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DOCTRINE, TRAINING, TEST, AND EVALUATION:
IS THE ARMY DOOMED TO KEEP ON REORGANIZING
ITS MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS?

BY

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DOCTRINE, TRAINING, TEST, AND EVALUATION:
IS THE ARMY DOOMED TO KEEP ON REORGANIZING
ITS MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.
AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH REPORT

by
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ABSTRACT

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TITLE: Doctrine, Training, Test, and Evaluation: Is the Army Doomed to Keep On Reorganizing Its Major Subordinate Commands?

→ The Army is now reorganizing its CONUS major subordinate commands for the second time in 11 years. The paper examines whether this trend is bound to continue, limiting the examination to the functional areas of doctrine, training, and test and evaluation. Because any assessment of the new organization would be before the fact, some method of measuring its structure is required. Six yardsticks were designated from organizational theory and used to examine the 1962 and 1973 reorganizations within the functional areas. Official studies and reports were the sources of organizational data. The paper concludes that there were basic flaws in the 1962 reorganization which contributed to the need to reorganize. No such flaws are seen in the 1973 reorganization, but there are several potential problem areas that bear watching. Specific areas for monitoring are recommended to the Chief of Staff. ↗

PREFACE

The author is indebted to the Office, Project Manager for Reorganization, Department of the Army, for the fine cooperation received while gathering information for this paper. The assistance given by LTC's Paul J. Raisig, Donald M. Campbell, and Robert W. Pointer was invaluable, and their helpfulness is much appreciated.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE QUESTION

On 11 January 1973, the Department of the Army announced a sweeping reorganization of its major subordinate commands in the continental United States (CONUS). This is a major change; of the three major CONUS commands only one, the Army Materiel Command (AMC), is to be continued while the other two, Continental Army Command (CONARC) and the Combat Developments Command (CDC), are replaced by two new, differently conceived organizations. AMC and CDC were established in 1962, only 11 years ago, in another major reorganization which also changed CONARC considerably. Since the rest of the Army has not changed all that much in those 11 years, a valid reaction to this new change might be, "Oh no, not again! When is this going to end?" The question is therefore raised: is the Army doomed to keep on reorganizing its major subordinate commands?

SCOPE OF THE PAPER

To limit the scope of this paper to one of manageable proportions, the author will examine the question within the framework of three functional areas: doctrine, training, and test and evaluation. Reasons for selection of these areas, clarifications of terms, other limitations, and the general approach to be used

are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Reasons for Selection

These three functional areas were picked because they were of great importance in the latest reorganization. Indeed, the first two taken together name one of the new commands, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Another newly formed agency, the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA), makes use of the remaining terms. The 1962 reorganization also saw significant changes in the selected functional areas, although logistics was the area most changed by that action.

Doctrine

To clarify the nature of the functional areas being discussed, some discussion of definitions is in order. The narrow definition of "doctrine" from Army Regulation (AR) 310-25, the Army dictionary, is: "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in action". "Doctrine" in normal usage sometimes has a wider meaning, however, as for example in its use in the name TRADOC. Here it is synonymous with "combat developments". AR 310-25 defines the latter as: "the formulation of new Army doctrine, organizations, materiel objectives, and requirements, and the early integration of the resulting products into the Army". The term "combat developments" also has some problems in usage. For example, the Army paper summarizing the

1962 reorganization stated that: "the Army has applied the term 'combat developments' to the research, development, and early integration into the Army of new doctrine, new organizations, and new materiel to obtain the greatest combat effectiveness".¹ This use implies that "combat developments" also includes activities of the research and development (R&D) community, while the current dictionary definition implies only guidance to that community. As will be shown later, the problem of "who does what and for whom" continues to plague the combat developments area. This paper will use "doctrine" in the larger sense when addressing the functional area, i.e. it will be considered to be synonymous with "combat developments" as defined in the AR.

Training

Although this functional area encompasses both individual and unit training, the emphasis will be on individual training, as that is where the organizational changes have taken place.

Test and Evaluation

These terms are now generally used as one, although they have separate meanings in AR 310-25. "Test" is defined as: "a process by which data are accumulated to serve as a basis for assessing the degree that a system meets, exceeds, or fails to meet the technical or operational properties ascribed to the system". Similarly, "evaluation" is: "a subjective determination, accomplished jointly by the several major subordinate commands, of the utility, that is

of the military value of a hardware item/ system -- real or conceptual -- to the user". The implication is that a test is quantitative while an evaluation is qualitative. The paper's emphasis will be on operational test and evaluation (OT&E) as opposed to developer testing, since OT&E is where the main changes have occurred.

Geographic Limitation

Since the principal major subordinate commands of the Army which deal with the selected functional areas are in CONUS, the paper will limit itself to examination of the CONUS commands. For brevity, therefore, these are the commands referred to in this paper by the term "major subordinate commands".

Approach

This paper approaches the problem from the standpoint of organizational structures of the major subordinate commands as they affect doctrine, training, and test and evaluation. The structures emerging from the two reorganizations together with their rationales will be analyzed to determine: what the principal shortcomings of the earlier reorganization were, whether they are corrected in the current reorganization, and whether there are new shortcomings of significance. By asking what we did wrong in 1962 and determining if we did it right this time, as implied in these analyses, an answer to the originally posed question can

be approached.

VALIDITY OF THE QUESTION

There are those who would consider the original question a strictly rhetorical one. Their point of view would hold that the simple historical progress of the military art will inevitably lead to reorganizations. The type of reorganization being discussed in this paper, however, is one of major functional changes, a revolution as opposed to an evolution.² The 1962 and 1973 reorganizations must be considered as revolutions of major scale in this context. It is acknowledged that an organization should change over time,³ but a measure of its successful organizational structure is that such a change is evolutionary rather than one of great upheaval.

Assessing the future on the basis of the question, "Did we do right, and if not, why not?" on past reorganizations may also be considered by some as unrealistic. Certainly the reorganizations were not planned by committees of infinite wisdom having unlimited time and other resources available, and in the vacuum of static situations. Many pressures for change existed in events occurring in the time between reorganizations, not the least of which was the Vietnam war. The paper will highlight at appropriate points the pressures faced by planners as well as those brought forth by historical events. Since comparisons will be limited to those that can be made in terms of non-time-sensitive principles,

however, it is felt that such comparisons will be valid.

One assumption is in order when considering the original question: that change for the sake of change is confined to evolutionary changes as used above. This assumption means that the Army would not reorganize on a major scale without reasons more substantive than change merely for change's sake. Acceptance of this assumption is required if the originally posed question is to be valid.

METHODOLOGY

The best way to assess the effectiveness of an organization is to examine it after the fact to determine how well it performed. Achievements and shortcomings are then a matter of historical record. Although this approach is possible for the 1962 reorganization, the current one is just now getting under way. Its commands will not be operating until some months after this paper is completed. Making an assessment therefore calls for "second guessing" before the fact, a feat displaying some audacity if not wisdom.

What can be done, however, is to assess the new organizations according to some "rules of the game", if in fact some exist. The "rules" being sought are general principles of organization, and the author will examine works on the theory of organizations, a fast developing branch of management theory, in search of such principles. Since the word "rule" implies some precision, the author prefers "yardstick", denoting a gross measure of some utility if not absolute exactness. Once the yardsticks are developed into

useful form, they can be applied to both the earlier and the present reorganizations. Official criticisms of the past structures can also be examined in terms of the yardsticks. Initially to be established, of course, is the validity of evaluating a whole organization through examining its structural skeleton.

Sources of Data

Literature search is to be the major source of data for this paper. Development of the yardsticks is to be based on examination of a variety of writings on organizational theory. The structure of the reorganized elements together with the rationale therefore will be gleaned principally from the reports of the committees performing the reorganization studies. Criticisms of the earlier reorganizations will also be obtained from official studies, mainly from the Parker Panel of 1971⁴ and to a lesser extent from the Blue Ribbon Panel of 1970.⁵

Several alternative approaches to obtain data were considered and rejected. The possibility of questioning former commanders and other knowledgeable personnel to get data on the shortfalls of the 1962 reorganization was one of these rejected alternatives. The Parker Panel has already done that. Having worked previously for MG Parker, the author feels confident in analyzing his report rather than replowing thoroughly worked ground. Other questionnaire techniques were similarly rejected. The author's previous exposures to organizational analyses have revealed that the more "expert" views one obtains on a given organization, the wider will be the

variance of views while at the same time the more obscure the mean view. Even "fudging" through the use of Delphi techniques fails to make such methods more conceptually palatable to the author. Hence this paper will rely on analysis of official reports.

Organizational levels to be studied will generally be limited to the principal sub-groupings of the major subordinate commands. Exploration in further depth is deemed not sufficiently productive in terms on providing additional insights.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

Chapter II will provide some yardsticks from the theory of organization. Chapter III will discuss the 1962 reorganization using these yardsticks, and will assess what went wrong or was wrong from the beginning within the framework of the three functional areas. Chapter IV will present details of the 1973 reorganization in the light of past shortfalls and the yardsticks. It will also analyze what shortfalls remain in the three functional areas. Finally, Chapter V will draw conclusions from the preceding and present the author's recommendations.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, Report on the Reorganization of the Department of the Army, p. 21. (Hereafter referred to as Green Book).

2. Professor Greiner of the Harvard Business School presents these terms in the context of organizations. He uses "evolution" in describing "prolonged periods of growth where no major upheaval occurs in organization practices". On the other hand, "revolution" is used to describe "those periods of substantial turmoil in organization life". Larry E. Greiner, "Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow", Harvard Business Review, July-August 1972, p. 38.

3. Professor Greiner would find agreement among many authors on this point. For example: "In a successful, growing business, in fact, organizational changes should come to be regarded as routine". Marvin Bower, "Organization: The Harness to Help People Pull Together", reprinted in Management: A Book of Readings, by Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, p. 405.

4. US Department of the Army, Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization. (Hereafter referred to as Parker Panel).

5. US Department of Defense, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, (Hereafter referred to as Blue Ribbon Defense Panel).

CHAPTER II

SOME YARDSTICKS FROM THE THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS

THE REALM OF ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY

As mentioned, the absence of ability to make historical judgments can be overcome to some extent by uncovering some pertinent principles from the theory of organizations. These principles may then be applied as yardsticks to the 1962 and the current reorganizations.

The author's journey into the realm of organizational theory, a portion of the theory of management, has been a highly educational one. Having a mathematics background, the author continues to be surprised when encountering social sciences such as economics and management which are just in this decade reaching maturity and credibility. As stated by Professors Blau and Scott:

"The field of formal organization is still at a very early stage of development. There exists as yet very little substantive theory in this field, not only far less than in the natural sciences, but also less than in other fields of sociology."¹

The basic problem in uncovering organizational principles was as follows: the early theorists, e.g. Barnard, Fayol, Taylor, Dennison, and Urwick, proposed several basic principles, but they did so piecemeal and so did not cover all of those now generally accepted. Their hypotheses were also difficult to verify empirically in studies. The relationships sought in these studies' data were simply obscured by the effects of other unidentified

variables. Scholars therefore became disenchanted with the classical theorists and set off in new directions, seeking to explain organizational behavior in other ways. From these efforts arose the behavioral science school, the decision theory school, the systems school, and the like. These schools frequently refer to some of the basic principles of organization, but they have generally avoided compiling a complete list they support.

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

Fortunately, Professors Koontz and O'Donnell of UCLA have condensed the work of the classicists as well as the second phase scholars into such a list of basic principles of organization.² They qualify these principles as being more in the nature of criteria for good organizing.³ Their statement of the principles is briefly summarized below. Certain of these principles will be discussed in greater detail later.

Principle of Unity of Objective. All parts of the structure should be pointed toward achieving the organization's goal.

Principle of Efficiency. The structure should achieve the organizational objectives with a minimum of unnecessary costs or undesired consequences.

Principle of the Span of Management. The structure should limit managers to the number of subordinates they can effectively control.

The Scalar Principle. The clearer the line of authority from the chief to each position in the organization, the better will be

the communication and decision making.

Principle of Delegation. An individual manager should have enough authority delegated to him to accomplish what he is expected to do.

Principle of Responsibility. The subordinate must be fully responsible to the superior for the authority delegated to him, and the superior must be fully responsible for the subordinate's actions.

Principle of Parity of Authority and Responsibility. The responsibility insisted on for a given delegation of authority should neither be greater nor less than that implied by the delegation.

Principle of the Unity of Command. The feeling of personal responsibility is enhanced and conflicting instructions decreased by requiring that the individual report only to a single superior.

Principle of Division of Work. The activities of an organization should be so divided and grouped as to maximize attainment of objectives.

Principle of Functional Definition. The individual's contribution is increased if he is provided with clear definitions of his functions and the standards expected of him, together with his relationships with other positions in terms of authority and information.

Principle of Separation. An activity designed to check on results of another activity can best do so if its supervisor is not subordinate to that other activity.

Principle of Balance. Applying of these principles and other

organizational techniques should be balanced in the light of overall mission accomplishment.

Principle of Flexibility. Organizational structure's accomplishment is enhanced by building in more inherent flexibility to respond to changing situations.

Principle of Leadership Facilitation. The more an organization's structure and the authority delegation within it allow a manager to set up an environment for performance, the more it will promote his leadership abilities.

To the Army officer, the above list appears to be a combination of some of the principles of war, some principles of leadership, and the patently obvious. Certainly there are several of the stated principles that inspire "Yes, but how?" questions and so are not by themselves entirely revealing. An expansion on several of these principles, however, in the light of military reorganizations should provide the yardsticks being sought.

VALIDITY OF STRUCTURAL APPROACH

The above listed principles can be seen to be generally applicable to an organization's structure. Before continuing, therefore, the validity of evaluating a whole organization through study of its structure should be affirmed. As indicated earlier, organizational scholars grew away from the classical school of theory which largely studied structural matters. Not finding all the answers within classical theory, they sought to explain organizational phenomena by means of behavioral theory, theory of decisions,

systems theory, and other such disciplines.

More recently, however, they have generally come full circle to the belief that structure is properly the center of all the refinements of the other disciplines. This view is stated best perhaps by one of the leading behavioral scientists, Dr. Harold J. Leavitt:

"Most of these works, from the communications nets to the work on role conflict to the work on the relationship between work flows and interpersonal factors, are surface-scratching operations that are only beginning to open an old but terribly important issue -- the issue of the design of organizational structures. From another side technology is reopening the same issue, for with computers and new analytic methods we have to make room (even in old-fashioned organizational structures) for new kinds of equipment, new kinds of people, new kinds of relationships. These two developments, rather than killing off the idea of organizational structure, are putting it back in the spotlight, making us ask again, 'What is the ideal structural design for an organization'"⁴

Dr. Leavitt's views on structure describe it not as an alternative to other approaches but as more of a framework on which the concepts of roles, communications and work flows, and the like can be placed and correlated.⁵ Drs. Koontz and O'Donnell imply agreement with this approach. Another management expert stated it as follows:

"Whether or not the actions of individuals are effectively harnessed to achieve the purposes of the business largely depends, I believe, on how well the plan of organization is fashioned and how resolutely managers at all levels follow it themselves and require others to do so. The boxes and lines on charts are merely symbols of plans that, as part of the management system, help to require and inspire purposeful, productive divisions and actions."⁶

The view of structure as the heart of an organization may be a recently revived one in the minds of organizational theorists.

It is an old dogma to the professional military man, however. For years he has been promoting organizational efficiency by first setting down the required roles and relationships (e.g. the unit standard operating procedures), and then insuring compliance. He then fine tunes the operation further by applying techniques from behavioral theory which he knows as principles of leadership. So from both an organizationalist's and a military leader's point of view, it appears valid to assess an organization by examination of its structure.

THE USEFUL YARDSTICKS

Pursuit of means of making such an assessment therefore appears a valid course of action. Hence, an amplification of several of the previously mentioned principles is in order to see if they would be useful yardsticks.

The Span of Management

This principle, sometimes called the span of control, has received more attention in management writings than any of the other principles. Early views on this concept were usually in the form of "universal truths", such as Urwick's: "No superior can supervise directly the work of more than five or, at the most, six subordinates whose work interlocks".⁷ Later views are less dogmatic, admitting that the number can change, depending on the level of management being considered.⁸ There is general agreement, however, that reducing the span of management should increase organizational

efficiency.

Further light has been shed on this principle by isolation of factors which affect the number which can be handled by a supervisor. Koontz and O'Donnell identify several such factors:⁹ the state of training of subordinates, the clarity of authority delegation, the completeness of plans being carried out, the organization's rate of change, the existence of good standards for performance measurement, the efficiency of available communications, and the amount of personal contact required.

