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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

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
22 December 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 165th  
Aviation Group (Combat) Period 1 Nov 71 - 15 Jan 72

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAAG-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
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
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(Continued on page 2)



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 165TH AVIATION GROUP (COMBAT)  
APO San Francisco 96384

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AVRAXS-3

15 January 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group  
(Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 CSFOR-65(33)

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1. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. Command: The Group's mission remained unchanged until 1 January 1972 when the Group began the first phase of stand down in accordance with KEYSTONE MALLARD Stand Down Schedule.

b. Organizational Changes:

(1) During the period 1-30 November 1971, the 307th Air Traffic Control Battalion was reduced to one company with four air traffic control sites in Military Region III. Residual sites were reassigned to the Aviation Detachment (Divisional), (AD(D)), in the respective Military Regions as depicted at Inclosure 1. remaining company of the 307th Air Traffic Control Battalion was transferred to the 165th Aviation Group (Combat) for command and control on January 1972 and scheduled to complete stand down on 20 January 1972.

(2) On 1 January 1972, flying units subordinate to the Group were reassigned as a result of the KEYSTONE MALLARD deactivation schedule. Reassignment of units is depicted at Inclosure 2.

(3) On 7 January 1972, the AD(D)s were reassigned from the Group in accordance with KEYSTONE MALLARD deactivation schedule to the units indicated at Inclosure 3.

(4) This headquarters began stand down activities on 1 January 1972 with completion date of 28 January 1972.

c. S1 Personnel:

(1) Authorized and present for duty strength as of 15 January 1972:

PERSONNEL	AUTHORIZED	PRESENT FOR DUTY
Officers	35	14
Warrant Officers	8	3
Enlisted Men	183	87
Dept of the Army Civilians	0	0
FSRs (ITT Gilfillan)	4	3

(2) Principal personnel changes that have occurred during the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 4.

DAFD-OTT  
721021  
Inclosure

AVRAXS-B

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group (Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 GSFOR-65(R3) (cont'd)

15 January 1972

(3) Morale: Excellent.

(a) There were 42 requests for Foreign Service Tour extension of which 11 were approved.

(b) Participation in the out-of-country R&R program was as follows:

MONTH	AUSTRALIA	BANGKOK	HAWAII	TAIPEI
NOVEMBER	100%	100%	85%	75%
DECEMBER	100%	85%	65%	55%

(c) Discipline: There were five Courts-Martial and 43 Article 15a during the reporting period.

(d) Reenlistments:

MONTH	CEILING	REUPS	PERCENT OF OBJECTIVE
NOVEMBER	5	4	80%
DECEMBER	4	6	150%

(e) Awards and Decorations (See Inclosure 5).

d. S2 Intelligence:

(1) The following figures pertain to personnel security during the reporting period.

(a) Clearances granted: 17 CONFIDENTIAL, 13 SECRET, and 2 TOP SECRET.

(b) Clearances Validated: 1 TOP SECRET and 48 SECRET.

(c) Unfavorable security actions: There were six suspensions of access.

(d) In accordance with DA Message 031927Z there were four TOP SECRET clearances administratively downgraded to SECRET.

e. S3 Operations, Plans and Trainings:

(1) During the reporting period, the air traffic control assets in Vietnam were reorganized to fully support the in-country requirements. This reorganization was caused by the stand down of the 307th Air Traffic Control Battalion and the 165th Aviation Group (Combat).

(2) The implementation involved reassigning the flying units to the 12th Aviation Group, the 5th Aviation Detachment to the 1st Aviation Brigade and the Aviation Detachments (Divisional) to the Aviation Group in the Military Region where the Aviation Detachments (divisional) were located. The reorganization was affected as depicted at Inclosures 2 and 3.

APPENDIX 3

15 January 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group (Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 CSFOR 65(R3) (cont'd)

(3) Air traffic assets resulting from the stand down of the 307th Air Traffic Control Battalion reassigned to the respective Aviation Detachments (Civilian) as depicted at Inclusion 1.

