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AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (7 Feb 72)

DAFD-OTT 711245

15 February 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Depot,
Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

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Verne L. Bowers
 VERNE L. BOWERS
 Major General, USA
 The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY DEPOT CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA-D-CO

20 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

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1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. November 1970: The Depot Property Book Officer conducted a 100% inventory of all MTDA/CTA property on hand in the Depot operating elements and troop units. This action resulted in an overdue updating and verification of the property book and hand receipt accounts. Four guard towers were constructed and positioned along the Depot's west perimeter. Each tower consists of two CONEXES stacked and welded together with firing slots cut in the upper CONEX. The tower is then reveted and sandbagged. The use of these four towers reduced the guard force requirement and improved the security posture on the west perimeter. The Directorate for Quality Assurance established a central turn-in point for depot material eligible for property disposal action. This turn-in point, operated by QA personnel, has improved the Depot PDO program by permitting selective loading, scheduled turn-in, and improved document control. Troop Command, USAF, with HHC and Companies A, B and C was organized effective 6 November 1970 by Hq USAF General Order Number 12, dtd 31 October 1970. This action discontinued the previous Depot provisional Operations Battalion and Support Battalion. Also on this date, the Special Staff Office of Security, Plans and Operations was designated as a directorate. Beginning in November, the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Delivery) rigged a total of 117 short tons of dummy supplies for air drop by container delivery system in conjunction with training requirements of the 483d Tactical Air Wing, Cam Ranh Bay. During the period 22-25 November, the 109th QM Co provided a rigger training team and equipment to train 150 personnel of the 184th Ordnance Battalion, Phu Tai, in helicopter sling load techniques. Also beginning in November, the 109th QM Co was committed to provide three riggers in support of the 5th Special Forces Group's sling load missions at Ban Me Thuot. The company also provided personnel to assist the 67th Engineer Detachment

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in generating oxygen at Ihang Rang AFB. This was due to the inability of the 67th Detachment oxygen plant to meet customer demands. On 13 November the SCRUB team that had been attached to the Receiving Branch of Storage Division departed for CONUS. During their 60 day stay the team identified 3,221 lines for a dollar value of \$441,500; 782 lines were retrograded to Okinawa as CNI. One officer and five enlisted men attended the USARV Dufflebag school at Vung Tau. The purpose of this one week course was to familiarize personnel with the capability and employment of various types of sensor devices.

b. December 1970: Director for Services initiated a program on all 12 ton trailers assigned to the Depot. This greatly reduced the deadline rate of these highly committed trailers. Also the Facilities Division of the directorate initiated an improvement program in the nonperishable warehouse area of the Depot. This included the rebuilding of the subgrade which was eroding under the PSF covering. Later, a laterite and crushed rock hardstand was built throughout the area. US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay was designated the prime depot for the wholesale supply support of II Military Region North, with the closing of USA-D-Quy Nhon. Stock Control Division, Directorate for Supply and Transportation, established a forward Customer Assistance Office and Red Ball Branch at Quy Nhon to effect liaison with the local customers during the phasedown and to continue the expeditious processing of Red Ball requisitions. Stock Control Division also formed a USA/ROKA Liaison Branch at Cam Ranh Bay to provide a central point for assisting ROKA units in receiving proper support from the US Army supply system. An MTDA was submitted requesting authorization for 38 military and six civilian spaces to staff the additional USAD-CRB activities in Quy Nhon and Cam Ranh.

c. January 1971: The Engineer Branch, Facilities Division, Directorate for Services began phasing out. The space authorization for this facility had been blocked; upon completion of pending projects, the following engineer equipment was turned in: six 29M scrapers, one 220 grader, and one 20 ton track mounted crane. The directorate retained one D7E tractor, one bucket loader, and two dump trucks, which were transferred to the Consolidated Motor Pool. On 28 January, the 109th QM Co (AD) was committed by USARV to send one air delivery platoon with air items to USA Support Command, Da Nang in support of Operation Lamson 719/Dewey Canyon. The platoon was further attached to the 101st Airborne Division Support Command and operated from Da Nang, Quang Tri and from forward Logistical Support Activities (LSA). During February and March 1971, over 990 short tons of Class I, III and V supplies were sling loaded to LSA Vandergrif or LSA Khe Sanh. From 8 to 15 February 1971, 10 EM were sent forward to LSA Vandergrif to assist 101st Airborne personnel in sling loading a total of 200 tons of POL in bladders. On 10 February 1971, one officer and

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ten EM were sent from Quang Tri to Da Nang to rig, for airdrop, 965 short tons of Class I, III and V supplies. On 14 February, 14 additional EM were sent to Da Nang from Cam Ranh Bay to assist in the rigging of these supplies. On 15 February, the company at Cam Ranh was directed to rig for airdrop, 125 tons of Class I, III and V supplies as a back-up for those being rigged at Da Nang. All loads at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang utilized the container delivery system. All personnel involved in support of Operation Lamson 719 at Quang Tri and Da Nang returned to the company at Cam Ranh Bay by 17 April 1971. Also during January, the Directorate for Security, Plans and Operations was relocated. The directorate was located in the rear third of a Quonset and the communications section operated from a shop van adjacent to the office. This split operation resulted in an inefficient utilization of administrative and communication personnel which could not be effectively supported with projected personnel losses. Further, the nature of the facility did not lend itself to expansion required to satisfy the Depot responsibility to provide an alternative Joint Defense Operation Center. The new facility met these requirements by providing a Depot Operation Center consolidating the directorate, communication facility, Staff Duty Office, and Depot Training Facility under one roof. Six BES sensor devices were installed on the Depot and were wired to the Operation Center. This system greatly enhanced the passive defense status of the Depot.

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d. February 1971: Plans for the consolidation of all wholesale and retail Class I support at the Depot resulted in the organization of the Subsistence Division, Directorate for Supply and Transportation, effective 16 February. This action combined the Depot's Class I management and wholesale storage functions into one activity, utilizing existing authorized spaces and facilities, and provided a central activity to plan and implement the further consolidation of the facilities operated by the 54th General Support Group with those of the Depot. This period also saw considerable progress in plans for the realignment and consolidation of logistical support functions provided by the Cam Ranh Bay logistical island. The decision to phase out the 54th General Support Group dictated the consolidation of all Class I, II, IV and IX, III and V supply functions and the service function of Self Service Supply Centers, Central Issue Facility, and Clothing and Equipment Exchange Facility under the depot. Goals, sub-goals and completion dates were established by Support Command, with final completion of the consolidation to be effected on 30 July. This plan was later rendered invalid by the USARV directive to phase out the Depot.

e. March 1971: The 68th Engineer Detachment (Gas Generating) and 194th Quartermaster Detachment (Air Delivery and Supply) were inactivated on 15 March by Keystone Robin Charlie (Increment 7). Also the 109th QM Co (AD) was drawn down by 56 spaces to an authorization of 121

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personnel. All equipment was turned in through Keystone channels by 4 March. The 109th QM Co assumed the air item storage and CC and S mission of the 194th QM Det; the 68th Engr Det was not a mission - performing unit so its inactivation did not require a mission re-alignment. During the month of March all nonperishable subsistence items stored in five warehouses were rewarehoused. This project greatly improved the utilization of available storage space, reduced loss through better control of pilferable items, and permitted the later relocation of nonperishables from outside storage to the warehouses. A decision was made by MG Woolwine, USARV, ADCG - Materiel, to phase down the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay to a General Supply Support Activity (GSSA) by 1 July 1971. All present Depot customers would continue to be supported by the GSSA; this activity would become a customer of USAD-Long Binh on 1 July 1971. This decision resulted in the initiation of several implementing actions. A new Activity Address Code - AT 88KE - was created for the GSSA. Replenishment for USAD-CRB was directed into USAD-LBN. A wall-to-wall inventory of the Depot Class IV Yard was completed; this added 1911 additional lines to the ABF and provided ICCV with maximum visibility of ECMY stock. A new 10,333 line ASL was prepared by ICCV for the GSSA; this ASL included 44 lines of Class IV. All dues-out were provided to USAD-LBN. A PR&C was prepared by the USAD Contract Officer Representative to propose that the GSSA be operated under contract to Vinnell Corporation, who presently operates the Depot open and covered storage areas, vehicle park, MHE pool, and care and preservation facility, as well as the Class II & IV DSU. Plans were also initiated to transfer the Unserviceable Property Division, Div for S&T, to the 69th Maintenance Battalion where it would be consolidated into a Cam Ranh CC&S activity. Redistribution instructions were received for all Class VII receipts not on the GSSA ASL, and the closing of the Vehicle Park was planned for 30 June. USARV directed the transfer of the MACV Team Kit mission from USAD-CRB to USAD, LBN effective 15 May 1971.

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f. April 1971: Actions to accomplish the phasedown of the Depot continued. All nonperishable items in open storage were moved to the five warehouse nonperishable complex, thus completing the rewarehousing and consolidation of nonperishable subsistence items. The perishable stock was rewarehoused to provide better freeze and chill space utilization in preparation for the assumption of the retail mission on 15 May. On that date, the USAD Subsistence Division personnel, equipment and facilities will be transferred to the 1st S&S Battalion, 54th GS Group. Also, a separate AAC (AT88JW) was requested and received for Class I items consigned to Cam Ranh Bay.

g. Storage Activities: Significant improvements in the Depot storage areas and procedures were accomplished during this six month period. All outside storage areas between the warehouses were phased

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out and the bulk stock was either retrograded, redistributed in-country or moved to inside storage locations by materiel category. Bin storage was reduced from five to four warehouses; as a result of retrograde, extensive rewarehousing, inventories and continuous location surveys, the number of small bin locations in warehouse 61 was reduced from 18,000 to 7,500 with a significant increase in location accuracy. Also during this period, Vinnell Corporation assumed storage responsibility for industrial gasses, tires, and bulk paint products, with no increase in contract cost. Depot on-hand tonnage decreased from 156,000 ST in January to 110,000 ST in April; MRO's processed during that period averaged 35,000 a month while receipts were processed on an average of 9,000 per month. A cyclic inventory of 41,757 lines was conducted which resulted in a net adjustment of \$29.3 million. Location accuracy improved from 91.5% in January to 95.3% in April. The Depot also became deeply involved in processing equipment turned in through Keystone actions. This included separate receipt, storage and issue procedures for SCRAM 1 and 2 equipment and retrograde or PDO processing for SCRAM 3 and 4 equipment.

2. LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) Computer operation shift hours

a. Observation: Twelve hour shifts in computer operations are excessive and contribute to errors through fatigue.

b. Evaluation: The close and constant attention required of computer operators causes fatigue and increases the probability of errors on twelve hour shifts.

c. Recommendation: That shifts be reduced from twelve to eight hours.

d. Command Action: By utilizing local national operators, shifts were reduced to eight hours, except for key supervisory personnel and in emergency conditions.

(2) Drug amnesty program

a. Observation: The effectiveness of the drug amnesty program in Cam Ranh Bay is reduced because individuals who are released are returned to the same environment that initially contributed to their drug problem.

b. Evaluation: After release from the program, individuals are returned to their unit where they are exposed to the same type of temptations and peer pressures that contributed to their problem.

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c. Recommendation: That upon release they be transferred out of the area, preferably out of country.

(3) Shortage of riggers (MOS 43E)

a. Observation: A critical shortage of assigned riggers affected the efficiency of the 109th QM Co. (AD) mission performance during February through April 1971.

b. Evaluation: A TOE air delivery platoon was attached to USASUPCOM, Da Nang on 28 January 1971 to provide an aerial resupply capability in support of Lanson 719. Due to personnel shortages, the company was almost totally depleted to provide sufficient riggers to perform the mission. Later, the company rear was tasked to rig contingency supplies at Cam Ranh Bay and provide continual resupply support for the detached platoon. As the operation extended, the rear areas security, maintenance, CC&S, air item storage and general housekeeping functions continued to suffer from lack of personnel.

c. Recommendation: That the 109th AM Co. (AD), as the only air delivery company in country, be maintained at full MTOE strength.

(4) Shortage of Stock Control Specialists (MOS 76F)

a. Observation: Stock Control Division experienced a critical shortage of stock control and accounting specialists, MOS 76F, during a two month period of being at 50% strength while assuming the additional support mission for customers in II Military Region North.

b. Evaluation: Mission performance was adversely affected by the critical shortage of personnel. Emphasis was placed on those functions required to move supplies in support of customers. Supporting administrative functions took second priority, resulting in a higher than desirable open-in-stock control and storage document counts, exception processing and lessened customer visitation.

c. Recommendation: That personnel requirements be fully met during periods of increased mission responsibility.

d. Command Action: Emphasis through command channels resulted in assignment of required personnel.

b. INTELLIGENCE:

(1) Guard towers

(a) Observation: A lack of guard towers along the Depot's western perimeter decreased the field of observation and resulted in a requirement

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for six guard posts to adequately cover the area.

b. Evaluation: Two CONEX containers were welded together and stacked to make a twenty-foot tower. Firing positions were cut in the top CONEX and a revetment and a sandbag wall was provided. Four such towers were positioned along the perimeter, two on high elevations, giving a greatly improved field of observation and fire.

c. Recommendation: This type of tower, with wide firing positions, is quick and easy to construct out of salvaged CONEX containers and satisfies the requirement for passive perimeter defense.

d. Command Action: Four such towers were constructed and are manned from 1800 to 0600 hours.

(2) Alarm Set, Anti-Intrusion, Restricted Area, BPS AN/GSQ-134.

a. Observation: The depot installed six BFS sensor devices along its perimeter.

b. Evaluation: The BFS device fully meets the needs of a passive defensive anti-intrusion system for a fixed installation. Due to terrain features and the requirement that the ends of the device not differ in elevation by more than 20 feet, other sensors must be incorporated to provide a continuous, uninterrupted sensor line. Due to the sandy soil at Cam Ranh, it was learned that during periods of high constant wind, the terrain features can be drastically altered by drifting sand. This results in false activations due to varying pressures on the hoses. The sensor can also be activated by animals, therefore, the sensor field must be protected by barrier fields. Sensor activation reaction plans, must be made to provide proper and rapid action when activation patterns are received. Also, the annunciators must be continuously monitored and tested by trained personnel.

c. Recommendation: That BFS sensors be employed where terrain features permit. Reaction plans must include appropriate actions to be taken upon sensor activation. Trained personnel, rather than rotating guards, should monitor the annunciators.

d. Command Action: Above recommendations have been implemented. USAD is awaiting MCLD sensors to complete the present sensor line.

(3) Perimeter Lighting:

a. Observation: Lighting is an essential requirement for effective passive defense.

b. Evaluation: The absence of lighting on the west perimeter decreases the effectiveness of the guard towers in that area.

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c. Recommendation: That protective lighting be provided for installation.

d. Command Action: Job Order Request was submitted by this headquarters on 19 Dec 70. The request was combined with other similar requirements by USASUFCOM-CRB and forwarded to USARV as an MCA project on 12 Feb 71.

(4) Use of Nung Guards

a. Observation: USAD hired four female Nung guards to improve the security control program relating to local national female employees.

b. Evaluation: Previously, WAC personnel had performed the personal security inspections of LN employees. Upon the reassignment of the WAC's, four Nung females were hired to perform this function. Within a short time it was apparent that they were well trained and qualified in performing personal inspections of the LNs as they processed through the Depot checkpoint at the beginning and end of the work day. Pilferage has noticeably decreased.

c. Recommendation: That Nung females continue to be employed to perform inspections of local national employees.

d. Command Actions: NA

(5) Security Guard Platoon

a. Observation: USAD-CRB requires full-time, trained security guards to control depot access and cargo movement.

b. Evaluation: The Depot MTDA authorizes a Security Guard Company; this unit was placed under another command by USASUFCOM to perform a higher priority installation security mission, and the Depot's authority to requisition against or to fill these spaces was blocked. However, the nature of the Depot dictates a need for defensive security and internal access control. Further, CO, USAD was designated as Ground Defense Coordinator for Sub Sector IIC. Part of this responsibility is to supervise a 42 man nightly guard force. Because of these requirements, the Depot established a provisional security guard platoon of one officer and 37 enlisted men. The personnel assigned to the platoon, therefore, must either be carried against Depot MTDA spaces or charged as excess.

c. Recommendation: That one officer and 37 enlisted spaces be unblocked and returned to the Depot to constitute an authorized Security Guard platoon.

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d. **Command Action:** A letter request was submitted to USASUPCOM-CRB in December identifying the required spaces by paragraph and line and justifying each space requested.

c. OPERATIONS

(1) PDO Collection Point

a. **Observation:** Considerable material eligible for PDO had been accumulating at various locations within the Depot. In many instances, Depot activities had loads turned back by PDO personnel because of improper documentation, mixed loads, or no turn-in appointment.

b. **Evaluation:** A Depot SOP was published which requires material eligible for PDO to be turned in to a central collection point operated by Directorate for Quality Assurance. At this point the material is separated by type which allows for minimum mixed loads. In addition, QA insures that proper documentation is present with material.

c. **Recommendation:** Centralized turn-in of PDO material has allowed for considerable savings to the government through lessened transportation and manpower requirements. This procedure should be continued until phaseout of the Depot.

d. **Command Action:** The collection point has proved successful and will be continued.

(2) 6NA Exceptions

a. **Observation:** The level of 6NA exceptions at this depot has been consistently high, reflecting a large quantity of assets which are not available for issue.

b. **Evaluation:** Previous programs used to reconcile 6NA's by physical inventory have proved largely ineffective for the following reasons:

(1) The 3SVII system-supplied programs (S160V series) produce a large initial burden to ICO. This results in a long waiting period in getting the results of inventory back into the system files. Combined with the length of time required to run the full series of programs, a time delay of about two weeks may result. During this period, enough new 6NA's are produced to offset the ones reconciled in inventory.

