

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.				
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-04-2016		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 20-07-2015 to 04-04-2016
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Silk or Spandex? China's Problematic 'One Road, One Belt' Plan to Expand its Economic Boundaries as seen through the lens of American, British, and Japanese Experience.		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
		5b. GRANT NUMBER		
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Jay W. Haley Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army		5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
		5e. TASK NUMBER		
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Forces Staff College-NDU Joint Advanced Warfighting School 7800 Hampton Blvd. Norfolk, VA 23511-1702		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Information as of 04 April 2016.				
14. ABSTRACT In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled a plan for Chinese economic expansion known as the <i>One Road One Belt</i> plan. This "modern day silk road" would connect the PRC via seaport to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China's coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. This thesis assesses the Chinese One Road One Belt economic plan through the historic imperial experiences of Great Britain in the nineteenth-century, Japan in the mid-twentieth century, and the United States in the latter half of the twentieth-century. The mixed methods approach—using historical sources and quantitative data sets—increases the likelihood of accuracy. Similar to the way Alfred Thayer Mahan used conditions to assess the sea power of nations, this analysis will apply three general conditions, further broken down into eight specific categories, to assess the likelihood of Chinese success. The categories include external security and the need for natural resources, which comprise the motives for expansion condition; period of industrialization, level of nationalism, and foreign policy outlook make up the form of empire condition; and internal stability, culture clash, and social inequality, make up the sustainment of empire condition. While each of these conditions and categories alone do not necessarily provide clear insight into the likely success or failure of an expansionist nation, the synthesis of the eight reveals patterns and relationships that explain why a nation's expansion fails. The results show that China is on a trajectory similar to that of Japan, which suggests an eventual collapse of their imperial ambitions and strategic openings for the United States diplomatically and economically.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS China, One Road One Belt plan, Empire, Great Britain, Japan, United States				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED UNLIMITED	109
				19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
				19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 757-443-6252

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



Silk or Spandex?: China's Problematic 'One Road, One Belt' Plan to Expand its Economic Boundaries as seen through the lens of American, British, and Japanese Experience.

by

Jay W. Haley

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

Not for commercial use without the express written permission of the author.

Intentionally left blank

**Silk or Spandex?: China's Problematic 'One Road, One Belt' Plan to
Expand its Economic Boundaries as seen through the lens of American,
British, and Japanese Experience.**

by Jay W. Haley

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: _____

Date **5 APR 16**

Thesis Advisor:

Signature: _____

**Professor David C. Rodearmel
Thesis Advisor**

Approved by:

Signature: _____

**William Sorrells, COL, USA
Committee Member**

Signature: _____

**Peter Yeager, Col, USMC
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School**

Intentionally left blank

Abstract

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled a plan for Chinese economic expansion known as the *One Road One Belt* plan. This “modern day silk road” would connect the PRC via seaport to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. This thesis assesses the Chinese One Road One Belt economic plan through the historic imperial experiences of Great Britain in the nineteenth-century, Japan in the mid-twentieth century, and the United States in the latter half of the twentieth-century. The mixed methods approach—using historical sources and quantitative data sets—increases the likelihood of accuracy. Similar to the way Alfred Thayer Mahan used conditions to assess the sea power of nations, this analysis will apply three general conditions, further broken down into eight specific categories, to assess the likelihood of Chinese success. The categories include external security and the need for natural resources, which comprise the motives for expansion condition; period of industrialization, level of nationalism, and foreign policy outlook make up the form of empire condition; and internal stability, culture clash, and social inequality, make up the sustainment of empire condition. While each of these conditions and categories alone do not necessarily provide clear insight into the likely success or failure of an expansionist nation, the synthesis of the eight reveals patterns and relationships that explain why a nation’s expansion fails. The results show that China is on a trajectory similar to that of Japan, which suggests an eventual collapse of their imperial ambitions and strategic openings for the United States diplomatically and economically. Additionally, at the operational level opportunities may exist for

United States Pacific Command to strengthen, reinforce, or reestablish its partnerships, presence, and unity of effort in the Asia-Pacific Theater.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my faculty advisors Dr. Bryon Greenwald, Professor David C. Rodearmel, and COL William Sorrells for their guidance and advice through this process. My former Transition Team Chief, LTC Jerome Sibayan, Ph.D., provided valuable insight into the relationships between the conditions and categories. Dr. Phil Saunders of the National Defense University provided the objective view needed to truly make the interdependency of the multiple categories actually make sense. Finally, I would like to especially thank Mr. Jeffrey Turner for his assistance as this thesis would not have been possible without it.

Intentionally left blank

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION: LOOKING WESTWARD	1
CHAPTER 1: THE TUG OF WAR – A METHODOLOGY	5
<i>Motives for Expansion (External Security; Need for Natural Resources)</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>External Security</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>The Need for Natural Resources</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Form of Empire (Period of Industrialization; Level of Nationalism; Foreign Policy Outlook)</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Period of Industrialization</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Level of Nationalism</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>Foreign Policy Outlook</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Sustainment of Empire (Internal Stability; Culture Clash; Social Inequality)</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Internal Stability</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Culture Clash</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Social Inequality</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Limitations / Scope</i>	<i>17</i>
CHAPTER 2: THREE’S A CROWD	19
<i>Motives for Expansion (External Security; Need for Natural Resources)</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>External Security</i>	<i>21</i>
Great Britain	21
Japan	22
United States	23
Summary	24
<i>Need for Natural Resources</i>	<i>25</i>
Great Britain	25
Japan	25
United States	26
Summary	26
<i>Form of Empire (Period of Industrialization; Level of Nationalism; Foreign Policy Outlook)</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Period of Industrialization</i>	<i>27</i>
Great Britain	27
Japan	28
United States	28
Summary	29
<i>Level of Nationalism</i>	<i>29</i>
Great Britain	29
Japan	30
United States	31
Summary	32
<i>Foreign Policy Outlook</i>	<i>32</i>
Great Britain	32
Japan	33
United States	34
Summary	35
<i>Sustainment of Empire (Internal Stability; Culture Clash; Social Inequality)</i>	<i>35</i>
<i>Internal Stability</i>	<i>35</i>
Great Britain	35
Japan	36
United States	36
Summary	36
<i>Culture Clash</i>	<i>37</i>
Great Britain	37
Japan	38
United States	39
Summary	40
<i>Social Inequality</i>	<i>41</i>
Great Britain	41
Japan	41
United States	42
Summary	42

Conclusion	43
CHAPTER 3: A NEW BELT OR PUNCHING EYELETS IN AN OLD ONE?	45
<i>Motives for Expansion (External Security; Need for Natural Resources)</i>	45
<i>External Security</i>	45
<i>Need for Natural Resources</i>	46
<i>Form of Empire (Period of Industrialization; Level of Nationalism; Foreign Policy Outlook)</i>	48
<i>Period of Industrialization</i>	48
<i>Level of Nationalism</i>	48
<i>Foreign Policy Outlook</i>	50
<i>Sustainment of Empire (Internal Stability; Culture Clash; Social Inequality)</i>	52
<i>Internal Stability</i>	52
<i>Culture Clash</i>	53
<i>Social Inequality</i>	56
Conclusion	59
CHAPTER 4: ROUGH SEAS AHEAD, PLEASE TIGHTEN YOUR SEAT BELTS	
.....	63
APPENDIX 1: A NOTE ON QUANTITATIVE DATA.....	71
APPENDIX 2: RESPECTIVE VALUES FOR GREAT BRITAIN.....	77
APPENDIX 3: RESPECTIVE VALUES FOR JAPAN	79
APPENDIX 4: RESPECTIVE VALUES FOR THE UNITED STATES.....	81
APPENDIX 5: RESPECTIVE VALUES FOR CHINA	83
BIBLIOGRAPHY	85
VITA.....	97

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. The One Road One Belt	2
Table 2.1: Cultural Comparison of Great Britain with Previous Colonies	38
Table 2.2: Cultural Comparison of Japan with Occupied Nations in WWII	39
Table 2.3: Cultural Comparison of Nations with a Lasting U.S. Military Presence	40
Table 2.4: Case Study Results.....	43
Table 3.1: Cultural Comparison of China with Nations on the One Road One Belt	54
Table 3.2: China Analysis Results	60
Table 4.1: Complete Results.....	63

Intentionally left blank

Introduction: Looking Westward

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled an aggressive plan for Chinese economic expansion to the west, known as the *One Road, One Belt* plan, a portion of the larger “Chinese Dream”, which according to Xi stands for peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit for all.¹ This maritime “modern day silk road” would connect the PRC via seaport to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.² The partner overland route will consist of rail lines, and energy connections spanning Central Asia, Iran, Turkey and, Russia.³ China intends the new sea route to meet its traditional overland silk sibling in Venice.

