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CIVIL AFFAIRS
IN KOREA 1950-51

By
C. Darwin Stolzenbach
Henry A. Kissinger

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ORO abstract

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN KOREA 1950-51

by

C. Darwin Stolzenbach
Henry A. Kissinger

Army experience in Korea demonstrates, as it has elsewhere, the need for preparedness in the handling of civil affairs. Unique in some respects, the experience does reflect aspects of the problems likely to be encountered elsewhere.

The study of civil affairs operations in Korea, conducted by ORO in 1951, reveals the following:

- (1) The need to negotiate civil affairs agreements during the early stages of conflict, providing those controls over the internal affairs of the combat areas that are necessary to attain the military and political objectives.
- (2) The inseparability of military command and civil affairs responsibilities, and the importance of both a single focus of responsibility within the Army for all civil affairs functions, and a single point of contact within the Army for relationships with governments of the operational areas.
- (3) The need for officers qualified in civil affairs functions, including officers skilled in the language of the area.
- (4) The need to alert commanders and other military personnel to the importance of civil affairs in attaining military and political objectives.

Further studies of the Korean experience are recommended in order to provide more information for the guidance of future civil affairs operations.

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1950-51,

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NOTE ON THE USE OF CERTAIN TERMS

The term civil affairs has been used in this memorandum to designate the range of Army activities in Korea that require relations with indigenous civil authorities. In the large portion of Korea to the rear of corps boundaries these relations are primarily of a liaison or advisory character - although there have been instances in which Army personnel found it necessary to assert de facto authority over local civil officials or civilians. In corps areas it appears to be the general rule that commanders exercise what authority is necessary over Korean officials. In the small area north of the 38th parallel occupied by UN troops, any authority exercised by Koreans is discretionary with the commander - in essence a military government type of relationship.

The term CA/MG (Civil Affairs and Military Government), is used to designate the range of functions associated with it in current Army doctrine (FM 27-5).

The term civil assistance has been used with reference to certain units so designated by the Eighth US Army Korea and charged with certain civil affairs-type responsibilities. Its use generally has been avoided on the ground that it does not embrace all the activities considered to be the subject for investigation in this study.

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SUMMARY

PURPOSE

This memorandum is based on a field study of civil affairs in Korea. Its purpose is to identify current problems facing the Army in the conduct of civil affairs and military government (CA/MG).

BACKGROUND

Wherever United States military forces have been engaged within the past decade, responsibility for the execution of occupation policies and relief measures has devolved upon the Army. Korea in 1950-51 was no exception.

The Eighth US Army entered Korea in 1950 without organization or plan for the kind of civil affairs operations it was eventually required to perform.

Within one year it was engaged in civil affairs on such a scale as to call for an organization of over 400 personnel (officers, enlisted men, and civilian specialists). It was responsible for programming and supervising the distribution of over 150 million dollars (annually) of civilian economic aid and of an equal or greater amount of aid for common civilian-military purposes.

It faced the necessity of coordinating its efforts with those of other US and UN agencies having independent channels of communication with higher authorities, and of daily negotiations with officials of the Korean Government at both national and local levels.

DISCUSSION

The decision to examine these activities was based upon the assumption that civil affairs in Korea, while possibly unique in

some respects, would reflect not only many of the problems common to all military effort but to some extent the Army's present capabilities for meeting CA/MG problems.

This memorandum attempts to draw the important lessons from one CA/MG experience, relate these to the special features of the particular situation, and point up their relevance for future Army planning in this field. The findings represent conditions as they were up to the end of September 1951.

These findings are concerned with the objectives, policies and programs of civil affairs in Korea, with the organization of Army and other agencies engaged in civil affairs, and with the personnel assigned to civil affairs functions.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The inseparability of the military and political components of modern warfare was clearly demonstrated by the recent experience of the Army in Korea.
 2. The experience of the Army in Korea further demonstrates that responsibility for substantial CA/MG functions tends to devolve upon the Army wherever it is engaged in combat operations.
 3. Policy direction tended to lag behind events, preventing the field commanders from taking measures that would have better prepared them for responsibilities they were forced ultimately to assume.
 4. The vague locus of responsibility for civil affairs in Korea, both within the Army organization and as between the Army and other US and UN agencies, made it difficult for the field commander to obtain a complete picture of civil affairs from one single source, and weakened the influence of Army civil affairs personnel with indigenous government officials.
 5. The lack of formal agreement with the Republic of Korea regarding the conduct of many important civil affairs operations was a source of friction between civil affairs personnel and Korean officials.
 6. The lack of means, short of invoking military necessity, whereby the Army commander could control or effectively influence basic economic decisions of the Republic of Korea has impaired the effectiveness of UN economic aid in supporting the Korean economy.
- The lack of highly qualified administrative and economic technicians and of reliable information regarding the operation of the Korean economy handicapped the programming of economic aid

and the rendering of advice on economic management to the Korean Government.

8. The quality of military personnel assigned to civil affairs in Korea, as measured by education and efficiency ratings, is not commensurate with the actual importance of the function. This condition may be taken as an indication of the low level of importance attached to civil affairs at all echelons.

9. The lack of US personnel trained in the Korean language put the Army at a serious disadvantage in its efforts to "advise" the indigenous officials.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On The Conduct of Future Civil Affairs Operations

1. Wherever the Army conducts operations within the territory of a nation treated as sovereign for political reasons, a civil affairs agreement should be negotiated during the early stages of the conflict, making provision for such controls over the internal affairs of the area as are deemed necessary to accomplish the objectives of the operations and as are commensurate with the responsibilities accepted by the Army.

2. The organization for civil affairs should provide for: (a) a single focus of responsibility for all CA/MG functions; (b) a single point of contact within the Army for relationships with the governments of Army operational areas; and (c) a status for the civil affairs units, at both staff and operating levels, that is commensurate with the importance of their tasks.

3. The Army should take steps to impress commanders and line officers with the importance of CA/MG. (This recommendation may imply greater stress on the teaching of political subjects at such institutions as West Point, the Command and General Staff School, and the National War College.)

4. The Army should take steps to find qualified officers and teach them the substance of CA/MG. (This recommendation involves the development of criteria for the selection of CA/MG officers, both within the regular establishment and within the reserves.)

On Further Study of Civil Affairs in Korea

5. A study should be made of those aspects of the operation of the Korean economy that have affected the administration of

the Army economic aid program, and of the economic data that are required to enable the Army to formulate effective economic management measures.

6. A study should be made of all agreements and attempts to negotiate agreements with the Republic of Korea on civil affairs matters, for the purpose of determining the effects that these agreements or the lack of agreements have had on civil affairs operations.

7. A study should be made of the requirements for bilingual civil affairs personnel and the effects of the lack of such personnel on the conduct of civil affairs in Korea.

SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN KOREA
1950-51

SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

The lack of preparation for civil affairs operations in Korea represented merely one aspect of a general unreadiness for war in the Far East. This very unpreparedness made Korea an excellent "laboratory" for the analysis of difficulties which inevitably arise as concomitants of insufficient planning. This study attempts, therefore, to assist the Army in planning for future contingencies, extracting from the Korean experience those aspects which seem likely to recur in the future, stating them in terms of objective criteria, and identifying the specific operations the Army might have to perform in similar unexpected situations.

The findings of this study reflect conditions as of September 1951, based on data gathered from official documents and personnel questionnaires, and supplemented by oral interviews at various levels of the Army organization and the Korean government.

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MAJOR CIVIL AFFAIRS PROBLEMS IN KOREA

The Situation

The conditions of civil affairs in Korea can be summarized as follows: (a) The Army is conducting military operations in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations. (b) The Republic of Korea is treated as an independent, friendly, sovereign nation. Civil affairs functions can thus be exercised only through a de facto or de jure surrender of Korean sovereignty in certain areas. (c) Army civil affairs responsibility includes support of military operations, prevention of disease and unrest to insure the security of troops, and support of the indigenous economy. This involves substantial technical and economic assistance. (d) The United States Ambassador, with an independent channel of communications to the Department of State, has been designated as the principal liaison agent with the Republic of Korea Government, except on matters of an essentially military character. (e) Although the Army is charged with the major civil affairs responsibility, there exist independent agencies of the United Nations that have overlapping functions - the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). (f) The government and political system of the Republic of Korea have been developed since the liberation of the country in 1945, and reflect both the briefness of experience as an independent and democratic country, and the lack of experience in responsible political activities resulting from Japanese rule. (g) The political and economic structure of the country has been further weakened and disrupted by the invasion of most of the area in the summer of 1950, and the renewed invasion of a large part in the winter of 1950-51, with resulting heavy casualties of manpower, migration of refugees, and war damage to property.

In some respects the conditions outlined above are special and nonrecurring. But in several major respects they are fairly typical of conditions that may be met quite commonly in future warfare.

Army authorities charged with civil affairs and military government (CA/MG) tasks will probably have to work with other agencies of the US government in most situations, and with UN or other allied multi-national authorities, and with weak and newly organized local government authorities, with or without the attribution of sovereignty. They will also have to deal, normally, with a civil economy disrupted by mobilization and by population movements.

Therefore, while the Korean experience may not present a perfectly typical situation for Army CA/MG, the major conditions imposed may be taken as far from unusual, and the experience may afford a generally sound basis for analysis of problems and solutions. The Army commander in Korea is charged with a complex of political and economic as well as military functions. The performance of these functions has a direct bearing not only on the more general policy objectives of the US but on the military effort in Korea as well. In carrying out these functions he is bound to bring into some kind of order and integration the relations of the Army with the civilian agencies of the US government, of the United Nations, and of the Republic of Korea.

Military Aspects of the Problem

In Korea, as elsewhere, the primary objective of civil affairs has been the support of military operations. This objective included both the prevention of conditions that would prejudice military operations as well as constructive efforts to obtain maximum utilization of indigenous resources.¹

Thus the first civil affairs efforts were in the fields of public health, welfare, and sanitation, for the purpose of preventing disease, starvation, and unrest. In the winter of 1950-51 the movement of several million refugees threatened interference with the use of vital communication lines. Later still, removal of civilians from combat areas and their subsequent care and disposition were deemed necessary, not only for humanitarian reasons, but as a security measure as well.

Suppression of guerilla activity which threatened the security of both troops and communications required effective liaison with indigenous police, and at times the assignment of military units for this purpose.

The restoration of public utility, transportation, and communication facilities needed for essential military and civilian purposes has

¹See CINCPAC message to CG Eighth Army, Korea, 17 Oct 50, Appendix B, p. 67. (The directives in Appendix B are arranged chronologically.)

been an important civil affairs requirement in Korea. The recruitment of Korean laborers to assist tactical and service troops has involved the Army directly in the management of large numbers of the indigenous civilian population.

The Republic of Korea military forces are a significant component of the United Nations forces, and constitute the principal instrument for the security of South Korea when and if other United Nations forces are withdrawn. Supplies of food and clothing for these forces must be provided either from the Korean economy or from foreign sources. All efforts to support the Korean economy, therefore, have an indirect bearing upon the military situation.

Economic Aspects of the Problem

Civil affairs in Korea are closely bound up with the economic conditions of the country. Although Korea is an underdeveloped and recently liberated nation its economic problems are of the same kind as those which beset any nation at war: to mobilize all resources in support of the military effort and the civilian economy, and to supplement them by imports when necessary.

In this task the Republic of Korea faces three major hardships: a serious inflation, so that scarce commodities tend to flow only to those who have wealth or influence; severe shortages of raw materials and essential services, curtailing the production of items needed for essential military and civilian purposes; and a limited supply of foreign exchange. The Korean government thus confronts problems of over-all economic management, the solution of which would involve such measures as wage and price controls, rationing, restrictions on the importation of foreign commodities, and measures to restore and increase production.

As a result of over 40 years of Japanese colonial rule the Koreans do not possess the administrative skills required by the present emergency. The government has not yet been organized to manage a wartime economy efficiently. Its personnel have been demoralized and, to some extent, corrupted by the wide disparity between fixed official salaries and highly inflated living costs.

This is one of the major reasons why the Korean Government has not been able to control inflation, distribute commodities equitably, direct scarce resources to the most essential uses, make the best use of the aid provided by the UN, or use its foreign exchange for only the most essential imports. Under these circumstances optimum results from UN economic aid could only be obtained if the deficiencies in the Korean government's ability to manage its economy are compensated by appropriate measures.

The formulation of such measures becomes a civil affairs function, requiring specialized staff and reliable economic statistics. The lack of both staff and data was conspicuous during the summer of 1951. In spite of repeated official requests by the Korean government for qualified technical advisors on fiscal and other economic problems, no outstanding expert personnel were available to the Army as of that time. The staff of the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, which had already accumulated considerable experience in handling oriental fiscal and economic problems, was apparently not actively assigned to Korean civil affairs matters. A study of the nature of this function and the economic data needed to support it could provide the basis for Army guidance in similar situations.

The Army, acting under both the need to obtain maximum indigenous support for military operations and a directive to support the Korean economy, is engaged in a program of economic aid. The administration of this aid is the primary civil affairs function in Korea - a task which depends for its successful fulfillment upon the manner in which the Korean economy is managed.

For this reason the solution to the problems mentioned above can be achieved in only one of two ways: either the Korean Government must be persuaded to put remedial measures into effect themselves, or civil affairs authorities must exercise some degree of economic control. The problem thus becomes political in character.

Political Aspects of the Problem

Three fundamentally divergent views have influenced the political arrangements for civil affairs in Korea:

Rigid adherence to the concept of Korean sovereignty and the desire to encourage Korean self-reliance have tended to preclude direct interference by the Army in the internal affairs of the Republic of Korea.

The concept of the Korean conflict as a United Nations effort has led to United States sponsorship of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and efforts to establish it as an independent operating agency in areas of Korea to the rear of the combat zone.

The concept of the integrity of military command has led to efforts to negotiate the legal surrender of portions of Korean sovereignty and has forestalled independent operations by UNKRA.

To the lack of clear and timely resolution of these conflicting approaches can be traced the absence of a basic legal instrument defining the responsibilities of the UN Army and the Republic of Korea with respect to civil affairs. It is true that there exist a number of specialized agreements dealing with such matters as finance, railroad operation, and the sale of relief commodities, but on matters affecting Army-ROK relationships in the handling of major economic problems, there is neither clear understanding nor written agreement.

The consequences of this fact are that greater amounts of economic aid have been provided than would otherwise have been necessary, and that the aid rendered has not been effectively utilized. To evaluate fully the lesson that emerges from the Korean civil affairs experience requires careful examination of the relevant facts pertaining to the relations of the Army and other US and UN agencies with the Republic of Korea.

It is recommended, therefore, that a study be made of all agreements and attempted agreements that have involved the Army commander in political relations with the Republic of Korea, with a view to determining the effect of these agreements or of the lack of agreements on civil affairs operations, and with the ultimate purpose of providing some guidance as to the types of agreements that could be prepared in advance for similar future situations.

Even in the absence of such a study, it can be concluded that whenever the Army is given civil affairs responsibility, such as it has in Korea, it must be afforded means for either making or influencing some of the decisions affecting the internal economy of the area. Under existing conditions in Korea the only tool available to the Army commander is the discretionary use of the principle of military necessity - a blunt and awkward instrument at best.

OBJECTIVES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The inseparability of the military and the political components of modern warfare was clearly demonstrated by the Korean experience. What had started as a "police-action" on 27 June 1950 had emerged by 6 July as an enterprise of a scope requiring definition by the DA of the relation of the military commander to the indigenous government, of his sphere of jurisdiction, and of the instruments at his disposal for carrying out civil affairs?

The military commander not only had to assume responsibilities exercisable only by surrender of sovereignty on the part of the ROK government, such as taking over the transportation system, but because of the impact of military operations on a subsistence level economy he had to undertake significant relief measures as well. After the closing out of ECA the Army was given responsibility even for the planning of long-range economic rehabilitation.

This study will confine itself to pointing out the factual situation of CA/MG during the most recent US military effort but will not analyze the problem of whether the Army should be charged with these responsibilities. Briefly: (a) The commitment of the Army to Korea forced a definition of relationships with the indigenous government and of the overriding authority of the military commander on the basis of "military necessity." (b) The need for economic relief measures became apparent during the very early stages of the conflict.³ (c) The Army was responsible at all times for the provision of supplies which served common military and civilian purposes⁴ and later even for long-range economic planning.⁵ This involved the creation of a civil affairs structure

²See DA directive to CINCPAC, 6 July 50, Appendix B, p. 50. This message was later confirmed by a JCS directive on 7 Sept 50.

³See DA message to CINCPAC, 6 July 50, and UN Security Council Resolution, 31 July 50, Appendix B, pp. 50 and 61 respectively.

⁴See State Department message containing letter of President to LCA Administrator, 1 Oct 50, Appendix B, p. 63.

⁵See CINCUNC directive to CG Eighth Army, 24 May 51, Appendix B, p. 116.

paralleling all levels of the Korean administration and in tactical organizations down to the division level. (d) The inseparability of the military and political component of the US effort in Korea was apparent to the responsible commanders in the field. Throughout the negotiations regarding the activation of UNKRA, CINCUNC insisted on the indivisibility of economic support measures and on the necessity of Army control even over the planning of long-range economic rehabilitation in order not to jeopardize his military mission.

This study will therefore analyze in what manner the Army came to assume its civil affairs functions, the adequacy of the civil affairs policies, and the effectiveness of the Army organization for civil affairs planning.

DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA OF POLICIES, OBJECTIVES, AND PROGRAMS

Objectives can be divided into two groups: the first group of objectives is the basic goals of the US in Korea expressed as national strategy. These include the original decision to repel the North Korean aggression, the implementation of the UN resolution to unify Korea, or the decision to engage in armistice negotiations. This category must be taken for granted for purposes of CA/MG planning since it reflects National Security Council decisions in which the Army view is considered but not controlling. The second group of objectives is the fundamental goals of the US civil affairs effort in Korea - the positive one of achieving the maximum support of the Korean economy for the military effort and the minimum aim of preventing disease, unrest, and interference with military operations.

Policies comprise the measures to achieve the objectives and the selection of instruments to implement them. These include the decision to treat the ROK government as sovereign, the division of functions between the Army, ECA, and the Department of State, the resolution creating UNKRA, and similar matters, as well as the basic CINCUNC and EUSAK directives.

Programs are the quantitative expressions of policy.

The basic objectives of the civil affairs effort in Korea were considered outside the scope of this study.

Civil affairs policies were evaluated in terms of the extent to which the stated objectives were in fact achieved, the extent to which these objectives were attained with an economy of means,

the possibility of describing these policies in specific directives, and the extent to which lower echelons were conscious of the policy.

The first criterion, on the actual achievement of the stated objectives, reflects the most basic test of policy and the reason for its existence. The second criterion, on how efficiently the objectives were achieved, derives from Army's need to maximize available resources of both manpower and materiel. Moreover the need for consistency and integration implies that policies should be objectively statable. The mere existence of a directive does not guarantee its availability at lower echelons or the awareness of policy by operating personnel; however, the remaining objectives define a problem of planning and of control and communication, in that order.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS POLICIES

If the determination of whether the stated objectives were in fact attained represents the most basic test for policy, then the US civil affairs effort in Korea can be judged a qualified success. Epidemics were prevented; no significant unrest on the part of the civilian population occurred. It must be emphasized, however, that the prevention of disease and unrest represents a minimum objective and essentially a negative one. Large scale riots or epidemics would conclusively prove the complete failure of civil affairs policies; their absence does not, however, indicate more than a minimum effectiveness. It will still be necessary to analyze whether the existing policies represented the most efficient utilization of resources for civil affairs and whether the instruments selected contributed to the most effective operational pattern.

Methods of CA/MG Operation

Three methods exist for the operation and execution of CA/MG programs: (a) by US military personnel or under the direct supervision of US personnel; (b) by the indigenous government under US direction; or (c) by the indigenous government with outside advice, but not direction. The first two alternatives involve a de facto surrender of sovereignty on the part of the indigenous government, and all three possibilities require a definition of the respective functions of US, UN (where applicable), and indigenous authorities.

The civil affairs effort in Korea utilized all three methods. First, the US Army directed the operation of all transportation into and within Korea and procured supplies for its relief programs.

In addition, throughout the campaign, the UN commander reserved the right of taking whatever action "military necessity" dictated, formally recognized in the directive from the DA of 6 July 1950. The determination of the nature of "military necessity" was left to the discretion of CINUNC. Second, the doctrine of "military necessity" was also invoked by tactical commanders in assuming directive powers over civil affairs functions from corps areas forward. The evacuation of refugees, the distribution of relief supplies, and various security measures were carried out by ROK authorities, wherever possible, but at the direction of the tactical commander. Finally, the ROK authorities were responsible for the distribution of relief supplies and other measures to prevent disease and unrest, subject only to the "advice and assistance" of US or UN agencies, particularly the United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK), the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), and UNKRA. In practice the distinction between direction and advice proved very tenuous, however, (see section on Organization.)

Obstacles to Efficient Operations

The decision to treat the ROK government as sovereign, and to introduce UN agencies to the maximum extent possible imposed severe limitations on the civil affairs effort. It made difficult an integrated approach due to the number of agencies involved and their vague spheres of jurisdiction. It led to friction with ROK authorities who considered even an advisory relationship an infringement of their sovereignty. It enabled the indigenous government to play off the various agencies against each other. It handicapped the policy of obtaining maximum contribution to military operations and to rehabilitation of the indigenous economy, due to the low level of technical competence and the corruption of the Korean administration. These problems were compounded by the absence of both a comprehensive civil affairs directive from the DA as well as of a formal instrument defining the scope of civil affairs functions and the Army's role in their execution.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS POLICY EFFORT

The Korean War soon made apparent the integral connection between the military and political component of modern warfare. US military forces were committed on 27 June 1950, and by 6 July a directive proved to be necessary defining the relationship between

the Army and the indigenous government and calling attention to the requirement for civil affairs activities.⁶

The DA Directive of 6 July 1950

Intended only as a statement of authority, the DA directive remained the basic civil affairs statement for Korea and provided the institutional framework. It called attention to the need for civil affairs activities in Korea and for the preparation of suitable directives. It ordered CINCUNC, for political reasons, to treat the ROK government as sovereign. It directed a maximum utilization of the indigenous authorities in operating civil affairs programs. It designated the US Ambassador as the channel of liaison for all matters except "those of an essentially military nature." It gave to the military commander directive power over "all matters affecting his military mission." And finally it promised the early preparation of a civil affairs agreement defining "the respective rights, duties, and jurisdictional limitations of the military forces of the US and the Government of Korea."

This directive has been summarized at such length because it set the framework of the civil affairs effort in Korea and accounted for some of its ambiguity. Although it demonstrated awareness for the needs of civil affairs and for civil affairs agreement to delimit the respective functions, it planted the seeds for a future conflict of authority by designating the US Ambassador as channel of liaison without making explicit his relationship to the UN commander. The decision to treat the government of Korea as sovereign and to utilize it for the conduct of civil affairs programs implied the subsequent advisory status of UNCACK toward the ROK government involving the difficulties discussed in the section on Organization.

The UN Security Council Resolution of 31 July 1950

The political and economic aspects of the Korean war were further underlined by a UN Security Council resolution of 31 July 1950 which called on the Unified Command to "exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea" and for establishing in the field the procedures for its provision.⁷ This was construed as the formal authority to conduct economic rehabilitation programs in Korea. The DA directed CINCFE to carry out the determination of requirements called for in the resolution.

⁶ See DA directive, 6 July 50, Appendix B, p. 59. This message was later confirmed by a JCS directive, 7 Sept 50.

⁷ See UN Security Council Resolution, 31 July 50, Appendix B, p. 61.

The Presidential Letter to the ECA Administrator, 29 September 1950

The State Department message of 1 October 1950 reflected the changed military situation after the Inchon landing.⁸ It transmitted to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), to the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and to the US Ambassador in Korea a Presidential letter to the ECA administrator, dated 29 September 1950, defining their respective spheres of jurisdiction:

ECA was charged with economic assistance to maximize the output of certain specified industries, with fiscal advisory assistance to combat the treat of inflation, and with planning for long-range economic rehabilitation.

The Army was made responsible for the financing and provision of direct civilian relief and, in general, of "supplies which serve common civilian and military purposes."

The letter further indicated that long-range economic rehabilitation would probably be turned over to a UN agency.

This arrangement proved adequate during the limited time of its existence largely because ECA coordinated its activities very closely with CINCUNC.⁹ The President's letter was soon superseded by two events: the US reverses in North Korea, which necessitated a greater degree of direct relief than anticipated, and by the UN action of 1 December 1950 creating UNKRA, and the subsequent US decision to close out ECA in Korea and to replace it in part with UNKRA.

With the withdrawal of ECA, the Army was confronted with a vacuum in certain spheres hitherto the responsibility of that Agency, and with the appearance in Korea of a new organization under UN auspices. UNKRA, moreover, possessed an independent channel of command and only a vague sphere of jurisdiction. This forced CINCUNC to consider the nature of civil affairs programs, the role of various agencies in their operation, and the adequacy of the existing command structure.

THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING UNKRA'S OPERATION AND JURISDICTION

The controversy between CINCUNC, DA, and the JCS on the one hand, and the Department of State and UNKRA on the other, regarding UNKRA's method of operation and sphere of jurisdiction

⁸See State Dept. Message, 1 Oct 50, Appendix B, p. 03.

⁹See CINCUNC messages to DA, 7 Feb 51, 8 Feb 51, and 26 Feb 51, Appendix B, pp. 79, 83, and 89.

brought into sharp focus the Army's requirements for civil affairs during military operations and in areas where it provides the major logistical support. The Army insisted on the integrity of command and on the inseparability of the military and political component of modern warfare, as exemplified by the US effort in Korea, while the Department of State and UNKRA took the position that these functions could be divided among different organizations with independent channels of command. Both sides agreed on the overriding nature of military necessity and on the commander's discretion in making this determination. It was this factor which made the substantive discussion largely illusory.

The Army's Position

In insisting on the inseparability of functions the Army proposed:¹⁰

The integration of UNKRA operating personnel into the EUSAK civil affairs organization, although under an independent personnel administration.

The creation of an UNKRA planning group composed of specialists under CINCUNC to furnish technical assistance to the ROK administration and to engage in long-range planning.

The eventual turning over of operational responsibility to UNKRA, the timing of this turn-over to be at the discretion of CINCUNC with the agreement of the Agent-General, UNKRA.

The Army supported these recommendations with arguments of:¹¹ the necessity for the integrity of command; the dangerous precedent established for future army operations under UN auspices if an independent UN organization were permitted to operate in Korea during combat; the opportunity, afforded by the existence of an independent agency, for the ROK administration to play the various organizations off against each other; the inseparability of relief and rehabilitation functions; and the difficulty of funding such programs under separate organizations. (It may be appropriate to record at this point that most of these objections were proved well-founded by events. For discussion see the section on Organization)

¹⁰ See CINCUNC message to DA, 26 Feb 51, Appendix B, p. 89.

¹¹ See Chief of Staff memo, 24 May 51, p. 112; also CINCUNC messages to DA on 7 Feb, 8 Feb, and 26 Feb 51, pp. 79, 83, and 89.

The Department of State Position

The Department of State, in supporting UNKRA's stand for a separate organization and a measure of independent operation, proposed:¹²

The creation of an independent planning staff for long-range rehabilitation programs by UNKRA.

The furnishing of appropriate technical assistance by UNKRA in areas except those of direct military significance.

During this controversy which extended from 6 February to 12 July 1951, the Army was confronted with operational requirements which could not wait for decision. As a consequence, the Army exercised all civil affairs functions including long-range economic planning. This was expressed in the DA directive of 12 May and the CINCUNC implementing directive of 24 May 1951, which stated: ". . . . CINCUNC has been given the complete and whole responsibility for all economic aid to the Korean people including, but not limited to, immediate relief, short-range rehabilitation and reconstruction, long-range planning and furnishing technical assistance to the officials of the Korean government." ¹³

Resolution of the Controversy by the Secretary of Defense

Although the Secretary of Defense on 3 July 1951 formally resolved the controversy substantially in favor of the contention of the Department of State, he nevertheless qualified this agreement with the following reservations:¹⁴(a) The final and overriding authority of the commander on the ground during hostilities; (b) The undesirability of setting a precedent for future operations under UN auspices; and (c) The budgeting by the DA for direct civilian relief.

These reservations left the scope of UNKRA operations in effect at the discretion of CINCUNC and EUSAK.¹⁵ The eventual integration of UNKRA personnel into EUSAK substantially on the lines of the original Army recommendation reflected the reality of the situation. (November 1951)

¹²See Muccio cable to Dept. of State, 17 Feb 51; also J. Donald Kingsley letter, 16 Apr 51. Both in Appendix B, pp. 87 and 101 respectively.

¹³See DA directive to CINCUNC, 12 May 51, and CINCUNC implementing directive to CG Eighth Army, paragraph 2, 24 May 51; both are in Appendix B, pp. 111 and 116 respectively.

¹⁴See Sec. of Defense letter to the Sec. of State, 3 July 51, Appendix B, p. 118.

¹⁵See CINCUNC cable of 17 Sept 51, regarding UNKRA's utilization of motor vehicles for industrial surveys, Appendix B, p. 127.

In summation, analysis of the institutional framework of civil affairs policies in Korea has revealed the following considerations:

- (a) The inseparability of the military and political (and economic) component of modern warfare became apparent as early as 6 July 1950. The directive of that date called attention to the need for a civil affairs program and, in view of the decision to treat the ROK government as sovereign, for a Civil Affairs agreement defining the respective spheres of jurisdiction.
- (b) The various patterns of organization for civil affairs reflected in part the military situation. The presidential letter of 29 September defining the functions of ECA and the Army was based on the assumption of an early end of hostilities; the decision to activate UNKRA took into account the possibility of continued US reverses and the desirability of maximum UN support. Every directive recognized the final authority of CINCUNC as the commander on the ground and the overriding nature of "military necessity."
- (c) The decision to close out ECA confronted the Army with a vacuum in the field of economic rehabilitation and with the problem of dealing with an independent UN agency.
- (d) In its controversy with the Department of State regarding the activation of UNKRA the Army insisted on the indivisibility of the military and political component of modern warfare. Although the Department of State maintained the contrary view and was supported by the Secretary of Defense, the general agreement on the overriding nature of military necessity largely vitiated the decision and led ultimately to the subordination of UNKRA to CINCUNC.
- (e) The Korean experience, therefore, indicates that in areas where the Army furnishes the major logistical support, and during the conduct of military operations the responsibility for the conduct of substantial civil affairs functions tends to devolve on the Army. This calls attention to the need for defining the scope of CA/MG functions, in particular operations, and for the creation of adequate organizational structures for their execution. (See section on Organization.)

THE AVAILABILITY OF POLICY DECISIONS

The decision to treat the ROK government as sovereign made necessary a definition of the respective spheres of jurisdiction of the US and UN authorities operating programs on the one hand, and

of the ROK government on the other. This was clearly recognized in the DA cable of 6 July 1950. In defining the framework of UN-ROK relationships it announced the early preparation of a civil affairs agreement.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the only agreement pertaining to economic aid for Korea was the ECA Agreement of 1948, which was not considered by the Army as suitable for the wartime situation.

The absence of a formal instrument and the uncertainty regarding their respective spheres of jurisdiction accounted for the occasional friction between ROK officials and personnel operating civil affairs programs. The complaint of ROK officials of US infringement on Korean sovereignty can be traced back, at least in part, to the vagueness of formal arrangements. CINCUNC's awareness of the need for a civil affairs agreement was shown by their repeated requests for authority to negotiate. This authority was not finally forthcoming until 25 September 1951.¹⁷

Chronology of Civil Affairs Decisions

The following represents the major policy decisions affecting the civil affairs effort in Korea:

27 June 1950	US military forces committed to action in Korea
6 July	CINCUNC advised of pending civil affairs directive. ¹⁸
31 July	UN Security Council asks US to provide machinery for relief and support of civilian population of Korea. ¹⁹
7 September	Interim civil affairs directive issued to CINCUNC. ²⁰
29 September	President defines responsibilities of Army and ECA for economic aid to Korea. ²¹
1 December	UN Assembly creates UNKRA. ²²

¹⁶ See DA cable of 6 July 50, paragraph 7, Appendix B, p. 60.

¹⁷ See DA message to CINCUNC, 25 Sept 51, paragraph 1, on CINCUNC's authority to negotiate an agreement with ROK, Appendix B, p. 129.

¹⁸ See DA message to CINCPAC, 6 July 50, Appendix B, p. 69.

¹⁹ See UN Security Council Resolution, 31 July 50, Appendix B, p. 61.

²⁰ JCS interim directive, 7 Sept 50.

²¹ See Presidential letter in State Dept. message of 1 Oct 50, Appendix B, p. 63.

²² See UN decision creating UNKRA, 1 Dec 50, Appendix B, p. 69.

- 7 February 1951 CINCUNC advised that no civil affairs agreement with ROK was contemplated.²³
- 12 May CINCUNC given full responsibility for relief and support of civilian population of Korea.²⁴
- 11 July Controversy regarding UNKRA resolved in favor of a limited UNKRA operations subject to the authority of military commander in field.²⁵
- 25 September CINCUNC authorized to negotiate economic aid agreement.²⁶

These policies comprise three general types:

Policies defining the relationship of US and UN agencies to the indigenous government and to each other.

Policies selecting the instruments for achieving civil affairs objectives.

Substantive measures to achieve stated objectives, such as maximum Korean self-help or the prevention of disease and unrest.

Lack of Adequate Policy

The analysis of the previous sections has indicated that there was a lack of policy on all three levels. No over-all civil affairs agreement has existed throughout the Korean war. The need for it is reflected in repeated requests by CINCUNC for authority to negotiate and calling attention to the impossibility of continuing under ECA procedures and authorities.²⁷

A clear-cut designation of instruments was temporarily achieved by the Presidential letter of 29 September. But between the decision to close out ECA (17 January 1951) and the final settlement of the controversy regarding the activation of UNKRA (12 July 1951) all civil affairs functions were exercised by the Army mainly by default and in the absence of a formal directive.

No comprehensive definition of civil affairs functions had been issued as of the end of September 1951. This is best reflected in the DA cable of 28 September 1951 stating "no statement covering all civil affairs activities can be transmitted."²⁸

²³ See DA message to CINCPAC, 7 Feb 51, paragraph 3, Appendix B, p. 81.

²⁴ See DA message to CINCUNC, 12 May 51, Part II, paragraph 1, Appendix B, p. 111.

²⁵ See Sec. of Defense letter to S. of State, 3 July 51, Appendix B, p. 118.

²⁶ See DA message to CINCUNC, 26 Sept 51, on authority to initiate negotiations with ROK, p. 120.

²⁷ For examples, see CINCUNC messages to DA, 26 Feb 51, 1 April 51, and 12 April 51, pp. 80, 92, and 94 respectively.

²⁸ See DA cable to CINCUNC, 28 Sept 51, paragraph 2, Appendix B, p. 131.

This policy lack was acutely felt at each level. It comes to expression in CINCUNC's repeated requests for a definition of functions. This culminated on 4 May in CINCUNC's acquiescence to independent operation by UNKRA in specified fields during combat despite his regret over "the necessity for any division of responsibility at this stage."²⁹ CINCUNC thereby expressed his preference for even an unsound policy over a policy vacuum.

Analysis of the answers of UNCACK personnel to activity questionnaires revealed that only 3 of 18 officers (18 percent) at the team commanders level (COs and Executive Officers), and 6 out of 84 UNCACK officers (7 percent), were aware that UNCACK had the mission to support the Korean economy. (The questionnaires were submitted in September; the EUSAK directives to UNCACK had been issued 8 July and 5 August 1951, respectively.³⁰ The sample contained 69 percent of UNCACK personnel.)

This relative lack of awareness of policy is related to the attitude of UNCACK personnel towards policy guidance. Out of 84 officers 22 (26 percent) complained about inadequate direction and this inadequacy was most keenly felt at higher echelons. Table 1 indicates this trend.

TABLE 1
CA/MG OFFICERS WHO COMPLAINED OF
INADEQUATE GUIDANCE

Personnel Surveyed	Total Sample	Percent of Total Personnel in Sample	Number Complaining of Too Little Guidance	Percent of Sample Complaining
All UNCACK	84	69	22	26
UNCACK Officers at Team Commander Level ^a	18	68	5	28
UNCACK Personnel at UNCACK Hq.	18	35	6	33
EUSAK CA/S Section Personnel	8	44	3	37

^aIncluding COs, Executive Officers, and officers known to perform similar functions.

²⁹See CINCUNC message to DA, 4 May 51, Part IV, Appendix B, p. 109.

³⁰See EUSAK directive on Industrial Rehabilitation, 8 July 51, and EUSAK directive on Assistance in Agriculture Production, 5 Aug 51; both Appendix B, pp. 120 and 124 respectively.

PROGRAMS

Programs are the quantitative expression of policies. In Korea they were composed of the following components: (a) Programs to prevent interference with military operations and to obtain maximum indigenous support for military operations; (b) direct relief; (c) programs to support the Korean economy; and (d) programs which serve common military and civilian purposes, such as the repair of communications or public utilities by the US Army.

With the withdrawal of ECA and the assumption by the Army of all civilian and economic support functions, programs were developed on the basis of joint UNCACK and ROK conferences and advice from the technical services, and reviewed by CA/S EUSAK. They were reviewed again by the Korean Economic Aid Division (KEAD) of GHQ for adequacy and availability of supplies, by the International Branch G-4, DA for the approval of part programs for offshore procurement, and by the Japan Logistical Command for logistical considerations.

Aside from the aid offered by Army programs for the direct support of military operations (for which statistics were not available to ORO staff), the Korean economic aid funds were apportioned as follows:³¹

Supplying Service	Amount of Aid (millions of dollars)
Engineer	12.3
Medical	7.5
Ordnance	1.3
Signal	6.7
Transportation	3.6
Quartermaster	
Agriculture	18.8
Bedding, clothing etc.	22.3
Food items	42.7
Supplies for industry	34.2
Sanitation	2.1
POL	<u>7.1</u>
	127.2
	<u>158.6</u>

³¹ From General Headquarters, UN Command report on "Supplies and Equipment for Korean Economic Aid Program," Feb 52.

The following listing breaks down the program into its basic categories:

Basic Categories	Amount of Aid (millions of dollars)	
Support of Korean economy		
Engineer items	12.3	
Ordnance items	1.3	
Signal items	6.7	
Supplies for industry	<u>34.2</u>	
	54.5	(33 percent of total)
Relief items		
Bedding, clothing, etc.	22.3	
Food	42.7	
Sanitation	2.1	
Medical	<u>7.5</u>	
	74.6	(52 percent)
Mixed items		
Agricultural supplies	18.8	
POL	7.1	
Transportation	<u>3.6</u>	
	<u>29.5</u>	(15 percent)
Total	158.6	

The Korean civil affairs program involved far more than a relief program; only 52 percent of its total budget was allocated for relief supplies. This percentage would be reduced even further if the statistics included programs directly operated by the US Army, such as repair of roads and public utilities, support of indigenous labor in forward areas, and support of the ROK Army. This was clearly recognized in the EUSAK directives of 8 July and 5 August 1951 charging team commanders with the conduct of basic surveys on the Korean agriculture and industry.³²

The interrelation of all three aspects of the Korean economic aid program is reflected in the fact that one agency at CINCUNC, the KEAD, is charged with planning all economic assistance, calling attention to the importance of basic area and economic information for planning a program of such scope.

Civil affairs programming has been handicapped by the absence of reliable statistics. A disproportionate part of the civil affairs

³² See EUSAK directives of 8 July and 5 August 51 on Korean Industry and Agriculture; both in Appendix 3, pp. 120 and 124 respectively.

effort has had to be devoted to collecting basic information. For this reason, review of requirements at higher echelons was usually in terms of the availability of supplies and of transportation, not in terms of their relation to a quantitatively defined objective. The voluminous statistics collected by Military Government in Korea between 1945-48 remained unavailable, despite efforts by CA/S EUSAK to obtain them.

The direct procurement of relief supplies by the Army and the occasional substitution of items on programs has caused considerable resentment among Korean officials. Korean ministers were unanimous in condemning this practice, attacking it partly as an infringement of sovereignty, partly for its alleged tendency to saddle Koreans with undesirable and unusable items. Although the objective merit of this criticism is extremely slight, its existence is nevertheless an interesting commentary on the psychological atmosphere of our Korean civil affairs effort and on the organizational pattern selected. (For full development of this point see section on Organization.)

CONCLUSIONS

The importance of civil affairs became apparent early in the Korean campaign. The D/A directive of 6 July 1950 defined the relationships with the indigenous government and the final authority of the military commander to exercise his authority on the basis of "military necessity."

The introduction of UNKRA called attention to the indivisibility of the military and political component of warfare and to the necessity for the Army, on the basis of "military necessity," to assume all civil affairs functions during combat operations or in areas where the major logistical support is furnished by the Army.

No legal instrument has ever fully defined the Army's relation to the indigenous government, accounting in part for the ROK complaint that civil affairs represented "an infringement" of Korean sovereignty.

If the Army again conducts operations within the territory of a nation treated as sovereign for political purposes, a civil affairs agreement should be negotiated during the very early stages of the conflict. This agreement should specify the role of the Army, its responsibilities, and the minimum conditions for the

effective performance of the mission. These civil affairs agreements could be prepared in advance for various situations the Army expects to confront. A part of the planning for civil affairs at the DA might concern itself with anticipating the requirements of various areas that seem likely theaters of future conflict. Of course, no such agreement can vitiate the principle of military necessity; however, the Korean experience shows that sole reliance on this principle as the basis for relations between the Army and indigenous authorities places an undue burden, and to some extent an unnecessary one, on the civil affairs units of the Army.

Throughout the Korean war, policy direction tended to lag behind event. This is reflected in frequent CINCUNC cables for a definition of functions, in the vagueness on the part of some civil affairs personnel regarding the nature of their policy and in their complaints regarding policy direction.

Civil affairs programming involved far more than a relief program. Only 52 percent of the direct civil affairs budget was devoted to the provision of relief items; the balance was utilized for the support of the Korean economy. Programming was handicapped by the paucity of reliable information regarding Korea and by the absence of a clearly defined policy noted above. Programs for the first year tended to be based on day-to-day requirements and reviewed in terms of availability of supplies and transportation, not of an integrated plan.

Economic support missions presuppose the availability of reliable basic statistical information. Civil affairs planning might well involve the preparation of area studies for potential targets of CA/MG efforts, utilizing the statistics of previous CA/MG experiences in theaters which seem to be probable areas of future conflict.

The Korean experience thus calls attention to the need for prior planning at theater and ZI levels. Most of the shortcomings noted above were unavoidable in view of the general lack of preparedness for the Korean War.

ORGANIZATION

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The preceding section has shown that wherever the Army engages in combat, and civilian activities impinge on military operations, the responsibility for the operation of substantial CA/MG programs tends to devolve upon the Army. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze how the Army organization can best be adapted to such civil affairs problems as may be thrust upon it and how CA/MG can be most effectively organized to make a maximum contribution to military operations.

The Army organization for civil affairs in Korea was evaluated in terms of four criteria:

The extent to which the locus of responsibility was clearly defined;

The degree to which the civil affairs structure was adapted to liaison with other non-indigenous agencies (US, UN, and Allied);

The extent to which the civil affairs organization was adapted to liaison with the indigenous government;

The possibility afforded the commander for considering the political implication of his actions.

AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH CIVIL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS

The locus of responsibility for civil affairs has been vague because the responsibilities of the Korean Government in relation to the Army remained undefined throughout the war, and because the number of agencies operating partly overlapping programs prevented a clear delineation of functions.

Figure 1 represents the agencies with independent channels of command that are concerned with the civil affairs programs in Korea and are in direct contact with the ROK government.




Fig. 1 - United Nations Agencies in Korea.

Four agencies with independent channels of command and communication had varying degrees of direct relationships with the ROK government in September 1951. The Eighth Army exercises civil affairs functions in order to achieve maximum support for military operations and to keep interference by the civilian population to a minimum. Its tasks include economic assistance to support the Korean economy and relief measures to prevent disease, starvation, and unrest. The Army further controls all transportation into and within Korea and has reserved the right, though without specific formal instrument, of direct interference to insure the security of its troops.

The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea (UNCURK) represents a monument to a dead policy. Its task to supervise the unification of Korea has been superseded by events; the UN resolution creating the United Nations Korean Rehabilitation Administration (UNKRA) gave it the substantive task of determining the areas suitable for its own operations.

UNKRA is charged with the task of long-term economic reconstruction. For a time during 1951, it maintained a resident agent in Pusan, who was in regular contact with the ROK government.

The US Ambassador to the ROK has been designated as the official channel of communication with the ROK authorities on all matters except those of an essentially military nature. He also controls the allocation of ROK dollar exchange by usage categories under the authority of the ECA agreement of 1948.

The overlapping nature of the four agencies' functions has prevented the establishment of a clear definition of the locus of over-all responsibility for civil affairs activities in Korea. The implementation of necessary, but unpopular, decisions of the Army has been delayed because of the premium put on Korean delaying tactics by the diffuse organizational pattern. Thus, during the period of the ORO field trip, Korean ministries frequently indicated their peripheral interest in UNCACK and their great expectations from UNKRA. A considerable amount of ROK planning was geared towards the latter agency.

The overlapping nature of the four agencies has created genuine confusion among responsible Koreans, particularly on the national level, and has prevented the implementation of an integrated policy. Thus despite the acute need for 20,000 housing units to prevent disaster during the winter, the ROK government spent the summer debating whether to implement a long-range housing program as sponsored by UNKRA or a short-range

one as suggested by UNCACK. Pending a decision, construction and/or supplies were frozen. By September, with winter fast approaching, no construction whatsoever had taken place and UNCACK was forced to place 20,000 tents on emergency procurement.

ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR CA/MG IN KOREA

An analysis of the Army structure revealed that it too was characterized by overlapping functions, a vague locus of responsibility, and complex liaison arrangements. Figure 2 describes the organization of the Army for CA/MG in Korea.

Numerous Army officers and agencies have had some measure of direct relationship with the ROK government or responsibility for the operation of the civil affairs program.

The CG EUSAK performs the usual liaison functions of an army commander on the highest levels of the ROK government. The Deputy Commander remains at Pusan, temporary seat of the ROK government, for the primary purpose of conducting these liaison functions in the absence of the CG.

The CA/S EUSAK, though a special staff section, maintains its own contacts with all levels of the ROK administration. Its commanding officer deals directly with the Korean President at regular intervals. G-4 EUSAK is charged with the utilization and support of indigenous labor. It exercises staff supervision over the Korean Service Corps, a para-military organization with a T/O of 60,000, as well as labor recruitment for tactical organizations.

The Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) assists in the training and operation of the Korean military and security forces, assigning advisors to all Korean army and police headquarters. The 2nd Logistical Command controls what is, in effect, the communication zone of Eighth Army (the area rear of corps). Its Area Commands in major Korean cities constitute the local US Army authority, and directly control transportation and, occasionally, public utilities.

The United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) is the main agency operating civil affairs programs behind corps rear boundaries. Its mission is composed of four major aspects. UNCACK provides supplies and equipment to prevent disease, starvation, and unrest, and supervises their distribution and utilization. It also provides civilian-type supplies for the support of the Korean economy, supports civil affairs activities in Corps




Fig. 2—Army organization in Korea, showing units exercising CA/MG functions.

and Division areas, and determines requirements for the accomplishment of the above objectives.

This complex Army organizational pattern has had undesirable consequences. It puts a premium on attempts by ROK officials to by-pass UNCACK, the chief operating agency, frequently insisting that it proved advantageous to contact CA/S or, at the very top, the Deputy Commander EUSAK.

While UNCACK is charged with the prevention of disease and unrest through the provision of civilian relief, K MAG has a related task in relation to police functions. Its police advisors are assigned to each major police headquarters from the Ministry of the Interior to the provincial level. Liaison between the two organizations is frequently inadequate on the provincial level. In fact, a number of jurisdictional disputes were called to the attention of the ORO staff.

ROK officials frequently do not know with whom to deal in the civil affairs structure. Thus when the Deputy Commander of EUSAK returned to the US, reportedly with no prospect of replacement, genuine confusion regarding liaison existed at the very top level of the ROK administration. This confusion is not confined to the top level; the following comment by a key cabinet minister can be taken as typical of many interviews at both the national and the provincial levels, "Considerable resentment exists among Korean officials regarding the advisorship function of UNCACK. I consider the UNCACK organization totally confusing with no visible policy. I do not know its top personnel, its responsibility, or its mission. I cannot find out whom in the Army to ask the most simple question. . ."

The Army's complex civil affairs organization has even made it difficult for the commander to obtain advice regarding the political implication of his actions. There exists in Korea no single staff section charged with surveying the whole field of civil affairs and possessing the authority to integrate all the various civil affairs activities.

This complex structure for civil affairs was not confined to Korea. Thus G-4, G-1, and the Public Health and Welfare Sections of CINCUNC divided the responsibility for civil affairs in Korea; while at the DA PMG, G-3 and G-4 were charged with various aspects of the civil affairs program.

Before discussing possible measures for achieving a more clearly defined locus of responsibility, it is necessary to examine briefly the internal problems of UNCACK, the chief agency operating civil affairs programs in Korea.

PROBLEMS OF THE UNCACK STRUCTURE

In September 1951, UNCACK was organized on a functional basis at headquarters, while its provincial teams paralleled the ROK administration, as shown in Figure 3. (A new organization, designed to achieve tighter control of field operations, was under consideration, but not yet approved in September 1951.)

Though UNCACK's official function in relation to ROK administration is "to advise and assist," 94 percent of the UNCACK sample interviewed insisted that actually it was an operating organization. (The UNCACK sample represented 38 percent of the UNCACK officer and civilian strength.) This was justified by the "corruption of Korean officials" and their low level of technical competence. Thus, the provincial UNCACK team in Seoul insisted on a cost-plus-fixed-fee system for letting contracts, while in Chungchong-namdo, the welfare officer did not permit the local myun (district) chiefs to draw up their own relief lists, but brought in officials from other areas. (It must be added that, by this drastic measure, estimates of relief population were reduced from 180,000 to 60,000.) The following statement represents the general attitude of UNCACK personnel: "If you want to get something done here, you have to go out and do it yourself."

On the other hand, the ROK officials were acutely aware of the fact that UNCACK was an operating organization. Whether it took the form of complaints of UNCACK interference with the operation of the ROK administration by denying transit passes to key employees at the provincial level, or of the control of programming and procurement at the national level, the vast majority of ROK officials agreed that UNCACK represented (to quote a typical statement), "an infringement of sovereignty." This resentment was aggravated by the absence of any instrument defining the respective spheres of jurisdiction. Forty-four percent of the sample opposed the advisorship in principle, calling it an example of US arrogance, a limitation of ROK independence, or a vestige of military government. A few officials (18 percent of the sample) even objected to labelling US goods as relief supplies since they alleged it implied condescension.

The national level of ROK administration interviewed was comprised of Cabinet ministers, with one exception. The provincial level included the governors and the Chiefs of Administrative Departments of two provinces, and the Mayor and the Department Chiefs of Seoul. Regarding the advisorship functions of UNCACK, two officials on the national level favored the advisorship relations, three were opposed in principle, and one




Fig. 3—UNCAK Organization, 20 September 1951.

was non-committal; on the provincial level, two officials favored the advisorship relations, eight were opposed in principle, and four were non-committal. (These figures are probably conservative because of the extreme circumspection of ROK officials in interviews with Americans.)

The frequency of the reasons given by ROK officials for their opposition to the US advisors is as follows:

<u>Reasons for ROK Opposition</u>	<u>Times Mentioned</u>
Interference with ROK sovereignty	10
Arrogance of US personnel	8
Tendency of indigenous population to by-pass Korean administration	8
UNCACK violation of the spirit of its efforts (usually direct operation)	5
Distribution of supplies should be left to discretion of ROK officials	7

The foregoing paragraphs are not meant to imply criticisms of UNCACK procedure, but to convey an indication of the complexity of the task facing civil affairs in Korea. They raise the question, however, whether an advisorship relation to an indigenous government can ever prove satisfactory for the accomplishment of civil affairs functions. The reactions of ROK officials would imply that the political advantages are not very pronounced, while US personnel insist that their tasks can be accomplished only by violating the spirit, if not the letter, of their directive. The question will have to be explored whether a more elastic structure and division of functions would not prove preferable in future operations of this type.

ORO attempted to analyze UNCACK operations in relation to three problems: (a) policy consciousness - the degree to which UNCACK personnel was aware of its mission; (b) policy guidance - the reaction of UNCACK personnel to the nature of the policy direction from higher echelons; and (c) operational guidance - the reaction of UNCACK personnel to the day-to-day direction of their activities.

Of 84 officers surveyed, 11 (13 percent) complained about inadequate operational guidance; 37 percent indicated dissatisfaction with what they considered ad hoc decisions and with the scant integration of UNCACK teams. By September 1951, more frequent team conferences were beginning to solve this problem.

Other difficulties were revealed by the questionnaire and interview procedure: (a) There was an interpreter problem in that practically no US personnel with command of the Korean language were available for civil affairs (as will be discussed in the section on Personnel); (b) Of the UNCACK sample, 65 percent complained about the frequency of reports and insisted that it forced them to pad their figures or invent incidents; and (c) 31 percent stressed the inadequacy of enlisted personnel, both in regard to T/O strength and to quality.

Table 2 summarizes the reactions of UNCACK personnel to its problems.

TABLE 2
REACTIONS OF UNCACK PERSONNEL TO
ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS*

Organization Problems and Source of Answers	Total Sample	Opinions		
		Too Little	Sufficient	Too Much
Policy Guidance				
Questionnaires	86	22 (26%)	62 (72%)	2 (2%)
Interviews	37	16 (42%)	21 (58%)	-
Operational Guidance				
Questionnaires	84	11 (17%)	67 (78%)	6 (5%)
Interviews	37	14 (37%)	23 (63%)	-
Reports				
Interviews	37	-	13 (35%)	24 (65%)
Enlisted Personnel				
Interviews	37	31 (85%)	6 (15%)	-

*The sample was based on 51 percent of UNCACK's total officer and civilian strength of 169 persons in the case of the questionnaires, and on 23 percent in the case of the interviews. No questionnaire data were available on the reactions to reports and the availability of enlisted personnel. The higher percentage of criticism in the interviews, compared to the questionnaires, can be explained by the greater confidence engendered by the former process.

CONCLUSIONS

The Korean civil affairs experience was analyzed in terms of criteria involving evaluations of the adequacy of the organization for liaison, of the locus of responsibility, and of its aptness for advising the commander.

An examination of UN and US agencies concerned with civil affairs revealed that four separate agencies with independent channels of communication were in direct contact with the ROK government in September 1951 - UNCURK, UNKRA, the Department of State, and the US Army. This has handicapped the development of an integrated policy, caused confusion among ROK officials regarding the real locus of responsibility, and encouraged ROK attempts to play off one organization against the other.

Within the Army, seven different units had varying degrees of direct relationships with ROK authorities, a situation that encouraged ROK attempts to by-pass the main operating agency, UNCACK, and that invited frequent jurisdictional disputes. This complex structure was not peculiar to EUSAK, but reflected conditions at both GHQ and DA. It explains in part the occasional lack of awareness of policy by UNCACK personnel and the complaints regarding policy direction.

The vague locus of responsibility has made it difficult for the commander to obtain a complete picture of civil affairs problems from one single source.

Based on the Korean experience, the organizational problem of civil affairs generally, can be resolved into specific needs for:

- A single focus of responsibility for all CA/MG functions;
- A single contact with the indigenous government;
- A status for the civil affairs section commensurate with the importance of its tasks.

POSSIBLE ORGANIZATION FOR FUTURE CA/MG ACTIVITIES

ORO has examined three possible CA/MG organizations, including the assignment of civilian advisors from the political organs of the government to the commanders at various levels, the organization of CA/MG under a special staff section, and the organization of CA/MG as a general staff section.

The assignment of civilian advisors was generally rejected on all echelons with such remarks as, "You can assign an advisor, but you cannot force me to take advice," or "No commander will tolerate an individual with an independent channel of communication." There was general agreement that, to be effective, the advisor would have to become part of the military structure and preferably be a military man himself.

The following arguments were advanced for a special staff section and against the creation of a general staff section: (a) The functions of CA/MG are analogous to those of a special, and not a general, staff; (b) sponsorship by an existing general staff section is adequate for the representation of the CA/MG point of view; (c) the existing general staff sections are adequate for handling all CA/MG functions; (d) G-5 section would be contrary to the doctrine taught at Fort Leavenworth (an argument used particularly by G-1 EUSAK in successfully opposing a G-5 section at that headquarters); (e) the creation of a G-5 section would represent a wasteful utilization of personnel because G-5 would not confine itself to advising, but would begin to duplicate the technical services; (f) five general staff sections would constitute an unwieldy group; and (g) augmentation units could be created, to be filled with need.

The following arguments were advanced for the creation of a G-5 section: (a) Modern war has an integral political component; (b) the importance of these civil affairs functions implies the creation of a general staff section, responsible for all aspects of CA/MG, with direct access to the chief of staff; (c) although existing general staff sections can and do sponsor a special staff section, they must perform their other tasks at the same time. CA/MG has to remain a peripheral concern under these circumstances; (d) five general staff sections should prove no more unwieldy than four; (e) a G-5 section need not duplicate the technical services. Indeed its status as a general staff section would enable it to call on the existing technical services for assistance. G-4 EUSAK favored the creation of a G-5 section for precisely this reason; (f) all CA/MG functions should be coordinated by one staff section; and (g) augmentation units may prove unworkable because personnel are unavailable when need arises, and nobody can advise the commander of the need.

Table 3 breaks down these views by echelon though, of course, not all the arguments were advanced by each individual interviewed.

TABLE 3

OPINIONS ON POSSIBLE CA/MG ORGANIZATIONS

Types of Organizations Favorable	Staff Officers*		CA/S Personnel EUSAK (inc. corps)	UNCACK Personnel
	GHQ	EUSAK (inc. corps)		
G-5 Section	6	9	8	15
Spec Staff Section	2	5	2	1
Non-committal or considered unimportant	0	4	3	7

*Staff officers included senior officers of the general staff sections at the echelon indicated. The relatively greater concern with a G-5 section on the operating level must, of course be corrected for "bias."

Though advocates of both the G-5 and special staff sections offer arguments of considerable merit, the Korean experience tends to support the need for a definite locus of responsibility for all CA/MG matters in the form of a G-5 section on all echelons down to division. This would enable the commander to inform himself of all the problems of CA/MG from a single source, and would provide direct access to the Chief of Staff, a condition essential to accomplishing CA/MG functions. Existing general staff sections cannot give their complete attention to CA/MG problems, and would subordinate such problems to those of a completely military nature.

The creation of a G-5 section would not represent a wasteful utilization of personnel particularly if civil supply is handled through the existing technical services on which a G-5 could call like any other general staff section.

G-5 would offer a mechanism for a single contact for liaison with the indigenous government, or with UN, or allied agencies, and would make possible a single channel of supervision and coordination from higher to lower echelons.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The influence of CA/MG personnel is totally out of proportion to their numbers. No other group of officers has a similar opportunity to affect the attitude of the civilian population towards the United States. Inasmuch as the CA/MG officers are in direct and constant contact with the local administration, the indigenous population will tend to judge the effectiveness of the US largely by the effectiveness of its CA/MG personnel. The officers are thus symbols of US power and US policy. The success of most CA/MG functions depends to a large extent on the initiative, sense of responsibility, and decisiveness of the small groups of officers who exercise them.

This report assumes that personnel policies towards CA/MG reflect, at least in part, its relative importance within the command.

As of September 1951, UNCACK contained 75 officers engaging in civil affairs functions, 94 civilians, and 154 enlisted men; CA/S contained 19 additional officers and 6 enlisted men. The UNCACK officer strength was broken down as follows: Brig. General, 1; Colonels, 3; Lt. Colonels, 8; Majors, 22; Captains, 24; Lieutenants, 14; W. O., 3.

The findings of this section are based on the analysis of 144 personnel questionnaires (76 percent of all officers and civilians in UNCACK and CA/S EUSAK) and 58 interview records (31 percent of all officers and civilians in UNCACK and CA/S EUSAK).

TYPE OF PERSONNEL IN CIVIL AFFAIRS IN KOREA

The great majority of the sample (87 percent), both within the civil affairs structure and the other staff sections, maintained that civil affairs personnel were recruited from "misfits, surplus,

and undesirables.' A smaller group (42 percent of the sample) insisted that civil affairs personnel were not doing a good job, proved to be too inexperienced, or were engaged in "empire building." Whatever the merit of these reactions, their prevalence has definite implications for the successful accomplishment of the civil affairs mission. To say that an allegation is untrue does not mean that its very existence presents no problem. The common belief in the inadequacy of civil affairs personnel has lowered the civil affairs prestige with other staff sections, lowered morale within the civil affairs structure, and made more difficult the development of a sense of a worthwhile civil affairs mission.

