

TOWARD A PAX UNIVERSALIS

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ABSTRACT

The centerpiece of the new U.S. strategy for the "New World Order" is a strategic reserve called the Crisis Response Force, designed to replace many aspects of our current forward defense. This study examines whether a strong, standing strategic reserve is appropriate to the American situation in the coming decade; it proceeds by comparing the overall strategy with five historic case studies of systems that faced similar problems and opportunities. The historic models chosen are the Roman Empire (from the fall of Carthage to A.D. 69; from A.D. 69 to A.D. 306; and from A.D. 306 until the final collapse); the Byzantine Empire; and the British Empire from Waterloo to World War I. The study applies a set of seven criteria to each case and systematically examines the results to find pitfalls and mechanisms which may have enduring relevance to a postulated future predicted by the 1991 Naval War College Global War Game. The study concludes that, as a (possibly extended) transitional stage toward an ideal network of regional coalitions, the new national strategy is realistic and effective—except, significantly, in the Middle East where a "naval bridge" approach should be taken. This study was originally prepared as a report for the Strategy and Campaign Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College (Strategy and Campaign Report 12-91).

Toward a Pax Universalis

A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for the 1990s

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PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, defense secretary Richard Cheney, and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have advocated a new U.S. strategy in the wake of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the recently completed “devolution” of the Soviet Union.¹ The president articulated the grand strategic design in his Aspen speech of 2 August 1990.² General Powell explained the proposed military framework for this grand strategic design in his “chairman’s vision” speech on 5 December 1990.³

The thrust of the overall concept is that the United States simply will not be able to afford a strategy of strong forward defense everywhere, given the thirty-percent budget reduction anticipated in the wake of the communist strategic collapse.⁴ The wisdom of such an approach is obvious to observers of the military budget debate. The threats we currently face are hard to define; we know they lurk there—and we see the chaos in Africa, Lebanon, and now in Eastern Europe, posed by problems of governance, ethnic hatreds, and religious fundamentalism. However, from a strategic force planning perspective, these threats are difficult to translate to a Congress and a public hungry for the expected peace dividend. Who, in February of 1990, would have predicted that we would be at war with Iraq one year later?

The centerpiece of the Chairman’s strategic vision is a strong, mobile, strategic reserve designed to replace many aspects of our current forward defense with the cheaper and more economical alternative of rapid deployment to a threatened area. Other aspects of the strategy include force packages dedicated to the Atlantic and Pacific, independent of the Contingency Force, for forward presence; reduced forward presence and U.S. basing overseas; and increased use of U.S. strategic mobility to compensate for reduced forward presence.⁵

The heavy reliance on a strong strategic reserve, the nucleus of this strategy, is a point of controversy. Historian Arther Ferrill contends that the

development of a strong, mobile reserve was a primary cause of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West.⁶ Military commentators such as Harry Summers have voiced concern that the reserve contemplated in the new U.S. strategy may be too lightly armed to win. Captain Allen L. Tiffany of the U.S. Army Reserve writes: "Though the importance of having rapidly deployable forces cannot be overstated, rapid deployability must take a back seat to the intelligent and reasonable design of combat units."⁷ Dr. Mackubin Owens echoes that concern and urges an intelligent, sequenced introduction of forces into theaters in contingency situations.⁸ However, this study is not designed to comment on the adequacy of the reserve; it is rather to examine whether a strong standing strategic reserve is appropriate to our situation in the approaching decade.

To say that the United States should not adopt the system proposed in the Chairman's vision because a strong strategic reserve failed the Roman Empire would be an unfounded generalization; it would also, however, be a mistake to ignore historical experience in examining the merits of the new strategy. This study attempts to place the new strategy in a historical context by comparing it with five historic case studies of similar problems and opportunities. Four of the cases examined are generally considered successes, and one a failure. All had some degree of success for a considerable amount of time. The criteria used in selecting these five particular historical security systems were:

- Each system had no large "superpower" competitor, but faced a number of smaller scale and less coherent threats than would be the case in bipolar competition.
- Each system was relatively durable; it had lasted for at least a century.
- Each encompassed a large multinational security system. (A candidate on the scale of Swiss or Swedish models would not have been large enough to satisfy the criteria.)

The objective was to study models of complexity and relative diffuseness of threat approximating the challenges and opportunities that will be faced by the United States in the post-Cold War era. The models that were chosen are: The early Roman Empire (from the destruction of Carthage to A.D. 69), the middle Roman Empire (from A.D. 69 to A.D. 306), the late Roman Empire (from A.D. 306 to the collapse in A.D. 476), the Byzantine Empire (A.D. 527 to A.D. 1000), and the British Empire from Waterloo to World War I.

Each case study examines several categories relevant to the situation the United States will face in the coming decades. These are: the method of

forward engagement, the type of reserve, the relative closure capability of reserve, the degree to which the system being defended depended on the periphery of the system for economic well-being, the cost of the security system, the balance between the forward-engagement and reserve components, indications and warning, and deterrence.

The study then draws systemic comparisons and offers some conclusions based on those comparisons. The objective in so doing is not to attempt to model our own security system on historical experiences that may well have been made irrelevant now by changed circumstances; rather, it is to find potential pitfalls and successful mechanisms which may have such enduring relevance that they will be useful in a critical and constructive examination of our own strategic instruments. The key question in the systemic analysis is whether an effective balance—between forward engagement and the proposed standing strategic reserve component (represented by the Contingency Force)—can be built into the proposed new strategy. All seven factors listed above will influence this attempted balance, but not equally. The historic models will give some indication of the weight each factor once had in circumstances similar to those that will be encountered by U.S. strategists in developing the new strategy.

To make such assessments, it has been necessary to postulate the future environment in which the new strategy will act. The predictive vehicle chosen is the Global War Game played at the Naval War College in July 1991. This game attempted to look ahead to the “new world order” in the next decade.

The study as a whole attempts to answer these key questions:

- Will the new strategy accomplish its objectives, that of giving the U.S. allies adequate security at an affordable cost with the reduced base force as postulated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?
- Is the system of forward engagement envisioned in the new strategy adequate? If not, what can be done to adjust it?
- Is the strategic reserve postulated in the new strategy adequate? If not, what adjustments can be made?

This study may appear to some to be ethnocentric and perhaps neo-imperialistic. It is not intended to be so. In a speech to the United Nations on 23 September 1991, President Bush stated plainly that the United States does not desire to impose a “Pax Americana” as a new world order. He stated, rather, that he was looking for a “Pax Universalis” whereby this country will be a partner in seeking a better world.⁹

There is a two-fold difficulty inherent in this study. First, for better or for worse, the United States is the world's only remaining superpower. There is no way to approach the subject without dealing with that reality. Dr. Robert Wood of the Naval War College likens this new senior-partner status to that of a "Global Marshal" rather than to the older and unpopular analogy of the "Global Policeman." He points out that the primary job of the U.S. Marshal in the American West was to put together ad hoc coalitions or posses to deal with emerging threats.¹⁰ General Powell envisions what appears to be the U.S. military's effort to position our forces so as best to contribute in the future to such efforts, in light of the lessons of the past few years.

A second problem that must be faced in taking a historical perspective is that the security systems that have faced circumstances similar to those we see today all chose to call themselves "empires." In view of the criteria chosen, it would be hard to find historical examples that were not imperial. The unfortunate truth is that despite the purest of motives we cannot change the circumstances that we inherit. If we can profit from the experiences of the Romans and Byzantines, we should do so. In studying them, we may well learn to avoid their failures.

The Early Roman Hegemonic Model

In his provocative study, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, Edward Luttwak describes the early Roman imperial security system as a hegemonic empire.¹¹ With the destruction of Carthage, Rome became the sole "superpower" in the Western world, as it was known during that era. She was consequently thrust into the role of guarantor of security. From the fall of Carthage onward, Rome developed with nations and tribes on the Mediterranean periphery a patchwork system of client relationships that placed considerable strategic depth between potential enemies and key interests. The clients who provided this depth were allowed considerable latitude within this system to act independently as long as their efforts did not conflict with vital Roman interests.¹² This allowed the Romans to exercise crisis management rather than having to garrison the entire periphery of the areas they viewed as vital. The system lasted roughly from 146 B.C. to A.D. 67 and provided an acceptable and affordable degree of security.

Method of Forward Engagement. The Roman strategy of forward engagement during this period was, insofar as possible, to allow the clients to handle on their own any low to mid-level threats to economic and social stability. If a threat became too great for the client to deal with, the legions intervened.¹³ Rome maintained garrisons on Roman soil close to the client's frontier, and sometimes in the territory of the client, depending on the coherence and immediacy of the threat.¹⁴ Notwithstanding, the preferred method of dealing with any incursion on the imperial periphery was to allow the client to make original contact and then to assess the situation. This afforded the luxury of considerable economy of force. This ring of surrogates was never fully closed, particularly along the German border where competent clients were hard to find.¹⁵ Nonetheless, the system did allow the Romans to economize elsewhere.

Type of Reserve. The hegemonic system had no actual standing strategic reserve, although as Luttwak points out, localized reserves were available.¹⁶ Rome depended on the strategic depth afforded by the clients, backed up by neighboring legions in the region, to provide warning adequate to redistribute forces to a trouble spot or to raise new legions if warranted. Luttwak and the noted historian T. Mommsen think the absence of a reserve constituted an unacceptable risk, but other commentators such as Arther Ferrill feel that the risk was justified by the absence of an enemy capable of launching an attack from two strategic directions at once.¹⁷

Relative Closure Time of Reserve. Because there was no centralized standing strategic reserve, an ad hoc reserve had to be constituted if a threat arose beyond the joint capabilities of clients and local Roman forces. This was generally done by fashioning a reaction force from neighboring regions or, in rare cases, by raising entirely new legions.¹⁸ The process was cumbersome, but it did not have to be exercised very often. Commentators who normally disagree on the quality of Roman strategy, such as Edward Luttwak and Theodore Mommsen, consider this to have been an unacceptable strategic risk, but others such as Ferrill argue that lacking a superpower threat capable of coordinated attacks from several strategic directions, the Romans could well afford to take this risk. Ferrill further argues that while a reserve is an imperative at the tactical and operational levels of war, it is not always appropriate at the strategic level.¹⁹ The best evidence for this position is that the Romans during this period got along without one. The hegemonic system never faced a threat so ominous as to cause the Romans of that era to consider seriously creating a strategic reserve. When the

Flavian emperors shifted to a preclusive system (strong forward defense) after A.D. 70, they also did without a reserve.

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. A primary reason why this system served Rome so well during this period was that no truly vital region or key interest of the empire was directly exposed to immediate risk in case of invasion. This gave the system strategic depth. Egypt, with its vital grain supply, was the most remote overseas possession truly vital to the economic well-being of the empire; even it, however, was safely protected by clients on the west and east as well as by the strategic depth afforded by the desert to the south.

Cost of the Security System. In terms of manpower and national treasure, the hegemonic system was perhaps the most inexpensive of those surveyed in this study.²⁰ Of course, this was made possible by the fact that the client states were then bearing much of the cost, which would be borne by the Roman taxpayer in the middle and late Roman systems.²¹ The entire empire was guarded by an army that seldom exceeded 380,000 troops, only about half of whom were fully paid regulars and the rest auxiliaries.²² Although there is no record of anyone having actually done so, there were individual Romans in that period who could have paid from their personal fortunes the entire cost of the Roman contribution to the security system.²³ This is a circumstance seldom equalled in the history of great empires.

Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. Obviously there was no such balance because there was no formal standing reserve. Ferrill's view that reserves have little efficacy at the strategic level when the threat is not strategically coherent appears to be the main principle at work here.

Indications and Warning. The Romans of this period appear to have constructed an excellent intelligence system composed of spies, diplomats, and paid informers such as Josephus the turncoat Jewish general. This type of intelligence was particularly important in client management. To be sure, the intelligence system was not rapid; on occasion the Romans suffered strategic surprise, as during the Jewish Revolt. It appears their use of Josephus at the time was an attempt to "get inside the heads" of their rebel opponents.²⁴ The system appears generally to have worked well enough to give the Romans relatively good warning.

Deterrence. The operation of "armed suasion," the knowledge of what Rome was capable of doing if displeased, is described by Luttwak in *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*. This concept appears to have been used by the Romans as a tool with which to apply a measured threat of

military power in the diplomatic arena for the purposes of managing clients and deterring potential foes.²⁵

The Middle Roman Empire and Preclusive Security

The father of the era of “preclusive security” (as Luttwak calls it) in the Roman Empire was the Emperor Vespasian, who began after A.D. 67 the process of absorbing the majority of the client states directly into the empire, thereby increasing immensely central control of the security system.²⁶ There is a great deal of debate among historians as to why the Romans abandoned the messy but successful hegemonic system. Luttwak feels that the soldier-emperors may have simply become impatient with the “leisurely” diplomatic processes required to manage the clients.²⁷ It is also likely that Vespasian and his allies in the Senate realized that with the “middleman,” in the form of client governments, eliminated, Rome’s coffers would be increased greatly. It is probably safe to assume that no “cost-benefit analysis” of any sort was done to ensure that the long-term costs of larger armies, fortifications, and direct imperial administration would not eventually outweigh the increased revenue; we will probably never know if one was. The reason the Romans abandoned the hegemonic system is probably irrelevant to this discussion, but it is significant that the hegemonic empire required less outlay of men and money than the preclusive system that will now be examined.

By the reign of Trajan (about A.D. 101), the empire had stopped expanding and had embarked on a deliberate policy of strategic defense, a strategy of perimeter protection thoroughly characterized by forward engagement with no standing strategic reserve. Like its predecessor, this strategy has been criticized by some for lacking a reserve and by others for fostering a “Maginot mentality.”²⁸ However, it must be noted that the system served Rome well for over two hundred years and was never seriously breached in a manner threatening the overall security of the empire.

Method of Forward Engagement. This era was probably the golden age of forward engagement. The Romans tenaciously defended every foot of the imperial periphery with a series of *limes* (field fortifications) that included watchtowers, blockhouses, great legionary bases, and extensive patrolling.²⁹ Remains of these great fortifications, such as Hadrian’s Wall, can still be seen today. The legions that manned them came to stay, and they became regionalized. Some modern critics feel these legions became too

regionally oriented.³⁰ However, the legions did have a great impact in making the border regions of the empire more Roman in culture and economics, which made them easier to govern and more profitable to tax, and also rendered them more fertile ground for army recruiting.³¹

Type of Strategic Reserve. Like the hegemonic model, this system had no standing strategic reserve but depended on forward engagement and the superb combat efficiency of the Roman legions to prevail against even numerically superior enemies.³² Although strategically defensive, this system depended on offensive action to win its battles. Romans of this period fought from within field fortifications only until they were able to launch a decisive counterattack.³³

Relative Closure Capability of Reserve. Lacking a standing reserve, and because any reserve would have to be formed before being dispatched, this system had a very poor closure capability. However, like the hegemonic system, it did not face a coordinated strategic threat that would have necessitated such a reserve.³⁴ On those rare occasions when a local debacle such as the Parthian War required considerable reinforcement, neighboring regions contributed legions to the trouble spot.³⁵

Economic Dependence on Periphery. This is a doubtful area. It is certain that the periphery became more important to the empire as the outer provinces became more Romanized, but this process was an evolutionary one. The emperor Aurelian certainly felt comfortable about giving up Dacia (Romania) voluntarily in A.D. 155 as an economy of force measure, but later emperors fought fiercely to retain the tax base and recruiting pool that the provinces had come to represent.³⁶ We are forced to conclude that the resources devoted to the fixed defenses by a succession of emperors were not spent lightly, and further that the money was invested to protect something deemed very valuable indeed.

Cost of the Security System. The system of preclusive security was more expensive in men and money than the hegemonic system (though less so than the strong reserve system that followed it). Added to the cost of maintaining a 380,000-man legionary force was the cost of building and maintaining the limes, roadbuilding, and creating provincial bureaucracies to replace the deposed client governments.³⁷ There does not appear to have been an accurate method of determining whether the costs outweighed benefits. It would appear, considering the system's relative longevity, that those in power thought that it was cost-effective.

Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. As with the early hegemonic system, there is no issue relative balance because there was no

standing reserve. This should not imply a value judgment, but it does support two ideas: that unbalanced systems with sufficient strategic depth, strong forward engagement, or a combination of both, can operate successfully; and, that a strong mobile reserve is not necessarily required in a security system lacking an opponent capable of launching coordinated attacks from more than one strategic direction. No inference can be drawn that a strong mobile reserve will not work; we can only conclude that a balanced system is not a prerequisite in all situations.

Indications and Warning. It would appear that the strong intelligence process of the hegemonic system was not significantly diminished during this era, but Rome appears to have depended for warning on tactical means such as watchtowers, blockhouses, and patrols, augmented by rapid reaction systems rather than on more strategic-level human intelligence.³⁸ Systems which rely on strong forward defense can accept such shallow warning arrangements if there is relatively little danger of strategic attack from several directions.³⁹ Thus Luttwak's criticism of the system is probably not relevant. Fortunately for Rome, she did not face a Genghis Khan or a Napoleon.

Deterrence. Roman deterrence remained strong in this era.⁴⁰ It was certainly highly visible, and the Romans had developed an unmistakable record of military successes from which they could draw to demonstrate it. Even the most unsophisticated barbarian prowling the periphery of the empire could see concrete proof of Roman engineering and military excellence in the limes, Hadrian's Wall, and other visible manifestations of Roman power and competence. Those who tested the system were dealt with harshly.

The Late Roman System and a Standing Strategic Reserve

Beginning in the third century A.D., a fundamental change occurred in the Roman Empire. The reason for the relative decline of the Roman security system during this period, leading ultimately to the collapse of the Roman Empire, has been a major cause of debate among historians who have specialized in examining the decline and fall of the Western Roman Empire; Edward Gibbon, Theodore Mommsen, Hans Delbruck, and Arther Ferrill disagree to some extent on this point. Declining population, increasing barbarian pressure, and a decline in the state of public morals have all received some measure of blame for the collapse of the empire in the West.

A definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study and may well remain a permanent subject of controversy.

One fact, however, remains clear: beginning with the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine the Great, the empire developed a strong, mobile strategic reserve as the primary means of ensuring security. The system evolved gradually, first attempting a balanced combination of forward engagement and reserve, then producing a system that relied primarily on the strategic reserve.⁴¹ The reasons given for the decline of forward engagement structure are varied, but the decline itself is irrefutably documented.⁴²

Ferrill argues strongly that the root cause of this change was not a more dangerous external threat but an attempt by the autocratic emperors of the period to protect the central seat of power. As the reserve became increasingly stronger and more elite, the perimeter security force became more like a local militia.⁴³ It also became increasingly barbarian.⁴⁴ Luttwak claims that to some extent barbarians were invited, in a hollow imitation of the hegemonic client system.⁴⁵ Delbruck is inclined to think they forced their way in.⁴⁶ Whatever the cause, forward engagement declined slowly but inexorably.

This decline resulted in a situation where barbarian incursions meant the immediate loss of territory on the imperial periphery until a counterattack could be mounted.⁴⁷ Increasingly, however, the quality of the reserve itself also declined; this decline was not as precipitous as that of the border troops, but it meant that imperial forces began to fail in their counterattacks. Thus, large chunks of the empire were lost forever.⁴⁸ Worse, these peripheral regions had become the primary recruiting territory for the legions; the effects of their losses were not only cumulative but exponential.⁴⁹ This meant that the decline began to pick up momentum, because each Roman loss was a disproportionate enhancement to the various barbarian entities encroaching on the empire.⁵⁰ Despite heroic efforts on the part of several talented and energetic individuals, the empire was dead by A.D. 476.

Method of Forward Engagement. We can be sure that Constantine the Great and his immediate successors did not deliberately set out to create a system that would destroy the empire; the change to a mobile reserve (actually begun by Diocletian) was a reaction to the strife that had preceded his ascension to the purple. After fighting a great civil war to preserve control of the empire, Constantine created a standing reserve specifically to ensure his hold on power, not to undermine the system of forward engagement.⁵¹ The subsequent decline of forward engagement was a classic example of the law of unintended consequences. The decline was evolution-

ary, and in the East it was ultimately arrested. Ferrill strongly argues that the barbarization of the army exacerbated this decline both on the periphery and eventually in the reserve itself as well.⁵² Eventually, the border army became a mere collection of ragtag militias and barbarian federate mercenaries (the term federate, or *foederati*, denotes barbarian mercenaries fighting for Rome but under the control of their own officers) of doubtful quality and of increasingly doubtful loyalty.⁵³

Type of Reserve. Although Diocletian was first to use a strong strategic reserve, it was Constantine who began the process of institutionalizing it.⁵⁴ The reserve began as a cavalry-dominated entity that nonetheless relied to some extent on disciplined infantry formations.⁵⁵ As the years wore on, this reserve became even more cavalry-oriented and increasingly Germanic.⁵⁶ As tactics began to revert to a more Gothic model (of relatively undisciplined heavy cavalry), the Romans lost much of the traditional tactical advantage they had enjoyed against the more numerous barbarian hosts. This meant that likelihood of Roman tactical success was reduced by the fifth century; where it had once been nearly certain, it was now problematical.⁵⁷ As it evolved, the Roman security system needed a reserve that could quickly move to a threatened area and defeat an incursion—or failing that, at least conduct a successful counterattack to recover lost ground.⁵⁸ In actuality, the system in its later years proved incapable of doing either with any consistency.⁵⁹

Relative Closure Capability of Reserve. This aspect of Roman security had not changed appreciably from the time of the early empire. It still took approximately two months to march from Rome to Cologne.⁶⁰ Even the switch to cavalry-heavy formations did not appreciably speed strategic mobility, because the army could move no faster than its trains. Transport by sea was generally faster than by land (to areas on the periphery that were accessible by sea), but it remained very risky due to the vagaries of Mediterranean weather.⁶¹ This is an important point because the system depended on rapid closure to make up for its growing lack of a strong forward component and its increasingly inadequate strategic depth. Rome had become dependent on a rapid-deployment strategy that simply could not do the job.

There is an irony here. Luttwak points out that the Romans lacked the modern means of rapid deployment available to us today and speculates that they might have done things differently if given that advantage. However, as noted, the Romans usually required at least sixty days to march their strategic reserve to the closest point on the periphery—Cologne; the players

in the 1991 Naval War College Global War Game (about which more later) found that (setting aside Maritime Prepositioned Force assets) it would take a U.S.-based strategic reserve about that same sixty days to get to the Middle East with enough sustainment to be credible. Today, it still takes about sixty days to get the real combat power of the contingency force to a theater except for the Maritime Prepositioning Force. It seems that one pays a price for technological improvements in combat power: one's forces become heavier and less mobile.

It is important not to draw hasty conclusions here. If this Roman system had possessed adequate strategic depth, or an adequate means for warning, it probably would have been much more effective in the long run. Thus we cannot infer from this case that standing strategic reserves without a strong mechanism for forward engagement are inherently bad; we can only observe that they were bad in this particular situation. We can also observe that any system that depends strongly on a standing strategic reserve allows the quality and combat capability of that reserve to decline only at great peril to its security.

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. By A.D. 200, Rome had come to depend on the outer provinces as a primary source of resources and economic strength.⁶² As is the case with our own economy today, many vital resources were located in exposed positions on the periphery of the security system. This dependence meant that Rome had strategic depth only in the sense that the imperial center was protected from peripheral threats; each loss on the periphery made the system weaker. However, the primary concern of the autocratic and centralized imperial center was the preservation of the power base of the emperor; protecting the periphery was of secondary concern. As a result, ironically, the system ate the talented pig of the fable, "one leg at a time."⁶³

Cost of the Security System. One of the pitfalls of trying to compare the strategic reserve of the late Roman Empire to the presently proposed American system is that whereas the Chairman envisions a system that would be cost-effective, the late Roman reserve was designed more to protect the emperor from internal devils than from the barbarians at the proverbial gate.⁶⁴ Cost, therefore, was not a major consideration for the later Roman Empire. This is exemplified in the words of the Emperor Septimus Severus to his sons, "Be united, enrich the soldiers, scorn the rest."⁶⁵ Preston and Wise show that this was done with a vengeance. In addition, as they point out, a caste system was created to ensure the availability of revenue-producing skills and military manpower for a security system that grew

increasingly more expensive in its later years.⁶⁶ This meant that successive generations were locked involuntarily into hereditary occupations. This act of economic desperation not only failed to cure the empire's economic woes in the long run, but also helped set the scene for the curse of feudal serfdom. ***Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve.*** The decline of the Roman system of forward engagement in comparison with the strategic reserve is one the few points on which the majority of historians agree. Because the decline of the forward engagement system is important in comparing the proposed U.S. system with the late Roman model, we will use the words of the historians themselves to describe the state of balance. Delbruck comments, "Now, however, the emperors could not get along without relatively large bodies of troops readily available even if in so doing they weakened the borders and sacrificed them to the incursions of the barbarians."⁶⁷ Ferrill writes, "Over the course of a century after Constantine's change in Roman grand strategy, the frontier troops turned into a ragtag local militia, while the reserve troops did all the fighting."⁶⁸ Luttwak also admits to the late Roman system's lack of balance: "It is apparent that reductions made in the provincial forces that guarded the frontiers in order to strengthen the regular field armies would always serve to provide security for imperial power, but they must have degraded the day-to-day security of the common people."⁶⁹

Indications and Warning. As the system of forward engagement declined, so did that for intelligence. As an example, at Adrianople in A.D. 378, Valens thought he was facing only 10,000 Visigoths; the enemy force actually numbered many more than that. Worse still, the Romans had no idea of the actual disposition of the enemy. This was a far cry from the days of Scipio Africanus, Marius, and Caesar, when the proper preparation of terrain for an entire campaign was considered a high art form.⁷⁰ With the exception of an occasional talented individual such as Aetius, who used his personal knowledge of the Huns (gained as a hostage) to splendid advantage at Chalons, Roman strategic and tactical intelligence appears to have declined alarmingly.⁷¹ Lacking effective strategic depth, the Roman system needed very timely warning. What it got was not effective enough in the late years of the empire.

Deterrence. Roman deterrence had formerly been a function of reputation and visible presence. By the fifth century, both had declined disastrously, until the humiliating situation in A.D. 452 when all that stood between Rome and the Huns was the Pope. Roman legions were now a parody of their former selves and were legions in name only.⁷² They were not to be seen on

the periphery; worse still, when they did arrive there, they often lost to their adversaries. This decline was slow at first, but as Ferrill documents, a “snowball effect” occurred as the concept of suasion effectively evaporated in the last decades of the empire.

The Byzantine System: A Balanced Model

The Byzantine system eventually became what the late Roman system was originally designed to be: a balanced arrangement that had as its core a strong strategic reserve complemented by strong and supple means of forward engagement. Both the late Roman system in the West and the Byzantine system were fathered by Constantine, but where the system of forward engagement broke down in the Western empire, it flourished in the East.

Due largely to the reforms of the Emperor Maurice, the Eastern or Byzantine empire developed a concept of forward engagement based on the hardy peasant militia of her provinces combined with a superb cadre of professional soldiers and field fortifications. The mobile strategic reserve, a heavy cavalry formation, moved quickly to reinforce when necessary; as often as not, however, the forward-based forces alone could handle low to mid-level incursions. The mobile reserve was certainly effective, but it was first and foremost a means of ensuring the survival of the centralized autocratic dynasty in Constantinople.⁷³

The Byzantine system proved to be one of the most resilient in history, lasting essentially intact for five hundred years. Even after the economic and social collapse after A.D. 1000, some semblance of empire lasted until the fifteenth century. This knack for survival merits the Byzantine system special attention.

Method of Forward Engagement. Like the contemporary late Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire lacked strategic depth; unlike its sister system, the Byzantine model developed, after the reign of the emperor Justinian, a healthy system for forward engagement and forward defense. “Ultimately, by granting tax relief to serving soldiers and plots of land on discharge, the state succeeded in recruiting the entire army rank and file from the dependable inhabitants within its borders.”⁷⁴ A strong peasant militia augmented the regular units within each *theme* (military district), resulting in a military system defended largely by natives fighting for hearth

and home. A strong chain of fortifications gave the corps as well as the populace, in each theme, a series of protected rallying points.

The theme system was strong enough to repel minor incursions, and it almost invariably blunted and slowed even major invasions enough to give the strategic reserve time to reinforce or counterattack. This meant that for at least a half-millennium, the empire was relatively untroubled by the loss of key economic territory on the periphery, which had dogged the Roman Empire in its later years. To be sure, this problem eventually caught up with the Byzantine Empire as it decayed from within, but this did not occur until five centuries after its Roman sister-system in the West had collapsed.⁷⁵

Another key factor of the Byzantine system was its use of diplomacy. The threats that faced the Byzantine Empire became ever more coherent as the years went by. Eventually, she even faced another “superpower” in the rising empire of Islam. Constantinople was not above bribing an enemy, as an economy-of-force measure, while addressing a separate foe on another flank.⁷⁶ Edward Gibbon castigates the Byzantines for this seemingly unmanly conduct, but this was not a matter of appeasement for the sake of weakness; it was an expedient meant to retain the latitude to focus efforts where they were needed most.⁷⁷ The Byzantines rarely allowed anyone, once bought, to renege on the arrangement.⁷⁸

The Byzantine navy, on the seaward flank, was also a key part of the system of forward defense. Using a combination of tactics and advanced technology such as Greek fire, the Byzantine fleet ensured the empire’s superiority at sea.⁷⁹ The Byzantine navy was originally a power-projection organization with sea control accruing gratuitously due to the absence of organized naval resistance. This changed with the rise of the fleets of the Vandals and later of Islam. At that point, the Byzantines applied the same professionalism to the problems of gaining and maintaining sea control that they showed in land warfare.

Type of Reserve. The Byzantine mobile reserve was a superb cavalry organization famous for its horse archers. This mobile, hard-hitting force ensured the security of the imperial court against potential mutiny in the themes, but also carried out the function of a strategic reserve for the imperial periphery. It was a capable military organization devoted to the study of the art and science of war.⁸⁰ Officers appear to have been rotated to service in different provincial themes often enough to ensure that they did not develop loyalties to regional leaders who could pose a threat to the emperor.⁸¹

The entire Byzantine army reflected an approach toward the study of war unparalleled until the nineteenth century. Their military texts, such as Leo's *Tactica* and *Ars Militaira* by Maurice, remain military classics to this day. The Byzantines were capable of thorough and accurate strategic estimates and operated a superb "lessons learned" system, as exemplified by this passage by Belisarius: "I found that the chief difference between the Goths and us was that our own Roman horse and Hunnish *foederati* (mercenaries) are all expert horse bowmen. . . . Their bowmen on foot are always drawn up to the rear. So their horsemen are no good till the battle comes to close quarters, and can easily be shot down while standing in battle array before the moment of contact arrives."⁸²

This studious approach to war permeates Byzantine history. The reserve appears to have been the hub of the professional education system, but it is also apparent that service with the provincial themes was a prerequisite for advancement.⁸³ This would help mitigate the type of decline of the Byzantine forward engagement system which would plague the late Roman system.

Relative Closure Time of Reserve. The Byzantine ability to bring up its reserve to points on the imperial periphery was not technically greater than that of the late Roman model, although the Byzantine reserve appears to have been somewhat more mobile than the Roman, due to an improvement in logistics trains.⁸⁴ It is hard to compare this system to the Roman model in this regard because the Byzantine Empire did not have a large body of water in its center as did the Romans. The Mediterranean Sea vastly complicated the Roman problem of maintaining communications and strategic transport. This made the Byzantine problem of mobility an easier one than that faced by Rome. In any case, the Byzantine model was far more able than the late Roman system to get its strategic reserve to the frontier, because the forward themes were able to buy the time necessary before vital territory and resources were lost.

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. The Byzantine Empire was highly dependent on its periphery for manpower, food, and other resources; it could not afford to trade space for time.⁸⁵ It was this knowledge that kept the forward-engagement component strong. The empire was fortunate here in that it was a mature security system. The dwellers on the imperial periphery valued their status as citizens of the empire and, for the most part, were willing to contribute to its defense.⁸⁶ This made the management of the security system a corporate effort rather than a problem left only to the emperor, as it became in the West. The Eastern empire never fell prey to the

temptation to which Theodosius had surrendered in allowing federate status to the German barbarians; that is, that he allowed the barbarians to be Romans when it was found useful to identify them as such. However, he had no means to compel their loyalty. Even though it made judicious use of mercenaries, the Eastern empire never became so dependent on them that they called the tune or controlled vital portions of the imperial marches. Thus, with a few notable exceptions, vital economic areas remained well protected for the five hundred years during which the system remained intact.

Cost of the Security System. The system was probably comparable in cost to that of the middle Roman Empire. The standing army was undoubtedly expensive, as were the navy and the fortifications. This was mitigated by the extensive use of militia in the themes. The high quality and enthusiasm of these citizen soldiers were ensured by the many palpable threats that faced the empire. The militia knew they were defending their homes and family against a very real menace. Therefore, they were willing to put up with the rigors of periodic military training as a hedge against the disastrous alternative of invasion.⁸⁷ Consequently, the cost of security was relatively high, but bearable.

Indications and Warning. The Byzantine security system was one of the best in this respect that the world has ever seen. An organized series of spies, military observation, and diplomatic contacts kept a careful eye on enemies and friends alike.⁸⁸ The impressive forward-based forces gave effective warning at the operational and tactical level to complement strategic intelligence efforts. The Byzantine system of forward engagement made it less dependent on warning than was the late Roman system, but nevertheless the Eastern empire took every advantage of the earliest possible indications.

Deterrence. The Byzantine Empire's leaders had a superb grasp of the political-military requirements for deterrence. They knew the value of power politics both domestically and in foreign affairs. They were not above terror, psychological operations, or bribery to gain vital national objectives. They understood long before Clausewitz that war is a political act, and they knew how to make themselves feared. The Byzantine's strategy after the reign of Justinian called for them never to start an unproductive war or let an enemy who had started one escape unscarred.

The British Empire from Waterloo to World War I As A Maritime Model

Thus far the study has not examined a system with truly global responsibilities. The reason is simple: of the great security systems that have come and gone since the time of Columbus, only the British Empire after the fall of Napoleon meets the three given criteria as replicating the strategic conditions the United States will face in the post-Cold War world. This is particularly true with respect to the absence of a great superpower competitor. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all faced great powers in their quest for worldwide empire; as often as not, that competitor was England. Even after 1814, the British faced superpower competition in Europe. The British did not choose to play in that league; Britain instead chose to dominate the non-European world through unchallenged control of the seas. She was able to do so because of agreements reached at the Congress of Vienna, where Viscount Castlereagh agreed to accept Metternich's European balance of power. In return, Britain got access to French and Spanish overseas holdings that added immeasurably to its overseas empire.

The Congress of Vienna thereby secured Britain's European flank. Although the British eventually withdrew from the system by refusing to assist in the suppression of nationalist uprisings, they continued to benefit from the mechanisms created by the Congress of Vienna until Bismarck effectively destroyed them in 1871. However, the balance of power Bismarck then created acted as effectively in British interests as had the mechanisms of the Congress until Bismarck was dismissed in 1890. At that point the European flank became much less secure.⁸⁹ Until then, the British took advantage of their secure European flank to turn their string of colonies and naval bases into a security system unique in history.

A combination of a small professional army having vast technological superiority over most potential foes with a clever use of indigenous soldiers in colonial formations allowed the British to maintain adequate security at a very affordable price. This advantage was reinforced by the fact that any possible combination of strategic foes would have to deal with the British fleet before posing a truly serious threat to the security of the system as a whole. This arrangement worked well for the British until they violated their own doctrine by engaging directly in a European war (World War I) that bankrupted the system and called the entire social fabric of British society into question.

In addition, rapid technological change required the British to go to the great expense of modernizing her fleet to keep ahead of naval upstarts such as the Americans, Germans, and Japanese. Britain kept the naval lead, but only with difficulty. Even without World War I it is unlikely that the British would have kept the mantle of sole naval superpower for much longer; the winds of nationalism and navalism were blowing hard in nations with economic and industrial potential far greater than that of Great Britain.

The British system lasted only a century, barely long enough to meet the hundred-year survival criteria laid down, but it merits consideration for two key reasons. First, as noted, it is the only truly global system to meet the criteria. Second, it is the only one that faced anything like the kind of technological change that our own new system will face in the coming decades.

Method of Forward Engagement. As we do today, the British faced several regional challenges. In Europe, their problem was to keep the continental powers so preoccupied with each other that none would have the money or inclination to start a naval race or join coalitions to challenge British supremacy at sea. The result was that the British concept of forward engagement in this era was diplomacy, as a means of sustaining a balance of power. The mechanisms of the Congress of Vienna and Bismarck's system that replaced it were generally adequate to give the British a free hand elsewhere. The role of the Royal Navy in the system was to isolate British colonies and other possessions from outside interference. The contribution of the British fleet and the evolution of gunboat diplomacy is well documented elsewhere; it is sufficient to say that its ubiquity and reputation for effectiveness played a major role in the relative state of global stability enjoyed throughout the nineteenth century.⁹⁰

As befitted Britain's place among what Paul Kennedy calls "gunpowder empires," the British Army maintained throughout the colonial possessions an effective forward presence, supported by its massive technological superiority over native threats and insulated by the navy from potential European foes.⁹¹ The colonial army was not particularly efficient by emerging European standards, but it became an extremely effective tool for the job at hand. It was greatly assisted in this by native regiments led by British officers, a cost-effective means to ensure colonial control. The Indian Army, led by British officers, allowed a very small British cadre to control a teeming native population very effectively. The same model on a smaller scale worked elsewhere in the empire as well.⁹²

This happy situation lasted well past 1870 when the Prussians unified Germany and altered the European balance enough to allow them to enter into a naval arms race if they so desired. Bismarck had the good sense to resist this temptation. His passing from the scene in 1890 allowed Kaiser Wilhelm, however, to embark upon such a course. This was the beginning of the end of the Pax Britannica, and the result for Germany would ultimately be even more unhappy.⁹³

Type of Reserve. As with the early and mid-Roman systems, the British imperial model maintained no standing strategic reserve. None was required. Given the lack of coherent threats and also a population that mistrusted standing armies as a threat to civil government, the lack of such a reserve is hardly surprising.

Relative Closure Time of Reserve. Again, as with the early and mid-Roman models, a reserve would have to be constituted before it was dispatched, making for a very unresponsive closure time. This defect was rendered relatively moot by the effective system of forward engagement and the protection afforded by the navy. To be sure, debacles occurred. The British military required 315 days to mount the failed rescue operation to Khartoum and a year and a half to react effectively to the Indian Mutiny.⁹⁴ As serious as these crises were at the time, they probably did not warrant the expense and political problems that would have resulted from the establishment of a reserve. Both situations were resolved quickly enough not to result in permanent damage to the empire. The ad hoc expedient of putting together expeditionary forces of warships, Royal Marines, and army units provided reaction time good enough for the general level of threat. In the century that the system effectively existed, it never lost a colony, and it expanded almost continuously until 1914.

Economic Dependence on the Periphery. The string of colonies, trading bases, and dependencies that Britain maintained around the world was, quite literally, the imperial economy. The loss of India, Egypt, or South Africa would have destroyed the fabric of the interdependent imperial economic system.⁹⁵ Britain was a truly great economic power because of the empire. That much of the empire was shed voluntarily, however commendably, does not erase the fact that its loss ended Britain's status as a true economic superpower. Even though the empire depended economically on the periphery, the oceans and the British fleet's control of them insulated the colonial system from European competitors and thereby gave the system good strategic depth.

Cost of Security System. This system was relatively inexpensive. Any security arrangement that relies on a great fleet-in-being will require vast sums of money, but the British fleet indispensably protected a maritime trade.⁹⁶ The need to modernize after the onset of the ironclad made the system much more expensive in the last fifty years of its existence than in the first; overall, it was a relative bargain.

The army also was extremely inexpensive until very close to World War I. Low pay rates for regulars and colonial troops alike, as well as the use of aristocratic officers willing to work for little financial compensation, allowed the British to keep defense costs very low for most of the period.⁹⁷ The British Army of the time was no match for a continental foe, nor was it meant to be.⁹⁸ Britain's island status, its naval superiority, and the European balance system protected the homeland. The British Army was a colonial constabulary on a grand scale, and a cheap one at that.

Indications and Warning. A security system with good strategic depth and adequate provision for forward engagement is not as dependent on early and accurate warning as one that lacks these advantages. The British were fortunate to possess both in abundance. They were doubly fortunate, because their resources for warning were mediocre at best. The British of the Victorian era were notoriously suspicious of people in intelligence work, and the performance of Britain's intelligence services suffered accordingly.⁹⁹ Consequently, the British were surprised by the Indian Mutiny, the events in Khartoum, and the Boer Rebellion. Fortunately, none of these threats were of such a magnitude that they could not be handled by the very slow deployment of ad hoc response forces.

Deterrence. The deterrent posture of the empire was adequate to ensure the security of the system as a whole. The combined strength of the British fleet, the colonial army, and active diplomacy created a synergistic effect of deterring revolts of dissatisfied native populations, warning off European overseas adventures that would harm British interests, and keeping Europeans preoccupied with continental events and therefore less interested in overseas projects than might otherwise have been the case.

Gunboat diplomacy was a political-military innovation that allowed the rather ponderous British fleet to exercise a more precise forward function, particularly in what we now call "peacetime engagement."¹⁰⁰ Local potentates who did not respect the reasonably light armament of the gunboats generally knew that it was backed up by far more formidable forces "over the horizon."

This deterrent effect of overall British power did not work in all cases. It was particularly weak when religious fanaticism was involved; the Indian Mutiny and the Dervish problem are examples. In other cases, such as the Boer War, British miscalculation undermined deterrence.¹⁰¹ Overall however, the deterrent system served the empire well.

A case can be made that the British Empire was the first world-class security system to be undone by technology. The development of ironclad warships and the maturation of German industry allowed the Kaiser's navy to challenge the British in a naval arms race that ultimately caused the British to adopt several policies that undermined the existing security system; given the Kaiser's ambitions, this was necessary. Britain could not be defended by "naval measures alone" from rising German military/naval power.¹⁰² Probably the most dangerous of these policies in the long run was to become so closely aligned with anti-German elements as virtually to ensure British continental participation in World War I.¹⁰³ Closely tied to this was the reform of the British Army, which allowed the British to contemplate seriously full involvement in the coming conflict. This, combined with naval modernization, also made the security system much more expensive. In today's post-industrial age, the impact of technology on strategy will very likely become even greater than it was in the nineteenth century.

Systemic Comparisons

This section examines the strategy proposed in General Powell's vision for dealing with the new world order in the 1990s and compares it to how our historical systems reacted to similar strategic problems and opportunities. This is done in the full realization of the dangers of historical parallelism or of a skewed attempt to draw lessons. The purpose here is to draw points of relevance and identify any obvious pitfalls that may await us in designing our own strategy.

Figure 1 is a comparison of the proposed national strategy with the historical systems previously studied, using the same categories with which we examined the historical cases. The new strategy is designed to deal with a series of presently incoherent but very real security challenges that will arise over time. As in the Naval War College 1991 Global War Game, the Chairman's strategy sees the world from a regional perspective, with each region presenting differing potential for crisis in a world of post-Soviet "devolution."¹⁰⁴ Each of our five historical security systems also dealt with

Systemic Comparisons

	Early Roman	Mid Roman	Late Roman	Byzantine	British	New U.S. Strategy
Forward Engagement	strong	strong	weak	strong	strong	moderate in Europe, moderate in Pacific, weak in Mideast
Type of standing reserve	none	none	strong	strong	none	strong mobile contingency force
Relative reserve closure capability	poor	poor	poor	good	poor	good in Europe & Pacific; moderate in Korea; poor in Mideast
Economic dependence on periphery	low	moderate to high	high	high	high	high, particularly in Mideast
Cost of security	low	fairly low	high	moderate	low	lower than Cold War system it replaced
Systemic balance	none	none	none	high	none	balanced except in Mideast
Indications and Warning	good	good	poor	good	fairly poor	moderately good but technology-dependent
Deterrence	good	good	poor	good	good	good except in Mideast

Figure 1.

regional challenges in the absence of a truly bipolar superpower competitor, but none of them faced a former competitor who, although much weakened, still retained the capability to destroy the remaining superpower as Russia will be able to do for some time to come. This factor may not become a day-to-day issue, but it will remain a major consideration in every major strategic decision.

As the players in the 1991 Global War Game found, predicting the world situation in the next ten to twenty years will be difficult, given the unprecedented breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. It appears certain that the new world order will be less orderly than the one we came to know from 1945 to 1989.¹⁰⁵ This study has drawn heavily on the 1991 Global War Game (GWG), less as a predictive model than as a medium for understanding the nature of the world that will face the new strategy as we attempt to implement it. The new world order, as nearly 1,200 players and analysts in Newport in the summer of 1991 saw it, has several key features.

- The game postulated the breakup of the Soviet Union into something smaller and much less manageable than the old Soviet state (being unaware, of course, of the future—and still inchoate—Commonwealth of Independent States).

- The players saw the United States as concerned primarily with three key regions: Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. They showed little interest in Africa, the Asian mainland, or even Latin America except insofar as those areas presented issues that threatened vital U.S. interests or world economic stability.

- The Middle East was seen as continuing to be the most volatile region as well as the one in which effective U.S. forward presence was most problematical. It was also apparent that a deterrent would have to be very “visible” to be effective there.

- Given an opportunity, the players representing the United States would have preferred to act through hegemonic regional coalitions to deal with security problems, but, due to lingering regional mistrust and traditional hostilities, this did not prove feasible in the foreseeable future outside of Europe. The players tasked with designing U.S. strategy saw Nato continuing to provide regional security and stability in Europe and hoped it would act as a model for the Pacific and the Middle East in the long run. They held out the prospect that the series of bilateral security relationships the U.S. has built in the Pacific would evolve into a Nato-like coalition, though presumably not within this century. They were much less hopeful about such a system evolving satisfactorily in the Middle East.

- In no region did the players see any viable substitute in the immediate future for the presence of the United States as a leader.¹⁰⁶

If we overlay the new strategy upon this model of the new world order, two issues immediately arise. First, as the new strategy acknowledges, we will have some of the same regional responsibilities as in the former bipolar world, but we will have fewer assets with which to influence events. Second, our ability to keep U.S. forces forward deployed will diminish from Cold War levels as a result of both economics and a political-military environment wherein nations will be less willing to have U.S. forces deployed on their soil than when there was an overarching Soviet threat. With this in mind, an examination of the new strategy within the construct of the historical case study systems is in order.

Method of Forward Engagement. The new national military strategy envisions a method of forward engagement that “deters forward” but does not usually “defend forward” with U.S. forces to the degree that was true in the past.¹⁰⁷ This is certainly in keeping with the perceived need to reduce the presence of U.S. forces overseas. Figure 2 outlines the general comparative sizes of forward-deployed forces proposed for the two regional theaters. Diplomacy and allied forward engagement, along with the strong and mobile reserve proposed in the contingency force, would make up for a reduction in forward presence under the plan as currently drafted.¹⁰⁸ The signed official strategy does not specify the relationship of the contingency force commander to any theater commander in chief that he is to support once his forces are deployed to the region.

There is no obvious parallel with any of the historical cases, because a different system of forward engagement is currently envisioned for each region. In Europe, Nato will probably retain the capability to make the Chairman’s vision work. In the Pacific, our bilateral defense agreements, combined with the strategic depth provided by the Pacific Ocean itself, should make the new strategy effective. Korea remains a special case here, but a strong U.S. forward presence is still contemplated until Republic of Korea forces can become self-reliant enough to justify U.S. reductions. As this is one area where we can still expect to “defend forward,” defensive battlefield success would be required to ensure the time necessary for the mobile reserve to play a decisive role.

As a consequence, our new system of forward engagement is a series of mini-systems. In Europe, it most resembles the client-oriented early Roman model, with Nato acting as a client on a grand scale. Along the Pacific Rim

ATLANTIC FORCES

- ☐ Underwrite Security and Vital Interests in Europe, Middle East, and SWA
- ☐ Continuing Commitment to Alliances
- ☐ Continue Forward Presence in Europe, Mediterranean, and Arabian Gulf
- ☐ Project Reinforcements from CONUS
 - * High Intensity Environment
 - * Primarily Heavy Forces
 - * Bulk of Reserves Augment and Support

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USAF</u>
Europe	2 Div	1 CVBG		3.6 TFW
SWA	Army, Navy, USMC, USAF Exercises and Prepositioning			
CONUS	3-4 Div	5 CVBG	MEF	2 TFW
	6 Res Div			11 Res TFW
	2 Cadre			

PACIFIC FORCES

- ☐ Provide Stabilizing Influence in Economically Important Region
- ☐ Continue Forward Presence in Japan and Korea
- ☐ Include Reinforcements from Hawaii, Alaska, and CONUS

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USAF</u>
Korea	1 Div(-)			1-2 TFW
Japan		1 CVBG		1-2 TFW
Hawaii/ Alaska	1 Div		) MEF	1 TFW
CONUS		5 CVBG		

Figure 2.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy* [draft] (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 30 September 1991).

it resembles the Byzantine model; it relies strongly on indications and warning and strategic depth, as well as on the Seventh Fleet and other Pacific Command assets for forward presence. In the special case of Korea, there is an attempt at a balance that also closely resembles the Byzantine model.

In the Middle East however, we have a difficulty. Unlike on the Pacific Rim, there is no strategic depth. Worse still, our net of bilateral alliances is weaker there than in any other region. Neither is there much chance of creating the conditions for a strong forward defense even if we wanted to. At present (Autumn 1991) we still have forces deployed in the region as a residue from Desert Storm, but this is a short-term deterrence measure, not part of a strategy of forward engagement. Unfortunately, the Global War Game found the Middle East to be the region where a clear deterrent will be most necessary, but also the area where it is most difficult to achieve.¹⁰⁹

Type of Reserve. The new military strategy proposed by the Chairman would have a series of forward-engagement strategies that vary by region; this is not the case with the envisioned strategic reserve. The new strategy has a single strategic reserve (as outlined in Figure 3) to be employed in a crisis in any region (albeit in smaller tailored force packages if the situation warrants). This mobile strategic reserve is different in function from that of the late Roman and Byzantine models. The U.S. contingency force is designed to realize economies in forces and money; it is primarily an attempt to do more with less.

The late Roman and Byzantine reserve concept had a primary mission of preserving an autocratic, centralized, power base; their secondary mission was to guard the territorial integrity of their respective empires. The late Roman model attempted to use barbarian mercenary levies to provide perimeter security, with eventually disastrous results.¹¹⁰ Its centralized reserve guarded the seat of power first, and counterattacked only after that mission was assured.¹¹¹ The Byzantine system was more balanced; it relied on a combination of citizen militia and professional cadres to eliminate small incursions while delaying and disrupting large ones. The Byzantine emperors used mobile cavalry reserves as the decisive hammer to punish any invader seriously enough to cause him to consider carefully any further adventure. However, it is safe to assume that the rulers in Constantinople maintained this reserve under their own control in order to ensure that no ambitious local *strategos* (military governor or corps commander) turned his regional force into a threat to the imperial throne.

The reserve created in the new U.S. strategy will face a different security system in each of the three major regions. If Nato continues to function reasonably well in cooperation with the political and economic framework of the European Community, and if the strategic depth afforded by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact remains constant, the reserve should never have to be employed in Europe. With the exception of Korea, the same holds

true in the Pacific Rim, but for different reasons. Unchallenged U.S. naval supremacy and the vast distances involved will make it difficult for any potential foe to assemble a threat beyond the capability of U.S. forces. If U.S. forward presence in Korea remains viable, there should be an adequate element of forward engagement in case of North Korean invasion to give the strategic reserve time to arrive and counterattack (in a manner reminiscent of the Byzantine system). Accordingly, the mobile contingency reserve would enhance our systems of forward engagement in Europe and the Pacific Rim, as well as in the special case of Korea. The Middle East is another matter altogether.

The new strategy does not have a standing force designed for the Middle East, and it contains no significant means of forward presence capable of either deterring aggression or buying time once aggression occurs. Also, the region offers virtually no strategic depth. This means that a mobile reserve will have to be extraordinarily fast-moving or have an indications and warning system bordering on the telepathic if the reserve plan is to be effective. Both of these subjects will be discussed in later sections, but suffice it to say that the effectiveness here of a strong mobile reserve as structured in General Powell's vision remains a point of concern.

Relative Closure Time. The ability of the reserve to arrive in a crisis area relatively quickly has generally been a critical element in any security system dependent on a strong, mobile reserve. The term "relative" is key here. In the late Roman system, the reserve remained capable of great mobility, but its relative, or effective, mobility declined proportionately with the decline of effective forward presence. In the last years of the empire, the perimeter of the imperial security system was distressingly close to the center. This total lack of strategic depth rendered every loss of territory vital. Because there was no effective forward defense, any barbarian incursion was by definition initially successful, and every reaction by the reserve was a counterattack rather than a reinforcement. Ferrill points out that the resulting constant reaction and combat stress had a deleterious effect on the army as a whole. The Byzantine system, by contrast, maintained a satisfactory relative closure capability because of the healthy balance between forward engagement and the mobile reserve. Its original strategic depth was about the same as the late Roman model (because it had evolved from that system). However, the Byzantines retained an effective and relatively inexpensive system of forward defense while the Romans neglected theirs.

CONTINGENCY FORCES

The "come-as-you-are" arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises, requires fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable, largely self-sufficient, and therefore drawn primarily from the active force structure. Our military strategy requires forces specifically tailored to this challenge. Each service brings unique capabilities to contingency forces. The Army contributes airborne, air assault, light infantry, and rapidly deliverable heavy forces. The Air Force brings its entire range of fighter and bomber forces. Carrier-based naval air power is an essential element as is the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps, particularly when access ashore is contested. The unique capabilities of our Special Operations Forces are an essential resource which must be protected, even as we reduce our forces.

CONTINGENCY FORCES

- Forward Stationed and Deployed Army, Navy, Marine and Air Forces—plus Special Operations Forces
- Joint National Contingency Forces
 - Can Provide Principal Response or Complement Forward Deployed Forces
 - OPCON to Geographic CINC
 - Faciliates Joint Training and the Development of Joint Doctrine and Tactics
- Respond to the Unexpected and Unpredictable
 - Mobile, Flexible, Fast, and Lethal

CINCS ASSIGNED FORCES

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

JOINT NATIONAL CONTINGENCY FORCES			
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<u>Army</u> 4-5 Div	<u>Navy</u> Tailored Mix	<u>USMC</u> MEF	<u>USAF</u> 7 TFW
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These forces will include:

- Forward stationed and deployed Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Forces and prepositioned equipment and supplies.
- Special Operations Force units drawn from the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- Joint National Contingency Forces: Our global interests dictate the need to preserve and enhance a core of mobile, flexible, highly trained, and ready forces, based in the CONUS, that can deploy—and arrive ready to fight—on short notice in response to unpredictable future crises. They complement our forward deployed assets; can provide an initial response capability where we have no forward deployed forces; can be an additive force where we do; facilitate joint training and the development of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and enhance joint force employmnet since these forces will routinely train together.

Figure 3.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy* [draft] (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 30 September 1991).

The key point here is that the new national military strategy has potential problems in the Middle East.¹¹² The previously discussed lack of forward engagement and strategic depth in the Persian Gulf area gives even our most agile reserve elements poor relative mobility in the strategy as it is currently articulated. With the exception of forward deployed amphibious forces and the MPF, the United States will be unable to bring credible and sustainable ground forces into the region within thirty days of the order to deploy. This would be true even under the most optimistic projections for procurement of fast sea lift and the C-17 aircraft.¹¹³ In other regions, with combinations of effective forward engagement, strategic depth, and sea control, this closure capability is acceptable; in the Middle East it is not.

Economic Dependence on Periphery. This concept actually determines strategic depth, because it dictates how much space the system can afford to trade for time. A security system may make this tradeoff if it is not dependent on the periphery for vital raw materials or food. If that dependence exists, the system must develop some means of ensuring the integrity of the periphery—by forward engagement, rapid response to threats, or some combination thereof. The global system of economic interdependencies that the new U.S. strategy will be called upon to defend is a necklace of industrialized nations and resource providers with several vital nodes such as the Pacific Rim, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States itself. Several of these regions have strategic depth in relation to potential threats; as outlined earlier, the Pacific Ocean gives the Pacific Rim considerable depth. “Depth” today is not so much a matter of distance as of water barriers; few states are able to mount a naval expedition large enough to threaten seriously island nations such as Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia—at least not without a naval construction program which would undoubtedly give sufficient warning to the United States and other actors in the region. This depth does not exist in Korea, but we can expect to see a viable enough forward defense there to make the new strategy effective.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union gives Europe a reasonable degree of breathing room; this will allow latitude for designing reduced, but effective, forward presence arrangements. Again we see problems in the Middle East. The vital Saudi and Kuwaiti oil fields are a mere few hours’ march from the nearest nations capable of threatening them. Lacking a viable forward presence, our alternative is a mobile reserve with a relatively short closure time. As discussed earlier, we lack this also.

In this connection we find a strong cautionary lesson in the unhappy fate of the late Roman system. In the early empire, Rome had not yet come to

depend on the regions that were to become vital economic provinces during the middle imperial period. As a consequence, the early imperium could buy cheap defense-in-depth by means of the client system. The Roman Empire of the middle era protected the now-vital regions through preclusive security in the form of strong forward basing. These regions were no less vital to the late empire, but the forward engagement strategy was replaced by a mobile reserve that was simply not fast enough to defend against a threat or strong enough to retake regions once lost. Thus, each loss became cumulative.

If, however, the fate of the late Roman system should serve as a warning of the dangers associated with the lack of an adequate forward-engagement strategy, it should not lead us to the hasty conclusion that a standing strategic reserve will not work. It does indicate that a lack of strong forward engagement is dangerous in the absence of strategic depth between the periphery and vital economic areas.

Cost of the Security System. The relative cost of the new U.S. security system as opposed to the historical cases examined in this study is of great interest here. The primary rationale for the new U.S. concept is its reduction in manpower and operating costs from the levels associated with the Cold War.

There is excellent evidence to suggest that, with the exception of the late Roman model, each of the historical security systems examined in this study existed because their creators were willing, in view of the threat that existed at the time, to accept the costs associated with them. The early Roman system, true to its frugal Latin origin, demanded that its clients pay a proportionate share. In effect, the Romans “bought” strategic depth by ceding much control to clients within their respective spheres of influence in exchange for Roman assistance when truly serious threats surfaced. This saved Rome much in the way of manpower and treasure; it was truly security on the cheap. The middle imperial period of preclusive security saw Rome exclusively assuming the cost of imperial security; in doing so, of course, she gained the advantage of exclusive control over the entire security system including that which had formerly been in the purview of the client kings.¹¹⁴ The middle imperium was more expensive than the early period, but not nearly as expensive as the late system, which ultimately proved to be as inefficient as it was ineffective. Although Edward Luttwak dwells on its early successes, Arther Ferrill reminds us that the system eventually proved a costly failure.¹¹⁵

For a militarized autocracy, the Byzantine Empire proved to be a relative bargain from the perspective of security. The use of a healthy citizen militia backed up by a solid professional cadre proved to be an effective and reasonably efficient means of forward engagement. To be sure, the system was more expensive than the early or middle Roman models, because it added a strong centralized reserve (which was designed probably to protect the central government as much as the marches). However, the cost was made acceptable by the relative coherence of the threat compared to that facing the other four models; peasants and emperors alike could see the danger from every direction.

Napoleon was to refer contemptuously to the British as a “nation of shopkeepers,” but the shopkeepers were to lock him away and build a security system that would dominate the world beyond Europe for the century. In World War I they were then forced by circumstances largely beyond their control to violate their prime economic directive by becoming decisively involved in a major European war.

It appears that the new U.S. strategy can succeed in giving acceptable security at a reasonable cost in manpower and national treasure in Europe, the Pacific rim, and in Korea. Even in the problematic Middle East, the solutions to problems of improving deterrence and decreasing our closure time to the theater appear to be matters of allocation of existing resources rather than of need for increased resources. The proof will be in the implementation.

Balance between Forward Engagement and Reserve. As we have seen, a balance between these elements is not a prerequisite for a successful security system. In three of our five cases there was no strategic reserve at all, with no catastrophic result. These three systems survived by use of strategic depth, strong forward engagement, or a combination of both. Only the Byzantine system had an effective balance. The Byzantine Empire was dependent on the periphery for its economic survival as a great power; it developed a balance because it lacked the strategic depth to allow a defense that could trade space for time. The periphery required strong forward engagement, and the emperors demanded protection for their seat of power.

Given strong forward engagement or great strategic depth, a security system can probably do nicely without a strong standing reserve, as did the first two Roman systems and British imperial model. Unfortunately, we lack today the depth and forward-engagement potential afforded by previous systems in the key area of the Middle East. This problem of strategic balance

will be the greatest security challenge facing the implementation of the new strategy.

Indications and Warning. Intelligence and warning have played a role in all of our historical case studies, but the centrality of that role has depended on the success of the forward engagement strategy and the strategic depth involved. The early imperial Romans, middle-empire Romans, and Byzantines appear to have had excellent intelligence systems, inasmuch as their warning was proportionate to the time needed to react. The British system was less impressive, but the diffuseness of the threat, combined with the absolute British ability to isolate a problem area through sea supremacy, negated the need for a truly efficient warning system. A mediocre system of I&W was good enough in the greater scheme of things.

The late Roman Empire saw its intelligence system decline fastest at the very time it was needed most. It appears that the late Rome security system as it existed around the early third century, when Luttwak contends that it did a good job, was complemented by a competent warning system. This was also the period when some balance remained between forward presence and the mobile reserve. However, as in most security systems, the real effectiveness of "indications and warning" is rooted in the system of forward presence. As Roman control on the periphery became more and more dependent on barbarian mercenaries, so did its intelligence sources. Rome knew what the barbarians in her service let her know, and this benefited Rome only insofar as Roman and barbarian agendas coincided.

Since the late 1970s the U.S. indications and warning system has been very dependent on technological means, whereas historically it has been based on human intelligence.¹¹⁶ As seen in the events leading up to Desert Shield and Desert Storm, space-based imagery and other technical means can only indicate what the enemy allows us to see and hear or that which cannot be hidden. It does not tell us about hidden agendas or other factors so important when we have neither sufficient forces to slow or stop an enemy nor sufficient strategic depth to trade space for time. The good news here is for Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Korea, where our new strategy will probably offer sufficient forward engagement or strategic depth to make our indications and warning system adequate. As in most categories, the Middle East remains a difficult case. If the 1991 Global War Game is at all predictive, we will need at least sixty days of warning to deploy adequately the strategic mobile reserve presently contemplated. In fact, we simply will not have that much advance notice to get our troops in place, and we will lack prepositioned forces to buy time to do so.

Deterrence. All security systems worthy of the name incorporate some form of deterrence. The early Roman system, as Luttwak describes it, deterred its more sophisticated foes through the certainty of Roman power “over the horizon”; less subtle potential adversaries were given more frequent and blunter lessons in the efficacy of Roman arms.¹¹⁷ The preclusive security system of the middle Empire had a more universally visible manifestation in its system of field fortifications. Likewise the Byzantines were extremely conspicuous in their security precautions and were careful in the psychological messages of military preparedness they sent to a plethora of potential foes. Even when the Byzantines were forced to pay bribes, they took great pains to let the recipient know that he was to stay bribed or suffer the consequences. The British in their time maintained a very marked presence in their colonies to deter bad behavior by colonists and natives alike. The British navy effectively kept troublesome third powers out of their sphere of influence. The later years of the late Roman epoch, on the other hand, were difficult for the imperium in that although the Roman army remained an effective field force, it had lost the reputation of invincibility it had enjoyed as late as the third century. Potential adversaries respected it but were no longer terrified of it. Delbruck and Ferrill disagree on the cause of this situation, but both agree that the eventual impact on Roman deterrence was disastrous.

If, again, the results of the 1991 Global War Game can be relied upon, it is ironic that the deterrent effect of the U.S. victory in Operation Desert Storm will probably be greater everywhere except where it was exercised and where it will probably remain most needed: the Middle East itself. The postwar experience of Iraqi rearmament supports the 1991 Global War Game’s conclusion that actors in this region must face deterrent presence that is active and exercised often if they are in fact to be deterred. Unfortunately this is the very region where such a presence is most difficult to achieve.

The U.S. strategy for the 1990s appears viable as currently articulated in every key region in the security system of the new world order except in the Middle East, where it is most likely to be challenged. We do not need to scrap the new concept; the proposed strategy has a very strong basis in fiscal reality, postulating a method that we can afford. Unlike the historical models examined, the approach of the new strategy will require a different method of forward presence in each region where vital U.S. security interests exist. The Middle East, however, will call for an effective forward presence where

the United States has traditionally not maintained one; this is a challenge, but not an impossible one.

In the best of all possible worlds, the ideal solution to the U.S. strategic dilemma of trying both to lead a great global security system and to seek stability in an increasingly unstable world, at an affordable price, would be to pursue the option originally attempted by the players representing the United States in the 1991 Naval War College Global War Game. The players wanted to create standing regional coalitions designed, in effect, to be the rough equivalent of the clients in the early Roman hegemonic model. The players sought coalitions where the U.S. could be a senior partner, not an *imperator* in the Roman sense. In this they anticipated President Bush in his remarks to the United Nations in September 1991. As far as possible, the players representing U.S. decision makers wanted to craft coalitions to handle local instabilities by creating standing regional mechanisms with the support when necessary of U.S. military power. They hoped for such coalitions in Europe, the Pacific, and the Middle East, and also for a stronger U.N. role.

Implementing this vision in the game proved to be difficult. The players found that, with the exception of Nato in Europe, most regions were not ready for this kind of security arrangement in the near term. Regional antagonisms died hard, and there was a lingering mistrust of certain actors in the Middle East and the Pacific—key actors which were indispensable to viable coalitions. While agreeing that stabilizing coalitions are a worthy long-term goal, the players quickly came to the realization that there must be interim mechanisms, and that the interim may last a very long time.¹¹⁸

The game also indicated that there is no short-run substitute for U.S. forward presence in any region, including Europe. The players generally agreed that the United States could cut back significantly in Nato and that some decrease in presence in the Pacific was warranted; however, no total substitute for U.S. involvement could be found in any region. The U.S. role in Europe was seen as evolving from that of military leader to one of honest broker. The security structure in the Pacific is now built around a web of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and other Pacific powers, agreements which could well become the basis for ad hoc coalitions in case of regional crises; however, the region did not appear ready for standing mechanisms. The Middle East was even more intractable in this regard. There, the U.S.

is linked bilaterally with several states which do not even talk with each other. There was simply no substitute for U.S. engagement.¹¹⁹

Given the imperfect world we live in, the strategy outlined by the Chairman, and as recently issued in "The National Military Strategy for the 1990s," is a logical approach to the problem of managing worldwide stability without bankrupting ourselves as a nation. It will work in Europe where the combination of Nato and our new-found strategic depth should serve us well. Likewise, in the Pacific we have adequate strategic depth and the sea superiority afforded by the Seventh Fleet to provide adequate forward engagement to back up our string of bilateral security agreements. Even in the special case of Korea we maintain adequate forward engagement to buy time in which to bring U.S. forces to bear should deterrence fail.

Only in the Middle East does the proposed U.S. strategy face a situation where we lack the strategic depth, adequate forward deployed forces, and indications and warning to give us relative closure capability adequate to ensure either deterrence or sufficiently rapid response against a regional aggressor, such as Iran or Iraq. There are two alternatives. The first is to seek an entirely new strategy which will adequately cover all regions. The second is to adjust the proposed strategy to make it viable in the Middle East. The first alternative is probably not realistic; the Chairman's vision is a commonsense one. It does have definite problems in one critical region, but this writer believes we can adjust the new strategy to compensate for its shortcomings in the Middle East without sacrificing the excellent overall concept. If we accept that the strategy can be fine-tuned in the Middle East, we are then led to the question of how to do so.

Options for Improvement. There are three ways in which the shortcomings of the current strategic vision might be adjusted in the Middle East region: first, by building a better system of forward presence; second, by improving the relative closure time of the strategic reserve; and third, by improving our indications and warning to make the thirty-day window of vulnerability we currently face less crippling. The Global War Game saw as critical the effective ability to react with credible and sustainable forces within thirty days of the start of a crisis. It showed a need to improve response capability in this time frame. Improving I&W is a difficult option because it is effective only in proportion to the readiness of decision makers to accept and act on it quickly and decisively—a matter outside the realm of strategy and not a strategic option. Consequently, the options presented below for adjusting the current strategic vision in the Middle East aim at improving forward presence and improving our relative closure time.

Option One. Permanent basing (to improve forward engagement) is a preclusive security arrangement that would allow us to keep ground and air forces permanently based in the Middle East and prepositioned ground equipment (Pomcus) in Europe. This would probably involve a combination of ground prepositioning and rotational unit deployment that would reduce reaction time while giving us a credible deterrent. It would also reduce our dependence on timely warning.

Option Two. A more rapid mobile reserve (for improved relative closure capability) would reduce the closure time of the contingency force through buying increasingly fast sea lift and more and larger transport aircraft. The decreased reaction time would lower our profile in the region day-to-day while increasing our strategic mobility in all regions, not just the Middle East.

Option Three. A hegemonic client-oriented strategy (for improved forward engagement) suggests that lacking a client coalition in the short run, the United States could opt to cultivate a regional hegemonic state as the primary means of our own forward engagement, in a manner reminiscent of the early Roman imperial model. This solution would have to allow for greater relative deterrence, but it could permit longer closure times if the client's armed forces remain competitive with any likely opponent. This is the approach we attempted with Iran from the fifties to the late seventies. In that case we picked a poor client, but that does not mean that the concept is inherently flawed. We should learn from the Iranian experience that client relationships are high-risk affairs, subject to vagaries of the client's internal politics. A reliable client would also compensate for less than ideal warning, because the critical warning time from a U.S. standpoint would be that necessary for a potential adversary to build a force that would require our assistance to the client.

Option Four. A "naval bridge" strategy (a combination of improved forward presence and relative closure capability) would be the use of combined carrier task forces, maritime prepositioning forces, and forward-deployed amphibious forces acting both as means of forward engagement and as a connecting "bridge" between the forward engagement component and the strategic contingency force outlined in the Chairman's vision. Such a strategy would entail the movement of the Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One, currently assigned to Europe, closer to the Middle East in order to reduce its transit time; this would also mean more permeable boundaries between unified commands. It would also entail more frequent visits and exercises of the maritime prepositioning squadrons to the Gulf for

such demonstrations as off-loading exercises. This strategy would also require an aircraft carrier and an amphibious ready group close to the Straits of Hormuz on a permanent basis. It would give the United States the ability to bring up the equivalent of a mid-sized Marine Expeditionary Force (37,000 personnel) well under the thirty days after crisis recognition that we previously mentioned as critical for effective crisis response; more importantly, this force would arrive with thirty days of logistical endurance.¹²⁰ The purpose of this force would be to provide the bridge between forward presence and the contingency role. This bridge would provide visible, credible deterrence as well as an effective and logistically sustainable forward-deployed presence should deterrence fail. This ability to bridge the gap between the thirty-day window of vulnerability and the sixty days required to get the bulk of the standing strategic "contingency force" into the theater was seen as critical by the GWG 91 players.

Discussion of Options. Option one (permanent basing) would be very difficult to implement, barring extraordinary and unforeseen developments. Ground basing is not a desirable component in the Middle East region. Most governments in the region view a large, long-term U.S. presence as a potentially greater threat to their internal security than any potential external power. The combination of anti-Western hostility among Muslims (especially Shiites) and the fear of "contamination" by Western influences is probably very realistic. It is also likely that Congress and the American public would balk at the cost of any new overseas basing in an era when some sort of peace dividend is expected. This would be a very difficult option to sell in the absence of any strong lobbying effort for an increased U.S. ground presence by Mideast states.

Option two (a more rapid mobile reserve) will probably come about to some degree as a natural outgrowth of the Chairman's vision, but the improvement in strategic mobility will probably be evolutionary and dependent on cost constraints. It will not be a quick fix, and it will not make up for the lack of strategic depth and effective forward defense that dogged us during the Iraqi crisis in 1990. In addition, it would not lead to a truly credible deterrent in a region where leaders most need to observe power to appreciate it. This option would be the most expensive of the four if we attempted to increase strategic mobility enough to bring sufficient army forces to the region within the critical first thirty days of a crisis. The players in the 1991 Global War Game saw that as improbable, given current budgetary realities. They saw the reduction of the closure time from sixty

to something approaching thirty days as a more realistic, but still a very expensive, alternative.

Option three (a hegemonic client-oriented strategy) is also probably not viable at present given the current governments of the likely candidate clients, but the evolution to such a system should not be ruled out as an eventual possibility. Since the two most likely client candidates (Iraq and Iran) are currently very hostile to U.S. interests, luring one into our camp would be a long process, and getting the American public to accept such a relationship would be problematic at best. The possibility of the Gulf Cooperation Council developing into a militarily effective Nato-like entity cannot be ruled out in the long run, but the Global War Game players did not see it as a realistic near-term option. An eventual evolution to this strategy would not necessarily be precluded by the interim adoption of one or more of the other options.

Option four (a naval bridge strategy) has the attraction of not requiring new forces and of being readily achievable within the guidelines of General Powell's vision. It would also assist the rapid introduction and initial sustainment of contingency forces into theater when necessary. Perhaps the best argument in favor of such a strategy is that it can be implemented with forces and equipment currently in the inventory at very little cost increase over existing arrangements. Additionally, the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) combined with other prepositioned assets (such as those currently maintained by the U.S. Army and Air Force) would logistically sustain army and air force elements as they arrive in theater; the precedent for this was set during the initial phases of Desert Shield. This ability to act as an "enabling force" truly makes the Navy-Marine Corps team the bridge between forward presence and the introduction of strategic reserves. Army and air force initiatives to improve strategic mobility would be complementary to the concept rather than competitive with it. The relatively small "footprint" of a MPF squadron, with its 150 or so merchant seamen and a tiny complement of full-time navy personnel, would almost certainly be easier to "sell," from a political-military standpoint, to Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, or other potential exercise hosts.

This proposed course of action will be greatly enhanced if the navy continues to examine options for changing the mix of aircraft in carrier air wings to provide a greater air-to-ground capability; this orientation would have utility in the Middle East, where the sophisticated anti-ship threat once posed by the Soviet Union has dissipated. This is not to suggest that the navy abandon its sea-control mission, a prerequisite for power projection, but it

does reflect the reality that sea control can now be presumed, except at choke points and close inshore (the areas where the line between sea control and power projection becomes somewhat blurred). The allegation by some analysts that the navy did not bring to bear enough "air-to-mud" capability during Desert Storm and will not do so in the future would be largely overcome by creating forces tailored to local enemy denial capabilities rather than by deploying standard packages to all regions of the world. At this writing the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting a "Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort" designed to seek more flexible and innovative methods of employing naval power in the manner described above.

The principal disadvantage of this "naval bridge option" is that it will require frequent and vigorous exercises to remind regional actors—several of which are notoriously slow learners—of its capabilities and rapid responsiveness. U.S. planners need to keep in mind that one of the primary causes of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a fundamental misunderstanding of both the will and the capability of the United States to act decisively in the Middle East region. The naval bridge option will require less dependence on timely indications and warning than option two, but it will be more dependent on it than options one and three. Option four has a third disadvantage in that it will require some hard strategic decisions. Most of all, the permanent placement of a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group with a Marine Expeditionary Unit on station in the region may well require a smaller reduction in naval forces than is currently contemplated, or the acceptance of some degree of risk elsewhere by reducing presence there. The dedication of a second MPF squadron to the Middle East, moving it closer to that theater, entails less risk if the Atlantic squadron is chosen. The threat in Europe appears to have diminished radically in the wake of the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. This certainly does not mean that MPF might not be used in Europe, but merely that the strategic calculus has changed to the extent that "hot spots," such as the Middle East and Korea, will require more immediate response in the foreseeable future than will Europe.

Conclusions. Option four, the naval bridge, appears to be potentially the most realistic of the options in the near term. Option two is less expensive than the others, but due to fiscal realities, is much less achievable in the near term, if at all. Option three will probably be considered as an ultimate solution to the imbalance between forward deployment and strategic contingency forces if relations with any of the potential candidate hegemonic clients improves in the long term. This option will have to overcome strong

memories of the debacle of our attempt to cultivate Iran; it is a very high-risk option. Option one would be difficult due to the cost, regional dislike of a standing Western presence, and the vulnerability of land prepositioning without adequate forces readily available for protection in the early stages of a crisis. Option one offers the best chance of deterring aggression in the region and of acting effectively early if deterrence fails. Option four offers the best opportunity for early forcible reentry into the region if an attacker strikes the arrival ports and airfields with nuclear or chemical weapons; the MPF carrier battle group and amphibious ready group would provide the core of the forward air and logistics needed. Of course the MPF would need to off-load and transfer some equipment to amphibious shipping in order to support adequately an amphibious operation; marines have been preparing for such an eventuality for years.

Would a forward engagement system of the size proposed in option four be enough to deter or fight effectively if deterrence failed? Michael Mazarr of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the United States needs a middle-weight mechanized corps. He states that if we had possessed such a corps (a light armored division and a light mechanized or motorized division supported by an armored cavalry regiment and an airmobile brigade) on 2 August 1990, we could have more effectively deterred Iraq. He further believes that such a force, designed to be flown into Saudi Arabia within a week or so, could have combined with the Saudi army and expanding U.S. tactical air assets (on land or at sea) to put up a very stiff fight.¹²¹

If the Global War Game and the results of Desert Shield are at all predictive, the corps Mazarr postulates is not logistically feasible using purely army assets likely to be available in the near term. However, such an organization becomes much more realistic when built around the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) postulated in option four, with its thirty days of sustainability. The ground combat element of that MEF is a marine mechanized division with a corps-sized command element already in place; its organization takes advantage of the synergism of the marine Air-Ground Task Force concept as well as its logistics sustainability. When army logistics units arrived in theater, the force could be reconfigured along service lines as appropriate. This is an example of the credibility and sustainability the naval bridge strategy affords, in which each service lends its own unique strengths to the overall efforts.

Recommendation. The naval bridge concept of option four should be adopted immediately, as it makes the strategy outlined in the Chairman's

vision viable, using assets currently existing, without major changes in force structure and with minimal political-military repercussions for the Middle East. The other options should be pursued as longer term solutions to the overall strategic problem in the Gulf Region as the situation dictates. Improving strategic mobility as outlined in option two should remain a high national strategic priority. The client-oriented strategy outlined in option three would best be pursued in the form of a Nato-like client coalition. This will be a very long-term endeavor if it can be done at all in the Middle East, where mistrust and long-standing rivalries are a virtual cottage industry. Opportunities to improve forward presence should be pursued as they arise, but we need to be aware that this option may well prove a double-edged sword in terms of internal instability within allied nations. It should be noted that since the original draft of this monograph in August 1991, several of the elements of the naval bridge option have been implemented, and the rest are contemplated.

In his lecture on Metternich and the Congress of Vienna, Professor George Baer of the Naval War College points out that the systems created by Metternich and Bismarck shared a major weakness in that both stressed stability over the creative management of change. The word "stability" is often used interchangeably with the concept of the "new world order" in discussing the present changing national security environment. The naval bridge strategy proposed in this paper is seen as a short to mid-term "fix" to a recognized soft spot in the proposed national military strategy. However, even this concept should probably be viewed as itself a bridge to an ultimate system of standing regional coalitions designed to manage change, allow for healthy commerce and economic development, and guard against elements that would seek change through catastrophic means. The new world order is a blank slate with enormous potential for good as well as evil, and the potential for evil must remain a major consideration in our national security planning. The National Military Strategy provides a superb vehicle for feeling our way into a new era, but it should be viewed as an evolving entity rather than as a closed system.

Notes

1. "Devolution" was a term used to describe current events in the 1991 Global War Game at the Naval War College. See *Global Wargame, GWG-1991*, Section 1, "Executive Summary, CNWS-S&C: 11-91" (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1991), p. 6.
2. President George Bush, "Remarks by the President in his Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium," Aspen, Colo.: 2 August 1990.
3. General Colin L. Powell, "Military Realities and Future Security Prospects," remarks delivered at the Royal United Services Institute, London: 5 December 1990.
4. *Ibid.*
5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy for the 1990s" (Washington: 21 January 1992), pp. 19-21.
6. Arther Ferrill, *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1988), pp. 167-169.
7. Allen L. Tiffany, "A Light Infantry Division with More for the Fight," *Military Review*; August 1991, p. 42.
8. Mackubin T. Owens, "The Marine Corps and the New National Military Strategy," *Amphibious Warfare Review*, Summer 1991, pp. 64-69.
9. President George Bush, "State of the World 1991," delivered to the United Nations General Assembly, New York: 23 September 1991. (Based on author's notes from viewing the speech).
10. Dr. Robert Wood, "Remarks Delivered to 1991 Global War Game Players," Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Newport, R.I.: 7 July 1991.
11. Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), p. 49.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
14. Lynn Montross, *War through the Ages* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), p. 83.
15. Delbruck describes in some detail the Roman attempt to close this ring in Germany in *The Barbarian Invasions*. He points out that the debacle at the Teutoburger Forest in A.D. 9 marked the high-water mark of this attempt to close it. The final Roman attempt to establish hegemony in Germany came to an end in the strategic failure of Germanicus in the punitive campaign of A.D. 16. See Hans Delbruck, *The Barbarian Invasions: History of the Art of War*, v. 2, trans. J. Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, Neb. and London: Univ. of Nebraska Press), p. 120.
16. Luttwak, p. 27.
17. Ferrill, p. 27.
18. Luttwak, pp. 48-49.
19. Ferrill, p. 27.
20. This is a judgment based purely on the smaller size of the army, the smaller standing imperial bureaucracy of the era, the lack of expensive standing fortifications and the absence of the paid mercenaries that characterized the two later Roman systems and the Byzantine empire.
21. Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Rise of Christian Europe* (London: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1965), p. 54.

22. Montross, p. 83.
23. Ferrill (p. 26) estimates the second-century Roman military budget to have been from 450 to 500 million sesterces. This was probably somewhat higher than at the time of the Emperor Augustus (approximately 27 B.C. to A.D. 14) due to higher costs associated with fixed fortifications. It also does not take into account the cost of civil administration of provinces that had been self-governing colonies during the hegemonic period.
24. Flavius Josephus, *The Wars of the Romans*, trans. William Whiston (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1915), pp. 1-2.
25. Luttwak, p. 51.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-117.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
29. Ferrill, pp. 25-26.
30. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, *Men in Arms* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 47.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
32. Hans Delbruck (p. 194) is a dissenter here. He believes that the Germans were better tactically and that the Roman military genius lay in the strategic ability to put numerically superior forces on the field at the decisive time and place.
33. Luttwak and Ferrill agree that the main strength of the Roman strategy in this era of strategic defense was the tactical offensive capability of the legions.
34. Ferrill, p. 27.
35. Luttwak, pp. 125-126.
36. Preston and Wise, p. 39.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
38. Luttwak (p. 72) describes a system capable of giving sufficient operational warning because it presented a strong front. An enemy massing to attack would have to conduct a costly buildup that was difficult to conceal, given the relative undisciplined nature of barbarian forces. This would give the Romans time to reinforce where necessary. There appear to have been no strategic surprises great enough to punish the system for its relative ineffectiveness. It seems that its intelligence was generally adequate. The Romans depended on superior command and control in the form of runners and other means of signalling to give them adequate warning once a serious threat began to develop.
39. Luttwak (pp. 124-125) claims that the lack of a reserve made this system very thin by the time of Marcus Aurelius.
40. Luttwak, p. 125.
41. Arther Ferrill acknowledges that this was an attempt to balance the system, in his essay, "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire," in Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), p. 83.
42. For background, see Delbruck's *The Barbarian Invasions* or Vegetius' *The Military Institutions of the Romans* (Harrisburg, Pa: The Telegraph Press, 1960.)
43. Ferrill, *The Fall* pp. 152-153.
44. Delbruck, pp. 317-318.
45. Luttwak, p. 188.
46. Delbruck, p. 318.

47. Trevor-Roper, p. 67.
48. Ferrill, *The Fall*, pp. 128-130.
49. Preston and Wise, p. 49.
50. Delbruck explains this process in some detail in chapter 6.
51. Ferrill, *The Fall*, pp. 46-47.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-169.
53. Preston and Wise, p. 49.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
55. Ferrill, *The Fall*, pp. 47-48.
56. Preston and Wise, p. 45.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
58. Luttwak explains this concept in chapter 3.
59. See Ferrill, "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" and Preston and Wise, chapter 3.
60. Ferrill, *The Fall*, p. 46.
61. Luttwak, p. 84.
62. Trevor-Roper, pp. 62-64.
63. An apt analogy is a song by folk singer Ray Stevens about a talented and heroic pig who does many wonderful things for a family that reciprocates by eating it one leg at a time. Not surprisingly, the pig eventually escapes, hobbling away on wooden legs.
64. General Powell made this point in a speech, "Military Realities and Future Security Prospects" (Dept. of Defense transcript, undated).
65. Preston and Wise, p. 46.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
67. Delbruck, p. 218.
68. Ferrill, *The Fall*, p. 83.
69. Luttwak, p. 189.
70. There is no reliable account of the Roman intelligence system of this era, but we can discern from Vegetius' contemptuous comments on security, as well as from poor Roman performance during the second Battle of Adrianople and similar campaigns, that intelligence had declined appreciably.
71. Delbruck, pp. 275-276.
72. Preston and Wise (pp. 48-49) accuse Theodosius of creating a security system that was Gothic in all but name.
73. Preston and Wise, p. 51.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
76. Montross, p. 115.
77. Preston and Wise, p. 57.
78. In his *Tactica*, the Emperor Leo advocates any means necessary that would economize scarce manpower resources to achieve political-military aims, but he stresses the need to back up every stratagem with raw power to ensure that, above all, Byzantine power is respected. See Preston and Wise, p. 57.
79. Preston and Wise, p. 59.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

81. Montross, p. 114.
82. Preston and Wise, pp. 52-53.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
84. C. W. C. Oman, *The Byzantine Empire* (London: Putnam and Sons, 1901), p. 219.
85. Preston and Wise (pp. 62-63) point out that the loss of the hardy peasants of the Asiatic themes on the periphery of the empire was the element that eventually terminated the Byzantine claim to be one of the great empires. This emphasizes the importance of the periphery and of the lack of strategic depth in the system.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.
87. Oman, p. 91.
88. The emperors Maurice and Leo devoted considerable space in their writings to military intelligence. Leo gives a masterful strategic intelligence estimate of various potential enemies in *Tactica*, quoted in Montross, p. 128.
89. Professor George Baer of the Naval War College gives an excellent overview of this process in his lecture titled "Metternich."
90. Stephen W. Sears, ed., *The Horizon History of the British Empire* (New York: American Heritage, 1973), pp. 334-335.
91. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random, 1987), p. 154.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
93. Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), p. 95.
94. Byron Farwell, *Queen Victoria's Little Wars* (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1972). Farwell uses the figure of 317 days for the relief force to actually reach Khartoum, counting from the first day of the siege (p. 290).
95. Kennedy, pp. 229-231.
96. Preston and Wise, p. 221.
97. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
99. Norman F. Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 34-35.
100. Sears, pp. 334-335.
101. Preston and Wise, pp. 260-261.
102. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of British Naval Mastery* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: The Ashfield Press, 1983) p. 229.
103. Howard, pp. 96 and 120-121.
104. As pointed out in note 1, the term "devolution" was used extensively in the 1991 Global Wargame at the Naval War College. It characterized the then-continuing breakup of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the instruments of government created after the Bolshevik Revolution. That trend accelerated during the preparation of this study at a rate that exceeded the expectations of the Global War Game players.
105. See *Global Wargame*, p. 14.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
107. JCS, *The National Military Strategy* (Washington: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1992) p. 7.

108. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-23.
109. *Global Wargame*, p. 7.
110. Ferrill, *The Fall*, pp. 168-169.
111. *Ibid.*, pp. 155-157.
112. *Global War Game*, pp. 22-23.
113. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
114. Luttwak, pp. 111-116.
115. Ferrill, *The Fall*, p. 169.
116. "U.S. Intelligence Often Off the Mark," *Providence Journal* (Providence, R.I.), 22 September 1991, p. A-4 (reprinted from *St. Petersburg Times*).
117. Luttwak, pp. 32-33.
118. *Global Wargame*, p. 10.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
120. Marine Corps Top Level Schools Brief to Marine Corps Fellows delivered at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 5 September 1991.
121. Michael J. Mazarr, "Middleweight Forces for Contingency Operations," *Military Review*, August 1991, p. 35.