

The Contracting Support Brigade: Is it capable of Sustaining Tempo and Combat Power in the Operational Environment?

Monograph

by

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Abstract

The Contracting Support Brigade: Is it Capable of Sustaining Tempo and Combat Power in the Operational Environment? by MAJ Carper H. McMillan III, USA, 50 pages.

The operational commander has the responsibility to link tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve the policy-maker's strategic objectives. Combat power and operational initiative sustained by tempo set the conditions for the decisive action that explicates these tactics. However, these tasks require a capable sustainment architecture that is flexible, responsive, and adaptive to not keep pace with, but instead to facilitate the warfighter's pursuit of the initiative. The costs and build-up required for operational logistics may not align with the temporal and spatial constraints of the mission. In the phase 0 and fiscally constrained operational environment, the Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) can spearhead the operations required to conduct theater-opening, establish initial capability, and posture the warfighter for decisive action. Thus, the operational commander must understand the capabilities and limitations of the CSB. This monograph explains and contrasts both variables and argues that the CSB must expand immediately to meet doctrinal expectations. This expansion of capability will ensure the CSB adequately supports the operational commander in the generation of combat power, sustainment of tempo, and maximization of operational reach.

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Acronyms

AAC	Army Acquisition Command
ACC	US Army Contracting Command
ACSA	Acquisition Cross Service Agreement
AMC	US Army Materiel Command
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARCENT	US Army Central Command
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CBN	Contracting Battalion
CENTCOM	US Central Command
CJCSN	Combined Joint Chief of Staff Notice
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
CSB	Contracting Support Brigade
CSIP	Contracting Support Integration Plan
CT	Contracting Team
CWC	Commission on Wartime Contracting
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	US Department of Defense
DS	Direct Support
ECC	US Expeditionary Contracting Command
ESC	Expeditionary Sustainment Command
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation

FMSWEB	Force Management System Website
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	Geographical Combatant Command
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HCA	Head of Contracting Activity
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
JCASO	Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
JTSCC	Joint Theater Support Contracting Command
KO	Contracting Officer
LPB	Logistics Preparation of the Battlefield
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LSCC	Lead Service for Contracting Coordination
MCP	Main Combat Post
MICC	Mission and Installation Contracting Command
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
OCS	Operational Contract Support
OEF-A	Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
PAP	Principal-Agent-Problem
PARC	Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting
RCC	Regional Contracting Command
RCO	Regional Contracting Office

RFF	Request For Forces
SOP	Standard of Practice
SOW	Statement of Work
TDA	Table Distributed Allowance
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRANSCOM	US Transportation Command
TSC	Theater Sustainment Command
UA	Unified Action
ULO	Unified Land Operations
USAREUR	US Army European Command
USFMSA	US Army Force Management Support Agency

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Introduction

Over the past thirteen years, the use of Operational Contract Support (OCS) underscored US Army sustainment capability, specifically in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A). These wars demonstrate unprecedented models for an evolutionary progression in the Army's utilization of contracting as a critical enabler for Unified Land Operations (ULO). An uncertain, fiscally constrained, near-future operational environment interspersed with threats to US interests, necessitates a deployable and tailorable force structure supplemented by equally responsive and adaptive sustainers. In a response to a 2007, Gansler Commission report, former Secretary of the Army Pete Geren stated, "Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that future military operations will involve large numbers of contractor personnel."¹

Operational contract support is required to support and sustain operational mission requirements. The Department of Defense (DOD), in reports and testimony to Congress, stipulated OCS reform its management, oversight, and contingency planning. Subsequently, the United States Army must adhere to doctrinal requirements and increase the capability of the contracting support brigade (CSB) in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. OCS, as the leading or supporting operational sustainment function, must provide the commander with the ability to generate and maintain combat power, tempo, and maximize operational reach.

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO), other government agencies, and individual military service components have identified consistent and systemic challenges to maximizing the performance and efficiency of government contracting. However, the US Army as the land proponent for Unified Action (UA) retains robust, but specified sustainment

¹ Lee McMahon and Gary Sheftick, "Gansler Commission Cites Systemic Problems in Army Contracting," US Army Homepage, Last modified November 1, 2007, accessed August 5, 2014, <http://www.army.mil/article/5906/gansler-commission-cites-systemic-problems-in-army-contracting/>.

responsibility for Army and joint forces. Thus, the unique, but un-isolated challenges that the Army contracting community must overcome to execute OCS in the future operational environment punctuate the significance of this study. This monograph centers on the Army CSB's capability to support the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), specifically, OEF-A. The CSB, serving as an operational contracting headquarters, provides the operational-to-tactical and operational-to-strategic links for theater and external support contracting. Depending on operational requirements and constraints, the CSB may surpass its role as an extension of the sustainment warfighting function and become the primary sustainment capability to the Army commander's center(s) of gravity.² Therefore, the limitations and shortcomings in the CSB's overall capability transcend into that of the commander's combat power, tempo, and operational reach. This monograph attempts to identify those limitations and their implications to recommend potential solutions.

In order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of this monograph's context and subject matter, the following key definitions precede the analysis. US Army doctrine defines Operational Contract Support (OCS) as "the integration of commercial sector support into military operations."³ The vital sub-functions that accomplish OCS are contract support integration and contractor management. US Army doctrine defines contract support integration as "the process of synchronizing operational planning, requirements development, and contracting in support of deployed military forces and other designated organizations in the area of operations

² "A *center of gravity* is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act...This definition states in modern terms the classic description offered by Clausewitz: 'the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.' The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat." Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-3.

³ Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, *Sustainment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-4.

(AO).”⁴ It also describes contractor management as “the process of managing and integrating contractor personnel and their equipment into military operations. Contractor management includes: planning and deployment/redeployment preparation; in-theater management; force protection and security; and executing government support requirements.”⁵ This monograph discusses the implementation and usage of two of the three types of contract support, which are theater support and external support. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which is the legal authority on all government contracts, defines a contract as a mutual and legally binding agreement between a buyer and seller for good and/or services.⁶ The US Army uses theater support contracts to meet contingency sustainment and support requirements, typically in time-sensitive situations. External support contracts, most common of which is the US Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) provide basic logistics and non-combat services outside of the common theater support contracts provided by the CSB. The CSB and its subordinates may also coordinate and execute contract management responsibility over external support contracts.

As previously discussed, the primary unit executing OCS is the contracting support brigade (CSB). The CSB’s respective strategic hierarchy in precedence is the US Army Materiel Command (USAMC), the US Army Contracting Command (ACC), and finally the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC). The CSB is a US Army operational headquarters that receives their contracting guidance and authority from the ECC.⁷ The nine Army CSBs align with and provide direct support to a regional Army service component command (ASCC), such as US

⁴ Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 4-10, *Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1-1.

⁵ ATTP 4-10.

⁶ ATTP 4-10, 1-2.

⁷ Field Manual (FM) 4-92, *Contracting Support Brigade* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 1-1.

Army Central Command (ARCENT) and when directed, a geographical combatant command (GCC) such as CENTCOM. Depending on operational requirements, the CSB commands tactical-level contracting units such as the contracting battalion (CBN) and contracting teams (CTs). The contracting officer representative (COR), appointed by the supported unit, assists the contracting officer with contract management oversight.⁸ The CSB also employs contract specialists to assist in non-warranted contracting functions.⁹ The final critical definition for this monograph is the contracting officer (KO). Army doctrine defines the KO as "...the military officer, non-commissioned officer (NCO) or Army civilian with the legal authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts. The contracting officer is appointed in writing through a warrant by the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or designated senior contracting official."¹⁰ The KO plays an indispensable role in performing OCS at all levels, as they must attain warrants to let contracts.

This monograph researches current OCS doctrine and DOD and Congressional guidance. However, the "Principal-Agent Problem" (PAP) anchors the theoretical framework of this document. The PAP, embedded in the larger realm of contract theory, examines the relationship between the principal (CSB) and their hired agent (vendor). The principle should employ proper and effective control mechanisms to ensure the agent meets or exceeds the agreed terms of the contract. Within the framework, four hypotheses measure and validate the efficacy of the CSB's current force structure and posture. Each CSB currently aligns with a regional ASCC headquarters and their parent GCC burdens them with inherent responsibility to support numerous contingencies within each region. The US Army's renewed focus on theater security

⁸ ATTP 4-10, 1-3.

⁹Army Technical Publication (ATP) 4-92, *Contracting Support to Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-3. In many of these headquarters, dedicated OCS coordination cells form within their G-4 sections that include both military and civilian logistic officers and non-warranted contracting specialists.

¹⁰ ATTP 4-10, 1-2.

cooperation indicates and expanding OCS requirement that continues to grow as GCCs shape areas of responsibility (AORs) in accordance with US interests.

The four hypotheses also examine CSB capability in respect to proposed relationships with headquarters or supported units in lieu of the current support structure. They are as follows:

H1: If the CSB force structure is increased then the GCC can increase the tempo of Phase 0 operations.

H2: If the CSB is under operational control (OPCON) of the ASCC then OCS to the warfighter is more integrated, flexible, simple, economical, continuous, and responsive.

H3: If an expanded contracting battalion effectively integrates with the theater sustainment command (TSC) then adequate contracting support is available to meet theater-level requirements.

H4: If the CSB's lowest subordinate unit, the contracting team, provides direct support to the brigade combat team (BCT) then adequate contracting support is available to meet their requirements.

The following four questions extend the PAP framework to transition the monograph to literature review and methodology when it then scrutinizes the subsequent findings:

Q1: What is the purpose of OCS and why is it important?

Q2: How many contracting battalions and contracting teams exist?

Q3: What is the actual functioning relationship of the CSB and the GCC and Expeditionary Contracting Command, respectively?

Q4: Part 1- How many phase 0 engagements occur every year in the CENTCOM AOR?
Part 2 - How many current contingencies exist in that AOR?

A couple of key limitations constrain researching Operational Contract Support (OCS) and the Contracting Support Brigade (CSB). The nine different CSBs develop and maintain additional documentation that is exclusive to the organization. This may include internal standards of practice (SOPs) that add layers of bureaucracy to the conduct of operations. In

addition, most of the literature compiled for this monograph dates from 2001-2014. Army contracting capability continues to evolve and grow in the midst of the research.

This study delimits analysis and research in time, space, and scope. The scope of this study centers on the CSB and its capability and relationships. US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) through its operational CSBs develops and manages 70 percent of the US Army's contracts.¹¹ Therefore this study focuses on the CSB as opposed to USAMC's other contracting agencies. Other omissions include US Army Corps of Engineers, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, National Guard, Program Executive Office-Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command and the US Army Medical Command. Strategic contracting capability resides in organizations such as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). "While the strategic level defines the direction and manner in which an organization pursues improvements in services acquisition, it is through the development, execution, and oversight of individual contracts that the strategy is implemented."¹²

This study references strategic organizations only in relation to CSB capability. The time frame covered in this monograph ranges primarily from 2007 to 2013. The CENTCOM AOR provides a focal point for case study as it contains the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF-A) conflict. In addition, the CENTCOM AOR includes 20 countries in the southwest Asian region. The reader of this monograph should expect minimal departure from the CENTCOM AOR within this document.

Five additional sections complete the organization of this monograph. The second section reviews the document's literature. Next, the third section explains the methodology or approach to research and analysis. Then the fourth section tests the hypotheses and answers the questions

¹¹ Undra Robinson, "Army Contract Specialists' Lack Of Desire To Become Contracting Officers" (Defense Acquisition University: Senior Service College Fellowship, 2012), 1.

¹² US Government Accountability Office, *Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address Systemic Challenges*, Paul L. Francis, GAO-11-580, last modified April 25, 2011, accessed August 1, 2014, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-580>.

through the case study process. The fifth section examines the results of the case studies by presenting pertinent findings and analysis. Finally, the sixth section concludes the document with implications and recommendations.

Review of Literature

The intent of this literature review is to analyze doctrine, studies, reports, and theoretical documentation that provide information and implications in reference to the capability of the contracting support brigade (CSB). Threats to US interests in expeditionary or immature areas of operation (AOs), such as Iraq and Syria in 2014, highlight the necessity of the CSB. No other Army organization possesses the capability to leverage the national capabilities of a host country in sustaining or complementing the organic or assigned assets of combat and auxiliary forces. However, can the CSB, in its current organizational and operational status establish, maintain, and exceed the minimal requirements of support to the US forces in a given AO? This question resonates from a broader discussion of Department of Defense (DOD) contracting capability.

Therefore, this study concentrates on the operational unit, the CSB, which must prepare and sustain the AO in the enduring global state of US Army military affairs. The US Army remains in multiple phases of the operation in which the CSB must be prepared to support in phases: 0-Shape; 1-Deter; 2-Seize the Initiative; 3-Dominate; 4-Stability; 5-Enable Civilian Authority.¹³ Specifically, this study examines whether or not the CSB should expand its capacity and capability in order to meet expeditionary, short-term, and enduring requirements that require contracting support. The theoretical framework expands to contextualize the “Principal-Agent Problem” (PAP) in reference to the purpose of the CSB, and outline the nesting of this study within DOD’s adamant call for contracting change.

¹³ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), III-39.

To maximize the effectiveness of the sustainment capability within the CSB, one needs to understand the variable of incentivization that fosters the trade of commodities or services. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts introduced four underlying principles of PAP theory that provide perspective on the responsibilities of the Army contracting officer (KO) or contract specialist.¹⁴ When the KO enters the Army into a contractual agreement with a contractor or vendor, under the context of PAP the KO assumes the role of “principal” and the vendor assumes the role of the “agent.” The principles of informativness, incentive-intensity, monitoring, and equal compensation further inform this perspective by rationalizing the causality for agent performance. The Informativness Principle according to Milgrom and Roberts claims, “total value is always increased by factoring into the determinant of pay any performance measure that (with the appropriate weighting) allows reducing the error with which the agent's choices are estimated and by excluding performance measures that increase the error with which effort is estimated (for example, because they are solely reflective of random factors outside the agent's control).”¹⁵

The KO’s obligation to understand these uncontrollable factors and mitigate them in coordination with the logistician for the operational commander transcends the science of sustainment and ventures into operational art. The second principle of “intensity of incentives,” “depends on four factors: the incremental profits created by additional effort, the precision with which the desired activities are assessed, the agent's risk tolerance, and the agent's responsiveness to incentives.”¹⁶ The contracting officer, not interested in profit, benefits from this concept by striving to create efficiencies of scale and maximizing the agent’s performance through incentives. The KO must also examine the broad and strategic impacts to the AO by potentially

¹⁴ Paul R. Milgrom and John Roberts, *Economics, Organization, and Management* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992).

¹⁵ Ibid., 226.

¹⁶ Ibid., 221.

oversaturating a host nation market or entire economy. The third principle complements incentive intensity, but focuses on monitoring intensity. “When the plan is to make the agent's pay very sensitive to performance, it will pay to measure that performance carefully.”¹⁷ While the contracting officer representative (COR) either conducts monitoring or designates someone to do so, the CSB sets these conditions in contract development. The fourth and last principle from Milgrom and Roberts is the equal compensation principle.¹⁸ This principle bases in the premise that services valued by the principal should be equally valuable to the agent.¹⁹ The CSB acquires an imperative to develop contracts that echo the equal compensation principle with their structure and content.

To facilitate shared understanding this study identifies three key concepts related to the CSB that supplement the overall research. These concepts are: preparation of pre-contractual documents; the CSB’s relationships with sister-service, strategic, operational, and tactical contracting organizations; and the planning integration strategy. The first concept involves the preparation of pre-contractual documents. The requiring activity, or supported unit through their designated and trained contracting officer representative (COR), retains the responsibility to develop “an ‘acquisition ready requirements’ package when requesting contracted support.”²⁰ The only requirement specified for this package in Army doctrine is a statement of work (SOW).²¹ Army doctrine directs the reader to consult the “local contract support office/unit” and “must be able to describe what is needed to fulfill the minimum acceptable standard for the government.”²²

¹⁷ Ibid., 226.

¹⁸ Ibid., 228.

¹⁹ Ibid., 229.

²⁰ FM 4-92, 2-1.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

These requirements can easily and often do result in points of friction between supported unit and the CSB. Given that the supported unit retains responsibility for identifying requirements, the ability to write effective SOWs requires development of a skillset. The potential deficiency often results in a misunderstanding between the KO and the COR/supported unit. The SOW which outlines these requirements should provide the contractor with a “detailed description of the requirement ... allowing the contracting officer to create a solicitation against which commercial vendors can bid a proposal and successfully deliver in accordance with the terms of the contract.”²³ A 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study on contract management in OEF-A found “that CORs are not prepared to oversee contracts because the required training does not include specifics on how to complete written statements of work and how to operate in Afghanistan’s unique contracting environment.”²⁴

As referenced in the GAO report, ill-prepared pre-contractual documents spawn challenges to effective contract management. The structure and content of the executed contract share significance with the capability of the COR. A poorly written or incoherent SOW may result in a contract that does not facilitate effective contract management and execution of requirements; in the best-case scenario, the KO can amend the contract at the expense of time, resources, and taxpayer dollars – and incalculable effect on the mission.

The introduction portion of this study delineates the responsibility of the CSB from other Army contracting organizations. However, the second key concept recognizes that the CSB as the central operational contracting organization may collaborate and coordinate with sister-service, or other operational and strategic sustainment and contracting units to plan and execute contracting support. The importance of these relationships exists in the CSB’s ability to extend the

²³ FM 4-92, 2-1.

²⁴ US Government Accountability Office, *Operational Contract Support: Management and Oversight Improvements Needed in Afghanistan*, Cary Russell, GAO-12-290, last modified March 2012, accessed August 1, 2014, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589710.pdf>.

supported/operational commander's operational reach. In order of precedence according to the levels of war, the strategic organizations that the CSB may leverage are the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). This joint DOD institution task organizes under the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and provides direct OCS to combatant commands – Chairman of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Notice (CJCSN) 4130.1 recognizes “the role of JCASO ... upon request, to provide operational contract support (OCS) management and coordination to commanders during peacetime and contingency operations.”²⁵ Since CENTCOM does not have organic or aligned OCS assets, they may rely on JCASO to augment capabilities – additionally, the CSB may benefit from the unique capabilities of sister-service KOs and contract specialists. At the operational level, US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) may designate a CSB to coordinate the use of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), though a team LOGCAP forward conducts planning and execution of those contracts.²⁶ As stated earlier the CSB's tactical units the contracting battalion (CBN) and contracting team (CT) conduct tactical level planning and letting of contracts. USAMC may augment the CSB with additional CTs depending on mission requirements.

The third concept to outline CSB capability comes from their Contract Support Integration Plan (CSIP). The CSIP, which integrated into concept plans and operations orders as “Annex W,” “serves as the planning mechanism to ensure effective and efficient contract support to a particular operation.”²⁷ The CSB planner at the ASCC and GCC must develop the CSIP in coordination with overall planning effort at the operational level. “The CSIP development process is intended to ensure the operational commander and supporting contracting personnel conduct

²⁵ Chairman of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Notice (CJCSN) 4130.0, *Guidance For Combatant Commander Employment Of Operational Contract Support Enabler-Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO)*, 2011.

²⁶ FM 4-92, 2-9.

²⁷ FM 4-92, 2-1.

advance planning, preparation, and coordination to support deployed forces.”²⁸ Coordination with the logistics-planning directorate of the ASCC, the G4, becomes imperative during this process, as the operational commander must balance the costs and benefits of using organic sustainment assets versus contracted services and supplies.²⁹ “Logistics and other support planners must consider all potential sources of support to include organic support, support from sister Services, support from multinational partners, and host nation support (HNS) before determining a supply or service support requirement should be met by commercial means.”³⁰

Department of Defense (DOD) contracting organizations and their corresponding processes, which include the CSB, come under consistent scrutiny for their coordination, management, and execution of the aforementioned concepts – and their ability to eliminate the misconceptions of the supported unit. The central document on addressing this issue emanates from the Gansler Commission on “Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations.”³¹ Their 2007 report titled “Urgent Reform Required: Army Expedition Contracting” became a benchmark in recommending critical improvement for Army contracting.³² Overall, the commission calls for cultural and institutional change, but they also make key points throughout the document. One point made states that “‘The Army is the DOD ‘Executive Agent’ for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is unable to fill military or civilian contracting billets, in either quantity or qualification.”³³ A fair assessment of this statement would argue that the

²⁸ FM 4-92, 2-1.

²⁹ Ibid. The ASCC G-4 is responsible for the coordinating, synchronizing, planning, and management of logistics functions and activity for the ASCC commander. These responsibilities include operational contracting support. Inherently, the G4 is the sustainment lead for the ASCC.

³⁰ ATTP 4-10, 3-2.

³¹ US Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, *The Gansler Commission Report*, (Washington DC, 2007).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., 4.

Gansler Commission made this report in 2007. However, additional reporting by the GAO indicates that despite some change and improvement the trend of inadequacy continues.³⁴ A 2012 GAO report states “... since February 2006, DOD has required planners to include...Annex W—in the combatant commands’ most detailed operation plans, if applicable to the plan. However, as of February 2010, only 4 operation plans with Annex Ws had been approved by DOD and planners had drafted an additional 30 Annex Ws for plans.”³⁵ The US Army maintained a lead or significant role in most of these plans, thus requiring contract support integration planning from the CSB. The report continues on the inadequacy of the Contract Support Integration Plan (CSIP) by stating that, “most of the annexes that had been drafted at that time restated broad language from existing DOD guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces but included few details on the type of contractors needed to execute a given plan.”³⁶

The case-study section of this document further explores the assertion made by these examples. That assertion contends that despite changes in doctrine and organization there are still systemic and cultural challenges to maximizing the efficacy of Army contracting. As the platform for performance and change, the CSB represents the center of gravity for combating these challenges.

Methodology

An analysis of the CSB’s capability begins with a focus on the key areas of operation (AOs) that have tested this capability. Of the seven regions assigned to Army service component commands (ASCCs) and their parent geographical component command (GCC), the CSB and

³⁴ US Government Accountability Office, *Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies*, Timothy J. DiNapoli. GAO-12-1026T, last modified September 12, 2012, accessed August 1, 2014, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648107.pdf>.

³⁵ Ibid., 4.

³⁶ Ibid., 5.

other supporting contracting organizations that operated in the CENTCOM/US Army Central Command (ARCENT) AOR have arguably faced the greatest challenges.³⁷ The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) reported in 2011 “At least \$31 billion, and possibly as much as \$60 billion, has been lost to contract waste and fraud in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”³⁸ All aspects of the military, specifically the Army, have evolved and continue to evolve with OEF-A providing the most recent and tangible lesson learned. Contracting, in this respect, does not differ from the elements of combat, support, or sustainment operations. It parallels these elements as a key enabler informed by OEF-A.

The case study for this monograph centers on findings from contracting operations, policies, and procedures during OEF-A. As stated in this monograph’s introduction the case study information ranges from 2001-2014. CENTCOM/ARCENT held operational and tactical responsibility for both theaters.³⁹ Still the terrain, culture, and combat and stability operations in each environment fostered unique requirements and ensuing approaches. Army contracting and its respective challenges in OIF/OEF-A embody the first major usage of contracts in a large contingency environment since Vietnam. Army contracting played a vital role in the Balkans in the late 1990s. “In 1992, the Army conducted a competitive selection for an umbrella support contract for military contingency operations under its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. The company “Brown, Root, and Sullivan” won the contract to support the effort. When US military forces deployed to Bosnia in December 1995, the Army decided to use this contract to build base

³⁷ FM 4-92, 1-2.

³⁸ US Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks* (Washington, DC: US Independent Agencies and Commissions, 2011), 1.

³⁹ FM 4-92, 1-2.

camps and provide services for its forces.”⁴⁰ Still, the first six years of performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) justified the reorganization of Army contracting as previously mentioned in the Gansler Commission Report in 2007.⁴¹ This report resulted in the creation of the Army Contracting Command (ACC) and its subordinate command, the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) on October 1, 2008.⁴² Again, the ECC designates contract authority to the CSB.⁴³ The Gansler Commission also found that the Army contracting profession in 2007 was absent of general officer leadership.” Per the creation of the ACC and ECC on October 1, 2008, these units with the garrison based Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC), retain three general officer billets.⁴⁴ The breakout includes a major general billet as the commander of the ACC, and brigadier general billets for both the ECC and MICC. The significance of these findings to this case study comes from validating the progression that Army contracting has made to understand and evaluate its current and potential capability in the generation of combat power, maintaining tempo, and maximizing operational reach.

The CSB’s capability and the contracting lessons learned from OIF/OEF-A anchor the structure and focus of this study, respectively. More specifically, the case study will focus on the CSB ability to support warfighter requirements (contract execution) and control costs (contract

⁴⁰ Global Accountability Office, *Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans*, GAO/NSIAD-00-225, Steven H. Sternlieb, last modified September 2000, accessed August 1, 2014, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/90440.pdf>, 6

⁴¹ US Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, *The Gansler Commission Report*, (Washington, DC: 2007).

⁴² “Army Contracting Command History,” US Army Contracting Command Website, accessed November 3, 2014, <http://www.acc.army.mil/command-and-staff/staff/historian/>.

⁴³ FM 4-92, 1-2.

⁴⁴ “2008 USA Contracting Command TDA,” FMSWeb Force Management Database, accessed November 14, 2014, https://fmsweb.army.mil/protected/WebTAADS/UIC_Frame.asp?DOC_TYPE=TDA&Update=GETSQL&MACOM=X1&DOCNO=XDW6QKAA&CCNUM=0109&DOCST=H&UIC=W6QKAA&EDATE=10/1/2008.

execution and management). The PAP framework with its key principles supplement the research questions listed in the introduction to systematize data collection on the CSB's capability. This methodology aids in the proving, disproving, and subsequent findings of analyzing this monograph's hypotheses.

The main hypothesis of the monograph asserts that the United States Army must adhere to doctrinal requirements and increase the capability of the contracting support brigade (CSB) in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR. Army doctrine provides a comprehensive and detailed approach to contract support that outlines a universal, but tailorable strategy for effective sustainment of the warfighter.⁴⁵ However, the initial findings from reports such as and similar to the Gansler Commission indicate a wide gap between doctrine's prescription for success and the actual performance of the CSB, and greater Army contracting community.⁴⁶

With the robust structure of ACC and ECC, and available strategic support from organizations such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the findings will indicate that the CSB had deficiencies in manpower and the experience of contracting officers (KOs) and contract specialists. This monograph will likely discover some rigidity in the culture of the contracting community that prohibits the CSB from operating at full capability; specifically Army doctrine and prior research that lends more to the science of contracting versus the art. The examination of these predictions drives the testing of the monographs hypotheses focusing on the force structure of the CSB its integration with theater and tactical units.

This monograph uses four questions for the purpose of this case study. These questions reinforce and further inform the results from testing the hypotheses. The first question asks,

⁴⁵ FM 4-92.

⁴⁶ US Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, *The Gansler Commission Report*, (Washington, DC: 2007).

“What is the purpose of OCS and why is it important?” This question reexamines why the CSB exists and what role it should play in the future for supporting the operational commander.

The second question asks, “How many contract support battalion and contracting support teams are there?” This question immediately addresses the capacity of the CSB. The first sub question for the second question is “How many warranted KOs do the units have; is there a DOD requirement to maintain a certain number?” The second sub question begs, “What sustainment support can the CSB leverage to meet requirements?” This question accompanies the second primary questions to identify all the options the CSB has to maximize capability. These questions provide insight to the CSBs capacity and capability to respond to a contingency.

The third question queries, “What is the actual functioning relationship of the CSB and the GCC and ECC, respectively?” This questions forces a re-explanation of the doctrinal roles currently established.⁴⁷ The importance of answering this question lies in the determination of whether the doctrinal roles are adequate and/or whether lack of adherence to doctrine is affecting the performance of the CSB.

The last question encompasses two parts because they correlate. The first part is “How many Phase 0 engagements occur every year in the CENTCOM AOR?” The second part is “How many current contingencies exist in the CENTOM AOR?” These questions present a contemporary requirement for the CSB to bridge the initial findings of the case study with the current opportunities for contract support. This should assist in the shaping of implications and recommendations from the case study.