A substantial proportion of the ROK officials voiced reservations regarding the competence or attitude of US civil affairs personnel. The following comments, made by ROK officials at the national level (ministers or chiefs or administrative departments), can be taken as typical: "The bad quality of American personnel causes many Koreans to fear that Korea represents only a peripheral US interest"; "Koreans are used to taking orders, if issued by competent personnel - but the Americans are too inexperienced"; "Koreans expect to be treated as second-class human beings in dealing with Americans." Following is a breakdown of recurring Korean complaints at both the national and the provincial levels in order of their frequency:

Americans become too dependent on interpreters.

US civil affairs personnel do not understand Korean conditions.

US civil affairs personnel are arrogant and impatient.

US civil affairs personnel are too inexperienced.

US personnel have too low levels of education.

Koreans agree with their inexperienced advisors, but do what they want anyway.

US civil affairs personnel are "cookie-pushers" (remark made by ROK minister who spent 30 years in the US).

The objective merit of these reactions, both US and ROK, was analyzed in terms of two criteria: first, the Over-all Efficiency Index of civil affairs personnel (average ratings over a period of 4-5 years) to determine the validity of the charge that units tend to send their "misfits" to civil affairs; and second, the qualifications of civil affairs personnel for their present tasks is measured in terms of educational background and experience.

Analysis of Over-all Efficiency Index of Civil Affairs Personnel

A comparison of the Over-all Efficiency Index (OEI) of UNCACK officers with the OEI of a sample of Infantry officers revealed that civil affairs officers were several points below the average for their grades. Colonels and Lt. Colonels averaged 16 points lower than comparable Infantry officers; Majors lacked 6 points, Captains lacked 6.5 points; and Lieutenants lacked 7 points. These ratings indicate that the OEI of civil affairs officers was lower in each grade than the Infantry average, and that the disparity increased with the grade. A statistical analysis shows that the disparity is significant; one could not expect a random sample of Infantry officers to exhibit such a pattern of efficiency.

It must be emphasized that the efficiency records reflect on previous performance, not necessarily on the officer's record in CA/MG. Only 35 percent of the sample had previous CA/MG experience. Nevertheless, though a below average efficiency record may not necessarily indicate a lack of qualifications for CA/MG, it would be strange if efficiency for CA/MG were inversely related to efficiency in previous assignments. Based on their military efficiency records, Korean civil affairs personnel were, therefore, below average. This may support the charge that units tend to send their less capable officers into civil affairs, particularly at field grade levels.

The Over-all Efficiency Index of officers with previous CA/MG experience (35 percent of the sample) revealed no significant difference. This may support the frequent assertion that CA/MG has always been used as a "shunting off" assignment and that this condition is by no means peculiar to Korea. The efficiency ratings of the regular Army officers in the sample (9 percent) were significantly higher than the rest.

Analysis of Educational Background of Civil Affairs Personnel

An analysis of the educational background of officers in civil affairs revealed the following distribution in the years of schooling attained:

<u>Schooling Completed</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Some High School	1	1
Graduation from High School	20	30
Some College	21	31
Graduation from College	14	21
Some Post-Graduate	<u>11</u>	<u>17</u>
	67	100

Civil affairs officers' educational background on the college level compared to that of the Army as a whole in the following manner:

Officers Having College Degree or Equivalent	Civil Affairs Personnel %	Army Personnel %
Colonels and Lt. Colonels	41.6	68.8
Majors	31.8	45.3
Captains	31.6	42.2
Lieutenants	63.6	36.2

These data indicate that the educational background of civil affairs officers was lower than the Army average in all but the lowest grade. A statistical analysis shows that the disparity was significant, that one could not expect a random sample of the Army to deviate from the average to such a degree.

This analysis tends to support the complaints of officers and of ROK officials regarding the lack of background of civil affairs personnel for their functions. The situation appears particularly serious in the field grades. Among UNCACK personnel, only lieutenants are above the Army average in education. This can be explained in part by the recall to active duty of many lieutenants of the organized reserve just after completion of college.

It is necessary to emphasize that to note these difficulties is not to maintain that they were avoidable under the circumstances, or that they are traceable entirely to the personnel policies of EUSAK. The acute shortage of officers in the early stages of the conflict and the critical state of the battle made it impossible to spare personnel for anything but combat functions. When civil affairs was organized in October 1950 it was filled up by drafts on other units. It is only logical to assume that commanding officers made available their most dispensable personnel. Of UNCACK personnel only 5 percent requested transfer to civil affairs, only 6 percent were requested by UNCACK, while 89 percent were assigned either out of the replacement stream or from line units.

The Korean experience does call attention, however, to the need for army planning for CA/MG well in advance of any emergency, and for the creation of CA/MG personnel structures as an integral part of the army organization. Augmentation units do not seem to be adequate, for when augmentation becomes necessary personnel will be unavailable.

QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN- MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS, AND OTHER PROBLEMS

There existed almost unanimous agreement among civil affairs personnel in Korea that, to be effective, CA/MG personnel must possess a military background and preferably be in uniform. In general, a broad background and "common sense," were preferred to narrowly specialized training. Where specialized knowledge proved necessary, it was nevertheless maintained that the nucleus of the teams should be furnished by individuals of broad views, with specialists to be added with need.

Civilian-Military Personnel Relationships

In Korea, the specialists in civil affairs were mostly civilians, both US and UN. Though on the whole this mixed organization worked well, certain problems nevertheless appeared. These involved primarily the tension between military and civilian personnel, and the method of recruiting civilians.

The military personnel criticized the civilian employees for their exorbitant salaries in relation to those of officers performing similar tasks, their desire to work a 40-hour week in a combat zone, assumption of intellectual superiority, and reluctance to accept military discipline. On the other hand, civilians had complained of their inferior status in relation to the officer personnel, and of the low levels of education and ability of the officer personnel.

Educational Attainment of Personnel

Table 4 compares the relative educational level of officer and civilian personnel.

TABLE 4
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS ATTAINED BY UNCAK PERSONNEL

Schooling Completed	US Army	US Civilians	UN Civilians
	%	%	%
High School Graduation	97	98	100
Some College	69	76	88
College Graduation	38	54	79
Some Post-Graduate	17	34	35

In addition, the method of recruitment, particularly of UN civilians, made for dissatisfaction. A number of individuals had been recruited from responsible positions expecting commensurate assignments in Korea only to find themselves in relatively limited tasks in insignificant Korean towns. Most US civilians had been recruited from Japan. The latter group largely represented personnel declared surplus with the phasing out of SCAP, and tended to have the lowest morale among the civilians.

On the whole, however, the civilians exhibited not only a higher educational level, but also a greater awareness of the importance of civil affairs. This is largely explained by the fact that a substantial proportion had requested to be assigned to civil affairs and that the majority were in Korea voluntarily. Table 5 illustrates the basis of assignment.

TABLE 5
BASIS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT TO UNCACK

Basis of Assignment	US Army	US Civilians	UN Civilians
Arbitrary Assignment	60	12	15
Requested by UNCACK	4	5	9
Requested Transfer	3	27	3
TOTAL IN SAMPLE	67	44	27

*Data represent 84 percent of total officer and civilian strength of UNCACK.

Need for Trained Linguists

One of the most serious problems facing civil affairs in Korea involved the shortage of trained linguists. UNCACK did not have a single individual capable of speaking Korean. The interpreter problem was compounded by the low level of education in Korea, so that personnel who could understand both English and the substance of complicated negotiations proved extremely difficult to find.

The shortage of trained US linguists has had the following consequences: (a) It put civil affairs personnel at the mercy of their Korean interpreters; (b) it made the Korean interpreter, unprepared by training and experience, the key man in civil affairs field operations; (c) it posed a serious security problem, because of the difficulty of adequately screening interpreters under Korean conditions; and (d) it exalted the influence of Koreans

who spoke English and therefore were able to obtain direct access to civil affairs personnel.

ROK officials were well aware of the interpreter problem and frequently advanced it as the reason for inefficient civil affairs performance. The following statements can be taken as typical: "Many misunderstandings are caused by poor interpreters," or "Korean interpreters do not understand the substance of what they are interpreting."

CONCLUSIONS

If the assumption is valid that personnel policies reflect the relative importance of CA/MG within a command, and if the analysis of this section is correct, two fundamental requirements emerge: (a) The need to impress commanders and line officers with the importance of CA/MG; and (b) the need to find qualified officers and teach them the substance of CA/MG.

The two requirements are interrelated and "a" can be defined as the prerequisite of "b." Requirement "a" may imply greater stress on the teaching of political subjects at such institutions as West Point, the Command and General Staff School, and the National War College. Requirement "b" involves the development of criteria for the selection of CA/MG officers and the development of an integrated training program, both within the regular establishment and within the reserves.

Though no definitive recommendations are possible in this regard, on the basis of one field study, the Korean experience has called attention to general needs for a group of officers, trained in CA/MG to provide the nucleus of field teams. These officers should have a broad military experience and a substantial education in political science or economics. Thus, they could provide the backbone of expanded CA/MG functions. Whether they would be best obtained by the establishment of a CA/MG corps, by a CA/MG specialization, or by some other method cannot be answered at this stage, but if specialists are required, they should, if at all possible, be provided by the reserves. If civilians are to be recruited for specialist tasks, their jobs should be specified. The Korean experience indicated that military-civilian organizations are feasible, though not preferable.

The Army could avoid the interpreter problem by creating a pool of trained linguists adequate for future contingencies. Although this may prove most difficult for remote and underdeveloped areas, it is precisely in these areas that indigenous interpreters will prove most unsatisfactory.

SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

APPENDIX A
SCOPE AND METHOD OF STUDY

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SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

This study attempts to assist the Army in planning for future contingencies. It is not concerned with weaknesses in the military structure in specific theaters except to illustrate typical patterns of operation. This is not an attempt to assess blame, but to draw lessons for the future. Moreover, to note a deficiency is not to say it could have been prevented with the means available and under the pressure of events. The unpreparedness for civil affairs operations in Korea represented merely one aspect of a general unreadiness for war in the Far East. On the other hand, this very unpreparedness makes Korea an excellent "laboratory" for the analysis of difficulties which arise as inevitable concomitants of insufficient planning.

One of the distinguishing features of operations research is its emphasis on the practical implications of its findings. It is not concerned with historical analysis as such or with administrative procedures for their own sake. Instead it attempts to extract from the experience of previous operations those aspects which seem likely to recur in the future and state them in terms of objective criteria and specific operations or functions the Army may have to perform. If any social science discipline is used, it is never used for its own sake but as a tool for continuing analysis.

Any study dealing with a subject as vast as the Army's role in CA/MG must select, out of the mass of available data, those portions it considers significant for its purpose. The selection of material in this study was guided by these purposes:

- (a) To discover the features common to all previous occupation efforts, which therefore define the minimum conditions of all CA/MG planning;
- (b) To analyze the problems peculiar to particular areas or to specific policies;
- (c) To discover the nature of these special conditions; to determine their characteristic variables, whether economic, social, or cultural, and to analyze the degree to which these must be considered in planning CA/MG efforts;
- (d) To consider only those aspects of previous experiences which seem likely to recur; and
- (e) To recommend measures which assist Army planning for these contingencies.

This memorandum represents a report on one of a series of comparative studies. Each field study must, therefore, be considered in relation to the developing pattern of analysis. In

order to assist in this evaluation, each separate report should be prefaced with a discussion of the situation it is designed to represent, including a discussion of the characteristics this effort has in common with other CA/MG experiences, analysis of the features peculiar to this effort both in relation to the area and to the policies pursued, and the applicability of the field study for future Army planning. As further study develops, the "type" situations are expected to provide an index to the trend of analysis and a point of reference for the requirements of Army planning.

The findings of this study reflect conditions as of September 1951. Army personnel in the FEC and EUSAK were acutely aware of many of the problems discussed here. A number of steps have already been taken to remedy obvious inadequacies. Nevertheless the problems have been restated in order to indicate areas requiring further study and the kind of difficulties that should be avoided in future Army planning. The fact of correction seems an indication of the general validity of the conclusions of this report.

This memorandum is based on the analysis of documents and questionnaires, supplemented by personal interviews at various levels of the Army organization and of the Korean government. This reflects an attempt to relate the problems of the civil affairs in Korea to specific operations and particular levels of planning.

It must be emphasized that the data developed by these procedures can not be taken at face value but must be interpreted to determine their significance. For example, the frequent complaints of personnel about inadequate T/Os may really reflect on the quality of the personnel, just as assertions of unsatisfactory policy direction may reveal a lack of control rather than the absence of policy. Nevertheless, whatever the substantive merit of these complaints, their existence is an objective fact useful as a guide to the analysis of problem areas. The validity of either interviews or questionnaires depends, however, on the proper selection of the sample and on the nature of the questionnaire.

The interview sample was selected in the following manner:

- (a) To obtain a picture of the impact of civil affairs on the operation of other general or special staff sections, interviews were conducted with responsible officers of staff sections at the D/A, GHQ, 8th Army, I Corps, IX Corps, 3 infantry divisions and 5 regiments.

- (b) An analysis of civil affairs planning involved interviews with representatives of PMGO, G/3 and G/4 of the Department of the Army, of G/1 and KEAD, G/4 of GHQ and the CA/S of 8th Army.
- (c) The limited time available for the Korean field study confined ORO staff to only a sample of the personnel operating civil affairs programs. All section chiefs at UNCACK and all officers and civilians of three of the provincial UNCACK teams were interviewed. The three UNCACK teams visited represented a cross-section operating under typical conditions.
- (d) In order to analyze the impact of civil affairs operations on the indigenous government, the Korean counterparts of the UNCACK sample were interviewed wherever possible. This included all key ROK ministers, as well as the governors and chiefs of administrative departments of three provinces.
- (e) The conduct of CA/MG in Korea was also influenced by UN resolutions and the actions of other US government agencies. To obtain some insight into these relationships, officials of the US delegation to the UN, of the North East Asia Desk of the Department of State, of the US Embassy staff in Korea, and of UNKRA were interviewed.

Activity and personnel questionnaires were distributed to officer and civilian personnel assigned to UNCACK, and activity questionnaires only to the Civil Assistance Section, EUSAK. ORO was thus able to correlate its interviews with the questionnaires, analyzing 87 activity and 144 personnel questionnaires. The activity questionnaires returned represented a 59 percent sample of the total officer strength of UNCACK and the CA/S EUSAK; the personnel questionnaires returned represented a 78 percent sample of UNCACK officers and civilians.

Documents analyzed included pertinent policy files relating to DA-theater communications. Special attention was paid to documents reflecting the Army's role in the process of policy formulation, and to the flow of policy from Washington through GHQ to the operating agencies in Korea.

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DA DIRECTIVE TO CINCFE, 6 July 50

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
Adjutant General's Office
Radio and Cable Center

INCOMING MESSAGE

6 July 50

FROM: DA (CSGPO)

TO: CINCFE

FOR: W 85117

Proposed Interim Initial Directive with respect to Civil Affairs Activities in Korea quoted below. ECA and State concur. Rqst your comments and views of Mr. Muccio soonest. "Pending dispatch more detailed instructions, following principles are laid down to prov you with preliminary gen guidance with respect to your auth and responsibilities with ref to relationships between forces under your comd. Amer Ambassador to Korea, Govt of Republic of Korea and UN Orgn.

"Govt of Republic of Korea is recogd by US as responsible governing auth and only lawful govt in Korea, and is only Korean Govt whose legality has been recognized by UN. Auth of Govt of Republic of Korea will be respected and civil affairs matters will be conducted through it to max extent which mil necessity permits.

"Amer Ambassador to Korea, as duly accredited representative of President of US to Govt of Republic of Korea, is and shall continue to be principal channel of liaison with that govt. On all matters pertaining to relations with Govt of Republic of Korea, except those of essentially mil character, you should therefore rely upon judgement of Amer Ambassador to extent that exigencies of mil situation permit.

"US Ambassador to Korea will nevertheless conform to your decisions on matters affecting mil mission and rgmts of mil situations. In event of disagreement as to actions within sphere of interest of other US Governmental agencies, you will

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W 85117

-2-

Incoming Message 6 Jul 50

refer such questions to this hq for determination, but in Interim you will act as mil situation may require.

"Mil action now being taken in Korea by forces under your comd is being taken pursuant to UN Scty Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27. You are regarded as having complete operational responsibility in carrying out that mil action on behalf of US Govt.

"In providing assistance to Civ Economy of Korea, including food, supplies, and materials required to prevent creation of condition prejudicial to success of mil operations in that area, ECA having concurred, you are authorized to make every possible use of representatives of that agency in Korea to assist you in accomplishing your mission. You will exercise a control over those representatives as may be necessary to ensure that their actions are coordinated with rqmts of mil situation.

"Upon receipt of necessary instructions, now in process of preparation, Ambassador, with appropriate assistance from your comd, will negotiate with Govt of Republic of Korea a Civil Affairs Agreement defining respective rights, duties, and jurisdictional limitations of mil forces of US and Govt of Republic of Korea."

NO SIG

UN SECURITY RESOLUTION ON KOREAN RELIEF, 31 July 50

July 31, 1950: United Nations Security Council resolution on Korean relief -

The Security Council,

Recognizing the hardships and privations to which the people of Korea are being subjected as a result of the continued prosecution by the North Korean forces of their unlawful attack; and

Appreciating the spontaneous offers of assistance to the Korean people which have been made by governments, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations;

Requests the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

Requests the Secretary-General to transmit all offers of assistance for relief and support to the Unified Command;

Requests the Unified Command to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on its relief activities;

Requests the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, other appropriate United Nations principal and subsidiary organs, the specialized agencies in accordance with the terms of their respective agreements with the United Nations, and appropriate non-governmental organizations to provide such assistance as the Unified Command may request for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and as appropriate in connection with the responsibilities being carried out by the Unified Command on behalf of the Security Council.

STATE DEPT. MESSAGE CONTAINING LETTER OF
PRESIDENT TO ECA ADMINISTRATOR, 1 Oct 50

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
Adjutant General's Office
Radio and Cable Center

INCOMING MESSAGE

1 Oct 50

FROM: STATE DEPT

TO: SCAP (USPOLAD) (ECA FOR JOHNSON) (G-4 INFO)
(PASS TO MUCCIO)

INFO: DA (OAFE)

Re President's letter to Hoffman, 29 Sep 50.

This is KORCIV Nbr 39.

This is Joint Army-ECA Cable.

Subj is ECA-Army Civilian Supply Responsibilities.

1. New ECA policy on procurement and functions is outlined in letter just received by Administrator from the President as follows verbatim:

"As a result of the recent action of the Security Council of the United Nations in placing over-all responsibility and authority for civilian reliefs and support in Korea, as well as for the conduct of military operations, in the Unified Command, it is now timely to clarify the functions of your administration in relation to the Republic of Korea.

"In accordance with our established national policy of supporting actions of the United Nations, substantial armed forces and military resources of the United States have been made available to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, for his use in discharging his military responsibilities. Your administration has been providing civilian supplies and technical aid on an emergency basis to assist in preventing the development of economic conditions in the area that would prejudice the success of the military operations now in progress.

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FROM: STATE DEPT TO: SCAP 1 OCT 50

"It is my earnest desire that continuity be maintained in the flow of economic aid to the Republic of Korea. Such aid as can be provided by your administration within the limits of available appropriations should continue to be applied to developing and maximizing economic self-help. This aid should be coordinated with the contributions of other countries into the Civilian Supply and Relief Program which is being implemented under the authority and responsibility of the Unified Command. I believe that your administration is well equipped by experience to perform certain important and specialized functions within this over-all program.

"Pending the adoption of a United Nations program for relief and rehabilitation in Korea, the Economic Cooperation Administration, within available funds, shall be responsible for the following types of assistance to the Republic of Korea, under appropriate arrangements with the Government of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command:

A. The provision of equipment, supplies, and advisory aid required to maximize the output of Korean agricultural and fisheries resources, and of essential civilian industrial production facilities which are not directly utilized by the United Nations Command for predominantly military purposes.

B. Fiscal advisory assistance to combat the threat of inflation and to help the Republic of Korea to develop appropriate controls in these fields.

C. The continued development and execution of programs for the training of personnel in the administration and operation of economic agencies and enterprises.

D. The development of requirements and suggested plans for the post-war rehabilitation of public utilities, mines, harbors and other facilities important to the economy of the Republic of Korea. Such suggested plans should be prepared for submission to whatever agency or agencies may be established to deal with post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction problems.

E. The development and analysis of information regarding economic problems in the Republic of Korea which will contribute to timely action in respect to these problems by the appropriate agencies.

F. Upon the request of the United Nations Command, provide assistance in arranging with local authorities in Korea for the proper distribution and issue of supplies in order to prevent conditions of disease and unrest and render advisory assistance in the procurement of supplies for such purposes.

- 3 -

FROM: STATE DEPT TO: SCAP 1 OCT 50

"To facilitate the concentration of the available resources and staff of your administration on the foregoing tasks and to operate within available appropriations during the current fiscal year, your administration will be relieved for the present period of any responsibility for financing requirements in Korea for direct civilian relief assistance, in the form of food, clothing, shelter, medical supplies and similar items; also, as a general rule, of responsibility for the provision of other categories of needed supplies which serve common military and civilian purposes. The Department of Defense will make suitable arrangements with the United Nations Command to finance the United States share of such needs for appropriations made to that department.

"With respect to the determination of requirements in both these broad areas, the unified command will have the benefit of the knowledge and experience of the personnel of your administration who will act in advisory capacity together with officials of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea concerned with these problems.

"Pending the creation of such machinery as may be determined by the United Nations to deal with post-war economic rehabilitation problems, the responsibility which your administration had assumed under arrangements with the Department of State and the Department of Defense in connection with contributions of non-military assistance to the Republic of Korea made through the United Nations, should now be undertaken by the Department of Defense since the latter has the principal responsibility for the supply and relief of the Korean people during the period of hostility.

"For the orderly performance of the foregoing functions, it will be necessary for you to review and adjust where necessary the assignments, at appropriate levels, of qualified staff of your administration to agencies of the Republic of Korea and units of the United Nations command in Korea and Japan.

"I am sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for their information and guidance in taking the necessary actions to put this arrangement into effect."

2. ECA and D/A have informally approved following interpretation of letter:

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When separated from
Classified enclosures

SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

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FROM: STATE DEPT TO: SCAP 1 OCT 50

ECA will honor contracts signed, and sub authorizations and PA's approved, prior to 15 Sept. All commitments made thereafter should conform to directions contained in President's letter. In general, ECA may not procure goods and supplies for direct civilian relief, EG, food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies, and, as stated in the President's letter, the Department of Defense will make suitable arrangements to finance requirements for civilian relief. However, supplies and equipment for production of relief supplies and to repair and rebuild facilities for the production of relief supplies are suitable ECA procurement. ECA will be responsible also for provision of equipment and supplies to maximize agricultural, fisheries, and industrial production. During the hostilities period, procurement of materials, supplies and equipment for public utilities, transport and industrial facilities must be limited to goods for facilities not directly controlled or utilized by CINCUNC for predominantly military purposes. Thus, such commodities as rolling stock, materials for repair of docks, warehouses, railroad stations will not be proper objects of ECA procurement so long as these facilities are controlled or utilized primarily by the military.

ECA and D/A conferring on further clarification respective responsibilities problem and procurement and agreement is being sought on responsibilities in terms of specific program and commodities. Will attempt obtain Bureau of Budget concurrence to list and will advise you progress.

FOSTER

SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

CINCFE DIRECTIVE TO CG EIGHTH ARMY, KOREA, 17 OCT 50

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMANDGD KEA WRH/icc
17 Oct 50

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: CG ARMY EIGHT KOREA.

C 66612 This is CRIVROK 47

1. Ref CINCFE msg CX 65654 CIVROK 32, 6 Oct; CINCFE mag CX 66092 CIVROK 42, 11 Oct; ECATO 492 KORCIV 39, 1 Oct 50; paras 3 and 4, Annex I Civil Affairs, to Opn O #2, 7 Oct 50.

2. The Commanding General, Eighth Army, is charged with the complete and overall responsibility for the provision of necessary supplies and equipment to prevent disease, starvation and unrest among the civilian population in Korea, and for the provision of civilian type supplies and equipment for construction and reconstruction necessary for the attainment of the military objectives of the UNC. The conduct of surveys, the determination of requirements, the submission of such requirements to CINCUNC and the supervision of the distribution and utilization of such supplies and equipment are the responsibility of the CG Eighth Army.

3. The CG Eighth Army will establish the necessary staff organization within his headquarters and the necessary field organizations for the accomplishment of this mission as appropriate, considering the different conditions existing in both North and South Korea, from sources within his command. For planning purposes, a table of distribution unit to provide approximately 132 personnel for PH&W functions has been approved in principle and will be assigned to CG Eighth Army upon approval of the detailed organization. PH&H Sect, GHQ, UNC, personnel now in Korea and attached to Eighth Army for administrative and logistic support, are available to CG Eighth Army until withdrawn or replaced by CINCUNC. Requests for additional personnel

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FROM: CINCFE TO: CG ARMY EIGHT WRH/icc

and spaces necessary to accomplish Civil Affairs mission will be submitted to CINCUNC.

4. The CG Eighth Army is authorized to utilize the assistance of the ECA insofar as the present mission of ECA will permit.

5. The CG Eighth Army is authorized to utilize such agencies of the Republic of Korea Government and of the North Korean officials as in his judgment he decides is desirable.

6. Coordination will be effected by the CG Eighth Army with the State Department as represented by the Ambassador to Korea and with the ECA.

7. The above responsibility will rest with CG Eighth Army until otherwise directed by CINCUNC.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH
Brig. General, ACG
Adjutant General

G. L. EBERLE
Major General, General Staff Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

UN RESOLUTION CREATING UNKRA, 1 DEC 50

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL

GENERAL

A/1595

ASSEMBLY

2 December 1950

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fifth Session
Agenda item 24

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA

Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at
its 314th plenary meeting on 1 December 1950(adopted on the report of the Joint Second and
Third Committee (A/1567, Part II))

A.

The General Assembly,Having regard to its resolution of 7 October 1950 on the problem of the independence of Korea,Having received and considered a report of the Economic and Social Council submitted in accordance with that resolution,Mindful that the aggression by North Korean forces and their warfare against the United Nations seeking to restore peace in the area has resulted in great devastation and destruction which the Korean people cannot themselves repair,Recognizing that as a result of such aggression the people of Korea are desperately in need of relief supplies and materials and help in reconstructing their economy,Deeply moved by the sufferings of the Korean people and determined to assist in their alleviation,Convinced that the creation of a United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation for Korea is necessary both to the maintenance of lasting peace in the area and to the establishment of the economic foundations for the building of a unified and independent nation,Considering that, under the said resolution of 7 October 1950, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation

/of Korea

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of Korea is the principal representative of the United Nations in Korea and hence must share in the responsibility for the work undertaken by the United Nations in furtherance of the objects and purposes mentioned in the said resolution,

Considering that it is nevertheless desirable to set up a special authority with broad powers to plan and supervise rehabilitation and relief and to assume such functions and responsibilities related to planning and supervision, to technical and administrative matters, and to questions affecting organization and implementation as are to be exercised under the plans for relief and rehabilitation approved by the General Assembly, such authority to carry out its responsibilities in close co-operation with the Commission,

A. Establishment of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea

1. Establishes the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) under the direction of a United Nations Agent General, who shall be assisted by one or more deputies. The Agent General shall be responsible to the General Assembly for the conduct (in accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly, and having regard to such general policy recommendations as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may make) of the programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea, as that programme may be determined from time to time by the General Assembly;

2. Authorizes the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea:

(a) To recommend to the Agent General such policies concerning the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency's programme and activities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective discharge of the Commission's responsibilities in relation to the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in Korea;

(b) To determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographical areas within which the Agency shall operate at any time;

/(c) To designate

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(c) To designate authorities in Korea with which the Agent General may establish relationships; and to advise the Agent General on the nature of such relationships;

(d) To take such steps as may be needed to support the Agent General in fulfilling his task in accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly for relief and rehabilitation;

(e) To consider the reports of the Agent General to the General Assembly and to transmit any comments thereon to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly;

(f) To call for information on those aspects of the work of the Agent General which the Commission may consider necessary for the proper performance of its work;

3. Authorizes the Commission to consult from time to time with the Agent General in regard to the provisional programme adopted by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council and especially with regard to the adequacy of that programme to meet the needs of Korea as defined in the statement of general policy, and to make recommendations thereon to the Economic and Social Council,

4. Directs the Agent General:

(a) To co-ordinate his programme with measures taken by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly relating to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea, and to support the Commission in fulfilling this task;

(b) To commence the operation of the programme in Korea at such time as may be agreed upon by the United Nations Unified Command, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the Agent General;

(c) To consult with and generally be guided by the advice of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea on the matters set forth under paragraph 2 (a) and be governed by its advice on the matters covered in paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c);

/5. Further

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5. Further directs the Agent General, in the carrying out of his functions:

(a) To ascertain, after consultation with the designated authorities in Korea, the requirements for supplies and services for relief and rehabilitation made necessary by the consequences of armed conflict in Korea;

(b) To provide for the procurement and shipment of supplies and services and for their effective distribution and utilization within Korea;

(c) To consult with and assist the appropriate authorities in Korea with respect to measures necessary for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy and the effective distribution and utilization within Korea of supplies and services furnished,

(d) To submit reports to the General Assembly through the Secretary-General, transmitting copies simultaneously to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and to the Economic and Social Council;

(e) To be guided in matters of administration, to the extent consistent with the special requirements of the programme, by the rules and regulations established for the operation of the Secretariat of the United Nations; Specifically he shall:

(1) Select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Agent General and the Secretary-General shall agree are applicable;

(2) Utilize, wherever appropriate, and within budgetary limitations, the existing facilities of the United Nations;

(3) Establish, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and in agreement with the Advisory Committee established under paragraph 6 below, financial regulations for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency;

(4) Arrange in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, for the rendering and audit of the accounts of the Agency under procedures similar to those applicable to the rendering and audit of the accounts of the United Nations.

/6. Establishes

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6. Establishes an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of . . . (five Member States) to advise the Agent General with regard to major financial, procurement distribution and other economic problems pertaining to his planning and operations. The Committee shall meet on the call of the Agent General but not less than four times a year. The meetings of the Committee shall be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations except in special circumstances, when the Committee, after consultation with the Agent General, may meet elsewhere if it deems that this would be essential to the proper performance of its work. The Committee shall determine its own methods of work and rules of procedure;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the Advisory Committee to appoint the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction, and authorizes the Agent General to appoint one or more Deputy Agents General in consultation with the Secretary-General;
8. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a special account to which should be credited all contributions in cash, kind or services, the resources credited to the account to be used exclusively for the programme of relief and rehabilitation and administrative expenses connected therewith; and directs the Secretary-General to make cash withdrawals from the account upon request of the Agent General. The Agent General is authorized to use contributions in kind or services at his discretion;
9. Recommends that the Agent General in carrying out his functions:
- (a) Make use at his discretion of facilities, services and personnel that may be available to him through existing national and international agencies and organizations both governmental and non-governmental;
 - (b) Consult with the Secretary-General and the heads of the specialized agencies before appointing his principal subordinate personnel in their respective fields of competence;
 - (c) Make use of the advice and technical assistance of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and, where appropriate,

/request them

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request them to undertake specific projects and special tasks either at their own expense or with funds made available by the Agent General;

(d) Maintain close contact with the Secretary-General for the purpose of ensuring fullest co-ordination of efforts of the organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in support of the programme;

10. Authorizes the Agent General to enter into agreements with such authorities in Korea as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may designate, containing terms and conditions governing measures affecting the distribution and utilization in Korea of the supplies and services furnished, in accordance with the statement of general policy on Korean relief and rehabilitation contained in section B of the present resolution;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the maximum extent possible, and subject to appropriate financial arrangements, such facilities, advice and services as the Agent General may request;

12. Requests the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to make available to the maximum extent possible, and subject to appropriate financial arrangements, such facilities, advice and services as the Agent General may request;

13. Requests the Economic and Social Council to review the reports of the Agent General and any comments which the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may submit thereon, and such other data as may be available on the progress of relief and rehabilitation in Korea and to make appropriate reports and recommendations thereon to the General Assembly;

14. Calls upon all Governments, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations pending the beginning of operations by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, to continue to furnish through the Secretary-General such assistance for the

/Korean people

Korean people as may be requested by the Unified Command;

15. Invites countries not Members of the United Nations to participate in financing the programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea:

B. Statement of general policy on relief and rehabilitation in Korea

16. Approves the following statement of general policy:
1. The United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea is necessary to the restoration of peace and the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea.
 2. To this end, it is the objective of the United Nations to provide, subject to the limit of the resources placed at its disposal for this purpose, relief and rehabilitation supplies, transport and services, to assist the Korean people to relieve the sufferings and to repair the devastation caused by aggression, and to lay the necessary economic foundations for the political unification and independence of the country.
 3. The United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation for Korea shall be carried out in practice in such a way as to contribute to the rapid restoration of the country's economy in conformity with the national interests of the Korean people, having in view the strengthening of the economic and political independence of Korea and having in view that, in accordance with the general principles of the United Nations, such assistance must not serve as a means for foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs of Korea and must not be accompanied by any conditions of a political nature.
 4. The United Nations programme is to be a supplement to the general recovery effort that will be undertaken by the Korean people on their own initiative and responsibility, through the most effective utilization of their own resources as well as of the aid which is rendered under the programme.
 5. Whilst the programme should be consistent with the pattern of long-term economic development in Korea, it is itself necessarily limited to relief and rehabilitation, and

/contributions

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contributions and supplies furnished under this programme shall be used exclusively for that purpose.

6. First priority shall be given to the provision of the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter for the population of Korea and measures to prevent epidemics. Second highest priority shall be given to projects which will yield early results in the indigenous production of basic necessities; this will include the reconstruction of transport and power facilities. As the programme develops, emphasis should be shifted to the provision of other materials, supplies and equipment for the reconstruction or replacement of war-damaged facilities necessary to the economic life of the country.

7. The necessary measures shall be taken to ensure that distribution shall be so conducted that all classes of the population shall receive their equitable shares of essential commodities without discrimination as to race, creed or political belief.

8. Subject to adequate control, the distribution of supplies shall be carried out, as appropriate, through public and co-operative organizations, through non-profit-making voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross, and through normal channels of private trade. At the same time, measures shall be taken to ensure that the cost of distribution and the profit from the sale of supplies are kept to the minimum. Measures shall be taken to ensure that the special needs of refugees and other distressed groups of the population are met through appropriate public welfare programmes, and accordingly the sale of relief supplies will take place only in justifiable cases and under conditions agreed upon with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

9. The local currency proceeds derived from the sale of relief and rehabilitation supplies or, at the discretion of the Agent General, an amount commensurate with the value of goods and services supplied, shall be paid into an account under the control of the Agent General. The Agent General, after consultation with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and in agreement with the Advisory Committee referred to in paragraph 6 of Section A of the present resolution, shall use these funds for

/appropriate

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appropriate additional relief and rehabilitation activities with-
in Korea, for the local currency expenses of the relief and
rehabilitation operations of the United Nations, or for measures
to combat inflation. The proceeds shall not be used for any
other purpose.

10. The necessary economic and financial measures shall
be taken by the authorities in Korea to ensure that the
resources provided under the United Nations programme,
as well as Korean resources, are effectively employed to
aid in laying the economic foundations of the country. Among
these, special attention should be given to measures to combat
inflation, to sound fiscal and monetary policies, to the requi-
site pricing, rationing and allocation controls (including the
pricing of goods imported under the programme), to the
prudent use of Korean foreign exchange resources together
with promotion of exports, and to the efficient management
of government enterprise.

11. Import taxes shall not be imposed on relief and rehabili-
tation supplies received under the United Nations programme.

12. The authorities in Korea should maintain such records
and make such reports on the receipt, distribution and use
of relief and rehabilitation supplies as may be determined
by the Agent General after consultation with them.

13. All authorities in Korea shall freely permit the personnel
of the United Nations to supervise the distribution of relief
and rehabilitation supplies, including the examination of all
storage and distribution facilities as well as records.

14. The personnel of the United Nations shall be accorded
within Korea the privileges, immunities and facilities
necessary for the fulfilment of their function.

15. All authorities in Korea and the Secretary-General shall
use their best efforts to inform the people of Korea of the
sources and purposes of the contributions of funds, supplies
and services.

16. In determining Korea's needs for relief and rehabilitation,
in drawing up programmes and plans, and in implementing
such programmes and plans, the Agency created to administer
the relief and rehabilitation programme should consult with
and utilize, to the greatest extent feasible, the service of
Korean authorities.

/B. The General Assembly

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B.

The General Assembly

1. Requests the President to appoint a Negotiating Committee composed of seven or more members for the purpose of consulting, as soon as possible during the current session of the General Assembly, with Member and non-member States as to the amounts which Governments may be willing to contribute towards the financing of the programme for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea;

2. Authorizes the Negotiating Committee to adopt procedures best suited to the accomplishment of its task, bearing in mind:

(a) The need for securing the maximum contribution in cash;

(b) The desirability of ensuring that any contribution in kind is of a nature which meets the requirements of the contemplated programmes; and

(c) The degree of assistance which can be rendered by specialized agencies, non-member States and other contributors;

3. Requests that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has ascertained the extent to which Member States are willing to make contributions, all delegations be notified accordingly by the Secretary-General in order that they may consult with their Governments;

4. Decides that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has completed its work, the Secretary-General shall, at the Committee's request, arrange, during the current session of the General Assembly, an appropriate meeting of Member and non-member States at which Members may commit themselves to their national contributions and the contributions of non-members may be made known.

* * *

In accordance with the terms of the above resolution, the President of the General Assembly, at the 318th plenary meeting on 4 December 1950, announced that he had appointed a Negotiating Committee. The following States Members were appointed: Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay.

CINCUNC MESSAGE TO DA, 7 FEB 51

CLASSIFIED
INCOMING MESSAGE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SECRET PRIORITY PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR WASH DC FOR G-3

NR : C54999 7 FEB 51

Ref mag DA 82639, 3 Feb.

1. The mil sit in Korea has caused a serious dislocation in the civ pop of Korea and there is little that can be considered secure or stabilized. The most serious problem is the care of the large number of refugees which requires immediate action to prevent disease, starvation and unrest.

2. Understood here that the mission of UNKRA is first to prov rel to the civ pop and second to undertake the rehabilitation of Korean economy both under the policy guidance of UNCURK. UNCURK is responsible for the activation of UNKRA at such time as is mutually agreed upon by the Unified Command, UNCURK and the Agent General of UNKRA. In general, this should not be until military operations are practically complete and peace and security are est in Korea. The army is now charged with dir rep and is best suited to carry out this mission while mil opns are in progress. ECA is charged with the long range rehabilitation mission and has found it impracticable to make much progress along this line due to unsettled conditions caused by the present mil sit. It is therefore doubtful if UNKRA would have any greater success in the long range mission.

3. According to figures aval to this Hq UNCURK now has on their staff in Japan 51 persons and in Korea 42 persons. This would appear to be adequate to make the plans for the activation and initiation of the opn of UNKRA at such time as it appears feasible.

DA IN 18388

(7 Feb 51)

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CLASSIFIED
INCOMING DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
MESSAGE STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR : C 54999

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4. Therefore it is considered that activation of UNKRA is not nec at this time. If, for reasons not known here it is considered nec to activate this agency it is recommended that the Agent General and/or his deputy be sent to this Comd as indiv UN observers only and that no UNKRA operational personnel be est in Korea at this time.

ACTION: G3

DA IN 18388

(7 Feb 51)

c jhp/1

80

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DA MESSAGE TO CINCFE ON LACK OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
AGREEMENT, 7 FEB 51

C
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

ELT/lah

ROUTINE

7 Feb 51

FROM: DEPTAR (COMPT) WASH DC

TO : CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

NR : DA 82861

Subj is Procurement Indigenous Sups in S Korea.

1. To extent feasible svcs, sups and fac procd in Korea in support US Armed Forces opns should be obtained through ROK without pmt therefore on understanding ROK will be reponsible for compensation as against owners or suppliers and that settlement of any claims arising from such provisions of svcs, sups and fac by ROK shall be a matter for later consideration by ROK and US Govt. Where circumstances preclude such procurement through ROK it should be effd dirly and made in local curr obtain under financial agreement.

2. Budget planning should be based on max feasible procurement indigenous sups through ROK and dollar fund rqmts should civer only min nec for dir procurement where procurement through ROK precluded.

3. Foregoing consistent w/provisions draft civil affairs agreement as approved here. In view of time elapsed, negotiation civil affairs agreement not now contemplated.

NO SIG

ACTION : COMPTROLLER

INFORMATION : COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF,
G-4, AG, SIGNAL

45718

ROUTINE

TOO : 062248

MCN : 72211

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CINCUNC MESSAGE TO DA. 8 FEB 51

CLASSIFIED
INCOMING
MESSAGEDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICERESTRICTED
ROUTINE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR WASH DC FOR G4/D8

INFO : CGARMYEIGHT KOREA

NR : CX 55090

8 FEB 51

1. Ref ur msg DA 81210 17 Jan 51 subj: ECA phase out in Korea.

2. Recm that ECA/Korea not phase out its act for fol reasons:

A. Morale-ECA to Koreans is symbol of US economic aid. To have ECA withdraw would undoubtedly be taken by the Koreans as a step toward abandonment. Korean morale appears to be improving; however, it is considered withdrawal by ECA would have serious detrimental effect.

B. Economic.

(1) Army is not staffed to fill economic rehab void should ECA withdraw-ECA aid to ROK in the form of sup and tech advice is considered vital in such fields as mining, agriculture, fisheries, textiles and power. The result of ECA phase out quite possibly would mean increase prov of end products by US and donations rather than self help production by Korea.

DA IN 19039

(9 Feb 51)

ORO -T-184

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SECURITY
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SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

CLASSIFIED
INCOMING
MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

Page 2

NR : CX 55090

(2) According to aval info UNKRA will, at such time as agreed to by the UNKRA agent general, un-unified command and UNCURK, assume responsibility for rel and economic rehab in Korea. Withdrawal of ECA will tend to void beneficial rehab meas accomplished to date and it is believed will require UNKRA when activated to begin anew. insofar as economic rehab responsibilities are concerned. Loss of personnel having knowledge of the area, pop, industry, agriculture, etc, cannot be discounted, not to mention valuable surveys, statistics, etc, prep by ECA.

C. Supply

(1) ECA sup and equip are and have been of vital importance not only to the accomplishment of the rel mission of CINCUNC but also to the accomplishment of the mil mission. It is fully understood that support of mil opns is not within the scope of ECA Mission, but in Korea ECA functions have been of untold help dir or indir to the mil opns. Such aid has consisted primarily of economic stabilization, sup of raw mat, tech advice, conduct of surveys and prov of sup and equip, such as railroad rolling stock, vital to mil opns.

(2) CINCFE would be required to prov many items previously prov by ECA in order to carry out rel mission since Min Economic Rehab is essential to the rel mission of preventing disease starvation and unrest. Prov of such sup will of necessity increase CRIK fund rqmts unless ECA funds are trf to Army.

DA IN 19039

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NR : CX 55090

D. Tech advice-CINCFE does not have the staff presently available to provide vital tech advice now provided by ECA. It is considered that a requirement for such aid definitely exists and that it is not within the present capabilities of CINCFE to provide.

E. Surveys-conduct of surveys such as war damage surveys require highly skilled technicians. ECA was of vital aid in the conduct of the "South Korea War Damage Survey." Conduct of such surveys without ECA assistance are not within the present capabilities of CINCFE.

3. In summation it is considered that phaseout of ECA/Korea could have adverse impact on military operations indirectly, if not directly, for reasons enumerated in paragraph 2 and that it is not within the present capabilities of CINCFE to assume ECA responsibilities.

4. If it is imperative to phaseout ECA/Korea activities the following solution is recommended by CINCFE:

A. Attach ECA industrial and financial advisers to Embassy, Korea, retaining the name ECA.

B. Attach ECA support personnel to UNC Field agencies, IE Army Eight.

C. ECA turnover to Army for storage and distribution such support and equipment now stockpiled for Korea or in process of support which are required for accomplishment of CINUNC mission to prevent disease, starvation and unrest and to further the military operations. Such transfer of stocks to be on non-reimbursable basis.

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NR : CX 55090

D. Transfer from ECA to Army aval funds to be used for administration, sup and services required to further the CINCUNC Mission.

E. Army take over responsibility for procure- ment, storage and distribution of formerly ECA procured sup and equip required for current mission of CINCUNC. It is considered such procurement would consist principally of min economic support as related to the mission for the prevention of disease, starvation and unrest.

ACTION: G4

INFO: G2 (STATE, CIA, ECA), G3, OOA, COMPT

DA IN 19039

(9 Feb 51)

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SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

AMBASSADOR MUCCIO CABLE TO SEC. OF STATE ON
UNKRA'S INDEPENDENT OPERATION, 17 FEB 51

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SECRET
PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

STATE DEPT MSG

FROM: USAMBASSADOR PUSAN KOREA SGD MUCCIO

TO : SECRETARY OF STATE

NR : UNNUMBERED

REC'D BY STATE 17 FEB 51

Sent Department unnumbered, repeated info CINCFE
Tokyo, Eighth Army Korea.

Cite Taegu 3.

REDEPTEL 1225 February 7 USPOLAD.

Prior to consideration feasibility finalizing liquidation
ECA Mission to Korea by transferring its responsibilities to
Embassy and Army, I consider every effort should be made to
activate UNKRA to assume directly from ECA responsibilities
economic and technical assistance together with procurement
and supply functions in these two fields.

So long as hostilities in progress, plausible division
might be for (A) UNKRA assume responsibility for supplies
and technical assistance to ROK in agriculture, fisheries,
textiles, public administration and other areas not directly
connected with military operations. It would be more eco-
nomical and help improve morale to expand production in agri-
culture, fisheries and textiles, thereby putting many now
unemployed to work, than to ignore these vital fields and have

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NR : UNNUMBERED

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to supply more direct relief to the civilian population. A modest UNKRA staff could do this and also plan for post hostilities operations. (B) Army retain fields of transportation, communications, public utilities and safety, refugees and similar areas of direct military significance using ECA funds to extent available as most rehabilitation in these fields would be of long-range benefit to the economy of Korea. Expenditures by Army for relief supplies to prevent disease, starvation and unrest to be provided from UN contributions of funds and in kind.

Detail of few remaining technical staff ECA Mission on non-reimbursable basis to UNKRA could then be effected without interim transfer of personnel and responsibilities to third agency. I feel such direct transfer desirable as ECA and Army had many difficulties in adjusting procurement-pipeline finale in January 1949. Transfer from ECA to State to UNKRA would inevitably lead to even more complications. Supply personnel of ECA Mission might also be detailed directly to UNKRA whether that agency establishes its own procurement channels or utilizes Army supply channels during hostilities period.

Believe final decision concerning timing and manner liquidation ECA Mission cannot be deferred any longer since ECA stopped additional procurement for Korea beginning December and ECA Mission no longer has technicians to assist in many vital areas of economy, particularly agriculture.

NOTE: 1225 is DA IN 18654 (7 Feb 51) G4

ACTION: G4

INFO: G2, G3, OOA, COMPT

DA IN 2559

(19 Feb 51) DTG 17 Feb/NFT chlp/2

CINCUNC MESSAGE TO DA ON ECA AND
UNKRA, 26 FEB, 51

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR WASH DC FOR G-3

INFO : CGARMYEIGHT KOREA, USAMBASSADOR KOREA

NR : CX 56401

Feb 51

Reurmsg DA 83464 14 Feb.

Views and recommendations re Korea rel and rehab program including recommendations regarding UNKRA opns and ECA phaseout are:

1. It is considered that so long as CINCUNC is charged with responsibility for mil opns in Korea and until such time as hostilities are considered terminated and peace and security have been established in Korea or a designated part thereof, that there can be no divided responsibility; therefore, it is considered that the rel and rehab mission must remain under the comd of CINCUNC so long as mil opns cont.

2. Indications here are that ECA has reduced its force in Korea below the level required for the proper accomplishment of the mission asgd to ECA in the President's ltr of 29 Sep 1950. It is assumed here that ECA was auth to make this reduction by the President of the US although this Hq has recd no concrete info to that effect. Muccio feels that a limited nr of thoroughly competent fiscal and other governmental advisers are essential in order to assist the ROK Govt in again

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NR : CX 56401

becoming operationally efficient. Muccio's views concurred in here. The proper agency to furn such personnel is UNKRA. A second group of planners for the immediate and long range rehab of the economy of Korea in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, textiles, mining, utilities, etc, is essential in order that advice and guidance to ROK Govt may continue and to permit UNKRA to be prepared to take over at the approp time. One more (a third) group of UN personnel to carry out the civ rel mission is nec. There are 33 UN individuals now working under the CG UN in Korea on the civ rel function. This plan is in effect the manner in which opns were conducted before ECA reduced its force and the plan constitutes no change in current functions except that all UN personnel so engaged will become members of the segment of UNKRA attached to the UNC.

3. For the present, UNKRA proposes to establish its main hq in Geneva for the purpose of soliciting contributions and donations from UN members and administering same. It further proposed to establish a liaison office in Tokyo for the purpose of prep plans to assume its full responsibilities when the mil sit permits and the immediate administration of the three classes of UN personnel listed in Para 2 above. This proposal concurred in here with the fol understanding:

A. That the responsibilities and operational functions for rel and rehab now asgd to CINCUNC and ECA will be temporarily asgd to CINCUNC.

B. That a segment of UNKRA is attached to UNC to assist in performing these functions and responsibilities under the dir control of CINCUNC.

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NR : CX 56401

C. That for the time being UNKRA will not be able to apply all provisions of its charter but to the extent possible UNKRA will be given freedom of action in spheres of activity not affecting CINCUNC missions. Further proposed here to attach those members of UNKRA who will operate in Korea to the UN Forces in Korea to operate under the CG thereof.

4. At such time as peace and security have been established in Korea or approp designated portion thereof as determined by CINCUNC, UNKRA to simultaneously take over all responsibilities for Korea rel and rehab which are now the responsibility of CINCUNC and ECA.

5. Kingsley agrees in principle with this msg and Hemmendinger, Dept of State and Colman, ECA, concur subj to approval respectively by Dept of State and ECA Wash.

ACTION: G3

INFO: G1, G2, G4, SECDEF, OSA, OASGM, CSA, COMPT,
PMG, CI, OOA, ESJS

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(26 Feb 51)

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CINCUNC MESSAGE TO DA, 1 APRIL 51

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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR WASH DC

INFO : CGARMYEIGHT KORFA

NR : CX 59080

APR 51

1. Ref:

A. Mymsg CX 56401, 26 Feb 51.

B. State Dept msg, 24 Mar 51.

C. State Dept DTG, 27 Mar 51.

2. From contents ref B and C it appears that events have overtaken plans, some of which are not in conformity with CINCUNC's understanding of agreements reached in Tokyo between CINCUNC, DA, State, ECA and agent general, UNJ, as expressed in ref A. In view of confusing and conflicting contents ref B and C, it is essential that CINCUNC rec immediately a directive delineating CINCUNC's specific responsibilities for Korean rel and rehab.

3. Sit here became more confused by rec of ref C. In view of previnfo re ECA/Korea phase out, CINCUNC had directed that a draft of new aid agreement's be prep and held pending rec of DA directive on entire matter. This draft will be completed and held.

DA IN 16955

(1 Apr 51)

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NR : CX 59080

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4. An apparent misconception of UNKRA opn in the Far East has arisen. CINCUNC reiterates that CINCUNC does not desire that UNKRA take over Korean rel and rehab until such time as peace and scty have been established in Korea or aprop designated portion thereof as determined by CINCUNC.

5. To provide for an orderly transfer of responsibility to UNKRA at a later date when the mil situation permits, CINCUNC is agreeable that:

A. A segment of UNKRA pers be atch to UNC now to assist in performing these functions and responsibilities under direct control of CINCUNC.

B. Further, to extent possible, UNKRA now be given freedom of action in spheres of activity not affecting CINCUNC's mission.

Note: 56401 is DA IN 4723 (26 Feb 51) G3
Other Ref NOT IDENTIFIED

ACTION: G3

INFO: OSD, G4, CSA, OOA, G2

DA IN 16955 (1 Apr 51) jeg/9

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CINCUNC MESSAGE TO DA ON UNKRA-UNC DIVISION OF
INFLUENCE, 12 APRIL 51

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PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR WASH DC FOR G3

INFO : CGARMYEIGHT KOREA

NR : CX 59898

APR 51

Ref:

- A. Urmsg DA 87515, 5 Apr 51, and
- B. Ourmsg CX 56401, 26 Feb 51.

This msg is in 6 parts.

Part I. This part refers to query 1 and 3 of part 2 of ref A. The situation here ref economic aid to Korea is becoming more and more confused by efforts to put into effect an opn which is basically unsound. Due to differences in prescribed procedures and differences in responsibilities to separate higher agencies, it is impossible to attempt to merge the opns of ECA, UNC and UNKRA unless, for the interim period, it is done as previously recmd by UNC. It appears that State Dept desires to provide the responsibilities between UNC and UNKRA. As has been repeatedly pointed out, this cannot be done at the present time. Neither UNC nor UNKRA can take over and operate under ECA regulations and procedures. ECA should close out its own affairs, except for specific items such as furn of POL products, power, ships, rolling stock, etc which are absolutely essential

DA IN 974

(12 Apr 51)

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NR : CX 59898

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to CINCUNCs present mission and which are now being taken over from ECA by CINCUNC.

Part II. This part answers ques posed in part 3 of ref A.

1. CINCUNC does not desire to assume control or in any way become involved with counterpart funds resulting from the US Aid Agreement. This is a US responsibility and CINCUNC is carrying out his responsibility for the relief and support of the people of Korea as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. CINCUNC recms that ECA or State, as determined by the ECA and State, close out this counterpart fund and CINCUNC concurs in the desirability of utilizing this fund to reduce the present ROK Govt deficit. CINCUNC will utilize what is known as the special fund which has as its source the proceeds from the sale of rel and rehab sups. For the reasons set forth in Part I above, it is not desirable to confuse and intermingle these two funds.

2. For the reasons set forth in Part I, there can be no divided responsibility during this interim period of mil opns and therefore UNKRA cannot be charged with responsibility for tech assistance (that is fiscal, medical and economic advisory assistance), except that the UNKRA Group (Korea) may operate under CG Army Eight as outlined in Para 1D, Part III below. UNCURK will have no responsibility during phase I and II (see Para 1B, Part III below) but naturally may at any time offer suggestions. Understanding here is that Muccio feels that AmEmb should be advisory in matters affecting US only. These functions cannot be separated from determination of rqmts and sup action nec to assure that proper sups, equip and svcs are supplied in the proper place at the proper time in order to prevent disease, starvation and unrest and in furtherance of the mil effort.

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3. ECA and CINCUNC have worked together on transfer of sups and contracts and have solved most of the problems. Where additional auth is nec to acquire desired sups and equip from existing ECA contracts or inventories, it will be rqst in each specific case.

Part III. Outline of procedures.

1. Based on assumption that CINCUNC will be charged with complete and over-all responsibility for all economic aid to the Korean people, including but not limited to immediate rel, short-range rehab and reconst, long-range planning and tech assistance to the ofls of the ROK Govt, CINCUNC suggests the fol procedures:

A. This responsibility will cont until such time as the mil opns will permit the transfer of this responsibility to UNKRA. The time for this transfer will be determined by CINCUNC and as agreed to by the Agent Gen of UNKRA. CINCUNC intends to charge the CG Eighth Army with this responsibility for all planning and opns within the territorial limits of Korea. No sound est can be made as to when this transfer to UNKRA will take place but with a view to making it as smooth as possible, it is desired to introduce UNKRA into the entire opn as it progresses and to the max extent possible to give UNKRA freedom of action in spheres of activity not affecting the mil or economic aid mission of CINCUNC.

B. Three phases are envisaged in the opn; to wit: Phase I - The period starting April 1, 1951 while ECA is phasing out and UNKRA is phasing in. This period may terminate about 30 June 1951. Phase II - The

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period starting approx 1 July 1951 during which CINCUNC will be responsible and UNKRA will be assisting. This period will terminate when mil opns will permit as decided by CINCUNC and as agreed to by the Agent Gen, UNKRA. Phase III - The period starting at the termination of phase II when UNKRA has assumed responsibility and is being assisted by CINCUNC principally in the field of procurement and trans. This period should terminate when UNKRA is prep to handle their own procurement and trans.

C. It is envisaged that the UNKRA personnel operating in Korea during phase I and II will consist of two groups, both operating under operational control of the CG, Eighth Army. These groups are defined as fol:

(1) One group to be known as UNKRA (Korea) will consist of a small group of governmental, economic, and industrial tech advisers who will operate as a group and will not be integrated in any unit or staff of the CG, Eighth Army.

(2) A second group will consist of personnel engaged in programming, short-range planning, determining rqmts and actually supplying for the needs of rel and short-range rehab and reconst. Personnel in this group may be integrated in staffs or units of the CG, Eighth Army.

D. The responsibilities and limitations on the activities of UNKRA (Korea) are envisaged as fol:

(1) Tech advice and assistance to the ofls of the ROK Govt.

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(2) Planning for long-range rehab and reconst of Korea.

(3) Assisting the operating group by recommendations and, in certain cases when called upon, by advice as to specific problems.

(4) All plans formulated or recommendations made by this group will be submitted to CG, Eighth Army for determination as to whether or not they affect CINCUNC mission. In case CG, Eighth Army decides in affirmative, such plans and recommendations will carry his comments or concurrence before being implemented or forwarded to higher authority and implementation of such plans will be carried out by the operating agencies of Army Eight in accordance with curr procedures.

(5) Close coordination with the operating group will be an essential part of the responsibilities of UNKRA (Korea).

E. The duties of the personnel integrated into the operating group will be as prescribed by the CG, Eighth Army.

F. The CG, Eighth Army will be responsible for the logistic support of both groups. An exception to this for the period 1 Apr to 30 June 1951 is that those individuals detailed by ECA to remain in Korea will be administered and billeted by the US Embassy Korea; however, office space, office sups, trans, etc will be furn by the CG, Eighth Army.

Part III - Previously ref State msgs.

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1. State msg 240519Z, 23 Mar 51 is apparently ECATO 218 to SCAP (ECA Field Office) Tokyo signed Foster which among other things agrees transfer TA activities Korea to CINCUNC and abolition ECA Mission orgn effective April 1 and that DA concurs.

2. State msg 270127Z, 26 Mar 51 is Joint State-ECA msg to Pusan, rptd info SCAP (ECA Field Office) Tokyo with info to DEPTAR (OOA) and indicates that ECA accounting procedures may cont to apply until UNKRA-ROK Aid Agreement further advances.

3. No knowledge here of an UNKRA-ROK Aid Agreement nor is it understood how there can be one until UNKRA becomes fully operational. CINCUNC has informal interim agreement for phase I with ROK for deposit of proceeds from sale of rel and rehab items and has prep a draft of a new UN-ROK Aid Agreement which will serve during phase II and probably also for phase III. This draft will be forwarded shortly.

Part V. Consideration of views of Agent Gen. UNKRA. Hyssong has furn this Hq with cable from Kingsley dtd 30 Mar in which Kingsley quotes cable sent to State Dept which outlines Kingsleys views on UNKRA opns. Kingsley withdraws concurrence to para 3 which is presumed to refer to CINCFE msg CX 56401, 26 Feb 51 and states that he desires to have deputy agent in Korea who would have, under Kingsley, over-all responsibility policy-wise and to whom tech assistance programming and rehab staff would be directly responsible administratively and all other respects. The views stated by Kingsley in his cable of 30 Mar to State Dept have been taken into consideration in the prep of this msg and although it is realized that his desires cannot be completely met by CINCUNC, every effort has been made to come as close as is possible under the conditions existing.

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Part VI. Recommendations. Without enumerating them, there are too great a number of msgs emanating from various sources for an orderly analysis of actions desired on the part of CINCUNC. However, a solution can be worked out as indicated in ref B and further outlined in Part III above, providing no attempt is made to put UNKRA in the operating business before it is ready to operate and before the mil sit in Korea will permit. CINCUNC believes that the above solution is sound and strongly recommends that it be adhered to.

Note: CX 56401 is DA IN 4723 (26 Feb 51) G3.
Other refs not identified.

ACTION: G3

INFO: G2 (STATE, ECA), G4, OSA, OASGM, CSA,
COMPT, PMG, CI, OSD, OOA, ESJS, G1

DA IN 974 (12 APR 51) tvt/4

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SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

J. DONALD KINGSLEY LETTER TO ASST. SEC. OF
STATE, 16 APRIL 51

COPY

Palais Wilson,
Geneva

April 16, 1951

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your confidential letter of 29 March 1951, submitting a proposal by the Unified Command to govern relations in the present phase between the United Nations instrumentalities in Korea, the United Nations Command, and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. I wish to inform you that I am at this time unable to agree to all details of the proposal submitted, and particularly to the proposed subordination of UNKRA technical and planning staff to control of "such major military commanders as may be designated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command". It is my contention that the activities of such staff in Korea will not materially affect the missions of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and that they fall, therefore, into that area in which UNKRA should be given freedom of action. Such staff should, in my judgment, be in a consultative relation to the United Nations Command, should be supported logistically by that Command, but should be responsible for both administrative and policy matters only to the Agent General.

Commenting more specifically upon the proposals outlined, I find myself in general accord with paragraph one. I would wish, however, to include a statement to the effect that there must be agreement between the Unified Command and the Agent General, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, on the quantities and character of any supplies furnished for civilian

The Honorable John D. Hickerson,
Assistant Secretary of State
of the United States of America,
Washington.

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relief, for general support of the Korean economy, or for rehabilitation, the procurement of which is in any way to be financed by the United Nations Reconstruction Agency, or which constitute donations to that Agency and its program. Any final understanding with the Unified Command should also include a statement on the method of accounting to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the procurement and distribution of such civilian assistance supplies by the Unified Command and the United Nations Command respectively.

My position on paragraph two depends in large part upon decision as to the area of UNKRA activities at this phase of operations. In general, I believe that the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency should recruit and finance the personnel responsible to it, but that personnel attached to the United Nations Command in the field should continue to be the clear responsibility of that Command. I am, as I indicated in discussions with members of your staff in Washington, most reluctant to assume responsibility without commensurate authority and while such may be necessary within limits, I am anxious to narrow those limits as much as possible. I would, for example, now take the view that if it is decided that technical assistance and planning personnel must be attached directly to the United Nations Command in the field, such personnel should be recruited and paid by that Command. Moreover, I do not wish at this stage to assume responsibility for the relief teams already in the field when, in fact, I have no authority in respect to them. I am not suggesting that UNKRA should, at this moment, take over the distribution of relief. That is, I agree, an appropriate responsibility of the United Nations Command under present military conditions. But that Command should, therefore, continue responsibility for personnel.

As to paragraph three, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency is only now in process of developing its administrative pattern. The history of all previous organizations, national or international, leads me to expect that this pattern will undergo numerous changes in the light of varying

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conditions. In any event, I am quite certain that maximum administrative flexibility is necessary at this stage. For these reasons, I believe it would be premature to include specific organizational details in any formal agreement with the Unified Command at this time.

I hope that the above comments will serve to clarify my position and that there may be opportunity to discuss these questions with the Unified Command when I visit Washington in the near future.

Very truly yours,

s/ J. Donald Kingsley
Agent General

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DA MESSAGE TO CINCUNC REGRETTING NECESSITY
FOR DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY, 4 MAY 51

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

OUTGOING MESSAGE

GD KEA WRH/icc
4 May 1951

FROM: CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN
TO: DEPTAR WASH DC. PRIORITY
INFO: CG ARMY EIGHT KOREA PRIORITY

For G-3. References: a. Urmsg DA 89032,
21 Apr 51. b. Ourmsg CX 59898, 12 Apr 51. This msg is in
4 parts.

Part I. 1. Discussions have taken place here with
Sir Arthur Rucker and other representatives of UNKRA re-
garding the confused situation reference economic aid to Korea
and it is desired to present in its entirety the most recent
thinking on the matter in order to arrive at a solution to the
problem as soon as practicable. UNC has in the past gravely
doubted the wisdom of any division of responsibility between
UNC and UNKRA at the present time. If, however, it is con-
sidered necessary on political grounds to give effect to the
UN Resolution constituting UNKRA by entrusting certain
responsibilities to UNKRA now, UNC could only, repeat only,
agree if the nature of the responsibilities and the procedures
to be adopted are as defined later in this msg. Such a division
of responsibility would also require an amended directive to
UNC since UNC is charged under UC directive of 29 September
1950 with responsibility for all forms of relief and economic
aid, except those items charged to ECA which is now phasing
out.

2. Neither UNC nor UNKRA can take over and operate
under ECA regulations and procedures. ECA should close out
its own affairs except for specific items such as furnishing of

FROM: CINCUNC TO DEPTAR, INFO ARMY EIGHT
GD KEA WRH/icc 4 MAY 51 CONT'D

POL products, power, ships, rolling stock, etc. which are absolutely essential to CINCUNC's present mission and which are now being taken over from ECA by CINCUNC.

Part II. 1. CINCUNC does not desire to assume control or in any way become involved with counterpart funds resulting from the US aid agreement. This is a US responsibility and CINCUNC is carrying out his responsibility for the relief and support of the people of Korea as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. CINCUNC recommends that ECA or State, as determined by the ECA and State, close out this counterpart fund and CINCUNC concurs in the desirability of utilizing this fund to reduce the present ROK government deficit. CINCUNC will utilize what is known as the special fund which has as its source the proceeds from the sale of relief and rehabilitation supplies. It is not desirable to confuse and intermingle these two funds.

2. During this interim period of military operations CINCUNC must have sole responsibility for all relief and short-term economic aid essential to the military operations. Specifically this will mean that after July 1 CINCUNC must be solely responsible for operating the program of relief and short-term economic aid now being submitted for the year 1951/52. In the short remaining period before July 1 UNKRA will in any case be able to do little if anything more than establish its procedures and commence planning. After that date and so long as the period of military operations continues, UNKRA could have responsibility only for long-range planning and high level technical assistance to the Korean Government and for any program of economic aid additional to the CINCUNC program which the military situation may permit UNKRA to implement. Such a division of responsibility would only be acceptable if the procedures outlined in this cable, for ensuring close coordination and preventing any UNKRA action conflicting with military necessities, are rigidly adhered to.

FROM: CINCUNC TO DEPTAR, INFO ARMY EIGHT
GD KEA WRH/icc 4 MAY 51 CONT'D

Part III. Outline of Procedures.

1. The responsibility of CINCUNC for the operation of the UNC programs of relief and short-term economic aid will continue until such time as the military operations will permit the transfer of this responsibility to UNKRA. The time for this transfer will be determined by CINCUNC and as agreed to by the Agent General of UNKRA. No sound estimate can be made as to when this transfer to UNKRA will take place but with a view to making it as smooth as possible, it is desired to introduce UNKRA into the entire operation as it progresses. CINCUNC intends to charge the Commanding General, Eighth Army, with this responsibility for all planning and operations within the territorial limits of Korea.

2. Three phases are envisaged in the operation; to wit: -

Phase I. The period starting April 1, 1951 while ECA is phasing out and UNKRA is phasing in. This period may terminate about 30 June 1951.

Phase II. The period starting approximately 1 July 1951 during which the responsibilities of CINCUNC and UNKRA will be as defined in paragraph 2 of Part II above. This period will terminate when military operations permit as decided by CINCUNC and as agreed to by the Agent General of UNKRA.

Phase III. The period starting at the termination of Phase II when UNKRA has assumed responsibility and is being assisted by CINCUNC principally in the field of procurement and transportation.

3. It is envisaged that the UNKRA personnel operating in Korea during Phase I and II will consist of two groups defined as follows:

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FROM: CINCUNC TO DEPTAR, INFO ARMY EIGHT
GD KEA WRH/icc 4 MAY 51 CONT'D

a. One group to be known as UNKRA (Korea) will consist of a small group of governmental economic and industrial technical advisors who will operate as a group under the direction of a Deputy Agent General or other officer appointed by and responsible to the Agent General.

b. A second group will consist of personnel engaged in programming, short-range planning, determining requirements and actually supplying for the needs of relief and short-range rehabilitation and reconstruction. Personnel in this group may be integrated in staffs or units of the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

4. The responsibilities of and limitations on the activities of UNKRA (Korea) are envisaged as follows:

a. Technical advice and assistance to the ROK Government.

b. Planning for long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea.

c. Implementing to the extent permitted by the military situation any program of economic aid additional to the CINCUNC program.

d. Assisting the operating group by recommendations and, in certain cases when called upon, by advice as to specific problems.

e. All plans formulated or recommendations made by this group will be coordinated with Commanding General, Eighth Army for determination as to whether or not they affect CINCUNC mission. No plans or recommendations which do, in the opinion of Commanding General, Eighth Army, affect CINCUNC mission will be implemented unless they carry the

FROM: CINCUNC TO DEPTAR, INFO ARMY EIGHT
GD KEA WRH/icc 4 MAY 51 CONT'D

concurrence of Commanding General, Eighth Army or higher authority. Approved plans requiring implementation by military agency will be carried out by the operating agencies of Eighth Army in accordance with current procedures.

f. Close coordination with operating group will be an essential part of the responsibilities of UNKRA (Korea).

5. The duties of the personnel integrated into the operating group will be as prescribed by the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

6. The Commanding General, Eighth Army, will be responsible for the logistic support of both groups. An exception to this for the period 1 April to 30 June 1951 is that those individuals detailed by ECA to remain in Korea will be administered and billeted by the United States Embassy Korea; however, office space, office supplies, transportation, etc. will be furnished by the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

7. It is understood that UNKRA intends to negotiate on UNKRA-ROK Agreement as soon as they are in a position to do so. A CINCUNC-ROK Agreement is, however, necessary to cover CINCUNC operations during Phase I and Phase II. CINCUNC has informal interim agreement for Phase I with ROK for deposit of proceeds from sale of relief and rehabilitation items, and is preparing a draft of a new CINCUNC-ROK Aid Agreement which will serve during Phase II. Final terms of agreement will, however, depend on approval of procedures in this msg.

Part IV. Recommendations.

CINCUNC regrets the necessity for any division of responsibility at this stage but is prepared to accept the above solution, provided the safeguards are rigidly enforced

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FROM: CINCUNC TO DEPTAR, INFO ARMY EIGHT
GD KEA WRH/icc 4 MAY 51 CONT'D

and recommends that it be approved and that the UC directive
of 29 Sep 50 be amended accordingly.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

G. L. EBERLE
Major General, General Staff Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

Distribution: CinC, CofS, DS, Compt, PH&W, G-1, G-2, G-3,
Trans, Engr, QM, Ord, Sig, TOECA, UNKRA
(Room 102, Empire House)

Approved by CofS
3 May 1951

DA TO CINCFE (CINCUNC) ON SUPPORT OF KOREAN
CIVIL POPULATION, 12 MAY 51

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Radio Branch

C
O
P
Y

INCOMING MESSAGE

EHD/cem

12 May 51

PRIORITY

FROM: DEPTAR (CSA) WASH DC

TO : CINCFE (CINCUNC) TOKYO JAPAN

NR : DA 90915

(A) CX 59898 of 12 Apr and (B) CX 61691 of 4 May.
This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1.

Para 1. Based on your recommendations in ref A the JCS on 4 May recommended that President sign a ltr (copy furnished your hq by Lt Col Kaufman, DA G-3 Representative) which would delegate to Dept Def authority to implement these recommendations.

Para 2. DA can see no necessity for division of responsibility for economic assistance in Korea, as indicated in Part 4 of ref B.

Para 3. In light of your strong recommendations in ref A and fact that your recommendations in ref B appear to be based on questionable assumption that division of responsibility is necessary, rqst your comments and recommendations regarding any revision of proposed Presidential Ltr.

Part 2.

Pending final action on proposed Presidential Ltr as CINCUNC should exercise in the fld the responsibility of the Unified Comd for rel and support of the civilian population of Korea. (See 31 July resolution of UN Scty Council, repeated to you in WAR 87619 of 1 Aug 50).

HULL

ACTION: G-4

INFORMATION: CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, G-3, AG,
Comptroller, Diplomatic, Engr, Ord, Public H & W,
Quartermaster, Signal, TOECA FO, Trans

27696

PRIORITY

MCN: 93111

ORO-T-184

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SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

CHIEF OF STAFF MESSAGE TO SEC., JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF, 24 MAY 51

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF

SUBJECT: Responsibilities for Economic Assistance in Korea

The Chief of Staff desires that the inclosure be presented
Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

JOHN W. BROWNING
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Assistant Secretary
General Staff

1 Incl
Memo by CofS US Army

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN KOREA

References: a. JCS 2157/1
b. JCS 2157/2
c. JCS 2157/3

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

1. In decision on reference a the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in substance, initiated action to obtain Presidential approval of the principle that the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) should have undivided responsibility for economic assistance in Korea so long as military operations continue.

2. By reference b the Joint Secretariat referred to me for comment and recommendation a request from the Acting Secretary of Defense that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsider their position with respect to economic assistance in Korea in the light of a qualified recommendation from CINCUNC (DA IN 8823 of 4 May) that the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) be given limited autonomy in Korea.

3. By reference c the Joint Secretariat referred to me for study in connection with this matter a Department of State proposal to obtain Presidential approval for giving UNKRA responsibility (in coordination with CINCUNC) for technical assistance, long range planning and such other economic assistance operations as the military situation may permit UNKRA to undertake.

4. Subsequent to CINCUNC's 4 May message he has reported (DA IN 13338 of 16 May) that he "still considers that div of responsibility to include separate aid agreements and separate programming, procurement and distr channels to be highly undesirable". In this message CINCUNC also indicated that his 4 May message was based on the assumption that it was necessary for UNKRA to initiate autonomous operations in Korea "for reasons unknown in GHQ".

5. Largely because of continuous State Department insistence that the United Nations introduce UNKRA into Korea prior to cessation of hostilities, the Unified Command is now under heavy United Nations political pressure to arrange for immediate initiation of UNKRA operations in Korea. At the same time UNKRA will not agree to participate in economic assistance activities at all unless it can initiate at least limited operations on an autonomous basis.

6. From the point of view of the Department of Defense one of the strongest objections to introduction of UNKRA into Korea at this time is the fact that funds for economic assistance activities which directly support military operations are likely to be denied on the premise that these funds should be made available to UNKRA instead of to the Department of Defense. Once UNKRA is given even limited responsibility in this field, the Department of Defense would continuously have to justify all military expenditures in Korea which have any recognizable relation to economic assistance. Thus, by virtue of funds limitations, CINCUNC might be forced into a position where he could not avoid turning over to UNKRA control of economic assistance activities having a direct and immediate bearing on his ability to conduct successful military operations.

7. Such a division of responsibility might also:

- a. Result in the development of serious friction between UNKRA representatives and military authorities in the field.
- b. Enable the Republic of Korea to play off CINCUNC against UNKRA in obtaining economic assistance.
- c. Create an undesirable precedent for similar division of responsibility in future United Nations military operations.
- d. Make very difficult the enforcement of proper controls against introduction of subversive elements in Korea.
- e. Result in duplication of headquarters facilities, thereby placing an unnecessary additional logistic load on CINCUNC military forces in Korea and adding to the total cost of administering the economic assistance program.
- f. Violate the principle, which has been firmly established as a result of World War II experience, that the military commander must have undivided responsibility for all civil affairs activities in his area during the period of active military operations.

8. Both Mr. Kingsley, Agent General for UNKRA, and his Deputy, Sir Arthur Rucker, have informally expressed the view that they personally favor an arrangement (such as that originally negotiated by Mr. Kingsley in February) wherein UNKRA personnel in Korea would be under the operational control of CINCUNC. However, they feel that the governments represented on the UNKRA Advisory Committee would not permit UNKRA to commence operations at all if the February agreement were to be implemented.

9. I consider it absolutely essential that the Joint Chiefs of Staff insist that there be no deviation whatsoever from the principle that CINCUNC must have undivided command over economic assistance activities in Korea so long as military operations continue.

10. Accordingly, I recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their position in this respect by forwarding the attached memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.

1 Incl
Proposed Memo for
Sec/Def.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. In compliance with the 12 and 18 May memoranda which your office forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully reconsidered their memorandum of 4 May. In this connection, they have noted a message (DA IN 13338 of 16 May) in which the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) reports that he still considers division of responsibility for economic assistance in Korea to be highly undesirable.

2. From a military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it is absolutely essential for CINCUNC to retain undivided command over all economic assistance activities in Korea so long as military operations continue.

3. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform the Secretary of State that you cannot concur in any proposal which would result in any division of responsibility for economic assistance activities in Korea so long as military operations continue.

CINCUNC DIRECTIVE TO CG EIGHTH ARMY, 24 MAY 51

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
APO 500

24 May 51

AG 400 (24 May 51) GD

SUBJECT: Responsibility for the Korean Economic Aid Program

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Army
APO 301

1. References.

a. CINCFE message C 66612, dated 17 October 1950.

b. General Headquarters, United Nations Command, letter AG 400 (1 April 51), subject: Korean Economic Aid - Phase Out of Economic Cooperation Administration and Integration of UNKRA into United Nations Command, dated 3 April 1951.

2. Under authority of the United Nations Security Council resolution of 31 July 1950 delegating responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea to the Unified Command and pending a revision to the Unified Command directive as promulgated in the Presidential letter of 29 September 1950, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, has been given the complete and overall responsibility for all economic aid to the Korean people including but not limited to immediate relief, short-range rehabilitation and reconstruction, long-range planning and furnishing technical assistance to the officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

3. Within the territorial limits of Korea, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, is charged with the complete and overall responsibility for:

a. The provision of necessary supplies and equipment to prevent disease, starvation and unrest among the civilian population in Korea.

AG 400 (24 May 51) cont.

- b. The provision of other consumer items.
 - c. The provision of necessary equipment, raw materials and other supplies for Korean agriculture, fisheries, essential industrial establishments, mines, power plants, transportation facilities, and public services, together with appropriate technical assistance.
 - d. Furnishing assistance to local authorities to insure the proper distribution, issue and utilization of essential civilian supplies.
 - e. The provision of fiscal, economic, medical and other advisory assistance.
 - f. The development of requirements and plans for the immediate and long-range rehabilitation of the Korean economy and submission of the requirements and plans to CINUNC.
4. The Commanding General, Eighth Army, will establish the necessary staff organization within his headquarters and the necessary field organization for the accomplishment of this mission as appropriate from sources with his command. Requests for additional personnel and es necessary to accomplish the Civil Affairs mission will be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.
5. The Commanding General, Eighth Army, is authorized to utilize such agencies of the Government of the Republic of Korea as in his judgement he decides is desirable.
6. At the present time, UNKRA is not assigned any operational responsibilities in Korea. UNKRA personnel planning for their final assumption of responsibility and any responsibilities which may be delegated to UNKRA during Phase II, will be given freedom of action to the maximum extent possible in spheres of activity not affecting the military or economic aid mission of the United Nations Command in Korea.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

H. B. BUSH
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps

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SEC. OF DEFENSE LETTER TO SEC. OF STATE, 3 JUL 51

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3 Jul 1951

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have considered carefully the question of the relationship between the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the Unified Command which was the subject of your letter of 16 May 1951. I concur in the draft memorandum for the President which you inclosed and in the draft letter to be addressed by the Department of State to the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction, which was inclosed with Assistant Secretary Rusk's letter of 20 June 1951.

I should like to point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed to me their view that the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command should retain undivided command over all economic assistance activities in Korea so long as military operations continue. In expressing the concurrence of the Department of Defense in the solution which you have proposed to the problem of organization relationships, I have been guided by the belief that this solution affords adequate protection to the integrity of General Ridgway's command, as well as by the urgent need for some arrangement whereby UNKRA may commence operations in the near future. I should, therefore, like to make explicit my understanding that the final authority and control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the ground during hostilities is not intended to be affected by these arrangements and that the scope of the responsibility to be exercised by UNKRA for any program of economic aid additional to the United Nations Command Program shall remain subject to the exigencies of military necessity as determined by General Ridgway.

I consider it important that these arrangements be consummated in such a way as to avoid the creation of a precedent for the commitment of the Government of the United States to the acceptance of the principle of the independent functioning of an international body in an active theater of military operation.

SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

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Ltr to Sec'y 3 Jul 1951

It is the view of the Department of Defense that the agreement with respect to UNKRA is appropriate only in the particular circumstances of the present instance.

I should like also to call your attention to a potential problem involving budgetary considerations. During the period of hostilities, the military authorities must have sufficient funds to finance civilian relief in Korea. The relatively sizeable funds available to UNKRA under the proposed Mutual Security Act of 1951 as compared to those allocated in the Defense budget for civil relief may tend to prejudice Congress against the allocation of supplemental funds for civil relief which may in time be necessary to complete the military mission. The denial by Congress of additional funds for civil relief might place the Department of Defense in the position of having to request funds from UNKRA or to invite the participation would not be desirable from a military point of view. It is hoped that due consideration may be given to this problem in the presentation of budgetary requests to the Congress.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

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EUSAK DIRECTIVE ON INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION,
8 JULY 51

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)
Office of the Commanding General
APO 301

AG 004. 03 KCAE

8 July 1951

SUBJECT: Industrial Rehabilitation of Korea

TO: Commanding Officer
United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea
8201st Army Unit
APO 59

1. The economic recovery of the Republic of Korea is dependent on the rehabilitation of its basic industries. To accomplish this, substantial contributions in materials and supplies, have been made to that nation. This aid is an emergency measure and should not continue indefinitely.

2. Korea has a number of natural resources and industrial plants which have lain dormant and inoperative during the past several years. The utilization of these resources and the rehabilitation of industries that use them, will materially aid in reestablishing the economy of Korea, which in turn will relieve the United Nations of the present burden.

3. To assist the Republic of Korea in the Immediate rehabilitation of the industries and the exploitation of its resources, the Commanding Officer United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea is responsible for and will insure that:

a. Mining.

(1) Adequate surveys of all mining operations are made. These surveys will include location, type, normal production, whether operating or non-operating, labor situation, transportation difficulties if any and financial conditions. These facilities will be given constant supervision to insure that the

SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

AG 004.03 KCAE

Subj: Industrial Rehabilitation of Korea - Cont'd

Republic of Korea and private mine owners, produce in quantity, sufficient to supply the maximum needs of the country. Where necessary, advice in modern techniques will be given. Transportation of the products will be coordinated with military requirements, to insure sufficient transportation for moving the products where needed and avoiding excessive stockpiling.

(2) Where items of machinery and supplies have been imported to aid in the rehabilitation of mines, surveillance is exercised to insure proper distribution, sale and use by the industry.

b. Electric Power.

(1) Rehabilitation of power generating plants is carried out continuously by the Republic of Korea; this will include both hydro and thermal plants.

(2) Necessary repairs to transformer stations transmission lines and other facilities are made promptly.

(3) Where machinery and parts have been imported, they are properly distributed, sold and used by the industry.

(4) Proper allocation of power is made to those industries producing essential commodities.

c. Textiles.

(1) A survey of all textile plants is made, noting their condition, capacity and adaptability for the most economically desired products, their location as regards transportation, their economic value to the local community and their place in the general economy.

(2) The required amount of raw materials and power are supplied to insure minimum interference with continuous operation.

-2-

AG 004.03 KCAE

Subj: Industrial Rehabilitation of Korea - Cont'd

(3) Production of items for the war effort are given priority over civilian requirements.

d. Industry in General.

(1) Those industries necessary for the production of consumer items such as food, clothing, fuel and shelter are given maximum stimulation.

(2) Raw materials imported by relief agencies are properly distributed, sold and used, for the production of essential commodities.

(3) Assistance and technical advice is given to those facilities producing items that further the war effort.

(4) Materials and repairs for the rehabilitation of war damaged plants are transported expeditiously.

(5) Technical assistance and advice is given in the rehabilitation and construction of manufacturing facilities.

e. Fisheries.

(1) Raw materials are equitably distributed to those companies producing commodities for the fishing industry; particularly such items as cotton yarn, abaca, tin plate, ammonia, lumber, POL products, ice and salt.

(2) Fishing and allied industries are utilized in all their aspects to produce the maximum amount of fish, consideration being given to proper preservation and possible export.

f. Shipbuilding: Shipbuilding facilities which can contribute to coastwise shipping and to the fishing fleet are encouraged to reestablish themselves and to produce to the maximum.

AG 004.03 KCAE

Subj: Industrial Rehabilitation of Korea - Cont'd

g. Transportation: There is made available, sufficient transportation to carry out the industrial rehabilitation efficiently, and to distribute consumer goods with minimum interference with the military operation.

h. General: Reestablishment of economical stability is accomplished, by advice to the Republic of Korea, and by encouragement and stimulation to private enterprises, objectively to produce those items essential to a self-supporting people. This will, in turn, reduce the relief expenses presently borne by the United States and other members of the United Nations.

4. The Commanding Officer, United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea will compile and evaluate sustaining imports, in terms of essentiality, and quantities; phasing arrival of such imports within the framework of the objectives stated in paragraph 2, above.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL VAN FLEET:

Copies furnished:
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CG, I Corps
CG, X Corps
CG, IX Corps
CG, 2d Log Comd

WAYNE E. HESS
2d Lt, AGC
Asst Adj

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EUSAK DIRECTIVE ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION,
5 AUG 51

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HEADQUARTERS

P EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)

Y Office of the Commanding General

APO 301

AG 004.03 KCAE

5 August 1951

SUBJECT: Assistance in Agriculture Production Korea

TO: See Distribution

1. The Economic recovery of the Republic of Korea is largely dependent on the rehabilitation of its basic industry. It is considered that the basic industry of Korea is agriculture. Being primarily an agricultural and secondly a fishing country, Korea has depended on the production of the soil and sea for exports to exchange for essential foreign commodities. With the rapid growth in population the difficulty of satisfying domestic consumption and also maintaining exports has increased. Since World War II and especially since the war which opened in June 1950, exports have been negligible and only large imports of food and fertilizer by the United States have averted starvation.

2. Approximately 70% of the population of Korea are engaged in agriculture. Judged by any other standard - whether it be that of foods, or invested capital, or value of gross or net output, or value of exports, agriculture is Korea's principal industry. To provide Korea with sufficient food stuffs to support its population and reduce the cost to the United States for large imports of food, requires the concentrated effort of all agencies concerned with the immediate rehabilitation of agriculture to produce the maximum crops from the arable land available.

3. The Commanding General of UNCACK will be responsible for and will insure that:

a. Complete surveys of crop acreage of each type of food stuff is made and maintained in each province.

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5 August 1951

AG 004.03 KCAE

SUBJECT: Assistance in Agriculture Production in Korea

- b. Estimates of the various types of commercial fertilizer for the several crops are made annually in order to program the importation of same and constant attention is given to the production and use of indigenous fertilizers.
- c. Plants producing agricultural implements are utilized and allotted sufficient power and raw materials to produce sufficient items to meet the requirements of the farmers.
- d. Assistance and advice, with the help of the Minister of Agriculture and other agricultural agencies in improved methods of production and distribution, are continuously furnished; always bearing in mind that our Western methods are not necessarily suited to the Orient.
- e. Repairs, improvements and reconstruction of irrigation projects are systemically prosecuted, to furnish necessary water and prevent soil erosion.
- f. When harvested, the grain is stored, protected and cared for in an adequate and satisfactory manner. Further that each farmer, each gun and each province turn in to the government, the quota that has been assessed, promptly and fully.
- g. Sufficient sea, railroad, and truck transportation is furnished to transport without delay fertilizer, seed, implements and food stuffs, ready for market. This is seasonal and will require constant surveillance to be successful.
- h. Implements, fertilizer and grains are delivered and sold at the prices established by the Government.
- i. Upland areas are exploited and used as pastures and orchards in the production of animals and fruits.

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5 August 1951

AG 004.03 KCAE

SUBJECT: Assistance in Agriculture Production in Korea

4. The close supervision of agriculture in all its aspects, will produce results that will go far toward making Korea self-supporting and at the same time reduce to a minimum the amount of money that will be required to import food stuff by the United States.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL VAN FLEET:

/s/ C. O. Overstreet
C. O. OVERSTREET
Captain, AGC
Asst Ag

DISTRIBUTION
S plus

CINCUNC, APO 500
CG I Corps, APO 358
CG IX Corps, APO 264
CG X Corps, APO 909
CG 2d Log Comd, APO 59
CG UNCACK, APO 59

COPY

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SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

CINCFE TO DA ON UNKRA USE OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
17 SEPT 51

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

MESSAGE

SECRET
ROUTINE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO : DEPTAR FOR G4/D8 WASH DC, CGARMYEIGHT
KOREA (MAIN)

NR : CX 51006

Part 1 to DA. Reply urmsg DA 81375, 14 Sep 51, will be made soonest. Contents urmsg handled here as SECRET mat to limit distr to only auth agencies.

Part 2 to Army 8.

1. Ref DA msg DA 81375, 14 Sep 51, rqst ur comments and recm on this matter be fwd this Hq ASAP.

2. Considered here that:

A. Trans desired by UNKRA pers is excessive for the performance of their mission.

B. Trans of a reasonable nr of admin veh in addition to those UNKRA now has on hand may be auth when properly justified.

3. Understood here that UNKRA is proposing and conducting tours and surveys in company with ROK officials of agriculture and industry. Possible that veh desired for these purposes. Such procedure is not in accordance with CINCUNC understanding of UNKRA responsibilities at this time. UNKRA should secure info for long range planning thru opn agencies of EUSAK.

(17 Sep 51)

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MESSAGE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR : CX 51006

Page 2

4. No arrangements have been made to extend or increase UNKRA activities and such extension or increase is not desired by CINCUNC at this time.

ACTION: G4

INFO : G3

DA IN 17369

(17 Sep 51)

wvp/8

DA MESSAGE TO CINCUNC ON AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE
ROK AGREEMENT, 25 SEPT 51

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

INCOMING MESSAGE

EHD/cem

PRIORITY

25 Sep 51

FROM: DEPTAR (CSUSA) WASH DC
TO : CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN
INFO : US AMBASSADOR PUSAN
NR : DA 82262

REURMSGs C 67912 of 29 Jul and C 69492 of 23 Aug.

1. You are auth to initiate immediate negotiations
with ROK on general basis of 26 Jul draft for proposed CINCUNC-
ROK agreement, as amended by:

A. Deletion of "nonindigenous" in 3d line
of Article 2, Sec 1.

B. Substitution of "stabilization" for "restora-
tion" in 3d line of Article 5, Sec 1.

C. Addition of phrase "and for purposes tending
to promote the stability of the Korean Economy" at end of Arti-
cle 4 B, Sec 2.

2. State agrees that under present circumstances
desirable to proceed with negotiation of proposed agreement.
In this connection Muccio has reported to State that a more
favorable atmosphere for your negotiations might be created if:

A. Negotiations for payment of dollars received
from won sales to UN personnel were successfully concluded

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PRIORITY

FROM: DEPTAR NR : DA 82262 25 SEP 51 CONT'D

prior to opening of your discussions on CINCUNC-ROK agreement. (For your info this matter now being expedited here and release of funds covering sales through 31 July expected soon. However since this payment will undoubtedly be made prior to conclusion of your negotiations, unless you consider such delay advisable, Dept Army considers that it is not essential to delay initiation of your negotiations solely on this account.)

B. Authority is obtained for your negotiators to agree to wipe out ECA counterpart fund by application on ROK overdraft. (Dept Army will initiate discussions in effort to obtain delegation of this authority to you as CINCFE, if you desire.)

C. Your negotiators are prepared to demonstrate that all possible steps being taken to increase flow of supplies for sale on Korean market since danger of runaway inflation now matter of utmost concern to responsible ROK officials.

3. Advise if you desire any further Dept Army action on this matter prior to initiation of negotiations.

TAYLOR

ACTION : G-4

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, AG

42387

PRIORITY

MCN : 75038

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SECURITY **SECRET** INFORMATION

DA MESSAGE TO CINCUNC ON IMPOSSIBILITY OF
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECTIVE, 28 SEPT 51

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RESTRICTED
ROUTINE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FAR EAST & PACIFIC BRANCH
OPERATIONS DIV ACOFS G3 G3
091 KOREA (29 AUG 51) DEPTAR
WASH DC COL EVERETT 56313

TO: CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN

NR: DA 82719

28 SEP 51

From G3 sgd Jenkins. Subj is Interim Civil Affairs
Directive for South Korea.

1. Refs: A. JCS 2157
B. Annex B to Appendix to encl to JCS-2157/3
C. JCS 2157/5
D. Part 2 ourmsg DA 90915 of 10 May
E. JCS 95977 of 10 July

2. As indicated in ref C, Sec Def has concurred in draft memo for pres (ref B) governing responsibilities of State, Defense, and ECA for economic assistance to Korea. However, at informal request of DA, State has deferred forwarding this memo to pres until a definite statement can be included therein regarding funding of economic assistance activities in Korea. A number of other questions relating to Civil affairs responsibilities in South Korea (e. g., Civil Information and Education) have also not rpt not been resolved. Hence, it is not rpt not yet possible to transmit a directive covering all of your civil affairs activities in South Korea.

DA 82719

(Sep 51)

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NR: DA 82719

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3. Pending issuance of an overall civil affairs directive, you should continue to carry out your civil affairs responsibilities in South Korea in accordance with general principles and procedures stated in ref A. In this connection DA considers that terms of ref A are sufficiently broad to permit you to carry out any civil affairs activities in South Korea which you consider essential to accomplishing mission assigned you by ref E.

4. Agent general for UNKRA has informed State (by ltr dtd 18 Jul) that proposals outlined in encl B to ref C "are entirely acceptable". Accordingly you should introduce UNKRA into the Korean economic assistance program in accordance with the provisions of enc B of ref C as interpreted and amplified by encl A of ref C. Except for those limited non operational responsibilities which ref C states UNKRA will assume in coordination with your cmd during phase (1), you should continue to exercise the broad responsibilities of the Unified Command for relief and support of the civilian population of Korea. (See 31 Jul 50 resolution of UN Security Council.) To the extent you deem appropriate in the light of ref C you should seek the active cooperation and assistance of UNKRA in discharge of your economic assistance activities. However, throughout phase (1) you will assume sole responsibility for all relief and short term economic aid which you consider essential to military operations.

5. Any previous civil affairs guidance or instructions in conflict with this interim directive are hereby rescinded.

ORIGIN: G3

DISTR: JCS, CSA, COMPT, G1, PMG, G4, JAG

DA 82719

(Sep 51)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G-3 040 ORO (25 Nov 52)

5 December 1952

SUBJECT: Publications of the Department of the Army Operations Research
Office

TO:

1. Transmitted herewith for your advance information is Technical Memorandum ORO-T-184, "Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-51."
2. ORO-T-184 is a working paper of Project LEGATE.
3. The Department of the Army has not as yet reviewed this publication. Upon the completion of this review by the Department of the Army, appropriate comments will be furnished for inclusion as a part of the document.
4. ACofS, G-3 invites comments on this Technical Memorandum suitable for consideration in the preparation of the report on the project.

Incl
ORO-T-184

H. Mck. Roper
H. Mck. ROPER
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy ACofS, G-3 for
Research, Requirements & Special Weapons

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HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AGJ 040 (15 May 53) EJ/B

15 May 1953

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Operations Research Office Technical
Memorandum ORO-T-184, "Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51"

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
G-3 Operations
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference: Letter G-3 040 ORO (25 Nov 52) Department of the Army, Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, 5 December 1952, Subject: "Publications of the Department of the Army Operations Research Office."

2. In compliance with Para 4 of reference letter the following comments are submitted:

a. The conclusions reached and the recommendations made in ORO-T-184 Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-51, are sound and in general represent an unbiased analysis of the Civil Affairs situation in Korea during the period 1950-51.

b. Further research by ORO in the field of civil affairs and military government be continued.

c. Department of the Army be informed that a definitive US Government and Civil Affairs and Military Government policy in relation to the primary mission of combat is necessary if Civil Affairs responsibilities are to effectively contribute to success in the conduct of military operations.

d. The criticisms on the whole seem to be fair and the recommendations constructive. The study recognizes that, in the light of our unpreparedness for war in Asia, some of the weaknesses were inevitable and that the value of this publication lies largely in using the Korean experience as guidance for other civil affairs operations which possibly lie in the future.

3. The Far East Command has gained much valuable information from this report, and is making a concentrated effort to utilize this information in future planning.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

/s/ V. A. EGGER
V. A. EGGER
Lt, USN
Acting Asst AG

Log No. 29367

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G-3 040 ORO (9 Apr 53)

16 April 1953


SUBJECT: Department of the Army Evaluation of ORO-T-184, "Civil Affairs
in Korea, 1950-51"

TO: Holders of Subject Report

1. ORO-T-184, "Civil Affairs in Korea, 1950-51" has been reviewed
in the Department of the Army.

2. It is considered that for purposes of further Department of the
Army study and for any necessary action by staff agencies, the **attached**
comments on conclusions and recommendations contained in ORO-T-184 as
indicated in attached inclosure will apply.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:



1 Incl.
Restatement of Conclusions
and Recommendations

H. McK. ROPER
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy ACofS, G-3 for
Research, Requirements & Special Wpns.

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Log No. 27553

COMMENTS ON-----THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN
ORO-T-184

1. Conclusions and recommendations:
 - a. Conclusions 1, 2 and 3 are recommended for acceptance without change.
 - b. Conclusion 4, line 1, is modified to read "4. The vague locus of staff responsibility-----."
 - c. Conclusion 5. The lack of formal agreement or informal understanding with the Republic of Korea regarding the conduct of many certain of the important civil affairs operations was a source of friction between civil affairs personnel and Korean officials.
 - d. Conclusion 6. (Rewritten) The lack, in certain cases, of agreements or informal understandings between the US and its agencies on the one hand and the Korean Government on the other, and the lack at times among various US and UN agencies of a clear understanding of Army responsibility in an area of military operation lessened the Army commander's effective influence over the basic economic arrangements with the Republic of Korea and thus impaired the effectiveness of UN economic aid in supporting the Korean economy.
 - e. Conclusion 7. The lack of a sufficient number of highly qualified administrative and economic technicians and of adequate reliable information retarding the operation of the Korean economy handicapped the programming of economic aid and the rendering of advice on economic management to the Korean Government.
 - f. Conclusion 8. The quality of military personnel assigned to civil affairs in Korea, as measured by education and efficiency ratings, is not commensurate with the actual importance of the function. This condition may be taken as an indication of the low level of importance attached to civil affairs at all echelons expected whenever it is necessary to create provisional civil affairs organizations using surplus personnel obtained from other military activities.
 - g. Conclusion 9. The lack of personnel trained in the Korean language and in careful selection and effective control of interpreters put the Army at a serious disadvantage in its efforts to "advise" the indigenous officials.
 - h. Recommendation 1, Wherever the Army conducts operations military operations are conducted within the territory of a nation treated as sovereign for political reasons recognized friendly government, a civil affairs agreement should be negotiated sought during the early stages of the conflict, making provision for such ~~centres~~ over arrangements regarding the internal affairs of the area as are deemed necessary or may subsequently become necessary to accomplish the objectives of the operations and as are commensurate with the responsibilities accepted by the Army military command. For those arrangements not suitable for in-

clusion or not yet included in a formal civil affairs agreement, clear understandings and the continuing exchange of information with the indigenous civil authorities regarding the conduct of various important civil affairs operations should be sought, to the extent practicable. Similar understandings should be arranged with non-military US and UN agencies present in the area of military operations.

i. Recommendation 2. The organization for civil affairs should provide for: (a) a single focus of staff responsibility for all CA/MG functions; (b) a single point channel of contact within the Army for relationships with the civil governments of Army occupational areas operational in areas in which the Army is also operating; and (c) a status for the civil affairs units, at both staff and operating levels, that is commensurate with the importance of their civil affairs tasks.

j. Recommendation 3. The Army should take steps to impress commanders and line officers staff officers with the importance of CA/MG. (This recommendation may imply greater stress at Army and Joint schools on the teaching of political subjects at such institutions as West Point, the Command and General Staff School, and the National War College the impact of CA/MG on the success or failure of military operations and greater emphasis on instruction in civil activities as they relate to military activities in an area of military operations.)

k. Recommendation 4. The Army should take steps to find adequate numbers of qualified officers and teach them the substance of CA/MG. (This recommendation involves consideration of the development of criteria for the selection of CA/MG officers, both within the regular establishment and within the reserves, of the establishment of a career pattern for CA/MG personnel, training in both military and political subjects, and of training both in the close support of tactical operations and rear area support of the operations of large units and commands. Consideration should be given to linking the CA/MG career pattern with such functions as attache and mission duty.)

l. Recommendation 5. A study should be made of those aspects of the operation of the Korean indigenous economy of an area of military operations that have affected will affect the administration of the Army economic aid program, and of the economic data that are required to enable the Army to formulate effective economic management measure principles.

m. Recommendation 6. (Rewritten) A study should be made of the subject of formal agreements and informal understandings which should be reached with indigenous governments in military operational areas, to include scope, principles to be considered in formulation, suitable terms to be employed, agency or agencies to negotiate, typical format, and military requirements.

n. Recommendation 7. A study should be made of the minimum requirements for number of bilingual civil affairs personnel and the effects of the lack of such personnel on the conduct of civil affairs in Korea in various world areas in time of war required to assure availability in key activities where use of interpreters might seriously endanger US interests and operations. In addition, a study should be made of and CA/MG personnel trained in the proper selection, control and use of interpreters from indigenous sources.

2. In addition to the above, and at the request of the Department of State Advisor to the Project Advisory Group for Project LEGATE, the Advisory Group recommends that, wherever the terms "sovereignty" and "surrender of sovereignty" occur throughout ORO-T-184 these terms be changed to "civil authority" and "surrender of civil authority" respectively. **

** It is requested that this evaluation be attached to the subject document.