Tactical Enthusiasm and Operational Blindness: Civilian Casualties during the Allied Air Campaign in Italy in 1940-1945
Abstract
This monograph investigates the Allied air campaign in Italy during the Second World War from an operational perspective to identify those factorsrelevant for today's practice of operational artthat determined a very high number of civilian casualties (as many as 60,000-80,000). Analysis points towards three main causes. First, the Allies entered the war with an air doctrine that was untested on a large scale. This should have suggested prudence in its application to measure its effectiveness and rapidly adapt ways and means to achieve the desired ends. It did not happen. Second, several flaws plagued the decision making process for the air campaign. Allied planners framed the Italian operational environment in analogy with the German one, failing to capture the substantial differences between the two. Additionally, excessive confidence in the supposed decisiveness of air power in bringing about the collapse of Italy prevented an early integration of the air and land campaigns. Third, Allied leadership showed insensitivity towards civilian casualties. There were no operational directives that urged air commanders to limit the casualties amongst the civilians. The conclusion of the monograph captures several lessons that challenge current and future operational planners to be ready to identify cognitive fallacies, to question assumptions, and to prove the soundness of the ways and means to achieve the desired ends.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 21, 2015
- Accession Number
- AD1001269
Entities
People
- Giovanni Corrado
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies