



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGY: FAILURES AND  
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN OVERCOMING THE  
PAPUAN INSURGENCY**

by

Djon Afriandi

December 2015

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APPROACHES IN OVERCOMING THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines some failures of the current Indonesian counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the Indonesian government's efforts to eliminate the separatist insurgency in Papua. In doing so, this thesis uses the McCormick "Diamond" COIN model to measure and determine the mistakes of the Indonesian approaches from 1965 to 2014. This thesis finds that the Indonesian COIN strategy has no balancing concept in applying its approaches toward the conflict. This thesis proposes alternative options for the Indonesian COIN strategy to completely destroy the insurgents in Papua in the future. In exploring the alternative methods, this thesis also practices the theory of the "Diamond" COIN model as a framework that leads to the conclusion that the Indonesian government must keep using limited coercive and smart political actions in dealing with the Papuan insurgency.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|        |                                                                                  |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ABRI   | Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (the Indonesian Armed Forces)             |
| ACFOA  | Australian Council for Overseas Aid                                              |
| COG    | Center of Gravity                                                                |
| COIN   | Counterinsurgency                                                                |
| DAU    | Dana Alokasi Umum (General Budget)                                               |
| DEIC   | Dutch East India Company                                                         |
| ELSHAM | Lembaga Studi Hak Asasi Manusia (Foundation for Human Rights Study and Advocacy) |
| ETA    | Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Separatist Group)                                         |
| GENAPA | Gerakan Nasional Papua (the Papuan National Movement)                            |
| HAM    | Hak Asasi Manusia (the Human Rights)                                             |
| IPWP   | International Parliamentarians for West Papua                                    |
| KIM    | Komite Indonesia Merdeka (Indonesian Independence Committee)                     |
| KODAM  | Komando Daerah Militer (Territorial Military Command)                            |
| KMB    | Konferensi Meja Bundar (Round Table Conventions)                                 |
| KUHP   | Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana (the Indonesian Criminal Law Book)              |
| LTTE   | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam                                                 |
| MSG    | Melanesian Spearhead Group                                                       |
| NAPAN  | Natural Papua National (the National Natural Papuan)                             |
| NGO    | Non-Governmental Organizations                                                   |

|         |                                                                                                         |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| NKRI    | Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (United States of Indonesian Republic)                               |
| OPM     | Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement)                                                          |
| PDP     | Dewan Presidium Papua (Papuan Presidium Council)                                                        |
| PKI     | Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)                                                   |
| PMPM    | Piagam Masyarakat Papua Merdeka (the Charter of Freedom Papuan People)                                  |
| PNG     | Papua New Guinea                                                                                        |
| POLDA   | Kepolisian Daerah (Territorial Policemen)                                                               |
| PPK     | Program Pengembangan Kecamatan (County Development Program)                                             |
| PT      | Persero Terbatas (Company)                                                                              |
| RAND    | Research and Development Corporation                                                                    |
| RMS     | Republik Maluku Selatan (South Moluccas Republic)                                                       |
| SPM     | Santa Perawan Maria (the Virgin Santa Maria)                                                            |
| TRIKORA | Tri Komando Rakyat (Three People Command)                                                               |
| TNI     | Tentara Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Defense Force)                                      |
| UNHCR   | United Nations High Commission for Refugees                                                             |
| UNSC    | United Nations Security Council                                                                         |
| UNTEA   | United Nations Temporary Executive Authority                                                            |
| USA     | United States of America                                                                                |
| USSR    | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                                                                     |
| UP4B    | Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Papua dan Papua Barat (the Rapid Development Unit for Papua and West Papua) |

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) continues (through its insurgents) to attempt to secede from the Republic of Indonesia. Although the Indonesian government has changed its approach in resolving this issue by using more political concepts rather than military force since the beginning of 2005, OPM insurgents have tended to increase their violations towards other people, including TNI soldiers and POLRI members. They also take advantage of the globalization effects that restrict the application of the Indonesian counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy to eliminate them. As a result, they apparently gain more support from the international community and currently are taking control over other Papuan people, especially those who live in remote areas.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the Indonesian government immediately needs alternative solutions regarding this insurgency to prevent the prolonged conflict from leading to the secession of the Papuan territory.

This thesis evaluates some failures of the Indonesian current COIN strategy in destroying OPM insurgents. It also attempts to find the alternative approaches that the Indonesian government should apply in its COIN strategy to eliminate the OPM insurgents effectively. Therefore, this thesis utilizes a qualitative approach and begins with assumptions that Papua needs more than a special autonomy status to resolve this issue. This thesis then uses some possible theoretical lenses and surveys the historical conflict as well as analyzes some previous insurgent cases in Papua in seeking weaknesses of the current Indonesian COIN strategy. Thus, in achieving those results objectively, this thesis applies descriptive, analytical, and prescriptive methods in its research.

Evaluation of the current Indonesian COIN strategy in Papua finds that the Indonesian government has failed to provide for the local Papuans' needs and secure international support for overcoming the OPM insurgents. The failures happen because

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<sup>1</sup> Kanis W.K., "Inilah Kasus Kekerasan di Papua Lima Bulan Terakhir [These are violations in the five last months in Papua]," *Kompasiana Hukum*, June 2, 2014, <http://hukum.kompasiana.com/2014/06/02/inilah-kasus-kekerasan-di-papua-5-bulan-terakhir--656183.html>.

the Indonesian government directly attacks the OPM armed and political insurgency before winning the hearts and minds of local people and guaranteeing their security. Moreover, the Indonesian government has made an incomplete effort to build relationships and conduct good diplomacy with both other countries and the United Nations to gain full support in destroying the OPM insurgency. This situation gives an opportunity to the OPM insurgents to win against the Indonesian central government in the competition to legitimize control over the Papuan people as a center of gravity and gain support from foreign countries. As a result, the Papuan people's trust in the Indonesian central government has decreased, leading OPM insurgents to freely conduct further armed and political resistance in order to gain more support both domestically and internationally.<sup>2</sup>

Improper military force, human rights violations, and false policies regarding the Papuan conflict are significant issues leading to the failure of Indonesian efforts in fulfilling the Papuan people's needs. Moreover, due to the Indonesian central government having underestimated the OPM insurgents' abilities to conduct both armed and political struggles, the Indonesian government began losing international support in 1972<sup>3</sup>. As a result, although the Indonesian central government applied the special autonomy system in the Papuan territory and pulled troops from Papua in 2005, the OPM insurgents have continued their struggle.<sup>4</sup> They keep fighting through various means to gain more support from other Papuans and international communities, leading the Indonesian government to face further difficulties and complexities in the efforts to destroy the OPM insurgency.

The analytical assumption of this thesis also recommends alternative options for the Indonesian government to properly and effectively overcome OPM insurgents. The Indonesian central government must focus more on applying three essential keys of the "Diamond" COIN model from Gordon McCormick: enhancing the government's

---

<sup>2</sup> Yorrays T.H. Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent] (Presidium Dewan Papua, Jayapura: Desanti Grafika, 2002), 34.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 119.

<sup>4</sup> Andri Hadi, *Papuans Need Democracy, Not Separatism*, Jakarta, July 30, 2004. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/07/30/papuans-need-democracy-not-separatism.html> accessed June 9, 2015.

legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, destroying OPM's abilities, and securing domestic and international support. This model encourages the Indonesian government to continue combining limited coercive actions and building consensus among the Papuan people in order to overcome the current OPM insurgency strategy. However, as one of the democratic countries in the world, the Indonesian government should keep properly combining those approaches to force the OPM insurgents into a situation where they have no support at all and cannot exist anymore.

The Indonesian government should continue the implementation of the Papuan special autonomy policy and put the Papuan people's welfare as a priority in making a policy regarding the PT Freeport Company in order to enhance its legitimacy and control over the Papuan people and territory. Furthermore, in destroying the OPM's abilities, the Indonesian government should equip Papuan KODAM soldiers and deploy them effectively, as well as enforce the law in Papua strictly. Finally, the Indonesian government should secure its domestic and international support by winning the war of influence and by skillful diplomacy in a dynamic international political system. Therefore, by effectively and consistently applying these essential keys of the Diamond COIN Model, the Indonesian government can patch the weaknesses of its current COIN strategy in Papua to lead to the completely ruination of the OPM insurgency.

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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. THESIS BACKGROUND**

As an archipelago country with a tremendous number of ethnicities, religions, and cultures, the most dangerous threat to Indonesian sovereignty is disintegration. Historically, Indonesia has successfully overcome many threats of disintegration. However, the East Timor<sup>5</sup> insurgency succeeded in separating that province from Indonesia in 1999, and another threat, the Papua insurgency, known as the Free Papua Movement (OPM),<sup>6</sup> has existed since 1964. The OPM is attempting to separate from the Republic of Indonesia by disrupting the stabilization of Indonesian national security in the Papuan territory.

The OPM's violations continue to escalate, and thus far the Indonesian government has failed to eliminate them. The OPM has taken advantage of globalization effects wherein democracy and human rights compel the Indonesian government to be more cautious in applying its strategy. An analysis of empirical data during a mission in Papua in 2003 suggests that the OPM divides its organization into two groups: armed separatists and political separatists. Through both these groups, the organization's strategy is to highlight its struggle and gain support from the international community.

According to the Military Regional Command of Papua (Komando Daerah Militer XVII Cendrawasih/Kodam XVII Cendrawasih),<sup>7</sup> the OPM's armed separatists have killed more than 25 Papuan Kodam soldiers and 15 civilians, including two Americans,

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<sup>5</sup> East Timor was the Indonesia's 27th province. However, in 1999, following the United Nations sponsored act of self-determination, Indonesia relinquished control of the territory, and East Timor became a country on May 20, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Pieter Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice: Decolonization and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua* (New York: Oneworld, 2009), 760. The OPM is an insurgency group in Papua Island that demands to separate from Indonesia.

<sup>7</sup> The Military Regional Command or Area Command is known as Komando Daerah Militer (Kodam). It is the key organization for strategic, tactical, and territorial operations for all services in the Indonesian National Defense Forces.

within the last two years.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the security of the Papuan territory has been reduced to its lowest level in the last decade. In addition, the OPM's political separatists have applied vertical organizational methods to develop international elements and mobilize popular support. Through the use of weapons, information technology, and diplomacy, these separatists systematically have improved their global reach. They have spread fear and weakened the trust of the local people in the Indonesian government. At the same time, they have gained international sympathy and support for their struggle.<sup>9</sup>

After withdrawing the Indonesian Armed Forces from Papua because of international pressure in 2005, Indonesia granted special autonomy status to Papua and divided it into two provinces (Papua and West Papua). However, in the decade since, Papuan social and economic development has not changed significantly.<sup>10</sup> Although Papua has abundant natural resources, the development of Papua has fallen short of the Papuan people's expectations. According to current statistical data, the number of poor and unemployed people within the territory increases every year. The number of impoverished has risen from 760,350 in 2012 to 761,620 in 2013, and the number of unemployed has increased from 498,000 in 2012 to 536,000 in 2013.<sup>11</sup>

The OPM's goal is to separate from Indonesia. According to John Mackinlay, the OPM remains in the "Global Insurgent Forces" category. In that regard, the OPM survives in an international environment using support from different countries.<sup>12</sup> The OPM's political separatists have global connectivity, which they systemically exploit to obtain weapons. In addition, they use information to spread fear and break the trust of the

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<sup>8</sup> Kanis W.K., "Inilah Kasus Kekerasan di Papua Lima Bulan Terakhir [These are violations in the five last months in Papua]," *Kompasiana Hukum*, June 2, 2014, <http://hukum.kompasiana.com/2014/06/02/inilah-kasus-kekerasan-di-papua-5-bulan-terakhir--656183.html>.

<sup>9</sup> Victor Krenak, "Civil Emergency Scenario in Papua," in *Internationalization of Papuan Issue: Actors, Modus Operandi, Motives*, ed. Gerry Setiawan, 151–52 (Jakarta: Perum LKBN Antara, 2014), 152.

<sup>10</sup> Suara Pembaruan, "Tanah Papua Sarang Korupsi [Papuan Land is A Nest of Corruption]," September 26, 2014, <http://sp.beritasatu.com/home/tanah-papua-sarang-korupsi-1/65669>.

<sup>11</sup> Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua Barat [Central Bureau of Statistic of West Papua Province], "Indikator Kesejahteraan Rakyat Provinsi Papua Barat 2013 [The Indicator of West Papuan people's welfare in 2013]," July 19, 2013, [http://papuabarat.bps.go.id/publikasi/2014/Indikator%20Kesejahteraan%20Rakyat%20Provinsi%20Papua%20Barat%202013/baca\\_publicasi.php#1](http://papuabarat.bps.go.id/publikasi/2014/Indikator%20Kesejahteraan%20Rakyat%20Provinsi%20Papua%20Barat%202013/baca_publicasi.php#1).

<sup>12</sup> John Mackinlay, *Globalisation and Insurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 97–99.

people with the government. If there is no solution to this issue, it is possible Papua will become the next East Timor for Indonesia. Thus, the question is whether the current Indonesian counterinsurgency strategy is able to resolve the Papua insurgency? If not, then what is the best strategy to apply?

## **B. PURPOSE**

According to Joseph Nye, Jr., “cultural conservatism, mistrust, civilian casualties, and local corruption make it difficult to win the hearts and minds that constitute the soft power part of a COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy.”<sup>13</sup> Since the 2005 discontinuation of military operations, Indonesia has pursued a more diplomatic approach in its strategy and has extended a special autonomy status to Papua. However, the OPM continues to advocate separation from the Republic of Indonesia, while growing larger and even more violent than 10 years ago.

Therefore, this thesis evaluates the current counterinsurgency strategy of the Indonesian government towards the OPM and attempts to identify the best policies to apply in the future. By understanding the historical conflict of Papua and analyzing previous insurgent cases, both domestically and internationally, this thesis provides a new perspective on the Indonesian strategy.

## **C. THE WARNING OF DISINTEGRATION IN PAPUA**

The Act of Free Choice led Papua to integrate into Indonesia in 1969. However, for almost 46 years, a few Papuans have resisted Indonesian governance by joining the Free Papua Movement (OPM). They have committed many violations, although the Indonesian government has made numerous efforts to develop the Papua provinces. The history of these integration and development efforts, as well as the current condition of Papua, has led many analysts to regard other possible resolutions.

Jacques Bertrand argues that democratization in Papua is insufficient to create a new term for integration. Special autonomy is not well established in Papua, and some groups resist it. These groups reiterate that they must have full independence, because

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<sup>13</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 38.

they fear special autonomy will lead to the same outcome as the Act of Free Choice. As an archipelago country, democratization has created a dilemma for the Indonesian government. While the Indonesian government is proposing a substantial compromise by offering special autonomy, the insurgency does not see any opportunity beyond full independence from Indonesia. In the meantime, military and police operations aimed at destroying small groups of armed insurgents send a clear message that the Indonesian government is unwilling to compromise on its sovereignty. Such operations perpetuate the continued climate of fear and suppression of the local populations. They also open the possibility for a broader insurgency to emerge and promote a secession similar to East Timor's, since the citizens of that nation held a similar perception of the integration process in Indonesia.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, Pieter Drooglever deems the Papuan people as unprepared to exercise their right to self-determination and denounces the process of integration in Indonesia in 1969 as unfair. He claims that neither a functional or mental integration into the Indonesian state was achieved after the Act of Free Choice because Papuan tribes remain in opposition to the Indonesian military.<sup>15</sup> As a result, although Papua has abundant natural resources, most Papuans continue to subsist on inadequate welfare, with very little access to health amenities and education.<sup>16</sup> However, Drooglever also realizes that a better solution is still available for the future of the Papuans. It depends on the Papuan society itself, the interest of the international community, and the interest of Indonesia in this area.<sup>17</sup>

#### **D. USEFUL CONCEPT**

In order to understand how the states in general should resolve their internal armed conflict, this thesis refers to Gordon McCormick's COIN Diamond Model.

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<sup>14</sup> Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 144–60.

<sup>15</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 762.

<sup>16</sup> Peter King, *West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?* (Sidney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), 23.

<sup>17</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 764.

According to McCormick, an interaction exists between the government, the insurgency, the population, and international actors.<sup>18</sup> In any COIN strategy, the government and the insurgency compete to gain both the legitimacy of control over the population as a center of gravity and support from international actors.<sup>19</sup>

#### **E. RELEVANT CASES**

Before applying the Diamond Model as a means to measure the effectiveness of the Indonesian strategy in defeating the Papuan insurgency, it may be useful to briefly review the strategy of counterinsurgency approaches applied in both East Timor and Sri Lanka. These two cases were chosen because they contain many similarities to the Papua conflict, including its history, geography, and insurgent strategy. The secession of East Timor from Indonesia becomes a lesson learned for the failed strategy of the government.

Mark Rolls describes the separation of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999 as the result of the misperception of Indonesian political leaders. They tended to make quick decisions in response to international pressure.<sup>20</sup> The separation of East Timor demonstrates that the political approach and political leaders have a key role in facing an insurgency.

In addition, Christopher Paul of the RAND Corporation claims that the end of Indonesia's authority in East Timor dates from the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. The incident caused horror globally and a new movement of criticism of Indonesian control in East Timor.<sup>21</sup> The prolonged war and the violation of human rights led to increasing international attention and interference in efforts to resolve the conflict. The Indonesian

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<sup>18</sup> Greg Wilson, "The Mystic Diamond: Applying the Diamond Model of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," in *Gangs and Guerillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism*, ed. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein, 15–20 (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 17.

<sup>19</sup> Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare: The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School* 18, no. 2 (2005): 2.

<sup>20</sup> Mark Rolls, "Indonesia's East Timor Experience," in *Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South East Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solution*, ed. Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff, 166–94 (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 190.

<sup>21</sup> Christopher Paul, *Path to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Cooperation, 2013), 379.

government allowed the East Timor insurgency to organize its cells broadly. As a result, the insurgency became more difficult to destroy.

Meanwhile, the ruination of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka reveals a successful strategy in a counterinsurgency campaign. In contrast to the failed counterinsurgent example of East Timor, Stephen L. Battle describes how targeting the insurgents' legitimacy became key to destroying the LTTE's positive connection to the Tamil people. The LTTE was driven to the condition where there were no other options for it than to coerce the populations and to fight the Sri Lankan Armed Forces as long as possible. In addition, the events of 9/11 also affected the international community's perception of violent groups. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces successfully separated the political insurgents from the armed insurgents. Consequently, the Sri Lankan government became capable of destroying the LTTE completely.<sup>22</sup>

In addition, Eranda Malaka Chandrasa analyzes how the power of political will and the stability of the government, the change of international influences, and a particular military and naval strategy contributed to the destruction of LTTE in 2009. Internal political stability, loss of support from the international system, and the ability of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces to adopt an effective strategy were the three main variables of a COIN strategy that ended the conflict.<sup>23</sup> In short, the most important key to winning the war was the Sri Lankan government's willingness to learn and adapt to the dynamic conflict.

## **F. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODS**

This thesis attempts to answer why some groups of Papua continue struggling to separate from Indonesia, and what the best Indonesian counterinsurgency strategy should be in order to benefit everyone.

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<sup>22</sup> Stephen L. Battle, "Lesson In Legitimacy: The LTTE End-Game Of 2007-2009" (Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).

<sup>23</sup> Eranda Malaka Chandrasa, "Adaptive COIN in Sri Lanka: What Contributed to the Demise of the LTTE?" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012).

In order to answer those questions, this thesis utilizes a qualitative approach and begins with the assumption that Papua needs more than a special autonomy status to eliminate the threat from its insurgents. This thesis then applies McCormick's Diamond Model in an effort to identify weaknesses within the Indonesian current strategy in Papua. Finally, this thesis recommends solutions that could be applicable in eliminating the Papua insurgency. In order to offer a feasible solution, this thesis applies counterinsurgency theories drawn from the McCormick Model and examines the Indonesian government's current military approaches. This thesis recommends real solutions, wherein all the stakeholders will have clear incentives to pursue the solutions and knowledge of how to achieve those goals according to each function. This approach will offer a better solution for the Papua conflict in the present and the future.

## **G. CONTENT OF THE THESIS**

Chapter II (The Historical Background of the Dispute) begins with a brief discussion of early Papua before and under Dutch colonization. It explains how the Dutch took over Western Papua from the Sultan of Tidore from North Moluccas. This chapter then describes the integration process of Papua into Indonesia through the Act of Free Choice (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat/PEPERA) in 1969. This act led to the reemergence of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM), which as an insurgency opposes the Indonesian government.

Chapter III (Flaws in the Indonesian Counterinsurgency Strategy) provides the failed approaches of the Indonesian government and examines the Indonesian government's COIN strategy against the OPM insurgency during the New Order and the Reformation Era.

Chapter IV (Improving the Indonesian COIN Strategy) proposes some ideas as recommendations for the Indonesian government to support its current COIN strategy in order to completely destroy Papuan insurgents in the future. This part uses three important keys of the COIN Diamond Model as a framework: enhancing the government legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, destroying the OPM's abilities, and securing domestic and international support.

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## II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

“When you look at the past without God’s eyes, you subject yourself to deception. The past no longer exists and God doesn’t linger there. However, Satan will show you whatever you want to see and believe, so you will be trapped in an emotion that cannot communicate truth, beyond what you want to remember.”

–Shannon L. Alder

### A. INTRODUCTION

One of the main issues fueling the Papuan insurgency is the dispute over Papua’s history. The OPM believes that Papuans are completely different, ethnically, from most other Indonesian people, and that Papua is not part of the Dutch East Indies territory, despite the decolonized negotiation between Indonesia and the Dutch in 1949. They also claim that the Papuans are not involved in any negotiation regarding their own freedom. They oppose the results of the Act of Free Choice, claiming that it was an unfair process intended to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia. On the other hand, the Indonesian government asserts that the process of integrating Papua into Indonesia is legal, having been approved by the United Nations in August 1969, and that the OPM and its free movement represent a repetition of Dutch attempts to create a federal state in this territory (see Figure 1) during negotiation in the 1960s.<sup>24</sup>

This chapter explores early Papuan history up to and including the emergence of the OPM. It begins with pre-Dutch colonization and continues through colonization and concludes with the process of integration by exploring the periods immediately before and after the Act of Free Choice. This chapter also identifies the emergence of the OPM and its resistance against the Indonesian government as the origin of the current conflict in this territory (see Figure 2).

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<sup>24</sup> Mark T. Berger and Edward Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalism after Decolonisation and the Limits of the Nation-State in Post-Cold War South East Asia,” *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 6 (2001): 1014.

Figure 1. Political Map of Indonesia



Source: [http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia\\_map2.htm](http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_map2.htm), accessed June 7, 2015

Figure 2. Map of Papua, Indonesia



Source: [http://www.japanfocus.org/-David\\_Adam-Stott/3597/article.html](http://www.japanfocus.org/-David_Adam-Stott/3597/article.html), accessed June 7, 2015

## B. EARLY PAPUA

New Guinea, one of the largest islands in the world, is shaped like a giant bird. If one were to superimpose it into a map of Europe, the most westerly part, the Bird's Head Peninsula, would cover the area between Antwerp and Liverpool, while the tail-feathers of the island would touch the Black Sea.

– Dr. Pieter Drooglever<sup>25</sup>

### 1. Pre-Dutch Colonization


Since the Thirteenth Century, Ternate and Tidore were the most important Moluccan Islamic kingdoms in the west of New Guinea. They possessed maritime forces that were used to expand their influence significantly throughout the surrounding

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<sup>25</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 1.

territories before the first Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century (see Figure 3). According to Drooglever, “the Ternate Kingdom extended to the South and the West and reached as far as the Celebes and Sunda Islands. The Tidore sultans, meanwhile, had their sights set on the East and their influence stretched as far as the nearby coastal area of New Guinea.”<sup>26</sup> The Tidore sultans led the *Uli Siwa* (Nine Alliance) that occupied Tidore Island, Makyan, Halmahera, all the islands surrounding them, and Papua. As Drooglever says, “The Papuans are a primitive people, consisting of dark skinned individuals with frizzy curls, tall and muscular in the coastal areas but small and hardy inland.”<sup>27</sup> The Tidore administration in Papua Island was represented by the Papuan kings (rajas) who started with the first king, Gura Besi, who swore to exercise his authority in the name of Tidore. The link between Tidore and the Papuan kings was also displayed by a large fleet of Papuan *kora-koras* employed to reinforce the Tidore monarchy when the Portuguese laid siege to Tidore in 1534. Thus, regular contact and cooperation between the Tidore sultans and Papuans originated many centuries ago.<sup>28</sup>

Figure 3. Map of Tidore in Indonesia



Source: [https://joshuaproject.net/people\\_groups/15474/ID](https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/15474/ID), accessed June 8, 2015

<sup>26</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 3.

<sup>27</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 2.

<sup>28</sup> Rosmaida Sinaga, *Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962* [The Dutch Term in Papua 1898 – 1962] (Depok, Jawa Barat: Komunitas Bambu, 2013), 36.

Although Alvaro de Saavedra was the first Spaniard to land on Papua Island in 1529, Ynigo Ortiz de Retez was the first to live there afterwards. He claimed Papua as a Spanish territory and called it Nueva Gvince (New Guinea). Basically, the Spaniards sought gold, but they could not find it there. Thus, they left for Panama and never returned. During this period, the Tidore sultans still maintained their hegemony in the Raja Ampat's territory and the northwest coast of New Guinea. The raja (or Major) *Kimelaha* was responsible, directly and indirectly, for gathering the tribute owed to the Tidore sultans. This gathering of tribute has been recognized as one of the motivations for Dutch involvement in this territory.<sup>29</sup>

In 1667, the Dutch states began to cooperate with the Tidore through the Dutch East India Company (DEIC). The Dutch succeeded in persuading the sultan to promise cooperation with the DEIC solely and to forego other foreign alliances. The DEIC then occupied the Sultanate of Tidore in 1780 and took control of the suzerain of New Guinea. In 1793, British forces established a fort in the west of New Guinea but abandoned it two years later.<sup>30</sup> This seizure triggered a series of wars against the Dutch, led by the new sultan of Tidore, Muhammad Amiruddin, who was well known as Sultan Nuku. He was supported by the Papuans in his fight against the Dutch colonial powers, which were stationed in Hitu (Ambon), Banda Islands, and Ternate Island. Although Sultan Nuku, the face of this resistance to foreign rule, died in 1805, the resistance resumed when the English occupied the Moluccas in 1810 and agreed to the Anglo-Dutch Treaty in 1824.<sup>31</sup>

This agreement led to the return of the previous Dutch territory in Moluccas, including the Ternate, Tidore, and the west of Papua. In 1865, the 141st Meridian was claimed by the Netherland East Indies government as its eastern border in order to prevent the emergence of potential rivals from Europe. This territory became Dutch New Guinea. As a result, both Britain and Germany were forced to focus on the other half of the island (the Papua New Guinea territory in present). In 1898, "the western half of New

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<sup>29</sup> Sinaga, *Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962* [The Dutch Term in Papua 1898 – 1962], 37.

<sup>30</sup> Sinaga, *Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962* [The Dutch Term in Papua 1898 – 1962], 39–40.

<sup>31</sup> Sinaga, *Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962* [The Dutch Term in Papua 1898 – 1962], 40.

Guinea was divided into two administrative *afdelingen* (divisions). Each one was governed by a Dutch civil servant with the rank of assistant resident. Both were subordinate to the resident in Ternate.”<sup>32</sup>

## **2. Papua under Dutch Colonization**

In the years following, the Dutch established control in most of Papua, including Merauke, the remote corner area, which would administer Dutch rule in the East Indies. At first, the natives accepted the Dutch expeditions, but after discovering the Dutch’s true intention to occupy their territory and control them, the natives fought the Dutch bitterly. As a result, many Papuans and Dutch were killed during the period before a 1907 Dutch East Indies military reconnaissance mission. With support from military personnel and hundreds of officers of the East Indian Army, this mission explored large sections of the island and systematically carried out agricultural projects. Meanwhile, the Dutch masterminded a situation in which the authority of the Tidore prince became notional, and the prince was reduced to a shadowy figure with no influence. The Dutch encouraged the committee of grandees of the sultanate to run the sultanate for many years. However, the unsophisticated weapons and technology of both the Sultanate of Tidore and Papuans made it impossible to resist the Dutch. As a result, the Dutch administration assumed the real power over the island, though in practice most of the island remained unaffected by colonial rule.<sup>33</sup>

By the late 1920s, the emergence of Indonesian nationalist movements, which shared the commonality of colonial oppression, became the dominant theme of the archipelago. However, Dutch colonials in Java, Sumatera, Borneo, and Celebes Islands repressed and cruelly captured many nationalists, who, along with their families, were exiled to Papua where Dutch colonials had administrative control. These nationalists were sent in exile to Tanah Merah–Bouven Digul, about 500 kilometers inland from inhabitants in the south coast of the Papua Island. Before they were moved to Banda Neira Island in the Moluccas, the founding fathers of Indonesia, such as Sutan Syahrir

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<sup>32</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 14.

<sup>33</sup> Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1013.

and Mohammad Hatta, spent a year in Tanah Merah–Bouven Digul, which was a terrifying place.<sup>34</sup> Their exile strengthened the brotherhood between Papuans and the people from other islands in the archipelago, leading to the common nationalism of Indonesians.<sup>35</sup>

In 1942, the Japanese seized control of Papua from the Dutch as a part of Japan's campaign of conquest in the Pacific. According to Berger and Aspinal, there were only 15 colonial administrative posts in the Netherlands New Guinea when the Japanese conquered this territory and found some early pro-Indonesian sentiment.<sup>36</sup> Their discovery lent credence to the fact that Dutch colonials had limited exploration and authority in Papua, using it simply as a control point for sea access for the herb and spice trade.

The Indonesian nationalist movement increased from 1942 to 1945 during the Japanese occupation. In response, Japan changed its policy to allow Indonesian nationalists to conduct wide communication across the archipelago, including Papua, to spread their nationalist spirit. Moreover, according to Peter King, when U.S. General Douglas MacArthur conquered the West New Guinea capital of Hollandia (Jayapura) in order to retake Southeast Asia, the United States and Australia played a larger role in the liberation of Papua from the Japanese in 1944 than the Dutch.<sup>37</sup> As a result, after Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945, the Indonesian nationalists and the pro-Indonesian Papuans insisted on integrating Papua into Indonesia, fueling the long negotiation process between the Indonesian state and the Dutch Empire. As Yorrys T.H. Raweyai notes, the pro-Indonesian Papuans strengthened their movement by raising the Indonesian flag on the same day as the birthday of the queen of the Dutch Empire, Wilhelmina, on August 31, 1945, and the ceremony was attended by Papuan executive

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<sup>34</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 31–32.

<sup>35</sup> Bernarda Materay, *Nasionalisme Ganda Orang Papua* [Papuans' Double Nationalism] (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2012), 53.

<sup>36</sup> Berger and Aspinal, "The Break-up of Indonesia?," 1013.

<sup>37</sup> King, *West Papua & Indonesia Since Suharto*, 20.

leaders such as Frans and Markus Kaisiepo, Marinus Krey, and Nicolas Jouwe.<sup>38</sup> A year later, in November 1946, Indonesia established the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KIM) in Hollandia, the purpose of which was to keep an independent Indonesia in West New Guinea. More than 150 people, Papuans and other Indonesian nationalists from different parts of the archipelago, attended this inaugural meeting.<sup>39</sup>

## **C. THE INTEGRATION PROCESS**

Insistent on colonizing the Indonesian archipelago by means of violence over the Linggar Jati Agreement, the Dutch conducted military aggressions in 1947 and 1948 that were repelled by both the Indonesian military and the Indonesian people. This situation led the international community, influenced by the trend of decolonization, to pay more attention to the conflict in this territory. The international community, represented by England, encouraged the Indonesian government and the Dutch empire to conduct further negotiations toward a resolution for both countries. Indonesian independence was declared in 1945, but was not formally acknowledged until 1949 through the Round Table Agreement, which referenced Papua.<sup>40</sup>

### **1. A Long Way to the Agreement**

In this situation, The Dutch sought to salvage some of their pride and prestige—and maintain access to at least a portion of Indies' fabulous resources. They contrived to reach an agreement on independence with Soekarno that set aside the transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea from the general transfer that saw Indonesia gain internationally recognized independence in 1949.

– Peter King<sup>41</sup>

In Round Table Conventions (Konferensi Meja Bundar [KMB]), conducted from August 23, 1949, to November 2, 1949, in Den Haag, the Netherlands pursued ways to

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<sup>38</sup> Yorrys T.H. Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent] (Presidium Dewan Papua, Jayapura: Desanti Grafika, 2002), 21.

<sup>39</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 90.

<sup>40</sup> Max Lane, *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia before and after Suharto* (New York: Verso, 2008), 23.

<sup>41</sup> King, *West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto*, 21.

avoid Papua becoming one of the issues of negotiation. However, the Indonesian delegations succeeded in reaching an agreement that acknowledged Indonesian independence and determined the completion of Papua's status a year later.<sup>42</sup> This agreement reflected the firm stance of the Indonesians in demanding that the transfer of authority contain all the Netherlands Indies' formerly administrated territories. Moreover, the trends of decolonization in Southeast Asia effectively pressured the Dutch to agree with the Indonesian delegation's proposal, which was supported by the international community. Subsequently, the Dutch attempted to delay resolving the Papua issue through meetings in both December 1950 and December 1951 in Den Haag, Netherlands. In sum, a treaty was not agreed upon within five years after KMB, and this led the Indonesian government to bring the dispute before the United Nation General Assembly in 1954.<sup>43</sup>

The Indonesian government formally addressed the Papua dispute to the Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1954, and received support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and some Asian and African countries. Indonesia, however, failed to gain a majority of votes in resolving the Papua dispute because most of the Western countries, including the United States, sided with the Dutch. Even though the United States abstained from voting, the Indonesian president, Soekarno, was disappointed in American's foreign policy. As a result, Soekarno mobilized popular support, especially from the Soviet Union, and attempted to unite internal opposition in a campaign to fight the Dutch colonization of West New Guinea.<sup>44</sup>

After the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia [PKI]) won the election in 1955, President Soekarno progressively strengthened the relationship between Indonesia and the Soviet Union by inviting the Soviet president, Voroshilov, and his prime minister, Khrushchev, to Indonesia. As a result, after 1957, the Soviet Union agreed to loan US\$450 million in weapons to Indonesia and provided diplomatic support,

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<sup>42</sup> William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and Its Settlement* (South Orange, NJ: Seton Hall University Press, 1973), 23.

<sup>43</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 24.

<sup>44</sup> Berger and Aspinal, "The Break-up of Indonesia?," 1013.

specifically for the integration of Papua.<sup>45</sup> By 1961, this cooperation allowed Indonesia to become one of the strongest armed forces in South Asia. Of course, such cooperation also worried most Western countries and especially the United States, which led Washington to change its foreign policy regarding the Indonesian matter.

The Cold War affected the political atmosphere in Southeast Asia and especially Indonesia, which after 1955 tended to be more influenced by the Indonesian Communist Party and the USSR. As Aspinall and Berger note, the pressure on the United States had been increased by Soekarno in the late 1950s, and he turned to the Soviet Union for military and economic support, while threatening war against the Dutch in the Papuan region.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, in order to gain increased influence against the USSR in Indonesia, John F. Kennedy, after being elected U.S. president in November 1960, turned his attention to Jakarta. The United States initiated peace offerings to Indonesia regarding the Papua territory and proposed acting as a third party in negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch. This proposal compelled the Dutch Empire to realize that sooner or later they would lose Papua; therefore, the Dutch set into motion a process of self-determination for a small group of Papuans, leading to independence and ultimately spawning Papua nationalism.<sup>47</sup>

While international support for Indonesia increased, the Dutch deployed an aircraft carrier into West Papuan waters and established the New Guinea Council, adopting West Papua as the name of the territory; on December 1, 1961, they designed and presented an anthem and flag, as well as other nationalist attributes.<sup>48</sup> In response, President Soekarno and other Indonesian nationalists rejected the Dutch claim and declared the People's Three Commands (Tri Komando Rakyat [Trikor]), sparking a campaign of military force in a form of the Mandala operation to resolve this dispute. Negotiations between the two countries reached a deadlock, and when small-armed

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<sup>45</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 25.

<sup>46</sup> Berger and Aspinall, "The Break-up of Indonesia?," 1014.

<sup>47</sup> Berger and Aspinall, "The Break-up of Indonesia?," 1013.

<sup>48</sup> Jan Pouwer, "The Colonisation, Decolonisation and Recolonisation of West Guinea," *Journal of Pacific History* 34, no. 2(1999): 168.

conflicts occurred in Papuan water and on land, larger military confrontations between Indonesian and Dutch forces became foreseeable.<sup>49</sup>

With support from the USSR, such a military campaign seemed likely to succeed, even though opposed by the United States. To counter, the United States effectively switched its support to Indonesia and encouraged Australia to join it. President Kennedy then met President Soekarno on February 21, 1962, and designated both his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, and the U.S. permanent envoy for the United Nations, Ellsworth Bunker, to pursue the diplomatic approach in solving the Papuan dispute. As a result, in August 1962, the United Nations proposed the New York agreement, which was signed by both Indonesia and the Dutch. This agreement forced the Dutch to transfer control of West New Guinea to Indonesia by May 1963 and to put in place the Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) during the transition period. The New York agreement also confirmed Indonesian sovereignty and determined that an Act of Free Choice for the Papuan people needed to be conducted within six years of the transfer of sovereignty.<sup>50</sup>

## **2. The Emergence of The Free Papua Movement Insurgency**

The United Nations designated Jose Rolz Bennet from Guatemala as UNTEA's chief administrator, and UNTEA assumed responsibility for the transfer of sovereignty on October 1, 1962. According to the New York agreement, UNTEA's staffs were to act as mediators and supervisors of the administrative transfer. They also had to explain the plan and process of the Act of Free Choice to the Papuan people during that time. In short, the UNTEA had full authority to advise and assist the process of sovereignty transferring.<sup>51</sup> After one year, UNTEA formally handed over West New Guinea's administration to Indonesia in May 1963, and the entire responsibility fell to the Indonesian government, which then renamed Papua as Irian Jaya and designated a local Papuan, E.J. Bonay, as the first Papuan governor.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Muhammad Yusran Halmin, "The Implementation of Special Autonomy in West Papua, Indonesia: Problems and Recommendations" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 15.

<sup>50</sup> King, *West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto*, 22.

<sup>51</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 661.

<sup>52</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 33.

Pro-integration Papuans hailed the new chapter of their national life, yet a small number of anti-integration Papuans insisted on separating from Indonesia. Most anti-integration Papuans, such as John Ariks, Melkianus Awom, and Karel Gobay, were former members of New Guinea Council, established by the Dutch in 1961. They thought Papuans should not have bowed to the control of powers they had not acknowledged, such as the West and Indonesia, and they believed Papuans had entered into a fate they did not choose. They insisted that the decolonization war against the Dutch and the early independence struggle did not include Irian Jaya. Thus, the bonds of common adversity that wrapped the rest of nation did not apply.<sup>53</sup> They established the nationalist guerilla organization, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka [OPM]) and attacked Indonesian military posts on July 26, 1964, as a declaration of an armed rebellion.<sup>54</sup>

The coup attempt by the PKI, and the subsequent internal political conflict in 1965, caused a change in Indonesian leadership from Soekarno to Soeharto. The subsequent promise of stability and security drove Soeharto and his New Order to prefer a military approach in eliminating the rebellion. During 1966 to 1968, the Indonesian Armed Forces succeeded in destroying many OPM insurgents: 75 insurgents were killed, 60 were captured, and more than 40 were forced to surrender.<sup>55</sup> The New Order government undertook this effort seriously, in order to consolidate its authority in the Irian Jaya territory. Meanwhile, by receiving strong support from the dominant Western powers, the military's approach became a non-issue for Western audiences. Consequently, the OPM's insurgents quickly became isolated from external communities. However, it was impossible for the Indonesian Armed Forces to eliminate the OPM insurgency entirely due to the territory's geographical vastness, large dispersal of population, and extreme ethno-linguistic diversity. Thus, even though the stability of security had been restored, the insurgents remained, especially in the inlands.

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<sup>53</sup> Jim Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development Versus West Papuan Nationalism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 13.

<sup>54</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 34.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

### 3. The Act of Free Choice and Its Controversy

According to the New York Agreement signed on August 15, 1962, Indonesian officials agreed to a referendum, supervised by the United Nations, before the end of the year 1969.<sup>56</sup> On August 12, 1968, the United Nations sent a supervision team led by Fernando Ortiz, a Bolivian diplomat, to Irian Jaya. This team consisted of the UN experts tasked to assist, advise, and participate in the process of an Act of Free Choice, which would be implemented a year later.<sup>57</sup> They came earlier to Irian Jaya in order to assist the Indonesian government in the preparation process, including the Act of Free Choice's formulation. They had the authority and power, as representatives of the United Nations, to enforce rule and guarantee that the implementation of an Act of Free Choice had been congruent with UN favor.

After several meetings, the Indonesian government addressed a proposal for an Act of Free Choice's implementation that would organize a system of voting under supervision of the UN on February 18, 1969. The *Indonesian Observer* newspapers published this proposal on February 24, 1969, followed by the *Djakarta Post* newspapers on February 26, 1969.<sup>58</sup> This proposal advocated a representative system of vote collection, not a one-man/one-vote system, due to extreme geographical challenges; in addition, the Indonesian government would encounter many difficulties in terms of communication, language diversity, transportation, illiteracy, and societal backwardness. The supervision team accepted the proposal in which an Act of Free Choice would be conducted through a representative system. As Andri Hadi claims, the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) did not mention one-man/one-vote systems as the only method for referendum process, and many new states in Africa, as well as Malaysia, in the early 1960s did not apply that system either.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, the Indonesian government

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<sup>56</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 501.

<sup>57</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 36.

<sup>58</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 38.

<sup>59</sup> Andri Hadi, *Papuans Need Democracy, Not Separatism*, Jakarta, July 30, 2004.  
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/07/30/papuans-need-democracy-not-separatism.html> accessed June 9, 2015.

organized an Act of Free Choice with a representative vote system starting on July 14, 1969.

The first implementation of an Act of Free Choice occurred in Merauke on July 14, 1969, then Jaya Wijaya on July 16, Painai on July 19, Fak-Fak on July 23, Sorong on July 26, Manokwari on July 29, Teluk Cendrawasih on July 31, and Jayapura on August 2. The UN supervision team, Indonesian politicians and military officials, foreign ambassadors, and domestic and international journalists monitored the voting in which a majority of 1,025 representatives agreed to integrate into Indonesia.<sup>60</sup> This Act of Free Choice in Irian Jaya was directly supervised by the UN and closely observed by international representatives and journalists morally responsible to report any improper vote collecting process. Since there was no interruption or objection regarding the implementation of an Act of Free Choice, the United Nations legalized it through UN Resolution 2509, and the Indonesian government ratified it in 1971. By that time, Papua territory was integrated into Indonesia as the Irian Jaya province.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

In the early history of Papua, Tidore was one of the most important Moluccan Islam kingdoms in the west of New Guinea island, and it maintained its hegemony until the Dutch expansion in 1667. After a series of attempts to destroy the influence of the Tidore sultanate in the region, the Dutch colonized most of western coastal Papua and initiated their rule in 1805. Since the Sultanate of Tidore had inadequate ability to fight the sophisticated Dutch military at the time, the Dutch emerged as the only authority with complete control over Papua. However, in a practical sense, most parts of the island were unaffected by colonial rule and still remained subordinate to the resident in Ternate.<sup>61</sup>

The Japanese policy of allowing Indonesian nationalists to spread their nationalism during the Japanese occupation in 1942 to 1945 proved key to building Indonesian nationalism within the Papua territory. Moreover, the Dutch policy designating Papua as the exile site for Indonesian nationalists fostered a strong

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<sup>60</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 38.

<sup>61</sup> Sinaga, *Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962* [The Dutch Term in Papua 1898 – 1962], 45.

brotherhood between Papuans and the people from the other islands in the archipelago, leading to a common nationalism. As a result, most Papuans insisted on integrating into Indonesia, leading to acrimony in the negotiation process between the Indonesia and the Dutch Empire after the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945.<sup>62</sup>

The trend of decolonization in the world led the international community to pressure the Dutch to acknowledge Indonesian independence and to further discuss the status of Papua a year after the agreement of the Round Table Conventions was signed in 1949. However, the Dutch's betrayal and the consistency of the Indonesian nationalists regarding Papua drove the Indonesian government to consider military force as a means to solve the dispute. Fortunately, the Cold War had effectively influenced the political atmosphere in Southeast Asia by the late 1950s. This situation led the United States to switch its support to Indonesia, and the UN to encourage the Dutch to sign the New York Agreement in August 1962. This agreement forced the Dutch to transfer control of Papua to Indonesia by May 1963 and mandated that an Act of Free Choice of the Papuan people be conducted within six years afterwards.<sup>63</sup>

The emergence of the OPM insurgency on July 26, 1964, was largely influenced by the Dutch, with repetitive tactics intended to maintain Dutch hegemony in the Indonesian archipelago. Most of OPM insurgents were former members of the New Guinea Council, established by the Dutch three years earlier. The change to Indonesia's internal political environment in 1965, along with support from the main Western countries afterwards, led the New Order regime to use coercive actions to destroy the insurgency. However, since the geographical challenge was the most difficult obstacle for the Indonesian Armed Forces, the insurgency could not be completely destroyed, and eventually it returned among the inlands of Papua territory.<sup>64</sup>

The United Nation accepted the result of An Act of Free Choice in 1969 and recognized the integration of Papua into Indonesia as completely legal. The UN

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<sup>62</sup> Materay, *Nasionalis Ganda Orang Papua* [Papuans' Double Nationalism], 62.

<sup>63</sup> Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 499–501.

<sup>64</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 35–36.

supervision team agreed beforehand with the Indonesian proposal regarding the system undertaken to implement An Act of Free Choice. Since the Indonesian government had limited ability to reach the territory entirely, it used a precedent system previously conducted in Africa and Malaysia in order to collect votes. Moreover, this practice of An Act of Free Choice, which was held from July 14 to August 2, 1969, was directly supervised by UN personnel and closely observed by international delegates and journalists.<sup>65</sup> Thus, by 1971, Papua territory legally integrated into Indonesia as one of Indonesian provinces, Irian Jaya.

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<sup>65</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 40–42.

### **III. FLAWS IN THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Since the Indonesian government took control over West Papua from UNTEA on May 1, 1963, the OPM has insisted on Papua's secession from Indonesia. The organization has waged a secessionist insurgency by way of political and violent means to achieve its goal. An insurgency employs political resources and violence to destroy political aspects of the legal state's legitimacy.<sup>66</sup> In this regard, the OPM has devised and implemented strategies to extend various forms of assistance, and to receive, in turn, both domestic and international support. However, the OPM also conducts organized violence against the Indonesian government.

Since 1963, the Indonesian government has undertaken a COIN strategy to overcome the OPM. According to Julian Paget, the origins and aims of insurgencies will vary, and the real enemies will be difficult to see, but a good COIN strategy will not change greatly.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, the Indonesian government has confidently applied the same COIN strategy that previously proved successful in destroying the Darul Islam Rebellion in 1948 and the Republic of South Maluku rebellion in 1950. Both rebellions were eliminated within a year by directly using a comparatively more powerful armed force. As a result, during the New Order Era from 1965 to 1998, under President Soeharto, the Indonesian government adopted a military approach as the main means for destroying the OPM insurgents, not only in Papua, but in other provinces such as East Timor and Aceh where insurgents also fought against Indonesian rule.

The secession of East Timor in 1998 and the peaceful resolution of Aceh in 2005 led the Indonesian government to pursue further political approaches in overcoming the OPM insurgents. The withdrawal of reinforced troops from Papua and application of

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<sup>66</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 15.

<sup>67</sup> Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 155.

special autonomy status in Papuan governance in 2005 demonstrated the goodwill of the Indonesian government. However, the OPM insurgency continued to insist on separating Papua from the Indonesian republic. This situation raised the question of why the previously successful Indonesian COIN strategy had failed to eliminate the separatist movement in Papua. In order to answer this question, this chapter examines the Indonesian COIN strategy from the New Order to the Reformation Era by applying McCormick's Diamond Model.

## **B. THE “DIAMOND” COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL**

Strategy is all about how (way of concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests.

– H. Richard Yarger<sup>68</sup>


In evaluating the failure of the Indonesian COIN strategy during the New Order and Reformation Era, McCormick's model suggests that there is an ongoing interaction among the following elements: the Indonesian government, the OPM insurgency, the local population, and various international actors. The Indonesian government and the OPM insurgency compete to gain legitimate control over the local population as a center of gravity (COG) and to obtain support from international actors (see Figure 4). The Indonesian government will gain the legitimacy and support from the COG if first it controls the local population by focusing on the Papuan people's needs, as well as establishing security for them (Leg-1 on Figure 4). According to McCormick, the Indonesian government then should destroy the insurgent infrastructure to reduce the OPM's control and influence over the population (Leg-2 on Figure 4). Afterwards, the government can attack the insurgents directly to completely destroy the insurgency (Leg-3 on Figure 4). In order to secure international support, the Indonesian government should undertake diplomatic efforts to build cooperation with foreign countries, including efforts taken through the United Nations. In doing so, the government should attempt to

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<sup>68</sup> H. Richard Yarger, “Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” n.d., <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/stratpap.htm>.

punish bad actors diplomatically (Leg-4 on Figure 4). The Indonesian government could then, theoretically, destroy the external support and financing of the insurgents in order to destroy their hope and motivation to separate from Indonesia (Leg-5 on Figure 4). By adhering to these facets of McCormick’s COIN strategy, the Indonesian government should be able to eradicate the OPM completely.

Figure 4. Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond” Counterinsurgency Model



Wilson, “The Mystic Diamond,” 16.

The Diamond Model proposes that the Indonesian government directly attack the OPM insurgency after first winning the hearts and minds of Papuan people and guaranteeing their security. It also recommends that the Indonesian government conduct diplomacy with other countries and the United Nations simultaneously to gain international support for defeating the OPM. Therefore, in the following pages, this thesis examines Indonesia’s COIN strategy during both the New Order Era (1965–1998) and the Reformation Era (1999–2014). In doing so, this thesis answers why the Indonesian government’s COIN strategy during those times failed.

### C. FAILING TO FULFILL LOCAL PEOPLE’S NEEDS

“Our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our uncertainty, instead of having diminished, has only increased. The reason of this is, that we do not gain all our experience at once, but by degrees; so our determinations continue to be assailed incessantly by fresh experience; and the mind, if we may use the expression, must always be under arms.”

– Carl von Clausewitz<sup>69</sup>

In McCormick’s COIN strategy, focusing on the local people’s needs (Leg-1) is essential to winning their hearts and minds, thereby enhancing the state’s legitimacy and control over them. By doing so, the people’s trust in the state increases while support of an insurgency decreases. As a result, military operations directed against the insurgency will be more successful. However, the Indonesian government has neglected to give sufficient attention to the needs of the local Papuans. As Raweyai says, the essential needs of Papua include improvements to infrastructure, education, and health care, in order to develop the Papuan province and provide greater opportunities for the people. However, there was no significant indication of progress in these areas until 1996.<sup>70</sup> In short, the Indonesian government had failed to build trust and gain support from the local people of the Papuan province, despite having the authority to use all available resources, including Papuan natural resources.

Ironically, in spite of its abundant natural resources, Papua has remained far behind other provinces in terms of development. Until 2000, this lag resulted in Papua’s possessing the greatest number of poor in Indonesia. According to research on the special autonomy performance in Papua, the percentage of poor people in Papua was 51.80%.<sup>71</sup> This level of poverty was similar to the level from 1969 to 1997, which reflected an average level of poor at around 50%.<sup>72</sup> Whatever the Indonesian government had done

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<sup>69</sup> Goodreads, “Quotes About Strategy,” <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/tag/strategy?page=2> (accessed July 7, 2015).

<sup>70</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 138–39.

<sup>71</sup> Agung Djojosoekarto and others, eds., *Kinerja Otonomi Khusus* [Special Autonomy Practice] (Jakarta: Kemitraan Partnership, 2008), 15.

<sup>72</sup> Agung Djojosoekarto and others, eds., *Kinerja Otonomi Khusus* [Special Autonomy Practice] (Jakarta: Kemitraan Partnership, 2008), 14.

during those years, it was not enough to improve Papua and led to claims from most Papuans that Papua was being economically exploited.

Moreover, military approaches conducted by the Indonesian government in order to secure the implementation of An Act of Free Choice in 1969 and other New Order policies increased negative sentiment among the Papuan people toward Indonesia. As a result, although the Indonesian government could physically eliminate the OPM's insurgents, it could not eradicate the insurgency completely.

### **1. Completing Short-Term Goals, but Discounting Long-Term Effects**

A new case gets lumped into a category to which it does not belong, and that's when the previously successful theory falls apart. ... According to prototype theory, the human mind tends to think in concrete ideal types rather than in rational abstractions. This makes it hard to recognize specificity. We see it happening all around us. Even some of the most gifted minds and top experts in their fields can fall into this trap. And when these convert to cure-allism insist on their theory's universal applicability, the damage can be monumental.<sup>73</sup>

Aware of Indonesia's former successes in defeating rebellions, the president of the New Order Era, Soeharto, applied the same military approach in attempting to destroy the Papuan separatist movement (Leg-3). The previously successful military operations between 1945 and 1965 led the Republic of Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [ABRI]<sup>74</sup>) to capture OPM political insurgents and attack OPM's armed insurgents directly. Clashes began on April 16, 1965, when insurgents raised the flag of West Papua and sang their separatist movement song "Hai Tanahku Papua" (Hi My Papuan Land) in Manokwari.<sup>75</sup> Terianus Arronggear, a kindergarten teacher in Manokwari, led this group and organized others such as Kaleb Taran, Manuel Horota, and Manuel Watofa to fight underground against the government. However, soon

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<sup>73</sup> Zachary Shore, *Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008), 107.

<sup>74</sup> It used to comprise the Army, Navy, Air Force and police. However, after separating the military and the police in 1998, the name of ABRI was changed to the Indonesian National Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]) that consists of the Army, Navy, and Air Force only.

<sup>75</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 99.

they were captured and exiled to Java Island. Three months later, on July 26, 1965, OPM insurgents, led by Jihanis Djambuani, attacked Indonesian Army soldiers conducting a flag-raising parade along with other local government employees and local farmers in Kebar, Monokwari. This attack killed three soldiers and wounded several civilians.<sup>76</sup> Two days later, Permenas Ferry Awom led more than 400 insurgents to attack the base camp of the 641 Cendrawasih I Infantry Battalion in Arfai, Manokwari. This attack killed three and wounded four soldiers, while approximately 30 OPM insurgents were killed.<sup>77</sup>

As a response, the Indonesian government conducted formal military operations called “Operasi Sadar” (Operation of Realization) led by Pangdam XVII/Cendrawasih, BG. R. Kartidjo on August 10, 1965.<sup>78</sup> This military operation aimed to destroy insurgent groups in Manokwari and capture Ferry Awom as soon as possible. On August 25, 1965, Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih expanded its operation to include the entire Papuan territory in order to prevent other violations from occurring. However, due to the limited numbers of soldiers, this operation did not achieve its goal. Then in January 1967 the OPM received the support of approximately 14,000 Arfak tribesmen led by Lodewijk Mandatjan.<sup>79</sup> These tribesmen attacked military posts and convoys in the Manokwari area, resulting in losses for both Indonesian soldiers and OPM insurgents. This occurrence led the government to further expand its military operations (Leg-3).

The Indonesian government established the “Brathayudha” and “Wibawa” military operations in order to secure the execution of An Act of Free Choice in 1969.<sup>80</sup> These operations were reinforced by troops from outside of Papuan territory in response to many armed violations committed by OPM insurgents, such as the incidents in Sausapor, Makbon, Anggi, Merauke, Jayapura, Enarotali, and Jayawijaya. By applying repressive actions directly toward OPM armed insurgents, the Indonesian military succeeded in forcing Mandatjan to surrender and reduced the number of armed insurgents

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<sup>76</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 113.

<sup>77</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 114.

<sup>78</sup> I. Ngurah Suryawan, “Kekerasan Negara di Tanah Papua [Violence in Papua Land],” December 6, 2014 <http://www.cahayapapua.com/kekerasan-negara-di-tanah-papua/> (accessed July 28, 2015)

<sup>79</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 35.

<sup>80</sup> Suryawan, “Kekerasan Negara di Tanah Papua [Violence in Papua Land].”

before the implementation of the referendum in July 1969. As Raweyai notes, the OPM tried to restructure its organization in 1970.<sup>81</sup> This response indicated that the fight by armed insurgent forces could be eliminated by direct Leg-3 military operations, but there would be negative consequences. The Act of Free Choice, as a result of the New York Agreement, could be executed on schedule as the Indonesian government's goal in the short term. Nevertheless, as a long-term effect, the repressive approaches applied by the Indonesian military fostered and expanded a negative sentiment toward Indonesia among Papuans.

According to McCormick's Diamond Model, the Indonesian government applied Leg-2 and Leg-3 of the Model in which the Indonesian government directly destroyed the OPM armed insurgents and its infrastructures by using military operations. However, the failure of the Indonesian government occurred when the Indonesian government attacked OPM insurgents directly without providing for local Papuan needs and security (Leg-1). During the transition period of the integration from 1963 to 1969, the government was too focused on destroying OPM's armed insurgents to secure the execution of a referendum as a final process of Papua's integration into Indonesia. The ABRI used all methods, including brutality, to achieve its duty. As a result, more than 6,000 Indonesian troops were deployed around the Papuan territory within five years, to seek and destroy any opposition to integration.<sup>82</sup> This approach seemed inappropriate when the opposition was made up of traditional rebel groups, poorly armed and badly organized. The OPM used traditional weapons such as arrows and spears and was divided into many groups that had their own strategies and sometimes opposed each other.<sup>83</sup>

Moreover, based on its successful experience in destroying previous rebellions, the Indonesian government applied military operations brutally in order to destroy the armed insurgents as soon as possible and to deter them from future fights against Indonesia's legitimacy. On April 27, 1969, two months before the referendum, Pangdam XVII/Cendrawasih (MG. Sarwo Edhi Wibowo) ordered B-26 airplane bombers to

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<sup>81</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 107.

<sup>82</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 35.

<sup>83</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 101.

bombard Enarotali in response to an attack on an ABRI airplane a couple days before; airborne assaults followed three days later.<sup>84</sup> This brutal military operation succeeded in destroying the insurgency in Enarotali; however, it caused more than 14,000 local Papuans to escape out of Enarotali.<sup>85</sup>

McCormick's Diamond can be further discussed and applied using the work of Ivan Arreguin-Toft, who claims that there are two kinds of strategies for a strong-actor (a state) to win in meeting an internal asymmetric conflict: direct and indirect strategy. He insists that every strategy has an ideal counterstrategy in the logic of strategic interaction. He defines:

Direct attack and direct defense are direct strategies, and barbarism and guerrilla warfare are indirect strategies. In all other things being equal, the strategic interaction and conflict outcomes demonstrate some hypotheses. First, if both strong and weak actors use a direct strategy, strong actors will win quickly and decisively. Second, weak actors will win if they apply an indirect strategy against a direct strategy of strong actors. Third, strong actors will keep losing if they use an indirect strategy against weak actors who use a direct strategy. Fourth, if strong actors employ barbarism to attack, and weak actors defend with a guerrilla warfare strategy, the result is strong actors will win.<sup>86</sup> (See Figure 5.)

Unlike McCormick's model, Arreguin-Toft's model allows the government to use military actions brutally in order to destroy the insurgents completely and avoid a prolonged war.

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<sup>84</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 118.

<sup>85</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 119.

<sup>86</sup> Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001): 108.

Figure 5. Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes  
(Expected Winner in Cells)<sup>87</sup>

|                                    |          | Weak-Actor<br>Strategic Approach |              |
|------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|--------------|
|                                    |          | Direct                           | Indirect     |
| Strong-Actor<br>Strategic Approach | Direct   | Strong Actor                     | Weak Actor   |
|                                    | Indirect | Weak Actor                       | Strong Actor |

However, there is a lesson to be learned from the Japanese colonization in the Asia region in the 1940s. The Japanese troops applied brutal tactics to secure their control over South Asian territory. They created dread in their opponents to establish deterrence for the long-term war that led to the appearance of more resistance groups against them.<sup>88</sup> For example, as Ruth Benedict claims:

They [the Burma people] are humiliated either as warriors or as a member of their family if they surrender. ... The [Japanese] army lived up to the code to such an extent that in the North Burma campaign the proportion of the captured to the dead was 142 to 17,166. That was a ratio of 1:120.<sup>89</sup>

As a result of this brutality, the Japanese troops encountered more difficulties in maintaining the stability of its colonies' territory afterwards.<sup>90</sup>

In other words, despite Arreguin-Toft's assertion, a strong-actor may not win simply by using brutality, as seen in the Papuan conflict. This misperception of military

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> George Duncan, "The Pacific Region," *Massacres and Atrocities of World War II*, n.d. [http://members.iinet.net.au/~gduncan/massacres\\_pacific.html](http://members.iinet.net.au/~gduncan/massacres_pacific.html).

<sup>89</sup> Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (New York: Mariner Books, 2005), 38.

<sup>90</sup> Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 301.

operations led the Indonesian government to achieve its short-term goal of securing the execution of referendum in 1969. However, the Indonesian government did not calculate the long-term disadvantages of such an approach. Since the Indonesian government did not pay more attention to the local Papuans' needs and only focused on the government's legitimacy after taking over control from UNTEA in 1963, the Indonesian government failed to establish trust among the Papuan people and guarantee their security (Leg-1). In response, local Papuans failed to provide the support needed to direct military operations, a situation resulting in the ABRI applying coercive approaches against the people. Thus, even though this brutal military operation was successful in eliminating OPM insurgents and securing the execution of An Act of Free Choice in 1969, anti-Indonesia sentiment increased afterwards.

## **2. Deterrence Led to Human Rights Violations**

After the success of the referendum in 1969 that led Papua to integrate formally into Indonesia, the Indonesian government continued its military approach to control and secure the Papuan province. In early 1970, the government sent large numbers of soldiers to the province as one element of its development policies.<sup>91</sup> Approximately 3,000 to 4,000 ABRI soldiers were sent, along with additional troops that were flown in annually to reinforce a very important concept in Indonesian politics, *Wawasan Nusantara* (the unity of the Indonesian archipelago). These soldiers acted as authority symbols opposed to Papuan claims for autonomy.<sup>92</sup> Possessing enough superior power to deter the OPM insurgency in any long conflict, the ABRI became unaccountable for its soldiers' attitudes, leading sometimes to human rights violations. This lack of accountability precipitated the failure to generate external support (Leg-4). Additionally, it allowed the OPM to rebuild its infrastructure and gain external support from the international community (Leg-5).

According to the seven steps of OPM's strategy for fighting the Indonesian government from 1970 to 2005, the OPM tried to gain attention and support from the

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<sup>91</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 55.

<sup>92</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 17.

local populations (Leg-2) and international community (Leg-5).<sup>93</sup> OPM conducted mass demonstrations, spread pamphlets, raised OPM flags, and attacked military posts (Leg-3) in order to provoke reactions from the ABRI. If the ABRI committed human rights violations, the OPM would gain attention and sympathy from other Papuans and the international community. As a result, the OPM was able to rebuild its infrastructure and obtain external support in order to legitimize its existence. Unfortunately, the ABRI was trapped in the OPM strategy and violated human rights in overcoming OPM's provocations. For example, when OPM supporters raised the flag *Bintang Kejora* (the Morning star) peacefully on July 6, 1998, in Biak, the ABRI attacked them brutally, killing eight Papuans, leaving three missing, wounding 37, arresting 150, and leaving 32 unknown dead bodies to be found.<sup>94</sup> According to the file of *Komnas HAM* (the Human Rights National Commission), there were 1,396 Papuans killed, 23 missing, 111 raped, 150 under arrest, 40 tortured, and 221 buildings burned during military operations from 1965 to 1998 (see Table 1).<sup>95</sup>

Table 1. List of Human Rights Violations<sup>96</sup>

|     | Districts                        | Killed      | Missing   | Raped      | Arrested   | Tortured  | Burned out |
|-----|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| I   | <b>PANIA</b><br>(1969-1998)      | 614         | 13        | 94         | -          | -         | -          |
| II  | <b>BIAK</b><br>(1969-1998)       | 102         | 3         | -          | 150        | 37        | -          |
| III | <b>WAMENA</b><br>(1977)          | 475         | -         | -          | -          | -         | -          |
| IV  | <b>SORONG</b><br>(1965-1999)     | 68          | 5         | 7          | -          | -         | -          |
| V   | <b>JAYAWIJAYA</b><br>(1996-1998) | 137         | 2         | 10         | -          | 3         | 221        |
|     | Total                            | <b>1396</b> | <b>23</b> | <b>111</b> | <b>150</b> | <b>40</b> | <b>221</b> |

<sup>93</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 107.

<sup>94</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 54.

<sup>95</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 57.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

This data is possibly not exact, but rather is a representation of an overreaction from the Indonesian military that led to violations of human rights during military operations. One example of such a reaction involves the kidnapping and murder of Dorthays Hiyo Eluay, a former chief of the Papuan Presidium Council (Dewan Presidium Papua [PDP]) on November 10, 2001. Eluay was kidnapped and murdered in Koya, Jayapura, by a number of Indonesian Special Forces soldiers. This violation happened when the soldiers tried to deter other OPM insurgents by kidnapping, torturing, and murdering them, making them examples of what to expect if they insisted on fighting against the Indonesian government. Even though those soldiers were found guilty and sent to prison for more than three years by the Military Supreme Court on April 21, 2002,<sup>97</sup> this case attracted international attention and increased sympathy for the OPM insurgency while automatically reducing external support for the Indonesian government.

Moreover, when the Indonesian military accepted brutality as a tactic, it shocked the OPM insurgents for a while, but also produced a higher risk to the whole COIN strategy. Demoralized OPM insurgents believed they had no choice to overcome the brutal coercive actions of the Indonesian military. As a result, they fought fearlessly and led the conflict into a long-term fight with no end in sight. Thus, by not accomplishing Leg-1 and Leg-2 of the COIN concept, the successful direct attacks conducted by the Indonesian military (Leg-3) portrayed Indonesia as a notorious state in the eyes of international community, and provided the OPM with an opportunity to gain external support.

### **3. Unsatisfied State Policy**


According to McCormick, if state policies satisfy the social value or vice versa, the system will be stable. Otherwise, if they do not, adaptation from both sides will be necessary to stabilize the system. If the adaptation fails, there will be a conflict (see

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<sup>97</sup> Gatot Prihanto, "Komnas HAM Diminta Membentuk KPP HAM Kasus Theys [Komnas HAM is asked to establish KPP HAM for Theys' Case]." *Penculikan dan Pembunuhan Theys Eluay* [Kidnaping and Killing of Theys Eluay], November 11, 2003, <https://papuapress.wordpress.com/tag/theys-eluay/>.

Figure 6).<sup>98</sup> After formal integration, the Indonesian government possessed legitimate control over the Papuan territory. The proper policy of development could have created better life for the local people and established trust in the Indonesian government. However, again, the government made blunders in applying some policies regarding the Papuan economy. When the Papuans did not accept the government's policies and the Indonesian central government still insisted they do so, new conflicts emerged. As a result, the local Papuan people were separated into two camps: those who supported the government and those who fought against it. The hatred of the Papuans who were unsatisfied with the results of the referendum and military operations now had something to stimulate their motivation to fight once more against the Indonesian government.

Figure 6. Chalmers Johnson's Revolutionary Change Theory



Adapted from Gordon H. McCormick, "Chalmers Johnson's Theory of Revolutionary Change," in A Guerrilla Warfare Seminar at Naval Postgraduate School, July 23, 2015

One of the improper policies from the Indonesian central government was the ambitious transmigration program from Java Island to Papua, beginning in the late 1960s

<sup>98</sup> Gordon H. McCormick, "A 'System' Perspective on Insurgency," in A Guerrilla Warfare Seminar at Naval Postgraduate School, July 23, 2015.

and continuing until the mid-1980s. In order to reduce the booming population in Java Island and solve the low population in Papua, the Indonesian central government sent Javanese transmigrants to occupy almost entire districts of the Papuan province. By April 1984, the government had sent 691,500 Javanese transmigrants to Papua, not including spontaneous migrants from other islands.<sup>99</sup> The problems emerged when the government-built public infrastructures such as roads, schools, and hospitals in the transmigration locations appeared much better than those in Papuan villages, and when the government provided transmigrants with higher agriculture technologies that helped them to be more successful in farming than local Papuan farmers. As a result, the local Papuans lost out in local economic competition and remained poor.

Moreover, when the migrant population exceeded the local Papuan population in a particular area, the migrants took control of the local economy and sequestered the local Papuans on their own land. According to the District Development Program (Program Pengembangan Kecamatan [PPK]), migrants controlled approximately 95% of 3,189 investments of small and middle industries in Papua in 1999.<sup>100</sup> This disparity occurred because local Papuan officials preferred to believe in migrants, who possessed higher educations and greater financial capital, rather than local Papuans. Moreover, from a total population in Papua of 2,217,200, roughly 725,171 non-Papuans lived in cities such as Jayapura, Merauke, Sorong.<sup>101</sup> Migrants received business permission from the local Papuan government more easily than Papuan businessmen. As a result, again, the local Papuans lost in economic competition within their own land, and segregation became an issue among local Papuans. This situation led the OPM to claim that the transmigration program was a form of genocide applied by the central government.

Another flawed policy involved the contract of the PT Freeport Indonesia Company as an affiliate of Freeport-McMoran, United States. Since 1972, the PT Freeport Company had excavated and produced approximately 510,000 tons of overburden and averaged 128,000 tons of ore processed daily, accommodating about

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<sup>99</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 132.

<sup>100</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 135.

<sup>101</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 83.

5,100 tons of gold and copper concentrated per day in November 1995. It expanded its production to 306,000 tons per day by early 1999.<sup>102</sup> According to PT Freeport Indonesia, its first working contract, originating in 1973, was valid for 30 years, and that contract had been expanded in 1991 for 30 more years with the option to extend it twice more for 10 years each time.<sup>103</sup> This means that although the working contract between the Indonesian government and PT Freeport Indonesia will end in 2021, Freeport retains the option to extend it until 2041.

This working contract was different from the Production Sharing Contract (Kontrak Kerja Sama) commonly used in the oil and natural gas industries in Indonesia. In this case, the Indonesian government had no control over management and operations of PT Freeport Indonesia and received few royalties for copper (1.5%–3.5%), and for gold (1% from the selling price).<sup>104</sup> This working contract conflicted with Indonesian law (Indonesian Constitution Number 5, 1960) in that, by law, the Indonesian government must maintain control over all ownership and the use of land, soil, air and all natural resources for all the Indonesian people's interest.<sup>105</sup> As a result, the government failed to improve the welfare of local Papuans due to an absence of control over the operational production of the PT Freeport Indonesia Company and a lack of received profits.

The second problem regarding the PT Freeport Indonesia company involves the local Papuan tribes such as the Amungme and the Kamoro, who live in the mountains and in the lowlands of Timika respectively. These tribes were forced by the government to move to new areas due to the mining expansions. They suffered from hunger once their lands and forests were destroyed and polluted by production waste. Moreover, migrant profiteers around Timika excluded them. As Yorrys says, there were about 1,000 native Papuans in Timika when the PT Freeport Company began to operate in 1973. However,

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<sup>102</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 156.

<sup>103</sup> PT. Freeport Indonesia, "Kontrak Karya [Working Contract]" n.d., <http://ptfi.co.id/id/media/facts-about-freeport-indonesia/facts-about-kontrak-karya>.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria [The Indonesian Law Number 5, 1960 about The fundamental Rules of Agrarian], n.d., <http://dkn.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Undang-Undang-RI-nomor-5-Tahun-1960-tentang-Pokok-Pokok-Dasar-Agraria.pdf>.

there were approximately 100,000 people in the same area in 2001, most of whom were migrants.<sup>106</sup> As a result, the Papuans struggled to compete and to live on their own land while suffering. This situation led to the claim they were receiving almost no benefit from the mine that had been stolen from them. Eventually, OPM insurgents influenced other Papuans to support and join their movement in order to regain ownership of Papuan land from the government.

#### **D. FAILING TO SECURE EXTERNAL SUPPORT**

Too often policy makers overlook the critical factors of anger, resentment, and hate. Lost in the detached world of strategy and theory, they forget that their enemies and allies alike are ruled as much by emotion as by raw power calculations. In military parlance, superior force does win battles, but it rarely resolves the roots of wars.<sup>107</sup>

After the fall of Soeharto's administration in May 1998, the successor, B.J. Habibie, came under international pressure that led him to offer a referendum for the East Timorese population.<sup>108</sup> As a result, East Timor seceded formally from Indonesia in the latter part of 1999; that secession fueled the Papuan independence movement. The OPM then began attempting to gain international support by asking the United Nations to review the Papuan territory's status.

In order to respond to the situation and accommodate the sharp differences in development between the Papuan province and other provinces in Indonesia, the Indonesian government issued the Constitution Number 21, 2001<sup>109</sup> regarding Special Autonomy status for the Papuan province. The Indonesian government expected this status to muffle the separatist movement by extending much wider authority to Papua

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<sup>106</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 133.

<sup>107</sup> Shore, *Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions*, 74.

<sup>108</sup> Berger and Aspinal, "The Break-up of Indonesia?," 1008–9.

<sup>109</sup> The Constitution Number 22 Year 1999 regarding the Local Government received wide authorities in managing their own territories as a basis of the Constitution Number 21 Year 2001 regarding the Special Autonomy for Papua Province. This constitution then was fixed by the Constitution Number 35 Year 2008 regarding the Special Autonomy status for West Papua Province, which was established in 2006.

(Papua province and West Papua province)<sup>110</sup> and allowing the people to advance their development by their own means without separating from Indonesia. In supporting this policy since 2002, the Indonesian government has allocated an additional 2% of the General Allocation Budget (Dana Alokasi Umum [DAU]) every year for 20 years. The funds must be used for the development of education, health, and the economy in Papua. Additionally, Papua has received annually US\$72,645,700 to develop and improve its infrastructures.<sup>111</sup> The Indonesian central government also has increased this fund every year by splitting 70% and 30% for Papua province and West Papua province, respectively. For example, Papua received approximately US\$329,085,021 in 2007<sup>112</sup> and US\$512,715,695 in 2014.<sup>113</sup> These efforts reflect how the government has tried to fix its mistakes from the previous mismanagement of the Papuan conflict by pursuing a more political approach through special autonomy status.

However, the OPM insurgency persists and continues its demand that Papua, as an independent state, separate from Indonesia. In 2012, OPM insurgents disrupted local security by attacking security forces and other civilians, causing a number of deaths. According to Sardjito, there were at least 45 attacks by OPM insurgents that year, leaving 34 people dead and two others suffering trauma.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, irregularities regarding the special autonomy funds were discovered, and these irregularities disrupted the

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<sup>110</sup> Since 2006, Papua consists of the Papua province in the east part of Papua and the West Papua province for the west part of Papua. However, I do not distinguish between Papua and West Papua province, except in particular matters that differ between Papua province and West Papua province in their characteristic of administration, policy and strategy.

<sup>111</sup> Dadan Wildan, *Memantapkan Pemahaman Konsepsi Wawasan Nusantara Dalam Menyusun Kebijakan Pembangunan di Papua Guna Mendukung Otonomi Khusus Dalam Rangka Keutuhan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* [To Enhance the Understanding of Archipelago Insight in order to support the Special Autonomy for the United of Indonesia] (Jakarta: Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 2007), 66.

<sup>112</sup> Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, *Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia serta Keterangan Pemerintah Atas Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara Tahun 2007 Beserta Nota Keuangannya di Depan Rapat Paripurna Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia 16 Agustus 2007* [Indonesian President's Speech and the Description of The State's Income Bill 2007 as well as its Financial Notes in the House of Representative's Plenary Session on August 16, 2007] (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara, 2007), 36.

<sup>113</sup> Indonesian Treasury, "National Budget," n.d., <http://www.anggaran.depkeu.go.id/peraturan/UU%2027%202014.pdf>

<sup>114</sup> Sardjito, "Special Autonomy Funds Increase, Shooting Incidents Up," in *Internationalization of Papuan Issue: Actor, Modus Operandi, Motives*, ed. Gerry Setiawan, 131–133 (Jakarta: Antara, 2014), 132.

development of Papuan welfare. In addition, the security of Papua could not be achieved, and optimal development could not be accomplished (failed to achieve Leg-1), leading to negative opinions of Indonesia among the international community. As a result, many foreign countries, including the United States, reduced their support of Indonesia regarding the Papuan conflict, indicating that the government had failed to secure international support for this issue (Leg-4).

### **1. Underestimation of the Capability of the OPM Insurgency**

Based on the concept of “insurgent control” by McCormick, the insurgents have two elements for achieving their movement’s goals: structure and strategy. If they have disadvantages in their structure, they have to be better in their strategies.<sup>115</sup> In its early movement, in 1965, the OPM fought against the Indonesian government openly with a formal free movement structure. However, the Indonesian government destroyed it easily with armed forces, leading the OPM to continue its struggle afterwards through an underground movement. Even though the OPM was divided into many movement groups and seemed to lack coordination among them, their movements could not be eliminated completely, suggesting that the OPM has already planned its strategy well and changed the form of its struggle (see Table 2). On the other hand, the Indonesian government had been lulled by the victory of referendum in 1969, and had made initiated policies that provided strategic advantages to OPM.

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<sup>115</sup> McCormick, “A ‘System’ Perspective on Insurgency.” in A Guerrilla Warfare Seminar at Naval Postgraduate School, July 23, 2015.


Table 2. Seven Steps of the OPM Strategy from 1964 to 2005

| STEPS | YEARS       | STRATEGIES                                                     |
|-------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1     | 1964 - 1969 | Preparation for an Act of Free Choice                          |
| 2     | 1970 - 1975 | Restructuring of OPM                                           |
| 3     | 1976 - 1981 | Redeployment of Resources following to PNG Independence        |
| 4     | 1982 - 1987 | Establishing the OPM Revolutionary Council (OPMRC)             |
| 5     | 1988 - 1993 | International Diplomacy Campaign                               |
| 6     | 1994 - 1999 | Healing of Papuan Nationalism                                  |
| 7     | 2000 - 2005 | Rebuilding New Papuan Nationalism through Melanesian Parameter |

Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 107.

Since 1970, the OPM has smoothly implemented its strategy to create a greater space for its political influence in order to restructure its movement and gain support or sympathy from both national and international communities (Leg-2 and Leg-5). By establishing a larger sphere of influence, the OPM could reduce the control space of the central government. If the OPM's structure ever reaches the state breaking point, the Indonesian central government would have no ability to control the Papuan social values at all, and the OPM would then have a great chance to achieve its final goal of separation from Indonesia (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Diagram of OPM Insurgency Structure and Strategy




Adapted from Gordon H. McCormick, "Counterinsurgent Process," in *A Guerrilla Warfare Seminar* at Naval Postgraduate School, July 21, 2015.

In order to rebuild and strengthen its structure, the OPM engaged in armed resistance and incorporated a political movement into its grand strategy. It began by establishing Gerakan Nasional Papua (GENAPA; the Papuan National Movement), Natural Papua Nasional (NAPAN; National Natural Papua), Piagam Masyarakat Papua Merdeka (PMPM; the Charter of Freedom Papuan People), and Santa Perawan Maria (SPM; The Virgin Santa Maria) in 1972 in the Merauke district. Petrus Kmur, Isack Rumawak, Karel Rumawir, and E.P. Ius led those political resistances, respectively.<sup>116</sup> As with the early political movements following integration, those organizations had a duty to spread the OPM's ideology among the Papuan people. They distributed anti-Indonesian pamphlets to influence other Papuans to fight with them in the spirit of independence. They established sporadic resistance throughout the Papuan territory, such

<sup>116</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 119.

as the Hans Bomay and Wenda groups in the border of Kerom and Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Willem Onde group in Merauke, the Tadeus Yogi group in Paniai, the Kelly Kwalik group in the Central Mountains, and the Kaladana and Uropkulin groups in Bintang Mountains (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. OPM Armed Insurgent Groups in the 1970s to the 2000s



Source: Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent]*, 125–28.

According to Thomas Perry Thornton, “acts of terror are instituted as parts of planned campaigns to achieve political objectives, thereby also excluding nonpolitical terror.”<sup>117</sup> OPM insurgents sabotaged, attacked, took hostages, and killed soldiers, police, journalists, researchers and other Papuans who had any relation to the Indonesian interests in Papua. The OPM needed terror in order both to display its existence to the international environment and to provoke the ABRI to violate human rights, thereby providing the OPM with propaganda. OPM insurgents initiated armed conflicts with

<sup>117</sup> Thomas P. Thornton, “Terror as A Weapon of Political Agitation” in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), 71.

ABRI soldiers, and these conflicts drove other Papuans to leave their houses and villages in order to save their lives. The resulting migration occurred in early 1984, when more than 10,000 refugees flooded into PNG. However, the OPM claimed this situation was in response to the persecution and brutality of ABRI soldiers, who often illegally crossed the PNG border in order to pursue armed OPM insurgents hiding there.<sup>118</sup> The refugee crisis became an international issue when the PNG foreign minister, Rabbie Namaliu, asked the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for financial support for those refugees, and complained formally to the UN regarding Indonesia's repeated incursions on October 1, 1984.<sup>119</sup>

OPM insurgents also tried to gain additional attention from the international community by taking foreign hostages. In late 1995, Kelly Kwalik and his groups took as hostages the Lorensz Expedition team, a group of biologists conducting research in Mapenduma village, Jayawijaya. The team consisted of 15 researchers; seven were German and Dutch from the World Wide Life organization, and eight from Indonesia.<sup>120</sup> Kelly Kwalik demanded that the international community pay more attention to Papua by calling upon the Indonesian central government to withdraw its troops from Papua; stop the transmigration programs; and discontinue the environmental destruction committed by PT Freeport. He also submitted a petition to three countries (England, the Netherlands, and Germany) to support OPM struggles.<sup>121</sup> Despite this drama ending with an ABRI special operations hostage rescue on May 15, 1995, the OPM succeeded in gaining attention from the world and opening the door for its political movement.

From mid-1994 to mid-1995, OPM insurgents began sending reports to some foreign countries regarding ABRI troops' human rights violations committed while protecting PT Freeport operations. Those reports were badly written and had to be transcribed and edited carefully by journalists and environmental activists Mathew

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<sup>118</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 46.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 123.

<sup>121</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 124.

Jamieson and Mathew Karney, and the OPM spokesman John Otto Ondawame,<sup>122</sup> before being forwarded to the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), an Australian NGO.<sup>123</sup> Afterwards, ACFOA released its report entitled *Trouble at Freeport*, alleging ABRI and the PT Freeport involvement in various murders and disappearances. This report led the Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Alan Taylor, to fly to Papua and talk with the people involved. He concluded that the ACFOA report was justified but discounted the involvement of PT Freeport.<sup>124</sup> Even though both ABRI and PT Freeport denied the issue, international pressure increased as the article spread overseas.

## 2. Losing International Supports

After East Timor's secession in 1998, OPM insurgents convinced other Papuans that the government had extracted their natural resources for the benefit of some political leaders in Jakarta.<sup>125</sup> They also advocated secession from Indonesia as the best solution. Therefore, they established the Presidium of Papuan Council (Presidium Dewan Papua [PDP]) led by Theys H. Eluay on June 4, 2000 in order to unite and manage their struggle.<sup>126</sup> They engaged in international activities, such as attending the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York, establishing the representative office of the PDP for Europe in Ireland, and lobbying the U.S. Congress, as well as establishing the representative of Papua in New York.<sup>127</sup> These international approaches had two goals: to convince the UN that Indonesia had mismanaged Papua and to demand that the UN review its decision regarding the integration status of Papua.

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<sup>122</sup> John Otto Ondawame was an Amungme villager who lived around the PT Freeport copper mine. He was a deputy leader of an OPM faction during the late 1970s. He was trained as a Jesuit priest at university before escaping to join the OPM. He was captured by security forces in PNG and then deported to Sweden, where he lived for 13 years. He went to Australia as part of an international diplomacy course sponsored by Catholic aid body Caritas and then was supported by the Australian West Papua Association (AWPA) run by Joe Collins and Anne Noonan in Sidney.

<sup>123</sup> Jim Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development Versus West Papuan Nationalism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 135 – 136.

<sup>124</sup> Elmslie, *Irian Jaya Under the Gun*, 139.

<sup>125</sup> Berger and Aspinall, "The Break-up of Indonesia?," 1015.

<sup>126</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 83.

<sup>127</sup> Raweyai, *Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka* [Why Papuans want to be independent], 86.

By receiving support from the international community, OPM insurgents succeeded in forcing the central government to withdraw its troops from Papua in 2004. This withdrawal allowed them more freedom in coordinating and managing their movement afterwards. Nonetheless, the Indonesian central government extended a special autonomy status to Papua in 2004 and divided Papua into two provinces (Papua and West Papua). OPM insurgents, now more united, disrupted the stability of Papuan security. Faced with a lack of soldiers and the difficulties of terrain, the TNI and police could not counter these OPM insurgents' efforts.<sup>128</sup>

OPM violations flourished, convincing the U.S. Embassy of Indonesia to release publicly the human rights violations committed by Indonesia within 2012 regarding the killing and disappearing of some OPM activists.<sup>129</sup> The OPM insurgency next sent Benny Wenda, one of the OPM leaders, and his Australian legal adviser Jennifer Robinson to appear at TEDx Sidney 2013 Forum at the University of Sidney, and this conversation was uploaded to YouTube five days later.<sup>130</sup> They also convinced the world of various violations committed by Indonesia against Papua and its people. Although the Australian embassy restated that its government believed the best future of the Papuans was as part of Indonesia and highly supported the application of wide-ranging autonomy for Papua in the future, the insurgency continued to gain support and sympathy from the international community. Approximately 65 organizations from 17 foreign countries have supported the OPM's struggle (table 3). To this point, the insurgency has succeeded in enhancing its external support (Leg-5) and made the government's efforts to stabilize the conflict more difficult and complex. In short, the Indonesian government has failed to secure its international support and provided an improved opportunity for the OPM to strengthen its structure.

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<sup>128</sup> On October 19, 2004, the Indonesian president, Megawati Soekarno Putri, authorized the change of the name of ABRI to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [The Indonesian National Defense Force]), which consists of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

<sup>129</sup> Embassy of the United States, *Laporan Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia Tahun 2012* [2012 human rights report on Indonesia], n.d., [http://indonesian.jakarta.usembassy.gov/news/keyreports\\_hrr2012.html](http://indonesian.jakarta.usembassy.gov/news/keyreports_hrr2012.html).

<sup>130</sup> Gerry Setiawan, "Jennifer Robinson's Groundless Allegation," in *Internationalization of Papuan Issue: Actors, Modus Operandi, Motives*, ed. Gerry Setiawan, 155–57 (Jakarta: Perum LKBN Antara, 2014), 155.

Table 3. List of Organizations/Institutions Supporting The Free Papua Movement Overseas<sup>131</sup>

|            |    |                                                        |
|------------|----|--------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>I</b>   |    | <b>In Britain</b>                                      |
| 1          | 1  | West Papua Association                                 |
| 2          | 2  | Tapol the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign             |
| 3          | 3  | Forest People Programme                                |
| 4          | 4  | National Union of Students                             |
| 5          | 5  | The Foundation for Endangered Languages                |
| 6          | 6  | Down to Earth                                          |
| 7          | 7  | World Development Movement                             |
| 8          | 8  | Colombia Solidarity Campaign                           |
| 9          | 9  | Oxford Papua Right for Campaign                        |
| 10         | 10 | Cambridge Campaign for Peace                           |
|            |    |                                                        |
| <b>II</b>  |    | <b>In Australia</b>                                    |
| 11         | 1  | Australia West Papua Association                       |
| 12         | 2  | International Volunteers for Peace                     |
| 13         | 3  | Medical Association for Prevention of War              |
| 14         | 4  | Pax Christi                                            |
| 15         | 5  | Religious Society for Friends (Quakers)                |
|            |    |                                                        |
| <b>III</b> |    | <b>In New Zealand</b>                                  |
| 16         | 1  | Indonesia Human Rights Committee                       |
| 17         | 2  | Peace Movement Aotearoa                                |
| 18         | 3  | Women's International League for Peace and Freedom     |
| 19         | 4  | Section, Aotearoa                                      |
| 20         | 5  | Christian World Service                                |
| 21         | 6  | Peace Foundation, Aotearoa                             |
| 22         | 7  | Disarmament & Security Centre                          |
| 23         | 8  | Global Peace and Justice Auckland                      |
| 24         | 9  | Pax Christi Aotearoa                                   |
| 25         | 10 | The New Zealand Council of Economic and Culture Rights |
| 26         | 11 | Women for Peace                                        |
| 27         | 12 | The Alliance Party                                     |
|            |    |                                                        |
| <b>IV</b>  |    | <b>In Netherlands</b>                                  |
| 28         | 1  | West Papuan Women Association in the Netherlands       |
| 29         | 2  | Children of Papua                                      |

<sup>131</sup> Ricard Radja, "Supporting Organization of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) Overseas," in *Internationalization of Papuan Issue: Actors, Modus Operandi, Motives*, ed. Gerry Setiawan, 90–94 (Jakarta: Perum LKBN Antara, 2014), 91–94.

|            |    |                                                                                             |
|------------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 30         | 3  | Foundation Pro Papua, established by veterans of former Dutch New Guinea                    |
| 31         | 4  | West Papua Courier                                                                          |
| 32         | 5  | Movement Peace, human Rights, Communication and Development                                 |
| 33         | 6  | Pa Vo-Papuan People's Foundation                                                            |
| 34         | 7  | The Netherlands Centre for Indigenous People                                                |
|            |    |                                                                                             |
| <b>V</b>   |    | <b>In Ireland</b>                                                                           |
| 35         | 1  | West Papua Action-Ireland                                                                   |
| 36         | 2  | Just Forrest-Ireland                                                                        |
| 37         | 3  | Tibet Support Group-Ireland                                                                 |
| 38         | 4  | Afri-Ireland                                                                                |
| 39         | 5  | Committee of 100-Finlandia                                                                  |
| 40         | 6  | East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign-Ireland                                              |
| 41         | 7  | Cuba Support Group-Ireland                                                                  |
| 42         | 8  | Latin America Solidarity Centre-Ireland                                                     |
| 43         | 9  | Trocaire, the Catholic Agency for World Development-Ireland                                 |
| 44         | 10 | Forest Friend Ireland/Cairdena Coille-Dublin                                                |
| 45         | 11 | Alternative to Violence-Belfast                                                             |
|            |    |                                                                                             |
| <b>VI</b>  |    | <b>In Belgium, Nepal and Sweden</b>                                                         |
|            | 1  | KWIA-Flanders (Belgium)                                                                     |
|            | 2  | Coalition of the Flemish North South Movement, Brussels Belgium                             |
|            | 3  | Nepal Indigenous Peoples Development and Information Service Centre (NIPDISC)–Nepal         |
|            | 4  | Anti-Racism Information Service–Switzerland                                                 |
|            | 5  | Swedish Association for Free Papua–Sweden                                                   |
|            |    |                                                                                             |
| <b>VII</b> |    | <b>In the United States and Canada</b>                                                      |
|            | 1  | East Timor Action Network (ET AN)                                                           |
|            | 2  | International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War                                  |
|            | 3  | Indonesia Human Rights Network–USA                                                          |
|            | 4  | Papuan American Student Association–Washington, DC, New York, California, Texas, and Hawaii |
|            | 5  | West Papua Action Network (WESPAN)–Canada                                                   |
|            | 6  | Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives–Canada                                              |
|            | 7  | Canadian Action for Indonesia & East Timor–Canada                                           |
|            | 8  | Canadians Concerned About Ethnic Violence in Indonesia–Canada                               |

|             |   |                                                              |
|-------------|---|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>VIII</b> |   | <b>In France, Germany, Norway, and Denmark</b>               |
|             | 1 | Survival International–France                                |
|             | 2 | German Pacific Network–Germany                               |
|             | 3 | Regnskogsfondet–Oslo, Norway                                 |
|             | 4 | International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs–Denmark      |
|             |   |                                                              |
| <b>IX</b>   |   | <b>In Fiji, Uganda, and Timor Leste</b>                      |
|             | 1 | Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC)–Fiji Islands         |
|             | 2 | Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives (FHRI)–Uganda        |
|             | 3 | International Platform of Jurists for East Timor–Timor Leste |

Table 3 (continued from previous page)

## E. SUMMARY

The OPM has organized its insurgency to reduce Indonesia's legitimacy and control over the ruling structures in Papua through a combination of armed forces and both domestic and international political appeals. In response, the Indonesian government has applied a COIN strategy to overcome those efforts. As a strategy, Indonesian COIN pursues military and political approaches to eliminate the OPM armed and political separatists completely. However, the Indonesian central government has failed to implement the COIN strategy successfully in Papua, allowing the insurgency to continue.

McCormick's Diamond Model of COIN strategy indicates that the Indonesian government has been careless in its failure to focus on needs of the local people and their security as an essential key to winning their hearts and minds. The government has attacked OPM insurgents directly without providing for local Papuan needs and security first. Moreover, the Indonesian military committed brutal acts in attempting to destroy the OPM's armed insurgents quickly and deter them from fighting against the government in the future. This situation led the ABRI to become trapped in the OPM's provocation strategy of violating human rights. Thus, negative sentiment toward Indonesia has increased among the Papuan people and foreign countries, although the government retains the means to eliminate the insurgents physically.

This situation worsened when, despite Papua's plentiful natural resources, it remained the poorest province in Indonesia until 2000 because of blundered

governmental policies regarding the development of the Papuan economy. One of its failures was the transmigration program that moved people from Java Island to Papua during the late 1960s until the mid-1980s without more concern for the native Papuans. The Indonesian central government provided better public infrastructures and higher agriculture technologies to transmigrants, enabling them to be more successful than the local Papuan farmers, and allowing them to control the local economy.

Another poor policy involved the contract with PT Freeport Indonesia as an affiliate of Freeport-McMoran, United States. In agreeing to a contract that excluded government control over operational productions of PT Freeport Indonesia and offered little profit from those same operations, the Indonesian central government failed to improve the welfare of local Papuans. This failure contributed to Papuans being segregated on their own land and led to claims that the transmigration program and the PT Freeport Company were parts of an Indonesian strategy to neglect and exclude local Papuans and extract Papuan natural resources. As a result, the Papuan people separated into two segments: those who supported the Indonesian central government and those who fought against it. The hatred of the local people with the result of An Act of Free Choice in 1969 and resulting military operations, as well as the failed economic development afterwards, motivated many to return to fighting the government.

In addition, the Indonesian government began losing its international support after the collapse of the New Order's administration in 1998. Although Indonesia withdrew its reinforcement troops from Papua five years later and in 2004 had extended special autonomy status to Papua and divided it into two provinces (Papua and West Papua), OPM insurgents continued struggling with greater unity of purpose. The Indonesian government underestimated the OPM insurgency capabilities in which they succeeded to influence many foreign countries including the United States to reduce their support for Indonesia regarding the Papuan conflict. The OPM had already changed the form of their struggle to create a larger space for political influence in order to restructure their movement and gain support or sympathy from national and international communities since 1970. They provoked the ABRI to violate human rights and tried to gain more

attention from the international community. After they received that attention, they began sending reports regarding ABRI troops' human rights violations in Papua.

Shortly after, the OPM succeeded in convincing other Papuans to be on their side and in asking the United Nations to review the Papuan territory's status. As a result, the OPM violations could not be controlled, indicating a decline in the Indonesian government's legitimacy and control over Papuan territory. Moreover, the Indonesian government failed to secure international support over this issue, leading the Indonesian government to avoid directly destroying the OPM infrastructures, OPM armed insurgents, and OPM external supports as effectively as it had previously.

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## **IV. IMPROVING THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The insurgency in Papua is uniquely founded on historical, cultural, economic, and political factors. Therefore, the solution to OPM's insurgency lies not only with the Indonesian military forces, but also requires the use of other approaches to counter the insurgency strategy. As Mackinlay indicates, "with so many variables influencing their (government's responses) success and failure, each government's approach is different, and consequently dictates different manifestations of insurgency organization."<sup>132</sup> For this reason, the Indonesian government should examine and measure all possible solutions in its strategy and then prioritize the best approach(es) to apply. If they do this, it is possible for Indonesia to control and diminish the insurgency in Papua.

In countering the OPM insurgency, it is not a matter of simply winning the hearts and minds of the local populations and developing the local economy, but also having the right organizational concepts and using certain national resources to match effectively the insurgency's strategy. As Richard Betts says, "An effective strategy is not impossible, but it is usually difficult and risky, and what works in one case may not in another that seems similar."<sup>133</sup> Thus, in guarding Indonesian sovereignty and protecting its interests, Indonesia must use all of the components of its national power: information, diplomacy, military force, and economic influence. These elements support each other in a COIN strategy.

### **B. ANALYSIS**

#### **1. The Indonesian Government COIN Strategy**

The OPM insurgency will most likely fight against the Indonesian government by means of both armed force and political influence until it achieves its main goal:

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<sup>132</sup> Mackinlay, *Globalisation and Insurgency*, 33.

<sup>133</sup> Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?," *Journal of International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 5–50.

separation as an independent country from Indonesia. It continues struggling because it has a system that supports its movement and accepts anything that affects Indonesian legitimacy and external support. With supports from local Papuans and the international community, the OPM insurgency will develop a stronger structure that can control the Papuan territory and exercise more authority over the Papuan people, as well as enjoy a better position in the international diplomacy.

Therefore, the Indonesian government must be careful in overcoming the OPM strategy, which is the same as the East Timor insurgency's strategy. The Indonesian government must create various approaches in its COIN strategy to avoid being trapped in the insurgents' strategy of provoking human rights violations, leading to the secession of Papua territory in the future.

## **2. Using the Diamond Model Effectively**

In the face of widespread humanitarian disasters, on the heels of civil war, and in the wake of failed states, the overwhelming temptation to “just do something” is understandable but misguided; the case for doing something is not necessarily a case for doing something military. ... Coercive military strategy, like all strategy, must adapt to the existing and anticipated future in international environment.<sup>134</sup>

The international community is currently paying greater attention to the human rights violations in Papua. A small failure in conducting military actions may cause a huge effect for the entire Indonesian COIN strategy in Papua. OPM insurgents will easily turn such a failure into propaganda to garner political supports domestically and internationally. In addition, the situation in Papua cannot be viewed as an internal armed conflict because the OPM's armed insurgents consist of small groups engaging in sporadic actions. As Soleman Pontoh claims, military operations can be applied to the separatist groups that have an organized armed group with clear hierarchy, control a part of the territory, and engage in highly intensive attacks.<sup>135</sup> Thus, for Indonesia as a

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<sup>134</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 9–10.

<sup>135</sup> Soleman B. Ponto, *Jangan Lepas Papua: Mencermati Pelaksanaan Operasi Militer di Papua* [Do not loose Papua: Watching of the Implementation of Military Operation in Papua] (Jakarta: Rayyana Komunikasindo, 2014), 170.

democratic state, military force is the option of last resort in overcoming the OPM insurgency. As Gil Merom indicates, “what prevents modern democracies from winning small wars is disagreement between state and society over expedient and moral issues that concern human life and dignity.”<sup>136</sup> This explanation is an essential key for the Indonesian government to consider and incorporate into its COIN strategy, especially in regards to human rights violations and other negative effects resulting from military force.

The Indonesian government must effectively adopt the McCormick Diamond Model to determine applicable the approaches of its COIN strategy in overcoming the OPM insurgency. According to Abraham H. Maslow, safety constitutes the second stage of a human being’s basic needs.<sup>137</sup> Therefore, the safety needs of the local Papuans, such as security, protection, stability, law, and freedom for fear must be addressed. If OPM insurgents threaten the locals, then the locals likely will support the OPM insurgency out of fear for their lives. Thus, although the Indonesian government should not use military operations in resolving the Papua conflict, it should continue using coercive diplomacy to secure the safety of the local people (Leg-1).

As Alexander L. George explains, “coercive diplomacy is a strictly defensive strategy.”<sup>138</sup> This approach proposes to persuade, convince, and force the opponents to stop, undo, or retract their plans in order to support the state’s political achievements.<sup>139</sup> The coercive action is not only conducted by means of military operations, but also through other ways such as establishing the equipped local KODAM soldiers and deploying them effectively, law enforcement, building the proper information network regarding the Papuan conflict, and gathering better intelligence on OPM insurgents’ abilities, locations, and main leaders. Thus, these actions can be used as security

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<sup>136</sup> Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19.

<sup>137</sup> Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 39.

<sup>138</sup> Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristic,” in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> eds., Alexander L. George and William L. Simon, 7-12 (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994), 8.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

measures within the Indonesian COIN strategy to accomplish Leg-1, Leg-2, and Leg-3 of Diamond Model.

Meanwhile, the government also must secure political support from international communities regarding the Papuan conflict (Leg-4) in order to reduce and eliminate the external support for OPM (Leg-5). As Virginia Gamba mentions, problems associated with the establishment of a security environment early on, and a lack of coordination regionally and internationally, are two principal problems that compromise the peacemaking initiatives to gain the sustainability of lasting peace.<sup>140</sup> Therefore, the government should continue applying its political approaches, along with its efforts to maintain the stability of the Papuan security. The Indonesian government's policies should support efforts to meet the Papuan people's needs (Leg-1) and disrupt the OPM's abilities (Leg-2), as well as convince the international community of Indonesia's intentions regarding the conflict (Leg-4 and Leg 5).

### **C. ENHANCING GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL OVER PAPUAN PEOPLE AND TERRITORY**

#### **1. Continuing the Implementation of the Special Autonomy Policy**

The special autonomy status extended to Papua by the Indonesian central government is the best policy undertaken to resolve the Papuan conflict. By providing a handful of authority to the local government, Papua can develop its territory according to its own culture and abilities. Correspondingly, the Indonesian central government can fully support the local Papuan government programs in developing the quality of the economy, education, and health of the Papuan people. By doing so, the Indonesian government can meet the essential needs of the Papuan people, leading to a winning of their hearts and minds (Leg-1).

Moreover, in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental public service, the Indonesian central government has divided Papua into two provinces, Papua and West Papua provinces. This policy significantly influences the Papuan's

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<sup>140</sup> Virginia Gamba, "Post-Agreement Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration," in *Violence and Reconstruction*, ed. John Darby, 53-75 (New York: The University of Notre Dame, 2006), 4.

development progress. The size of the Papuan territory is 416,060.32 square kilometers (Papua: 319,036.05 square kilometers and West Papua: 97,024.27 square kilometers), more than three times the size of Java Island (127,499 square kilometers), which consists of six provinces.<sup>141</sup> Thus, it is difficult for the Papua and West Papua provincial governments to manage their territories and provide sufficient services for their people. With the total population at approximately 3,593,803 people in 2010,<sup>142</sup> the Papuan territory ideally should have at least four provinces that can escalate the opening of more remote areas in Papua. Nevertheless, by dividing Papua into two provinces, Papua has provided better services to its people compared to the conditions 10 years ago. According to the report of the Unit for Acceleration of Papua and West Papua Development (Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Papua dan Papua Barat [UP4B]) that was published in April 2013, “Papua has progressed and changed because the country has done a lot to make changes happen since the implementation of special autonomy status in 2004.”<sup>143</sup>

In addition, according to Paskalis Kossay, the implementation of special autonomy and territory expansion in Papua has opened more opportunities for jobs and invited more investments, increasing the Papuan economy.<sup>144</sup> Papuan wealth has increased, and social-economic segregation has declined. As a result, these policies can counter the common negative view that Papua is still lagging behind and not changing, a view that does not match with the facts. If the Indonesian central government through the Papuan local governments continues applying these policies, it will increase the Papuans’ trust in the government’s control (Leg-1).

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<sup>141</sup> Badan Pusat Statistik, *Luas Daerah dan Jumlah Pulau Menurut Provinsi, 2002–2014* [The Size and the Numbers of Islands based on Provinces, 2002 - 2004], n.d., <http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1366>.

<sup>142</sup> Badan Pusat Statistik, *Penduduk Indonesia menurut Provinsi 1971, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 dan 2010* [Indonesian People based on Provinces 1971, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2010], n.d., <http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1267>.

<sup>143</sup> Sardjito, “Special Autonomy Totally Fails, Who Says So?” in *Internationalization of Papuan Issue: Actors, Modus Operandi, Motives*, ed. Gerry Setiawan, 134–39 (Jakarta: Perum LKBN Antara, 2014), 138.

<sup>144</sup> Paskalis Kossay, *Pemekaran Wilayah di Tanah Papua: Solusi atau Masalah* [The Regional Expansion of Papuan land: A Solution or Problem] (Jakarta: Tollelegi, 2012), 63.

Furthermore, the Indonesian government should establish its economic strategy in a limited capacity, depending on the situation, and perhaps only in areas where the government can guarantee security. This approach must align with the security approaches because economic development needs the stability of security, especially in remote areas. According to Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, “the often long periods of instability brought about by conquering nomadic tribes have had immediate effects on welfare through reduction in production and trade.”<sup>145</sup> This means that security instability affects the economic environment, and eventually the populace’s welfare. Thus, the Indonesian government should apply a strategy to maintain and if possible, improve the economies of isolated areas, in order to gain the trust of the Papuans in those areas. In return, the remote Papuan people will enjoy better lives (Leg-1) and likely abandon the OPM insurgency (Leg-2).

Another reason why the Indonesian government should develop the economies of remote areas is to deny the OPM control of the economic process in those areas (Leg-2). According to Karen Ballentine, “The opportunity [the economy in conflict time] for rebellion is not just shaped by rebel access to mountainous terrain, but also by the limited reach of state authority and capacity in other peripheral areas.”<sup>146</sup> If the Indonesian government does nothing to increase the economy of Papua’s remote areas, the insurgency will take control of those areas’ economies. It will erode the trust of the remote people in their government and make the government’s efforts to destroy the OPM insurgents much harder in that the remote people will have learned to rely on the OPM’s economic support. Therefore, the Indonesian government should take advantage of economic development, gain the trust of the populace, and also eliminate the insurgency’s opportunity to explore and to control the natural resources in those areas. This policy could accomplish Leg-1 and Leg-2 of the COIN Diamond Model and

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<sup>145</sup> Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, *The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8.

<sup>146</sup> Karen Ballentine, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict,” in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, ed. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, 259-283 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 266.

enhance the trust of the international community in Indonesia's ability to resolve the Papuan conflict (Leg-4).

## **2. Papuan People as a Priority in a Policy Regarding the PT Freeport Company**

According to the 2006 Indonesian vice president, Jusuf Kalla, the working contract between the Indonesian government and PT Freeport Company should be respected and may not be canceled suddenly, but the Indonesian government must evaluate it every five years.<sup>147</sup> The PT Freeport Company is one of the biggest copper and gold companies in the world and can significantly affect issues domestically and internationally. The operational production of the PT Freeport Company in Papua involves many national and international companies, including employees and their families, as well as the people living in the surrounding the area. The sudden cessation of the company's operational production would negatively affect many countries' interests and many people both directly and indirectly, as well as lead to new problems and conflicts. Therefore, the government should be careful in trying to resolve this issue in order to gain the trust of Papuan people (Leg-1) and secure international support (Leg-4).

On the other hand, Indonesia, as one of the world's democratic countries, is involved in the global governance system. Failures to properly resolve the problems regarding the PT Freeport Company will become a focus of international attention. The investors, human rights organizations, and others will insist on protecting or demanding their interests in Papua. If this situation continues without resolution, the problems regarding the PT Freeport Company will become more complex and difficult to resolve. Thus, the Indonesian government must continue applying concrete policies that encourage the existence of the PT Freeport Company in Papua but that also benefit the Papuan people, the Indonesian government, and the international community.

The Indonesian government should regard the welfare of the Papuan people as a priority. The significant issues regarding the existence of the PT Freeport Company in

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<sup>147</sup> Hidayat Gunadi and Gatot, "Bukan Untuk Gigit Jari—Tetes Emas Raksasa Tambang [Not for loss – Gold droplets of the Giant Mine]," *Gatra*, March 11, 2006.

Papua are social segregation between the people who live in Timika city and native Papuans who live around it, and the environmental destruction resulting from the PT Freeport Company's operational production. These issues could be exploited by the OPM insurgency to provoke other Papuans to disrupt the operational production of the company, leading to repressive actions conducted by the KODAM soldiers and POLDA policemen such as the violent clash on February 21, 2006, that caused the operational production of the PT Freeport Company to be temporarily closed.<sup>148</sup> Thus, the Indonesian government has to launch a campaign of offensive diplomacy toward other actors in order to invite and convince them of the best solution for all, especially for the Papuan people.

One of the solutions that should be discussed is reviewing the second Working Contract between the Indonesian central government and the PT Freeport Company signed in 1991. The Indonesian royalty for exploitation and production is only 1%–3.5% of net revenue, and royalty for mining areas is US\$0.025–0.05 for an acre a year.<sup>149</sup> It does not make sense, with the current US\$1 = Rp. 14,000.00, that the Indonesian central government only gets Rp. 350.00 to Rp. 700.00 per acre per year. How can the Indonesian government provide for the welfare of the Papuan people who live around the mining areas with such small amounts of money? The Indonesian central government must undertake this contract review and involve the Papuan local government as much as possible in reaching a solution.

Another solution involves convincing the PT Freeport Company to build smelters in Papua. This solution could be used as a tool for the Indonesian government to directly control the production of mining concentrates, as well as opening the job fields for native Papuans. By building smelters in Papua, the native Papuans could be involved as laborers, and such an effort would also attract more economic investment in Papua. This approach directly and indirectly would increase the welfare quality of native Papuans

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<sup>148</sup> Gunadi and Gatot, "Bukan Untuk Gigit Jari - Tetesan Emas Raksasa Tambang [Not for loss – Gold droplets of the Giant Mine]."

<sup>149</sup> Dewi Aryani, "Kasus Freeport, Hilangnya Nurani Pemerintah [Freeport Case, The Disappearance of Government's conscience]," *Antara News*, November 26, 2011, <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/286476/kasus-freeport-hilangnya-nurani-pemerintah>.

living around the mining areas. Therefore, if the central government can tightly control its official management of royalties and convince the PT Freeport Company to review its second Working Contract in sharing proportional royalty, as well as building the smelters in Papua, the government can improve the local Papuans' welfare.

Regarding the environmental issue, the Indonesian central government should invite NGOs that are concerned about current environmental destruction to persuade the PT Freeport Company to correct its management of waste production. According to Marwan Batubara, the waste production of the PT Freeport Company, consisting of 200,000 tons a day, is a dangerous contaminant to aquatic organisms.<sup>150</sup> It will destroy the ecosystem along rivers around the mining areas and contaminate those who rely on those rivers for living. If there are no mitigating actions regarding this issue, the result will be an indirect mass genocide of the people around the mining areas. This environmental destruction also violates the Indonesian Constitution No. 23/1997. Thus, the government, the PT Freeport Company, and both domestic and international NGOs should conduct coordinated discussions regarding the best solution to avoid the worst contamination by the PT Freeport Company's waste production. By achieving this solution, the government will earn the trust of the Papuan people, who will enjoy a better quality of health in their own land (Leg-1).

#### **D. DESTROYING THE OPM'S ABILITIES**

##### **1. Equipped Soldiers and Effective Deployment**

The Indonesian government should effectively use its military forces to support its COIN strategy in overcoming the Papuan insurgency. Once the government requires military force, the force must completely accomplish its missions to avoid prolonged wars and also to reduce collateral damage (Leg-3) in order to guarantee the security of Papuan people (Leg-1). Therefore, the Indonesian government must adequately equip and properly train its soldiers prior to their deployment. As Merom says, "In particular, once democracies decide to intervene in situations that can degenerate into small wars, they try

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<sup>150</sup> Marwan Batubara, *Menggugat Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam: Menuju Negara Berdaulat* [Suing the Management of Natural Resources: Towards a Sovereign State] (Jakarta: Komisi Penyelamat Kekayaan Negara, 2009), 243.

to act decisively and with overwhelming force but without resort to their ground troops.”<sup>151</sup>

For example, the current deployment of Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih soldiers and Papuan Polda policemen in Papua is only 2,650 personnel. They have to guard and be responsible for 421,981 square kilometers of land, 228,000 square kilometers of ocean, 817 kilometers of the Indonesian border with New Guinea, and additionally, the Papuan population of more than 2,274,300.<sup>152</sup> It is difficult for them to do their job well in guaranteeing the security for the Papuan people. Moreover, Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih soldiers and Papuan Polda policemen have limited and unsophisticated operational equipment that cannot efficiently and rapidly react in the Papuan geography. There are many dense and muddy forests in Papua, serving as base camps for the OPM.

Therefore, in securing the local people, the KODAM XVI/Cendrawasih soldiers and POLDA Papuan policemen must be ready with all technical supports possible, including sophisticated equipment, high tactical weapons, high mobility helicopters, and improved intelligence support. They should also be effectively deployed in particular areas that have high intensity OPM armed insurgent violations, and in areas that can be used to isolate the armed insurgents from other internal and external supports such as land and water borders with neighboring countries (Leg-2). With highly skilled soldiers and policemen, proper equipment, fast mobility, and accurate intelligence, KODAM XI/Cendrawasih soldiers and POLDA Papuan policemen can secure Papuan territory and the Papuan people from the violations of OPM insurgents (Leg-1).

## **2. The Law Enforcement**

In October 2004 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 1566, which defines terrorism and declares that in no circumstances can terrorist acts be condoned or excused for political or ideological reasons: Criminal acts, including [those] against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury,

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<sup>151</sup> Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 248.

<sup>152</sup> Sardjono W. D, *Pemulihan Keamanan di Wilayah Papua Guna Meningkatkan Stabilitas Nasional Dalam Rangka Pembangunan Nasional* [Restoration of Papuan Security to improve National Stability for National Development], (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional RI, 2013), 38.

or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature. (UNSC Resolution 1566, October 2004)<sup>153</sup>

The separatist movement in Papua engages in many violations against other Papuans and the legal Indonesian government. The OPM insurgency, through its armed insurgents, conducts mass terror against the Indonesian government and Papuans, who do not support them. They kidnap, take hostages, and kill TNI soldiers, Indonesian policemen, and civilians, including foreign citizens, in order to force the Indonesian government to change its policy regarding the Papuan territory. They are not members of a regular army and have no clear front lines, nor do they adhere to the Geneva Convention's rules of war. Therefore, they can become particularly dangerous for Indonesia's sovereignty and security stability in the region.

Moreover, according to the article 106 and 107 of Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP; the Indonesian Criminal Law book), all efforts to separate, and those who lead to separate the entire or a part of the Indonesian territory from the Indonesian sovereignty, can be charged in prison by a life sentence or up to 20 years confinement.<sup>154</sup> It is clear that the OPM insurgency conducts criminal actions in pursuing its goal of separation from Indonesia. Therefore, its leaders and members can be legally apprehended by the Indonesian policemen and charged by the Indonesian legal justice system. There is no excuse for the Indonesian government, through its police, not to enforce the Indonesian law towards the OPM insurgents who are criminals and violate Indonesian law.

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<sup>153</sup> Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.

<sup>154</sup> Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional: Kementerian Hukum dan HAM Republik Indonesia, *Kompilasi Hukum Pidana*, <http://hukumpidana.bphn.go.id/babbuku/bab-i-kejahatan-terhadap-keamanan-negara/>.

Supported by the implementation of special autonomy and a good will political approach, law enforcement can reduce the OPM insurgency to an extremist organization of criminals who are capable of conducting terrorist attacks and threatening Indonesian national security. In response, the OPM insurgents will lose popular support from both Papuans and the international community (Leg-2 and Leg-5), leading to the Indonesian government finally being able to eliminate them. The Indonesian government should proportionally catch and charge the OPM insurgency leaders, such as Dany Kagoya, Goliat Tabuni, and Benny Wenda and their men, in order to reduce the effectiveness of the OPM insurgency. If the government applies this concept correctly and precisely, the result will support the implementation of the Indonesian COIN strategy in overcoming the Papua insurgency entirely.

## **E. SECURING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT**

### **1. Winning the War of Opinions**

Indonesia, as one of the largest democratic countries in the world, seeks a democratic solution to its problems in wartime as well as in peacetime. Thus, the Indonesian government needs an information strategy to unify public opinion nationally and internationally (Leg-1 and Leg-4) before undertaking other strategies to defeat the Papua insurgency directly (Leg-3). The end of military operations in Papua in 2005 showed that the Indonesian government did not have enough support domestically and internationally. The human rights violations during the military operations forced the Indonesian government to withdraw its soldiers from Papua. This situation proved that OPM insurgents could establish negative opinion of Indonesian soldiers in order to gain sympathy from the world.

The OPM insurgency has used propaganda to systematically gain public support. It succeeded in encouraging domestic and international NGOs and some countries to force the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Papua. At the beginning of 2004, the Indonesian Armed Forces succeeded significantly in eliminating the number of Papuan insurgents. However, the insurgency used social media and its structures in foreign countries to spread irresponsible data of the Indonesian military's human rights violations

and gained support from both the Indonesian public and some foreign countries. After interventions by the international community, the Indonesian government finally withdrew its military from Papua in 2005. A week after the withdrawal of troops concluded, the OPM attacked the weapon storage locations of Puncak Jaya Military District Command (Kodim Puncak Jaya), resulting in 20 rifles being stolen, and two soldiers being killed by insurgents.<sup>155</sup> Even though the TNI soldiers sent two combat companies to Papua in order to hunt the insurgency, those soldiers could not locate all the weapons and attackers before withdrawing them six months later.

Douglas Borer made the following observation: “What is information today will still be information tomorrow, but the effect of a given piece of information may be very different from one day to the next, depending on the time, the circumstances, the actors involved, and most importantly, who the consumers or recipients of that information are.”<sup>156</sup> Every single piece of information is critical and affects people’s opinions. Therefore, the Indonesian government should pay more attention to the effects of negative information on its efforts to reconstruct Papua. The government should release the correct information regarding its positive efforts. The government should also publish a balance of news, including the negative activities of its soldiers, as part of a transparency process solution to human rights violations. In other words, Indonesia needs a particular strategy to face *the battle for the story*,<sup>157</sup> in order to win people’s minds and gain global support (Leg-1 and Leg-4) for destroying the Papuan insurgency completely.

As John Arquilla notes, “Information strategy is a still-forming phenomenon that has both technological and nontechnological components, and that encompasses both

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<sup>155</sup> Military District Command, also well known as Komando Distrik Militer (Kodim), is an organization below Kodam, which is responsible for a particular district. Muridhan S. Widjojo, “Separatisme-Hak Asasi Manusia-Separatisme: Siklus Kekerasan di Papua, Indonesia” *Journal Hak Asasi Manusia Dignitas: Hak Untuk Menentukan Nasib Sendiri* 3, no. 1 (2005). [http://perpustakaan.elsam.or.id/index.php?p=show\\_detail&id=12514](http://perpustakaan.elsam.or.id/index.php?p=show_detail&id=12514).

<sup>156</sup> Douglas Borer, “Why Is Information Strategy Difficult?” in *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice*, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 236.

<sup>157</sup> Borer, “Why is Information Strategy Difficult?” 238. He defines that the battle for the story is a historical double standard, which is caused by globalization in the information age. As the state loses control over information and individuals gain ever more control, increasing numbers of the world’s citizens have access to good (and bad) information about the world around them.

what one intends to do to the enemy and what one intends to do for oneself.”<sup>158</sup> In destroying the Papuan insurgency, the Indonesian government should develop the opinion that the OPM has violated the Indonesian constitution and become a danger to Indonesian sovereignty. The Indonesian government should continuously inform the global community on OPM’s negative activities and ideologies, including the utilization of media, to include social and formal media. All Indonesian people and the international community must know how the OPM’s actions harm Papuan society and its economic development, including the attacks on Indonesian soldiers in Papua. The Indonesian government broadcasts this information continually in order to propagate the negative effects of the OPM insurgency. This approach provides a general knowledge of what OPM does, how it terrorizes Papuan society, and how it creates hazards to national security.

According to McCormick, one’s preferences are not always driven by rationality, but they are absolutely drawn from nurture.<sup>159</sup> The Papuan people and international community did not create their preferences by themselves, but the OPM insurgents did build and provide particular preferences for them. If the Indonesian government could change those preferences, the people would have better options than to support the OPM (Leg-2). Thus, if the Indonesian government informational approach gains at least 1% of the Papuan people and foreign countries as active supports, and 99% of others do nothing to support the OPM insurgency, the Indonesian government could destroy the insurgency.

## **2. Playing Good Diplomacy in a Dynamic International Political Change**

Indonesia’s failure to challenge interventions from foreign countries regarding the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Papua in 2005 is a lesson for building better diplomacy in the future. Indonesia realizes that to overcome an insurgency, they not only must use coercive actions, but also must pursue diplomatic strategies. Indeed, understanding and solving political problems in Papua is difficult, and Indonesia cannot

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<sup>158</sup> John Arquilla, “Thinking about Information Strategy” in *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice*, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1.

<sup>159</sup> Gordon H. McCormick, “Operationalizing the Insurgency,” in A Guerrilla Warfare Seminar at Naval Postgraduate School, August 6, 2015.

resolve them in a short period of time. The situation in Papua requires time to construct firm relationships based on the shared interests of the Indonesian people, including Papua and the international community. As the sixth Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono says, the best way to boost the international influence of Indonesia is not using hard power but soft power.<sup>160</sup> Thus, Indonesia must focus more on its soft power to conduct successful diplomacy towards the international community in order to gain support regarding the Papuan conflict (Leg-4).

In order to gain international support, the OPM insurgency built international networks, in England, Belgium, Holland, Papua New Guinea, and Australia. They communicate effectively with those countries' government officials and individual politicians. As Thomas P.M. Barnett says, "The global war on terrorism is all about connectivity because the terrorists themselves arise in response to such emerging networks."<sup>161</sup> The OPM insurgency will always try to build international networks to gain support for its struggle. Even though most formal officials of those governments deny that their countries support the OPM insurgency,<sup>162</sup> the OPM insurgency has representative offices in those nations. As a result, there are senators in those countries who personally support Papua's separation from Indonesia.<sup>163</sup> By using their authority, it is possible that they will influence their governments to change their policies regarding Papua.

To overcome these possibilities, Indonesia should employ two methods of soft power. The first is to strengthen the domestic political system in order to build internal political stability. As William R. Keylor mentions, "The increasingly contentious political situation in Indonesia soon attracted the attention of foreign powers, both within

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<sup>160</sup> Dino Patti Djalal, *Harus Bisa!: Seni Memimpin ala SBY* [Must be able to!: The Art of Leadership in the style of SBY] (Jakarta: Red & White Publishing, 2008), 340.

<sup>161</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2005), 85.

<sup>162</sup> Hamid Ramli, "British Ambassador Condemns Oxford City Council," in *Internationalization of Papuan Issue: Actors, Modus Operandi, Motives*, ed. Gerry Setiawan, 231–34 (Jakarta: Perum LKBN Antara, 2014), 232.

<sup>163</sup> Sardjono W.D., *Pemulihan Keamanan di Wilayah Papua Guna Meningkatkan Stabilitas Nasional Dalam Rangka Pembangunan Nasional* [Restoration of Papuan Security to improve National Stability for National Development] (Jakarta: Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional RI, 2013), 58.

and outside the region, which sought to profit from the simmering conflict between the government and its opponents.”<sup>164</sup> If the Indonesian government can eliminate the arguing or conflicts of interests of its internal opponents, Indonesia will strengthen its ability to prevent adverse policies or actions from foreign countries. An example is the international intervention in the Indonesian internal political crisis in 1998 that led to the rushed decision to promise free elections for East Timor.<sup>165</sup>

Thus, the Indonesian government must have support from its people and their senators order to maintain the stabilization of Indonesian internal politics, especially with regards to the Papuan conflict. As Borer says, “Legitimacy of all governments is ultimately rooted in the domestic policy, embedded in the relation nexus between the rulers and the ruled.”<sup>166</sup> Destroying the OPM insurgency requires political will from all Indonesian local political leaders.

The second method is to increase Indonesian political efforts to build cooperation and trust among regional and global powers. According to Louis Kriesberg’s theory of conflict resolution, in order to minimize the destruction associated with conflicts and obtain mutually beneficial results, the state has to generate sympathy and empathy from the internal and external communities.<sup>167</sup> By increasing political international cooperation, it will be easier for the Indonesian government to gain the support of the international community. However, this cooperation must be focused on protecting Indonesian national interests as a priority. Therefore, the Indonesian government needs qualified diplomats, as well as other factors of political bargaining, such as military and economic power.

Indonesian diplomats should be able to build cooperation with other influential countries, such as the United States, China, and Russia, and establish collective regional

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<sup>164</sup> William R. Keylor, *A World of Nations: The International Order since 1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 323.

<sup>165</sup> Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1009.

<sup>166</sup> Douglas A. Borer, *Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 195.

<sup>167</sup> Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 23.

and global security agreements in order to maintain the stability of Indonesian national security and perpetuate Indonesian sovereignty for the long term. As Stephen J. Cimbala states, “Collective security should be based on a strict prohibition against resorting to forcing the resolution of political disputes and is binding on all states on a regional or global basis.”<sup>168</sup> In doing so, Indonesian diplomats must understand the dynamic political world, in order to protect Indonesian interests from other international actors. As Yudhoyono says in his book *Selalu Ada Pilihan* (There are always choices), the current international cooperation’s structures requires [Indonesian leaders] to smartly and creatively develop diplomacy and international relations in order to support and guarantee the Indonesian interests.<sup>169</sup> By actively joining the international community in resolving global issues, the international community will feel that Indonesia is a part of its community, and of course, it will subsequently improve the Indonesian bargaining position.

Furthermore, the Indonesian government must commit to preventing internal human rights violations, not only in Papua, but also in the entire Indonesian archipelago. Since such violations are a most controversial issue, highlighted by the international community’s reaction to the OPM insurgency, the Indonesian government must demonstrate its good will regarding this issue. As the Indonesian president from 2004 to 2014, Yudhoyono stated:

I understand there are many international concerns regarding the human rights issue in Papua. I guarantee that the TNI soldiers and Indonesian policemen in Papua also respect the law and the human rights. If there is a violation regarding the human rights there, I will punish whoever is at fault. There will be no one immune and the military trial will be held. ... However, you have to remember that although I have changed my policy regarding Papua from more of a security approach to more of a political approach, the OPM insurgents keep attacking and killing our soldiers,

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<sup>168</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, *Force and Diplomacy in the Future* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1992), 201.

<sup>169</sup> Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, *Selalu Ada Pilihan: Untuk Pencinta Demokrasi dan Pemimpin Indonesia Mendatang* [There is always an option: For the Lover of Democracy and The Indonesian Future Leader] (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2014), 545.

policemen, and civilians. ... Thus, I hope the world will be fair as well, and objectively see the reality in receiving the information.<sup>170</sup>

By pursuing these political approaches, the Indonesian government can convince the international community of its commitment and consistency in properly solving the Papuan conflict without violating the human rights (Leg-4). This commitment and consistency will be key factors in the success of the Indonesian government to reduce the international support for the OPM insurgency (Leg-5). The commitment and consistency of the Indonesian government is one of the common weapons of social influence, and it is also highly valued in the world culture.<sup>171</sup>

## **F. SUMMARY**

The solution regarding the OPM's insurgency requires other approaches due to its historical, cultural, economic, and political background. As one of the democratic countries in the world, Indonesia needs the right organizational concepts in its COIN strategy to use effectively all of its national resources in a democratic framework. It consists of three important keys of the COIN Diamond Model: enhancing the government legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, destroying the OPM's abilities, and securing domestic and international support.

In order to enhance its legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, the Indonesian government should continue the implementation of Papuan special autonomy policy and prioritize the welfare of the Papuan people in making a policy regarding the PT Freeport Company. These approaches could accomplish Leg-1 and Leg-2 of the Diamond COIN Model and also enhance the trust of the international community in Indonesia's ability to resolve the Papuan conflict (Leg-4). Furthermore, in destroying the OPM's abilities (Leg-2, Leg-3, and Leg-5), the Indonesian government should equip Papuan KODAM's soldiers and deploy them effectively, as well as enforce the law in Papua strictly.

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<sup>170</sup> Yudhoyono, *Selalu Ada Pilihan* [There is always an Options], 705–6.

<sup>171</sup> Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: Science and Practice*, (Boston, Massachusetts: Pearson Education, 2009), 52.

Finally, the Indonesian government should secure its domestic and international support by winning the war of influence, and playing the good diplomacy in a dynamic international political change. These approaches will be key factors in the success of the Indonesian government to secure its domestic and international support (Leg-1 and Leg-4) as well as to reduce the domestic and international support of the OPM insurgency (Leg-2 and Leg-5) at the same time. Thus, by applying three important keys of the COIN Diamond Model in patching all the weaknesses of the current Indonesian COIN strategy, the Indonesian government will be capable of completely destroying the OPM insurgency, and providing a better life for the Papuan people in the future.

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