

An Analysis of the Indian Army's COIN Experience

**A Monograph
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Abstract

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN ARMY'S COIN EXPERIENCE by LT COL KMS Rana, Indian Army, 62 pages.

The last decade has witnessed an exponential growth in terrorism and violence emanating from transnational terrorist organizations & insurgencies. Even though the 'second grammar' of warfare - COIN operations, has existed for ages, this rise in terror has led to a global revisit on COIN. In the light of this renewed focus on COIN, this monograph analyses the experience of the Indian Army in COIN operations. In spite of a six-decade long history of COIN campaigns, these Indian COIN campaigns have remained unknown to the rest of the world. A look at the Indian COIN experience brings out a different perspective on COIN and an analysis of the COIN campaigns of the Indian Army offers pertinent lessons for all Armed Forces engaged in such operations. This paper will attempt to evaluate the conception of the Indian COIN doctrine, which is primarily based for domestic COIN, examine the relevant doctrinal precepts of the expeditionary COIN doctrines of the Western Armies, and bring out the relevant differences & similarities in these COIN approaches. This monograph will examine these Indian COIN campaigns, conducted in complex environments, and trace the iterative doctrinal process, which reached full circle with the enunciation of the Indian Army's *Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations- "Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove"* in 2006. The Indian experience highlights the primacy of the population in the solution of an insurgency, reiterates the fact that military COIN campaigns are a part of the larger politico-military resolution process and brings out a suggested line of effort model for COIN campaigns.

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Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrinal Publication
AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARTRAC	Army Training Command (Indian Army)
BC	Before Christ
COA	Course of Action
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CIJW	Counter Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GOC	General Officer Commanding
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMSF	Indian Marine Commando Force
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
JKLF	Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
LoC	Line of Control
LOC	Lines of Communication
LET	Lashkar-e-Toiba
LTTE	Liberation Tamil Tiger Elam
MARCOS	Marine Commandos (Indian Navy)
MNF	Mizo National Front
NNC	Naga Nationalist Council
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RR	Rashtriya Rifles
TTP	Tactics, techniques, and procedures

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Introduction

Counterinsurgency or COIN warfare represents a type of warfare in which military force is employed to re-establish governmental control. The last century has witnessed that COIN operations continue to remain an important element in the continuum of operations. Some of the major armies are still engaged in such operations; prominent among them is the US Army with an ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. The Indian Army too has had its share of COIN experience both within the country and overseas. A study of India's COIN campaigns spanning over six decades could provide rich lessons to all armed forces engaged in such operations.¹

India is a diverse country composed of various ethnic races, communities, religions and cultures. The country emerged from the colonial rule with a backward economic, technological and infrastructure profile in 1947. According to economic historian Angus Madisson, Indian economy went from being the largest in the world in 1600 to being one of the smallest in 1947.² After independence, insurgent movements emerged within India's borders and the Indian Army deployed within the country to conduct COIN operations in support of the union to bring back normalcy. These operations were conducted in terrain ranging from the jungles of the North Eastern states of India to the valley of Kashmir under influence of complex regional and societal factors.³ Analysis of these campaigns provides a discourse on possible solutions to an insurgency by politico military means. The major Indian insurgencies and COIN campaigns of the Indian Army are shown in Map 1.


This paper has three sets of hypotheses. First, India, a multi ethnic nation, became structurally prone to insurgencies due to the economic disparity among regions as a fallout of the British rule and 'proxy' war against India by external actors. Second, the Indian COIN effort is primarily a political process with COIN campaigns of the Indian Army aiding the politico military resolution process. Third, this paper will analyze

¹ Sumit Ganguly and David Fidler, "Introduction," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly, and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-3.

² Angus Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History* (OXFORD: Oxford University Press, USA, 2007).

³ Ibid.

the COIN experience of the Indian Army to prove that a combination of factors such as better insurgent equipment, a shift in their operational approach and relevant environmental features led to a paradigm shift in the concept of COIN operations and doctrine of the Indian Army in the early nineties.



Map 1: COIN campaigns of the Indian Army

Most military doctrines define insurgency. The Indian Army COIN doctrine defines insurgency as an “organized armed struggle against a legally constituted government with an aim to either seize power, replace the government or secession.”⁴ The US Army COIN manual FM 3-24 defines insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at the over throw of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”⁵ Thus, the core issue that emerges in an insurgency is control of political power.⁶ Insurgencies and corresponding COIN campaigns have shown that a pure military solution to an insurgency may not always be

⁴ Army Training Command (ARTRAC), *Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations* (Shimla: ARTRAC, 2006). At <http://ids.nic.in/>. (accessed 28 Jul 2011).

⁵ Headquarters Department of Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-1.

⁶ Ibid.

viable. The Indian approach to COIN has remained centered on a politico- military process with insurgency taken as a politico military problem.⁷

The Indian Army has conducted COIN operations both internally and overseas. Some of the major COIN campaigns were in the North Eastern states from 1956 through the 1990s, in Punjab from 1987 to 1993 and in Jammu & Kashmir from 1990 until present day.⁸ The Indian Army also deployed in Sri Lanka as Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from 1987 to 1990 and waged a COIN campaign to bring peace to the strife torn island.⁹ These COIN campaigns were composed of hard fought guerilla battles at the tactical level and demanded a constant evolution of tactics to defeat the insurgents and operational art to bridge the diverse geopolitical and strategic military aims to tactics. The environment in which the Indian Army operated as part of its COIN campaigns were complex and varied significantly from one another. Not all these campaigns were success stories; however, they did have a lasting impact on the Indian Army's doctrinal process. This doctrinal process was compiled as the Indian Army's ***Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations in 2006*** (This paper refers to this as the Indian COIN doctrine).¹⁰

An important facet of the Indian COIN experience is the different operating environments. Each of these COIN campaigns witnessed a varying influence of societal, regional and political factors. In addition, the resource availability in terms of military infrastructure for these COIN campaigns varied as per the economic power of the nation. An analysis of these campaigns brings out an iterative doctrinal process commencing from the early days of the Indian Army in the North Eastern states through Sri Lanka to COIN operations in Kashmir. This led to the formulation of successive strategies to counter the insurgents. This paper highlights the conception of COIN doctrine of the Indian Army in its current form.¹¹

⁷ Rajesh Rajgopalan(2007): *Force and Compromise : India's Counter Insurgency Grand Strategy*, South Asia : Journal of South Asian Studies. 75-76.

⁸ Sumit Ganguly and David Fidler, "Introduction," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly, and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-3.

⁹ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992), i-ii.

¹⁰ Dipankar Banerjee, "The Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 189.

¹¹ Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Fighting Like a Guerrilla: the Indian Army and Counterinsurgency* (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2008), 134-168.

The Indian Army's experience in Sri Lanka led to a paradigm shift in the concept of COIN operations of the Indian Army. This shift was in fact a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with changes in doctrine, organization and technology. The earlier versions of the Indian Army's COIN campaigns reveal use of conventional force with relatively lesser usage of technology. Today, the Indian mantra has manifested into **"Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove"** doctrine.¹² This signifies the primacy of the local population in the solution of an insurgency, the need of a well-equipped force to bring about effective elimination of insurgents and conduct of COIN operations as part of a larger politico-military resolution process.

In spite of the large experience, the lessons of the Indian COIN campaigns have remained largely unknown to rest of the world. The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the COIN experience of the Indian Army and review the doctrinal evolution to outline important lessons learned. This study will attempt to highlight COIN precepts pertinent to all military forces. Analysis of COIN campaigns leads to identification of common patterns, which are consistent over time. The tools available to counter an insurgency have changed with technology but the principles of COIN warfare have remained the same.¹³ The aim of this monograph is to showcase these principles.

This monograph begins with a literature review of the various COIN theories of the Indian Army through the period of its long deployment. To remain in sync with other military forces engaged in such operations and bring out salient differences between domestic & expeditionary COIN campaigns, the review shall include an overview of the US, British and French COIN doctrines. To analyze the paradigm shift in the COIN operations of the Indian Army, important COIN campaigns of the Indian Army will be examined in case studies. The cases include COIN campaigns of Indian Army in the North Eastern States of Nagaland and Mizoram, Sri Lanka (IPKF) and Jammu & Kashmir (from 1990 until present day). These cases will also outline the RMA in the Indian COIN operations. The analysis of these cases will then lead to recommendations for COIN operations in general.

¹² Army Training Command (ARTRAC), *Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations* (Shimla: ARTRAC, 2006) , 49. At <http://ids.nic.in/>. (accessed 28 Jul 2011).

¹³ Walter C Ladwig III, *Insights from Northeast: Counterinsurgency in Nagaland and Mizoram*. At <http://users.ox.ac.uk>(accessed 25 September 2011).

Literature Review

In spite of COIN warfare being conducted throughout time, COIN theory has remained largely ignored by military theorists.¹⁴ Until the 20th century, most of the writings remained centered around the ‘revolutionary war’ and insurgency. Clausewitz also refers to insurgency as a ‘People in Arms’ movement.¹⁵ The majority of the writings on COIN were dominated by the exploits of the Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong who used guerilla war, a protracted popular war, to conquer China from the capitalist Gou Mingthang.

French Theorist David Galula suggests that since COIN campaigns are launched solely as a reaction to an insurgency, these campaigns can be successful only if an insurgency is correctly analyzed.¹⁶ Galula identifies two types of insurgencies, the Orthodox pattern (inspired by Chinese communists) and the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern.¹⁷ These descriptions as given by Galula correspond to guerilla warfare based movements (Orthodox pattern) and Terrorism (Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern).¹⁸

Bard O’Neil looks at the types of insurgencies in terms of the ultimate goals and political aspects to arrive at certain very pertinent distinctions.¹⁹ The fundamental issue, which a counterinsurgent needs to understand, is the goal of an insurgency. This understanding leads to a sound COIN strategy. The O’Neil categorization is described in table 1 below.

Type	Description
Anarchist	Seek to abolish authority with far reaching goals. Aim for destruction of political system.
Egalitarian	Seek to impose new system based on equality.
Traditionalist	Based on primordial and sacred values emanating from ancestral ties and religion.
Apocalyptic-Utopian	Aim to establish a new world order via the apocalypse of terrorism.

¹⁴ Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 419-437.

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 479-483.

¹⁶ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 43-44.

¹⁷ Ibid, 44-62.

¹⁸ Ibid, 44-62.

¹⁹ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: from Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2005), 19.

Pluralist	Seek a revolutionary transformation of the political system.
Secessionist	Aim for independence after renouncing a state.
Reformist	Non-revolutionary. Target the economic policies.
Preservationist	Resort to illegal actions against authorities and non-ruling groups to affect change.
Commercial	Aim to secure material resources through seizure and control of power.

Table 1: O’Neil Categorization of Insurgencies²⁰

COIN Doctrine

This subsection examines the current COIN doctrines of India, USA, UK & France. This analysis will bring out the salient similarities and differences in the approach adopted in COIN operations by various forces. An understanding of these approaches to COIN puts forth an abstract view of COIN campaigns and brings out unique peculiarities of a domestic COIN campaign as compared to a COIN campaign at the behest of a Host Nation (expeditionary COIN). This analysis will also attempt to put into perspective, the conception of the Indian COIN doctrine.

US COIN Doctrine

The FM 3-24 defines *Counterinsurgency* as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”.²¹ Even though main purpose of the US armed forces remains to fight the national wars in pursuit of strategic aims, the US Army and Marine Corps have conducted COIN campaigns around the world. The FM 3-24 identifies the complexity of COIN operations as being beyond pure combat.²² The underlying logic of the American COIN doctrine is the capability of soldiers and marines to fight and help build states. This logic is codified in the Unified Land Operations, ADP 3-0.²³ The overall framework of COIN operations guiding the US Armed Forces action is given in figure 1.

²⁰ Ibid, 19-28.

²¹ Headquarters Department of Army, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-1.

²² Ibid, 1-19.

²³ Headquarters Department of Army, ADP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011), iii.




Figure 1: Framework of US Operations in COIN²⁴

Among principles for COIN operations identified in the FM 3-24, restoring the legitimate government of the host nation remains as the main objective of a COIN operation.²⁵ This important principle signifies the recognition by a COIN force of the importance of the political system in the resolution process of an insurgency. US doctrine stresses unity of effort, a good understanding of the environment, good intelligence and isolation of the insurgents from the support base. These principles lead to lines of operation for a COIN scenario as given in Figure 2.




Figure 2: US Lines of Operation in COIN²⁶

Thus, US doctrine requires the synchronized use of military, political, economic and psychological actions aimed at restoring the legitimacy of the local institutions. Since the scenarios in which the US forces

²⁴ Headquarters Department of Army, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-19.