Another set of factors was stated in a 1962 study by the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company.¹⁰ These factors appear more directly related to examination of military organizations. Lockheed identified them as "underlying variables affecting the span of management", and described them as follows: (1) similarity of functions, self-explanatory; (2) geographic contiguity, referring to physical location of subordinate elements; (3) complexity of functions, referring to the nature of the work to be done; (4) direction and control, referring to the nature of subordinates, their state of training, the extent authority should be delegated, and the personal attention needed; (5) coordination, referring to time required to keep the unit in step with other activities; (6) planning, referring to the importance, complexity, and time requirements for unit planning; and (7) organizational assistance, the availability of staff or administrative assistance.

Lockheed concluded that the efficient span of management, that is the number of subordinates that could be effectively

controlled, varied directly as the similarity of functions, the extent of geographic contiguity, and the availability of organizational assistance. The span also varied inversely with several others, decreasing as complexity of functions increased and as coordination, planning, and direction and control requirements increased. Lockheed went further by attempting to quantify these relationships to produce a supervisory index number, but the numbers used were subjective value judgments and hence of limited validity. The qualitative conclusions above have general acceptance, however.

Carrying Lockheed's points a bit further, we can hypothesize that the efficiency of supervision for a given span of management can be increased by making each subordinate's functions more similar and less complex. The military has a capability generally greater than that of most organizations to do this by varying the functional grouping of its elements. Making units within a chain of responsibility more functionally homogeneous in this way would also tend to decrease coordination, planning, and direction and control requirements. It should be noted that the homogeneity approach is also consistent with the previously mentioned principles of the unity of objective and the division of work.

Layering

A corollary to considerations of the span of management is the problem of layering. The two phenomena seem to vary reciprocally; the narrower a span of management one sets up, the more

levels of an organization generally develop, and vice versa. Excessive layering is generally regarded by organizational scholars as an evil. Principal shortcomings attributed to it are distortion and suppression of communications, delays in decision making, and dilution of authority.¹¹

Several attempts at assessing the combined effects of span of management and layering are inconclusive when taken together.¹² Too many extraneous variables appear to cloud the measurement of the relative effects. Of the two variables, however, span of management is considered the most important.¹³

If layering could be decreased without suffering digressions in the span of management, however, increased efficiency would result. In most applications, of course, this is impossible, but the possibility should not be dismissed.

Unity of Command

This principle is so basic to the military that it is considered as one of the nine principles of war. It is violated in chains of responsibility recently established in the US military, however. For example, advent of the concept of joint military operations has made a fact of life that a commander may answer to one chain of command for operational control and to another for administrative and support matters. The principle of unity of command should be adhered to whenever possible. Organizational changes which result in answering to one superior, or at least a decreased number of them, should therefore be considered as improvements.

Separation

Students of human nature would certainly agree that elements which evaluate an organization's accomplishments or failures should be separate from the organization. In simple terms, it is not usually a good idea to criticize the boss officially. Organizational theorists support this view quite positively.¹⁴ The military acknowledges this principle in establishing such agencies as inspector general's offices, but the principle is also frequently ignored.

DERIVATIVE YARDSTICKS

The yardsticks discussed to this point are amplifications of some of Koontz and O'Donnell's previously discussed fourteen principles of organization. There are two others that may be considered as tendencies observed when there is a failure to apply these fourteen principles. The author labels them the tendency toward creeping centralization and the tendency toward "ad hocism".

Creeping Centralization

This hypothesis submits that to offset failures in application of the stated principles or to hedge against possible future failures, the high level manager will tend to centralize decision making in routine day-to-day operations.

Mr. John C. Ries observed this tendency while studying the possibility of unifying the US defense establishment. He pointed

out that "even though the general staff system frequently expresses the sincerest affirmation that operations must be decentralized, the forces in the system pull toward centralization".¹⁵ Mr. Ries acknowledged that management theory favors decentralization, as can be concluded from the principles of the span of management, delegation, and the parity of authority and responsibility. He observed, however, that the military continues to favor centralization.¹⁶

A major ally of the tendency toward creeping centralization is the modern management information system. Through the system, the high level manager can receive considerably more data for either control or decision making than was possible earlier.¹⁷ By whatever technology it may be aided, creeping centralization is an observable phenomenon when the organizational structure is not effective.

"Ad Hocism"

This hypothesis states that when a formal organizational structure fails to be effective, there is a tendency to accomplish the tasks through ad hoc work groups. Professor Rensis Likert observed this tendency when informal processes were used which violated: "the principles upon which both the structure and procedures are implicitly or explicitly based".¹⁸ Professor Likert characterizes the results of such processes as involving: "a piecemeal, trial-and-error attack on the problem".¹⁹

A distinction must be drawn between a truly flexible organization and "ad hocism". True flexibility is planned for in the

in the structure and is, of course, one of the principles of organization cited earlier. Such planned flexibility is the very key to modern organizations in the views of Professor Warren G. Bennis of MIT.²⁰ "Ad hocism", on the other hand, occurs when a specified formal structure fails to perform the way it is organized.

SUMMARY

This chapter has journeyed into the realm of organizational theory in search of yardsticks which may be used to examine an organization's structure. It was affirmed that such structural examination was a valid way to assess the effectiveness of an organization. Fourteen principles of organization as described by Koontz and O'Donnell were presented, each of which would qualify as a yardstick. Amplification of some of these provided four useful yardsticks. Consideration of observed tendencies when the applications of organizational principles fail led to two more yardsticks. The selected yardsticks therefore were:

- The span of management.
- Layering.
- Unity of command.
- Separation.
- Creeping centralization.
- "Ad hocism".

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach, p. 9.
2. Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management, p. 423-429.
3. Ibid., p. 423.
4. Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology, p. 309.
5. Ibid., p. 307-310.
6. Marvin Bower, "Organization: the Harness to Help People Pull Together", 1960, reprinted in Management: a Book of Readings, edited by Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, p. 396. (Hereafter referred to as Readings).
7. Lyndall F. Urwick, "The Manager's Span of Control", 1956, reprinted in Readings, p. 264.
8. Koontz, "Making Theory Operational: the Span of Management", 1966, reprinted in Readings, p. 272.
9. Koontz and O'Donnell, Principles of Management, p. 247-250.
10. Koontz, "Making Theory Operational: the Span of Management", p. 275-278.
11. R. Carzo and J.N. Yanouzas, "Effects of Flat and Tall Organizational Structures", 1969, reprinted in Readings, p. 280.
12. Ibid., p. 280, 291.
13. Urwick, p. 267.
14. Koontz and O'Donnell, Principles of Management, p. 287. See also L.C. Sorrel, "Business Organizations and Guides for Grouping Activities", 1930, reprinted in Readings, p. 315.
15. John C. Ries, The Management of Defense, p. 41.
16. Ibid., p. 211.
17. Leavitt, p. 317.

18. Rensis Likert, The Human Organization: Its Management and Value, p. 186.

19. Ibid.

20. Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations, p. 12.

CHAPTER III

THE 1962 REORGANIZATION AND WHAT WENT WRONG


THE ARMY BEFORE THE REORGANIZATION

Prior to the 1962 reorganization the Army's structure, left from World War II, was modified significantly by the introduction of the Department of Defense and the unified commands. Army reorganizations in 1954-55 and 1956 further reacted to these changes.¹ The basic functions of Department of the Army (DA), then as now, were to: "organize, train, and equip the appropriate military forces, to provide these forces to unified commands, and to support the forces so assigned".² Implied tasks were:

"Research, development, procurement, supply and maintenance of materiel; promulgation of doctrine; procurement of personnel and their training as individuals and within units; development of organizational concepts and preparation of tables of organization and equipment for units; and management of the reserve components and the industrial mobilization base".³

As shown in figure 1⁴, DA had two major components: Headquarters DA and the Army Field Commands. Headquarters DA was organized as shown on figure 2.⁵ At first glance, the diagram looks current. Closer examination indicates that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) is missing, his function then being performed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS). The main difference, however, was the presence of the seven chiefs of technical services. These technical services performed procurement functions under the command-like supervision

PRESENT DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MAJOR COMMAND STRUCTURE
(PRIOR TO THE 1962 REORGANIZATION)



* Includes Army Security Agency, Army Audit Agency, United States Military Academy, Army War College; Army Personnel assigned to Defense Atomic Support Agency, National War College, Defense Supply and Telephone Services; and other activities in support of the Office, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Unified and Specified Commands.

(PRIOR TO THE 1962 REORGANIZATION)



of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) functions as overwatched by the Chief of Research and Development (CRD).