(2) A series of programs developed in this office to implement a cyclic (freeze) inventory also failed to reduce the 6NA count. This is mainly because 6NA's continued to develop at a rate high enough to offset the number reconciled by inventory.

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c. Recommendation: Programs are required that will allow ICO to inventory 6NA exceptions as they are created. The results from such inventory (DBA and ZLI cards) must be input into the system with a minimum of time delay.

d. Command Action: A program for daily 6NA reconciliation (V7328) has been obtained from Long Binh Depot. Consultation with Storage has resulted in a daily schedule to implement the program. Cards were initially outputted on 24 April 1971 and the effects should be visible by 31 May 71.

(3) Data Processing Tape Library

a. Observation: Scheduling and tape library operations have been neglected in favor of actual machine operations. This has resulted in poor overall thru-put due to numerous errors in Library identification, retention of magnetic tapes, failure to clean magnetic tapes on a cyclic basis, lost computer time due to faulty tape files, and inefficient and disjointed scheduling of computer operations.

b. Evaluation: Scheduling the use of computer time is an extremely important part of computer operations. It is much less visible than other parts, however, and tends to be largely ignored in the press of everyday operations. Tape Library Management is a very necessary part of ADP housekeeping operations. Unless data files are properly maintained, there is incomplete information to process. Scratch files are either erroneously or insufficiently made available for operations and the life expectancy of magnetic tape is severely reduced due to lack of tape maintenance and cleaning.

c. Recommendations: Personnel be authorized for scheduling and the tape library sections; each section consisting of one NCO and two EM, MOS 74E.

d. Command Action: The recommendations have been implemented at the expense of other authorized positions.

(4) PPA Requisition Card Files

a. Observations: PPA requisition card files at Nha Trang, Ihan Rang, RBD-CRB, and Air Force were much outdated and had inaccurate stock numbers, units of issue and prices.

b. Evaluation: Requisitioning and accounting would be much simpler and less chances for mistakes would be realized if these card files were updated.

c. Recommendations: That the PPA requisition card files for each of these units be updated.

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d. **Command Action:** DEU was asked to print out four new sets of IPA cards from which a new IPA card file for each of these four Class I supply points was constructed and distributed along with an Authorized Stockage List.

(5) Cam Ranh Bay Class I Activity Address Code

a. **Observations:** Milvans and Sealand vans delivered to Class I Storage areas contained loads consisting of mixed classes of supplies since all supplies delivered to USAD-CRB had an Activity Address Code (AAC) of AT8150. Class I does not have the equipment and facilities to handle anything other than subsistence supplies.

b. **Evaluation:** The use of a separate AAC would eliminate shipment of Class I with mixed loads on Milvans and Sealand vans. Cargo would be delivered direct to Class I storage areas lessening the receipt time, amount of handling and perhaps reduce pilferage.

c. **Recommendation:** That a new AAC be established for Class I requisitioned for Cam Ranh Bay.

d. **Command Action:** A request submitted to ICCV resulted in the assigning of AT88JW as the CRB Class I AAC.

(6) Pilferage of Class I

a. **Observations:** An increased traffic load through Class I areas contributed to pilferage of subsistence, particularly MCI's, PIR's and sundries, which were stored in Warehouse 83.

b. **Evaluation:** Closer control of traffic, fencing off the un-perishable storage area, and moving more highly pilferable items to a more secure warehouse would reduce pilferage.

c. **Recommendations:** That pilferable items be rewarehoused into warehouse 82 which was more secure than warehouse 83, concertine barriers be constructed around warehouses, and that disciplinary action be taken against offenders.

d. **Command Action:** Recommendations were implemented, and pilferage was greatly reduced.

(7) Overaged MCI's

a. **Observations:** Customers have called and complained about overaged MCI's. These customers claimed that these MCI's had too old a date of pack and that they had expired. These and other MCI's do in fact

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have an overaged original date of pack but they were kept in Cold Storage for several years and the age of these MCI's does not start until they are taken out of Cold Storage. There is a tag on these pallets stating this and the date they were taken out.

b. Evaluation: Customers either failed to read these tags or were not informed of this and did not believe the tag.

c. Recommendations: That all military units having Class I functions be informed of the situation and the condition of these MCI's.

d. Command Action: All units drawing MCI's from Class I, USAD-CRB have been notified and informed that there is nothing wrong with the MCI's that they are not to be aged except from the time they are removed from Cold Storage, and that this date is marked on the pallet.

(8) Inspection and Certification of Retrograde Items

a. Observation: There have been numerous incidents of hazardous items being discovered in materiel shipped offshore from CRB.

b. Evaluation: This indicated a lack of understanding of guidelines as established in DA and USARV regulations and a general laxity on the part of all concerned with the retrograde program.

c. Recommendation: To provide better guidelines to insure that all personnel concerned with the retrograde program become thoroughly knowledgeable with requirements for the retrograding of materiel.

d. Command Action: To insure compliance with current retrograde regulations, a detailed SOP was developed to provide repetitive checks to insure perpetuation of inspections, certification and accuracy of manifests.

(9) DD Form 66, Report of Packaging and Handling Deficiencies

a. Observation: UPD has been receiving numerous DD Forms 6, Report of Packaging and Handling Deficiencies, from various CONUS Depots.

b. Evaluation: Many of these deficiencies were valid, others were not valid; in addition, most of the deficiencies occurred more than six months prior to receipt of deficiency report. However all deficiencies were evaluated objectively.

c. Recommendations: A meeting was held between all personnel in UED associated with retrograde of materiel. Each and every deficiency was discussed and evaluated to insure compliance with all retrograde instructions in order to prevent reoccurrences of noted deficiencies.

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d. Command Action: Personnel in the Signal, Armament and Packing and Crating Sections of UPD have been instructed to insure that all items to be retrograded are properly secured, blocked and braced to prevent damage upon shipment. Additionally, all engines prior to acceptance must be properly drained and secured in the container provided by the turning-in unit. Personnel at the pier facilities have been instructed to insure that all items are properly prepared for retrograde in accordance with current regulations and the retrograde SOP developed by UPD.

(10) Processing Time for Retrograde Shipment of Small Items

a. Observation: Due to the large amount of equipment being turned in and processed at UPD under the Keystone program an excessive workload was created in order to handle, pack and store equipment.

b. Evaluation: Considerable time was being utilized in order to construct boxes or containers for the numerous small items being processed through UPD at one time. This consumes work hours as well as usage of lumber required to store and ship other items.

c. Recommendations: That considerable time and labor would be saved if items could be received, stored and shipped by utilizing conexes instead of wooden boxes. This process would alleviate the handling, storage and boxing problems.

d. Command Action: For all large volumes of small items received at UPD every effort will be made to utilize conexes to expedite handling, packing and shipment time.

(11) Red Ball Processing

a. Observation: During the early part of the reporting period reduced strength combined with an almost doubled workload and the receipt of requisitions in a new format caused some delay in processing of requisitions.

b. Evaluation: Receipt of two cards for V1 V2 Red Ball requisitions presented a particular control, processing and recording problem. Material Release Orders were initially prepared manually. Some V1 cards were received without matching V2 cards and vice versa, and many were received in incorrect or garbled format.

c. Recommendation: That additional personnel be assigned to Red Ball Branch and mechanized programs be developed to sort all incoming cards, to prepare listings of all Red Ball requisitions, and to print Materiel Release Orders mechanically.

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d. **Command Action:** Recommendations were implemented and resulted in decreasing the RBX processing time by 50% and increasing the rate of referral fill from 65% to 79%.

(12) Locator Survey/Cyclical Inventory

a. **Observation:** ABF inaccuracies resulted in warehouse denials, inaccurate replenishment data and reduced customer support.

b. **Evaluation:** Although many locator surveys had been completed, a cyclical inventory had not been conducted in the history of USAD-CRB.

c. **Recommendation:** That a cyclical inventory be conducted.

d. **Command Action:** In a three part program, a master locator survey was conducted, being completed in the month of January. A complete cyclical inventory was then initiated and completed in April. Reconciliation of accumulated 6NA (locations on file but no assets recorded) is currently in process. Initial results have been to raise the locator accuracy to 95% and gain visibility of \$68 million of stocks, with a net inventory adjustment of \$29 million. Also, problem areas were uncovered in AMDF-ABF catalog data, such as disparity in unit price, unit of issue and FSN. A program was initiated within Document Processing Branch to correct unit price and unit of issue by checking FSN's on Inventory Reconciliation listing against AMDF and processing corrections to the ABF.

(13) Bin Replenishment Action

a. **Observation:** A large quantity of boxes were shipped from the BY open storage area to Warehouse 61 without documentation. Due to the increase of items requiring disposition through C&P, PDO and items qualifying as CHI, it was apparent that a more suitable method for processing MRO's along with the material for items which cannot be issued in bulk quantities, would reduce the number of broken crates in the BY Complex and facilitate MRO processing.

c. **Recommendation:** All stock being shipped between warehouses must have the MRO attached to the materiel. Upon receipt of materiel from the BY Complex, a new location should be established for the remainder of the stock after the MRO has been filled. This would further decrease the amount of broken crates requiring processing through C&P. It would also reduce the flow of MRO's to the bulk storage area that could be processed by the bin warehouses.

d. **Command Action:** The bin replenishment procedures were implemented resulting in improved MRO processing, more efficient storage procedures in the BY bulk storage area, and more effective replenishment of bin location.

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(14) MRO Open In Storage Suspense File

a. Observation: Open in storage procedures between Dir for Data Processing, Storage Document Control (SDC) and Storage Operators were inefficient and resulted in double handling of documentation.

b. Evaluation: Procedures called for Data Processing to provide "999" cards to SDC with the MRO's. These cards constituted the open in storage suspense file; when the #2 copy of the MRO was returned to SDC from the warehouse, SDC matched it up with the corresponding "999" card and forwarded the package to Data Processing, who matched the "999" card with the MRO card and put the ARO card to cycle.

c. Recommendation: That the "ARO" card be provided to SDC and used in lieu of the "999" card.

d. Command Action: Recommendation implemented, resulting in a reduction in handling and processing time and correspondingly fewer errors.

(15) APO Shipping Procedures

a. Observation: Procedures used to ship Class II and IX items to customers through the APO system resulted in backlogs at the APO and damage to stock.

b. Evaluation: APO mail items of less than three cube and 70 pounds were placed in CONEXES and delivered to the local APO, where they were unloaded and each box mailed separately. The post office could not handle the volume generated, thus creating a shipping backlog, and the double handling caused damage to the boxes.

c. Recommendation: That all shipments for a customer be placed in mail bags which would be expeditiously processed through the APO directly to the customer.

d. Command Action: This system was initiated in March and has greatly improved the processing of APO shipments to customers.

(16) Coordination Between Detached Air Delivery Platoon and Company Headquarters

a. Observation: One air delivery platoon, 109th AM Co (AD) was attached to US/SUECOM-Da Nang in support of Lam Son 719. All air item support for this detached platoon's mission accomplishment was provided by the company at Cam Ranh Bay.

b. Evaluation: All requests for additional air items or resupply of air items initiated by the air delivery platoon leader had to be

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routed through USASUECOM-DNG to USASUECOM-CRB and then to the company. This tended to increase the response time in providing required air items.

c. Recommendation: That an air delivery platoon, when detached from its parent unit, be authorized to coordinate directly with company headquarters for resupply of air items. The company would then initiate the request for a CE or SMAR to expeditiously transport the required items. The authority for such requests should be provided for in the applicable USARV operation plan and in the message directing the detachment of the platoon.