²⁵ Ibid, 1-21.

²⁶ Ibid, 5-3.

conduct these operations are in different parts of the world, the role of the Host Nation (HN) is kept as pivotal in the COIN effort.

British COIN Doctrine

The British COIN doctrine describes insurgency as the presence of an illegal armed force threatening to oust a legitimately constituted government. The British doctrine also envisages the role of the British Army in countering insurgency in a failed state. This intervention could be at the behest of the Host Nation or as part of the international community's resolve.²⁷ The British doctrine rests on the foundation that countering insurgency must focus on the political process. The range of responses in a COIN environment is given out in figure 3. Multinational policy is the guiding factor in the balance among British political, diplomatic assistance, armed forces employment and economic investment.²⁸




Figure 3: British Range of Responses in COIN²⁹

The British doctrine defines three approaches to COIN. The indirect approach with a small military contribution in terms of special capabilities, a direct approach with employment of coalition & indigenous security forces and a balanced approach possessing equal political, economic and military efforts.³⁰ Another

²⁷ United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, *British Army Field Manual Counterinsurgency* (London:UK MOD Printing Office, 2009), 1-12.

²⁸ Ibid, 1-13.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid, 1-15.

important issue addressed in the British doctrine is the time factor involved in COIN leading to a conundrum between creation of self-reliant indigenous forces and prolonged stay of a coalition.³¹

French COIN Doctrine

The French Army published a COIN doctrine focused at the tactical level in 2010. This doctrine describes COIN as follows

“ a course of action that consists of neutralizing an organization that practices armed violence in the form of guerilla warfare or terrorist attacks, by reducing that organization’s freedom of movement through confinement, or even eliminating it through the effects of reduction and/or dispersion. The level of engagement in this type of struggle depends upon the national or international political option chosen, upon the balance of forces on the ground and the attitude of the population”.³²

The French doctrine describes the use of armed force as a critical step in restoring security in a region against asymmetric threats. This armed intervention depends upon the framework of engagement or mandate provided by the government, host nation or international authorities.³³ The French continuum of COIN operations consists of three phases, which are described in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4: French Continuum of COIN Operations³⁴

Thus, the French doctrine looks at COIN as a coercive COA to restore and enforce security by destroying armed enemy organizations. The desired effect apart from destruction and capture of insurgents is contribution of military in the isolation of the insurgent movement.³⁵

³¹ Ibid, 1-16.

³² French Amy, *Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level* (Forces Employment Doctrine Center Paris, April 2010), 9.

³³ Ibid, 10.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

The Indian Army & COIN Operations

The Indian Army's experience with COIN warfare began in the 1950s. A list of Indian insurgencies is given out in the table 2. The Galula and O'Neil descriptions help to categorize these insurgences.

Place	Nagaland	Mizoram	Punjab	Assam	Manipur	Jammu & Kashmir
Period	1956-1997	1966-1976	1987-1993	1990-2000	1990-2000	1990-2011
Style	Guerilla	Guerilla	Guerilla, Terrorism	Guerilla, Terrorism	Guerilla, Terrorism	Guerilla, Terrorism
Type	Secessionist Preservationist	Secessionist Preservationist	Secessionist	Secessionist Preservationist	Secessionist Preservationist	Secessionist

Table 2: Major Indian Insurgencies³⁶

India's COIN effort, with the exception of intervention in Sri Lanka, has primarily focused on bringing normalcy back to troubled regions within its borders.³⁷ Therefore, the Indian COIN campaigns have been primarily a domestic effort as compared to the expeditionary COIN, which has characterized the COIN efforts of the Western armies. Domestic COIN is unified by the overarching logic of the Union Government's effort to defeat attempts to disrupt the nationalism of a country, whereas in expeditionary COIN the establishment of legitimacy is one of the foremost objectives.

Thus, the Indian doctrine and concept of operations on COIN have remained focused to attain the domestic military -political strategic aims for which the campaign is launched. This generic operational orientation may not always give the best results, as was experienced by the Indian Army in Sri Lanka. Another important factor, which has affected the Indian Army's COIN warfare progression, is delineation of primary and secondary roles of the Indian Army as per the Indian Army Doctrine.³⁸ Primary role of the Indian Army is to preserve national interests and safe guard sovereignty and territorial integrity against external

³⁶ Durga Madhab (John) Mitra, *Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications For Counterinsurgency Operations in the Third World* (publication place: Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War Co, 2007), 5. This table has been amended. While the temporal details have remained as the basis, the author has included some of his own analysis in the description, style and types of insurgencies.

³⁷ Rajesh Rajagopalan (2000): 'Restoring Normalcy': *The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency Doctrine*, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11:1, 44-68.

³⁸ Army Training Command (ARTRAC), *Indian Army Doctrine* (Shimla: ARTRAC, 2004), 1.13. At <http://ids.nic.in/> (accessed 28 Jul 2011).

threats, with assistance to Government agencies to cope with internal threats being a secondary role.³⁹ These twin roles did result in a cognitive tension in the minds of the military leaders throughout the military progression of the Indian Army. The heavy bias on conventional war was also reflected in the initial COIN theories and concept of operations.

Indian COIN Doctrine

The Indian Army's COIN doctrine uses the term Sub Conventional Operations domain to define the various types of conflicts within this spectrum as shown in figure 5.




Figure 5: Sub Conventional Domain⁴⁰

However, it is fair to assume that all the conflicts in the Sub Conventional Domain emanate from one common root, insurgency or an armed movement. The role of the Indian Army in COIN / counter terrorist operations, as defined by the Indian COIN doctrine, is as follows

“The task of the Army in COIN / counter terrorist operations is to re- establish control so that the civil administration can exercise its proper functions. The short and long-term goals are-
Short Term. To bring down violence to manageable levels, with a view to enable elected government, state agencies and the democratic process to function.

Long Term. Target the Achilles heel of terrorists groups by denying them the firm bases tacitly supported by internal and/or external elements. Launch concentrated operations, which are intelligence based and target specific, to effectively dominate the area while avoiding large-scale speculative operations and collateral damage. Block un-interrupted supply of arms, ammunition and financial support to terrorist groups. Gain confidence of the population by assistance in socio-democratic process and socio-economic development to deny terrorists the popular support. Disengage and withdraw in a graduated manner at a politically opportune moment based on appreciation of the ‘success’ indicators”.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Army Training Command (ARTRAC), *Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations* (Shimla: ARTRAC, 2006) , 6. At <http://ids.nic.in/> (accessed 28 Jul 2011).

⁴¹ Ibid, 30.

Evolution of the Indian COIN Doctrine

The evolution of the Indian Army's concept of COIN operations and the concurrent building of the Indian COIN doctrine can be broadly divided into four phases. These phases are based on periods that witnessed the Indian Army's deployment in COIN operations and informed the COIN doctrine.

The *first phase* began in the 1950s and continued until mid 1960s. During this phase, the Indian Army was deployed in Nagaland to counter the Naga insurgency after the Assam Rifles (a paramilitary force raised by the British) could no longer control the situation. Nagaland is a remote state in the North Eastern region of India. This state remained isolated during the British era with limited governmental control over the Naga tribes. Soon after independence, seeds of resentment over autonomy germinated into a violent struggle for independence from India. This phase signifies the creation of the COIN doctrine in its nascent stage. In Nagaland, the Indian Army resorted to conventional warfare in the initial stages. This led to large-scale collateral damage and negligible results as the insurgents resorted to hit and run guerrilla tactics. As the conflict grew and the deployment of the Indian Army increased, political guidance and direction shaped the COIN doctrine towards **use of minimum force**. This led to the renunciation of heavy weapons such as artillery and air power in COIN operations.⁴² Another factor, which directly affected the Indian COIN doctrine, was the impact of the British Campaign in Malaya (1950-58).⁴³ Important guidelines which became part of Indian COIN operations were: the need for a clear-cut political aim, the requirement of a unified command structure, segregation of local population from insurgents and the importance of '**wining hearts and minds**'. The operational imperatives that became part of the Indian COIN doctrine at the end of this phase were use of minimum force, isolation of guerrillas from the population, area domination of AOR and maintaining superiority of forces.⁴⁴

⁴² Rajesh Rajagopalan (2000): '*Restoring Normalcy*': *The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency Doctrine*, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11:1, 44-68.

⁴³ Dipankar Banerjee, "The Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 192.

⁴⁴ Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Fighting Like a Guerrilla: the Indian Army and Counterinsurgency* (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2008), 149.

The *second phase* of this doctrinal evolution commenced in the mid sixties and lasted until mid eighties. During this period, the Indian Army fought fierce COIN campaigns in Mizoram & Nagaland in the North Eastern region of India. Mizoram, like the Naga state, remained detached from the Indian mainstream due to relative distance and jungle terrain. The Mizo state in 1950s was composed of a number of villages of various tribes with each village under the relative command of a headman. The roots of the Mizo insurgency trace back to economic reasons and isolationist policies of the British rule like the 'Excluded Area Act'. Because of these policies, the Mizo tribe had felt marginalized and in mid 1960s, armed struggle arose to detach the state from the Indian Union. To quell this movement, Indian Army deployed for COIN operations in Mizoram. This phase saw a strong impetus towards modernisation of the Indian Army and improvement in the COIN doctrine. It was during this period that a specialized COIN warfare school, the Counter Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School (CIJW), was established in Mizoram.⁴⁵ The aim of this institution was to impart training to all units deploying into COIN operational areas. This was necessary to maintain a training balance between conventional warfare and COIN, and facilitate the shift of the units from positional warfare to COIN. As part of the new strategy, the Indian Army created special COIN battalions in the Infantry and modernized the Assam Rifles (paramilitary forces).⁴⁶ New population control measures like village grouping scheme were launched. The village grouping schemes primarily hinged on area domination by physical occupation of forward operating bases (FOB) at platoon level in select villages.⁴⁷ The Indian Army started the Cordon and Search operation in Nagaland and continued this type of population control measure in Mizoram. Another aspect in this phase was the use of heliborne operations in COIN. This doctrinal phase saw successful culmination of a COIN campaign and perfect synchronization of the politico military effort to bring normalcy. Mizoram became free of insurgency in 1986 and the leader of the main insurgent group gave up arms to join the political mainstream (later became the Chief Minister of the state).

⁴⁵ Dipankar Banerjee, "The Indian Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 194. The Indian Army's Counter Insurgency & Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) has emerged as a centre of excellence in COIN warfare. The School has also trained number foreign armies in COIN operations including the US Army Infantry & Special Operation Forces. The motto of this school is '*Fight the Guerilla like a Guerilla*'.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 195.

⁴⁷ D. K Palit, *Sentinels Of The North-East*.(New Delhi : Palit & Palit, 1984), 269-270.

The *third phase* of the Indian Army's COIN warfare progression was from mid 1980s and continued until the early 1990s. This phase saw a paradigm shift in the concept of operations of the Indian Army's COIN warfare. This shift was shaped by the India's military intervention in Sri Lanka, 'Operation PAWAN'.⁴⁸ This tour of duty was also one of the few COIN campaigns conducted by the Indian Army outside India. The Indian Army deployed in Sri Lanka in July of 1987 as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). This peacekeeping mission was an outcome of the Indo Sri Lanka Peace accord of 1987 wherein India pledged assistance to the Sinhalese government in brokering peace with the warring Tamils led by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE).⁴⁹ Sri Lankan Tamils looked to India for assistance because of linkages with the Indian State of Tamil Nadu. Thus, India played a major role in the internal dynamics of Sri Lanka. Also until 1987, India supported the Tamil cause both materially and fundamentally. This accord theoretically paved way for bringing the Tamils into the Sri Lankan mainstream and return of peace on the island. When the IPKF deployed in mid 1987 as a planned peacekeeping mission, the first deploying units were equipped lightly and not for COIN.⁵⁰ The rift between the Sinhalese and Tamils was far deeper than what was envisaged by the Indian leadership.

LTTE went back on its word of giving up arms and sought military help from India. On denial of military assistance from India, LTTE commenced attacks on Sri Lankan forces and IPKF. The peacekeeping mission was transformed into a COIN campaign overnight.⁵¹ The IPKF was not completely prepared for this transition. The IPKF used the prevalent COIN doctrine; however, this did not bring good results. The LTTE were credible guerrilla fighters and the IPKF suffered heavy losses initially.⁵² Conducted in a foreign environment, this campaign was one of the most complex COIN campaigns of the Indian Army. The political indecision and lack of local support notwithstanding, the IPKF soon improved the situation, albeit at a heavy cost. The initial operational approach of the IPKF campaign was a conventional one. The total force level of

⁴⁸ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992), i-ii.

⁴⁹ Harkirat Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka: the I.P.K.F. Experience Retold*. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 9.

⁵⁰ Ashok K. Mehta, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 163.

⁵¹ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992), 84-85.

⁵² Harkirat Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka: the I.P.K.F. Experience Retold*. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 143-148.

the IPKF was increased rapidly and using combined arms manoeuvre LTTE strongholds were cleared. This was followed by a COIN campaign. In these guerrilla battles the glaring deficiencies in the weapons and equipment, especially in small arms and crew served weapons, was felt by the Indian Army. The LTTE was equipped with sophisticated arms and most battles were won by the IPKF by sheer numerical superiority and heavy losses. The IPKF was also targeted by LTTE with booby traps and anti personnel/vehicle mines. The situation was complicated with no political backing from either the Sri Lankan or Tamils, fierce guerrilla opposition in the form of LTTE and no population support. This adverse situation spurred a revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the Indian COIN warfare. Improved economic situation of the India enabled introduction of modern equipment in a short time frame. By the time the IPKF departed from the island in 1990, the Indian Army was successful in largely cutting down the size of the Tamil Tigers. A large portion of their cadres and hierarchy was eliminated, and their support base was waning. The exit of the IPKF from the island was also due to a pact between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE.⁵³ However, the Indian Army's COIN warfare had taken a new turn. New aspects were introduced into the doctrine of COIN operations such as aggressive use of attack helicopters, Special Forces operations, cordon & search operations, long-range ambushes and intelligence based operations with small teams.⁵⁴

The *fourth phase* of the doctrinal evolution started in the early nineties and is in progress until today. The beginning of this phase saw the Indian Army fight a COIN campaign in Punjab in late 1989-1991. This COIN campaign was unique as the Punjab Police and Paramilitary Forces took the lead role in this campaign. The Indian Army carried out COIN operations only in the worst affected regions of Punjab. Within a short span of time, Punjab regained normalcy.⁵⁵ The reason for success was a unified political process, popular support and surgical operations by the security forces. The COIN doctrine, which had been refined during the Sri Lankan tour, did show results. As part of the RMA, the Indian Army raised the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Anant Mathur, *Secrets of COIN Success: Lessons from the Punjab Campaign*, Faultlines Vol 20. At <http://satp.com> (accessed 28 Oct 2011).

specialized COIN force.⁵⁶ This force consisted of personnel from all arms and services on a rotational tour of duty. During 1989, Pakistan sponsored insurgency erupted in Kashmir. The initial period saw a large number of Kashmiri youth being herded out of the Kashmir valley into Pakistan and on completion of militant training, these militants infiltrated back into Kashmir. Two main groups or militant tanzeems emerged in late 1989, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM).⁵⁷ The JKLF stood for independence while the HM was for merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. The Pakistani hierarchy termed this proxy war as 'Operation TOPAZ', a strategy to bleed India with a thousand cuts.⁵⁸ The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) proved to be the primary agency in this effort to sever Kashmir from India using the fundamental religious ideals and fuelling insurgency in the valley.

By early 1990, the situation in Kashmir worsened and the Indian Army had to be deployed to conduct COIN operations. The continued backing of Pakistan and the complexity of the socio-political fibre of Kashmir has enabled existence of this insurgency until today. This fierce COIN campaign, Operation RAKSHAK, witnessed the Indian Army fighting indigenous (Kashmiri) militants, Aghani Mujahedeen (diverted by ISI into Kashmiri 'jihad' on termination of war in Afghanistan in 1989) and Foreign Militants (primarily Pakistani nationals acting as mercenaries) under complex social, economic and political environment.⁵⁹ The COIN doctrine of the Indian Army of 1990 was again put to test. The RMA that began immediately after Operation PAWAN (IPKF in Sri Lanka) continued into this phase and brought significant operational results. The COIN warfare changed with deployment of Rashtriya Rifles(RR), the specialized battalions for COIN. The establishment of Battle Schools for COIN operations went a long way in training the freshly deploying troops and enunciation of the doctrine.⁶⁰ The Indian Army launched a combined effort along the Line of Control (LoC) and in the hinterland of Kashmir. The LoC prong was primarily aimed at prevention

⁵⁶ Rajesh Rajgopalan(2004), *Innovations in Counterinsurgency: The Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifles*, Contemporary South Asia 13(1), 25-37.

⁵⁷ V.G. Patankar, "Insurgency, Proxy War and Terrorism in Kashmir," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 67-69.

⁵⁸ Behram A Sahukar, *The Indian Approach To Counterinsurgency Operations*. At www.irg.com.(Accessed 20 September 2011).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Rajesh Rajagopalan (2000): 'Restoring Normalcy': *The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency Doctrine*, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11:1, 44-68.

of infiltration and exfiltration of militants and Kashmiri youth. This prong consisted of physical deployment of troops, long-range ambushes to eliminate militant columns and erection of the border fence. In the hinterland, the COIN grid strategy was adopted. The grid was deployment of forces off the map in a grid formation and covering all major communication centres.⁶¹

The COIN warfare of the Indian Army evolved in a major way during the Operation RAKSHAK. A large number of sophisticated surveillance equipment, electronic warfare equipment, IED jammers and state of the art small arms were brought into the Indian Army. It can be said that the Operation RAKSHAK actually honed the Indian Army's COIN warfare skills and the whole cycle reached an important decisive point in the conceptualization of the Indian Army's COIN doctrine – '**Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove**'.⁶²

Logic of COIN Campaigns

The underlying logic behind a COIN campaign is the approach adopted to resolve the situation. A RAND study gives out these approaches as classic, contemporary or the insurgent like approaches based on the types of steps taken to counter the insurgent.⁶³ Table 3 shows the RAND model on COIN approaches.

	Approach	Core Tenets
Classic COIN Approaches	Development (classic "hearts and minds")	Development results in indigenous support. Development has long gestation.
	Pacification (a broad term for population-centric COIN)	Enable community policing. Development and security go hand in hand.
	Legitimacy (Local support-based approach.)	Insurgency is fundamentally an issue of legitimacy. Lawful governance upholds the rule of law and provides basic services. Protect legitimacy by avoiding collateral damage.
	Democracy (to increase the legitimacy of a government and resolve grievances.)	Democratic voice and expression resolve grievances. Democracy generates legitimacy.
	Resettlement (actions taken to separate the population from the insurgents.)	"The population is the sea in which the fish of insurgency swim".

⁶¹ LN Subramanian, *CI Operations in Jammu and Kashmir*. At <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/Ins.html>. (accessed 30 October 2011).

⁶² Army Training Command (ARTRAC), *Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations* (Shimla: ARTRAC, 2006) , 49. At <http://ids.nic.in/>. (accessed 28 Jul 2011).

⁶³ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2010), 31-32.

	Cost-benefit (focused on insurgents requirements.)	Treat the insurgency as a system. COIN forces increase the cost of insurgent actions.
	Border control (prevention of aid from across the borders)	Insurgencies thrive on cross-border support and havens. Secure borders stops aid and increases international legitimacy.
	“Crush them” (insurgency can be annihilated through the vigorous application of force and repression.)	Escalating repression can crush an insurgency.
	Amnesty/rewards	Amnesty is a potentially attractive option for insurgents, reducing the need for a “fight to the finish.”
Contemporary COIN Approaches	Strategic communication (coordinated whole-of-government persuasion and influence effort. A population-centric and legitimacy-based approach).	Maintain credibility. Minimize the “say-do” gap. Unity of effort. Core themes contribute to COIN operational goals.
	Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Focused on separation of insurgents from the population, popular support, intelligence collection and legitimacy.)	“Provide security. Establish government capabilities. Provide basic services. Address grievances. Reduce corruption.”
	“Beat cop” (The beat-cop approach is concerned with the employment of the COIN force.)	Intelligence collection. Deters criminal activity. Creates trust between the coin force and the population.
	“Boots on the ground”	The presence of COIN forces deters adversary action and reassures the population.
	“Put a local face on it”	Invest in training, developing, and equipping local security forces.
	Cultural awareness	Cultural insensitivity undermines successful COIN practices. Good cultural awareness is an enabler.
	Criticality of intelligence	Actionable intelligence drives successful COIN operations.

Table 3: RAND Model on Approaches to COIN⁶⁴

To objectively assess the success or failure of a COIN campaign it is important to understand the approach adopted by the COIN force and codify the good & bad practices in a COIN campaign. A COIN campaign viewed through a lens of these practices gives an understanding of the outcome of the campaign, which may be a success or a failure. A collation of such practices is given out by the RAND study as shown in Table 4.

Good Practices	Bad Practices
The COIN force follows principle of strategic communications.	The COIN force used punitive measures and large scale repression.
The actions of the COIN force reduce the	The primary COIN force was an external

⁶⁴ Ibid, 36-77.

insurgent support.	force.
The government maintained legitimacy in the area of conflict.	COIN force or government actions cause new grievances as claimed by the insurgents.
COIN ensures that democracy is restored in the area of conflict.	No coordination between militias, COIN force or government.
COIN force generates actionable intelligence.	The COIN force uses relocation of civilians for population control without thought to local economy.
The COIN force maintained superiority of strength over the guerrillas.	COIN force causes collateral damage.
The government/state was made proficient with assistance.	In the area of conflict, COIN force seen worse than the insurgents.
The COIN force prevented collateral damage and used minimum required force.	The COIN force not adaptive changes in insurgent strategy, operations, or tactics.
The COIN force created an environment of good relations with the local population.	The COIN force uses coercion or intimidation.
Development of area of conflict and provision of infrastructure .	Insurgents superior to the COIN in motivation and professionalism.
COIN force generates goodwill so that most of the local population supports their cause.	COIN force not self sufficient.
COIN force establishes area domination to facilitate security to the local population.	The COIN force and government have differing goals.
The COIN force utilizes air dominance with no collateral damage.	
The COIN force ensures provision of basic amenities in the area of operations.	
A secure environment created and maintained in the area of conflict.	

Table 4: RAND Model on Good and Bad Practices in COIN⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Ibid, xvii.

Methodology

This section will outline the methodology, which will be adopted to prove the hypotheses. First, India, a multi ethnic nation, became structurally prone to insurgencies due to the economic disparity between regions as a fallout of the British rule and ‘proxy’ war against India by external actors. Second, the Indian COIN effort is primarily a political process with COIN campaigns of the Indian Army aiding to the politico military resolution process. Third, a combination of factors such as better insurgent equipment, a shift in their operational approach and relevant environmental features led to a paradigm shift in the concept of COIN operations and doctrine of the Indian Army in the early nineties.

In the previous section, the COIN theories of the Indian Army through the various COIN experiences have been highlighted. These theories have shaped the structure of the research of this paper and facilitated a conclusive analysis of the Indian COIN doctrine. A case method is an effective tool to assess theories. Inquiries can be made with the help of an experiment, large-n method or case study method.⁶⁶ Since the author has chosen a set of explanatory hypotheses and the Indian COIN campaigns (cases) have been recorded unevenly in detail, it is best to select a case study method.⁶⁷ The cases that need to be examined are the Indian COIN campaigns, which have informed the COIN doctrine and concept of COIN operations of the Indian Army in major ways. Another aspect, which needs consideration, is the evaluation of the RMA in the Indian COIN warfare leading to a paradigm shift in the concept of COIN operations of the Indian Army.

Within this mandate, the cases that best fulfill the criteria are the Indian COIN campaigns in the North Eastern states of Nagaland and Mizoram, peacekeeping mission turned into COIN campaign in Sri Lanka (Operation PAWAN) and the long drawn Indian COIN campaign in Kashmir (Operation RAKSHAK). The COIN campaign of the Nagaland and Mizoram provides insight into the creation of the initial COIN doctrine of the Indian Army and the foundation of Indian COIN warfare. The Sri Lankan tour of duty was in many ways a wakeup call for the Indian Army. The fierce guerilla opposition in foreign land with no popular support and total political indifference made matters worse for the IPFK during the Operation PAWAN. The Indian Army prevailed over the LTTE, however at a very costly price. This COIN campaign resulted in a

⁶⁶ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods For Students of Political Science*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 53-55.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

RMA in COIN warfare in the Indian Army. An analysis of the performance of the IPKF leads us to the conceptualization of the paradigm shift in the COIN concept of operations. This shift is evident in the COIN campaign in Kashmir. The manifestation of the effect of peculiar environmental conditions on COIN warfare needs consideration especially in the Indian context. Apart from these factors, another contributory feature was the availability of resources to the Indian Army, which varied according to the economic state of India. The national economic prowess directly tied into the technological quotient of the COIN force.

To examine a case in detail, the variables identified in the analysis of the RAND study in the previous section along with factors specific to domestic COIN will be utilized to assess the COIN approach adopted and the outcome of the case. Some of the additional parameters, specific to the Indian context that assist in the overall analysis, are principles of the prevalent COIN doctrine, concept of operations, brief results of the operations, societal conditions, political system, regional environment and resource availability. In the Indian COIN warfare, the political piece and civil-military relations have played a very important part. As part of the political and regional variables, the structures created for establishing coordination between the civil-military leadership at the state level need to be examined in detail. The creation of the Unified Command in the North Eastern states and later in the Kashmir valley is one such example.⁶⁸ The COIN cases will be assessed on the approach adopted and the practices of the COIN force leading to the outcome. These practices will be evaluated using a nominal model. This model assesses the presence or absence of a particular COIN practice (denoted by '1' for presence and '0' for absence) and helps to codify the fact that a particular practice aided to the overall campaign. A scalar method of assessing a particular COIN practice may be beyond the scope of this analysis.

To analyze the RMA in the Indian COIN warfare, the variables utilized would be doctrine, organization, training, material (resources), personnel and facilities. The manner in which the RMA informs the concept of operations of the Indian Army in COIN would also form an important subset of the analyses of each case. These analyses would lead to lessons for all armed forces engaged in COIN warfare either within its own borders or in aid of a foreign country.

⁶⁸ Rajesh Rajagopalan, 'Restoring Normalcy': *The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency Doctrine, Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 11:1, 44-68.

Case Studies on the Indian Army's COIN Campaigns

To evaluate the doctrinal evolution of the Indian Army in COIN operations and identify the paradigm shift in the concept of operations, the following COIN campaigns will be reviewed

- a. Case Study I - COIN Campaign in Nagaland. This COIN campaign commenced in 1956 and continued until 1997 when the hostilities ended with a ceasefire. Since the period of this campaign is long with relatively extended periods of inaction in-between, the case study will focus on the period from 1956 to 1964 - the initiation of the Indian Army to COIN warfare.
- b. Case Study II – COIN Campaign in Mizoram. Period 1966 to 1972.
- c. Case Study III – IPKF in Sri Lanka. Period 1987-1990. This was a peacekeeping mission turned into a COIN campaign. This is one of the few COIN campaigns that the Indian Army has conducted outside its borders.
- d. Case Study IV – COIN in Jammu & Kashmir. This case will focus on the period 1997-2011.

Logic for Assessment of Outcome of a Campaign

For both expeditionary and domestic COIN campaigns, the outcome is assessed as per the status of the insurgency. The specific context for these distinct approaches is given below.

- a. In an expeditionary COIN campaign, the fact that a COIN force ensures a democratically elected government is in power, governmental legitimacy is recognized and sovereignty is maintained over the area of conflict qualifies the campaign as a COIN win. The opposite result would make it a COIN loss. While provision of certain power sharing mechanisms and concessions with the insurgents would imply a mixed outcome of a campaign.⁶⁹
- b. For the domestic COIN campaigns, building of legitimacy and democracy are not relevant. The insurgents giving up arms & secessionist ideals and their amalgamation into the national

⁶⁹Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2010), xvii.

mainstream defines a win. The realization of the political ambitions of the insurgent movement & recognition of aspirations of the local population are important factors in this regard.

- c. Before analyzing the cases, it may be pertinent to bring out the outcomes of the Indian COIN campaigns. The outcomes are given in Table 5. This shall put these COIN endeavors in perspective.

Region	Period	Outcome
Nagaland	1956-1997	COIN Win
Punjab	1987-1993	COIN Win
Mizoram	1966-1986	COIN Win
Sri Lanka	1987-1990	Mixed
Jammu & Kashmir	1990-2011	COIN Win


Table 5: Outcome of Indian COIN Campaigns

Case Study I: COIN Campaign in Nagaland

Case Outcome: COIN Win

Geography & Terrain

Nagaland is one of the states in the North Eastern region of India. It has the states of Arunachal Pradesh to its north, Assam to the west, Manipur to the south and borders Myanmar to the east (refer map below). Nagaland has an area of 16,579 Sq. km. and population of 1,988, 636 (2010 Census), and is one of the jungle-clad regions of India.⁷⁰ Nagaland is a mountainous region with average altitude ranging from 900 to 1500 meters and is covered with thick tropical forests.⁷¹



Map 2: Nagaland

Background

The Naga insurgency was a direct outcome of policies of the 'British Raj'. Nagaland state gets its name from the inhabitants, the Naga tribes. Until 1963, the Naga region or Naga hills was part of the state of

⁷⁰ R. Upadhyay, *Naga Insurgency - A Confusion Of War Or Peace*, Paper No 1256, South Asia Analysis Group. At www.southasiaanalysis.org (Accessed 23 September 2011).

⁷¹ D.B. Shekatkar, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 12.

Assam. The Nagas are from the Indo-Mongoloid group and speak Tibeto-Burman dialects of the Sino-Tibetan family of languages. The Yajurveda gives out the earliest presence of the Nagas from 1000 BC.⁷² Nagas consist of various tribes, sub-tribes and clans. These Naga tribes speaking different dialects occupied specific mountain ranges within the state with settlements on hilltops and followed an animistic religion until their conversion to Christianity. They lived in relative isolation for centuries. Nagas came into real contact with the outside world via the British missionaries in early 19th century.⁷³ The British followed a policy of least interference in the Naga region, considering it a backward area. However, they respected the unique nature of this region and did not want migration into this region from other parts of India. This policy led to regulations such as “inner & outer line permits and excluded area acts”, which were regulations aimed at preservation of the Naga culture and prevention of exploitation of the Naga people.⁷⁴ However, these were the primary reasons that resulted in the isolation of the Naga region from the Indian mainstream. It is believed that the British toyed with idea of a “Crown Colony” after Independent India consisting of the Indian North Eastern region and Burma.⁷⁵ These steps were considered towards creation of the “Crown Colony”.

Origins of Insurgency

The Naga Separatist Movement began in 1918 when the 'Naga Club' was formed by a group of educated Nagas. This organization submitted a memorandum before the Simon Commission in 1929 demanding exclusion of Nagas from the proposed constitutional reform in British administration in India citing the Naga region as a different entity.⁷⁶ This memo led to inclusion of Naga region in the ‘excluded areas act of 1935’ and resulted in no political reforms coming to the Naga region as part of the transfer of political power from Britain to India. This ‘Naga Club’ was transformed into the Naga National Council (NNC), a

⁷² Dinesh Kotwal, *The Naga Insurgency: The Past And The Future*, at www.idsa.org (accessed 12 December 2011).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ R. Upadhyay, *Naga Insurgency -A Confusion Of War Or Peace*, Paper No 1256, South Asia Analysis Group. At www.southasiaanalysis.org (Accessed 23 September 2011).

political party, in 1946.⁷⁷ Initially the political objective of NNC was solidarity of all Nagas and the inclusion of Naga Hills within the province of Assam in a free India, with local autonomy and adequate safeguards for the interest of the Nagas.⁷⁸ However, this objective changed from autonomy to independence, with the appearance of AZ Phizo as the NNC supermo and declaration of Naga independence in 1947.⁷⁹ An agreement brokered by the then Governor of Assam, Sir Akbari Hydari called the ‘Hydari Agreement’ between the Indian Government and NNC in the 1947 calmed the waters for a while.⁸⁰ However, both sides drew different interpretations from the controversial clause nine, or the ‘ten-year’ clause, in the agreement. The government believed that after ten years, the Naga region would be amalgamated into mainstream India while the Naga perceived this as independence after a decade.⁸¹ Nagas rejected the Hydari agreement and armed insurrection commenced against the Indian Government for an Independent Naga region. A Z Phizo emerged at the fore of this struggle; he engineered the creation of the parallel Naga Federal Government in the early 1950s, and the Naga Federal Army. By 1953, large-scale violence and attacks on Indian Government officials erupted in the Naga region.⁸² By 1956, the situation in Nagaland worsened. The Assam Rifles (a paramilitary force organized to guard the Indo Myanmar border) could not control the situation and the Indian Army was deployed for COIN operations.

Political Objectives and Strategy of the Insurgents

The aim of the Naga insurgency was independence. This was totally unacceptable to India.⁸³ The political

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Dinesh Kotwal, *The Naga Insurgency: The Past And The Future*, at www.idsa.org (accessed 12 December 2011).

⁷⁹ D.B. Shekatkar, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 11.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Dinesh Kotwal, *The Naga Insurgency: The Past And The Future*, at www.idsa.org (accessed 12 December 2011).

⁸² D.B. Shekatkar, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 12.

⁸³ Ibid, 12.

roots of Naga insurgency lay in the Naga sense of identity , religion and tribal affinity. The political wing of the insurgency attempted to generate external support in wake of the complete refusal of their demands by the Indian government. The Naga struggle led by AZ Phizo espoused that the Naga region was never a part of India and was annexed by the British in the 18th century. Once the British suzerainty lapsed, the Nagas believed they were independent.⁸⁴ Phizo wanted to make this a ‘peoples war’ and held a ‘plebiscite’ in the Naga region in 1952 which was not recognized by the government. The aim of the Naga insurgents was to make the Indian Union pay a heavy price and wear down the Government by violence and anarchist actions.

Military Capability of Insurgents

The Naga tribesmen were skilled guerilla fighters. The long history of inter tribal warfare had produced a warrior ethos in the Naga Hills.⁸⁵ Thus, the armed insurrection was absorbed amongst the Naga warriors easily. The Second World War introduced the Nagas to modern guerilla fighting. The dumps of arms and ammunition left by the retreating Japanese Army provided arms and ammunition for the armed insurrection.⁸⁶ The Naga Army was modeled on the British Army and had a formal command structure.⁸⁷ The true military strength and capability of the insurgents came from the guerilla warfare skills such as use of ambushes, hit & run raids, use of IEDs.⁸⁸ By late 1955, violence had engulfed whole of the Naga Hills with insurgents carrying out ambushes at Assam Rifles Patrols, destroying Government Buildings, disrupting all forms of communication and forcing people to meet the insurgents’ requirement of food and other expenses.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Prakash Singh, *Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2001), 70.

⁸⁵ D.B. Shekatkar, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 13.

⁸⁶ Dinesh Kotwal, *The Naga Insurgency: The Past And The Future*, at www.idsa.org (accessed 12 December 2011).

⁸⁷ D.B. Shekatkar, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 13.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 55-56.

The military capabilities of the insurgents were also directly linked to the foreign aid and external assistance. This came from China and Pakistan. Assistance to the Naga insurgency played with the Chinese and Pakistani designs of destabilizing India through internal disturbances. The Chinese aid was also linked to their perceived Indian posture on the Tibet issue during the 1960s. The geographic location of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) aided the Naga cause.⁹⁰ The location of Myanmar helped the insurgents to seek refuge in the vast expanse of unguarded jungles and establish their camps/bases.

The Indian COIN Campaign (1956-1964)

The Indian Army deployed in the Naga region in 1956 after the armed insurrection led by the Naga Army (also called the Naga Home Guards) threatened to take over the region. An adhoc division headquarters was created with a Major General as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Naga Hills and in command of the COIN campaign. The initial force level for the COIN campaign composed of three infantry brigades.⁹¹ The bias on the conventional warfare was evident in the initial responses and the guerillas inflicted heavy casualties on the Indian Army using the typical guerilla tactics. An example of the guerilla skill was the expertise of the Nagas in high intensity ambushes. In one such ambush, a platoon of an infantry battalion was ambushed by strength of 200-300 guerillas to wipe out the whole platoon. The use of heavy weapons such as air, artillery and tanks proved counterproductive as it led to large-scale collateral damage with no effect on the insurgents.⁹²

The first two years of COIN campaign saw the initiative with the hostiles. The losses suffered by the Indian Army were high.⁹³ With little previous experience in COIN operations (some portion of the Indian Army did participate in the COIN operations in Afghanistan in the early 19th century as part of the British

⁹⁰ D.B. Shekatkar, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 14.

⁹¹ S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 55-56, 272.

⁹² D.B. Shekatkar, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 20.

⁹³ S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 273.

Indian Army; the percentage was miniscule) the initial responses were modeled on the conventional approach. Another factor, which affected the COIN campaign, was the lack of preparedness and training for such kind of operations. The Indian Army realized the hard way that strategies and tactics developed on the conventional battlefield do not translate into action in COIN. Other glaring deficiencies were lack of unity of effort with civilian agencies and lack of intelligence.⁹⁴ The formations involved in the COIN campaign, assisted by directions from higher headquarters including the apex political level, did refine the COIN tactics & strategy and laid the foundation of the Indian COIN doctrine.⁹⁵ The troops led by some sterling leadership adjusted to the COIN warfare. Tactics such as patrolling, area domination, raids on hostile camps, move of convoys with adequate protection, counter ambush drills and road opening drills developed as COIN battle procedures. The period from 1959 to 1963 saw the COIN force wresting the initiative from the insurgents and causing massive damage on the hostiles. A combined military and political effort did result in fracturing the insurgency movement. Measures such as grouping of villages to isolate the insurgents from their support base were adopted. These measures brought mixed results. However in the end they proved to be successful. The COIN force also launched a development program to win over the locals as part of the ‘winning hearts and minds’ drive. An analysis of the Indian Army’s COIN practices during the campaign is given in table 6 below.

COIN Practice	Period 1956-1958	Period 1958-1964
Use of minimum force	0	1
Intelligence based operations	0	1
Area Domination	0	1
Use of Principles of Strategic Communication	0	1
Unity of Effort	0	1
Isolation of insurgents from Locals	0	1
Amnesty to Insurgents(Surrender Policy)	0	1
‘Winning Hearts and Minds’	0	1

Table 6: Analysis of the Indian Army’s COIN Practices in Nagaland

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

Outcome of COIN Campaign

The relentless operations by the COIN force resulted in the Nagas softening their stand. In 1960, an agreement between the Naga Peoples Convention (consisting of all the tribes) and the Government of India commenced the process to give the Naga region autonomy. This autonomy came in the form of creation of Nagaland state within the Union of India on 01 December 1963.⁹⁶ AZ Phizo, the leader of the Naga insurgency, fled to East Pakistan in the aftermath of massive COIN operations.⁹⁷ The hostilities came to a temporary end with a ceasefire in 1964.⁹⁸ The COIN campaign can be qualified as a win.

Analysis

The Nagaland experience commenced the Indian Army's long experience with COIN warfare. A relatively unprepared force commenced the COIN campaign. However, the Indian Army overcame the adverse environment in quick time and the COIN force put in place an effective campaign from 1959 onwards. The government legalized the Army's employment within the country with the Disturbed Area act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in 1958. AFSPA has acted as the legal instrument for the Army during conduct of COIN operations ever since.⁹⁹ This act has drawn criticism from various civilian agencies, NGOs and the hardliners contending that ceding sweeping powers to the Army cause gross human rights violations. However, on the contrary this act provides the Army the legality to execute military action within India and protection to the personnel engaged in such operations. The most important impact on the Indian COIN doctrine was the realization of the primacy of the population in a COIN campaign. Thus, an understanding of the local culture, customs and languages is essential for any COIN force to use the conventional approach of development and winning hearts and minds.

⁹⁶ R. Upadhyay, *Naga Insurgency -A Confusion Of War Or Peace*, Paper No 1256, South Asia Analysis Group. At www.southasiaanalysis.org (Accessed 23 September 2011).

⁹⁷ S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 57.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 59.

⁹⁹ D.B. Shekatkar, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Nagaland," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 22.

The requirement to isolate the insurgents from the local population emerged as an imperative to cut off the insurgent from his support base. Measures such as the grouping of villages, area domination and deployment of operating bases in important town/villages and communication centers became part of the COIN doctrine. The Army and the government commenced a unique method to win over the insurgents by giving amnesty. This surrender policy was successful in many ways and lured many insurgents back to the mainstream. The division emerged as the effective tactical headquarters equipped to execute COIN campaigns.


This COIN campaign was successful in subduing the Naga insurgency, which threatened the existence of Indian nationalism at its nascent stage, using a politico military process. Thus, unity of effort between the political and military prongs emerged as an essential attribute of a COIN campaign.

Case Study II: COIN Campaign in Mizoram

Case Outcome: COIN Win

Geography & Terrain

Mizoram is one of the states of the North Eastern region with borders with state of Manipur to North East, Assam to North, Tripura to the West and has the international border with Bangladesh & Myanmar. The terrain in Mizoram is similar to rest of the North Eastern states and is a tropical jungle clad hilly region. These hills, known as the Lushai or Mizo Hills, have an average height of 1000 meters. The state of Mizoram covers 21,081 sq km and has a population of 1,091,014.¹⁰⁰



Map 3: Mizoram

Background

The Mizos belong to the mongloid race and are believed to have originated from the Shinlung or Chhinlunsan region located on the banks of the Yalung river in China. The Mizos first settled in the

¹⁰⁰ Jagadish K. Patnaik, *Mizoram, Dimensions and Perspectives: Society, Economy, and Polity* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Co, 2008), 3.

Burmese region of Kabaw Valley - Chin Hills and migrated to the Lushai Hills in the middle of the 18th century.¹⁰¹ The Mizo region was conquered by the British in 1891 and amalgamated into the Province of Assam. This conquest also brought Christianity to the Mizo area and by early 1900s most of the population was Christian. However, the policy of the 'British Raj' towards the Mizo region was the same as for the rest of the North Eastern states. This was a policy of least interference and adoption of measures such 'inner line permit' to prevent migration of population from plains into these regions. These policies led to the isolation of the Mizo region from mainstream India and were ostensibly towards creation of the 'Crown Colony' consisting of the North Eastern region of India and Burma.¹⁰² On independence, the Lushai Hills region became a district in the state of Assam in 1947.

Origins of Insurgency

Even though the Mizos had remained detached from the Indian mainstream during the 1900s, this isolation did not form into an insurgent movement at the time of the independence as was the case in the Naga region. The leader of the Naga insurgency did make a failed attempt to include the Mizos in the struggle against Indian government in 1946.¹⁰³ Mizo Hills remained a peaceful district in Assam state from 1947 through 1960. The Mizo insurgency cannot be purely blamed on the 'Raj' and it was more of governmental oversight that resulted in the Mizos taking up arms against the union. This oversight can be quantified at three specific levels. First, the Government took few steps to integrate Mizo region with the mainstream after independence. An example of this was the state of surface communications from the plains of Assam into the Mizo hills; the communications remained as backward as they were in 1940s. Second, was the lack of sensitivity towards the Mizo tribal culture. This was in the form of imposition of Assamese language and abolition of village Chieftain System. Third, was the Government inaction in the aftermath of the rat famine 'Mautam' that effected the Mizo region in the late 1950s. This proved to be the main cause for the Mizo

¹⁰¹ *History of Mizoram* at <http://mizoram.nic.in/about/history.htm>(accessed 25 December 2011).

¹⁰² Vivek Chadha, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Mizoram," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 29.

¹⁰³ S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 83.

armed insurrection. In 1960, Laldenga created the Mizo National Famine Front with an aim of alleviating the Mizos from the famine. In 1962, he converted this organization into the Mizo National Front (MNF) and this group spearheaded the armed struggle for an Independent Mizoram.¹⁰⁴

Political Aims and Strategy of the Insurgents

The aim of the insurgents was secession of the Mizo region from India. The Laldenga led MNF wanted to exploit the general discontent of the local population, which had brewed during the 1950s and boiled over during the famine crisis. The MNF strategy aimed to use the economic issues along with the religion card to integrate the populace against the government.¹⁰⁵

Military Capability of Insurgents

The MNF was reorganized from an Anti Famine front to an independence movement in 1962. However, Laldenga did not commence armed insurrection until 1966. The insurgents utilized this intervening period as a preparatory phase. The geographic location of the Mizo Hills is such that it shares the international border with Bangladesh (East Pakistan till 1971) along the Chittagong Hill Tracts. These hill tracts are vast expanse of jungles and provided sanctuaries to the insurgents. The MNF established bases in the Chittagong Hill tracts with explicit support from East Pakistan in terms of basing rights, supply of arms & ammunition and guerilla training.¹⁰⁶ The insurgent strategy was twofold. First, Laldenga wanted to take advantage of absence of army by disrupting the governance with a massive conventional type operation to capture important towns. Second, this was to be followed by a long drawn guerilla battle to wrest the political power with popular backing. The MNF was organized on the lines of the Indian Army with a strength of eight battalions organized into two brigades.¹⁰⁷ In February 1966, MNF issued a “Declaration of Independence”,

¹⁰⁴ Vivek Chadha, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Mizoram,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 29.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 85-86.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 35.

setting stage for one of the most fierce insurgencies faced by the Indian Army.¹⁰⁸ On 28 February 1966, MNF launched ‘*Operation Jericho*’, which composed of raids on government installations, siege of important towns and cutting off LOCs.

The Indian COIN Campaign (1966-1972)

The rapidity and lightening speed of the MNF attacks across the Mizo hills took the country by surprise. The Assam Rifles had only one battalion in the Mizo region with its Headquarters at Aizwal (the capital of the state) and rest of the companies occupying forward bases.¹⁰⁹ With most of the bases of this battalion besieged by the MNF, the situation was beyond the control of the Assam Rifles. The Indian Army was called out for COIN operations. One infantry brigade with four infantry battalions was moved into Mizo region on 02 March 1966.¹¹⁰ The COIN campaign of the Indian Army had three distinct phases. The first phase involved re-establishment of control over major towns, villages and LOCs. With the Indian Army having been engaged in COIN warfare in Nagaland since 1956, the response to the Mizo insurgency was better. Even though the use of airpower is not recommended in COIN operations, in this case airpower usage was resorted to during the first phase. The strafing of guerilla positions with Hunter jets broke the sieges and also enabled movement of Army into Mizoram. Use of heliborne actions to insert troops to positions of tactical advantage was carried out for the first time.¹¹¹ In a period of six months, the brigade in charge of the COIN effort in Mizoram was fully in control of the important towns, villages and LOCs. The MNF guerillas melted into the jungles and fell back to guerilla actions. The first phase was successful.

The COIN force launched its second phase which was classic COIN operations based on a people centric theme. The force level was increased with move of an additional brigade and a Division Headquarters put in command of the COIN effort in the Mizo region. This phase was characterized by actions to isolate the

¹⁰⁸ Vivek Chadha, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Mizoram,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 34.

¹⁰⁹ Palit, D. K..*Sentinels Of The North-East*.(New Delhi : Palit & Palit, 1984), 259.

¹¹⁰ S.P. Sinha, *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response* (New Delhi:Lancer Publishers, 2008), 89.

¹¹¹ Vivek Chadha, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Mizoram,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 37.

guerillas from the locals. A deployment pattern was evolved – the COIN Grid, in which formations were deployed in a grid fashion off the map covering the important towns and LOCs.¹¹² Population security measures such as occupation of forward operating bases at platoons level - ‘Operation Blanket’ and grouping of villages ‘Operation Accomplishment’ - were launched by the COIN force.¹¹³ The grouping of villages- ‘Operation Accomplishment’ was controversial. Though it did produce protected villages; however in the longer run, it affected the Mizo way of living and in turn affected the Mizo economy. It was discontinued after the resentment of the locals rose. The Army also perfected the Cordon and Search operation in this campaign.¹¹⁴ This became an important means to dominate the AOR, isolate the guerillas and protect the population. This operation became a part of the Indian COIN doctrine because of its stated advantages even though it was troop intensive with low probability of success.

The Indian Army enhanced the COIN effort with organizational changes. To train troops deploying into COIN areas, a training facility- the Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) - was established in Mizoram at Vairengte.¹¹⁵ This school became a nodal agency on the Indian Army’s COIN efforts. Another step was to create special Infantry Battalions for COIN. The Indian Army and Assam Rifles modernized during this phase and sophisticated equipment was inducted into the forces. The COIN campaign demonstrated unity of effort between security forces, civil administration and intelligence agencies. By 1972, the MNF had lost most of its cadres and due to the synergistic actions of the politico military process, the Mizo insurgency lost its steam. Foreign support and easy access of the MNF to sanctuaries across the borders was also greatly affected due to Burmese military action and fall of East Pakistan during 1971 war. Analysis of the COIN practices during the COIN campaign is given in the table 7 below.

COIN Practice	Period 1966-1967	Period 1967-1972
Use of minimum force	0	1
Intelligence based operations	1	1

¹¹² Ibid, 39.

¹¹³ Palit, D. K..*Sentinels Of The North-East*.(New Delhi : Palit & Palit, 1984), 259.

