Analysis of NATO Doctrine for Biosurveillance
Abstract
The United States is in the process of developing an all-of-Nation approach to a biosurveillance enterprise that will allow the U.S. to quickly detect an incident of national significance that affects human, animal, or plant health. While no formal all-of-government biosurveillance implementation doctrine exists, the Department of Defense (DOD) will and already does contribute to this notional enterprise with existing capabilities that are distributed across the DOD. The Institute for Defense Analyses was asked to report on the feasibility of the application of NATO doctrine to the development and implementation of biosurveillance concepts and doctrine. An initial search revealed that neither NATO nor DOD had formal doctrine on biosurveillance. Therefore, NATO biosurveillance doctrine could not contribute to a developing DOD biosurveillance doctrine. The existing capabilities that exist both in NATO and DOD could certainly form a starting point for a biosurveillance doctrine in DOD. They each have qualities that resonate with the U.S. Strategy for biosurveillance, which takes an approach of collecting, integrating, analyzing, and communicating all-hazards and disease activity to allow better decision making. However, for DOD and NATO to have clear and interoperable biosurveillance doctrine, specific actions should to be taken based on the conclusions and recommended actions from this study.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 2015
- Accession Number
- AD1000188
Entities
People
- Carl A. Curling
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses