimental headquarters and elements of three additional battalions of the 274th. Their capabilities included attacks by small arms, automatic weapons, E-40 and RPG, recoilless rifle and indirect weapons fire. Summary of Contacts follows:

- a. 090645 at YT 301044: Found and destroyed 6 bunkers, 4 fighting positions.

- b. 110510 at YT 300006: 1L 28 cut wires to 5 lb chicon mine hooked up with wires, flashlight batteries to B-40 booster. Mine dismantled by security forces.
- c. 153320 at YT 372015: Found 8 bunkers, 3000 rounds of M-60 ammo.
- d. 151855 at YT 301027: Between 12 and 20 mortar rounds hit the NDP. 0 KIA, 1 KIA from 984th, 12 KIA & 1 KIA from US Security. Concho Van destroyed and Hess Van damaged.
- e. 171530 at YT 361054: Found 8 bunker complexes and 1 VC KIA.
- f. 181030 at YT 361012: Found and destroyed 17 bunkers.
- g. 191500 at YT 300020: Found one bunker 7 x 1 x 2 meters with 1 1/2 ft overhead cover.
- h. 010940 at YT 355018: Found and destroyed 3 bunkers, negative recent use. Also found one hootch at same location.
- i. 121315 at YT 362007: Found baby trapped 105 round, which was later blown in place by security.
- j. 121130 at YT 392027: Found two bunkers recently used, with 1 1/2 foot overhead cover.
- k. 121420 at YT 404020: One round 75 mm Recoiless rifle fire received in cut, no casualties or damage.
- l. 121630 at YT 404020: Found five new occupied bunkers.
- m. 131000 at YT 404018: Received 3 rounds of 75 mm and small arms fire. Negative casualties or damage.
- n. 140930 at YT 407020: Found 20 newly made bunkers and got a body count of 2 VC KIA's as a result of air strike previous day.
- o. 150920 at YT 405024: Had contact in the cut. LC 24 hit by RPG, operator injured with damage to vehicle.
- p. 151515 at YT 405024: Recon after air strike found 2 VC KIA's.
- q. 161130 at 402030: Found 3 recently used bunkers and 2 VC KIA's.
- r. 1711105 at YT 375047: Lead plow took small arms fire, negative casualties, negative damage.
- s. 171500 at YT 403025: Discovered 20 fresh bunkers, heavily reinforced, with overhead cover and doors. Bunkers contained large amounts of food, utensils, and some documents. Found one RPG round.
- t. 171605 at YT 377045: Found and destroyed one 500 lb bomb also found one VC body, approximately one month old.
- u. 181045 at YT 370052: Found 10 fresh bunkers occupied with in last five minutes.
- v. 181300 at YT 403023: Security forces sweeping recent contact area discovered 10 new bunkers and two VC KIA approximately two to three days old.
- w. 201015 at YT 403030: Found and destroyed 11 new bunkers.
- x. 211110 at YT 395045: Found and destroyed 6 new bunkers, Found one RPG round, two lb rice, utensils and clothing.

5. Concept of Operation:

- a. On 8 March 1971 the entire company moved from Long Binh to the intersection of QL 1 and ATL 25 where they were met by security from the 1/5 Mech Inf, 25th Division. They were then escorted to the unload point NT 343052 where the plows were unloaded. The first NDP was set up at YT 361029. They stayed at this location 15 days.
- b. The company arrived at the second NDP located at YT 395023 on 23 March 71. They cut from there for the next 14 days.
- c. The third NDP was set up at YT 383030 where the company was

- based until the end of the operation 22 April 71.
- d. The last cutting day was 21 April, preparation was made to drop belly pans and pull maintenance be for returning to Long Binh. On the morning of 22 April all equipment was loaded onto lowboys at YT 343052, and the company returned to Long Binh.
6. Administration and Logistic:
 - a. Rations: Rations were trucked from Long Binh to Bear Cat, then airlifted by Chinook to the NLF. Hot "A" rations were served for breakfast and supper. "C" rations were supplied for dinner.
 - b. Ammunition: Supplied by unit Rear Detachment.
 - c. F.O.L. Fuel resupplied by security element. Oil resupplied by Unit Rear Detachment and Security.
 - d. Uniform and Equipment: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment.
 - e. Repair Parts: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment. Some 546 and 578 parts were supplied by security.
 - f. Water: Airlifted by Chinook to NLF from Bear Cat.
 7. Results:
 - (a) Friendly Losses
 - (1) Personnel
 - (a) 1 US KIA 20 US MIA (see para d, n, Intelligence)
 - (b) 2 Thais injured in accidents (One by D-9 hitting FC, One by tree hitting LC)
 - (2) Equipment:
 - (a) Miscellaneous Personal Gear.
 - (b) 1 incident of US equipment hit by MFG, resulting in damage to plow (see para n, Intelligence)
 - (b) Enemy Losses:
 - (1) Personnel:
 - (a) 10 VC KIA as result of contact, in air strikes. (see para e, m, o, p, s, u, Intelligence)
 - (c) Operational Statistics:
 - (1) Total Days of Operation: 46
 - (2) Total Cutting Days: 44
 - (3) Total Acres Cut: 3948
 - (4) Average Plows/Day: 17.8
 - (5) Average Acres/Day: 89.7
 - (6) Average Acres/Plow/Day: 5.0
 8. Commanders Comments and Lessons Learned:
 - a. A basic problem encountered during the first part of the operation was the introduction of a different overlay and cutting plan by the original security forces (25th Inf Division). While the plan was tactically sound in that it provided for breaking the area into sections by cutting strips, it proved to be unfeasible due to the terrain. The area was laced with numerous ravines, streams and steep ridges and the plows had great difficulty cutting in most places. As the rough terrain continued to take its toll on acres, numerous alternatives were proposed by the Linc Clearing

Commander yet each of these was ignored and the second overlay was adhered to. This cost a tremendous amount of acres in the overall analysis and was a situation that could have been avoided with a little more cooperation. Recommend that in future operation the land clearing commander be given complete control of the cutting to include where, when, and how - within security limitations, of course.

- b. On this operation, the 984th was severely hampered by being called upon to detach a platoon and send it to another location for a period of two weeks. The effects were obvious, not only in loss of acreage at the main cut, but also in increased maintenance problems encountered by having to support two widely separated elements. It has been proven time and again that a Land Clearing Company operating as a whole can produce 20 - 30 percent more acreage with a higher plow availability rate than it can with elements in different locations. Suggest the whole idea be given a thorough re-evaluation and where small areas of 500 - 1000 acres require cutting, send the whole company to do the job in a few days rather than commit one platoon for an extended period.
- c. With the extremely hilly terrain encountered on this operation, a severe problem arose with tractors constantly throwing tracks. While trying to cut along slopes and ridges. Part of the problem was traced to incorrect track tension, but it was learned that cutting straight up and down the slopes instead of along them just about eliminated the problem. This proved to be a slower method of cutting, yet proved more efficient in the long run as less tracks were thrown and more plows were available for cutting.
- d. Another problem encountered was in the time and acres lost after an enemy contact in the cut. Plows removal and reorganization proved to be fast and efficient, yet many hours were lost while artillery, gunships and air strikes were put in the contact area. On subsequent days, two or three different areas in the same general vicinity were chosen as cutting locations and if contact was made in one area, the plows were regrouped and cutting begun in another area while reaction continued in the first. This proved to save much valuable time resulting in increased acres.


JOHN E. WRIGHT
CPT, CE
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
984TH ENGINEER COMPANY (LC) 62D ENGINEER BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96491

AGHC-984

29 April, 1971

Commanding Officer
62d Engineer Battalion
ATTN: AGHC-3

NOT REPRODUCIBLE

1. The following is an After Action Report for the Nhon Trach operation in which the first platoon of the 984th Engineer Company (LC) participated during the period 18 March, to 3 April, 1971.

- a. Name of Operation: Nhon Trach Cut.
- b. Project Directive No: 146-5685-0-20.
- c. Dates of Operation: 18 March, 1971, to 3 April, 1971.
- d. Terrain: Light to heavy jungle, uneven land surface with sharp ridges, deep ravines.
- e. Soil: 70% good hard soil, 20% silty, 10% rocky.
- f. Weather: Hot, humid, with no rain.
- g. Location: An area in Bien Hoa district, Nhon Trach Province bordering a populated area at Phu Hoi. This is South of IRL 25 and west of QL 15. Actual boundaries were between East-West grid lines YS 89 and North-South grid lines YS 05 - YS 10.

2. Task Organization:

- a. Command Headquarters: 62d Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco 96491
- b. Organizational Unit: First Platoon, 984th Engineer Company (LC).
- c. Supporting Units: (1) First Platoon, 1/5 Mech Inf, 25th Infantry Division.
(2) Regional forces from the Nhon Trach District.