(4) The Army Flight Following System was reduced to the minimum required service in conjunction with the reduced VFR air traffic particularly between Military Regions. See disposition of FOCs and FSSs at Inclusion 1.

f. Operational Statistics: Depicted below are the operations statistics for the Group Headquarters aircraft as of 12 January 1972:

SORTIES	PASSENGERS	CARGO (TONS)	HOURS
565	1056	0.9	408.20

g. S4 Aircraft Status: The figures below indicate aircraft authorization and the actual inventory as of 15 January 1972:

TYPE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND
U1A	1	0
U6A	1	0
U21A	2	0
UH1D/H	1	0

h. Air Traffic Control Section: During the reporting period the Air Traffic Control Section conducted the following evaluations:

- (1) GCA Evaluations: 14
- (2) Control Tower Evaluations: 24
- (3) Air Traffic Control Training Evaluations: 24
- (4) Facility Ratings Granted: 15
- (5) Airspace Coordinating Conferences: 2

## 2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S EVALUATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMAND ACTION

a. Personnel: None.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

### (1) Mission Tasking of Assigned Aviation Companies:

(a) Observation: Assigned aviation companies are tasked to provide a specific number of aircraft to the supported headquarters daily without regard to the actual requirements for air transportation or surveillance.

(b) Evaluation: The arrangement of providing a specific number of aircraft daily to the supported headquarters is not the most effective and efficient means of utilizing assets. The employment of aircraft was justified on a numerical availability as opposed to actual operational requirements. Therefore, missions are generated for the aircraft to justify a continuing requirement for that number of aircraft.

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15 January 1972  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group (Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 CSFOR-65(R3) (cont. d)

(c) Recommendation: Missions for the Command Airplane Company, the 120th Aviation Company, and the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company should be kept to the unit from the SGS at USARV and MACV as missions are required instead of a standard number of aircraft daily. Higher headquarters should assist mission tasking by establishing priorities for aviation support.

(d) Command Action: None.

(?) Divisional air traffic control assets were not utilized to the maximum extent.

(a) Observation: The 165th Aviation Group (Combat), through its Aviation Detachments (Divisional) and/or TATC Teams, provided air traffic control service to Combat Divisions which did not fully utilize their own TOE capability to provide air traffic control support for Army Airspace in the Division area of operations.

(b) Evaluation: All Combat Divisions are originally structured for air traffic control support. Instead of supplementing the Division air traffic control requirements the 165th Aviation Group (Combat) became the primary source of air traffic control support in the division area of operations. In this regard, the Divisions failed to exercise inherent air traffic control capability and, as a consequence, Divisional air traffic control concepts and doctrines were not realized in Vietnam. The 165th Aviation Group (Combat) provided support to the 23rd Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 25th Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 5th Mechanized Division and the 1st Infantry Division.

(c) Recommendation: In future deployments of Combat Divisions, the organic air traffic assets should be used to the maximum extent and an air traffic control battalion to supplement air traffic control assets in the Army area.

(d) Command Action: None.

d. Organization:

(1) Structure of Aviation Detachments (Divisional):

(a) Observation: The MTOE of the Aviation Detachments (Divisional) authorizes a Lieutenant Colonel as the Detachment Commander. He is in command of 17 to 21 men with a capability of air traffic control activities only. The Detachment is entirely dependent on other units for administration, logistical and security support. There is no provision for an air traffic control trained officer in the MTOE.

(b) Evaluation: A Lieutenant Colonel is not the appropriate grade for an Aviation Detachment (Divisional) Commander. He has, in most cases, been assigned as Post Commander or Deputy Installation Commander. The air traffic control mission, in most cases, receives a minimum of his attention. Post duties and housekeeping should be separated from air traffic control. In cases where a Captain was assigned as interim commander of an Aviation Detachment (Divisional),

AVBAXS-B

15 January 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group (Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 OSFOR-65(R3) (cont'd)

the quality of air traffic control service improved because he was not assigned additional post-type duties. The Air Traffic School at Fort Rucker trains Warrant Officers and, as yet, there are no slots for them in an Aviation Detachment (Divisional). The lack of highly skilled technicians is a hindrance to proficient air traffic control in the Aviation Detachment (Divisional).

(c) Recommendation: The Aviation Detachment (Divisional) should be commanded by an air traffic control trained Captain and have an air traffic control trained Warrant Officer assigned as Operations Officer.

(d) Command Action: A study should be made of the structure of Aviation Detachments (Divisional) by the Air Traffic Control Staff Section at 1st Aviation Brigade, USARV and the recommendations be forwarded to Department of the Army for consideration.

(2) Identification of Air Traffic Control Qualified Officers:

(a) Observation: Most of the officers assigned to the 165th Aviation Group (Combat) had no air traffic control experience and are from many career fields and branches.

(b) Evaluation: Command and staff positions in the air traffic control field are filled with officers who spend an initial period of two to three months becoming familiar with the highly specialized equipment and procedures in air traffic control. After a year in this field, the officers are not necessarily assigned to air traffic control duties at their next or subsequent assignments. The NCOs who are career air traffic control specialists, have made many critical comments on the problem of lack of stability in officer assignments to air traffic control positions.

(c) Recommendation: Air traffic control skilled officers should be identified by MOS prefix or suffix and controlled by branch assignment.

(d) Command Action: None.

(3) Stand down of the Air Traffic Control Battalion:

(a) Observation: The Air Traffic Control Battalion stood down and the remaining air traffic control facilities were turned over to the Aviation Detachments (Divisional).

(b) Evaluation: The decision to employ Aviation Detachments (Divisional) as opposed to Air Traffic Control Battalion assets was made after strong requests by field commanders to retain the Lieutenant Colonel Aviation Detachment (Divisional) Commander. The basis of the retention was to allow the field commander to have a Deputy Installation Commander primarily to perform housekeeping and administrative duties at the airfield of assignment and not hinder the field commander's primary combat mission.

(c) Recommendation: The responsibility for air traffic control at Army level should be assigned to the Air Traffic Control Battalion.

15 January 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group (Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 CSFOR-65(R)) (cont d)

(d) Command Action: None.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics: None.

g. Communications:

(1) Utilization of ITT Gilfillan Factory Representatives:

(a) Observation: The ITT Gilfillan Factory Service Representative provided a vital link in the 165th Aviation Group (Combat) GCA maintenance program. They provided training, technical assistance and liaison with the factory, when required. The contract and employment of the factory service representatives was monitored by the staff of the 165th Aviation Group (Combat) and the Group Signal Officer served as the Contract Representative.

(b) Evaluation: The ITT Gilfillan Factory Service Representatives have a dual capability. First, these factory service representatives provide on site technical repair assistance and provide higher echelon maintenance over and above the capability of school-trained avionics repairmen. Secondly, it has been proven that a scheduled program of field visits for periods of three or four days greatly enhanced the maintenance posture of the sites.

(c) Recommendation: In order to insure realization of the dual capability mentioned above, it is necessary that the controlling headquarters establish a schedule for the factory service representatives to visit field sites. The controlling headquarters should furnish priority transportation air or ground, to insure desired results.

(d) Command Action: None.

(2) Training of GCA Radar Repairmen, MOS 26D:

(a) Observation: First term school-trained GCA Radar Repairmen were not fully prepared to cope with the unique maintenance problems encountered in the Republic of Vietnam. Repairmen had difficulty establishing and maintaining their repair parts Prescribed Load List (PLL). They lacked the training to perform the Direct Support (DS) maintenance and limited General Support (GS) maintenance required at the site locations.

(b) Evaluation: Most technicians are assigned to RVN directly from the GCA School in CONUS. Although they are given extensive training in the maintenance of GCA systems, they do not have the experience to perform DS/GS maintenance without close supervision. It would be impractical to establish DS/GS repair facilities at each radar location because of the added personnel and equipment that would be necessary.

(c) Recommendation: Relieve the on site repairmen of Direct Support and limited General Support responsibilities and limit them to organizational and limited Direct Support maintenance only. Establish DS/GS Ground Control Approach repair

AVPAXI-B

15 January 1972  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group  
(Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 CSFOR-65(R3) (cont'd)

facilities with quick reaction contact teams in each corps area. These facilities should be co-located with Aviation Electronics maintenance units and assigned the required test equipment, repair parts and the experienced personnel to accomplish the mission.

(d) Command Action: None.

(3) Air traffic control peculiar avionics DS/GS repair facilities:

(a) Observation: The responsibility for DS/GS repair of air traffic control peculiar avionics equipment should be at the Army Level DS/GS Group and not the Group having operational control, in this case the 165th Aviation Group (Combat). The 165th Aviation Group (Combat) was not organized or manned for general support maintenance for the following reasons:

- (1) Lack of properly trained DS/GS repairmen.
- (2) Insufficient transportation.
- (3) The excessive span of control from Group to Detachment.

(b) Evaluation:

(1) The 34th General Support Group has an avionics maintenance oriented organization with facilities and assets to support the maintenance of air traffic control peculiar avionics items.

(2) DS/GS support activities established on a geographical basis would alleviate transportation difficulties and communications problems and provide a quick reaction time to the Aviation Detachments (Divisional) and their sub-sites.

(3) It is necessary that each Aviation Detachment (Divisional) Commander effect detailed coordination and liaison with the supporting DS/GS unit and thus place demands on the system.

(c) Recommendation:

(1) The Beacon/Tower DS/GS repair facility be placed under the control of the 34th General Support Group.

(2) Beacon/Tower DS/GS repair facilities be established in each corps area.

(d) Command Action: None.

(4) Use of the AN/TPN-18 as a RAPCON Facility Radar:

(a) Observation: The AN/TPN-18 is a light weight helicopter transportable radar set designed for use on forward airstrips and heliports. The maximum range of the AN/TPN-18 is 40 nautical miles with height finding capabilities of from 300 to 3000 feet.

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15 January 72

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group (Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 CSFOR-65(R)) (cont'd)

(b) Evaluation: For a successful RAPCON facility, the radar used should have the capability of aircraft detection at a minimum of 100 miles.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) The AN/TIN-18 not be used as a RAPCON radar at a fixed installation.

(2) A rugged radar, such as the AN/TPX-144 be used in conjunction with the AN/TSC-53 Communications Central as a RAPCON facility.

(d) Command Action: None.

h. Material: None.

i. Other: None.

### 3. EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED DURING INACTIVATION/REDEPLOYMENT:

a. Personnel: None.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations: Stand down of a unit with a continuing operational mission:

(1) Observation: The 165th Aviation Group (Combat) Headquarters and the Air Traffic Control Battalion were stood down while the battalion continued to have an air traffic control mission.

(2) Evaluation: Although the 165th Aviation Group (Combat) anticipated the stand down of the Air Traffic Control Battalion and "zero balanced" three of the companies and the Battalion Headquarters, the fourth company had several sites still operating on the KEYSTONE notification date. These sites could not be closed out due to operational requirements. The personnel and equipment had to be released from KEYSTONE assets and added as excess to selected Aviation Detachments (Divisional).

(3) Recommendation: When a unit is identified for stand down, the mission of that unit be terminated at the stand down start date or transferred to another unit prior to the KEYSTONE notification date.

(4) Command Action: None.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics: None.

g. Communications: None.

AVPAXG:


15 January 1972

SUBJECT: Operations Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group  
(Combat) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972 CSFOR-65(RJ) (L. 1)

h. Material: None.

i. Other: None.

5 Inclosure  
as

  
LOWELL L. BALLARD, JR.  
LTC, IN  
Commanding

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The following is a breakdown of how the Air Traffic Control Battalion assets were reorganized to Aviation Detachments (Divisions) throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

<u>ATC BN ASSETS</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>	<u>AD(D)</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ON</u>	<u>OFF</u>
Phu Bai FOC	CLOSED			2 Nov 61	
Phu Bai App C-1	Transferred to	321st	Phu Bai	7 Nov 61	
Da Nang FSS	Transferred to	32nd	Da Nang	3 Nov 61	
Coastal Ctr FOC	Transferred to	339th	Dong Da Thien	8 Nov 61	
Da Lat	CLOSED			2 Nov 61	
Phan Thiet FSS	CLOSED			15 Dec 61	
Tuy Hoa FSS	Transferred To	Tuy Hoa AAF	Tuy Hoa	7 Dec 61	
Pleiku FSS	Transferred to	344th	Pleiku	17 Nov 61	
Quin Nhon FSS	Transferred to	318th	An Son Lane	17 Nov 61	
Kontum TATC Team	Transferred to	344th	Kontum	17 Nov 61	
Saigon FOC	Transferred to	313th	Saigon	25 Nov 61	
Song Be FSS	CLOSED			2 Jan 62	
Lessiter TATC Team	Transferred to	316th	Long Binh	25 Dec 61	
Tay Ninh W. TATC Team	CLOSED			2 Jan 62	
Tay Ninh E. TATC Team	CLOSED			2 Jan 62	
Thien Ngon TATC Team	CLOSED			1 Jan 62	
Lai Khe TATC Team	CLOSED			15 Dec 61	
FSB Mace ATC Team	Transferred to	316th	Xuan Loc	27 Dec 61	
Vodat Radar (ASR)	CLOSED			13 Dec 61	
Camau FSS	Transferred to	345th	Can Tho	17 Dec 61	
Camau TATC Team	Transferred to	343th	Can Tho	17 Dec 61	