¹¹⁴ Rajesh Rajagopalan (2000): ‘*Restoring Normalcy*’: *The Evolution of the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency Doctrine*, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11:1, 44-68.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Area Domination	0	1
Use of Principles of Strategic Communication	0	1
Unity of Effort	1	1
Isolation of insurgents from Locals	0	1
Amnesty to insurgents(surrender policy)	0	1
Sealing of borders and steps to nullify foreign help	0	1
Training of troops on COIN	0	1
‘Winning Hearts and Minds’	0	1

Table 7: Analysis of the Indian Army’s COIN Practices in Mizoram

Outcome of COIN Campaign

The COIN campaign resulted in breaking the insurgency movement in Mizo region. The MNF resolve was fractured by the successful efforts of the Indian Army. Factions emerged in the insurgent movement looking at moderate solutions. The Mizo region was made a Union Territory in 1972 with representation of the Mizo people in the parliament. The process of giving up arms, and a settlement between the MNF and the government commenced in 1975. This was concluded in 1986, with Mizoram becoming a state within the Union of India and the MNF renouncing insurgency. Laldenga, the leader of the MNF was appointed the Chief Minister of Mizoram. The COIN campaign was a win.

Analysis

The COIN campaign in Mizoram was the second experience of the Indian Army with this type of warfare. The COIN effort was streamlined less the initial phase which was more of an intelligence failure and almost led to a ‘take over’ of Mizo region by the insurgents. The COIN effort resulted in the Mizo movement moving from secessionist - preservationist to peace.

The COIN force was successful in isolating the guerillas using various measures like the creation of grouped villages. In spite of being successful these measures proved detrimental for the populace and the economy. Thus, a pure replication of ideas (this idea of population security was first tried by the British in

Malaya) without proper thought in execution may prove counterproductive. Other effective isolation measures were adopted such having greater number of FOBs and the cordon & search operation. One of important lessons from this campaign was the tactics of the counterinsurgent. The COIN force used guerilla tactics with a population centric approach. This led to the elimination of insurgents without any collateral damage.

The importance of training for COIN was understood well by the Indian Army. The establishment of the CIJW proved to be a novel idea and led to a better trained COIN force. The successful border sealing operations and measures to nullify the external support were important steps in destroying the external help of the insurgents. These steps led to the MNF becoming redundant. The 1971 war leading to the creation of Bangladesh was a significant development for the COIN campaign as it left the MNF without the support base in the face of stiff COIN operations.

The COIN effort in the Mizo region was fought at two levels. First, militarily COIN operations eliminated the armed wing of the MNF. Second, at the political level the MNF hierarchy was constantly given opportunity to end the struggle within the framework of the constitution. The politico military stance on grant of amnesty to insurgents willing to give up arms went a long way in fracturing the insurgent resolve. The political flexibility in terms of accepting the statehood demands and paving way for the MNF leader to become the Chief Minister showed mature handling .This synergy between the levels was a significant force towards the conflict resolution and a successful COIN campaign.

Case Study III: Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka

Case Outcome: Mixed

Geography and Terrain

Sri Lanka is a tropical island country in the Indian Ocean, and is located 25 kilometers off the southern coast of India. The island is 437 kilometers long and 225 kilometers wide. Geographically the island is composed of three zones. The Southern zone, also called the ‘coconut triangle’, consisted of areas of the south including the capital Colombo. The Central zone is composed of highlands including the important city of Kandy. The Northern zone comprises of the Jaffna peninsula and the coastal region of the east.¹¹⁶ It is believed that the island was connected with the Indian mainland via the ‘Dhanush Sethu’ or a reef.¹¹⁷



Map 4: Sri Lanka

Background

To put the ethnic strife in the island in perspective, it is essential to analyze historical roots of this island. History of this island dates back to 6 BC when the first Aryan settlers from present day Indian states of Orrisa and Bengal reached this island. This phase was followed by the spread of Buddhism on the island from

¹¹⁶ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992). 6-7.

¹¹⁷ Harkirat Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka: the I.P.K.F. Experience Retold*. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 11.

3 BC. By 12 AD, most of the original Sri Lankan population (Sinhalese) adopted Buddhism.¹¹⁸ The Tamil invaders arrived on the island from 12 AD onwards. The clashes between the Tamils and Sinhalese have occurred off and on since these times. The Tamil domination remained centered in the Northern zone. The 16th century saw the advent of the Europeans on the island. The Portuguese and then the Dutch attempted to control the island. In 18th century, the British arrived and by 1815, the island was under British control.¹¹⁹ The British laid down the foundation of a common administration for the island and controlled the ethnic clashes. British also brought a huge labor force consisting of Tamils from India to work on the tea plantations.¹²⁰ Thus, on independence Ceylon (as the island was known until 1972) was a multi ethnic country with a Sinhalese majority and a Tamil population divided between original Tamils and Indian Tamils.

Tamil Insurgency and Indian Role

The resentment of the Tamils emanating from the policies of Sinhalese ruling majority led to the Tamil insurgency. During the British period, the Tamils had a better literacy rate and economic development.¹²¹ This led to a Tamil dominance over the island administration. Thus on becoming independent, the Sinhalese discriminated against the Tamils. This can be seen from the actions such as disenfranchising of Indian Tamils, imposition of Sinhala language and adoption of Buddhism as the official religion.¹²² The insurgency commenced on a political basis in the initial years with small-scale violence. In 1972, Vellupillai Prabhakaran formed the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). This organization was later renamed as Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976.¹²³ The LTTE spearheaded Tamil cause using armed actions and waged one of the most fierce guerilla campaigns.

¹¹⁸ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992). 9-11.

¹¹⁹ Harkirat Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka: the I.P.K.F. Experience Retold*. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 14.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 14-15.

¹²¹ Ashok K Mehta, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 156.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992). 16-17.

By 1980s, the Tamils insurgency led by LTTE stood for a separate Tamil state or 'Elam'. The location of Sri Lanka and the huge Tamil population make the island important to India. An unstable Lanka is a security threat and the large Tamil population threatens a large-scale refugee problem. In addition, the politically important Indian state of Tamil Nadu was sympathetic towards the Tamil/LTTE cause. India favored a political resolution to the Tamil crisis. However, during the 1980s after reported excess of the Sri Lankan forces on Tamils, India demonstrated support to the Tamil cause espoused by the Tamil militant organizations.¹²⁴

Indo Sri Lanka Peace Accord – 1987

A military intervention in Sri Lanka appeared possible since the 1983 Tamil riots, which threatened to boil over to India. The Indian Government was committed to protect the interests of the Tamils. This meant that the use of the military option to force the Sri Lankan Government to reach a political solution with the LTTE was within the realm of possibilities.¹²⁵ Aggressive posturing and relief air operations by the India in Jaffna in early 1987, insignificant results in military operations by Sri Lankan Army and declining economic situation forced the Sri Lankan President to seek assistance from India to resolve the Tamil crisis.¹²⁶ This resulted in the Indo Sri Lanka Peace accord of July 1987. The accord entailed the cessation of hostilities, Sri Lankan Government accepting the Tamil demands of the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, LTTE giving up arms and an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to assist in this peacemaking process.

Operation PAWAN – Deployment of IPKF & Failure of Peace Accord

After the peace accord was inked, Sri Lanka, Tamils and India treated this as a process to bring peace to the island. The mission for the IPKF was peacekeeping. Thus, the initial force level of the IPKF was one division less its heavy weapons.

¹²⁴ Ashok K Mehta, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 157.

¹²⁵ Shankar Bhaduri and Afsir Karim, *The Sri Lankan Crisis* (New Delhi: Lancer,1990), 112.

¹²⁶ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992). 25-27.

This division deployed on the island by end of July 1987.¹²⁷ However, the Indo Sri Lanka peace accord ran into trouble in August 1987 due the obstinate stand of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government. In addition, the LTTE was aggrieved on the inaction on its demands and the reported arming other Tamil organizations by Indian intelligence agencies. The ‘boat tragedy’, which was the capture of a boat carrying important LTTE leaders by the Sri Lankan navy and their subsequent suicide led to abrogation of the ceasefire. The LTTE accused IPKF & India of betrayal. LTTE commenced attacks on IPKF, Sri Lankan army and Sinhalese population.¹²⁸ India decided to execute military action against LTTE. A contingency not thought of, by the Indian Army. By early October 1987, the peacekeeping mission was over and the Indian Army was engaged in an overseas COIN campaign.¹²⁹

First Phase of COIN Campaign (October 1987 to November 1987): Capture of Jaffna

This phase was more of a conventional warfare type of phase that saw the Indian Army capture the LTTE stronghold - city of Jaffna. The Indian Army hierarchy expected the capture of Jaffna within 72 hours. However, the IPKF was ill prepared for this type of urban guerilla warfare, which the LTTE had mastered.¹³⁰ The initial peacekeeping force was also not equipped for this kind of assault. It lacked heavy equipment, firepower and battlefield mobility.¹³¹ The force level of one infantry division was rapidly enhanced. However, the incoming troops were moved into battle without much notice leading to reduced efficiency. The operational plan to capture Jaffna looked good in theory as the plan revolved around multiple thrusts of brigade strength and employment of a commando air assault to take down the LTTE Headquarters located in the centre of Jaffna.¹³² However, it took almost a month to clear LTTE from the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE demonstrated superior guerilla tactics. The Tigers made full use of the public and used them as human

¹²⁷ Ashok K Mehta, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 163.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 163-164.

¹²⁹ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992). 84-87.

¹³⁰ Ashok K Mehta, “India’s Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 164-165.

¹³¹ Harkirat Singh, *Intervention in Sri Lanka: the I.P.K.F. Experience Retold*. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 78.

¹³² Ibid, 85.

shields.¹³³ The LOCs were targeted with a well thought IED and mine warfare plan. The LTTE also possessed better small arms, the AK 47/G3 series rifles as compared to the semi automatics with the IPKF.¹³⁴ This proved to be a crucial factor at the tactical level. The IPKF captured Jaffna at a very heavy price. The analysis of this phase is given in table 8 below.

COIN Practice	Oct 1987- Nov 1987
Innovation in planning to cater for urban scenario	0
Adequate time for planning, preparation and orientation of inducting units	0
Use of fire power assets	0
Correct appreciation and estimate of LTTE strengths	0
Ability to capture/ eliminate LTTE hierarchy	0
Prevention of escape of LTTE cadres into the jungle areas on capture of Jaffna town	0
Intelligence preparation of battlefield	0
Training of troops prior to deployment	0
Securing of LOCs and use of counter mine/IED measures	0

Table 8: Analysis of Phase I of IPKF's COIN Campaign

Second Phase of COIN Campaign (December 1987 to June 1988)

Operation PAWAN transitioned into an actual COIN campaign in December 1987 after the capture of Jaffna. The force level of the IPKF had risen to a Corps with four divisions. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) IPKF, a Lieutenant General, was in command of the force. The force grappled with problems of identification of LTTE among the civilians, intelligence, garnering popular support, inferior small arms and lack of heavy weapons(not used due threat of collateral damage). The IPKF established itself into four division sectors - Northern (Jaffna), Eastern (Trincomalee), Central (Vavuniya) and Southern

¹³³ Ashok K Mehta, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 164-165.

¹³⁴ Depinder Singh, *The IPKF in Sri Lanka*. (Noida: South Asia Books, 1992). 112.

(Batticalloa).¹³⁵ Battle schools were established to train the inducting forces. The LTTE continued to execute guerilla hit & run tactics and the tactical level saw pitched battles. The IPKF resorted to large-scale cordon and search operations, which did not yield much success except for area domination.¹³⁶ ‘Winning hearts and minds’ drive was launched in each sector. Since Jaffna was the heart of the Tamil territory, the major effort was launched here. A rehabilitation program headed by a Brigadier, called the Town Commandant of Jaffna, was started in the town. An analysis of the IPKF during this phase is given 9 below.

COIN Practice	Dec 1987- June 1987
Training of troops prior to deployment (battle schools)	1
Surgical elimination LTTE insurgents	0
Use of fire power assets	0
Area domination	1
Ability to capture/ eliminate LTTE hierarchy	0
Intelligence gathering effort	0
Psychological Operations	1
Securing of LOCs and use of counter mine/IED measures	0
‘Winning Hearts and Minds’	1

Table 9: Analysis of Phase II of IPKF’s COIN Campaign

Third Phase of COIN Campaign (June 1988 to March 1990)

This phase witnessed a paradigm shift in the concept of operations of the IPKF. The large-scale operations continued; however, greater emphasis on Special Forces operations and long-range ambushes was laid. The introduction AK 47 rifles into the IPKF provided the force with firepower matching the guerillas. The Special Forces operations brought significant results and resulted in elimination of key LTTE leaders.

¹³⁵ Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Fighting the Guerilla like a Guerilla: Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*. (UK: Routledge, 2009). 113.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 114-115.