3. Intelligence: Enemy forces in the Nhon Trach region consisted of local VC regulars and a Sapper unit, with small arms, RPG, and indirect fire capability. The enemy on most occasions chose to leave his positions without fighting for them. A summary of contacts and finds by the 984th follows:

- a. 181320 at YS 056878: LC 4 hit a booby trap. Negative damage, negative injuries.
- b. 181400 at YS 060878: Found 22 bunkers 5 x 5 x 5 feet with 1½ feet overhead cover. Estimate activity within the last 30 minutes by approximately 50 VC. Found 5 lbs. of documents, one typewriter, assorted clothing, food, eating utensils.
- c. 181600 at YS 062873: Found 6 bunkers approximately two months old, 4 x 5 x 4 feet.
- d. 181730 at YS 063876: LC 3 hit a mine, which initiated contact. Negative damage, negative injuries on the ground. LCH guiding cut received one hit. Estimate 25 VC. Found 2 RPG rounds, 50 each 50 cal ammo, 75 rounds M-60, one US claymore, frag grenades, clothing, eating utensils. Found 12 bunkers 2 x 5 x 6 feet with two feet overhead cover.
- e. 190630 at YS 069877: Found 27 bunkers used within last 24 hours. 5 x 5 x 5 feet with 1½ feet overhead cover. Also found 1 pound of documents.

Incl 6

- f. 191115 at YS 068875: Contact with 3 VC. Results 1 VC KIA.
- g. 191415 at YS 070873: Found one 750 lb. bomb, which was later blown in place by EOD team
- h. 191430 at YS 071673: Uncovered 7 bunkers 4 x 5 x 4 feet. 24 hours old used by four to seven VC.
- i. 201415 at YS 059878: Found medical supplies. Included 200 vials. Located in tunnel 45 ft x 3 ft in diameter. Found 10 bunkers 4 x 5 x 5 1 foot overhead cover. Bunkers approx 1 1/2 months old.
- j. 211000 at YS 068868: LC 3 hit mine, negative damage, negative injury.
- k. 221115 at 073866: Found 4 bunkers 3 x 4 x 4 feet, four months old.
- l. 230930 at YS 883057: Found 6 bunkers 3 x 4 x 5 feet and list of medical supplies
- m. 231030 at YS 881058: Found 155 arty round.
- n. 241315 at YS 073872: Found 8 bunkers 3 x 6 x 4 feet with three feet overhead cover. Ten to fifteen personnel using bunkers within last four days. One 75 mm round booby trap found near bunkers. Booby trap and bunkers destroyed.
- o. 250510 at YS 063873: Found three tunnel type bunkers 5 x 5 x 4 with 3 feet overhead cover.
- p. 270930 at YS 075869: Found one grenade booby trap, destroyed by LC 7 with negative damage, negative injuries. Same location found three sleeping positions, two 50cal cans of rice, two canteens, one track detector. Positions used within last 48 hours.
- q. 281420 at YS 077868: LC 10 detonated a booby trap with negative damage, negative injuries. Same location found two LAWs, two pounds of documents, two fighting positions.
- r. 291630 at YS 065866: LC 4 detonated one booby trap. negative damage, minor injuries to Vietnamese interpreter. Same location found two bunkers and one tunnel.
- s. 300630 at YS 063874: One 750 lb bomb was found. EOD team blew it in place.
- t. 310855 at YS 097877: Found 8 bunkers approx 2 weeks old, 4 x 6 x 4 with 1 1/2 feet overhead cover.
- u. 011530 at YS 058884: LC 3 hit booby trap, Negative damage. Operator received minor shrapnel wounds in back. Treated at site.
- v. 021030 at YS 098888: LC 4 hit booby trap with negative damage, negative injuries

4. Mission: Number 1

To deny the enemy use of an area bounded by East-West grid lines YS 86 - 89 and North-South grid lines YS 05-YS 10.

Number 2.

To destroy mine or booby trap devices, which have denied friendly units safe entry into this area.

5. Concept of Operation: With security provided by 1st plt 1/5 Mech Inf 25 Div.

- a. On 18 March, 1971 the first platoon moved out from Long Binh to QL 15 and continued South to LTL 20. They cut straight out to YS 057873 where the first NDP was set up. The plows then moved northward to the woodline, where they began cutting at 13 15 hours.
- b. Because of intelligence that a Sapper unit was in the area, the unit moved to YS 063866 on the afternoon of 23 March, 1971, after cutting in the morning.
- c. On 4 April, 1971, 1st plt 984th Engineers traveled to YS 077878 where

the plows were loaded onto lowboys and taken back to the remainder of the company in Xuan Loc Province.

6. Commander Comments

- a. Radio communication with H-16 Detachment was marginal. On two occasions the rear could not be reached at all. Elements which are critical to the success of the mission, to include the use of a LOH in guiding the cut and POL supply, did not meet the needs of the land clearing unit. On uneven terrain it is often necessary that a LOH be on call for a total of between 4 and 5 hours a day. In actual practice, there were occasions when it was not available when needed, or available for as little as 5 minutes a day.
- b. The Regional Forces left much to be desired. Despite repeated warnings they often chased animals with H-16's right in among the plows as they cut. On one occasion a plow set off a mine, injuring a Vietnamese who was on the ground nearby. They were detrimental to morale as indicated by cases of theft, involving cameras, radios, softdrinks, & wristwatch.

7. Lessons Learned:

- a. The most effective use of Home Plows is on a company size scale. The use of just one platoon results in more difficulty maintaining, repairing, and supplying parts for equipment. The effectiveness is jeopardized through a longer time necessary to complete the mission, less chance of recording enemy KIS's, and poorer security in the unit area of cutting.
- b. This ultimately affects not only the platoon size cut, but the effectiveness of the remainder of the company. Recommend a thorough reevaluation of the practice of splitting up a company to handle two missions simultaneously.

8. Results:


- a. Friendly Losses:
 - (1) Personnel:
 - (a) 1 US wounded by booby trap (see paragraph u, Intelligence)
 - (b) 1 Vietnamese wounded by booby trap (see paragraph r, Intelligence)
 - (2) equipment:
 - (a) Miscellaneous personal gear. Stolen by HF's
 - (b) Eight incidents of US equipment hitting mines (negative damage in all cases)
- b. Enemy losses:
 - (1) Personnel:
 - (a) One VC KIA by direct contact (see paragraph d, Intelligence)
 - (b) 22 VC KIA and one POW as a result of blocking forces in the two week period.
 - (2) Other Losses:
 - (a) See paragraph a thru v, (Intelligence).
 - (b) Bunkers: 110

c. Operational Statistics:

- (1) Total days of operation: 18
- (2) Total cutting Days: 17
- (3) Total Acres cut: 527
- (4) Average Flow/Day: 6.8
- (5) Average Acres Day: 31.0
- (6) Average Acres/ Flow/Day: 4.6

9. Administration and Logistic:

- a. Rations: Supplied by security truck from Frenzel Jones to NDF. Hot "A" rations were served for breakfast and supper. C rations were supplied for dinner.
- b. Ammunition: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment, security
- c. FOL: Fuel and oil resupplied by security element.
- d. Uniform and Equipment: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment.
- e. Repair Parts: Supplied by Unit Rear Detachment
- f. Water: Supplied by security element, trucked out from Camp Frenzel Jones


 GREGORY R. MULLENBORE
 1LT, Inf

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 62D ENGINEER BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96491

EGEB-3

30 March 1971

SUBJECT: Secondary Growth Control Equipment Report.

THRU: Commanding Officer
159th Engineer Group
APO 96491

TO: Commanding Officer
20th Engineer Brigade
APO SF 96491

1. Reference: DF AVHEM-MD, US Army Vietnam, subject: Land Clearing.

2. This report is submitted in compliance with the above reference.

3. Chronological sequence of events;

a. 9 November 1970-62nd Engineer Bn received 2ea Rome Plows and Disc Harrows, Model TYH.

b. 15-16 November 1970- Harrows assembled and inspected.

c. 15 March 1971- Evaluation team departed Long Binh for testing site 5 kilometers SW of Long Thanh: XT 180379. Team consisted of 1 officer, 1 senior NCO, 2 operators, a cook, 1ea. bullblade, and the D9 Disc Harrow.

d. 19 March 1971- Test was suspended due to the break down of the disc harrow. Team returned to Long Binh on 20 March 1971.

4. Personnel and Equipment needed to conduct test and evaluation.

a. Personnel:

(1) OIC

(2) NCOIC

(3) 2 D9 Operators(62E20)

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SUBJECT: Secondary Growth Control Equipment Report.

(4) 1D7 Operator(62E20)

(5) 1 Cook

b. Equipment:

(1) 1 D9G Rome Flow

(2) 1 Rome Model TYH Disc Harrow

(3) 1 D7E Tractor with Bulldozer Blade

(4) 1 PRC 25 Radio

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5. Test and Evaluation:

a. Procedures: The D9 Rome Flow was loaded on a 50 ton LoBed trailer and moved to the cutting site by an 830B Tractor. The Disc Harrow was loaded on a 25 ton tractor trailer and moved by a 10 ton tractor. Roads traveled were all two lane asphalt roads and the equipment was offloaded at the side of the road 1500 meters from the actual cutting site. No problems were encountered in loading or offloading the equipment. The team moved to the cutting site with security and constructed their FDP. The area to be cut was selected more for the tactical significance than for specific testing of the Harrow. Vegetation in the cut consisted of heavy, dense bamboo, up to 14 Ft. in height, with occasional scrub brush mixed with the bamboo. The soil was a dry and sandy loam.

b. Evaluation: Production for the first day was low because the tractor and harrow became stuck near a ricepaddy area. The harrow was disconnected from the Flow and the D9 was extracted by 2 D7 Rome Flows. Production increased on the second day of operation. A large trace was laid out and the D9 went around the trace for approximately 8 hours resulting in 10 acres for 1 days cutting. The output for the third days cutting was identical to the second days cut. On the fourth cutting day the flow moved into extremely dense bamboo with old stumps remaining from an old logging operation. 4 hours of cutting were completed before the drawbar swivel broke when the front gang carrier struck a large stump. The project was suspended at that time and the equipment returned to Long Binh.

(2) Production: The D9 Disc Harrow average 10 acres for one complete cutting day in heavy bamboo.

(3) Effectiveness: The Harrow was effective in cutting the dense bamboo encountered in the first two days of cutting. The entire plants destroyed and the root structure was damaged. The mechanical adjustments for the offset bar and the drawbar were pre set in the middle positions. The harrow was opened and closed by a hydraulic ram and all cutting was done in the completely opened position. Various settings of this opening were tested, however the maximum opening was the most satisfactory. The tractor was

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(3) Operated in first gear for all cutting due to the density of the vegetation and to the presence of stumps and clay mounds.

(4) Environmental Limitations: The D9 Tractors and Harrow should not be operated near soft wet areas such as rice paddies. When the tractor and harrow are working in a cut with bomb craters or dry stream beds, caution should be used because the plow and harrow would get stuck in an obstacle that would not, normally, be trouble for the Rome Plow operating alone. When the Harrow became stuck a D7 was required to pull the harrow back while the D9 walked out of the ditch. Stumps also provided difficulties in the operation of the disc harrow. Some of the stumps would be pulled out of the ground and become lodged between the two gangs. When this happened the plow operator would try to manipulate the harrow to remove the stump or a second tractor with a winch would snatch the stump out of the harrow.

(5) Maintenance Requirements for the Disc Harrows: The harrow proved to be a rigged piece of machinery. Although the drawbar broke, the harrow was being used in terrain which would be more effectively cleared with Rome Plow blades. The hydraulic system functioned in a satisfactory manner. Lubrication and tightening of nuts was performed after each day's cutting. The nut locks were difficult to remove because the cap screws became rounded, or worn by striking rocks. One difficulty in operating the disc harrow, that was caused by the design of the harrow, was the front gang carrier. The right side of the front gang carrier protruded into the uncut bamboo and would snag large clumps of uncut bamboo scattered throughout the cut. If the right side of the front gang carrier were tapered this operation and they became damaged and bent by stumps. They should be removed for the dry season, and replaced when moist soil conditions require their use.

6. The Overall Evaluation of the Disc Harrow.

a. The Rome Plow Disc Harrow was moderately effective in clearing secondary growth, i.e. dense bamboo.

b. Bomb craters and ditches slow production because extraction of tractor and harrow is time consuming.

c. Stumps became snagged between front and rear gangs and had to be removed.

d. Acreage cut was lower than the acreage the D9 Rome Plow would have accomplished without the harrow.

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e. Conclusions:

(1) The D9 Disc Harrow was effective in cutting heavy bamboo, however the output of the D9 Harrow was approximately 1/2 of the output of the D9 Rome Plow with blade.

(2) Optimum cutting can be accomplished in large flat areas where stumps, gullies, or bomb craters few in number

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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