CONARC, established in 1954, was the principal Army field command. It was organized as shown on figure 3.⁶ Its major responsibilities included: "training of individuals and units of the active Army and reserve components, development of doctrine and combat materiel requirements, emergency planning and preparedness, and the support of Army components of unified commands".⁷ In the individual training function, CONARC ran 12 Army Training Centers and 11 service schools, but did not control the schools operated by the seven technical services or several directly under DA control. CONARC's combat developments responsibilities included the following: "develop, test, and recommend new tactics, techniques, organization, and doctrine; review and prepare requirements for new combat materiel; and test materiel developed by the technical services".⁸

MAIN FEATURES OF THE 1962 REORGANIZATION

Shortly after becoming Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Robert S. McNamara tasked DA to provide a study of its functions, organization, and procedures. The study was designated Office, Secretary of Defense (OSD) Project 80 (Army) to distinguish it from 119 other studies responding to Mr. McNamara's initial flurry of piercing questions. The study group was chaired by Mr. Leonard W. Hoelscher, Deputy Comptroller of the Army.

CONARC STRUCTURE PRIOR TO THE 1962 REORGANIZATION

UNITED STATES CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND



Environment Surrounding the Change

Mr. McNamara's sense of urgency became immediately apparent. Also apparent was his receptivity to new alternatives. In short, it was a "brand new ball game" in the defense establishment. To maintain an open approach, the Hoelscher Committee's preliminary conclusions were closely held, particularly those recommending elimination of the technical services, but also a number dealing with proposed changes to the Army Staff.⁹ Consequently, the Staff's reaction was somewhat hostile on its initial exposure to the study in an 11 October 1961 briefing.¹⁰ The Chief of Staff appointed a committee of general officers headed by LTG David W. Traub, Comptroller of the Army, to develop an Army Staff position on the study.¹¹ Unfortunately, on 16 October 1961 the Secretary of the Army, Elvis J. Stahr, chose to forward the report to SECDEF without a statement of the Army's position. The report was already 16 days overdue, and Mr. Stahr believed that Mr. McNamara would be satisfied by the study's general conclusions.¹² These conclusions only whetted SECDEF's appetite for details, alternatives, and specific views. There followed nearly two months of intense trauma while the Traub Committee tried to develop the Army Staff's official position and at the same time answer SECDEF's continuing questions.¹³ The revised recommendations were submitted in December 1961 and approved in early January 1962. Although the Hoelscher Committee had a wide spectrum of alternatives well documented, the excellence of the final product despite this pressure is a tribute to the Traub Committee's professionalism.

CONCEPT OF U. S. ARMY MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT AND LOGISTIC COMMAND




Figure 4

for test and evaluation, e.g. the boards and proving grounds.

Combat Developments Command

CDC's initial organization was as shown on figure 5.²⁰ Its purpose was to consolidate under one command the total combat developments function and to be: "a well integrated, aggressive, and authoritative agency to develop future concepts of warfare and field organizations".²¹ It was: "to have Army-wide responsibility for developing materiel objectives and qualitative requirements, for war gaming and field experimentation, for selected operations research studies, and for certain cost effectiveness studies".²²

CDC inherited most of these missions and the resources to accomplish them from CONARC. It also absorbed the combat developments aspects of the Army school system, together with the responsibility for preparing tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and field manuals (FM).

Revisions to CONARC

CONARC's revised structure is shown on figure 6.²³ Although it lost the combat developments function, its training function was expanded and consolidated.²⁴ It was now responsible for very nearly all the Army's individual training activities. It inherited the training elements belonging to those technical services which were disestablished. CONARC was therefore the agency responsible to DA for both individual training and unit training in CONUS. It continued its role of supervision of the CONUS armies and management

CONCLUSIONS



Figure 5

of the majority of all CONUS Army installations through these intermediate headquarters.

EVALUATION OF CHANGES

The following evaluations are views of the author based on analysis of the indicated studies and on the author's perceptions while a member of the Army Staff. Three general observations are appropriate at this point, to be followed by observations within the three functional areas.

General

One reason given for changes in the Army Staff was the following: "The General Staff will be relieved of command-like and operating functions."²⁵ Some of the functions referred to had been deliberately installed in the Staff in earlier changes, as in the case of DCSLOG.²⁶ In general, however, this reason acknowledged the presence of creeping centralization.

The logistics reorganization went a long way toward being a major structural success, despite early opposition of the old hands from the technical services. The changes were in consonance with several of the 14 principles of organization, especially those of unity of objective, efficiency, and division of work. AMC's basic structural soundness was confirmed in the Parker Panel's assessment.²⁷ Their report considered AMC's biggest problem to be excessive span of management due to the complexity and diversity of its missions. This problem has been attacked by a series of evolutionary changes

which delegate some of the AMC commander's responsibilities.

The administrative structure between the CONUS installation and DA generally involved two intermediate headquarters: CONARC and one of the CONUS armies. It was not clear that the freedom to shift resources at these levels justified this amount of layering.²⁸ The span of management at each of these intermediate levels continued to be adversely affected by the complexity resulting from the diverse missions of the headquarters.

Doctrine (Combat Developments)

This area has provided the greatest difficulty in recent reorganizations. The interrelationships are so complex that a clear division of functions has so far not been found. To confirm this complexity, one need only examine the relationships in effect for combat developments prior to the 1962 reorganization (figure 7).²⁹

There are ten participants in the combat developments / research and development process, not counting the overall decision maker. They are listed and described in a simplistic manner below for clarity in later discussions. The combat developer comes up with future concepts and doctrine (in the narrow sense), and defines future materiel requirements. The developer, acting on these materiel requirements, translates them into prototype hardware. The engineering tester sees if the prototype works and if it meets the stated requirements. The service tester evaluates both the hardware and the requirement in terms of a real and continuing need.

COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS SYSTEM PRIOR TO 1962




Figure 7

The logistician then purchases the item for the user. The production tester verifies quality control and a troop tester determines how the item should be handled by units of the user. The other two participants are slightly out of the mainstream. The preparer of current doctrine (again in the narrow sense) does just that, and the instructor trains troops in doctrine, tactics, and use of materiel.

The terms used above which deal with testing require further comment. All are not exactly in current use as defined in AR 70-10 and AR 71-8, the current authorities on Army test and evaluation. However, they serve to identify the most basic of the considerable number of tests in the process. The term "service test" is used as in expanded service test (EST), and the term "troop test" is used as in intensified confirmatory troop test (ICTT). The term "production test" includes both pre-production- (PPT) and initial production tests (IPT). The term "engineering test" includes a series of tests at various points in the development process. The terms shown were selected so that they may be more descriptive than the general categories of developer test (DT) and operational test (OT) as used in AR 1000-1, but less confusing than the flurry of more detailed terms in AR 70-10.

There are numerous information flows needed among these ten participants to make the process work. The nature and required intensity of these flows shape the alternative organizational relationships to a major extent. Potential structural efficiencies and applications of such organizational principles as the span of

management and separation also play a part. There are a variety of possible organizational structures, each with certain advantages and disadvantages. However, none to date appears as a clear cut optimal solution of the combat developments problem. Solutions chosen in the past illustrate some of the possibilities. Each will be discussed in the terms mentioned above so that they may be more easily compared.

In the pre-1962 period (figure 7), CONARC was the combat developer, the service tester, the user, and the troop tester. It also was the preparer of current doctrine and the instructor. The technical services were the developers, engineering testers, logisticians, and production testers. The principle of separation was then reasonably present in the testing process, as CONARC's test functions acted as checks and balances on the developer. CONARC's overall span of management was horrendous, however. Its control over the combat developments process was quite complicated and inefficient,³⁰ as figure 7 shows.

The 1962 reorganization brought a mixed bag to the combat developments process. The overall mission was transferred from CONARC to CDC so that it would receive the necessary attention. CDC was also made responsible for performance of field experimentation and for preparation of TOE and FM.³¹ The latter mission was received from CONARC's school system, and resulted in separation of the instructor from the preparer of current doctrine. Each reported to an entirely different chain of command, so a bar to communication was created.³² Without this communication, doctrinal

output tended to become sterile and less realistic.

CDC was also required to make independent evaluations of service and troop tests conducted by AMC's TECOM,³³ and since 1971 to plan these tests. In fact, CDC really replaced CONARC in general as the user's representative in the development process. This role purported to maintain a semblance of the principle of separation when AMC, the new developer / logistician, gained control of all the testing agencies and facilities. CDC's role in the development process has led to a considerable number of the problems it has faced. Basically, free thinking about future concepts and needs is hampered by detailed coordinative actions on present development problems. The mix of attention between present and future has resulted in lower overall performance³⁴ and has led to CDC's internal structure being incredibly layered.

CDC's study output has not been uniformly excellent over the years.³⁵ This results from inadequate guidance from and communications with Headquarters DA, and also from the frequent need to revert to "ad hocism" to accomplish a given study. Study work generally was passed to the lowest possible elements, with intermediate levels acting only as reviewers. The study elements at the lower level were not in all cases highly qualified.³⁶ CDC's relationships with Headquarters DA were expected to improve with the establishment in 1963 of the Office of the ACSFOR. Another change in 1964 made the ACSFOR the primary staff officer at DA for combat developments. He was then the user's representative at that level.³⁷ Although ACSFOR is the General Staff Officer

responsible for most of DA's overall business (force development), his status has not grown to match his responsibilities. This lack of status has slowed improvements of the situation.³⁸

In summary, the 1962 reorganization did not bring the hoped for improvements to the combat developments process. CDC's missions were quite diverse and led to dilution of effort and a layered internal structure. Useful communications with instructional agencies were made bureaucratically difficult, and those with Headquarters DA did not improve as expected. Studies were therefore sometimes not properly guided. They also tended toward completion by "ad hocism" or by inexperienced personnel.

Training

The centralization of essentially all individual training functions under CONARC was a definite improvement over the previous fragmented arrangement. The payoff might have been greater, however, if the training function did not have to compete for resources with CONARC's three other missions: force development, force employment, and support and service.³⁹

Although CONARC lost the combat developments and operational test missions, its structure as a trainer on one hand and a force developer, deployer, and supporter on the other still exhibited an excessive span of management.⁴⁰

School commandants also suffered from lack of unity of command in their chains of responsibility. They answered to CONARC for training matters and to the appropriate CONUS army headquarters

for administration and support.⁴¹

Test and Evaluation

As with the other functional areas, the 1962 reorganization brought both good and bad. A problem was created from the efficiency experts' desire to join the resources of the various test agencies. These resources had been run by CONARC (e.g. the boards) and by the technical services (e.g. the proving grounds). AMC's TECOM gained control of both. While this change still exhibited the principle of separation in developer testing in that TECOM was separate from the commodity commands, it did not do so when viewed from outside AMC. That is to say, if the AMC commander shows proponentcy for a particular item being tested, then TECOM's objectivity may not be guaranteed.

The principle of separation is also missing from the service and troop testing function. TECOM became principal agent for these tests. Hence the tester works for the developer, a definite violation of the principle, although it is somewhat softened by CDC's oversight role. The Parker Panel affirmed that TECOM was being objective in practice, however.⁴²

The entire weapons acquisition process has received considerable attention in recent years, and many revisions have been made in response to recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. The Army's test and evaluation process has been carefully redefined by the resulting new regulations. It is interesting to note, however, that the violation of the principle of separation was not

entirely corrected until the current reorganization.

SUMMARY

The 1962 reorganization was generally a success despite its origin under pressure. AMC's functional organization was in consonance with similar approaches throughout the Department of Defense. Its basic success is affirmed by the need for only evolutionary changes since that time. Overall, the major subordinate commands were generally successful, but displayed some organizational problems within the three functional areas considered. These problems are summarized below, this time by organization rather than by functional area.

Headquarters DA

1962 changes responded to detection of the tendency toward creeping centralization (but this problem recurred).

CONARC

Despite the loss of the service and troop test functions to AMC and the combat developments function to CDC, CONARC's span of management continued to be too large. Its multiplicity of missions were also found in the CONUS army headquarters, and this layering was a problem, particularly in installation management. Training needs competed for resources against those of the other CONARC missions. Schools had a unity of command problem in reporting to CONARC on training matters and to the CONUS armies otherwise.

AMC

The complexity and diversity of AMC's missions created span of management problems, but evolutionary changes to delegate authority have improved the situation. AMC's control over most test resources violated the principle of separation, and so gave rise to suspicions of proponency in developer and operational testing.

CDC

CDC did not solve the combat developments problem as organizers hoped it would. Its missions were diverse, creating a layered organization and diluted effort. The previous easy communication with instructional agencies was complicated by lack of unity of command. Study guidance from DA was not always complete, complicating the study problem already made difficult by inexperienced personnel and the tendency toward "ad hocism".

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of Defense, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix A, p. 61-64. (Hereafter referred to as Blue Ribbon Defense Panel).

2. US Department of the Army, Report on the Reorganization of the Department of the Army, p. 4. (Hereafter referred to as Green Book).

3. Ibid., p. 4-5.

4. Ibid., Figure 1.

5. Ibid., Figure 2.

6. Ibid., Figure 3.

7. Ibid., p. 9.

8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Martin Blumenson, Reorganization of the Army, 1962, p. 35,36, 44-46.

10. Ibid., p. 54.

11. Ibid., p. 58.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 59-77.

14. Green Book, p. 17-19.

15. Ibid., p. 19-20.

16. Ibid., p. 21.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., Figure 11.

19. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix A, p. 85.

20. Green Book, Figure 19.

21. Ibid., p. 28.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., Figure 20.
24. Ibid., p. 29.
25. Ibid., p. 30.
26. Ibid., p. 17.
27. US Department of the Army, Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization, Volume II, p. II-14-4. (Hereafter referred to as Parker Panel).
28. Ibid., p. II-15-9.
29. US Department of the Army, Study of the Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army, OSD Project 80 (Army), Part III, p. III-B-15. (Hereafter referred to as Hoelscher Report).
30. Green Book, p. 21.
31. Ibid., p. 28.
32. Parker Panel, p. II-16-6, 7.
33. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 71-8, p. 6. (Hereafter referred to as AR 71-8).
34. Parker Panel, p. II-16-9.
35. Ibid., p. II-16-5.
36. Ibid., p. II-8-B-1 to 5.
37. Ibid., p. II-9-3 to 5.
38. Ibid., p. II-9-6.
39. Ibid., p. II-15-1.
40. Ibid., p. II-15-7.
41. Ibid., p. II-15-3.
42. Ibid., p. II-8-12.

CHAPTER IV

THE 1973 REORGANIZATION: DID WE DO RIGHT?

THE ARMY 1962 - 1973

Chapter III has indicated the shape of the Army's CONUS major subordinate commands following the 1962 reorganization. These commands operated under the tremendous pressure of Vietnam war requirements throughout most of this period. It is useful to recall some of those pressures.

Overall, the Army increased its size by nearly two-thirds following the 1965 deployment to Vietnam. It later shrank back to a level lower than the start point, and did so in a relatively short span of months. The Army did this the hard way: a Presidential decision prior to the 1965 buildup forestalled expansion by mobilization of reserve elements. The cadre for newly created units came from the active Army, and promotions soared accordingly. When the phasedown had been completed, the Army found itself overstrength in the higher enlisted and officer grades. The distribution of military occupational specialties was also skewed. Too many men with skills trained especially for Vietnam needs were forced to retrain because of different baseline requirements. Turbulence followed turbulence. First, it was due to short overseas cycles of service, then the phasedown itself, and finally the redistribution of skills as the Army moved toward an all-volunteer status.

The major subordinate commands, despite their organizational problems outlined in Chapter III, rose to the occasion and accomplished the mission. CONARC's training base expanded and contracted as the needs changed, with the emphasis on Vietnam-oriented skills. AMC managed the immense problem of increased equipment procurement, maintenance, and distribution. The combat developments process shifted its focus to Vietnam-peculiar materiel, tactics, and techniques. The reserve forces were neglected, their equipment stocks being used like a surge tank to fill immediate requirements. Even the other active forces suffered by being mainly a rotation base for Vietnam needs.

MAIN FEATURES OF THE 1973 REORGANIZATION

The Environment Surrounding the Change

This time the pressures for change were not embodied in one person. Nevertheless, there were pressures, and most but not all originated outside the Army. Now that the Vietnam war was ending, it was a time for reassessment.

Mr. Robert F. Froehlke, Secretary of the Army, summarized the external pressures very succinctly.¹ He cited Congress's and OSD's pressures on the Army recently to up its "teeth-to-tail" ratio, i.e. to increase its ratio of combat to support personnel. A second pressure for personnel reductions came from these same sources in view of the rising personnel costs. In response to this pressure, the administration has elected to place much greater reliance on

the reserves, leading to pressures for their improvement. Finally, Congress and OSD have made it clear that improvements in the weapons system acquisition process were required, to include an effective independent operational test capability. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel devoted considerable of its report to this problem in the overall defense establishment.

Mr. Froehlke also mentioned several internal pressures which overlapped with those above. These were Army perceptions of: the need to improve readiness of reserve forces; the need to improve individual training; the need to improve the readiness of active division forces; the need to tie together the schools and the development of doctrine; the need to improve health care and personnel management; and the need to improve management at the installation level.

The Army began studying these pressures and ways it could reorganize to meet them. In April, 1972, public announcement was made of the formation of the Office of the Project Manager for Reorganization (OPMR), headed by then MG James G. Kalergis.² This small group of select personnel had considerable material available from past studies of organizational matters. They had the Hoelscher Report from 1961, for example. Although its recommendations were later modified by the relatively conservative Traub Committee, the Hoelscher report's alternatives covered a very wide range of possible approaches. These approaches were reconsidered with an open mind, and the reasons for their original rejection were reassessed. The 1970 panel chaired by MG David S. Parker also examined the problems

and the Hoelscher recommendations on them, among others. New alternatives were stated and new recommendations made.

The Kalergis Group drew heavily on the Parker Panel's work. Most of the Parker Panel's meaty proposals were not immediately adopted by the Army, but were designated for further study. The panel's main recommendations included the following:³

- On the Army Staff, replace CRD with a Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Systems (DCSMS).

- Consolidate all personnel functions within Headquarters DA.

- Remove several operating functions of DCSLOG.

- Expand CDC by assigning it responsibility for the service schools now run by CONARC.

- Combine the Combat Developments Experimentation (CDEC) and Project MASSTER (Mobile Army Sensor Systems Test, Evaluation, and Review).

The first recommendation bears additional comment at this point. Under the Parker Panel concept,⁴ DCSMS would supervise the entire weapons system acquisition process for the Army. The advantage of this approach is a decrease in unity of command problems caused by the developer, AMC, being responsible to two General Staff agencies, OCRD and ODCSLOG, for materiel development and procurement matters. This view continues not to be accepted, however, with ODCSLOG being opposed to loss of its procurement functions.

The Kalergis Committee also profited from the history of the trauma of the 1962 reorganization, as depicted by the Office, Chief of Military History.⁵ Although OPMR's activities and reports were

closely held until the 11 January 1973 public announcement, considerable coordination was made with the affected major subordinate commands. Thus the lack of communication seen in 1961 was not in evidence here. The major subordinate commands, particularly CONARC, did most of the detailed planning. CONARC's Operation Steadfast report⁶ contained most of these details. OPMR also received authority to continue as the coordinating element for execution of the reorganization, a major step forward from the 1962 arrangements which established an entirely new coordinating agency.

OPMR was able to work on a deliberate schedule without outside pressure from "big brother", so much in evidence in 1961. This helpful environment resulted from the participatory management approach of then SECDEF Melvin R. Laird. As a matter of fact, OPMR was able to pause while the new Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, examined its tentative recommendations carefully and made his own views felt. All in all, the environment surrounding the Kalergis Committee's operations was calm and deliberate.

Overall Rationale for Change

OPMR attempted to respond to the pressures mentioned by Mr. Froehlke by making a number of significant organizational changes. Through such structural changes, OPMR attacked current span of management problems at CONARC and CDC by reducing the number of diverse missions each was to handle. Layering within CONARC's subordinate commands was also attacked through increasing the homogeneity of the overall structure.


The plan called for replacing CONARC and CDC with two new commands, the Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Also established were the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) and the Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA). Figure 8⁷ portrays the new structure. These organizations and other less significant changes are described below.

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

This new command combines the combat developments role of CDC with CONARC's service schools and Army training centers (ATC). TRADOC will "manage all individual schooling and training, the development of combat organizations and better ways to use them, and the Army Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program".⁸ In the terms introduced in Chapter III, TRADOC is the combat developer, the preparer of current doctrine, and the instructor.

TRADOC will assume full command of those posts primarily associated with training (see figure 9⁹). To assist in coordination of efforts of the schools and training centers, but not in their command, three functional centers are to be established: the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Virginia; and the Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. These centers will use the schools' combat developments outputs in building block fashion to develop organizational and support concepts up through corps level.¹⁰ The centers will insure that instruction within their associated schools is consistent and timely.

CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION



TRAINING & DOCTRINE CMD.

Size...


- 180,000 MILITARY...22% ACTIVE FORCE...12% TOTAL

Hqs. Location...

- FT. MONROE, VA.

Mission...

- TRAINING OF THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICER and SOLDIER
 - SERVICE SCHOOLS
 - TRAINING CENTERS
- IDEAS FOR NEW ORGANIZATIONS-EQUIPMENT...AND WAYS TO USE THEM
- MANAGE ROTC PROGRAM...DEDICATED BASIS



TRADOC's supervision over the ROTC program will be through four regional activities, each commanded by a brigadier general.¹¹ A permanent command structure is thus provided, to include supervision of summer camp activities, and a better framework is established to supervise the individual instructor detachments.

To control the above functions, TRADOC's headquarters will be organized as shown on figure 10.¹² This arrangement is orthodox and largely reflects CONARC's old organization for similar functions. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM) is an expansion of the comptroller function.


Forces Command (FORSCOM)

By stripping the combat developments and individual training functions out of CONARC Headquarters, what is left is a "troop command". This is what FORSCOM is designed to be. Specifically, FORSCOM's missions are: command of Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) and deployable US Army Reserve (USAR) units in CONUS; direction and supervision of Army National Guard training; acting as the Army component command of US Readiness Command; command of forces-oriented installations; and control over CONUS land defense and survival measures.¹³

To supervise these missions, FORSCOM Headquarters will be organized as shown on figure 11.¹⁴ The installations it will supervise are shown on figure 12.¹⁵


Under this concept the CONUS armies will be limited to command and supervision of reserve units and supervision of

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND



NOTE 1. ALSO PERSONAL STAFF OF CG.
NOTE 2. UNDER OP CON DCS ROTC.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCE COMMAND



NOTE 1. ALSO PERSONAL STAFF OF CG

FORCES COMMAND

Size . . .

○ 225,000 MILITARY . . . 27% ACTIVE FORCE . . . 59% TOTAL


Hqs Location . . .

○ FT MCPHERSON, GA.

Mission . . . READINESS

○ ACTIVE ARMY COMBAT and SUPPORT FORCES . . . and
RESERVE COMPONENTS

○ DIRECT LINE TO MAJOR ACTIVE ARMY UNITS



training and readiness of Army National Guard units. Nine Army Readiness Regions will be established to provide readily available assistance to the reserve components.¹⁶ The active Army units and posts, on the other hand, will be directly under FORSCOM control.

Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA)

This agency is being formed from DCSOPS' Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (STAG) and from study-oriented elements of CDC Headquarters. It is located in Bethesda, Maryland. Its organization is as shown on figure 13.¹⁷

CAA's mission is to:¹⁸

"(1) Conduct mid- and long range force concept studies to establish the framework and guidance for the development of doctrine, organizations, and materiel requirements for Army forces.

(2) Assist ACSFOR in the development of force structures and in the analysis of force-related issues to support DA planning and programming and provide the basis for materiel acquisition.

(3) Conduct studies and analyses to provide the basis for DA and DOD level decisions in the development and acquisition of major systems and selected items of materiel.

(4) Improve DA capability to develop and make use of models, simulations, and war games.

(5) Conduct studies, evaluations, analyses, and surveys using war games and/or appropriate operations research, systems analysis, and allied techniques to address operational plans and concepts of operation.

(6) Formulate test requirements, and assist OTEA in developing test plans and evaluating test results".

The mission is certainly an impressive one, and it is considered that the agency will be DA's single in-house analysis capability.¹⁹ It will be under the ACSFOR's supervision.

Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA)

CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY




Figure 13

OTEA is a brand new agency, formed as a class II activity under ACSFOR's supervision. It is organized as shown in figure 14.²⁰ Its mission is to:²¹

- "(1) Accomplish the planning for, direction of, and evaluation of operational testing of all major systems and selected non-major systems required in the materiel acquisition process.
- (2) Manage and coordinate force development testing and experimentation.
- (3) Provide the focal point for Army participation in planning for and conduct of joint operational and force development test activities.
- (4) Provide a strong focal point organization at DA Headquarters to keep DA and OSD fully informed on the Army's OT&E needs and accomplishments."

OTEA assumes many of these functions from CDC. The latter had been built up in 1971 to accomplish OT&E planning and supervision independent of the developer (AMC), thus responding somewhat to OSD guidance on independence of OT&E. The establishment of OTEA more clearly responds to that guidance, however.

Other Changes


AMC modified its structure slightly to effect several economies. The few changes made attested to the basic soundness of its original structure, as modernized by several evolutionary changes.

A US Army Health Services Command is to be established to provide a single manager for Army medical activities in CONUS. The Academy of Health Sciences is to be included, which will encompass all Army medical training activities.

The newly established Military Personnel Center will combine the operating functions of DCSPER with the Office of Personnel

OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION AGENCY

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



Operations into a "one stop" personnel center.

