



2008 Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations Conference

Arlington, VA
3-4 September 2008

Agenda

Wednesday, 2 September 2008

THE HISTORY OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

- Alan Gropman, ICAF, NDU

KEYNOTE PANEL: “*Interagency Coordination: Progress, Resourcing, Challenges, and Priorities*”

- Joe McMenamin, Principal Director, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations

PANEL DISCUSSION: “*Maritime/Port Security and Stabilization*”

Panelists:

- Joseph G. Wood, Jr. CHMM, P.E. Deputy Director, Security and Protective Services Group
- Deputy LCDR Patrick Fulgham, USN, Executive Officer, Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron Two
- CAPT Dennis Gallagher, Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa

THE ROLE OF FOR AND NOT-FOR PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Moderator: Doug Brooks, President, International Peace Operations Association

Panelists:

- Connie Carrino, Director, Afgan Programs, ARD, Inc.

Thursday, 4 September 2008

KEYNOTE SPEECH: “*SSTRO: THE JOINT RESPONSE*”

- LTG John (Bob) Wood, USA, Deputy Commander, USJFCOM

PANEL: “*Theater Security Cooperation Planning*”

- Kevin Staley, Deputy Director, Partner Nation Engagement
- COL Donald Zimmer, USA, Chief, Security Cooperation Division, USAFRICOM

PANEL DISCUSSION: “*Phase 0, Shaping Sustainable Stability in Africa*”

- COL Donald Zimmer, USA, Chief, Security Cooperation Division, USAFRICOM

PANEL: “*The Power of Public-Private Partnership*”

Panelists:

- John P. Howe III, MD, President and CEO, Project HOPE

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN PURSUIT OF SECURITY AND STABILIZATION

- Rich Hoffman, Director, Center for Civil Military Relations

A 21ST CENTURY VISION OF U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: BUILDING A BETTER, SAFER WORLD

- GEN Peter Schoomaker, USA (Ret), Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

2008 STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS CONFERENCE



PARTICIPANTS INCLUDE:

- ▶ GEN Peter Schoomaker, USA (Ret), *Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*
- ▶ Ambassador David Litt, *Executive Director, Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction, Institute for Defense and Business and former Ambassador to the UAE*
- ▶ Project Hope
- ▶ OSD/SOLIC
- ▶ Tom Baltazar, *USAID/OMA*
- ▶ MG James Champion, USA, *Director, Stability Directorate, USSOUTHCOM*



SEPTEMBER 3-4, 2008

WWW.NDIA.ORG/MEETINGS/8420

The Ritz Carlton, Pentagon City ▶ Arlington, Virginia

EVENT #8420

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3

7:30 am - 5:00 pm Registration Open

7:30 am - 8:30 am Registration and Continental Breakfast

8:30 am WELCOME & OPENING REMARKS

- ▶ MG Barry Bates, USA (Ret), *Vice President, Operations, NDIA*
- ▶ Walt Sasser, *Vice President, Government Relations, Camber Corporation*

9:00 am THE HISTORY OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

- ▶ Alan Gropman, *ICAF, NDU*

9:30 am KEYNOTE SPEECH: *Convergence of Development and Defense*

- ▶ The Honorable Dr. John Hillen, *CEO, Global Strategies Group (North America) Inc. (former Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs)*

10:15 am BREAK

10:30 am KEYNOTE PANEL: *Interagency Coordination: Progress, Resourcing, Challenges, and Priorities*

Moderator: Lewis Rasmussen, *Conflict Mitigation and Stability Transformation, ARD, Inc.*

Panelists:

- ▶ Donald L. Sampler, Jr., *Deputy Coordinator for Conflict Prevention and Strategic Communications*
- ▶ Joe McMenamin, *Principal Director, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations*
- ▶ Michael Hess, *Assistant Administrator for DCHA, USAID*

12:00 pm LUNCHEON: *Stability Operations and the Grand National Security Shift*

- ▶ Jeb Nadaner, *former Deputy Assistant, Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations*

1:15 pm PANEL DISCUSSION: *Haiti Stabilization Initiative*

Moderator and Speaker: Barbara Sotirin, *Deputy Director for Research and Development, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*

Panelists:

- ▶ MG James Champion, USA, *Stability Director, USSOUTHCOM*
- ▶ Merrie Archer, *Senior Planning Officer, S/CRS*
- ▶ Paul Tuebner, *Former Mission Director, USAID Haiti*

2:30 pm **PANEL DISCUSSION: *Maritime/Port Security and Stabilization***

Moderator: Margaret Daly Hayes, *Co-Owner, Evidence Based Research*

Panelists:

- ▶ Catherine Coghill, *Director, Security and Protective Services Group, Tetra Tech, Inc.*
- ▶ LCDR Patrick Fulgham, USN, *Executive Officer, Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron Two*
- ▶ CAPT Dennis Gallagher, *Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa*

3:45 pm **BREAK****4:00 pm** **THE ROLE OF FOR AND NOT-FOR PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

Moderator: Doug Brooks, *President, International Peace Operations Association*

Panelists:

- ▶ Kevin Delmour, *Complex Solutions, Inc.*
- ▶ Connie Carrino, *Director, Afgan Programs, ARD, Inc.*
- ▶ William Stuebner, *Senior Director, Civil-Military Relations & Program Support, ACDI/VOCA*
- ▶ Neil Levine, *Director, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, USAID*

5:30 pm **ADMINISTRATIVE REMARKS**

- ▶ Walt Sasser, *Vice President, Government Relations, Camber Corporation*

5:30 pm - 6:30 pm **RECEPTION IN PLAZA BALLROOM**

Sponsored by Tetra Tech/ARD, Inc.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 4

7:30 am - 12:00 pm Registration Open

7:30 am - 8:20 am Registration and Continental Breakfast

8:20 am **OPENING REMARKS**

- ▶ Lewis Rasmussen, *Conflict Mitigation and Stability Transformation, ARD, Inc.*

8:30 am **KEYNOTE SPEECH: *SSTRO: THE JOINT RESPONSE***

- ▶ LTG John (Bob) Wood, USA, *Deputy Commander, USJFCOM*

9:15 am **PANEL: Theater Security Cooperation Planning**

Moderator: Gary DeKay, *Camber Corporation*

Panelists:

- ▶ COL Donald Zimmer, USA, *Chief, Security Cooperation Division, USAFRICOM*
- ▶ Ambassador David Greenlee
- ▶ Kevin Staley, *Deputy Director, Partner Nation Engagement Integration, Stability Directorate, USSOUTHCOM*
- ▶ Tom Baltazar, *Director, Office of Military Affairs, USAID*

10:35 am **BREAK**

10:50 am **PANEL DISCUSSION: Phase 0, Shaping Sustainable Stability in Africa**

Moderator: Jay Singh, *former Senior. Development Advisor, JTFHOA and Director of Business Development, Tetra Tech, Inc.*

Panelists:

- ▶ Louis Mazel, *Director, Office of African Regional and Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State*
- ▶ Terry Dunmire, *Director, Business Development, DynCorp International; Board Member, Corporate Council on Africa*
- ▶ COL Donald Zimmer, USA, *Chief, Security Cooperation Division, USAFRICOM*
- ▶ Paul Miller, *Africa Team Leader and Policy Advisor, Catholic Relief Services*

12:10 pm **LUNCHEON: Stability Operations: Practitioner Reflections and Academic Contributions**

- ▶ Ambassador David Litt, *Executive Director, Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction, Institute for Defense Business, Chapel Hill, NC*

1:30 pm **PANEL: The Power of Public-Private Partnership**

Moderator: Mathew Hensley, *President, International Public-Private Partnership (IP3)*

Panelists:

- ▶ Lynn Dines, *President and CEO, Synectic Solutions, Inc.*
- ▶ John P. Howe III, MD, *President and CEO, Project HOPE*
- ▶ Chief of Naval Operations Representative

2:50 pm **STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN PURSUIT OF SECURITY AND STABILIZATION**

- ▶ Rich Hoffman, *Director, Center for Civil Military Relations*

3:20 pm **BREAK**

3:35 pm **A 21ST CENTURY VISION OF U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: BUILDING A BETTER, SAFER WORLD**

- ▶ GEN Peter Schoomaker, USA (Ret), *Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

4:20 pm **CLOSING REMARKS**

- ▶ MG Barry Bates, USA (Ret), *Vice President, Operations, NDIA*

Notes

**Thank you to
our Reception
Sponsor!**



TETRA TECH

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Not-for-profits in Stability Operations: *Roles and Opportunities*

Presented by Doug Brooks

President, International Peace Operations Association

**Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations
Conference**



Pentagon City, 3 September, 2008

“Westernless” Peacekeeping



- **Lack of political will.**
- **Militaries smaller.**
- **PKOs often ignored.**
- **Vast underfunding.**
- ***Abdication of the West!***



Non-Profits filling the gaps



- Significant moral advantages
 - Widespread popular support
 - Vs. mixed popular view of military and private sector
- Low profile
 - Often operate long before official mission
 - Can do projects with less political risk
- Cooperation with local civil society
- Off-budget-budget – not from larger mission

Advantages for Non-Profits



- Often bring enormous regional expertise
- Independent funds extremely cost effective
- Utilization and capacity building with locals
- Specialties in small, ignored niche projects
- Can support long-term projects gov'ts can't
- Step in when int'l community fails
- Bring attention and funding to 'orphan' conflicts
- Can do reconciliation projects better

Disadvantages for Non-Profits I



■ Risk Averse

- ❑ NGO casualties often cause exodus
- ❑ Avoid use of security, especially robust security
- ❑ Public withdrawal can create political heat

■ Coordination issues

- ❑ Independence can cause duplicate projects
- ❑ Projects can complicate larger mission

Disadvantages for Non-Profits II



- Military Averse
 - Many non-profits shun military contacts
 - Can generate anti-military hostility
- Independently focused
 - May have special interests at odds with mission
 - Support for minority groups
 - Gender empowerment programs
 - Noble causes may cause political difficulties
 - Religious-based groups can create own problems

In sum . . .




- Non-profit community brings enormous value and expertise to operations.
- Mixed quality and motivations.
- Establishing informal communications allow use of expertise and help coordination.
- Ultimately, non-profit community is the driving force – moral and political - spurring and supporting many ongoing PKOs

IPOA

International Peace Operations Association

- **Not for Profit.**
- **Industry Assn.**
- **Improve PKOs.**
- **Code of Conduct.**
- **Regulation and Law.**
- **Advocacy and Education.**





Questions?

1900 L STREET, NW, SUITE 320 | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
 (T): (202) 464-0721 | (F): (202) 464-0726 | IPOA@IPOAONLINE.ORG

The Role of For-Profits and Not-for-Profits in Stabilization

NDIA Stability Operations
Conference
September 3-4, 2008



Development and Stability Operations: a range of examples

- Institution-building during reconstruction
- Assessments in hot spots
- Mediation
- Alternative development
- Infrastructure in conflict zones

Property Taxes: Albania

- 1993—no way to access local tax base
- Established land registration system—fully independent and self-financing
- Launched pilot projects; public information campaigns, training, institutional capacity building
- Registered 200K properties

Agricultural Market Studies: North Caucasus (ICRP)

- Conducted assessment of Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Dagestan, and southern Stavropol krai
- Analyzed how agribusiness clustering in areas of the Russian Federation could help mitigate conflict in the region



Mediation brings Peace: Balkh, Afghanistan (LGCD)



- Isterkot village 12K;
Karbasi village 1.4K —
historical conflict
- Mediation Committee
- Small projects to promote
community cooperation:
volleyball yard,
embroidery equipment,
sheep

Cutting what finances terror in Colombia: ADAM



- 28K families benefitted/24K jobs created
- 141K hectares free of illicit crops
- 54K families under illicit crop-free agreement
- 620 communities/ producer associations with illicit crop-free agreements

Growing Democracy on the Bamyán Bazaar Road: LGCD



Provincial Governor Habiba Sarabi

“show us how determined the Afghan people are to see their country succeed,”
First Lady Laura Bush, WSJ
June 12, 2008

Jobs; wells; improve bazaar;
public outreach, safety and
community participation

Take your Child to Work Day in 2008



Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

Executing Navy's Maritime Strategy

**LCDR Patrick Fulgham,
Executive Officer
Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron TWO**

02 September 2008



Navy Expeditionary Combat Command



Providing adaptive force packages of rapidly deployable expeditionary forces, made up of active duty and reserve mission specialists, to warfare commanders in support of maritime security operations around the globe.



Riverine



**Naval Construction
(Seabees)**



**Explosive Ordnance
Disposal**



**Maritime Expeditionary
Security**



**Expeditionary
Diving**



**Expeditionary
Intelligence**



Combat Camera



**Expeditionary
Logistics**



Guard Battalion



**Maritime
Civil Affairs**




**Expeditionary
Training**



**Expeditionary
Combat Readiness**



NECC At A Glance



47 percent of NECC forces are Reserve Component



Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower



MARITIME STRATEGY

NECC – EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Forward Presence

Deterrence

Sea Control

Power Projection

Maritime Security

HA/DR

*“Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively,
while enhancing our ability to prevent war...”*



NECC – Forward Presence

Maritime
Expeditionary
Security
patrolling
harbor in
CENTCOM
AOR – March
2005



Seabees build
a school roof
in Ethiopia –
Oct. 2007



Riverine Patrol
Boat tows
boats seized
on Haditha
Dam – Sept.
2007



EOD with
Polish Army
soldiers
conduct a
safe disposal
area site
survey in Al
Hillah, Iraq –
Oct. 2003

“Operating forward enables familiarity with the environment...operational understanding and experience to quickly engage in combat operations...and combat terrorism as far from our shores as possible.”



NECC - Deterrence



Seabees drill
a well in
Philippines –
Feb. 2004



Expeditionary
Training Command
with Dominican
Republic Sailors –
Sept. 2007



Maritime Civil Affairs
planner in Ghana –
November 2007



*“Effective Theater Security Cooperation activities
are a form of extended deterrence...”*



NECC – Sea Control



EOD conducting mine countermeasures dive in Arabian Gulf – June 2003

Riverine patrolling Haditha Dam – April 2007 (far left)



Maritime Expeditionary Security on watch on Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal – Nov. 2005.

...extended to the near-land waterways.



NECC – Power Projection



Riverine on patrol on the Euphrates River – Sept. 2007



MESF boat det conducts security patrol in Arabian Gulf -- March 2005



Cargo Handling Battalion in CENTCOM AOR.

*“..ability...to project and sustain power ashore
is the basis of our combat credibility.”*



NECC – Maritime Security



Force protection dive at Port of Djibouti –
March 2006



Maritime Security Squadron on
patrol in the Arabian Gulf – Aug.
2007.

Riverine squadron on patrol at
Haditha Dam – December 2007

“..security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war...”



NECC – HA/DR



Expeditionary Echelon TOC – March 2007
(above)

Seabees along Gulf of Mexico following
Hurricane Katrina – March 2006 (above,
right)

Cargo Handling Battalion unloads medical
supplies during Exercise Balikatan in the
Phillipines – Feb. 2004 (right)

MDSU Divers at Minneapolis bridge
collapse – Aug. 2007 (far right)



*“..the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them
to provide assistance.”*



Executing Maritime Strategy Around the Globe

NECC Global Engagement



All NECC capabilities on mission/deployment in FY-07

NECC

Adaptive, Responsive, Expeditionary



NECC Maritime Functions and Capabilities



Functions

Capabilities

Riverine and Boat Operations

Construction

EOD

Maritime Security

Diving & Salvage

Intelligence

Logistics

Engagement

- Explosive remnants of War
- Counter IED
- Counter Proliferation/CBRNE
- Undersea Mine Countermeasures
- Humanitarian Mine Action
- Foreign Internal Defense

- Tactical HUMINT/ Source OPS
- Interrogators
- Intel Exploitation
- Tactical Site Exploitation
- Expeditionary Analysis

- Harbor Clearance
- Ship Salvage
- Battle Damage Repair

- Interdiction
- Waterborne Security
- Brown Water Security
- Enabler for Offensive Force Flow

- Horiz. & Vert. Construction
- Underwater Construction
- Expeditionary Camps
- Expeditionary Engineering

- Anti-terrorism/Force Protection
- High Value Unit Protection
- Port Security / Surveillance
- Airfield Security
- Visit Board Search and Seizure
- Shore Based Security
- Coalition Maritime Security
- Detainee Operations
- Law Enforcement
- Intelligence

- Port Operations
- Cargo Handling
- Expeditionary Logistics
- Logistics Over-the-Shore

- Foreign Military Training
- Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center
- Maritime Civil Affairs
- Expeditionary Medical Training



NECC Battlespace

Adaptive, Responsive, Expeditionary



Questions?





Navy Expeditionary Combat Command



Back-up slides



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Riverine**


- Combat arms force providing maritime operations in rivers and waterways
- Denies terrorists use of the maritime environment as venue for attack or for illegal purposes
- Ensures continuance of legitimate trade
- Keeps lines of communications open



Closing gaps in the maritime environment



Riverine Maritime Security Operations





NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Naval Construction (Seabees)**

- Provides contingency construction support to include:
 - Forward operations base construction and operation
 - Bridge and airfield construction/repair
 - Fleet hospital set-up and operations
- Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)
- Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief



We build – We fight



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Explosive Ordnance Disposal**

- Special Operations
- Fleet operations with CSG, ESG and shore stations
- Force Protection
- Mine Countermeasures



Enabling Access for Combat Forces



NECC Force Mission Areas

•Maritime Expeditionary Security

- Scalable and sustainable security teams capable of defending mission-critical assets in worldwide near-coast, in-shore and embarked environments
- Provide maritime and in-shore surveillance, security, antiterrorism, ground and afloat defense, Visit, Board, Search & Seizure (VBSS) Level III and C4I support in harbors and ports
- Wide range of secondary tasks from detention operations to law enforcement



Tailored, scalable, responsive and flexible



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Diving operations**

- Mobile Diving and Salvage (MDSU)
 - Conducts expeditionary salvage, search and recovery both ashore and afloat.
 - Performs harbor clearance with full spectrum salvage and de-beaching, underwater cutting and welding, and limited demolition
 - Ships husbandry and force protection dive support of ships in port and piers. Program lead for the search unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV).
- Underwater Construction Team (UCT)
 - Provides construction, inspection and repair of ocean facilities such as wharves, piers, underwater pipelines, moorings and boat ramps



Expeditionary in every maritime environment



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Expeditionary Intelligence**

- Provide flexible, capable and ready maritime expeditionary intelligence forces
- Maritime Interdiction Operations Intelligence Exploitation Team (MIO-IET)
- Navy HUMINT Teams (NHT)
- Expeditionary Intelligence Support Element (EISE)



Adaptive tactical intelligence operations



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Combat Camera**

- Operations support
 - Counterterrorism
 - Psychological operations
 - Information operations
 - Battle damage assessment
 - Force protection
 - Public affairs
- Medical support
- Investigative support
- Historical documentation
- Intelligence gathering support