SUBJECT: Reassignment of Subordinate Units.

The following units were reassigned on 1 January 1972 as indicated below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>ATTACHED</u>
120th Avn Co (AH)	Long Binh	12th CAG (less OPCON)	
129th Med Det	Long Binh	1st Avn Bde	
Command Airplane Co	Long Thanh	12th CAG (Less OPCON)	
73rd Avn Co (SA)	Long Thanh	12th CAG (Less OPCON)	
197th Med Det	Long Thanh	12th CAG	Cmd Apl Cc
772nd Med Det	Long Thanh	12th CAG	Cmd Apl Cc
Tuy Hoa Army Airlid Cwd	Tuy Hoa	17th CAG	
5th Avn Det	Vung Tau	1st Avn Bde	
85th Med Det	Vung Tau	1st Avn Bde	34th GS Gp
154th Med Det	Vung Tau	1st Avn Bde	34th GS Gp
*Long Thanh TDA	Long Thanh	12th CAG	

\*Pending USARV assignment of unit to 1st Aviation Brigade

SUBJECT: Reassignment of Subordinate Units

The following units were reassigned on 7 January 1972 as indicated below.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>ATTACHED</u>
312th AD(D)	Sanford AAF	12th CAG	
313th AD(D)	H-3 (Saigon)	34th GS Gp (AM&S)	
316th AD(D)	Long Binh (Plantation)	12th CAG	
318th AD(D)	An Son (Ianc)	17th CAG	
321st AD(D)	Hue/Phu Bai	11th CAG	
322nd AD(D)	Marble Mountain	11th CAG	
339th AD(D)	Ninh Hoa	17th CAG	
340th AD(D)	Phu Loi	34th GS Gp (AM&S)	
344th AD(D)	Pleiku	17th CAG	
345th AD(D)	Can Tho	16th CAG	
346th AD(D)	Vinh Long	16th CAG	
*362nd AD(D)	SAAF (Mobile)	12th CAG	
363rd AD(D)	Vung Tau	34th GS Gp (AM&S)	
365th AD(D)	Long Thanh	12th CAG	

\*This unit is at reduced strength and has the capability to relocate as a mobile TATC within 24 hours.

SUBJECT: Principal Personnel Changes (1 Nov 71-31 Dec 71)

S3 13 Dec 71

OUTGOING: King, Dewey M. LTC 429-44-5656 FA

INCOMING: Shoemaker, John R. MAJ 504-32-6418 CE

Flt Chk 1 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Mesnier, Charles R. LTC 492-24-4942 FA

INCOMING: Carlmark, Gary K. CPT 555-42-2158 AD

Avns Sfty Off 15 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Vacant

INCOMING: Beal, Weuley A. MAJ 013-32-2495 SC

XO HHC 19 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Osborne, George M. 1LT 229-66-0884 AR

INCOMING: Bernardo, Charles M. 1LT 149-38-7856

Gp Surgeon 24 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Vacant

INCOMING: Guerrero, Joseph C. CPT 101-32-0656 MC

CO 307 ATC Bn

OUTGOING: Proletti, Raymond A. LTC 093-24-1294 SC

INCOMING: Firman, Samuel G. MAJ 302-30-6843 FA

CO CAC 14 Dec 71

OUTGOING: Bayne, Robert D. LTC 247-34-3341 IN

INCOMING: McKenzie, Robert D. MAJ 380-32-1745 IN

CO 312 1 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Baldwin, Max R. MAJ 253-43-8353 7A