There were several other changes, but they were not as significant as those above.

EVALUATION OF CHANGES

Discussions below are based on the information available to the author at the time of writing. This information was not available prior to 11 January 1973, the date of public announcement. Sufficient information for this analysis was provided after that date through the excellent cooperation of OPMR representatives. It is realized that many of the details of the reorganization plan are now in a state of flux as the organizations themselves take shape. For example, AR's in need of revision have not yet been published. To supplement the available data, the author will include perceptions of Army functioning gleaned in his three years' experience on the Army Staff. In these discussions, several general observations will be followed by more detailed observations within the three functional areas.

General

In general, OPMR's choices acknowledged their understanding of and agreement with the organizational principles set down in Chapter II. Simplicity and directness were the key to the selected alternatives.

For example, in the case of installation management where one possibility would have been a "dual hat" command arrangement,

the alternative selected was invariably the more simple one embodying unity of command. This direct approach should be superior in the long run. In this particular case it may cause short term problems, however, while management experts move and organize the new working arrangements. CONARC's installation experts must split and those assigned to CONUS armies must move so that the new headquarters will be manned. Management offices at installation level and DA level must be augmented if the new system is to work. The long term gain should be worth these temporary problems, however.

OPMR also reduced the span of management problem in the two new commands by making them more functionally homogeneous. This possibility was suggested on page 17. In fact, in the case of FORSCOM, both a decrease in the span of management through homogeneity of functions and a reduction in layering was accomplished as suggested on page 18. However, the net effect may not be positive in the area of the span of installation management. While the installation manager formerly had to compete for resources with a few others within the CONUS army, he now will have to compete with 20 or more nationwide. It is granted that the "pie" is larger, but his needs can be more easily eclipsed by higher priorities. In summary, the area of installation management is a candidate for near term problems. Once the system stabilizes, however, the final result could well be significant net improvement.

Descriptions of DA functioning following the reorganization have a familiar sound to them. For example: "DA will reduce its involvement in the day-to-day operations of its major commands and

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restrict itself to its primary function". It appears that creeping centralization has set in again. More importantly, nothing in the material available to the author indicates establishment of a specific mechanism at DA to preclude a further recurrence of this problem. The pressure for such recurrence will be great for several reasons: the increased DA role in installation management, decreased overall resources, and improved management information systems, to name but a few.

If FORSCOM's role in improving readiness of the reserve components is successful, the total force concept will be enhanced. If support for all components is combined as a result of this approach, there may develop at Headquarters DA some pressure for internal change. Specifically, there may develop pressures for the major staff functions to be handled for both active and reserve forces by the principal Staff agency. The continued existence of the Office, Chief of Reserve Components (CORC) would then become questionable.

Doctrine (Combat Developments)

It appears that TRADOC will have considerable help in carrying forth the combat developments mission formerly handled by CDC. It loses some portions of the roles which caused CDC so many interface problems: for example, the overall "crystal ball gazing" role to CAA, and the OT&E planning and supervising role to OTEA. What is left is largely the mission of providing doctrine in the narrow sense. Hence here is another net gain in the span of management

through increased homogeneity.

TRADOC will also have less to do than CDC did in the area of formal materiel requirements. The new AR 1000-1 prescribes a different system for documenting such requirements. Once a Required Operational Capability (ROC) for a piece of equipment is submitted -- it may come from any source -- it is further defined by a task force for major systems or an appropriate agency for other than major systems. CDC's former role requiring high expenditures of man hours developing detailed Materiel Need (MN) documents is thus ended. TRADOC agencies will produce ROC as a normal consequence of their search for new concepts, however. Their work to define in greater detail some materiel concepts for other than major systems also fits in better to the overall scheme.

While AMC's opponent in the day-to-day squabbles over materiel development will not be CDC's replacement, it is not clear that there will be no squabbles. Likely candidates for the role of new opponent are CAA and OTEA. It is too early to make knowledgeable predictions on this, however.

With CAA handling the major study role, there is a greater chance that TRADOC's study contributions will be of better quality. As mentioned in Chapter III, the former study system in CDC tended to push study requirements down to the elements with least resources, with higher layers acting only as a filter. If the agencies are now restricted to studies within their purview, there will be progress. In this regard, the role of the functional centers, hopefully to be one of real supervision rather than just filtering, will be

key to success of the effort.

The mission assigned CAA as outlined on page 59 is an impressive one. It remains to be seen whether the agency will be able to accomplish all the tasks described. If it does, it will be a major power within Headquarters DA. The author's scepticism comes from recollection of similar missions assigned in 1967 to the newly formed Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army (AVCofSA). Roles then assigned included a considerable in-house study capability, a study directing capability, a capability for development and operation of force planning models, and an independent weapons system analysis capability. One by one these functions have disappeared in office reorganizations as the basic AVCofSA functions of overall Staff coordination and operating the Army's programming system have become dominant. Whether the same sort of transition will hit CAA remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether CAA can retain sufficient quality personnel to perform their mission.

The organization of CAA is based on a flexible approach and task organization to meet various study requirements. As such it should not digress into "ad hocism", but this is always a possibility.

There is also a potential unity of command problem involving CAA and its tasking. The decision to have CAA responsible to ACSFOR was not made until 13 February 1973, an indication that the Army Staff is concerned over the working relationship. The difficulty arises because ACSFOR must now filter the requirements for CAA work from the other staff agencies. Such work requirements might be considerable since the agencies are losing what in-house

analysis capability they had. In performing the filtering function, ACSFOR then becomes "more equal" than his peers. DCSOPS is expected to be the principal source of difficulties, as he is accustomed to having STAG immediately responsive for a variety of war gaming and other studies. If ACSFOR can control CAA's work load, then CAA has a chance of being successful; if not, then CAA will surely have problems.

As a matter of fact, the work load problem is the most basic one plaguing the entire study area. The Army has not had really effective controls on its study requirements in any scheme of management tried to date. Progress will not really be made until an authority is able to say, "I'm sorry, sir, your question is quite interesting, but not important enough that we can afford study resources to pursue it" to generals and civilian officials at all levels when (and only when) it is appropriate to do so. It remains to be seen whether ACSFOR's control mechanism will be this effective, or if "can do" continues to be the order of the day.

In general, TRADOC should be able to accomplish its doctrinal mission better due to the loss of conflicting missions that troubled CDC. The real key to its success again rests with ACSFOR. The latter, assisted by CAA, will produce the Army Master Force Development Plan²³ which hopefully will tie together the whole combat developments effort. If this can be done effectively, and if ACSFOR can control CAA's efforts effectively, the prognosis is good. Certainly the "big picture" study and analysis capability

(CAA) is now where it belongs, close to and really a part of Headquarters DA.

Overall, the TRADOC organizational structure appears properly constituted to do its doctrinal job, if it is appropriately guided by ACSFOR, aided by CAA's output of concepts and studies. If the DA guidance is not good, however, there will be the inevitable conflict between a four-star (TRADOC) and a three-star (ACSFOR) aided by a two-star (CAA). In this case three plus two does not necessarily beat four, and the Chief of Staff will have to become involved.

Training

Giving this mission to TRADOC will certainly result in unity of command over the training function. The mission is quite compatible with TRADOC's combat developments responsibilities, and will return the dialogue between these areas necessary to foster a non-sterile approach to combat developments. The similarity of these functions and lack of other divergent functions will decrease span of management problems. This view is presented despite the Parker Panel position that the ATC's should be separate from a command of this type.²⁴ Their rationale involved the ATC's role in mobilization and in the general personnel process.

There are some problems created which did not previously exist. Coordination will have to be established between FORSCOM and TRADOC, assisted by the Military Personnel Center, so that individual training outputs respond to FORSCOM's fluctuating needs.

Such coordination was previously possible within CONARC Headquarters. Further coordination will be necessary to provide guidance to individual training, e.g. advanced individual training (AIT) conducted in FORSCOM units. These problems are solvable, but they do require actions not heretofore necessary.

As mentioned earlier, the functional centers are key to TRADOC's success in combat developments matters. In the area of training they will insure the consistency of material being taught. If the functional centers go beyond the coordinative mission and attempt to command the schools and training centers, there will be difficulties. Rank differences of commanders may minimize this potential problem, but the situation should be monitored.

Test and Evaluation

The creation of OTEA certainly responds to the requirement for separation of the OT&E functions from the developer. The overall testing assets (TECOM) remain under AMC control, and properly so because AMC needs to control these assets in developer testing. There will probably be coordination problems, as OTEA's role is a supervisory one over assets owned by other agencies.

Just how many personnel OTEA will need to perform this supervision is not clear. OTEA's charter acknowledges this uncertainty, but it is the author's view that the requirement will go above the 200 total now recommended.²⁵ For one thing, although the plan has acknowledged the need to develop operational tests for other than the materiel acquisition process, the real impact

of this requirement is not yet clear. The emphasis so far is on OT&E in support of materiel development.

ACSFOR's role as the supervisor of OTEA's actions further adds to his increased status on the Army Staff. Although he has had status shortfalls in the past,²⁶ his status will certainly grow if he is successful in controlling CAA and OTEA in addition to his present responsibilities. This is as it should be, for force development is really the business of Headquarters DA and it is therefore logical that the staff officer primarily responsible for that function should be dominant. However, precedence has occasionally dominated logic in past Army Staff decisions.

A pessimist (the author qualifies for this label) would suggest that there will be an attempt to offset ACSFOR's dominance by a redistribution of functions in the future. While the Parker Panel's DCS for Materiel Systems proposal²⁷ was disapproved, it may be resurrected. The logistician's objection about losing major item procurement functions to the DCSMS might be overcome by stopping short of this point, i.e. by having the new agency responsible through development only. Perhaps this slot could be titled DCS for Materiel Development (DCSMD). Thus the ACSFOR would lose his materiel roles to DCSMD, the successor to CRD, and his remaining force development functions would not earn him dominant status.

It is the author's view that such a reorganization would be quite unfortunate. ACSFOR's role in materiel development is essentially that of a devil's advocate. This role acts as a check on the developer, and the check would be lost if materiel develop-

came under the complete control of one Staff agency. "Unity of proponentcy" is not one of the recognized organizational principles; in fact it is the antithesis of the principle of separation.

SUMMARY

As the US Vietnam war involvement decreased, there arose both internal and external pressures on the Army. These pressures were generally to do better with fewer people, to improve the posture of the reserve components, and to improve the weapons system acquisition process. In view of the organizational problems remaining from the 1962 reorganization, a feasible solution to these pressures appeared to be another reorganization. OPMR coordinated a potential solution, obtained its approval, and is supervising its execution.

The approved structural changes show appreciation for the principles of organization discussed in Chapter II as well as perception of most of the organizational shortfalls discussed in Chapter III. OPMR's recommendations are characterized by directness and simplicity. Overall, they should be successful. There are some potential problem areas, however, and these and some specific comments are discussed below by agency rather than by functional area.

Headquarters DA

Creeping centralization was again detected and corrections were made. There will be pressures leading to its return, especi-

ally in the area of installation management. However, no measures to prevent its return are yet visible.

If FORSCOM is successful in causing further integration of the reserve components, there may be pressure to spread the CORC activities throughout the rest of the Staff.

ACSFOR's responsibility to control CAA's activities may cause friction among the Staff in practice. If ACSFOR can control CAA and OTEA successfully, his ascendancy may cause pressures to split his responsibilities. Such a split might involve converting CRD into a DCS for Materiel Development.

TRADOC

Accomplishment of TRADOC's combat developments mission is enhanced by loss of two other diverse functions. Its organization should respond to the basic mission well. Under the new weapons system acquisition process, its role in materiel development is more in keeping with its structural capabilities.

In the area of installation management, there will be some short term problems due to the turbulence of change. There may be a span of management problem, as all TRADOC posts report directly to its headquarters.

The keys to success are the new functional centers, but if they attempt to command rather than coordinate there will be unity of command problems.

Also significant to success in combat developments matters will be proper guidance, to include the Army Master Force

Development Plan.

FORSCOM

The installation management situation is the same as that noted above for TRADOC.

There may be a problem in coordinating with TRADOC on training requirements and on the need for FORSCOM units to run individual training cycles.

Overall, accomplishment of the FORSCOM should be greatly enhanced by the change.

CAA

CAA's mission is very ambitious, and so the agency may not be completely successful. There may be squabbles with AMC in the materiel development area. If CAA's success is limited, it may be due to its flexible organization digressing into "ad hocism", or inability to control the study program. On the other hand, if it is successful, there may be pressures on ACSFOR as noted above.

OTEA

OTEA may also be involved in squabbles with AMC involving either materiel development details or conflicts in availability of AMC test resources to OTEA. Personnel requirements may exceed expectation as experience is gained on the extent of OTEA's needs.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert F. Froehlke, "Thinking Behind the Army's Reorganization", Commander's Digest, Volume 13, No. 12, 25 January 1973, p. 3.

2. Commander's Digest, p. 2.

3. US Department of the Army, Report of the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Organization, p. I-11 to I-16.

4. Ibid., p. II-8-16.

5. Martin Blumenson, Reorganization of the Army, 1962,

6. US Department of the Army, Continental Army Command, Operation Steadfast, July 1972.

7. US Department of the Army, "Army Reorganization", US Army Command Information Spotlight, Issue 47, p. 3. (Hereafter referred to as Spotlight).

8. Ibid., p. 6.

9. Ibid., p. 22.

10. Ibid., p. 7.

11. Ibid.

12. Operation Steadfast, Volume A, p. A-1-4.

13. Spotlight, p. 4.

14. Operation Steadfast, Volume E, p. E-1-3.

15. Spotlight, p. 23.

16. Ibid., p. 5.

17. US Department of the Army, Concepts Analysis Agency, Briefing Material, December 1972, p. 2.

18. US Department of the Army, Office, Project Manager for Reorganization, Implementation Plan, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, p. 2-5.

19. Briefing Material, p. 4.

20. US Department of the Army, Office, Project Manager for Reorganization, Implementation Plan, US Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency, Annex B. (Hereafter referred to as OTEA Implementation Plan).

21. Ibid., p. 2.

22. Commander's Digest, p. 9.

23. Operation Steadfast, Volume B, Chapter 1.

24. Parker Panel, p. II-17-20.

25. OTEA Implementation Plan, p. 2.

26. Parker Panel, p. II-9-6.

27. Ibid., p. II-9-7.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having completed examination of the past and the current reorganizations' strengths and weaknesses, it is appropriate to pause at this point and look back on the overall observations presented. Chapter II gleaned six yardsticks from the realm of organizational theory that were potentially useful in assessing a military organization's structure. These yardsticks were applied to structures resulting from the 1962 reorganization in Chapter III, and to those from the current reorganization in Chapter IV. Observations from these chapters are summarized on pages 21, 43, and 72 respectively, and will not be repeated in further detail here. From these observations, certain conclusions can be drawn, which in turn lead to recommendations.

CONCLUSIONS

Application of the six selected yardsticks, with occasional assistance from others of the stated 14 basic principles of organization, provided a valid assessment of both past and present organizational structures. These structures are valid reflections of the total organization they represent.

The 1962 reorganization was largely a success despite its pressured beginnings. There were, however, several basic violations of the organizational principles. Chief among these were CONARC's continued excessive span of management and CDC's weakness from a number of aspects.

These shortfalls were exacerbated by Vietnam war problems. When US involvement neared termination, these shortfalls, coupled with several internal and external pressures for change, signalled the need for a new reorganization.

OPMR showed appreciation for the selected yardsticks and their measurement of earlier difficulties. OPMR's structural solution, while causing extensive change, is direct, simple, and bold.

Use of the yardsticks on the new structure disclosed several potential problems, but these are not basic flaws in the structure. They are more in the nature of areas calling for monitoring to prevent difficulties from developing.

Within the three selected functional areas, then, no shortcoming of the new structure appears to necessitate drastic surgery in the form of another reorganization of the major subordinate commands. There are some potential pressures for change, but these are confined to the Army Staff. Even if close monitoring fails to overcome these pressures, however, the changes would only involve Headquarters DA.

Therefore, considering the functional areas of doctrine, training, and test and evaluation, the Army is not doomed to keep on reorganizing its major subordinate commands.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The potential problems in the new structure can be offset if their existence is recognized. It is therefore recommended

that the Chief of Staff, Army:

- Support the Project Manager for Reorganization to insure vigorous execution of the reorganization plan.

- Task his staff management personnel to be immediately responsive in curbing recurrences of creeping centralization.

- Monitor potential Staff friction over ACSFOR's tasking of CAA.

- Demand that CAA's mission accomplishment be of high quality.

- Assure that ACSFOR's Army Master Force Development Plan provides effective guidance.

- Initiate a study of the alternative of eliminating the functions of CORC, in anticipation of the possibility of greater integration of reserve components.

- Resist Staff efforts to redistribute ACSFOR's functions, such as the possible expansion of CRD functions into that of a DCS for Materiel Development.


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