Insurgent Design: The Re-Emergence of Al-Qaida from 9/11 to the Present

Abstract

Analysts disagree on how to characterize al-Qaidas evolution. One perspective regards jihadi-Islamism in general to be self-marginalizing. A second perspective describes the merging of discrete jihadist grand strategies that is considered symptomatic of the decline of al-Qaida and its allies. A third finds that al-Qaida is gathering strength. This study expands upon the gathering strength perspective, contending that al-Qaidas successes are derived from its design orientation and competence. Al-Qaida agents have vigorously redesigned their transnational system to adapt to a profoundly hostile and unpredictable environment. For al-Qaida and its brethren, the highest rate of adaptation is occurring on the battlefield, as they experiment with varied technologies of warfare, rather than in debate over grand strategic ideas. Where before there were fleeting, desultory actions by terroristic cells, now maturing organizations vie for territorial control, establishing jihadi emirates and proto-states. To respond effectively to the situation, Western understanding of al-Qaida and the wider system of jihadi-Islamist insurgency must evolve apace.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 2015
Accession Number
AD1009218

Entities

People

  • Joshua A. Russo

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Autonomy
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil War
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of State
  • Geography
  • Governments
  • Guerrilla Warfare
  • Insurgency
  • Man Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
  • Military Organizations
  • Personnel Management
  • Political Movements
  • Political Systems
  • Students
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Political Violence and Terrorism Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies