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AGO ltr, 11 jun 1980


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (31 Jan 73) DAFD-OTT

9 February 1973

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: LTC Linton C. Beasley, Province
Senior Advisor, Kien Phong Province, 14 July 1971 - 13 January 1973

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U), dated 2 July 1971.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of LTC Linton C. Beasley, subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
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
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(Continued on page 2)

Verne L. Bowers
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General



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HEADQUARTERS
ADVISORY TEAM 84 (KIEN PHONG PROVINCE)
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

MACDR-84

19 December 1972

SUBJECT: Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour Report
(RCS MACCORDS 174.01) - LINTON C. BEASLEY, 227-34-6180

THRU: DEPCORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO: HQ, US Military Assistance Command
ATTN: MACCORDS (ACofStaff, CORDS)
APO 96222

Attached is my completion of tour report for the period 14 July 1971
to 13 January 1973.

Lt Col Beasley
LINTON C. BEASLEY
LTC, Infantry
Province Senior Advisor/Commanding

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SECTION * I

NAME: BEASLEY, Linton C.

GRADE: LTC

PII Redacted

BRANCH OF SERVICE: Infantry

PROVINCE: Kien Phong

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 14 July 1971 - 13 January 1973

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 13 January 1973

PREVIOUS TOUR(S) IN VIETNAM (DATES - INCLUSIVE):
September 1961 - August 1962

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR(S): Ranger Advisor,
Trung Lap Ranger Training Center and Provisional Rhade
Bn, Bamethuct

PII Redacted

SECTION * II

1. What background did you have for your position?
 - One previous tour in RVN and 18 years experience in Army.
2. What training did you have for this position?
 - Regular PSA course at VN Training Center Wash.
3. What vocational training would you suggest for your position?
 - Full language course to attain reasonable fluency.
4. What should be the length of tour for your position?
 - At least 18 months.
5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory?
If not, specify deficiencies.
 - Yes.
6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming?
Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?
 - No.
7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not what changes would you recommend?
 - Yes.
8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?
 - Yes.
9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?
 - Yes.

ANSWER QUESTIONS 10 .. 15 BY GIVING AN ORDER OF PRIORITY

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:
1. Land Reform.
 2. National Fund for Local Development.
 3. Rural Development Cadre.
11. The most effective para military forces are:
1. Regional Force.
 2. Popular Force.
 3. People's Self Defense Force.
12. The most successful pacification programs are:
1. Land Reform.
 2. Rural Development Cadre.
 3. Territorial Forces.
13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:
1. Land Reform.
 2. Territorial Forces.
 3. Public Works.
14. The least successful pacification programs are:
1. Social Welfare/Refugee.
 2. Public Health.
 3. Taxation.
15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:
1. Chieu Hoi.
 2. ADB Rural Banks (this is due to manner of implemation here
Rather than Potential much more effort is
needed).
 3. National Police.
16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GWN
and US are making.

- Yes.

17. The people, as you know them, are (more) (less) committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

- This is difficult to judge at this point, there are a lot of public demonstrations of support but at the same time some PAAS show that the people want peace and would align with whom ever would assure that.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goal that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? (Yes) (No) If no, what change in the plan should be made?

- No, the Plan is too general. It should be more specific as to exact goals to be achieved and exact tasks to be performed.

19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? (Yes) (No) If not, how can this be accomplished?

- Yes.

SECTION *** III

TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF:

Prior to the enemy offensive, huge strides in pacification were being made as the goal to secure the entire province population was becoming a reality. Systematic elimination of enemy mini-base areas was accomplished throughout most of the province as outposts were constructed in the former contested areas. Tan Thanh, located in the eastern portion of Hong Ngu District became the model Resettlement hamlet that grew to a population of over three thousand in the course of five months. The significant aspect of this hamlet is that it straddles a major infiltration route from Cambodia to the heart of the Delta. Also, it is located in the Western portion of the Plain of Reeds that is virtually virgin land. In this short period of time, the hamlet proudly displayed a covered market place, village office, church and dispensary all of masonry construction. The success achieved in this area can only be contributed to the security provided by the Territorial Forces that was sufficiently adequate to permit President Thieu to make a personal visit in March 1972.

Of the four refugee areas established from the Cambodian incursion, three had been resettled prior to March 1972. The last resettlement was to have been located in Kien Van District along the Kinh So Mot canal. This is a highly fertile area but has not been seeded since the early 60's due to enemy presence. The enemy had fully controlled this western portion of Base Area 470 and had virtually denied entrance into the area by any opposing force. An aggressive land clearing plan was implemented in conjunction with outpost construction in March 1971. Six RF Companies and one RF Battalion were involved in the operation and, although progress was being made, the cost were high. By the end of March, five outposts were constructed and approximately twenty percent of the land area had been cleared at a cost of 7 killed and 97 wounded from booby traps which is indicative of the importance the enemy has placed in this area. The mission was aborted in April when NVA forces invaded the province.

Prior to the invasion, the war per se was virtually non existant. The few contacts that were made were insignificant and concentration on pacification prevailed. Following the initial invasion in Tan Thanh Village on 17 April the Territorial Forces suffered one setback after another as the enemy continued to roll back outposts to reopen his infiltration routes. It was not until 2 May that the Sector Forces gained the initiative and carried the action to the enemy. The aggressiveness of the Territorial Forces continued to mount with each

successful action that culminated in July when the enemy lost 885 KIA, 20 captured, and 5 Chieu Hoi. Although the initial outset appeared bleak, the resultant accomplishments have been most rewarding.

The major shortcomings of the Territorial Forces is the high desertion rate which averages between 20 and 25% of troop loss in any given month. It is apparent that at least one fourth of a unit's strength lacks the determination, motivation, and loyalty to fight. A solution to this is indoctrination, which must be strongly emphasized by the unit's leadership and supplemented by the Sector POL/AR personnel. The Kien Phong Territorial Forces have frequently been cited as one of the best in the Delta.

PSDF:

The People's Self Defense Forces of Kien Phong have had, for the most part, little opportunity to show their effectiveness. The interest in the program however, continues to generate overwhelming interest as is noted by a 50,757 man force of which 13,101 are under arms. During the course of the past year, 48 hamlets have been placed solely under the PSDF and National Police for security. Since that time only one incident occurred where the security of a hamlet was threatened, that being Long Khanh and Long Thuan Islands on 4 November 1972.

In this case the D-2 Battalion with supporting elements of the 207 NVA Regiment, infiltrated the island. The reaction by the PSDF and NP was superb and effectively contained the enemy until additional ARVN and RF Forces arrived. Of an estimated 340 man enemy force, 287 were accounted for by body count and captives. A truly fantastic result considering the primary mission of the para-military forces is not to engage NVA forces, but merely serve as an early warning device.

Previous action involving the PSDF could only be measured as far less than desirable six months ago. Since 4 November a turn toward improvement has occurred as noted by the results achieved:

Friendly:	2 KIA	6 WIA	2 MIA	3 Wpns
Enemy:	17 KIA	18 Cap	7 Wpns	3 c/s Wpns

These results are compared with the year total:

Friendly:	21 KIA	24 WIA	64 MIA	154 Wpns
Enemy:	39 KIA	28 Cap	12 Wpns	5 c/s Wpns

Although the PSDF still harbors some shortcomings, many of the former problems are being resolved by the recently trained cadre of 327 representatives from throughout the province. A continuous monitoring system over the district and village training programs has been instituted by sector to insure the training is continuous and beneficial. Results thus far have shown tremendous improvement in the calibre of leadership in several hamlets. Optimism prevailing, the entire PSDF program will

be enhanced as more leaders materialize through the current training program.

Province and District officials still show a lack of confidence in the military and political reliability of the PSDF.

REFUGEE & SOCIAL WELFARE:

The weakest service in the province is Social Welfare. This weakness is critical as over 10% of the province population can be classified as war victims (over 45,000). In My An District, at least 50% of the population can be classified as war victims.

The in-camp refugees in this province have received four payments in the nine months that they have been refugees. It took five and a half months to establish a bread baking contract. It has been difficult for them to get medical attention. All this bad treatment has been completely unnecessary and due entirely to bureaucratic ineptitude and political hypocrisy. It took almost a full year of effort before the Social Welfare Service Chief was removed.

In addition to the above things, the SWS Chief failed to hire any teachers or mid-wives for all the 40 school rooms being built and the 7 maternity/dispensaries being built. He was so incompetent that all responsibility for the building of the projects themselves were turned over to the PPDC. A CORDS suggestion that was quickly acted upon by the Province Chief and the rest of his staff. There was also the matter of the war victims from Thong Binh Village (Hieu Duc Hamlet) in Hong Ngu which was mostly 100% destroyed during a battle on the 5th of July it was not until the last week of November that the money arrived in province and the money still has not yet been distributed.

Due to the almost total incompetence of the Kien Phong Social Welfare Service, the PPDC was given operational control over the more than 30,000,000,000 in RTV Development funds at the suggestion of CORDS. This program had progressed well and with the previous experience of the PPDC in managing VSD put to good use. Currently these projects are now about 85% complete.

NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE:

The National Police Field Forces are well trained in both civil police and paramilitary operations. Operations are conducted based on information supplies by the Police Special Branch and other intelligence collecting agencies. Recently the Field Police were instrumental in causing the failure of enemy initiated actions to "Grab Land" in anticipation of a cease fire. Operations directed towards the apprehension of draft evaders have been very successful and operations based on the F-6 program have shown favorable results. The one main problem is the failure in some instances by intelligence agencies or coordinate information with the Field Police for their action.

NATIONAL POLICE OPERATIONS:

The National Police, of this Province, has been forced, due to the military build up, to operate and function with personnel with very limited education. The average policeman has acquired no more than a forth grade education, many of whom can do little more than read or write his own name. When a "Cease Fire" does come to this country, more and more responsibility will be placed on the National Police. If this educational problem continues to exist, there is some question if the National Police can fulfill these responsibilities with any degree of efficiency. Some advancements have been made within the National Police. One such achievement is the establishment of police stations in all 51 villages of this Province. GVN presence, in the form of police, is brought to the village and hamlet level with the establishment of these stations. A second major advance within the National Police was the recent advancement in rank of qualified personnel. Few if any promotions have occurred in the past. These promotions and the establishment of adequate promotion system will do much to enhance the morale, increase the incentive of subordinates and undoubtedly have a far reaching affect on the future efficiency and effectiveness of the National Police. The main problem that exists in this province is the failure of the Province Police Chief to enforce and oversee the responsibilities of his office. This man, Major Nguyen Huu Truong, undoubtedly has the capabilities, being well educated and having attended the International Police Academy in Washington. However, little is done on his part to increase the general operations of the National Police. When problems are brought to or come to his attention, the opinion is generated from his actions that if the problem is overlooked long enough it will either be forgotten or will resolve itself. He spends too much time out of province and a great deal of time at his residence and away from his desk. A great deal of advisory time and effort has been spent attempting to initiate an in-province training program to combat the educational problem and an inspection program to uncover and identify the areas where training is more urgently needed. Although he admits that both of these programs are necessary, he does little to enforce their initiation. Another major problem which confronts the National Police, in general, is disciplinary action. When incompetence, corruption or other wrong doings of a severe nature are brought to light, disciplinary action amounts to nothing more than a transfer from one province to another. This type of disciplinary action in many instances amounts to a promotion rather than punishment, depending on the economic development of the province assigned.

PHUNG HOANG (PROPAC):

While advertised as the number one program in the nation, actions by government officials indicate otherwise. The most obvious reason for failure of this program has been the lack of any real determination to identify, arrest, prosecute and imprison known VCI. Instead implementation

has been characterized by procrastination, improper interrogation, premature release, corruption involving payoff to police and other government officials and intimidation of probable loyal citizens. Until government officials can establish their credibility and their good intentions to protect the rights of innocent citizens no significant improvement can be expected. Instead a negative result will continue to accrue due to the suspicion, distrust and fear generated by present conditions and methods.

VILLAGE SELF-DEVELOPMENT:

The PPDC has shown itself to be reasonably effective. It has effectively implemented the programs under its control. Province Development programs have been carried out. Its record in VSD is not quite as good. It had many dossiers from 1969 and 1970 which had not yet been completed. However, since this problem appeared countrywide and received attention from the central government, it is now rapidly being corrected.

RD CADRE:

During my year and a half here in Kien Phong there has been a marked improvement in the performance of the Rural Development Cadre. When I first arrived here, a cloud of suspicion hung over the RDC as a result of corruption involving payroll padding. With the appointment of a new RDC group chief, the situation changed radically. The RDC are now one of the best governmental units in province. VSD has been improved as it is now managed by people who live and work in the villages.

Finally, after three years, planning for VSD is done during the rainy season, and building is done during the dry season, instead of the other way around. This change will considerably improve the 1973 VSD program, especially in this province which is affected by the rainy season to the extent that the whole province is virtually a big lake from August through February.

The RDC also organized one of the biggest youth work camps ever held in the Delta, as 1,675 youth from all 51 villages in Kien Phong met for three days in the province town. This meeting was held only two and a half weeks after the province capital was nearly surrounded by three battalions of NVA only two kilometers away from the city.

The RDC are also doing an excellent job in the area of peoples informations, with very limited assets. The RDC are participating in a monthly show (TV) which is broadcast from Can Tho and Saigon. They have set up information stations at locations where cyclos congregate to pick up passengers.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT:

The Province Council continues to remain a weak and ineffective organization in Kien Phong Province. Most of its recommendations to the Province Chief and his service chiefs do not even get the courtesy of an answer. The Province Council Projects which come under the NFLD program, are extremely late and in a highly unfinished state. Its funds for development of peoples groups are expended only under great duress. Most of the members of the Province Council, including the President of the council, do not have the foggiest notion of how to spend the funds that they are supposed to control.

AID IN KIND:

AIK Funds have served as a stimulus to action on needed projects. The Funds have been used to support military and developmental objectives.

CHIEU HOI:

The Chieu Hoi Service has been running at about a capacity of 10 persons as of late. The only thing that needs attention here is the closing down of the Province Chieu Hoi Service. With the GVN so desperate for funds, it can ill afford such wasteful expenditures as this one.

PUBLIC HEALTH:

Public Health has continued to expand in the form of physical assets and programs. There continues; however, to be a shortage of trained personnel -- particularly for the new maternities and dispensaries that are being built at the village level. Public Health also continues to have one of the poorest construction records in the province. Nearly all services finish their projects before Public Health Projects are even started.

EDUCATION:

Primary Education continues to expand at a reasonable rate, with the most important problem being a shortage of teachers. Kien Phong is one of the least desirable to live in the Delta. This fact is shown in that over 100 teachers transferred out, while only 16 transferred in during 1972. In addition, the hidebound bureaucracy of MOE in Saigon caused the normal school trained teachers to arrive after over half of the school year is already gone every year. In addition, schools continue to be built faster than teachers can be provided. There is also no provision for coordinating the building of WSD and RTV school with the Education Service so that teachers can be requested. This is a process that needs to be done as far in advance as possible.

The Cao Lanh High School is the third largest high school in Vietnam, with over 4,000 students. Its principle is hard working and energetic. The Province Council has added seven rooms to this school

over the past two years, but much more is needed. A library supported by MOE was established with CORDS Kien Phong and the USAID library branch assistance. This establishment of this library was a model of assistance effort, with CORDS providing assistance and encouragement and the principle of the high school providing the desire and most of the work. The principal need is now to convert the Cao Lanh High School to a comprehensive unit.

PUBLIC WORKS:

The performance of the Public Works Service in this province is excellent, especially considering the lack of equipment. The Public Works Chief is a capable individual. One of the major accomplishments has been the near completion of an all season road from the province capital to the district town of Hong Ngu near the Cambodian border.

The most consistent problem encountered in this area has been the lack of rock. CORDS assisted in the building of a second off-loading bridge at the province rock storage area, to try to ease the shortage of this critical construction material. Through out my entire tour in this province, this problem has continued to plague public works projects.

CORDS also worked with the Public Works Service, the Province Council, and the PSDF in the formation of the Cao Lanh Fire Brigade after a disastrous pre-TET fire this year. Two water pumps were obtained from excess property in Saigon, the Public Works Service repaired the pumps and put them in working order, and the PSDF organized a fire protection unit.

CORDS has been working since 1969 to get proper technicians and remodeling work performed on the city water plant. This plant was built during the French period to serve about 5,000 people. It is currently serving nearly 25,000 people. As a result, the water is pumped for all practical purposes straight from the canals into peoples homes. With CORDS interest expressed, the Province Chief kept personnel in Saigon informed of his interest in improving the water plant. The Public Works Chief also worked closely with the concerned Vietnamese personnel in Saigon in this regard. During the month of November the Director General of Water Supply notified the province that his office would assume control of the Cao Lanh Water Plant in mid-1973. This action will bring money and technical assistance to the Cao Lanh Water Plant that were previously unobtainable.

One of the areas that has plagued the Public Works Service is the maintenance of the ferry boats which carry traffic across the Mekong to Sadec Province and thence one to Can Tho. The two ferry boats are very old and in need of replacement. The one old ferry that is operable frequently breaks down for as much as three to four days at a time. The other old ferry will require a substantial capital investment to put it in operating condition.

LAND REFORM:

Land Reform is one of the finest run services in the Province. This service has as its goal 40,500 hectares to be distributed by March 26, 1973. It mid-November this goal was surpassed and the Kien Phong PLAS became the first one in Vietnam to meet its goal. This is in spite of the fact that Kien Phong had 4,000 hectares added to its goal in 1971. It now appears that the PLAS Chief will come close to making his own personnel goal of 50,000 hectares distributed by March 1973. This success was achieved in spite of the fact that Kien Phong has been the scene of much heavy fighting ever since the beginning of the NVA offensive in early April of this year. During this period Kien Phong's HES rating dropped it from 5th to 19th out of 44 in the biggest loss of security in the Delta. This success has been due to the hard work of the entire PLAS and its close coordination with village security forces to provide safety for land reform cadre. The areas that continue to provide the strongest resistance to the land reform program are the very wealthy and very secure island villages which lie in the Mekong River.

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION:

In the area of agriculture, Kien Phong is again fortunate to have an excellent service chief. Kien Phong is a poor province, by Delta standards, due to its lack of security and the fact that 90% of its arable land can only grow floating rice which has a very low yield. In an attempt to grow feed grains, a grain sorghum program is being developed in Kien Phong.

In contrast to some other provinces, the grain sorghum program here is a tremendous success. During the first crop year of its emphasis here in 1971, the Agriculture Service more than doubled its goal assigned by the National Ministry. This year the goal for Kien Phong was 2,000 hectares. At this point, 3,000 hectares will be planted, with a total possible hectare of 8,000 possible if the seed is provided promptly by Saigon. The farmers of Kien Phong are still hungry for goods and services which a crop of floating rice will not provide. This program is a great success because the Vietnamese want it. The credit for this success goes entirely to the Agriculture Service Chief and his cadre who have been conducting training sessions and propaganda sessions on grain sorghum for the past six months. He has put a great deal of prior planning into this program. He has received some assistance from MR IV Agriculture Branch in marketing some of the sorghum.

He is also working on a corn program for this province as a second crop. He has a few hectares of high lysine corn as an experiment. About 300 hectares of corn have been planted altogether in effort to establish it as a secondary crop.

Through the effort of CORDS, several new varieties of deep water rice are being tried in this province, which has 120,000 hectares of

deep water rice, and about 10,000 hectares of TN rice land. This province was one of several selected for this experimental because the service chief is well respected.

The major failure in agriculture has been the inability to establish any rural banks. This failure has occurred for two reasons. First, due to the security conditions in the province, most bank deposits are kept in nearby provinces which are more secure, such as An Giang, Sadec, and Chau Doc. The ADB is used by people primarily to funnel funds outside of the province. The second reason is the inability of the individuals involved in the starting of the bank to avoid quarreling among themselves.

YOUTH AFFAIRS: (See Rural Development Cadre).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:

In the area of finance lie some of the most important problems facing Vietnam today. With the draw down of US financial assistance to the GVN, it is becoming vital to establish an effective means to collect funds and spend them for the welfare of the Vietnamese people. It is essential that the people of Vietnam are made aware of the fact that the taxes that they will be required to pay will be used to better their existence.

The first basic steps have been taken with the new land tax law which was implemented under a Prime Ministerial Decree. It is now up to the Vietnamese Government to properly implement this decree.

The task facing the GW is a large and complex one, which can be broken into two major areas of consideration-training and collection. The CORDS staff has attempted to encourage the local Finance Service to improve its training methods. Surveys in the province have shown that the village Finance Commissioners are woefully unprepared for the task that is before them. A vicious cycle has emerged in which the Finance Service has only two people who are competent to train village personnel but they are heavily overworked already. But yet part of this heavy workload stems from the incompetence of the village officials who must submit their work to the province for final approval. There is a urgent need to establish a high quality training program to upgrade village officials knowledge, such as land reform organized. This could perhaps be accomplished by creating a training branch at each province. Due to the understandable reluctance of village officials to travel to Vung Tau this method is the preferable one. These training personnel could train the village personnel in budgetting techniques as well as in collection techniques, highly desirable in this province due to the seasonal variations in village collections.

After proper training has occurred, the collection aspect of governmental collections will come much easier. The efficiency of collections will depend on large part to the emphasis that the central government places on it. In the Delta, the money is there to be collected if there is the desire to do so.

In the area of general administration, the streamlining of the village and hamlet staffs which occurred under Decree 120 were effective, but no clear cut guidance has yet been given for villages which contain large district towns. These villages which may contain 20 to 30,000 or more people are still basically stuck with the same staff as a village of 5,000 people.

Along with any administration anywhere in the world there will always be a certain amount of petty graft and corruption. However, here in Vietnam, the amount of corruption has reached astronomical heights. This corruption has resulted in projects being delayed, poorly constructed, partially constructed or cancelled all together. Government officials who are accused and then convicted of corruption are almost always allowed to return to their posts for all to see. How can a government ask its people to respect and support it when all they can see is wealthy officials and incomplete or poorly constructed public buildings. This corruption can only be minimized by starting at the top of the governmental bureaucracy. Nibbling at the bottom of the pyramid of corruption serves very little useful or lasting purpose. Especially since much of the income of the people at the top depends on their bestowing a certain amount of protection for those beneath them. This issue is one which will rapidly rise to the forefront as Vietnam is forced to become evermore self-sufficient. Just how much can be afforded for corruption and still provide the rate of development necessary to maintain the support of the people remains to be seen.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

REPORT REQUIREMENTS:

Although still burdensome, recurring reports are being phased out. There appears to be many other one-time reports requesting information already available from the GVN at higher headquarters.

REPORT FEEDBACK:

Much of the feedback information is out-of-date and of no value by the time it is received. Analysis and comments on the Consolidated Province Profile are useful, however, as it gives us a basis for comparison with other provinces.

UNCLASSIFIED

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13. ABSTRACT			