(17) Phasedown of USAD-Qui Nhon

a. Observation: The lack of detailed planning to accomplish an orderly phasedown and closure of the US Army Depot at Qui Nhon has had a detrimental effect on the units remaining the II MR North. The average of 50% zero balance of ASL stocks at USAD-CRB, coupled with limited transportation capability and longer supply lines, have contributed to a shortage of materials in all areas except ammunitions, subsistence and POL.

b. Evaluation: Initial planning to establish an optimum phasedown plan for closing the depot and continuing support for customers in the field would require immediate action to determine units to be placed on stand down versus units remaining in the area. Since the decisions to close has been made and the units placed in a stand down status is known, planning could proceed as follows:

1. Obtain ASL for non-stand down customers, prepare computer program to stratify both ASL and fringe demands based on the most current five month period for non-stand down customers.

2. Develop a 60 day operating level based on the current demand stratification and provide automatic distribution of stocks to customers. Do not depend on the customer to request 60 day overstockage. This will provide continuity for an interim period, and will prevent major units from experiencing extreme material shortage as is now evidenced by the 1st ROK Logistics Support Group, ROK Tiger Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade.

3. Terminate non-stand down customers immediately and realign them with remaining depots.

4. Terminate stand down customers without delay and satellite them on remaining DSU/GSU activities and depots. Stand down units would turn in all assets through remaining DSU/GSU's and remaining depots to fill

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dues-out and replenish required stocks. This method would have prevented USAD-QNH from having to dispose of station returns at a later date that were previously held as stock.

5. Transfer ABF and dues-out files to gaining depot without delay. Prepare computer program to match remaining assets against theater dues-out and theater ASL after first insuring that the most current R/O update possible has been accomplished. Reject MRO's for all items not matching the above criteria as retrograde excess for immediate shipment to Okinawa and/or Conus depots. Reject MRO's for allotments matching theater ASL and/or theater dues-out (dues-out would prevail over TASL). A feature would be written into the program to interrogate R/O balance to prevent overstockage in theater Depots with residue being rejected for automatic redistribution to Okinawa and/or Conus depots.

6. In order to obtain maximum utilization of available manpower and equipment, the phasedown programs would be keyed to position 60 of the 3S ABF which will select material for shipment by classes of supply. This method could insure selection of high tonnage items on a gradual basis and allow for prior planning of transportation and material handling equipment. Employing this method would allow for gradual phasedown and prohibit a mass attempt at disposal of stocks. Disposal of stocks would be scheduled as follows:

PHASE	CLASS OF SUPPLY
1	VII
2	IV
3	IX
4	II
5	III

7. The program developed to screen for theater ASL and theater fringe would be run as each phase is implemented and would key on position 60 of the ABF.

7. By transferring the ABF immediately after the decision has been made to close a depot, management and stock control personnel would be deployed into storage locations to improve inventory and location accuracy which would serve to establish and maintain a better data base.

c. Recommendation: That the considerations presented in b above be included in the initial plans for closedown of overseas depots.

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(18) Inter-Depot Communications During Phasedown

a. Observation: Probably the most difficult problem in the phasedown of the QNH Depot was that of telephonic and transceiver communication.

b. Evaluation: Requests were made to install "hot lines" from Stock Control, USAD-CRB to Stock Control, USAD-QNH but approval was never received. Normal telephone communication was so involved and frequently took so long that important information was not received on time, if at all. Important actions were taking place unknown by one or the other of the parties involved. Misinformation and misunderstanding were routine, causing duplication of effort or no action being taken at all. Telecommunication was inadequate to meet the sudden increased requirements. Frequently documents were carried to the transceiver site but were never received at the other end. These problems were especially noticeable in the Red Ball Branch where there is a maximum processing time for a given requisition. Initially there was a misunderstanding by the customer and he was mailing Red Ball Requisitions from the QNH area to USAD-CRB. Mailing time is frequently 10 - 14 days. This automatically invalidated these requisitions which can't be over 48 hours old when received at this depot. When the requisitions were transceived the backlog created prevented them from reaching their destination within the 48 hours time frame. Frequently they were never received for reasons which were never discovered. The header card which identifies the contents of a particular transceiver batch was incomplete or nonexistent. The result was that cards were frequently picked up by the wrong person and erroneously processed through normal cycles or were set aside and never delivered to the proper sections.

c. Recommendation: Recommend that a request for additional transceiver capability and telephone communication be initiated and approved well in advance of the requirement so that they can be operational before a crisis situation develops.

d. ORGANIZATION

(1) Mission Capability of the 109th QM Co (AD)

a. Observation: Under Keystone, the 109th QM Co was reduced from 177 to 121 spaces, which equated to a loss of one of its three air drop platoons. The TOE capability of one platoon is to rig 50 ST of supplies per day.

b. Evaluation: Under the same Keystone increment, the 194th QM Det (ADS) was inactivated. The mission of the unit was to provide direct, general, and depot support maintenance and surveillance inspection for Army air delivery and personnel parachute equipment in Vietnam, to operate the air item storage facility at USAD-CRB, and to provide for the salvage and offshore shipment of air items. This mission was assumed by the

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109th QM Company in addition to its TOE mission; with this additional mission the 109th is unable to organize two air drop platoons and rig 100 ST a day.

g. Recommendation: Present planning may affect the future status of the 109th. Until their status is clarified, the unit will continue to perform both missions under its present MTOE. However, higher headquarters should be cognizant of their reduced rigging capability (see also 2a (3)).

d. Command Action: If the 109th QM Company remains at Cam Ranh Bay with its present missions, an MTOE will be submitted to reflect the present organization of one air drop and one supply and service platoon.

(2) TAADS Processing

a. Observation: The mission, organization and functions of the Depot have undergone continual changes during this period and changes will continue to occur.

b. Evaluation: During the past six months six changes to the Depot MTDAs have been submitted or prepared to be submitted during May. These changes reflect proponent or Support Command directed changes. One such change reflected the assumption of the prime depot mission in II MR North. By the time this document was forwarded to USARV and returned approved, the close-out of USAD-QNH was completed and different plans had been developed for II MR North. A need for a new detailed TDA has existed throughout the reporting period but the rapid changes and plans for the phasedown of the Depot negated the validity of pursuing the preparation of such a document.

g. Recommendation: That USARV be given the authority to approve authorization changes for their subordinate commands or that such changes be processed to DA by message. The TAADS system is too slow to keep up with the rapidly changing situation during this period of force reduction.

(3) Troop Command

a. Observation: Prior to November, the Troop organization of the Depot consisted of two provisional battalions. Support Battalion (Prov) consisted of HHC, Co B, Property Disposal Company, 109th QM Company and the 194th QM Detachment. The Director for Services was also the battalion commander. Operations Battalion (Prov), commanded by the Director for S&T, consisted of Companies C, D, E and F. The Depot TDA authorizes a Troop Command with four companies. The provisional organization was implemented because the size of the organization was too large to provide effective command control with four companies with over 300 men each.

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b. **Evaluation:** Hq USAD GO Number 12, dtd 31 Oct 70, organized Troop Command with HHC and companies A, B, C and the 109th QM Company, effective 6 November. This change was made possible by the reduced troop strength and provided a linear chain of command from the Depot Commander to one troop commander. The paragraphs of the Depot MTDA were allocated among each of the four companies as follows: HHC - 01 to 01C, 02, 03 to 03B, 05 to 05D, 06 to 06Q, 07P to 07S, 08 to 08A; Co A - 06R to 07A, 07J to 07O, 08B; Co B - 04 to 04I, 08C; Co C - 07B to 07I, 08D. This allocation insured that all units would be relatively equal in size and that most sections of a directorate would be assigned to one company.

g. **Recommendation:** That the TDA Troop Command organization be continued.

e. **TRAINING**

(1) **Use of Riggers to Perform Sling Load Missions**

a. **Observation:** The 109th QM Company was frequently committed to provide riggers to perform sling load missions. This is the only air delivery company in Vietnam and, coupled with a shortage of assigned riggers, the unit's ability to perform its rigging mission on short notice was significantly affected by the detachment of additional riggers. This was particularly evident on Lam Son 719.

b. **Evaluation:** Although sling loading recently came under the purview of the rigger field, the job does not necessitate rigger qualified personnel. The detachment of riggers to perform these functions reduces the unit's capability to effectively perform its primary mission, particularly while it is already short of personnel.

c. **Recommendation:** That riggers train personnel of units with a sling load requirement rather than being attached to perform this function.

(2) **Job Performance of Stock Managers**

a. **Observation:** Job performance by newly assigned stock management personnel is below standard's.

b. **Evaluation:** Newly assigned personnel lacked the formal training required to perform their assigned duties in middle management in sustaining the wholesale supply system. 90% of personnel assigned as managers lacked the knowledge to function under the automated supply system and as a result further compounded problems in an already turbulent logistics system. Functional areas began to show the need for additional training at an early stage; the most significant areas were the manager's

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ability to readily process customers requisitions and maintain a correct data base under the automated supply system. The majority of middle management personnel's knowledge of the existing supply system was so limited that they were of little or no help at all upon introduction to their assigned duties.

g. Recommendation: The curriculum for the Stock Control and Accounting Specialist and supervisors must be modified and extended in time to allow for sufficient training. Any subsequent reassignments of personnel must be into areas where they can perform duties commensurate with their training and capabilities developed through experience.

d. Command Action: Formal and informal training was scheduled and conducted by Stock Control Division to familiarize management personnel in an alien system and to sustain current operations of supporting customers in the field taxed capabilities to the maximum and extended time requirements beyond normal requirements to accomplish such missions outside a combat area.

(3) Cross Training

a. Observation: Due to rapid personnel turn over, drops in DEROS, administrative absences, such as leave and R&R, and personnel shortages, personnel in each duty section must be cross trained to the maximum extent possible.

b. Evaluation: Effective cross training allows a work section to produce with minimum loss of efficiency when personnel rotate or are on administrative absence.

c. Recommendation: That all depot work elements and troop units continue to emphasize a cross training program, particularly during this period of Depot phasedown and lack of replacement personnel.

d. Command Action: USAD will continue to provide command emphasis to cross training and on-the-job training.

f. LOGISTICS

(1) Technical Inspection of 12 Ton S&P Trailers

a. Observation: All of the trailers on hand were in bad condition due to constant use and lack of maintenance.

b. Evaluation: All trailers are under the control for movement by the Transportation Management Division, Director for Supply and Transportation. Due to urgent commitments, the trailers were continuously

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utilized and moved from one location to another without regular monthly services being performed. To preclude further deterioration of the trailer fleet, it was decided to form a mobile Technical Inspection team and inspect trailers located in the various Depot areas. As a result of this thorough inspection, many missing parts were placed on requisition, trailers completely serviced and others deadlined for short periods until all faults were corrected. The Depot now has a serviceable fleet of trailers capable of moving the required tonnage.

c. Recommendation: That all 12 ton trailers be inspected for serviceability on a monthly basis.

d. Command Action: The Consolidated Motor Pool conducts monthly inspections of all Depot trailers.

(2) Improvement of Storage Area Roadways

a. Observation: The work areas in the nonperishable warehouse area were in poor condition and precluded the deficient utilization of MIE.

b. Evaluation: Poor subgrade materiel previously used under the PSP was rapidly being washed away by monsoon rains and heavy traffic. As a result the PSP began to break loose and curl under the ends. This caused impassable roads and was tearing up the pneumatic tires on commercial forklifts. The PSP was eventually removed and an all weather roadway was constructed with 200 cubic feet of crushed rock and 800 cubic feet of laterite.

c. Recommendation: As other PSP areas deteriorate that they be replaced with a similar road system.

d. Command Action: The Depot no longer possesses the engineer capability to perform this work. Assistance will be requested through AC of S, Services as required.

(3) IBM Interpreters

a. Observation: A continual problem existed in the input/output section of data processing due to card output not being interpreted prior to cards being distributed to the customer.

b. Evaluation: This problem was caused by the daily break down of the two IBM interpreters.

c. Recommendation: That the machines be replaced.

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d. **Command Action:** Requisition was placed with IBM for two replacement machines are expected to arrive from CONUS in June.

(4) IBM Verifiers

a. **Observation:** Constant downtime on certain verifiers was caused by outdated and worn out equipment.

b. **Evaluation:** The electrical systems of certain machines was outdated.

c. **Recommendation:** That these verifiers be replaced by later models with electronic printed circuit boards.

d. **Command Action:** Four new model verifiers were received from USAD-Qui Nhon when they phased out. Obsolete models were returned to IBM Corp.

3. COMMUNICATIONS: Depot Operation Center (DOC)

(1) Observation: As Ground Defense Coordinator for Sub Section IIC, CO, USAD is responsible to operate a station in designated radio nets and to provide for the alternate Joint Defense Operation Center.

(2) Evaluation: The existing DOC consisted of a third of quonset and a converted expandable shop van. This split operation did not provide the required flexibility for expansion, and did not permit the combining and cross training of the administrative and communications sections of the Directorate for Security, Plans and Operations. The projected loss of communications personnel dictated the co-location of the operation. A more suitable physical facility was required to permit the establishment of a DOC/JDOC. To accomplish this, the DOC was relocated to a full quonset which was restructured to provide suitable work space for the office of the director, communication section, staff duty office and Depot conference and training room. All radio and switchboard equipment was removed from the radio van and installed in a specially constructed operator's console. A fifty pair cable was prewired to a distribution box on the rear of the console; this cable terminated in a field expedient junction box which was positioned on the periphery of the Depot headquarters area. All telephone and sensor lines were terminated in this junction box rather than being brought through the headquarters area to the DOC. A 35 foot telephone pole was installed adjacent to the DOC for use as an FM antenna mast. Four RC-292 antenna heads were installed on the pole. The primary power source was AC, with four 24 volt DC batteries wired in series to a circuit to provide automatic back-up power on loss of primary power. An 18,000 BTU air conditioner was procured for the radio room. The DOC/alternate JDCO was completed with the provision of required maps, SOE's and radio and switchboard net diagrams.

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(3) Recommendation: That administrative personnel assigned to Dir for SP&O be cross trained as radio room operators to provide maximum flexibility in the DOC.

(4) Command Action: Cross training and formal OJT receive continued emphasis. All assigned personnel are qualified to operate the DOC Radio Room.

h. MATERIEL: Plastic Bonding Materiel

(1) Observation: Nonperishable subsistence has been received banded with plastic banding. The ends of this banding materiel are difficult to seal; as a result cases slip and pallets tend to lean.


(2) Evaluation: Many additional man hours must be expended in rebanding and repalletizing.

(3) Recommendation: That a better method of sealing be used or the use of plastic banding be discontinued.

(4) Command Action: One request was submitted through transportation channels and one to USARV Subsistence that this type of banding be discontinued.

i. OTHER: None

1 Incl
Organization Chart


WILLIAM F. MADIGAN
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

18 AUG 1971

AVCA GO-P (24 July 1971) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the US Army
Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, for the Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay,
APO 96312

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by the
US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay for the period ending 30 April
1971 is forwarded.

2. Reference paragraph 2 a (2): When individuals are re-
leased from the Drug Amnesty Program, they will be given an
opportunity to return to their old unit or to another unit
within the command, providing their MOS is compatible with
the unit's requirements. Transfer to another unit can con-
ceivably reduce peer pressure; however, the temptation (ie.
availability of drugs) remains regardless where he is tran-
sferred in Vietnam.

3. Reference paragraph 2b (5): The Depot's need for a se-
curity guard platoon no longer exists because of the phase
down/reduction of the Depot. The request for the security
platoon has been cancelled.

4. Reference paragraph 2 d (1): The present mission of
the 109th QM Company does not warrant an MTOE change, and
none will be submitted.

5. Concur with the basic report as modified by this ind-
orsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

John H. Anderson
JOHN H. ANDERSON
ACG
1971

- 1 Incl

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AVHDO-DO (20 May 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Cam
Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 5 OCT 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-FD,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters except as indicated below:

a. Reference item concerning "Inspection and Certification of Retrograde Items," page 12, paragraph 2c(8): Nonconcur. DA and USARV regulations are very explicit concerning the inspection of retrograde material for hazardous items. Paragraph 3b(4) of Annex F to USARV OPLAN 183 (U) states: "Insure that all ammunition is removed from vehicles, weapons, and other major items of equipment (AR 746-1). The commander of the unit turning in equipment to the processing locations will insure that all ammunition, ammunition components, explosives, trash, caked mud, human remains, fuel, lubrication, coolants, and other extraneous materials have been removed in accordance with AR 746-1 and USARV Reg 750-33. The responsibility to certify that the vehicle has been inspected and is free from all items reflected on the USARV Form 563 (App II, USARV Reg 750-33) will not be delegated by the commander of the unit being processed at the Keystone Processing locations." It is agreed that there is a general laxity on the part of all concerned, especially those commissioned and warrant officers who sign the certificates stating that the material is free of hazardous items. In a number of cases this amounts to signing a false certificate. Nonconcur in Recommendation: The guidelines, as explained above, are very specific. The necessary publications are available. This is a point of interest of the Inspection and Assistance (I&A) Team during their monthly visits to the retrograde facilities. The fault lies at the unit commanders, retrograde facility commander level. These individuals must insure that the appropriate regulations are followed. Disciplinary action should be considered in cases of gross negligence. The I&A Team will continue to call this area to the attention of the necessary commanders. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Shortage of Stock Control Specialists (MOS 76P)," page 6, paragraph 2a(4): Nonconcur. Assignments of enlisted personnel are made to each of the major commands on a fair and equitable basis. It would appear that the imbalance of personnel assigned to US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, may be due to the distribution of replacement assets received by USASUPCOM-CRB. Currently, USASUPCOM-CRB is at 150 percent of their authorized strength in MOSC 76P. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.


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GPOP-FD (20 May 71) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ US Army Depot,
Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 JAN 1972

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl

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US ARMY DEPOT, CAM RANH BAY



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UNCLASSIFIED

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