The data to test these hypotheses and answer these questions originates from mostly government sources. The Government Accountability Office, Army doctrine, Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), and Gansler Commission offer the central documents that initiated

⁴⁷ FM 4-92.

the study and will likely sustain and balance the research. Thus, this monograph consistently references these sources.

The methodology for this study seeks to derive the most pertinent information to help further the evolution of Army contracting. The questions and hypotheses developed are practical and should pinpoint key findings from a vast collection of appropriate sources. OEF-A affords a generous test site with many opportunities to observe Army contracting in retrospect. However, the greatest benefit comes from the extrapolations made to improve for the very near future.

Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (2001-2014)

This section uses a theoretical approach derived from principal-agent-problem (PAP) theory to analyze the qualitative and quantitative structure of the contracting support brigade (CSB) in relation to the US Army's sustainment requirements. These requirements often emerge in phase 0 of operations and continue through the additional five phases until the AOR returns to phase 0.⁴⁸ Operational contract support (OCS) may still be required on an enduring basis. These phases hold significance in relating the case study of OEF-A to the current and future implications of CSB capability.

Following this introduction, the case study section of the monograph divides into four corresponding and sequential subsections. The overview with justification continues the case study by explaining why OEF-A provide the best model for examining the CSB. Next, the in-depth analyses of the structured questions sets conditions to data mine and provide the monograph's findings and recommendations. This process begins with the succeeding initial findings subsection. The last subsection summarizes the case study and leads the monograph into the findings and analysis section to refine the case study results.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT), since its declaration by George W. Bush on 20 September 2001, ignited a paradigm shift in modern warfare. The first front in this paradigm shift

⁴⁸ JP 5-0, III-39.

was OEF-A. OEF-A, due to the history of conventional army and external political challenges, presents a relevant model for analyzing and preparing for the future of conflict. This portion of the monograph will examine why and how OEF-A set a precedence for future actions in the operational environment. As the operational commander changes his perspective on the environment, the sustainer must do the same. Thus, operational contract support is significantly impacted by OEF-A.

The invasion of Afghanistan, justified by the Taliban's refusal to extradite Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda from Pakistan, indicated a paradigm shift in the impact of non-state actors on international conflicts. US policy makers and military leaders had to acknowledge that the type of individuals and institutions that historically did not receive recognition for sovereignty and stable governance could have global impact and influence. These non-state actors, without the open and direct aide and influence of established states focused on weapons of the mind instead of the combat power they lacked.

In 2001, the danger of ideology, while well known in the circles of academia and history was not commonplace on the whiteboards of operational planners, let alone policy-makers. Today, an increased focus on information and/or non-lethal effects based contingencies at the operations level and psychological operations at the tactical level evidence a new imperative for planning and tactics. The lesson for the operational commander is that they have a requirement to address ideology in the form of political-military relationships and ongoing partnership with regional leaders in those respective fields. The sustainer plays a key role in supporting these activities as they transition from key leader engagements to tactical and operational planning and exercises.

Afghanistan, as a landlocked nation bordered by unwilling US allies and adversarial states presented geo-political challenges to generating combat power and sustaining tempo. Pakistan surrounds Afghanistan on its eastern and southern borders. Iran covers its entire western border while Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan border Afghanistan in the north (See

Figure 1). This leaves US forces in Afghanistan with two options for seaports that transition into ground lines of communication; those options are Iran and Pakistan. Iran, who the United States has no diplomatic relations with, is not a viable option. Pakistan maintains strategic interest in Afghanistan because it adds strategic depth to their long-standing rivalry with India on their eastern border. Accordingly, Pakistan needs Afghanistan for stabilization and reluctantly works with the Taliban and other sectarian actors to achieve this stability. Still, despite the hesitant and strained relationship with Pakistan, their cooperation is essential for the United States to sustain and support operations in Afghanistan.

This is where a complicated situation becomes complex. Prior to the 9-11 attacks, Pakistan supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, as one of three countries worldwide that recognized them as a state.⁴⁹ Pakistan grudgingly reversed their support of the Taliban after the 9-11 attacks. Committed as a US ally since 2001 the Pakistani government has turned over hundreds of fighters affiliated with Al-Qaida or the Taliban.⁵⁰ However, Pakistan has received criticism for harboring terrorists – the most blatant example being the Osama Bin Laden raid at a location close to Pakistani military facilities. The United States’ unilateral killing of militants in Pakistan by drones and Afghan-border skirmishes has further exacerbated US-Pakistani tensions.

US forces have operated under these and similar conditions since the war began October 11, 2001. The synchronization of combat operations with the geopolitical actions is a norm that operational commander must contend with. Whether in phase 0 or phase 4 of the campaign, the sustainer’s role becomes more critical as the creative use of non-combative ways and means supplements operations. Afghanistan’s poor infrastructure, diverse culture, and rugged terrain combined to provide operational and tactical complexity. Throughout the history of OEF-A this

⁴⁹ Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified July 4, 2014, accessed February 7, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551>.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

complexity consistently forces reframing of conventional operational approaches to meet strategic objectives.




Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan with Ethnic Breakout

Source: Zachary Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified July 4, 2014, accessed February 7, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551>.

In essence, the commitment to the international campaign that continues today in 2015 required an intrinsic capability to project combat power globally. While the GWOT challenged all DOD assets, the sustainment community, the backbone of all major operations, has arguably transformed the most. The CSB represents a critical part of this sustainment transformation. The US Army’s 2004-2013 modular transformation of brigade combat teams (BCTs) occurred with a conjointly supportive operational sustainment umbrella and organic sustainment infrastructure. The theater sustainment commands (TSCs), their subordinate sustainment brigades, and various tactical sustainers providing general and theater support to the warfighter needed an analogous contracting force. This contracting force’s charter required them to fill in the gaps of sustainment and sometimes supplement sustainment shortages caused by the nature of war and a confusing, but burgeoning Army Force Generation (AFORGEN) cycle. As previously stated, during OEF-A and Operation Iraqi Freedom the first major report card on the Army’s wartime contracting

capability came during the 2007 Gansler Commission Report.⁵¹ While this case study does not constitute another report card on Army contracting, it does examine the aptitude of the CSB – which is the Army contracting community’s most adept sustainment organization supporting theater operations worldwide.

As this case study observes the performance of the CSB, it will also consider Army contracting in OEF-A holistically in relation to the CSB. For example, if according to Army doctrine, examples occurred where the CSB did not execute Army contracting requirements that fell within their scope of responsibility. Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) Southwest Asia officially re-designated as the 408th CSB officially on 22 September 2006 to solidify its position as the theater contracting organization for Southwest Asia and OEF-A.⁵² Thus, this case study divides into three primary periods. Period I ranges from the start of OEF-A on 7 October 2001, through the implementation of the CSB in 2006.⁵³ Period II takes a macro focus on the initial impacts of the CSB up until the results of the Gansler Commission Report on 31 October 2007. The analysis of this second period seeks to identify any immediate impacts the CSB had on Army contracting in the AOR. Subsequently, this period questions whether these impacts present relevant findings for current or future operations. Period three covers the period of 1 November 2007 to the present. This period’s relevancy supersedes the first two in that the CSB firmly established its role in theater and the DOD has issued the cultural and performance improvements that they required the Army to make.

⁵¹ US Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, *The Gansler Commission Report*, (Washington, DC: 2007).

⁵² US Army Acquisition Support Center, *USAASC Newsletter: Preparing for the Future: People, Teamwork, Partnership, Leadership, Volume 1, Issue, 1, AAC Transformation: New Naming Convention for Release of the Army Modular Contracting Support Brigade (CSB)*, (October 2006), 2.

⁵³ “Operation Enduring Freedom Fast Facts,” Cable News Network Library, last modified October 27, 2014, accessed November 3, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/28/world/operation-enduring-freedom-fast-facts/>.

These periods, serving as timelines for the case study, outline one of the most critical eras in the evolution of sustainment, let alone contracting. While US Army contracting traces back to the US Civil War, OCS in campaigns ranges from the Vietnam War, to Operation Desert Storm, to the Bosnian War. However, no other conflicts generated a need for contracting support such as the evolving sustainment infrastructure found in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF-A. As the US Army currently supports and prepares to potentially expand capability for conflicts in Eastern Europe, Africa, and again in Iraq the most recent example becomes the most pertinent. Budget restraints and US Army officer drawdowns in which the logistics branch loses the highest percentage of officers, challenges force readiness. The closeness of today's challenges to OIF and OEF-A, especially with the current withdrawal from Afghanistan, makes this case study the best model for this monograph.

The case study views the CENTCOM AOR during periods one through three as a whole with OEF-A as a subset. In the case of theater specific variables that arise the focus will be on the CSB's performance in response to the variable. The host nation's pool of vendors and their respective capabilities exemplifies this variable. The importance of not comparing, but identifying theater differences or uniqueness highlights the CSB's requirement to be responsive and flexible in any expeditionary or operational environment.⁵⁴

The first case study question underscores all other questions and resonates through all three case study periods. What is the purpose of operational contract support (OCS) and why is it important? OCS fills many roles in the greater Army and joint sustainment community. OCS supports tactical operational and strategic objectives throughout all phases. Army doctrine clearly articulates the mission perspective on the purpose and importance of OCS. Army doctrine states that, "The CSBs' specialized capability to provide operational contract support planning, integration, and contractor management provides the operational commander additional

⁵⁴ FM 4-92.

sustainment support capabilities; enables sustained operational momentum; and facilitates the effective transition from combat to security and stability operations.”⁵⁵ Economic stabilization often stands as a key objective or line of effort in support or in lieu of combat operations. Army doctrines also states that, “Operational contract support plays a significant role in supporting economic stabilization and infrastructure development, especially at the local level...the emphasis is on generating employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through economic development, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure.”⁵⁶ The Army Contracting Command fact sheet states that, “the command awarded nearly 228,000 contracts in fiscal year 2012 valued at more than \$74 billion, which is equal to 69 percent of the Army’s contract dollars and 15 percent of the total dollars spent on contracts by the entire federal government.”⁵⁷

In the context of the “Principal-Agent-Problem” theory, OCS links the principal, the US Army contracting officer (KO), and the agent, the contractor/vendor. The KO’s development and execution of the contract, enabled by the overarching framework of the CSB’s organizational infrastructure and contracting support integration plan (CSIP) requires evaluation in direct correlation with the contractor’s performance. In turn, KO performance directly reflects the CSB’s overall leadership and management of the OCS process.

As stated in this document’s introduction, OCS can supplement or complement an Army unit’s organic sustainment capability. However, OCS may offer advantages over the more common organic sustainment solutions. OCS organizations such as contracting teams (CTs) deploy as smaller units with much less equipment in comparison to organic sustainers.

⁵⁵ FM 4-92, Foreword.

⁵⁶ ADRP 4-0, 3-15.

⁵⁷ “Army Contracting Command Fact Sheet” US Army Contracting Command Website, accessed November 3, 2014, <http://www.slideshare.net/ArmyContracting/army-contracting-command-fact-sheet>.

Additionally, the CT retains the capability to contract the required support depending on availability in the AO. Deploying a sustainment unit to an AO requires many resources. The timeline associated with planning, staffing, and executing a request for forces (RFF) and the subsequent deployment process consumes valuable time. The RFF which starts as a GCC request, must be approved by the joint staff and finally by the US Secretary of Defense.⁵⁸ The unit typically requires chartered or military aircraft scheduled weeks to months in advance. The shipping of their equipment, for example from the United States to the CENTCOM AOR, can take 45-60 days. Upon the operational commander's request, the CT exemplifies rapid mobility since it can project OCS to a theater on the next available commercial flight. The KO can accomplish the mission with a minimal equipment set, likely consisting of laptop computers and transportation in the AOR.⁵⁹

The decision to sustain the mission with OCS in lieu of organic logistics, or other capability, should result from a detailed cost-benefit analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of each option. The decision-making process occurs as part of logistics preparation of the battlefield (LPB). Army doctrine defines LPB as “those actions (force structure, resources, and strategic lift) taken to reduce the cost of logistically supporting an (operational plan) OPLAN or a contingency plan. LPB minimizes or eliminates potential problems at the outbreak of hostilities, during deployment, and throughout the operations. It is a systematic tool used by logisticians and commanders to complete their mission. It becomes the basis for deciding where, when, and how to deploy limited resources (supplies, equipment, people, and money).”⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), I-11.

⁵⁹ Army Technical Publication (ATP) 4-92, *Contracting Support to Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-13.

⁶⁰ Army Technical Publication (ATP) 4-93, *Sustainment Brigade* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), A-1.

Army doctrine provides greater context with its prescription for OCS planning.⁶¹ “A critical part in the operational level OCS planning process is the supported unit ... OCS analysis of the operational environment, which includes integrating this information with any OCS related, G-2 provided intelligence preparation of the operational environment information. This OCS analysis of the operational environment mission is a shared responsibility between the supported command’s staff and the CSB’s contracting support operations staff.”⁶² If the operational commander decides to deploy a contracting battalion or contracting team, the CSB selects the appropriate contractor(s) from a pool of available units.

The second question takes a snapshot of case study periods II and III, and asks how many contracting battalions (CBNs) and contracting teams (CTs) exist in support of the nine CSBs? Currently the nine CSBs, with Expeditionary Contracting Command oversight, lead, manage, and direct “17 contracting battalions and 108 contracting teams that provide expeditionary contracting support to Army and joint forces.”⁶³ However, none of the CBNs and only two CTs remain organic or under operational control (OPCON) to the 408th CSB, the lead Army contracting organization for the CENTCOM AOR.⁶⁴ The 408th CTs work as contracting centers in Kuwait and Qatar. The CSB and its CTs total about 134 personnel. Roughly, 100 of these personnel represent Table Distributed Allowance (TDA) employees.⁶⁵ TDA staff is not formally part of the contracting support brigade table of organization and equipment (TOE) organization. “The size

⁶¹ ATP 4-92.

⁶² ATP 4-92, A-10.

⁶³ “Expeditionary Contracting Command Fact Sheet,” Slideshare, accessed November 3, 2014, <http://www.slideshare.net/ArmyContracting/ecc-22934537>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ “2015 408th Contracting Support Brigade TDA,” FMSWeb Force Management Database, accessed August 6, 2014, https://fmsweb.army.mil/protected/WebTAADS/UIC_Frame.asp?DOC_TYPE=TDA&Update=GETSQL&MACOM=X1&DOCNO=X1WNH199&CCNUM=0116&DOCST=A&UIC=WNH199&EDATE=10/16/2015.

and structure of this TDA staff section, to include the number and functions of the civilian expeditionary workforce designated positions, varies between the different CSBs. The TDA staff can augment the brigade TOE structure in areas such as operations, and for some CSBs, to provide significant contracting support to outside the continental United States Army installations. This TDA structure can also provide unit liaison, planning, and staff training support.”⁶⁶ Considering the OCS required to sustain Army, joint, and combined forces in OEF-A, the 408th lacks organizational structure to maintain a growing theater past initial deployments.

In contrast to the 408th, the 409th Contracting Support Brigade, Kaiserslautern, Germany mission commands two CBNs, and nine CTs.⁶⁷ The 410th Contracting Support Brigade, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas mission commands one CBN, and six CTs.⁶⁸ The 411th Contracting Support Brigade, Camp Coiner, Korea mission commands one CBN and six CTs.⁶⁹ The 413th Contracting Support Brigade, Fort Shafter, Hawaii mission commands seven CTs.

In comparison to the 408th, the 414th Contracting Support Brigade, Vicenza, Italy mission commands four CTs.⁷⁰ “The Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) contracting units integrated into stateside operations” include the 412th Contracting Support Brigade, Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston with one CBN and four CTs.⁷¹ Additionally, the 418th Contracting Support Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas mission commands four CBNs and sixteen contracting teams.⁷² The 419th Contracting Support Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C. mission

⁶⁶ ATP 4-92, 1-8.

⁶⁷ “Expeditionary Contracting Command Fact Sheet,” Slideshare, accessed November 3, 2014, <http://www.slideshare.net/ArmyContracting/ecc-22934537>.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

commands three CBNs and twelve CTs.⁷³ The 408th CSB, who support the largest and most contested AOR, the CENTCOM, AOR have the equivalent structure of a Garrison contracting brigade.

The significance of contrasting and comparing the distribution of CBNs and CTs emerges in the evaluation of the 408th's capability to provide adequate support to OEF-A. Outside of the aforementioned contracting units and their respective distributions, the remaining contracting organizations are available for supporting global contingencies. However, the Secretary of Defense or President must authorize funding and the required sustainment to support a new contingency (phase 0). The same authority moves the contingency to phase 1 or beyond. Thus, the required time and resources to allocate additional CBNs or CTs to a CSB such as the 408th may be constrained.

The first sub question asks, "How many warranted contracting officers (KOs) do the units have; is there a DOD requirement to maintain a certain number?" According to the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USFMSA), no Army or joint organizations have been required to maintain billets for warranted Army contracting officers.⁷⁴ The researcher conducted a query on the Force Management Support website (FMSWEB) and found the above result by searching ranks of captain (O3) through colonel (O6). The rank of captain stands as the earliest an Army officer can transfer to or assess to an Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) career designation; specifically for this study, the military occupational specialty (MOS) classification is 51C. The

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ "2015 408th Contracting Support Brigade TDA," FMSWeb Force Management Database, accessed August 6, 2014, https://fmsweb.army.mil/protected/WebTAADS/UIC_Frame.asp?DOC_TYPE=TDA&Update=GETSQL&MACOM=X1&DOCNO=X1WNH199&CCNUM=0116&DOCST=A&UIC=WNH199&EDATE=10/16/2015.

rank of colonel in the 51 specialty series, classifies AAC members as generalists (51Z), and serves as the highest-ranking officer and commander of a CSB.⁷⁵

The second sub question continues ascertaining the CSB's capability by asking, "What sustainment support can the CSB leverage to meet requirements?" As outlined previously in this monograph, Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), under the guidance of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), may add contracting capability to the CSB when requested by the GCC. This support typically occurs when the GCC designates the CSB as the lead service for contracting coordination (LSCC).⁷⁶ Another capability previously mentioned in this monograph is the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). AMC's team LOGCAP forward units may expand the capacity of the CSB or the joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC), requiring contract management support or mission command. As of August 2012, LOGCAP comprised the largest contract density in OEF-A with thirty-five percent of all FOB-based contractors.⁷⁷ The Combined-JTSCC placed second with nineteen percent. These support relationships transcend doctrine and set the tone for the next question.

The third question, which resides in case study periods II and III asks, "What is the actual functioning relationship of the contracting support brigade (CSB) and the GCC and Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC), respectively?" The core principle in these relationships that underscores this question is the contrast between command authority and contracting authority. Army doctrines explains, "Command authority, prescribed in Title 10, US Code, Section 164,

⁷⁵ Ibid. FMSWEB: 4M (Army Acquisition Corps Candidate) and 4Z (Army Acquisition Corps Member) are the only Army Skill Identifier (ASI) requirements for Army contracting officers in FMSWEB.

⁷⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), xiii.

⁷⁷ CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, "Procurement Opportunities in: Afghanistan and the Central Asian States (CAS)"(briefing, CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, MacDill AFB, FL, 2012), accessed November 1, 2014, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a578473.pdf>.

includes the authority to perform functions involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks and designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of an operation; however, command authority does not include the ability to make binding contracts on behalf of the US Government. The authority to acquire supplies and services for the government comes from three sources: (1) the US Constitution (2) statutory authority found in US Code Title 10, and (3) regulatory authority from the FAR, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, and Service FAR supplements.”⁷⁸ The operational commander cannot make the CSB commander or their contracting officers (KOs) execute a contracting action. That authority will always reside with the contracting authority chain of command – the CSB, then ACC/ECC, and finally US Army Materiel Command.⁷⁹

Army doctrine states, “When deployed, the CSB has a direct support (DS) relationship with the Army Forces commander in the operational area and executes its contracting mission under the direction and contracting authority of the ECC.”⁸⁰ The Army Forces (operational) commander operating in their respective region executes the mission and intent of the GCC. The DS relationship as defined in Army doctrine is “... a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance... A unit assigned a DS relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the supported unit.”⁸¹ What doctrine does not account for is a scenario such as OEF-A in 2014. In this scenario, CENTCOM, as the AOR manager in a combined and joint environment, has specific

⁷⁸ ATP 4-92, 1-10.

⁷⁹ ATP 4-92, 1-11.

⁸⁰ FM 4-92.

⁸¹ Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-87.

requirements for their ECC operationally controlled CSB, the 408th. Coincidentally, multiple contingencies and theater security cooperation responsibilities exist for US Army Central Command that requires operational contract support (OCS). CENTCOM as the parent unit can set priorities, but according to numerous GAO and DOD reports, the predecessor organization of the ECC and its subordinate CSBs (formerly the PARCs) has struggled under these circumstances. To mitigate past struggles and prepare for future engagements, CENTCOM designates services, respectively, as lead services for contracting coordination (LSCCs) for each of their countries in the AOR where they maintain a footprint. The CSB in its current structure cannot possibly support OEF-A's contracting requirements and the other Phase 0 requirements in the AOR.

The ECC, providing Army contracting personnel for the five joint regional contracting centers (RCCs) currently deployed in Afghanistan, support a joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC).⁸² Army doctrine states, "Deployed Army contracting battalions and teams can, when required ... be task organized by the supporting CSB into regional contracting centers and offices."⁸³ Additionally, Regional Contracting Offices (RCOs) provide another support option. Army doctrine states, "Like RCCs, Army-based regional contracting offices are temporary theater support contracting organizations built around augmented contracting teams operating under the command and contracting oversight of a designated regional contracting center."⁸⁴ The tension between doctrine and reality exists because the RCCs in Afghanistan have been indefinite since 2003. In addition, the 408th CSB, responsible for southwest Asia does not provide direct support to these RCCs or their customers.

⁸² Michael T. Luft, "Contracting in Afghanistan," (briefing., Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan., 2013), 8, accessed November 29, 2014, https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://pdf-release.net/external/454170/pdf-release-dot-net Contracting_in_Afghanistan_DoD.pdf.

⁸³ ATP 4-92, 2-12.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Joint doctrine states, the joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC) “Commands theater support contracting; coordinates common contracting actions in the joint operations area via joint contracting support board; assists in OCS analysis of the OE effort. (The JTSCC is) Most applicable in complex, large-scale phase IV operations.” The CENTCOM Contracting Command currently fills the JTSCC role in OEF-A. According to Army doctrine, the CSB may stand up a JTSCC as it serves as the “basis for a joint theater support contracting command responsible for common contracting support.” However, an AOR the size of OEF-A requires the handoff to a larger contracting organization. The ECC “when designated as the lead service for contracting...can deploy its headquarters mission command capability to establish a JTSCC.”⁸⁵ This explains why the ECC and its regional contracting centers have and continue to services Afghanistan. Even still, the CSB, supporting the operational commander, must be capable of supporting the initial requirements that facilitate a transfer of authority/responsibility to the larger contracting organization.

The Army forces commander for the CENTCOM AOR, ARCENT maintains a forward deployed headquarters (HQs) in Kuwait and a main command post (MCP) at Shaw Air Force Base, SC; formerly at Fort McPherson during the start of OIF and OEF-A. The forward HQs receive direct support from the 408th CSB and the MCP receives planning and advisory support from the principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC). While Army doctrine clarifies that the PARC transformed into the CSB during the 2007 evolution of the ACC, the unit still exists at ARCENT as a rear echelon of the 408th CSB.⁸⁶

How many Phase 0 engagements occur every year in the CENTCOM AOR?” The exact number of phase 0 engagements that CENTCOM and its subordinate units conduct yearly is

⁸⁵ “Expeditionary Contracting Command Fact Sheet,” Slideshare, accessed November 3, 2014, <http://www.slideshare.net/ArmyContracting/ecc-22934537>.

⁸⁶ FM 4-92, 1-1.

beyond the classification level of this monograph. However, the unclassified estimate of these engagements easily approximates over 50 yearly. This part of the question transcends all periods of the case study and displays a continuous requirement for CENTCOM. CENTCOM's AOR includes twenty countries.⁸⁷ Each country ranks in priority and potentially requires support by military engagement. Many of these engagements occur on a rotational basis – meaning that units and individuals maintain a regular presence in the AOR. Thus, they require planned sustainment in order to facilitate their respective missions. Due to diplomatic conditions and permissions, the number of military personnel in these environments is often restricted. This presents another opportunity to use operational contract support (OCS) to maximize efficiency and surpass personnel constraints. These missions have occurred through Periods I through III encompassing the timeframe of OEF-A. Again, one contracting support brigade (CSB) supports regionally assigned Army units and when designated by CENTCOM, joint forces.

The second part to the fourth question is “How many current contingencies are there? Just as CENTCOM participates in numerous phase 0 engagements; their volatile environment also includes current contingencies wide in scope of responsibility. Contracting support could be required in other areas therefore, this monograph limits its research to specific conflicts in OEF-A, in Jordan to support the ‘Syrian Crisis’, and the correlating conflict in Iraq to combat and degrade the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). This part of the question focuses on period III of the case study.

As stated earlier, OEF-A continues to exist as a key area for Army contracting activity. The current CENTCOM Commander, GEN Lloyd Austin declared OEF-A as his GCC's number one priority of effort in a March 2014 statement before The House Appropriations Committee –

⁸⁷ “Area of Responsibility Countries,” US Central Command Website Home: About CENTCOM, accessed November 8, 2014, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/area-of-responsibility-countries-en>.

Defense Subcommittee on the Posture of US Central Command.⁸⁸ Specifically he requested his forces to “Responsibly transition Operation Enduring Freedom and support Afghanistan as a regionally integrated, secure, stable and developing country.”⁸⁹ In discussing the challenges OEF-A presents, GEN Austin acknowledges four principal efforts. Those efforts consist of “Completing the transition and retrograde of US personnel and equipment out of Afghanistan...Maintaining the safety and security of US/Coalition troops and personnel...Supporting continuing CT efforts that are contributing to the defeat of Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, including the Haqqani Network,” and “Advising, training and assisting the ANSF, while also helping them to prepare to provide security in support of the April 2014 scheduled national elections.” These efforts all require extensive contract support, especially the retrograde and withdrawal from theater. The continued presence that these efforts allude to creates new requirements for security and sustainment.

The US Air National Guard has maintained a training relationship with the Jordanian Armed Forces since 2004.⁹⁰ CENTCOM support in Jordan has required and maintained a footprint since 2011 with the Eager Lion 2011 exercise.⁹¹ These multi-lateral annual exercises have included up to 40 countries and 10,000 personnel. CENTCOM continues these exercises in 2014 despite the ongoing Syrian civil war and rise of the “Islamic State in Syria.” While this

⁸⁸ “Commander’s Posture Statement,” US Central Command Website Home: About CENTCOM., accessed November 8, 2014, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/commanders-posture-statement-en>

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Donna Miles, “Guard Program Builds Partner Capacity, Relationships in Centcom,” November 1, 2013, Defense.Gov News, accessed November 10, 2014, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121042>.

⁹¹ Nicholas Seeley, “US, 18 other nations, wrap up Eager Lion military exercise in Jordan,” 29 May 2012, The Christian Science Monitor, accessed November 10, 2014, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0529/US-18-other-nations-wrap-up-Eager-Lion-military-exercise-in-Jordan>.

event has grown, so have the sustainment requirements. “The first Eager Lion, a bilateral exercise between the US and Jordan, took place in the summer of 2011 – when the world’s attention was focused on Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, and the fledgling protests in Syria were just another blip on the radar.”⁹² Since 2012, CENTCOM maintains a permanent presence in Jordan with a rotational division headquarters. This footprint does not include a tactical sustainment/logistics unit or its vehicles and equipment. “On 17 April 2013, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the deployment of elements of the 1st Armored Division headquarters to Jordan in response to the ongoing crisis in Syria... If directed, the elements from the 1st Armored Division could establish a joint task force headquarters that would provide command and control for chemical weapons response, humanitarian assistance efforts, and stability operations.”⁹³ These forces have relied primarily on Acquisition Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) support since the start of the first Eager Lion in 2011.⁹⁴ The researcher queried FEDBizOPs.gov to compare the ACSA to OCS support in Jordan. The federal business opportunities website, FEDBISOPs.gov stands as the central database for solicitations of government contracts. The website only lists nine solicitations from the 408th CSB in support of Eager Lion activities since 2009. Those solicitations include one for basic life support services in 2012, submitted by the 408th CSB’s Qatar contracting center.⁹⁵ Then on OCT 10, 2014, the ACC submitted one for basic life support

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ “1st Armored Division ‘Old Ironsides,’” Global Security: FORSCOM, accessed November 12, 2014, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/1ad.htm>.

⁹⁴ “Commander’s Posture Statement,” US Central Command Website Home: About CENTCOM., accessed November 8, 2014, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/commanders-posture-statement-en>.

⁹⁵ “Life Support Services JTC (Jordan),” Federal Business Opportunities Database, accessed November 12, 2014, https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b2050bcbe14b95854671c79214c65e58&tab=core&_cview=1.

services.⁹⁶ Later on 20 OCT 2014, the ACC submitted a solicitation for materials handling equipment support.⁹⁷ The requirements that these solicitations fulfill represent a large logistical footprint needed to support the exercises and forward headquarters. This same requirement needed soliciting as early as 2009 or 2010 in support of the first Eager Lion exercise. The ACSA does not provide the quality assurance, contract management, cost analysis, and secure funding supported by an Army contract. The current contingency in Iraq has spawned the opposite approach to responsiveness due to US President Barak Obama's constraint of his "no boots" on ground" guidance.

CENTCOM's management of the growing conflict in Iraq in support of the degradation of the "Islamic State in Syria" necessitates a contract-reliant effort to underwrite a ground effort limited to an advisory and training mission. With the guidance from the President Obama less than two months old and with the situation in Iraq developing daily, the US Army Contracting Command, and likely one or more of its CSBs responded quickly to supporting the mission. "The US Army Contracting Command posted a notice last month (August 2014) seeking contractors willing to work on an initial 12-month contract, who should be "cognizant of the goals of reducing tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and Sunni and Shias."⁹⁸ The article that contained this quote was titled, "In place of 'boots on the ground,' US seeks contractors for Iraq." It posted in the 'Stars and Stripes' periodical on September 7, 2014.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ "Basic Life Support Services to Support ARCENT Exercises throughout the Kingdom of Jordan," Federal Business Opportunities Database, accessed November 12, 2014, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=6650e0719ca9668022bb1dcc27607f1b&tab=core&_cview=1.

⁹⁷ "Jordan Transportation and Material Handling Equipment Services," Federal Business Opportunities Database, accessed November 12, 2014, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=60ed0c0913584e8fc43aad06ff66057e&tab=core&_cview=0.

⁹⁸ Seth Robson, "In place of 'boots on the ground,' US seeks contractors for Iraq," *Stars and Stripes*, September 7, 2014, accessed November 13, 2014, <http://www.stripes.com/news/in-place-of-boots-on-the-ground-us-seeks-contractors-for-iraq-1.301798>.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Summary

The DOD authorized organizational structure combined with the present and future operational requirements challenge the feasibility of the 408th CSB meeting doctrinal requirements. The Army has made vast improvements since 2007 in the way it approaches OCS. Operational commanders understand the importance of OCS, but there are still limitations in the effective contract management of the tactical requirements that underwrite operations. 19 military personnel, augmented by 17 civilian contracting personnel (408th's military organizational structure) are going to struggle in the management, planning, and execution of contracts across the most unpredictable and dynamic AOR in the DOD.

Analysis

The analysis of the research questions nests in the monograph's four hypotheses. Each hypothesis tests the questions results against previously stated criteria. The criterion focuses on the contracting support brigade's relationship with key units subordinate to the operational commander. The findings from the questions also serve as a foundation for the results of the hypotheses and the successive recommendations at the end of this monograph.

The first hypothesis states, "If the CSB force structure is increased then the GCC can increase the tempo of Phase 0 operations." The findings from the case study provide mixed outcomes for this hypothesis. The Army CSB, particularly the 408th CSB, must increase its force structure to manage, let alone increase the tempo of phase 0 operations. As explained in answering the second question of this monograph, CSBs such as the 409th in Germany, the 410th in San Antonio, Texas the 411th in South Korea and the 413th in Hawaii seem to maintain the appropriate infrastructure to support their region. In this case the 408th exemplifies an anomaly with their inadequate force structure.

The update of Army doctrine on 15 October 2014 provides a vast improvement in the Army contracting community's support to operations at all levels of war.¹⁰⁰ The key exception to this complement emerges from their lack of prescription of "phase 0" contract management and execution responsibilities. Additionally, Army doctrine even warns the reader of the "leanness" of the CSB – meaning that the CSB lacks the breadth and depth in personnel of larger sustainment units.¹⁰¹ Thus, the hypothesis receives direct validation from Army doctrine which suggests the CSB has to add personnel to maximize effectiveness. Still, the research results challenge the hypothesis, as there are examples of CSBs other than the 408th (ARCENT/CENTCOM) that can meet the doctrinal requirements in their area of responsibility.

The second hypothesis states, "If the CSB is (operationally controlled) OPCON to the ASCC then OCS to the warfighter is more integrated, flexible, simple, economical, continuous, and responsive." The outcomes suggest that this hypothesis is supported. The bottom line is that the CSB works for the US Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC), not the ASCC or Army Corps. A conflict exists in Army doctrine in reference to the CSB's support relationships. "Contracting support brigades are (table of equipment) TOE commands assigned to the ECC for outside the continental United States operations... The CSB commander is the Army's primary theater strategic and operational level contracting support planner and advisor, and commands Army theater support contracting organizations."¹⁰² The CSB maintains a direct support relationship with the ASCC or Army Corps, which limits that organization from setting priorities for theater contracting execution, planning, and management. Army doctrine explains the CSB/ASCC direct support (DS) relationship by stating "the direct support relationship provides theater and field army commanders the capability, in all phases of the operation, to set the aligned

¹⁰⁰ ATP 4-92.

¹⁰¹ ATP 4-92, 1-13.

¹⁰² ATP 4-92, 1-2.

contracting support brigade's priorities, to place the brigade on the battlefield (when deployed) and to task their supporting CSBs to accomplish missions within the scope of CSB doctrinally-based operations.”

Army doctrine lacks clarity that guarantees the unabated support to the operational commander. The supporting logic is that the ECC exercises command and organizing authority and can set priorities for the CSB that may conflict with ASCC's or Corps' priorities. For example, if there is a contracting requirement in Israel, the US Army European Command (USAREUR), and thus the 409th CSB's has responsibility. Also, assume that 408th CSB has a forward deployed contracting team supporting an exercise in Jordan (ARCENT's AOR). If USAREUR needs additional support in Israel, technically the ECC can direct the 408th's forward deployed Jordan team to support the requirement. Neither the operational commander should not have to compete or bargain with the ECC for contracting support. The operational commander, nor the CSB commander should have to plunder through the request-for-forces (RFF) process to right size the breadth and depth of the CSB.

In the transition to the joint environment, Army doctrine notates that the CSB may lead the Combined-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (CJTSCC) until the ECC takes over.¹⁰³ Army doctrine states, “The primary building block of an Army centric joint theater support contracting command will be a complete contracting support brigade headquarters along with selected Expeditionary Contracting Command personnel... the ECC Commander would fill the joint theater support contracting command billet... the contracting support brigade commander would serve in one of the other key joint theater support contracting command positions, such as the chief of staff, or as the senior contracting official for theater support.”¹⁰⁴ The operational commander does not inherently retain his senior contracting commander and

¹⁰³ ATP 4-92, 3-11.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

advisor to conduct OCS in the rest of the AOR. The OEF-A construct, supported by its CJTSCC and regional contracting centers (RCCs) allows the 408th CSB to manage the rest of the AOR. Again, this structure evolved before and in the midst of creating the CSB. Current Army doctrine's designation of a DS relationship between the ASCC or Corps and the CSB leaves the operational commander vulnerable to lose a portion of the CSB headquarters leadership and overall capability.¹⁰⁵

One of the likely reasons for the current support relationships is the tension between contracting authority and command authority. The ASCC or Army Corps can still mission command the CSB while the ACC/ECC retains contract authority. This relationship is similar to the GCC/ASCC/Army Corps relationship with US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). TRANSCOM authorizes, directs, coordinates, and synchronizes strategic and inter-theater transportation of the operational commander's forces. His theater sustainment command (TSC) or G4 (logistics directorate) solicit approval for Army forces transportation to and within the AOR through TRANSCOM. During this process, the operational commander maintains operational control of his forces. If the operational commander retains the same authority over the CSB, that authority further validates the hypothesis' claim of making OCS to the warfighter more integrated, flexible, simple, economical, continuous, and responsive.

If an expanded contracting battalion (CBN) effectively integrates with the TSC then adequate contracting support is available to meet theater-level requirements. The outcomes of this study support this hypothesis. The research showed that the TSC, or its forward footprint, the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) is doctrinally aligned with the CBN.¹⁰⁶ The actual

¹⁰⁵ ATP 4-92, 1-11.

¹⁰⁶ ATP 4-92, 1-12.

TSC, or partial TSC known as a TSC (-), when forward deployed without an ESC would likely maintain the same relationship. The CBN may also align with an Army division.¹⁰⁷

As opposed to the CSB, the CBN is better suited for organizational leanness with “as required” augmentation by additional contracting teams (CTs). The notional expanded CSB, with their currently established theater contracting authority makes this possible. These relationships also set the tone for the fourth and final hypothesis.

If the CSB’s lowest subordinate unit, the contracting team (CT), provides direct support to the brigade combat team (BCT) then adequate contracting support is available to meet their requirements. The outcomes in the research support this hypothesis. Army doctrine states, “When deployed, CTs operate under the command of a parent contracting support brigade or battalion and may be task organized into separate expeditionary contracting elements. CT support arrangements may include, but are not limited to: ... direct support to individual brigade combat teams (BCT), particularly in early operational phases... non-BCT divisional units ... organizations, operating in the division area of operations, particularly in later operational phases...direct support to sustainment brigade headquarters.”¹⁰⁸ The size of the CT, complemented by the OCS capability in the BCT S-4 section is adequate to support the BCT’s contracting requirements. The CJTSCC and/or CSB by doctrine should develop a theater contracting support architecture that effectively facilitates the CTs meeting these requirements. The progress of the Army and greater DOD contracting community notated in the case study of this document continues, especially in the midst of current conflicts. The research of recent and past (within the case study construct) Army contracting operations in comparison and contrast with old and current doctrine and criticisms provided a baseline to test the hypotheses. The expanded contracting support brigade (CSB) served as the central element in these tests as it is

¹⁰⁷ ATP 4-92, 1-12.

¹⁰⁸ ATP 4-92, 1-11.

the core operational contracting organization. The intent of comparing the subsequent parallel support structures, with the warfighter (representing support to the operational commander and his subordinates) in one category and the contracting organization in the other was to verify the consistency of contracting capability at the Army's respective organization levels. The result was effective analysis that derived the relevant recommendations that discussed in the conclusion section.

Findings

The purpose of this study was to examine the efficacy of one of the Army's most important sustainment organizations. The CSB as an operational headquarters will play a more critical role now and in the future than in any other US conflict. Army leadership has given clear guidance on their vision for the future. The CSB must posture and prepare to underscore the capability that meets the objectives of this vision. Again, the Army and greater DOD contracting community consistently progresses to meet these challenges.

The results of the study indicate that the contracting support brigade (CSB) has the appropriate intellectual and doctrinal framework to plan, execute, and manage operational contract support (OCS) in the contemporary global operational environment. The CSB might be the pinnacle achievement emerging from the 14-year period of evolution in Army contracting. Still, the CSB has organizational and institutional challenges that will hinder it from exploiting its potential capability to meet operational requirements. A significant gap still exists between some CSBs and the operational community, including operational-level logisticians.

Consistent with the questions and hypothesis of the monograph, the findings recapitulate critical points derived from the research. The findings endeavor to maintain a consistent logic trail in researching the capability of the CSB. As the findings conclude the intent shifts to analysis and whether the initial hypotheses are supported or not. When OEF-A began in 2001, the then current OCS doctrine provided a similar perspective to current doctrine. That Army doctrine originally published in 1999 states, "To bridge the gap before scheduled resources and CSS units

arrive, or when other logistical support options do not provide the supplies and service needed, the Army is turning more frequently to contracting support to provide goods and services required. Contracting support is an integral part of the overall process of obtaining support across the entire spectrum. Contingency contracting provides the commander a flexible and responsive means to support deployed forces and their mission.” While this Army doctrine recognizes the need for a contracting force, the staffing and organization effort of the contracting support brigade (CSB) then in 2001 and today in 2014 does not correlate with the narrative.

The evolution of Army contracting during OEF-A resulted in the birth of the current doctrinal minimally manned CSB (developed in 2007). However, adequately sized and robust CSBs such as the 409th CSB (and its subordinate units) supporting the US Army European Command have continually developed as an organization since World War II. Mission requirements force the 408th CSB to request additional contracting capability to support the CENTCOM AOR. This headquarters is unproven in OEF-A and has garnered limited success in the greater CENTCOM AOR. Instead, regional contracting centers (RCCs) in OEF- A have accomplished the mission stipulated for the CSB.

RCCs have become the OEF-A contracting support status quo. However, this theater from the period of 2007 to 2014 has expanded critical thought and the subsequent realization of new threats, requirements, and approaches in the CENTCOM AOR. While the doctrinal scope of the CSB has maintained pace, the actual size of the conceptual/doctrinal CSB and 408th CSB has not matched this growth. Years after the Gansler Commission Report, many of the same criticisms still exist for Army contracting. The CSB cannot be the responsive, adaptive, and flexible sustainment unit setting conditions for the warfighter if they are piecing together capability as the mission begins. The CSB must adapt and grow with changes in the operational environment.

The mismatch of capability to requirements emanates more from the CENTCOM AOR than any other AOR. The bottom line is that the 408th CSB is understrength and will have to

request additional personnel to meet requirements in the AOR. The timelines associated with selecting, requesting, and deploying the appropriate contracting personnel supports a best-case scenario of challenged unit cohesion and unity of effort. Army doctrine does not seem to consider this dilemma; even worse doctrine assumes that the assigned personnel will have the necessary regional expertise to support operations. That is the conjectural equivalent of an untrained Army brigade in a complex environment having to learn, adapt, and fight ad hoc while attempting to mitigate associated risks. The CSB must expand immediately and permanently with another contracting battalion and at least five more contracting teams to address requirements in the CENTCOM AOR.

Once configured, the ideal CSB would be capable of executing the core functions of developing and authorizing contracts. None of the 408th or any CSB MTOE positions requires their personnel to acquire a contracting warrant – which is required to authorize contracts. However, ACC 51C officers are required to obtain Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Contracting Certification Levels.” The education and experience requirements to meet these certifications per the DOD’s Defense Acquisition University provide comprehensive development of the Army contracting officer. Still, the ability to effectively develop and execute a contract depends on the availability of warranted contracting officers. While a given CSB may have adequate warranted contracting officers, Army regulation does not mandate the requirement as it should. In the greater scheme of the “Principal-Agent-Problem” principle, the conditions set by the CSB’s organizational structure denote an inherent imbalance or deficiency in the KO and contractor’s relationship. The Army contracting community led by the US Army Contracting Command has to address this issue by requiring a certain number and specific populations of contracting officers to attain warrants.

The concepts of shaping, security cooperation, assuring access, building partner capacity, providing flexible options, and even strategic depth signify functions of the ASCC — heavily supported by the theater sustainment command (TSC) and the CSB. These functions embody

operational requirements that are critical throughout, but perhaps most critical in phase 0/steady state. Army doctrine states, “During steady state, CSBs provide contracting advice and assistance to the supported headquarters with emphasis on OCS planning AOR-wide as well as phase 0 operations support.”¹⁰⁹ Still, the fact that any operational environment can transition to Phase 0 to Phase 3 in a matter of hours emphasizes the importance of the TSC/CSB relationship. This doctrinal relationship between the TSC and CSB must be maintained, supported and encouraged by the operational commander and his headquarters.

Army doctrine also explicitly states that contracting battalions and teams will provide direct support to US Army corps/divisions and US Army brigades, respectively.¹¹⁰ At this level, direct support relationships are appropriate because the CSB, per guidance from the ASCC’s operational commander should have established overarching theater contracts. The CT/CBN can then authorize and execute sub-contracts for the corps, divisions, and brigades based on their requirements.

The decision to deploy available contracting teams (CTs) and battalions (CBNs) to a particular AOR rests with the ACC/ECC. They also serve as the authorization authority for their CSBs, which again, regionally align with the GCCs and their respective ASCC. The operational commander at the ASCC does not control their assigned CSB through a direct support relationship; the ACC ultimately controls the CSB. The “direct support” relationship mirrors the original role of the CSB as an advisor to the ASCC commander on contracting issues. However, the operational commander shapes theaters and needs to have his critical assets available and ready to act on his guidance. While the operational commander needs and likely appreciates an advisor, more importantly he needs sustainment support through contracting planning, management and execution.

¹⁰⁹ ATP 4-92, 2-1.

¹¹⁰ ATP 4-92, 1-11.

Conclusion

Operational contract support (OCS) is ultimately the responsibility of the Army logistics community.¹¹¹ However, OCS does not win wars and meet strategic objectives. The operational commander has the responsibility to link tactical actions to achieve the aforementioned strategic objectives. Combat power and operational initiative sustained by tempo set the conditions for the decisive action that explicates these tactics. However, these tasks require a capable sustainment architecture that is flexible, responsive, and adaptive to not keep pace with, but instead to facilitate the warfighter's pursuit of the initiative. The costs and build-up required for operational logistics may not align with the temporal and spatial constraints of the mission. In the phase 0 and fiscally constrained operational environment, the Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) can spearhead the operations required to conduct theater-opening, establish initial capability, and posture the warfighter for decisive action. Thus, the operational commander must understand capabilities and limitations of the CSB. This monograph explains and contrasts both variables and argues that the CSB must expand immediately to meet doctrinal expectations. This expansion of capability will ensure the CSB adequately supports the operational commander in the generation combat power, sustainment of tempo, and maximization of operational reach. Whether it serves as the operational commander's primary or supplementary sustainment option, the CSB, at full capability is a critical enabler in the contemporary operational environment.

¹¹¹ ATTP 4-10.

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