INCOMING: Mesnier, Charles R. LTC 492-24-4942 FA

CO 313 6 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Williford, Henry G. LTC 457-30-4601 CE

INCOMING: Schwem, Marvin W. MAJ 366-75-3715 IN

CO 315 21 Dec 71 (Unit Stand Down)

OUTGOING: Principio, Marco A. MAJ 123-28-8578 IN

INCOMING: NA

CO 316 5 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Nesbitt, Woodrow M. CPT 249-70-0005 FA

INCOMING: Baldwin, Max R. 253-54-8353 FA

CO 340 20 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Firman, Samuel G. MAJ 302-30-6883 FA

INCOMING: Vacant

Enclosure 4

Inclosure 4 (Cont)

CO 340 23 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Vacant

INCOMING: Bender, James D. LTC 446-34-6817 AD

CO 344 2 Dec 71

OUTGOING: Gogolkewicz, Richard MAJ 195-30-5502 PA

INCOMING: Hardy, John L. MAJ 048-22-6482 FA

CO 352 2 Nov 71

OUTGOING: Cruz, Roger E. CPT 294-42-8791 SC

INCOMING: McKenney, Richard C. MAJ 541-38-5710 IN

CO 359 20 Dec 71 (Unit Stand Down)

OUTGOING: McKenney, Richard C. MAJ 541-38-5710 IN

INCOMING: NA

CO 363 23 Dec 71

OUTGOING: Smith, Herbert M. Jr. LTC 465-34-1116 IN

INCOMING: Foster, John K. LTC 429-44-4183 TC

CO Tuy Hoa Army Airfield Command

OUTGOING: Moore, Peter W. LTC 174-26-2445

INCOMING: McKenney, Richard C. MAJ 541-38-5710 IN

**SUBJECT: Awards and Decorations for November and December**

<u>AWARD &amp; DECORATION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>
Silver Star	0	0
Legion of Merit	3	0
Distinguished Flying Cross	17	0
Soldiers Medal	0	0
Bronze Star Medal (V)	3	1
Bronze Star Medal (A)	7	1
Bronze Star Medal (S)	84	24
Air Medal (V)	1	1
Army Commendation Medal (V)	2	0
Army Commendation Medal (A)	15	0
Army Commendation Medal (S)	74	23
Purple Heart	1	1


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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 165th  
Aviation Group (Combat) for Period 1 Nov 71 to 15 Jan 72,  
CSFOR-65(R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO San Francisco 96375 11 FEB 1972

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIMC-DC,  
APO San Francisco. 96375

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned  
for the period 1 Nov 71 to 15 Jan 72 and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



MAX MADDOX  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

5 Incl  
nc

AVHRO-10 (15 Jan 72) 24 Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (Headquarters, 165th Aviation  
Group (Combat)) Period 1 November 1971 to 15 January 1972  
GPOPR-05(R5)


Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375-1 @ APR 1972

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTH: GPOPR-21,  
APO 96358

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 15 January 1972 from Headquarters, 165th Aviation Group and concurs with the exception of paragraph 2d(1), page 4: Nonconcur with recommendation for a change in grade of the Aviation Detachment (Divisional) Commander. The value of Lieutenant Colonel ADD commander has been repeatedly proven. It is true that he is often employed in the capacity of Deputy Installation Commander/Coordinator. This situation normally occurs at large airfields or at bases where the airfield operation is the primary base mission. In most cases, his small detachment strength is heavily augmented by the supported installation. Operation and administration of an airfield is a highly complex arrangement and the ATC function is just one of its facets. The commander needs to be a rated and experienced aviator, but it is not necessary that he be a school trained traffic manager. His basic pilot training incorporates adequate training in this specialty for this management function. The TOE's have been reviewed and modified and still reflect a LTC as the AD(D) Commander.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Incl  
nc

  
PETER H. RODDA  
1LT AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1st Avn Bde

GPOP-FD (15 Jan 72) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 165th Aviation  
Group (Cbt), Period Ending 15 January 1972,  
RGS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. L. Mahu*

M. L. Mahu  
TIT. AGC  
Asst AG

5 Incl  
nc

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Security Classification

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