Visual documentation for the joint warfighter



NECC Force Mission Areas



•Expeditionary Logistics

- Worldwide expeditionary logistics
- Provides support for:
 - Port and air cargo handling missions
 - Customs inspections
 - Contingency contracting
 - Fuels distribution
 - Freight terminal and warehouse operations
 - Postal services
 - Ordnance reporting and handling



Cargo handlers and expeditionary logisticians



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion**

- Assumed administrative oversight for NEGB-Guantanamo (GTMO)
- Part of JTF-GTMO
- 600 guards
- Fully trained in
 - Procedures training
 - Cultural training
 - Legal training
 - Self-defense training
 - First aid (self-aid and buddy aid) training
 - Non-lethal weapons training (pepper spray)
 - Weapons training and qualification (for external security)



Safe and humane care and custody



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Maritime Civil Affairs**

- Assess, plan and coordinate civil/military operations in the maritime environment
 - Major combatant and non-combatant evacuations
 - Maritime operations
 - Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
 - Refugee operations
- Regionally aligned and focused
- Host nation interagency coordination
- U.S. Country Team coordination



Civil affairs enhances security and stability



MCAG Skill Set

(USA core skills plus USN maritime specialties)



Army Core CA Skills

- Communications
- Civil Information Management
- Public Health and Welfare
- Public Information/Education
- Coastal/Land Navigation
- Medical
- Language
- Cultural/Regional Awareness
- Negotiation and Mediation
- CA Mission Planning/Civil Military Operations
- Information Operations
- Project Management
- International Civilian Response Management
- HA/DR
- Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

Proposed Maritime CA Skills

- Maritime Rule of Law & International Law
- Marine Fisheries & Natural Resources
- Port Administration / Port Ops / Maintenance
- Port Infrastructure
- Maritime Inter-Agency Coordination
- Small Craft Operations
- Port / Waterborne Security
- Port Customs & Logistics
- Port / Waterway Surveys
- Control of Maritime Immigration



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Expeditionary Training**

- Provide timely, focused and customized maritime capabilities training at host nation request
- Increases global maritime security capabilities
- Increases host nations' capacity to govern and protect themselves
- Supports Global Maritime Partnership concept



Building and enhancing maritime partnerships



NECC Force Mission Areas



- **Expeditionary Combat Readiness**
 - Train, equip, certify, deploy and redeploy IA, In-Lieu-Of and Ad Hoc forces
 - Provide administrative oversight and reach-back functions
 - Conduit of information for family members
 - Provide support network
 - Ensure critical and appropriate training
 - Warrior Transition



Supporting Sailors and their families




NECC Forces



Current capabilities

Future capabilities

Key: (Total)
(AC/RC/CIV)
[IA / ILO/ADHOC]



First Naval Construction Division (1NCD)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF)

Navy Expeditionary Intelligence Command (NEIC)

Combat Camera (COMCAMLANT)

Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG)

Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion (NEGB)

Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG)

Expeditionary Training Command (ETC)

Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center (ECRC)

NECC

Adaptive, Responsive, Expeditionary

[Back](#)



COCOM/Theater Engagement SOUTHCOM



- **USNS Comfort mission**
 - MESF, Seabees, COMCAM
- **Pilot Global Fleet Station-HSV Swift**
 - NECC sourced Command Element
 - ETC, MCAG, MESF
- **Joint Logistics Over The Shore 07 Guatemala**
 - Seabees, MESF, NAVELSG
- **High Value Assets Transits Panama Canal**
 - MESF
- **Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay**
 - NEGB
- **Continuing Promise 08**
 - Seabees, MCAG, MESF





COCOM/Theater Engagement NORTHCOM

- **Expeditionary support to Defense Support To Civilian Authorities (DSCA)**

- Hurricane Katrina relief
 - Seabees, MDSU
- Minneapolis Bridge Recovery
 - MDSU, UCT
- EOD Shore detachments
- EOD support to U.S. Secret Service





COCOM/Theater Engagement EUCOM/AFRICOM



- **Africa Partnership Station**
 - ETC, MCAG, MESF, Seabees
- **EOD support to EUCOM**
- **Joint Task Force Horn Of Africa**
 - EOD, Seabees
- **Anti-piracy**
 - Maritime Interdiction Operations-Intelligence Exploitation Team





COCOM/Theater Engagement CENTCOM



- **Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait**
 - 9 Capabilities Currently Deployed
- **Exercises**
 - Egypt
 - Pakistan
 - Jordan
 - Lebanon
 - Yemen
 - Oman
 - Qatar





COCOM/Theater Engagement PACOM



- **PELELIU**
 - Seabees
- **PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 07 and 08**
USNS Mercy
 - Seabees, MESF, MCAG
- **Republic of Philippines**
 - EOD, MESF
- **Forward Deployed Seabees**
 - Okinawa, Guam
- **RIMPAC 08**
 - EOD, Seabees, MESF, NAVELSG, MCAG, COMCAM
- **CARAT 08**
 - Seabees, EOD





COCOM/Theater Engagement AFRICOM/EUCOM



- **Africa Partnership Station**
 - ETC, MCAG, MESF, Seabees
- **EOD support to EUCOM**
- **Joint Task Force Horn Of Africa**
 - EOD, Seabees
- **Anti-piracy**
 - Maritime Interdiction Operations-Intelligence Exploitation Team





Expeditionary Echelon



- An adaptive force package to include command and control of maritime security, riverine control, engineering and construction, diving and salvage, medical, and logistics capabilities
- Highly mobile, self sustainable, and operates from a forward expeditionary camp available in support of JTF tasking and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).
- The Expeditionary Echelon includes a Command Element and Survey Reconnaissance, and Liaison Party (SRLP), which deploys on order to specified Areas of Operations to prepare for the deployment of Expeditionary Echelon units



Command & Control for Expeditionary Battlespace



Expeditionary Echelon Force Structure



Capabilities

Command & Control*

• Construction/Disaster Recovery

• Port Clearing/Salvage

• Logistics

• Medical

• Maritime Security & Small Boat Ops

• Riverine

• CMO/PAO



O7 – O8

- NCF ≥ 2 NCR(-)
 ≥ 3 NMCB
2 CBMU Det
1 UCT
3 PHIBCB DRT



O6

- NCF > 1 NMCB
1 CBMU Det
2 UCT Air Det
2 PHIBCB DRT



O5

- NCF ≤ 1 NMCB
 ≤ 1 UCT Air Det
1 PHIBCB DRT

- EOD ≤ 2 Det
MDSU ≤ 1 MDSU

- ELSG: 1 NCHB(-)

- 1 EMF x 81 beds, 1 CRTS+MAT, 1 FDPMU

- NCW ≥ 1 NCWRON
1 MSD, 1 MIUW, 2 IBU

- RIVFOR ≥ 1 RIVGRU

- MCAG ≥ 1 LNO

- EOD ≤ 1 Det
MDSU ≤ 2 MDSD, 1 ASD

- ELSG: 1 Surface Co
1 Air Co

- 2 EMF x 10 beds,
1 FDPMU

- NCW ≤ 1 NCWRON
1 MSD, 1 IBU

- RIVFOR ≤ 1 RIVRON

- MCAG: 1 LNO

- EOD: None
MDSU ≤ 1 MDSD, 1 ASD

- ELSG: 1 Air Co

- 1 EMF x 10 beds,
1 FDPMU


- NCW ≥ 1 MSD, 1 IBU

- RIVFOR ≥ 1 RIVDET

- MCAG $\geq$ None

* Dependant upon mission requirements


NECC



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Expeditionary Echelon





Task Force 56



- **Operational oversight for all Naval Forces Central Command expeditionary combat forces**
- **CTF 56 Forces provide unique, mission essential capabilities for C5F with Six Task Groups:**
 - CTG 56.1 – Explosive Ordnance Disposal / Expeditionary Diving and Salvage
 - Provides Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Expeditionary Salvage support
 - CTG 56.2 – Naval Construction Forces
 - Provides expeditionary engineering and construction support for forward deployed forces
 - CTG 56.3 – Expeditionary Logistics Support
 - Provides logistics support for USN/USA/USMC, cargo movement and customs throughout AOR
 - CTG 56.4 – Riverine
 - Provides riverine protection of waterways from illegal smuggling of weapons, drugs and people
 - CTG 56.5 – Maritime Expeditionary Security
 - Provides anti-Terrorism/Force Protection of land/port/littoral waterway operations for USN and Coalition assets, as well as point defense of strategic platforms and MSC vessels
 - CTG 56.6 – Expeditionary Combat Readiness
 - Provides administrative “Sailor support” for all Individual Augmentees, and administers the Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Training Course and Warrior Transition Program
- **More than 10,000 Sailors across the CENTCOM AOR**



Navy Expeditionary Combat Enterprise



NECE is comprised of the NECC staff, all subordinate commands and all other commands that influence and support the warfighting capability of the NECC Force.

- As one of the five Warfighting Enterprises across the Navy, NECE is dedicated to the readiness, support and sustainment of the NECC Force.
- NECE establishes processes and policies that seek out cost-wise readiness initiatives and innovation, identifying barriers to process improvement and encouraging positive enterprise behaviors, enhancing the ability to manage the force in a way that maximizes readiness at the right time and for the right cost.
- NECE formalizes and aligns cross organizational relationships with US Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM), the other Warfare Enterprises, and the broader Navy Enterprise to leverage metrics, tools and processes where possible, to learn from the more mature enterprises and accelerate development.
- NECE meets the need to define force capacity and capabilities to tackle current and long term requirements.



Major Combat Operations



NECC brings...

Combat enablers



Port and near-shore force protection

Expeditionary logistics



Active-reserve integration



Antiterrorism & Force Protection



- EOD

- PACOM
- EUCOM

- MESF

- EUCOM
- CENTCOM
- PACOM

- Riverine

- CENTCOM

- NEIC

- CENTCOM





Theater Security Cooperation



- ETC
 - SOUTHCOM
 - AFRICOM
- MCAG
 - SOUTHCOM
 - AFRICOM
- EOD
 - EUCOM
- COMCAM
 - SOUTHCOM
- MESF
 - SOUTHCOM
 - PACOM
- Seabees
 - CENTCOM
 - PACOM
 - SOUTHCOM



Support to the Joint Force



•EOD

- PACOM
- EUCOM
- CENTCOM

•Seabees

- PACOM
- EUCOM
- CENTCOM

•NAVELSG

- CENTCOM

•COMCAM

- SOUTHCOM
- CENTCOM

•MESF

- PACOM
- CENTCOM

•Riverine

- CENTCOM

•ETC

- SOUTHCOM
- EUCOM

•ECRC

- CENTCOM





Homeland Defense & Security



- **EOD**
 - **Secret Service Support**
- **MESF**
 - **Refueling/Defueling**
 - **Fleet Week Security**
- **Coast Guard Integration**



NECC

Adaptive, Responsive, Expeditionary

[Back](#)



Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief



- ***Expeditionary Echelon***
- ***Seabees***
 - ***CENTCOM***
 - ***EUCOM***
 - ***NORTHCOM***
 - ***PACOM***
- ***Divers***
 - ***NORTHCOM***
- ***MCAG***
 - ***SOUTHCOM***
 - ***AFRICOM***





Why NECC



National Strategy for Maritime Security

“The security of the maritime domain requires comprehensive and cohesive efforts among the United States and many cooperating nations to protect the common interest in global maritime security...Forces must be trained, equipped, and prepared to detect, deter, interdict, and defeat terrorists throughout the maritime domain.

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

“Joint maritime forces...will conduct highly distributed operations with a networked fleet that is more capable of projecting power in the ‘brown and green waters’ of coastal areas...It will have greater capacity for riverine operations and other irregular operations.


Naval Operations Concept

“...enhance our ability to conduct non-traditional missions in order to ensure that naval power and influence can be applied at and from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore, as required.”

2006 Navy Strategic Plan (NSP)

“Navy must lead the maritime portion of the GWOT byMIO, VBSS level III, Riverine, Expeditionary Security Force, NECC, and Combat Skills Readiness Center.”

Navy Expeditionary Combat Forces Laydown



● NCW/EOD

● NAVELSG

▲ NCF

◆ RIVERINE

163 Commands at 74 Sites in 30 States and 10 Countries *Expeditionary*

*Note: Does not depict reserve units at the company/det level





CY07 Mission Support



- **Continued CENTCOM deployments**
 - Seabees, NCW, EOD, NAVELSG, ComCam, ECRC, Riverine
- **Support to USNS Comfort – SouthCom mission**
 - NCW, Seabees, COMCAM
- **NavSouth training mission**
 - ETC, MCAG, NCW
- **NavEur West Africa training**
 - ETC, MCAG, NCW
- **PacFlt exercises and training**
 - EOD, Seabees, NCW
- **Antarctica logistics support**
 - NAVELSG
- **Global maritime security**
 - NCW, EOD, Intel



Full Spectrum Operations





Typical Technologies



- **Dual Frequency Radar**
 - 1m square target at 12nm
- **Link 16**
 - Share data real time with higher authority
- **Navy Expeditionary Overwatch**
 - Use UAV as a relay and sensor platform
 - Extends USV beyond line of sight
 - All data into a single battle space picture
- **Wireless networks**
 - Ship to ship (VBSS/MEO)
 - Internal ship
- **Sensor integration**
 - Various sensors integrated into a single battle space picture
- **Communication on the move**
 - Real-Time Video, VOIP, and data from a moving vehicle using SATCOM



What NECC Is Looking For



- A forty-year technology leap forward!
 - To the present day...
 - Current technology into NECC Sailors' hands now
- Technology for partners and allies
- What is possible for the future NECC Sailor
 - Process
 - Exercises



The Test: Takeaways



- NECC has an enduring mission beyond OIF/OEF: GFM (presence), MCO, MSP
- NECC's capabilities are Navy capabilities that date back to WWII (**Seabees, EOD, Coastal, etc**)
- NECC forces are deployed world-wide (not just CENTCOM)
- NECC is a model of Active-Reserve Integration
- NECC: the people are the secret weapon

The Horn/East Africa Geopolitical Realities

- **Violent extremism is a transnational challenge and there are safe havens in East Africa**
- **Coalition and Partner Nations' participation is critical to our success**
- **Limited maritime capability of our Partner Nations constrains their potential contribution**
- **There is no regional structure for maritime safety and security**
- **The region has a tradition of smuggling as a form of commerce**


Regional Security Challenges

...Cooperative Support enabling African Solutions

Horn of Africa

Critical Seaports

Strategic Waterways



- Arms Smuggling
- Trafficking in People
- Trafficking in Drugs
- Illegal Fishing
- Piracy
- Pollution



Combined Maritime Forces



The Horn/East Africa Maritime Objectives

1. Develop partnerships

- Identify partner nations needs, goals and intentions
- Gain political support to improve maritime safety and security
- Gain support for U.S./coalition activities to enhance regional maritime security

2. Develop our Partner Nations' maritime capabilities

- Strengthen security, customs regulation, and enforcement in port facilities;
- Improve maritime domain awareness
- Improve capacity to patrol, monitor and assert control over the maritime domain;
- Be prepared to respond to contingencies

3. Develop a regional organization for maritime safety and security

- Foster regional cooperation between partner nations
- Establish regional maritime domain awareness
- Facilitate information sharing and coordination
- Plan for development of a multi-national command center to manage and coordinate multinational operations

Djibouti Maritime Safety and Security Roadmap

1. Develop Djibouti's short range maritime patrol capability

- Obock pier/base construction
- Provide equipment, including patrol boats, armament, comms equipment
- US Coast Guard Mobile Training Team assessment
- Technical assistance to develop doctrine and procedures for DJNAV patrolling

2. Develop Djibouti's coastal surveillance capability


- Provide sensors capable of providing detection and cueing of maritime traffic to DJNAV patrol forces and coalition forces

3. Develop plan for sustainment of capability

- Conduct annual reviews of equipment to identify candidates for replacement/repair
- Continue culture of maintenance monitoring and technical assists

4. Integrate DJNAV into Global Maritime Security Frameworks

- Training with passing coalition ships
- Coordination between DJNAV and Yemen to enhance maritime governance



U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

**NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL
ASSOCIATION**
Stability Operations Conference

*Alan Gropman, Colonel USAF, Retired
Ph.D*

**Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University**




3 September 2008

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

– Lessons from the Past

- United States, 1865 to 1877
- Haiti 1915 to 1934
- Germany (1945-
- Japan (1945-

Conclusions and Observations



U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

Dying is easy but comedy is hard

A. For American armed forces, military victory against conventional fighting foes is (relatively) easy

B. But stabilization and reconstruction operations—AKA--nation building--are hard

C. Remember books on counterinsurgency from the 1960s prescribing the way to victory in Vietnam?

- **We all know how that turned out.**
- **Similarly, today, books on stabilization and reconstruction often oversimplify complexities and underestimate difficulties.**

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

III. Conventional Wisdom. . .

A. Successful reconstruction takes five to seven years—BUT:

- We were in the ex-Confederacy 12 years and failed
- We occupied Haiti 19 years and failed
- We were in the Philippines for 45 years and failed
- Post World War II Germany and Japan are models, but:
 1. Both still American troops still stationed there
 2. Both are under the American nuclear umbrella
 3. Both devote much less of their gross domestic product than United States to defense because they are protected by America

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

III. Conventional Wisdom. . .

B. Bosnia and Kosovo are not stable after more than a decade

C. Korea can be counted a success—but it took more than three decades

D. United States is not unique

- Papua New Guinea is a failing state
- Solomon Islands no better
- East Timor is failing
- Fiji has had a series of military coups
- The Congo under a series of names is hyper unstable and has been
- Nigeria is problematic to say the least
- Uganda is in trouble
- Rwanda and Burundi are trembling
- Zimbabwe is close to hopeless

E. We must examine carefully all nation-building generalizations

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

IV. Relevant touchstones

A. *“Four Pillars of Reconstruction” (Orr/CSIS)*

- Security
- Governance and participation
- Economic and social well-being
- Justice and reconciliation

B. *Defining stability operations (DOD Dir. 3000.5)*

- Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

V. Reconstructing the American Union (1865-1877)

A. *Traditional Paradigm – Reconstruction of American South (1865-1877)*

- Reconstruction considered distinct from Civil War

B. *Fully Integrated One Hundred Year Struggle (1860-1964 and beyond)*

- Secession-War-Reunion-Nationalization

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

V. Reconstruction

C. Indigenous resistance (unrepentant Confederates)

- Question of hearts and minds
- Harsh war, soft peace

D. Ethnic/racial dimension: Legal equality versus racial discrimination

E. Lack of overwhelming military presence (US Army)

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

V. Reconstruction

F. Nation reunited but no national settlement

G. Civil War generation proved the adage – easier to win a war than to impose and maintain peace

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

VI. Focus on Haiti and Post World War II Germany/Japan

A. *Haiti*

- **America in Haiti 19 years (1915-1934)**
- **BUT by 1900 United States Marines had landed in Haiti 8 times**
- **1900-1914 United States gunboats in Haitian waters**
 1. **American banks and entrepreneurs engaged in Haiti**
 2. **By 1910, United States had dominance in Haitian affairs**
 3. **In 1913, President Wilson wanted control of Haiti to reform it**
 - **Motivations for occupation (motivations matter)**
 - (a) **Wilsonian idealism**
 - (b) **American Imperialism**
 - (c) **Security of Panama Canal**
 - (d) **Racial paternalism**

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

A. Haiti

- Americans disarm Port-au-Prince; arrest/kill Caco rebels
- United States installs client president, who is given a treaty he must sign
- United States seizes custom houses, fights Caco rebels, declares martial law, controls Gendarmerie
- Americans create new Haitian constitution
 1. Overturns Haitian prohibition on foreign ownership of Haitian land
 2. Extend martial control over entire country igniting rebellion
 3. Americans turned to forced labor to build roads over entire country—reignites rebellion

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

A. Haiti

- From 1918 to 1922 Marines fight an insurgency
 1. United States is criticized overseas and also domestically, Senate studies claims of torture and other atrocities
 2. Relative tranquility 1922–1929 with new puppet president
 - Haitian press censored
 - Opponents of occupation jailed by United States
 3. Fall 1929 renewed protests, student strikes, general strike
- Hoover appoints commission, finds: “unless measures are taken to meet” the public’s “demands for a legislature that can elect a president in the near future . . . grave public disorder will arise.”
- August 1934 occupation ends, BUT direct supervision of Haiti’s economy continued through 1942
- Constant coups, revolts, crime, disorder virtually ever after

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

B. Germany and Japan

- Focus will be on why/ how occupations succeeded
- Germany:
 1. Unlike Haiti, Germany utterly defeated, initial number of troops in Germany 100/1000, fell to 10/1000 (still, much more than Haiti)
 2. Germany's nation building program much greater United States effort than others
 - External reasons—Cold War tensions—promote greater concern by America
 - German fear of Soviets encourages German cooperation
 - United States had two cooperative allies
 - Most German neighbors supported America
 - First goal was security—a constant in nation-building

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

C. Germany

- Military administration was central
- United States had a transformation plan
- German army demobilized war crime tribunal held, substantial humanitarian and economic assistance provided
- American constabulary force established (30,000); that trained German police
- German police largely take over by 1949
- Total denazification proved impractical if Germans were eventually to run state
- There were 3,600,000 Nazis left in 1945
- German special courts tried 900,000 Nazis convicting 120,000

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

C. Germany

- Sovereignty gradually returned beginning in 1947
- Elections held in 1949, ultimate authority in occupation forces
- Education completely reformed, freedom of press/discussion ensured
- General Clay, commander of occupation went far beyond authority to reconstruct German economy
 1. American sector economic output 4th quarter 1946, 2.5 times same quarter 1945
 2. German Gross Domestic Product grows double digit rate 1947 to 1952
 3. Marshall Plan aid began in mid-1948

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

C. Germany

■ Lessons learned by Jim Dobbins:

1. Democracy can be transferred
2. Enforced accountability for crimes can facilitate transformation
3. Divided states/authorities are headaches
4. Money from everywhere is essential
5. Immediate reparations are counterproductive
6. “[M]ilitary force and political capital can . . . successfully . . . underpin . . . [enduring] societal transformation.” BUT
 - (a) Planning is essential
 - (b) Security is essential
 - (c) Economic recovery is indispensable
 - (d) Establishing democracy is valuable

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

D. Japan

- **Allies agree on terms for Japan:**
 1. **Unconditional surrender**
 2. **Purge World War II Japanese leadership**
 3. **Allied occupation until a new order was established and Japan's war-making power destroyed**
 4. **Disbandment of Japan's empire**
 5. **Military disarmament**
 6. **Prosecution of war criminals**
 7. **Establishment of freedom of speech, religion, thought, respect for human rights**
 8. **Reduction of economic capacity to prevent rearmament.**
- **Emperor was preserved, but forced to deny his deity**
 1. **MacArthur whitewashed emperor, used him**
 2. **MacArthur also ruled through Cabinet/Diet**
 3. **Unlike Germany's occupation, United States essentially solely in charge; MacArthur ruled**

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

C. Japan

- **Humanitarian problems:**
 1. **3,000,000 unwelcome Japanese civilians in former colonies; 3.5 million military too**
 2. **Many Japanese cities destroyed, 9 million homeless**
- **Security from insurgency almost guaranteed because Emperor and civilian cabinet cooperated in ensuring indigenous forces disarmed**
 1. **End 1945, 354,875 American troops in Japan**
 2. **War crime tribunals were held**
 3. **Militaristic politicians and bureaucrats purged from government—but few politicians and fewer bureaucrats**
 4. **New Constitution hastily written under MacArthur's supervision**
 - **Japanese argue, but accept**
 - **Constitution never amended!**
 - **Article 9 of constitution forswears war**

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

D. Japan

- Elections held April 1946!
 1. 363 parties, 2770 candidates for 466 seats
 2. 78.52% men/66.97% women vote
 3. 377 new members
 4. Conservatives win (and have done so nearly ever since)
- MacArthur demanded food to prevent Japanese hunger; despite objections from United States government, got it
 1. Saved millions from malnutrition
 2. Earned respect/admiration for United States
- By 1947 Cold War tensions induce United States to consider Japan as ally; promote rearmament
 1. Korean War convinces most Japanese to get onboard
 2. Korean War also sparks vast economic boom

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

D. Japan

- **MacArthur fully understood nexus between economic security, prosperity and democracy**

- 1. MacArthur pulled in opposite directions in democratizing economy**

- (a) Many demand zaibatsu eliminated, but reform less than thorough**

- (b) Labor unions sanctioned, encouraged, but many communists in union leadership**

- (c) In end foundation for sound economy laid**

- 2. Land Reform to see that farmers owned land they worked instead of renting, broke the back of landlords who had been a major prop of hyper nationalism and militarism—may be MacArthur's most profound reform**

- **April 1952, Japan gets sovereignty**

- 1. United States gets bases for guarantee of Japanese security by America**

U.S. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS HISTORICALLY

F. Germany and Japan Summary

- **There is no substitute for planning**
- **Security is the *sine qua non* for nation building**
 1. Obviously easier said than done
 2. And many paths can be taken to achieve security, but antagonizing the people is self-defeating
 3. One cannot fight an insurgency and build a nation simultaneously
 4. Physical security is not enough
- **Economic security is the next prerequisite**
 1. Another easier said than done and many paths can be followed
 2. No nation can be built without people employed constructively
 3. Democracy is impossible without economic security
 4. Establishing economic security is necessarily a multilateral effort

Center for Civil-Military Relations



Strengthening Democratic Civil-Military Relationships in S&R Operations

September 5, 2008





Agenda

- Importance of Democratic Civil-Military Relations
- Stabilization and Reconstruction Players
- Stabilization and Reconstruction Arena
- Civil-Military Relations Reform Process
- Civil-Military Relations Reform Focus Areas
- Summary and Conclusions

Importance of Democratic Civil-Military Relations



“As the Founding Fathers wisely understood, the Congress and a free press, as with a non-political military, assure a free country.” *Secretary of Defense Honorable Robert M. Gates, Lecture at West Point April 21, 2008*



“Every action we take, every day, must be executed in a way that strengthens and sustains the public’s trust and confidence in our ability and our integrity.” *Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen, CJCS Guidance October 1, 2007*


S&R Players




- Environment
- Population
- Host Government
- Neighbors
- Threats
- Coalition
- International Organizations
- Non-Governmental Organizations



The S&R Arena



Civil-Military Relations Reform Process



Civil-Military Relations Reform Focus Areas



- Security and Defense Policy and Strategy Development
- Security and Defense Institution Building: Public and Private
- Defense Planning, Budgeting and Resource Management
- Defense Acquisition and Infrastructure
- Intelligence Organizations and Operations
- Legislative Affairs
- Media Relations and Strategic Communications
- Human Rights and Human Resource Management
- Professional Security, Defense and Military Education and Training
- Assessment and Validation of Security Sector and Defense Reform efforts



Summary & Conclusions

- Democratic civil-military relations are a key component of success in Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations
- Building host-nation (HN) security capability and capacity requires building effective and efficient HN security institutions
- Building effective and efficient HN security institutions requires a deep understanding of HN PMESII, and a sustained multi-level education and training effort

The Power of Public-Private Partnerships

**Creating Greater Access to
Health Care in Underserved Markets**



U.S. Navy-HOPE Partnership



- Participated in 10 humanitarian assistance missions with Navy
- Cared for more than 200,000 patients in 24 countries in Southeast Asia, West Africa, Latin America/Caribbean
- Conducted more than 1,350 training courses, and trained more than 53,000 students
- Provided nearly 600 civilian volunteer doctors, nurses and other professionals
- Delivered more than \$30 million in donated medicines and medical supplies



2008 Navy-HOPE HA Missions



HMS SWIFT

West Africa: March-May



USS Boxer

Central and South America – Pacific: May-June



USNS Mercy

Southeast Asia: June-September



USS Kearsarge

**Central and South America –
Atlantic: August-November**

HMS SWIFT: West Africa



USS Boxer: Latin America Pacific




USNS Mercy: Southeast Asia



USS Kearsarge: Latin America Atlantic



Grand Facilitator



Power of Public-Private Partnerships

- Health Professional Education
- Greater Access to Care



China Diabetes Education Program



Dominican Republic Vaccines



The Power of Public-Private Partnerships

**Creating Greater Access to
Health Care in Underserved Markets**





SSTRO: *The Joint Response*



**LTG Bob Wood
Deputy Commander
USJFCOM**

“The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.”

-- National Security Presidential Directive 44



Joint Operating Environment

- ❑ Rising state powers – economies, militaries, influence
- ❑ Rising power of non-state actors – growth of ideological, religious, and identity-based groups, less bound by conventions
- ❑ WMD proliferation
- ❑ Globalization – transparency, fast-moving information and money, persistent media presence with global audience
- ❑ Technology – rapid change, proliferation, “range” and “precision” much more affordable
- ❑ Demographics – migration, growth, urbanization, aging, youth bulges
- ❑ Scarcity of Natural Resources – energy, food, water
- ❑ Disasters – natural disasters, possibly fueled by climate change, pandemics

Drivers of instability and conflict tend to reinforce one another, creating a vicious, degenerating cycle in which conditions continue to deteriorate, and the feelings of insecurity and the grievances of the local population continue to increase



Strategic Level SSTRO Response

National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”
7 Dec 05


- ☐ **Administration’s statement of national policy regarding interagency and SSTRO focused on planning, coordination, and contingency response**
- ☐ **Assigned lead agency responsibility to Department of State**
 - Granted authority to Secretary of State to coordinate and integrate activities of other government (USG) agencies
 - Empowered the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
- ☐ **Addressed coordination between State and Defense Departments**
 - Integration of stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate
 - Develop a a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate



Strategic Level SSTRO Response

DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations” 28 Nov 05

- ❑ Stability operations identified as a core U.S. military mission to help establish order to advances U.S. interests and values
- ❑ SSTRO success will assist in securing lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces
- ❑ The Directive tasks DoD to:
 - Develop stability operations exercises and training
 - Create joint doctrine for stability operations
 - Involve USG, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private sector entities in DoD planning, training, and exercises
 - Designate senior military officers in Services and Geographic Combatant Commands to lead stability operations activities
 - Develop a variety of military-civilian team concepts to employ in future stability operations



“[Stability Ops] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations....”

DoDD 3000.05 provides a framework for bolstering military and civilian stability operations capabilities



Recent Operations Illuminate SSTRO Gaps & Seams

- ❑ **Understanding the joint operational environment**
 - *Improving cultural awareness and understanding*
- ❑ **Enabling Economic Development**
 - *Linking security & economic lines of operation – quickly resourcing local priorities*
- ❑ **Enabling Organizational Capacity Development**
 - *Providing essential government services - - to facilitate HN legitimacy - lead to self-sufficiency*
- ❑ **Building relationships via engagement with local populace**
 - *Tribal through provincial levels - - SSTRO version of presence*
- ❑ **Improving Commander's strategic communication plan**
 - *Managing Information and expectations - - synchronizing message with reality on the ground*
- ❑ **Using appropriate levels of force**
 - *Balance protection of joint forces and population with interdicting causes of sectarian violence*
- ❑ **Enabling effective governance to promote stability**
- ❑ **Providing military support to provincial/national elections**
 - *Set the condition for transition*
- ❑ **Enabling effective reconciliation efforts to positively shape the HN political environment**



Joint & Operational SSTRO Response

☐ Joint Doctrine

- JP 3-0 (Operations), JP 3-57 (Civ/Mil Operations), JP 3-08 (Interagency Coordination), JP 3-13 (Information Operations), and JP 3-61 (Public Affairs)
- US Army is working on a Counterinsurgency (COIN) Joint Pub

☐ Joint Concepts

- Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, under revision
- Military Support to SSTR Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC) 2.0, Dec 06
- Irregular Warfare JOC 1.0, Sep 07
- Cooperative Security JOC, awaiting signature
- Strategic Communications Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), awaiting signature

☐ COCOM & JTF Operations

- SSTRO focus in training of MNC-I, ISAF, CJTF-HOA
- Expanding support to State Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS)
- Support to increased number of POLADs and PRT manning and training
- Increased interagency involvement in military planning and security cooperation
- USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM efforts on moving toward an interagency entity



SSTRO and Joint Solutions

- ❑ Joint forces are designed, organized, equipped, and trained to execute one or more of four broad types of military activities in varying combination:
 - ❑ Combat to defeat armed and organized enemies – regular, irregular, or both
 - ❑ Security to protect and control populations – goal is to reduce violence to a level manageable by local law enforcement authorities
 - ❑ Relief and reconstruction to assist in the restoration of civil services in the wake of combat operations, a breakdown of civil order, or a natural disaster
 - ❑ Engagement to improve the capabilities of, or cooperation with, others to enhance stability, prevent crises, and enable other operations
- ❑ Any mission that the joint force is assigned will consist of some combination of these activities



“Military Support to SSTRO” Joint Operating Concept

Military Problem: Provide effective assistance to a government (or one in its formative stage) under serious stress, which is often caught in a deteriorating cycle due to a natural or man-made disaster and usually involves the following factors:

- Absence of key government functions
- Poor economic performance
- Ethnic/religious tensions
- Widespread lawlessness
- Pronounced economic disparities

Solution Central Idea: Combine the efforts of the Joint Force, the interagency, and multinational partners to provide direct assistance to a seriously stressed host-nation in order to stabilize the situation and then help build self-sufficient host-nation capacity across the following major mission areas:

- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services
- Establish representative and effective governance, and the rule of law
- Deliver humanitarian assistance
- Support economic development
- Conduct strategic communication

Supporting Ideas:

- Achieve unified action
- Conduct contingency planning & preparation
- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment
- Build host nation capability and capacity and reduce the drivers of instability and conflict
- Conduct Strategic Communication

Functional and Operational Capabilities

Risks and Their Mitigation



SSTRO Functional & Operational Capabilities – SSTRO JOC

Examples

☐ **Creating a Safe, Secure Environment**

- *Conduct measured offensive and defensive ops against the leaders and military forces of hostile groups*
- *With coalition partners and HN police, train, equip, and advise large number of foreign forces in full range of SSTRO related skills*

☐ **Building U.S. Government Institutional Agility**

- *U.S. Government institutions must be able to distribute funds, goods, and services rapidly and efficiently to successfully conduct SSTRO*
- *Cdr access and use of flexible and adaptive contingency funds*
- *Cdr's ability to rapidly use reliable, expert foreign and domestic contractor support*

☐ **Reconstructing Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services**

- *Ability to protect or repair/construct key infrastructure, i.e., roads, bridges, airfields, hospitals, schools, power plants, electrical grids, telecommunications, sewage, et.al*

☐ **Delivering Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief**

☐ **Enabling Command, Control and Coordination**

☐ **Supporting Economic Development**


☐ **Providing Battle space Awareness/Understanding**

☐ **Establishing Representative/Effective Government and Rule of Law**

☐ **Conducting Strategic Communications**




Merging Functional and Operational Capabilities





Merging Functional and Operational Capabilities





USJFCOM Response to SSTRO Challenges

☐ **Concept Development**

- *Capstone Concept for Joint Operation (Revision)*
- *Military Support to SSTR Operations*
- *Irregular Warfare*
- *Military Support to Cooperative Security*

☐ **Experimentation**

- *Unified Action, Multinational Experiment-5*

☐ **Capability Development**

- *SSTR JTF- HQ Template*
- *IW Center*

☐ **Training**

- *MRXs, COCOM Exercise Support, PRT Training, Distributed Learning (JKO)*

☐ **Force Provider**

- *Key capabilities, (e.g. Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Engineers, Military Intelligence)*

☐ **Lessons learned**

- *JCOA Studies*

☐ **Enablers**

- *SJFHQ/JECC (e.g. TF Ramadi), JPASE, JCSE, and JWAC*



Summary

Improving SSTRO capabilities by enhancing...

- ☐ Interagency and DOD operational and intelligence planning
- ☐ Training, education, and personnel management with focus on key specialized skills such as Foreign Area Officers (FAO), Civil Affairs (CA), global public health, Psychological Operations, and joint public affairs
- ☐ Rapid demonstration and fielding of urgently needed DOD, USG Agency, multinational, and Service capabilities
- ☐ Expanded means to build international partner capabilities and capacity for conducting SSTRO operations
- ☐ Improve training and education for DOD, military, and civilian personnel in operations in UN/international environment
- ☐ Contingency Contract Management/Integration
- ☐ Strategic Communications
- ☐ Building Partnership Capacity

The military's ability to conduct stability operations required a cultural change with a focus on new habits of thought and action rather than new technology and weapons systems

Actions Underway →



UNCLASSIFIED



CJTF-Horn of Africa (HOA)

CJTF-HOA MISSION STATEMENT

CJTF-HOA Conducts Unified Action in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Horn of Africa to **Prevent Conflict**, **Promote Regional Stability**, and **Protect Coalition Interests in Order to Prevail Against Extremism**

- Foster regional cooperation
- Build capacity
 - Border security
 - Coastal/Maritime security
 - Counter-terrorism
- Erode support for extremism:
 - Focused humanitarian and civil assistance
 - Isolate virtually and physically
- Unified Action Through Unity of Effort
 - Coalition Participation
 - Interagency, NGO and CJTF-HOA Partnership
- Partner Nation Engagement



Desired End State

- Terrorist Networks Destroyed/Isolated
- Border/Coastal Security Capacity Established
- Regional Nations Able To Prevent Terrorism Resurgence
- *Africa solving Africa's problems*



TF Ramadi - SJFHQ, USJFCOM

A Joint SSTR Operation in Action!





Back-Ups



Strategic Level SSTRO Response

- ❑ **DoD Directive 3000.05: *"Military Support for stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," 28 Nov 05.***
 - ❑ CDRUSJFCOM through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will;
 - ❑ Explore new stability ops concepts and capabilities as part of the joint concept development and experimentation program, in coordination with USD(P) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - ❑ Develop organizational and operational concepts for the military-civilian teams described in paragraph 4.5 including their composition, manning, and sourcing, in coordination w/relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector
 - ❑ Establish, design, and conduct experiments to identify innovative ideas for stability ops, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the USD(P), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - ❑ Support Combatant Commanders stability ops training and ensure forces assigned to USJFCOM are trained for stability ops
 - ❑ Gather and disseminate lessons-learned from stability ops
 - ❑ Participate in the Defense Science and Technology planning process to ensure stability ops requirements are supported by Defense Technology Objectives and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTDs). Recommend sponsors for ACTDs as appropriate
 - ❑ Participate in the Defense Operational Test and Evaluation planning process to ensure stability ops are supported by Joint Test and Evaluations (JT&Es) programs. Recommend sponsors for JT&Es as appropriate
 - ❑ Develop Joint Public Affairs capabilities for stability ops
 - ❑ Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals of subparagraph 5.10.1, in coordination with the USD(P)




SSTRO Risks and Their Mitigation

(from SSTRO JOC)

- ❑ **Risk:** USG Interagency community will not develop sufficient amounts/kinds of deployable civilian capabilities needed to conduct SSTRO. (high risk)
 - ❑ **Mitigation:** work w/NSC, U.S. Departments, Agencies, and Congress to gain the support to build SSTRO-related civilian capabilities.
- ❑ **Risk:** DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTRO operations (high risk)
 - ❑ **Mitigation:** Develop/experiment niche and surge capabilities within total force, longer tours to maintain force structure. (medium risk).
- ❑ **Risk:** The American public and its elected representatives will not allow the United States to get involved in a major SSTRO operation, or should such involvement be permitted, will prove unwilling to sustain their support for the conduct of a lengthy, costly SSTRO campaign. (high risk).
 - ❑ **Mitigation:** focuses on having DOD and its IA partners develop the rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities that will be needed to rapidly initiate effective operations within and across the major mission elements (MMEs) of a major SSTRO operation - - e.g. strategic communication strategies and means that complement other SSTRO operations. SSTRO strategic communication strategies must include a strong focus on keeping the American public accurately informed prior to and during the course of the SSTRO operation.
- ❑ **Risk:** Multiple external actors, including the U.S. military and interagency elements, will prove unable to integrate their efforts across the SSTRO operation's multidimensional mission elements with those of the existing or new host nation government during a high end SSTRO operation and thus the operation will not succeed in creating the new domestic order or a viable peace. (low risk)
 - ❑ **Mitigation:** give priority to developing and exercising integration mechanisms for the planning and conduct of SSTRO operations.

Department of State (Sep 07)

Interagency Management System for R&S Planning, Policy, and Operations






Emerging Contexts of Future Conflicts and War

- ☐ Cooperation and conflict among conventional state powers will remain a primary driver.
- ☐ Increasing cooperation and conflict with and among non-conventional, non-state powers will increase as a driver.
- ☐ Some adversaries will use both conventional and non-conventional power as it advances their aims (e.g. Iran, N. Korea – both a “state” and a “network”). Non-conventional activity will be difficult to attribute.
- ☐ There will be more WMD / nuclear-armed states.
- ☐ Persistent media presence, coupled with instant global distribution, will bring the general populations more directly in touch with joint force operations.
- ☐ Technology proliferation (distinct from WMD) among conventional powers and non-conventional powers will increase their “reach” into the sea, air, and space.
- ☐ There will be more large, sprawling cities at home, near home, and abroad, in which the joint force will operate.

These contexts will increasingly intersect and overlap contributing to added complexity in Joint Operations and specifically Security, Stability, Transition & Reconstruction Operations




Civil Affairs: Key Joint Force Enabler for SSTRO



Army White Paper
Stability Operations in
An Era of Persistent
Conflict (DRAFT /
Predecisional)

Traditional CA Missions



NOTE: CA capabilities are attached to supported commanders IAW force generation cycle.


Doctrinal CA Capabilities Alignment
FM 3-05.40 (Sep 06)
GTA 41-01-001 (Jan 08)



Overall CA Sourcing for GWOT

Capability versus Capacity

GPF Civil Affairs (USAR)	SOF Civil Affairs (AC)	USARC (USAR other than CA)	IRR	USN	USAF	Unfilled
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Key Points:

- Force levels required at start of OIF were not sustainable
- Surge sourcing (addition to 07-09) employed SOF CA “bridge” mission
- FY08 mission requirements increase (global Requirements and PRTs)
- Impact: Current dwell ratio for GPF CA is approximately 1:2, for SOF CA 1:0.8



CA Way Ahead

- ☐ Draft POM FY 10 recommendation to OSD - - accelerate CA MOTE Conversion (JFP issues).
- ☐ Draft POM FY 10 recommendation to OSD - - accelerate CA growth (e.g. USACAPOC by 904 spaces - - FY 2010-2012).
- ☐ Implications/Findings as per SECDEF (IW) Action Memo 2.3.4, dated 7 May 08, asking CDRUSSOCOM and CDRUSJFCOM to look at AC/RC re-balance.
- ☐ Implications as per final draft DOD 2000.13, Civil Affairs, currently in staffing (CA Proponency impact).
- ☐ Implications/Findings as per 5 Jun 08 Senior Readiness Oversight Council Meetings SROC (subject: Civil Affairs/ILO Policies).
- ☐ SECDEF decision as per CDRUSSOCOM Memo, dated 25 Apr 08, asking for DOD/Joint Proponency w/requisite authorities over Services.
- ☐ Implications/Findings as per HASC "Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan" Report, dated Apr 08.



Joint Forces Command Mission

The United States Joint Forces Command provides mission-ready Joint Capable forces and supports the development and integration of Military, Government, and Multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the Joint Force.





Commander's Guidance

- ☐ Jointness is not a natural state – deserves our best effort
- ☐ Our enemy means every word it says
- ☐ We will fight future wars with partners
- ☐ Our military must improve capability in the irregular fight
- ☐ Maintain our conventional dominance

Reshape our forces to fight a new way of war




The Military Problem – Finding Balance Reducing Future Risk to Meet the Evolving Threat


Where we were




Where we are operating today



Where do we want to be tomorrow?



OR




What are the discriminators?
What are the game changers?



The Challenge

- ❑ Build the right numbers
- ❑ Provide the right equipment
- ❑ Provide the right guidance
- ❑ Be able to operate together with Partners
 - ❑ US and Multi-national
 - ❑ Military and Civilian



Interagency Coordination: Progress, Resourcing, Challenges, and Priorities



**Joe McMenamin, Stability Operations Capabilities
September 2008**

The overall classification of this briefing is: **UNCLASSIFIED**



DoD's Role – A Balancing Act

POLICY

- ☐ DoD support is critical to the success of the Interagency process and the improvement of civilian capabilities and whole-of-government response
 - DoD influence and resources (expertise, lessons learned, facilities, public efforts) to assist in the development of civilian capacity and capabilities.
- ☐ DoD capabilities must be able to integrate with civilian capabilities if and when they develop in order to realize a collaborative and effective civil-military response



But, DoD must also manage expectations and be prepared should sufficient civilian capacity not materialize.



DoD Priorities

- ☐ **Optimize balance between stability operations and combat operations capabilities within DoD.**
- ☐ **Be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.**
- ☐ **Improve integration of civilian and military stability operations efforts within DoD and in conjunction with other USG agencies, allies, and private sector partners.**

USG Unity of Effort across the government is critical for successful stability operations.



POLICY

DoD Objectives for NSPD-44

- ❑ **Ensure integration of NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05**
 - Support operationalization and further development of the Interagency Management System
- ❑ **Support increased civilian deployable capacity**
 - Support to the Civilian Stabilization Initiative
 - USG integrated training strategy (including DoD participation and support)
 - Develop a Generic MOU for DoD's role in providing security for civilian deployments and templates for future engagements
- ❑ **Support whole-of-government planning**
 - Comprehensive USG strategic- and operational-level planning framework (including role of DoD and integration of DoD planning processes)





Major Mission Elements

Capability and Capacity

US Army Stability Tasks FM 3-0	USG Sectors DOS Essential Task Matrix
Civil Security	Security
Support to Governance	Governance and Participation
Provision of Essential Services	Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being
Support Economic Infrastructure Development	Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure
Civil Control	Justice and Reconciliation


Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.



POLICY

Coordination and Planning

- ❑ **Integrate a number of on-going DoD initiatives with related interagency activities:**
 - Whole-of-government planning (processes & test cases)
 - Civil-military coordination models and teams
 - Essential Task Matrix Capabilities Review
 - Modeling & simulation for stability operations
 - Social-Cultural/Science Initiatives
 - Lessons learned / best practices processes and products for stability operations
 - Integrated USG training for stability operations
 - Civilian participation in military exercises
 - Information sharing




Build a cadre of civilian experts in planning and the operational art



POLICY

Challenges

- ❑ Balancing Force Development (Traditional, IW, SOF, GPF)
- ❑ Developing Civilian Planners (Designation, Training And Education)
- ❑ Developing Civ-Mil Team Models That Can Be Deployed In Future Contingencies
- ❑ Improving Information Sharing
- ❑ Leveraging the Private Sector
- ❑ Prediction
- ❑ Prevention
- ❑ Smaller-scale Engagements
- ❑ Multi-country Engagements
- ❑ Larger USG Issues
 - National Security Reform
 - Foreign Assistance Reform
 - National Security Professional





Final Thoughts

POLICY

- ❑ Don't think of what is needed in terms of civilian or military
 - It is capabilities to do something.
 - It is capacity to respond and sustain.
 - It is compatibility between the interagency, allies and partners.
- ❑ The lines are blurred



Capability

TRAINING
EQUIPPING
EXERCISING
ADVISING

Capacity

LOGISTIC &
MATERIEL
SUPPORT
TECHNICAL
SUPPORT
UNITS/
PERSONNEL

Compatibility

INTER-
OPERABILITY
COMMON
LEARNING
INFORMATION &
INTEL SHARING



U.S. Africa Command Mission Statement

United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.





AFRICOM Theater Security Cooperation

- AFRICOM Status/Mission Transfers from other COCOMs
- Mission/Focus
- Planning Guidance
- Campaign Plan Development
- Work with Willing African Partners (Regional/Country)
- Inter-Agency Approach/Chief of Mission Authority
- Tools (IMET/FMF/CTFP/Mil-Mil/ACOTA/HA/DHAPP/Plus)
- Expand Presence: Additional Offices of Security Cooperation
- Comments/Questions




AFRICOM: Shaping Sustainable Stability

- Steady State/Non-Crisis:
TSC/Engagement
- Post Conflict: Security Sector Reform
 - Inter-Agency
 - Bi-lateral & International Organization
- Partners
 - Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Southern Sudan



Planning & Synchronization





Theater Security Cooperation Activities- FY08



**Humanitarian
Assistance
280 events**



**Defense and
Military Contacts
463 events**



**Combined
Exercises
24 events**



**Combined
Training
100 events**



**Combined
Education
108 events**



**Information
Sharing
58 events**



**Counter narcotics
Assistance
82 events**



**Combined
Experimentation
5 events**



**Security
Assistance
FMS, FMF, IMET**



**Other Programs
(CTFP)
105 events**



**Def Support to
Public Diplomacy
2 events**



**Int'l Armaments
Cooperation
0 events**



**Infrastructure
Support Projects
0 events**

**Counter Non-
Proliferation
26 events**

**FMS: Foreign Military Sales
FMF: Foreign Military Finance
IMET: Intl Military Education and Training
CTFP: Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program**

**Support Tools to
to achieve
Strategic Objectives**



**International
Agreements
35 events**



**National Guard
State Partnership
161 Events**



Building Partners



US Southern Command Headquarters

Liaison Officers



Argentina



Canada



Chile



Colombia



Ecuador



Peru



Uruguay



Army



Marine Corps



Navy



Air Force



Coast Guard



Homeland
Security



State
Department



Department of
Defense



Justice



USAID



Treasury



Intelligence Agencies

Partner Academic Institutions



Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security
Cooperation



Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies



Inter-American
Defense College



Inter-American
Air Force Academy



Naval Small Craft
Instruction & Technical
Training School



School of International
Graduate Studies



Numerous other leading
academic institutions

Interagency, multinational, inter-institutional partnerships

UNCLASSIFIED



Regional Response Capacity

WebEOC

Disaster Preparedness

Disaster Response



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

OFDA-LAC / MDROs



Regional Security System (RSS)



State Partnership Program (SPP)





Human Rights Initiative

Mission

- Prevent and sanction violations of HR and IHL by members of military and security forces, and create zero tolerance for any violations they may commit

Process

- Bring representatives of military, security forces, civilian government and NGOs together to work systematically toward a common goal in human rights—a nation's *Strategic Plan* for Human Rights

Status (January 2008)



In-Country Visits Completed; MoC Pending



Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) Signed;
Implementation Conference Pending

- URY and the CFAC



Implementing HRI (8 countries)

- BOL, COL, CRI, DOM, GTM, HND, PRY, SLV



Focus FY08+





Strategic Risk Management and Trade Resumption Planning



Joseph G. Wood, Jr. CHMM, P.E.
Deputy Director, Security and Protective Services Group

September 3, 2008



Tetra Tech Inc.

- Tetra Tech is a leading international engineering and technical services consulting firm.
 - #8 Top 500 Design Firms
 - #7 Top 200 Environmental Firms
 - #8 General Building
 - #3 Telecommunications
 - #6 Manufacturing
 - #1 Water
 - #6 Hazardous Waste
- Tetra Tech has nearly 8,500 professionals in approximately 275 offices worldwide.



Integrated Port Services

- Risk Assessment, Mitigation, and Management
- Development of Port-wide Risk Management Strategies
- Resource Analysis For Risk Management Strategies
- Concept/Continuity of Operations
- Trade Resumption and Resiliency Planning
- Security Systems Design
- Cost and Value Engineering



Security is key

- **Security** – The ability to:
 - Detect (and assess);
 - Delay; and
 - Respond to malevolent acts.

Security is key to the development and sustainability in the port commerce environment.

Strategic Risk Management Planning (SRMP) Goals



The primary goals of the SRMP process are to:

- Develop a comprehensive strategic risk management plan for an area
 - Utilize and build upon the conclusions and recommendations from previous assessments if available
- Develop a long term investment plan to reduce risks associated with vulnerabilities to the port community



What does a SRMP do?

- Systematically prioritizes facilities, functions, interdependencies, and resources;
- Emphasizes port-wide and region-wide partnering opportunities to optimize regional risk management; and
- Establishes a forward-looking risk management strategy to increase security, survivability, and interoperability by decreasing vulnerabilities port- or region-wide.

The SRMP Process

- Evaluate Previously Completed Risk Assessments
 - Scope and Methodologies
 - Threats
 - Vulnerabilities
 - Consequences
- Develop Data Gap Analysis Summary
- On-site Validation
- Establish Current Qualitative Risk Baseline



The SRMP Process, cont.

- Define target (end-state) risk goals
- Identify end-state risk reduction measures to “fill in the gaps” and achieve goals
- Determine future port- or region-wide risk

The International Risk

■ Critical Issues

- Piracy
- Emerging Threats (e.g., extremist groups, etc.)
- Internal Response Force Integrity
- International Task Force Response
- The Security / Development Nexus



Trade Resumption and Resiliency (TRR) Goals

- Develop mitigation strategies for rapid restoration of critical facilities
 - Includes elements of preparedness, survivability, and resiliency.
- Develop simplified cost-benefit model to identify and prioritize projects



TRR Methodology

- Conduct Regional-scale Economic Modeling
- Identify and Analyze Port-wide Systems
- Assess Recovery and Response Capabilities
- Identify and Prioritize Mitigation Gaps
- Perform Cost-benefit Analysis of Mitigations
- Develop Business Continuity and Trade Resumption Plan



Awareness, Prevent, And Protect Mission Area Gap Analysis

- Maritime Domain Awareness
 - Multi-agency Information Centers
 - Interoperable Communications
 - Intelligent Radar
 - Private Sector Information Sharing
 - Security Awareness Training



Awareness, Prevent, And Protect Mission Area Gap Analysis

■ Prevention

- Electronic Systems to Monitor the Waterway
- National Police and Coast Guard Operations on the Waterway
- Coordinated International Task Force Operations
- Private Sector Security Management



Awareness, Prevent, And Protect Mission Area Gap Analysis

■ Protection

- CCTV Surveillance, Intrusion Detection, and Access Control for Critical Infrastructure (e.g., bridges, pipelines, etc.)
- Facility Access Control for Dock Workers
- Enhanced Security For Vessels In Coastal Areas

Response and Recovery Mission Area Gap Analysis



- Emergency Response Gaps
 - Interoperable Communications
 - Information Sharing
 - Lack of Planning, Equipping, Training, and Exercising (PETE), Special Teams in Police, Fire, Hazmat, EMS and Public Health
 - Inadequate Marine Fire Resources and Training to National Standards
 - Limited Marine Patrols / Presence

Response and Recovery Mission Area Gap Analysis



- Recovery
 - Short-and Long-term Recovery Plan
 - Private Sector Resource Usage Strategy
- Trade Resumption and Resiliency Gap Analysis
 - Integrated Logistics and Transportation Concept of Operations



Trade Resumption and Resiliency Gap Analysis

- The most critical support systems and elements for trade resumption and resiliency are typically:
 - Availability of a Skilled Workforce;
 - Electricity;
 - Transportation (i.e., rail, road, as well as maritime); and
 - Communication.

Resumption Prioritization

- Based on economic impacts, system interdependencies, and sector resiliencies
 - Industry Prioritization
 - Vessel Prioritization



Implementation of the SRMP mitigations will:

- Help promote a safe and secure (i.e., risk-based) operational environment;
- Promote the economic viability of ports, terminals, intermodal centers, and carriers; and
- Implement a dynamic trade resumption and resiliency plan.



TETRA TECH



U.S. Africa Command Mission Statement

United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.





AFRICOM: Shaping Sustainable Stability

- Steady State/Non-Crisis:
TSC/Engagement
- Post Conflict: Security Sector Reform
 - Inter-Agency
 - Bi-lateral & International Organization Partners
 - Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Southern Sudan



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AFRICOM Theater Security Cooperation

- AFRICOM Status/Mission Transfers from other COCOMs
- Mission/Focus
- Planning Guidance
- Campaign Plan Development
- Work with Willing African Partners (Regional/Country)
- Inter-Agency Approach/Chief of Mission Authority
- Tools (IMET/FMF/CTFP/Mil-Mil/ACOTA/HA/DHAPP/Plus)
- Expand Presence: Additional Offices of Security Cooperation
- Comments/Questions