The Special Forces also included the Indian Marine Commando Force (IMSF), equivalent of the US Navy SEALs. The IMSF (now known as the Marine Commandos – MARCOS) did significant operations along the coastal areas of the Jaffna peninsula. The SF operations were organized and controlled by a SF group headquarters. Use of helicopter gunships in concert with long-range patrols became the norm and this concept brought significant results. The concept of small team operations was evolved as a Special Forces tactic during this phase. The IPKF launched a huge psychological operations campaign to undermine the LTTE and make the Tamil population aware of the involvement and commitment of IPKF towards the Tamil cause.¹³⁷ This phase also saw large-scale operations at Brigade level in all division sectors.¹³⁸ These operations, though primarily ‘jungle bashing’, were successful in driving out the LTTE out of the major towns and villages. The achilles heel of the IPKF proved to be the LOCs and constant IED attacks/ ambushes by the LTTE, which caused heavy casualties. An analysis of this phase is given below.

COIN Practice	Dec 1987- June 1987
Training of troops prior to deployment(battle schools)	1
Surgical elimination LTTE insurgents	0
Use of fire power assets	1
Area domination	1
Ability to capture/ eliminate LTTE hierarchy	1
Intelligence gathering effort	1
Psychological Operations	1
Securing of LOCs and use of counter mine/IED measures	0
‘Winning Hearts and Minds’	1

Table 10: Analysis of Phase III of IPKF’s COIN Campaign

¹³⁷ S.C. Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna* (New Delhi: Lancer, 1992), 40-43.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 46.

Outcome

By July 1989, the IPKF had been successful in eliminating large numbers of LTTE cadre and hierarchy. The control of the IPKF was evident from the free and smooth conduct of the elections in late 1988 and early 1989.¹³⁹ The COIN effort was gaining momentum. Sensing a virtual defeat, the LTTE entered into a pact with the new Sri Lankan President who was against the deployment of the IPKF. He demanded the withdrawal of the IPKF in June 1989. The change of government at New Delhi started the IPKF withdrawal. The new government at New Delhi decided in November 1989 not to honor the Indo Sri Lanka Peace accord and withdraw the IPKF. The last elements of IPKF left the island in March 1990.¹⁴⁰ A COIN campaign, which was now reaping the benefits of the hard work and struggle of the previous years, was brought to an abrupt end.

Analysis

Most experts term the IPKF experience as a loss. Contrary to the popular belief that Sri Lankan intervention was a pure failure, this intervention had a mixed result. The Indian Army was caught off guard in October 1987, when the events happened in such rapid succession that led to the initial oversight. The basis of the IPKF deployment – the Indo Sri Lanka peace accord was flawed. The government followed a pro Tamil/LTTE stance until this accord. On what basis did the Government of India, come to the conclusion that the LTTE would fall in line with the accord is debatable.

Political follies notwithstanding, the Indian Army rose to the challenge posed by this situation albeit paying a heavy price. This operation represents an Operations Other Than War (OOTW) scenario in which a growing military force reacted swiftly. Operation PAWAN truly symbolizes the commencement of the involvement of the Indian Army with the second grammar in a big way. The earlier COIN campaigns had seen a lower level of troop deployment. However, these large-scale employments were to become a reality. IPKF

¹³⁹ Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Fighting the Guerilla like a Guerilla: Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*. (UK: Routledge, 2009). 112.

¹⁴⁰ Ashok K Mehta, "India's Counterinsurgency Campaign in Sri Lanka," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 166-167.

withdrew from the island in March 1990. The Indian Army would soon be deployed in Jammu & Kashmir in a COIN campaign, which wages even till today.

The fact that some experts say that the IPKF experience was kept out of the Indian Army's doctrine is again debatable. The Indian Army doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations was published only in 2006 is a point to ponder over. Unlike other armies, in the Indian Armed Forces doctrine and TTPs have been kept separate. The TTPs have remained in the General Staff publications published from time to time. The TTPs learnt in Sri Lanka were included in the various COIN manuals published in 1990/91.

One of the most important lessons, which came out of the Sri Lankan intervention, was the ineffectiveness of the small arms in the Indian Army. This glaring deficiency was overcome in some form with the introduction of AK 47 rifles, which commenced in Sri Lanka and was carried further in the following years to equip troops in COIN operational areas. The other important area, which saw significant results in the Operation PAWAN, was the Special Forces operations. These commandos did the Indian Army proud with courageous, brave and successful operations. Their performance, with superior skill and ability to fight like the guerillas, stood out in Sri Lanka. The Special Forces proved to be a force multiplier and are treated as such in the Indian Army ever since. The Special Forces saw renewed emphasis after this intervention.

There were a number of areas in which the Indian Army faltered. The jointness & coordination amongst the services stood out as a glaring deficiency. The COIN campaign suffered from a lack of unity of command & effort. The coordination between the highest political level and the IPKF was affected by the ad hoc command arrangements. The political, diplomatic, military and intelligence fields were not fully unified.¹⁴¹ The IPKF also suffered in terms of the training and preparedness of the soldiers. The initial formations were not fully trained on urban guerilla fighting.

In many ways, Operation PAWAN was a wakeup call for India. It was the first serious engagement since the 1971 war. It did commence a revolution in military affairs for the Indian Army. The Indian Army raised the Rashtriya Rifles, a specialized force for COIN, in 1992. COIN training was institutionalized in the Indian Army. This training was imparted through the various training centers, academies and schools. The lack of equipment during the Sri Lankan intervention was viewed very seriously. The latest small arms, body

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 168-169.

armor, tactical communication equipment, and night vision devices soon found their way into the Indian Army.

To look at the Sri Lankan intervention as a pure COIN loss would be an injustice to the sacrifice of the courageous men who laid down their lives fighting the LTTE. The haste in the deployment of troops to the island without a holistic analysis of the warring groups in Sri Lanka, the difference in the requirements of a peacekeeping mission vis a vis a COIN campaign, credible Tamil fighters and lack of political backing attributed to the complex environment in which the IPKF operated. The credibility of the COIN campaign of the IPKF can be gauged by the secret pact done by the LTTE with the new Sri Lankan president to oust the IPKF from the island in June 1989.


In retrospect, this pact by the Sri Lankan Government with the LTTE again proved to be futile. It was a move aimed only at the removal of the IPKF, which had become a force beyond the capability of LTTE to handle. The LTTE renewed its armed struggle with the Sri Lankan Government immediately on departure of IPKF. This strife continued until 2008-2009, a period of two decades after the IPKF left the island, and kept the country in relative turmoil.

Case Study IV: COIN in Jammu & Kashmir

Case Outcome: Win

Geography and Terrain

The Jammu & Kashmir is the northern most state of the India. It includes the Jammu region, Kashmir valley and Ladakh region. The area is mountainous except for the valley floor with an average height of 4500 meters. The Kashmir valley is a piece of land straddled between the Great Himalayan range (the Eastern boundary) and Pir Panjal mountain ranges (western boundary). The state has disputed borders with Pakistan on the North West & North and with China on the East.¹⁴²



Map 5: Jammu and Kashmir¹⁴³

Background

The Kashmir problem dates back to the time when India became independent in 1947 and was partitioned into two nations based on religion.¹⁴⁴ The Kashmir princely state was under the rule of Dogras, a

¹⁴² LN Dhar, *An Outline History of Kashmir*, At <http://koausa.org/Crown/history.html> (accessed 12 January 2012).

¹⁴³ Map of Kashmir, The University of Texas, On-line Library; available at <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kashmir.html> (accessed 23 September 2011).

Hindu community. On partition, as the majority of the population being Muslim, Pakistan assumed that Kashmir would opt to be part of Pakistan.¹⁴⁵ The Jammu & Kashmir region is important due its strategic location, economic resources and vast natural beauty. However, the relative indecision of the Ruler of Kashmir to chose sides spurred Pakistan to send tribal militants under the leadership of regulars in August – September 1947 to capture Kashmir. The Ruler approached the Indian Government for assistance and signed the Instrument of Accession to be part of India.¹⁴⁶ This action made Kashmir a disputed territory with both India & Pakistan claiming it and set in motion the first among a series of conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The first of these conflicts, the 1947-48 War, ended with a UN brokered ceasefire and eviction of Pakistani forces from majority of Kashmir. However, it led to a disputed and active border separated by the Cease Fire Line (later mutually agreed as the Line of Control (LoC) in 1972). Pakistan made ill-fated conventional attempts to wrest Kashmir in the 1965, 1971 Indo Pak Wars and the Kargil War of 1999.¹⁴⁷

Insurgency, Proxy War & Terrorism

Insurgency erupted in Kashmir valley in the mid 1980s. This was a fallout of the discontent of the Kashmiris with the governmental policies, economic failure and alienation from rest of India.¹⁴⁸ The manner in which the state became part of the Indian dominion demanded extra efforts from the Union Government to amalgamate Kashmiris with Indian mainland. The Kasmiri culture or *Kashmiriyat* is a peace loving culture dominated by Sufism, and both Hindus & Muslim have lived in great harmony within the state for centuries.¹⁴⁹ However, governmental oversight leading to high levels of unemployment, unfair elections and rampant corruption were among the host of causes, which caused the simmering discontent to turn into an

¹⁴⁴ Prakash Singh, *Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2001), 175.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 176-177.

¹⁴⁷ V.G. Patankar, “Insurgency, Proxy War and Terrorism in Kashmir,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 66-67.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Narender Kumar, *Jammu and Kashmir: The Emerging Contours and the Way Ahead*, Manekshaw Paper No. 21, 2010, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi at www.claws.in (accessed 12 January 2012), 1-3.

insurgency.¹⁵⁰ This insurgency has been actively supported by Pakistan through its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Insurgency in Kashmir first led to ‘Islamisation’ of the region in the mid 1980s and caused large scale ethnic cleansing of the state as Hindus were forced to leave the state.¹⁵¹ The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was one of the first militant organizations of the valley and it commenced full-scale attacks on Government institutions in 1988.¹⁵² The other militant organization or *tanzeem*, which arose, was the hard line Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). JKLF stood for Kashmiri independence while HM was for merger with Pakistan. Due to its Pro independence stance, the JKLF was sidelined by the ISI. During the 1990s new terrorist groups, with full backing of Pakistan, emerged such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM). The Pakistani intervention transformed this insurgency into transnational terrorism. Pakistan has used this terrorism as its proxy war in furtherance of its strategy ‘death by thousand cuts’ to sever Kashmir from India.¹⁵³

Terrorist Capabilities and Modus Operandi

Pakistan provided safe haven for the terrorist groups, training facilities, arms & ammunition and as the years went by, mercenaries in the form of Pakistani and Afghani Mujahideen. In the initial years, a large focus of the militant organizations was to garner local support, recruit Kashmiri youth for the ‘jihad’ and transport these youths to the training bases across the LoC into POK.¹⁵⁴ These groups on completion of training infiltrated back into Kashmir and moved into the hinterland. In the later years the number of indigenous militants decreased, the ISI drive turned to infiltration of Pakistani and other foreign terrorists. A number of Islamist groups such as the Al Qaeda pledged support to militant groups operating in Kashmir.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ L.N. Subramanian, *CI Operations in Jammu & Kashmir*, Bharat Rakshak Monitor - Volume 3(2) September - October 2000 at <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/Ins.html>.(accessed 12 January 2012).

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Narender Kumar, *Jammu and Kashmir: The Emerging Contours and the Way Ahead*, Manekshaw Paper No. 21, 2010, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi at www.claws.in (accessed 12 January 2012), 3.

¹⁵⁴ Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 13-15.

¹⁵⁵ V.G. Patankar, “Insurgency, Proxy War and Terrorism in Kashmir,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 68.

The modus operandi of the militants was to target the government institutions and terrorize the population using sensational terrorist actions. The focus of the terrorists was to destroy governmental control in Kashmir, coerce the local population in concert with the separatist political wing to join the jihad and complete a takeover of Kashmir. The situation went beyond the control of police and paramilitary forces and the Indian Army deployed in Kashmir in 1990 for one of its longest COIN campaigns.

Case Summary

Before analyzing the COIN campaign of the Indian Army in Kashmir, it is essential to summarize the case. This will put into perspective the effect of the campaign. This campaign has been waged from 1990 until today with significant results. However, this case study will look at the COIN campaign from 1997 to 2011, as this period saw the execution of a planned COIN campaign and enunciation of the latest COIN doctrine of the Indian Army. The insurgency, which commenced in an indigenous flavor in 1990s, became a movement with dwindling local support due the exposure of the Pakistani fallacies and an effective COIN campaign as the time went by.¹⁵⁶ Pakistan marginalized the pro independence JKLF and backed terrorist organizations that stood for merger with Pakistan.¹⁵⁷ The effect of the COIN campaign was such, that in 1998 the valley saw one of its most peaceful times. The dwindling terrorism in Kashmir led to the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil in 1999, which was launched by the Pakistan Army along with mujahedeen to provide a fillip to the sagging terrorism.¹⁵⁸ The Indian Army crushed this Pakistani attempt to sever the Ladhaki region of Jammu and Kashmir in the Kargil War of 1999.¹⁵⁹ This limited war did affect the COIN grid and terrorism saw a spike in 2000 with renewed Pakistani support. The terrorists caused sensational attacks such as the attacks on the Kashmir assembly in October 2001 and the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The terrorists also resorted to suicide or fidayeen attacks on security posts and installations. However, the COIN campaign, which saw a

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 69.

¹⁵⁷ Rahul K Bhonsle, *Winning Hearts and Minds : Lessons from Jammu and Kashmir*, Manekshaw Paper No. 14, 2009, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi at www.claws.in (accessed 12 January 2012), 8.

¹⁵⁸ Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (Washington, D.C.: Columbia University Press, 2002), 121-122.

¹⁵⁹ Peter R. Lavoy, *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: the Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 64-91.

new face from 1997 onwards – ‘**iron fist in a velvet glove**’ was launched with renewed vigor. The campaign stood for a developmental approach, winning the hearts of the local population, use of minimal force and surgical elimination of terrorists by a tailor made, technology savvy COIN force.¹⁶⁰ The effect of this COIN campaign was evident and few Kashmiri youth joined the ranks of the militants. The percentage of foreign terrorists killed went from 0.2 percent in 1991 to 82.5 percent in 2004.¹⁶¹ The conduct of free and fair elections in 2002, 2007 (local assembly) and 2009 (parliamentary) in which the population voted in large numbers signified a shift towards normalcy and the success of the COIN campaign. The table 11 below shows the violence levels at a glance.

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
2001	1067	590	2850	4507
2002	839	469	1714	3022
2003	658	338	1546	2542
2004	534	325	951	1810
2005	521	218	1000	1739
2006	349	168	599	1116
2007	164	121	492	777
2008	69	90	382	541
2009	55	78	242	375
2010	36	69	270	375

Table 11: Jammu and Kashmir Fatalities 2001 - 2010¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ V.G. Patankar, “Insurgency, Proxy War and Terrorism in Kashmir,” in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 73.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 69.

¹⁶² South Asia Terrorism Portal, *Jammu and Kashmir Assessment 2011* at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/index.html> (Accessed 13 January 2012).

Analysis of COIN Campaign (1997-2011)

The most important component of the Indian Army's COIN campaign post 1997 was the impetus given to adjust the tactics & strategy to the population and identifying the Kashmiri population as the *Center of Gravity*.¹⁶³ This concept had major ramifications on the COIN operations and transformed into *Use of Minimal Force*, adoption of a people centric development approach to *Win Hearts and Minds* of the Kashmiri population and annihilation of militants & their Tanzeems. The table 12 below gives out an analysis of the COIN campaign.

COIN Practice	1997-2011	Explanation
Training of troops prior to deployment (COIN battle schools)	1	Transformation of troops from conventional role to COIN. Sensitizing the troops to the humane approach & COIN doctrine.
Specialized Formations & Battalions for COIN	1	Rashtriya Rifles(RR)
LoC Fence and Counter Infiltration Deployment	1	Border Control.
Counter Insurgency Grid	1	Area Domination. Each COIN Grid had Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) with capability to deploy immediately. ¹⁶⁴
Elimination of terrorists using Intelligence based operations based on small teams.	1	The ' <i>Iron Fist</i> '. Aim is to prevent any collateral damage.
Ability to capture/ eliminate hierarchy	1	Use of Special Forces. The ' <i>Iron Fist</i> '
Intelligence based operations	1	
Setup for Civil Military Coordination	1	Kashmir Monitoring Group at the National Level and Unified Headquarters at the State level. ¹⁶⁵
Psychological Operations	1	Termed as perception management.
Securing of LOCs and use of counter IED measures	1	Use of road opening parties and extensive use of jammers and EW.

¹⁶³ V.G. Patankar, "Insurgency, Proxy War and Terrorism in Kashmir," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, ed. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 2009), 72.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 83.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 72.

Winning Hearts & Minds	1	<i>Operation Sadbhavna(Goodwill)</i> This program formalized the Winning Hearts and Minds effort in 1998. ¹⁶⁶
Surrender Policy	1	Amnesty Program.

Table 12: Analysis of Indian Army's COIN Practices in Jammu & Kashmir (1997-2011)

To summarize the focus of the Indian COIN campaign, figure 6 below aptly captures the theme of people centric approach of the Indian Army




Figure 6: The Three Pronged COIN Approach

The Indian COIN effort has successfully thwarted the insurgency in Kashmir. However, what it is now grappling is transnational terrorism, which is no longer limited to Kashmir. The recent Mumbai attack is a distinct reminder of the jihadi narrative of the terrorists. The continued cross border support is the main source of sustenance to this narrative. The Indian Army doctrine and concept of operations in COIN have seen a complete evolution process with COIN campaign in Kashmir, Operation RAKSHAK. The execution of people centric operations with use of minimal force is a strenuous task for troops on ground. It calls for a unity of effort at all levels and a common shared understanding of the larger picture- to change Kashmiri narrative from Azadi/Pro Pakistan to a nationalistic one.

¹⁶⁶ Arpita Anant, *Counterinsurgency and "Op Sadhbhavana" in Jammu and Kashmir*, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 19, 2011 at <http://www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/CounterinsurgencyandOpSadhbhavanainJammuandKashmir> (Accessed 12 December 2011), 6.

Conclusion

The importance of COIN warfare around the world has increased in a major way during the last decade or so. The 9/11 attacks have led to a paradigm shift in the global outlook to terrorist actions and the global war on terror has emerged as the riposte to this menace of transnational terrorism. This transformation has also led to a relook on various theories on COIN warfare. The analysis of the Indian experience with COIN thus gives possible ways in which an insurgency or an insurgency turned terrorist movement can be solved using a politico military process.

The Indian Army's COIN experience through the various COIN campaigns did result in an iterative learning process, which influenced the conceptualization of the Indian COIN doctrine. The summary of the findings of this discourse on the Indian COIN experience is given out below. These findings are generic and find applicability for all COIN forces.

1. At the core of this research and analysis stands out the Indian COIN doctrine – **‘Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove’**. The various COIN campaigns have informed the evolution of this doctrine in many ways, as is evident from the analysis of the COIN cases of the North East, Sri Lanka & Kashmir. There are two very important issues which need to be reiterated. First, there is no substitute for effective military operations against an insurgency/terrorist movement. These need to be carried out with surgical effectiveness. The second issue is the identification of the **population** as the **center of gravity** in an insurgency. This exclusive recognition flows into a **people centric operations model** and use of various means such as use of minimal force, development, ‘winning hearts & minds’ and pacification. These have distinct effects such as a pro COIN force population, isolation of the insurgents and free flow of intelligence.
2. The insurgencies in the North East region of India proved that India was structurally prone to insurgencies due the fallout of the British policies and the Governmental oversight thereafter. Most importantly the region was not amalgamated into the Indian mainstream. These COIN campaigns were the commencement of the Indian Army's COIN chapter. The importance of knowledge of the **customs and traditions** of the population stood out as an absolute essential for a COIN force. Also direct replication of ideas without correlation to the particular context proved

to be harmful. The case in point was the population protection measures such as grouping of villages on the lines of the British campaign in Malaya. The importance of **border control** was understood early in these campaigns and is an important tool to block all kinds of external aid to an insurgency.

3. Contrary to the perceived belief, the Sri Lankan intervention did have a lasting impact on the COIN paradigm of the Indian Army. Firstly, it shattered the image that an Indian soldier is superior to a guerilla. It also exposed the glaring deficiencies in small arms, crew served weapons and tactical communications. The **Special Forces** emerged as a force capable to deliver out of proportion results and were the silver lining in the Sri Lankan intervention. This COIN campaign also resulted in a revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the Indian Army. The requirement of specially trained troops for COIN was identified as an important requisite. This led to the raising of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), a special COIN force. Even though the COIN school in the form of the Counter Insurgency & Jungle Warfare (CIJW) was established in the 1970s, the need to **train troops** deploying into a COIN operational area was a criticality. This was overcome with battle schools to train the deploying troops.
4. Political leverage proved to be a major tool in the solution process. The insurgencies in the North Eastern states of India primarily hinged on the political aspirations of the local populace. The Indian Government displayed maturity in identifying these aspirations and accommodating the insurgents into the political mainstream, as was evident in the Mizo insurgency case study. This adds to the argument that the COIN process is a **politico military process** and both these prongs are equally important.
5. The relative stalemate in Kashmir even though the COIN campaign is successful shows how the external actor and his 'proxy war' encumber the efforts of a government at both levels – political & military. The research brings out that the percentage of indigenous militants is almost negligible and most of the terrorists are of foreign origin (ostensibly Pakistani). Even though the violence levels have fallen drastically, militancy persists in the region.

An important component of this research is to analyze the difference between expeditionary COIN and domestic COIN campaigns. This distinction is evident in the COIN doctrines of the Western armies

engaged in the expeditionary COIN as compared to the Indian COIN doctrine focused primarily on domestic COIN. An important factor, common to both types COIN campaigns, is recognition of the core of the solution process - the local population and people-centric operations are among the recommended solutions for both these types of campaigns. Legalizing the deployment of a foreign force and building legitimacy in an expeditionary COIN conflict remains pivotal for success. While in a domestic COIN campaign, as is evident from the case studies, military operations are one of the prongs of the politico military process. The RAND study brings out COIN approaches, which are primarily for expeditionary COIN while the case studies have attempted to show-case domestic COIN. Table 13 below compares the COIN approaches for an expeditionary campaign and Indian COIN approach.

Expeditionary COIN Approach¹⁶⁷	Indian COIN Approach¹⁶⁸
Development - classic “hearts and minds Pacification -a broad term for population-centric COIN Legitimacy -Local support–based approach. Critical for a foreign COIN force. Democracy - to increase the legitimacy of the local government. Resettlement - actions taken to separate the population from the insurgents. Border control (prevention of aid from across the borders) “Crush them” - insurgency can be annihilated through the vigorous application of force and repression. Amnesty/rewards Strategic communication (coordinated whole-of-government persuasion and influence effort. A population-centric and legitimacy-based approach). Field Manual (FM) 3-24 - Focused on separation of insurgents from the population, popular support, intelligence collection and legitimacy. “Boots on the ground” – deployment of COIN Force. “Put a local face on it”- building the capacity of the local security forces. Cultural awareness - Good cultural awareness is an enabler Criticality of intelligence – actionable intelligence drives COIN operations.	Iron Fist – Specialized COIN Force to conduct surgical operations to eliminate terrorists. Use of Minimum Force & no collateral damage. COIN Grid – deployment of COIN force in the hinterland to provide security to population, area domination and isolation of terrorists. Counter Infiltration Force – to enforce border control. Velvet Glove – “Wining Hearts & Minds” Development plan – <i>Operation Sadbhawna (Goodwill)</i>. Enablers – Training of troops on COIN. Cultural awareness and sensitizing the COIN force to the local population, customs & traditions. Intelligence based operations. Structures for Civil-Military Coordination. Amnesty/Surrender policy. Political interlocutors.

Table 13: Comparison of COIN Approaches - RAND Study & Indian COIN Doctrine

¹⁶⁷ Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2010), 36-77.

¹⁶⁸ Army Training Command (ARTRAC), *Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations* (Shimla: ARTRAC, 2006) , 21-57. At <http://ids.nic.in/> (accessed 28 Jul 2011).

It is indeed ironic that though Indian Army has primarily executed domestic COIN campaigns, it was during the Sri Lankan intervention, an expeditionary COIN campaign, where the Indian Army witnessed one of the fiercest COIN campaigns. The credible opposition in the form of the LTTE led the Indian Army to relook its COIN warfare and spurred a revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the Indian COIN paradigm.

In conclusion, the Indian Army has been engaged in COIN operations for over six decades now. The Indian COIN experience brings out the importance of a holistic approach for the conflict resolution as compared to purely military operations based campaigns. The need to identify the **primacy** of the **population** in the solution process is critical to most of the COIN campaigns. Asymmetric threat is a reality of the present and the future. It is incumbent on militaries countering such threats to analyze the varied COIN campaigns. The Indian cases offer many lessons to the US as the environmental realities are quite similar to Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the Indian approaches are distinctly similar to the US concepts. This similarity stems from the common ideals on COIN – pacification of local population, economic development and military operations to annihilate the terrorists.

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