The One Road, One Belt plan ties directly to Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream, but is also a key component of Chinese rejuvenation.⁴ The success of this plan is important to the Chinese because the original Silk Road, of the third to fifteenth centuries, reflects a time when China was the dominant trade power in the region, and the Silk Road was a network of commercial land and sea routes that connected China to the Mediterranean Sea.⁵ Therefore, success of the One Road One Belt equals a return to Chinese dominance, and establishment of a bipolar world with the United States.⁶ While largely an economic

¹ R.S. Kalha, “An Assessment of the Chinese Dream: 2015,” *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 3 (May, 2015): 274.

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367 (accessed December 20, 2015).

³ Theresa Fallon, “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,” *American Foreign Policy Interests* 37, no. 03 (May/June 2015): 142.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

⁵ *Ibid.*; Agence France-Presse, “First ‘Silk Road’ train arrives in Tehran from China,” Yahoo News Website, entry posted February 15, 2016, <http://news.yahoo.com/first-silk-road-train-arrives-tehran-china-134703954.html> (accessed on February 15, 2016).

⁶ Munich Security Conference, “China: Doubling Down?” In *Munich Security Report 2016: Boundless Crises, Reckless Spoilers, Helpless Guardians* (Munich: 2016), 10.

endeavor, the One Road One Belt greatly resembles the imperial expansion of other countries throughout history. While the details of this plan still remain somewhat murky it appears that this economic or imperial expansion is in direct competition to the perceived military expansion of the United State in Asia.⁷



Figure 1. The One Road One Belt⁸

The construction and maintenance of this “imperial plan” will require the PRC to extend itself further than it has in recent history. In comparison to the expansion of the British and Japanese Empires as well as the United States, this plan is likely to be fraught with problems. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is deliberately constructing the One Road One Belt to shape their economic future.⁹ However, as the PRC expands this

⁷ Alexandra Viers, “Evaluating China’s New Silk Road,” The Cipher Brief, entry posted January 25, 2016, <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/evaluating-chinas-new-silk-road> (accessed on January 30, 2016).

⁸ Xuming Qian, “The ‘One Road One Belt’ Strategy and China’s Energy Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East Institute, entry posted May 20, 2015, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/%E2%80%99Cone-belt-one-road%E2%80%9D-strategy-and-china%E2%80%99s-energy-policy-middle-east> (accessed on November 10, 2015).

⁹ Emma Scott, “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Strategy Meets the UAE’s Look East Policy,” *China Brief* 15, no. 11 (May 29, 2015): 12.

“modern day silk road” it will have to secure its interests at greater and greater distances from mainland China, a task for which it has little previous experience. The mismatch between the PRC’s stated strategic aims and the low probability of its success creates friction points in its approach to the region. These friction points may offer the United States an opportunity to reassert its influence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas.

Using a combined hermeneutic and quantitative method, this study distills several historical case studies to derive specific characteristics, criteria, categories, and context for application to a contemporary problem set. Much in the same way that Alfred Thayer Mahan used conditions to assess ability of nations to exercise sea power effectively, this analysis will apply three general conditions further divided into eight specific categories to assess China’s likelihood of success.¹⁰ The categories include security and internal stability, which comprise the security condition; the need for natural resources and period of industrialization, which make up the economic condition; and culture clash, level of nationalism, social inequality, and foreign policy outlook, which make up the culture condition. Consideration of the conditions and categories to each other creates an emergence of a “tug of war” of influences.

By first applying these conditions and categories to the imperial expansion of a “crowd of three” empires, Britain in the nineteenth-century, Japan in the mid twentieth-century, and the United States in the latter part of the twentieth-century, this study develops a historic baseline with which to assess the PRC’s One Road One Belt plan.

¹⁰ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783* (1987 repr., New York: Dover Publications, 1890), 28-81. While the conditions and categories applied in this analysis are not the same as Mahan’s, he did attempt to apply a hermeneutic method to assess how and why states were great sea powers. In the same way, this method attempts to assess the likelihood of success for an imperial plan.

Specifically, application of the method to two of the One Road One Belt plan's locations (Sri Lanka and Kenya), like eyelets on a belt, shows that while the PRC is set to make short-term gains; Chinese aggressiveness, both in terms of application of national power, but also their cultural approach to others, makes long-term success highly unlikely. The failure of the PRC's strategy, like a boat tossing in rough seas, will create an opportunity for the United States to reassert its influence in the region, and the U.S. should prepare the political and diplomatic ground for this eventual and inevitable reality.

Chapter 1: The Tug Of War – A Methodology

This comparison of China's One Road, One Belt plan with the characteristics of other great powers' rise and fall will use quantitative data and qualitative historical context to develop a theory to show why some nations can successfully expand and others fail. This mixed methods approach to analyzing a Chinese economic plan provides greater reliability and authenticity to the analysis because the variety of the methods applied increases the likelihood of accuracy. The categories for the subsequent analysis include: external security, internal stability, the need for natural resources, period of industrialization, culture clash, level of nationalism, social inequality, and foreign policy outlook.¹ These categories are further grouped into general thematic conditions: Motives for Expansion (external security, need for natural resources); Form of Empire (period of industrialization, level of nationalism, foreign policy outlook); and Sustainment of Empire (internal stability, culture clash, social inequality).² These conditions and categories frame the topic quantitatively and represent forces influencing the likelihood of success either directly or indirectly. While each of these categories alone does not necessarily provide clear insight into the success or failure of an expansionist nation, the synthesis of the eight reveals patterns—a “tug of war” of influences—that explain why a nation expands towards empire and why it succeeds or fails. This chapter will outline the

¹ A literature review of Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*; Jack Snyder's *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*; Timothy Parson's *Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall*; A.P. Thornton's *Imperialism in the Twentieth Century*; Raymond Betts' *Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth Century*; and *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements* edited by Gyan Prakash revealed trends that historians generally agree on. These trends informed the categories used throughout this analysis.

² For an in-depth review of the indices, their components, and values please see Appendix 1: A Note on Quantitative Data.

definitions and criteria used for each of these categories. Further, application of these categories to the British, Japanese, and American case studies create a scale to interpret the analysis of the PRC's plan.

Motives for Expansion (External Security; Need for Natural Resources)

Nations expand for many reasons. While each is important in own right, this analysis focuses on two primary causes—the desire for physical and/or economic security. In a sense these causes represent the motivation British expansion during the colonial era (physical and economic), the Japanese expansion after World War I (physical and economic), the American expansion after World War II (non-territorial, ideological, and economic).³

Territory has always provided the strategic depth and therefore security, motivating many nations to expand to attain it (e.g., traditional Russian concerns with their “near abroad”).⁴ In other cases, the drive for expansion comes from the need to secure natural resources not direct territorial security. The Spanish, Dutch, British, and Japanese expansions all fit this pattern.⁵ Still other nations largely immune to territorial security concerns expand ideologically (United States) to foster a system of rules conducive to its political and economic wellbeing, occasionally even fighting to preserve

³ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), 195-196, 392.

⁴ Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” *New York Review of Books* 42, no. 13 (August 10, 1995): 27-30; Richard N. Lebow, *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 199.

⁵ Kennedy, 27-30; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 33.

that system (World War II, Korea, Vietnam, protection of Kuwait, Persian Gulf War, even Operation Iraqi Freedom).⁶

Both categories in this condition are mutually supporting and inter-related, necessitating their being placed under the same condition, because in many cases the same elements responsible for external security are those driving a need for natural resources. David Singer's data sets used in the *Correlates of War: Research Origins and Rationale* (COW) are beneficial because they depict general trends in the external security category.⁷ Its purpose here is to show trend lines that can quantitatively support the qualitative research and add to the predictive nature of the analysis on One Road One Belt, much in the same way that Kenneth Waltz sought a predictive theory despite disagreeing with the authors of the *Correlates of War*.⁸ The COW also represents power consumption and provides a quantitative basis for a nation's need for natural resources using the Primary Energy Consumption (PEC) score.

External Security

Throughout history, nations have shown many reasons for expansion or imperial ambitions.⁹ When looking at the various reasons that lead a nation to expand, national security is usually a primary factor. Each nation has a desire and need for security, but

⁶ G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14-18.

⁷ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48.

⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 17, no. 03 (Winter 1992-1993): 9. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 68. This page provides Waltz' summary on using a predictive theory to forecast how states may act in a future time.

⁹ Kennedy, xv-xxv.

more important is the degree to which a nation expands, either desiring to maintain security or increase security. Jack Snyder sets out multiple reasons for aggressive expansion in the name of security. Specifically, he states that “conquest increases power...because it increases resources, both human and materiel, that can be used in further competition against other great powers.”¹⁰ Assuming this view, in the context of security a nation will expand to increase its power, thus also increasing its security. There is a rationale that the greater the power of the nation, the more secure it becomes, in other words, the more security-related effects accumulate.¹¹

A nation’s perception of its security, as related to its expansion, defines its drive for security.¹² While the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) measures factors that indicate the power of a nation, it can help understand trend lines for a nation’s perception of its security.¹³ If a nation perceives itself as more secure proportionally to their relative power then the CINC provides a way to measure these trends.¹⁴ Using this logic, a low score indicates a feeling of insecurity and a high score indicates a perception of security. This concept will also be tested against the case studies to normalize the analysis.

The Need for Natural Resources

A country’s need for natural resources depends on its period of industrialization, as much as its period of industrialization drives the need for natural resources. As a country’s population grows, or as a nation increases its industrial base, the need to power

¹⁰ Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1991), 3.

¹¹ Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1999), 105-116.

¹² Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review* 113 (June/July, 2002): 3, 10-11.

homes, businesses, cars, and industry becomes greater and greater. Rarely are nations replete with 100% of the resources they need to sustain demand over time; therefore, a need is created to expand, enter into agreements, or colonize in order to meet national demand for natural resources. Jack Snyder contends that the requirement for natural resources becomes greater as a nation approaches self-sufficiency since this promotes the perception of security.¹⁵ Additionally, the requirement for natural resources and the subsequent expansion that can accompany it, can also have a secondary purpose to prevent competitors, or rival nations in this case, from gaining access to resources and thereby promoting security through insecurity.¹⁶

Natural Resources are defined as “materials or substances such as minerals, forests, water, and fertile land that occur in nature and can be used for economic gain.”¹⁷ This examination analyzes a nation’s requirement for natural resources, to sustain or increase their growth, on a scale of low to high using available Primary Energy Consumption (PEC) data.¹⁸ This measurement is in thousands of coal-ton equivalents and is based on the formula: $\text{Primary Energy Consumption} = ((\text{Energy Production} + \text{Energy Imports}) - \text{Energy Exports}) - \text{Change in Domestic Stocks}$.¹⁹ A high PEC score therefore indicates a nation has a large need for natural resources and correlates to a higher

¹⁵ Snyder, 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., 21.

¹⁷ Oxford English Dictionary, Online Edition, s.v. “Natural Resources.” <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/125333?redirectedFrom=Natural+Resources#eid35412885> (accessed September 16, 2015).

¹⁸ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

¹⁹ Correlates of War Project, “National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0, June 2010” Correlates of War Project Website, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/nmc-codebook> (accessed October 17, 2015). One issue with domestic stocks is the lack of historical records of domestic stockpiles of energy commodities, such as coal and petroleum, which was extrapolated by the Correlates of War Project through various historical sources. This factor does not interfere with the analysis presented here, as only the quantitative trends are being evaluated from the PEC data.

likelihood of expansion. Conversely, a low PEC score indicates a nation is less likely to expand in the search for natural resources.

Form of Empire (Period of Industrialization; Nationalism; Foreign Policy Outlook)

According to Richard Saull, empires are technically forms of formal rule, with one nation or society dominating others.²⁰ This form of rule, or empire, is usually associated with some form of taxation, revenue collection, or extraction of resources.²¹ Returning to the motives for expansion, an identified shift occurred after World War II where colonies owed their resources or tributes to the empire began to decline.²² At the same time, the expansion of more liberalist ideals grew out of the U.S. position in the world after World War II, showing a shift from territorial to ideological forms of empire.²³ Again, these classifications of forms of empire are not all encompassing and generalized for the purposes of achieving the point of a broader study. It also does not mean that a wholesale shift in these forms occurred after World War II.

Period of Industrialization

While talk of the period of industrialization in the twenty-first century seems antiquated, there are many periods of industrialization. Considering Great Britain as the first industrialized nation, evaluations of all other nations are possible using Great Britain as a benchmark.²⁴ Once again using the PEC score from the COW, Great Britain's PEC score for 1830 serves as that benchmark, with categorization of the period of industrialization as early, mid, or late based on the amount of time it takes a nation to

²⁰ Richard Saull, "On the 'New' American 'Empire'," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 02 (June, 2004): 250-251.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Kennedy, 392.

²³ Ikenberry, Knock, Slaughter, and Smith, 15.

²⁴ Kennedy, 198-199.

reach an equivalent or higher PEC. This measurement also provides a means to interpret the correlation of power, interests, and domestic structure.²⁵ Additionally, using the PEC score allows for a correlation between a nation's need for natural resources and its need to provide security for its interests geared towards supplying their industrialization. While portions of Snyder's analysis provide a framework to measure the case studies and analyze the One Road-One Belt plan in this paper, Paul Kennedy points out that a very good measurement of industrialization is energy consumption by a power, so data used to measure the need for natural resources is also applicable to identifying the period of industrialization.²⁶ A high PEC correlates to a high level of industrialization and therefore an increased need for resources, either obtained domestically or sought abroad. The comparative case studies of Great Britain and Japan, who both experienced extreme periods of industrialization, provided a scale on which to base the analysis of China.²⁷

Level of Nationalism

The measurement of nationalism is made in relation to the level of imperialism. In 1986, Ernest Haas defined nationalist ideologies as "political programs [that] make assertions about the nation's claim to historical uniqueness."²⁸ In other words, nationalism describes how a nation sees and feels about itself collectively. According to Haas, nationalism assumes a rational and progressive movement because it underscores a

²⁵ Ibid, 55-58; Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1962), 5-30; James R. Kurth, "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes," *International Organization* 33, no. 01 (Winter, 1979): 1-34.

²⁶ Kennedy, 198-201.

²⁷ Using millions of metric tons of coal equivalent provides a quantitative scale to measure three nations who underwent industrialization at different times over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries.

²⁸ Ernest B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study it?" *International Organization* 40, no. 03 (Summer 1986): 727-728.

population rejecting some or part of the past, and diagnoses that past as a problem that must be solved. This analysis will use Haas' attributes of nationalist ideologies to base the level of nationalism measured. This measurement enables a qualitative correlation between the ideology and the potential for a country's aggressive action.

Foreign Policy Outlook

The Foreign policy outlook of a nation, describes each nations' realist or liberal viewpoint when it comes to international relations. Appropriately, one must ask which viewpoint is more apt to suggest success or failure? The application of this category is based on the theory that "mankind is loosely organized into an international society of sovereign states which have the monopoly of power and rely...on power in their mutual relations," and that patterns in the political history of nations can lead to general predictions of future international behavior.²⁹ While both liberalist and realist nations expand, a realist nation is more likely to expand in its quest for power. Each case study will further specify a specific international relations (IR) theory that when considered in conjunction with the form of empire, a nation's foreign policy outlook assesses how comfortable a nation is with its dependence on external resources and its reaction to those sources being cut-off.

Sustainment of Empire (Internal Stability; Culture Clash; Social Inequality)

The final condition for consideration is how a nation sustains its empire. Beyond just the logistical considerations, or how to police the empire, this condition considers the interactions of groups domestically and internationally. In many cases, a nation expands its empire to offset issues of domestic instability, such as financing massive internal

²⁹ Joseph Frankel, *International Relations*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), vii-xi.

debt.³⁰ Similarly, the level of social inequality internal to the imperial nation may hamper or prevent expansion due to their treatment of the formation of a cartel to thwart imperial motivations.³¹ Finally, consideration of the interaction of cultures in relation to a nation's ability to sustain its empire is critical due to a nation's perceptions of superiority creating friction, or simply due to the multiple differences in how cultures behave.³² Any shift in one condition or category may cause ripple effects across the other two, and the sustainment condition shows how closely intertwined it is to the form and motive conditions to understand the causal relationships.

Internal Stability

While the need for security examines how a nation looks at its security environment beyond its borders, a nation's internal or domestic stability also has a direct relationship on its ability to expand. Domestic discord inhibits expansionist initiatives, but does not necessarily prevent aggressive behavior. In most cases an attempt to offset internal stability stops short of actual conflict, but can lead to war, such as in 1903 and 1904 when Russia sought a confrontation with Japan to offset instability at home.³³ Similarly, in 1967 President Nasser of Egypt initiated a war with Israel largely as a response to his waning image in the Arab world.³⁴ Certainly, there is a proportional relationship between the internal stability of a nation and its ability to be a trusted

³⁰ Timothy Parsons, *Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 366.

³¹ Snyder, 239 and 316.

³² Parsons, 1-2.

³³ Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 66.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 69.

member of the international community, but an externalized reaction to an internal issue shows the relationship between external and internal security under this condition.³⁵

One way to measure the stability of a nation is through its adherence to the rule of law. The Rule of Law Data from the Cline Center for Democracy provides an excellent way to observe trends in civil unrest and crimes, thus providing trend lines to assess internal stability and societal cohesiveness.³⁶ Rule of Law Data provides a quantitative measurement of a nation's rule of law in the behavior of its citizens and government.³⁷ Peter F. Nardulli, Buddy Peyton, and Joseph Bajjalieh echo this view, they argue "the rule of law is seen as being synonymous with societal stability."³⁸ The analysis presented here will use the values for Legal Order, taken from Hans Kelsen's definition of the same name, that "bring[s] about a certain reciprocal behavior of human beings: to make them refrain from certain acts which, for some reason, are deemed detrimental to society, and to make them perform others which, for some reason, are considered useful to society."³⁹ The benefit to use of Rule of Law data is that any leader can endorse "rule of law" without articulating what they mean allowing the use and misuse by leaders with widely divergent political and social views.⁴⁰ Brian Tamanaha captures this perfectly in the introduction to *On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory* where he presents several quotes that demonstrate the concept: "Chinese leaders say they...support the

³⁵ Laurie Nathan, "Domestic Instability and Security Communities," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 02 (June 2006): 280.

³⁶ Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Peter F. Nardulli, Buddy Peyton, and Joseph Bajjalieh, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Rule of Law Constructs, 1850–2010," *Journal of Law and Courts*, 1, no. 1, (March, 2013): 141.

³⁹ Hans Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 15. Pages 45 and 46 are also useful for further examinations on the rule of law.

⁴⁰ Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh, 140.

establishment of the rule of law”...President Mohammed Khatami of Iran has made repeated remarks about the value of a civil society and the importance of the rule of law.”⁴¹ These are just two of many more examples from Tamanaha that note leadership’s endorsement of Rule of Law, but unstated definition of it. This thesis uses the average of the Legal Order values to assess the internal stability of a nation on a scale of low, moderate, or high. A low value indicates discord and a lack of rule of law reflects a low level of internal stability. A high Legal Order value corresponds to a high level of internal stability. Such measurements make it possible to infer a nation’s ability to maintain or initiate expansion.

Culture Clash

As nations expand and build their imperial ambitions they inevitably encounter cultures that vary from their own, which can have adverse effects on the likelihood of a nation’s successful expansion. In *Imperialism in the Twentieth Century*, A.P. Thornton notes that imperial nations possess a certain arrogance that implies only their culture is the correct one. He contrasts this, however, with the statement that “Alien masters preferred native subjects who were friendly rather than those who were hostile.”⁴² The most direct method to account for the potential culture clash is to apply Geert Hofstede’s Values Survey Module (VSM) to measure national culture and identify potential friction points. The current VSM assesses five dimensions: power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long term orientation. Research has shown that the VSM is useful for making “cross-country comparisons,” but the individual factors are

⁴¹ Brian Z. Tamanaha, *On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2-3.

⁴² A.P. Thornton, *Imperialism in the Twentieth Century*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 10-12.

used only in the aggregate, and provide a general basis to take a measurement and evaluate the potential for culture clash.⁴³ Similar VSM scores indicate countries whose cultures are similar and less likely for culture clash, while very different VSM scores that indicate a high likelihood of friction between competing cultures.

Social Inequality

Similar to internal stability, this category seeks to identify large disparities between “classes” in an imperial society. Social inequality, or stratification, refers to a system of ranking individuals and groups with respect to the distribution of valued goods, services, and prestige.⁴⁴ California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo sociologist Harold Kerbo states that these inequalities threaten social order and the proper functioning of the division of labor in industrial societies.⁴⁵

One way of identifying trend lines that indicate social inequality is through use of the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is an average of factors “in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living.”⁴⁶ The HDI provides a basis for evaluating the social inequality of a nation because the higher the value of a country’s HDI the greater the proportionality to the nation’s social stability.⁴⁷ The HDI

⁴³ Geert Hofstede, *Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), 9-11; Paul E. Spector, Cary L. Cooper, and Kate Sparks, “An International Study of the Psychometric Properties of the Hofstede Values Survey Module 1994: A Comparison of Individual and Country/Province Level Results,” *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 50, no. 02 (April 2001): 270-271.

⁴⁴ Harold R. Kerbo, “Social Stratification”, in *21st Century Sociology: A Reference Handbook*, eds. Clifton D. Bryant and Dennis L. Peck (Beverly Hills: Sage, 2006), 228.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 229.

⁴⁶ United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Index” Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed October 8, 2015).

⁴⁷ Izete Pengo Bagolin and Flavio V. Comim, “Human Development Index (HDI) and its family of indexes: and evolving critical review,” *Revista de Economia* 34, no. 02 (May 2008): 12; Paul Streeten, “Human Development: Means and Ends,” *The American Economic Review*, 84, no. 02 (May, 1994): 236.

provides further analytic value by balancing the representation of social / government categories like security and rule of law, and social violence, in a particular society against individual development. For the purposes of this thesis, an assessment of social inequality will be made using trends from the HDI of each country and placed on a scale of low, moderate, or high based on the average values of the HDI.⁴⁸

Limitations / Scope

It may become evident that not all indices are an exact match for its category. In these cases, overlooking the differences in order to establish comparability versus a best fit better served the broader intent of the project. Additionally, the COW, HDI, Rule of Law Data, and Hofstede's VSM are not without critics, and while not perfect, these data sets provide trend lines to enable other research and largely exist as the only complete data sets of their kind available for comparability.⁴⁹

The current list of categories is not exhaustive and more conditions and indices could be employed. For instance, the size of a country's population is one indicator used in other studies.⁵⁰ While population size infers a need for natural resources and level of industrialization, its inclusion would be redundant because the categories in the economic condition more directly answer this. Similarly, size of the military, income levels of the

⁴⁸ Nicholas Crafts, "The Human Development Index 1870-1999: Some Revised Estimates," *European Review of Economic History*, 6, no. 03 (December 2002): 396-397. Because HDI data only goes back to 1980 it necessitates the use of extrapolated values, taken from Crafts' research, for Great Britain and Japan.

⁴⁹ Linda MacGrain Herkenhoff, "A Socially Intelligent Approach to Global Remuneration," *World Journal of Management* 1, no. 1 (September 2009): 118-140. Spector, Cooper, and Sparks, 269-281; Eric Neumayer, "The Human Development Index and Sustainability — a Constructive Proposal," *Ecological Economics*, 39, no. 01 (October 2001): 102-103. Donal Carbaugh, "From Cognitive Dichotomies to Cultural Discourses: Hofstede, Foucault and Moulettes in Conversation," *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 2, no. 1 (February 21, 2007): 1-6.

⁵⁰ Kennedy, 198-199.

population, and gross national product were not included for the same reason.⁵¹ Finally, two other categories that were initially considered, but later discarded, were Aggressiveness of a Nation and Power.⁵² Both of these are very good indicators for expansion, but difficult to measure adequately in an objective, quantifiable manner. In addition, they each restrict, and or exclude other considerations whereas security, need for natural resources, nationalism, and culture clash each include aggressiveness and power in their measurements without significant overlap. Certainly, each of the excluded categories and many others are suitable for consideration of this topic, but are reserved for a follow-on study.

⁵¹ Ibid., 200-203, 436.

⁵² Snyder, 3-6, 5-7; Thornton, 7.

Chapter 2: Three's A Crowd

Having explained the three conditions and eight categories under consideration, this chapter now uses them as a lens through which to interpret and evaluate a crowd of three empires: Great Britain in the nineteenth century, Japan in the mid-twentieth century, and the United States in the mid to late twentieth century.¹

Pax Britannica began in 1815 with Wellington's victory over Napoleon and British power paramount in the world.² This power extended to the end of World War II when the United States supplanted Pax Britannica with Pax Americana.³ However, many authors contend that the real end of Pax Britannica coincided with the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1897.⁴ Victoria ascended to the throne in 1837 and expanded the British Empire to eventually become a Queen-Empress over an empire extending from Canada to British Guiana to India.⁵ Based on these dates and the availability of indices, the dates of 1861 to 1899 were selected for the analysis of the British Empire. The epoch encompasses the empire at its peak as well as its gradual decline.⁶

The modern Japanese Empire originated in 1854 when Commodore Perry negotiated the Japanese-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce that ended Japanese isolation.⁷ Later in 1868, the Meiji restoration led to the beginning of industrialization in

¹ See Appendices 2-4 for the complete list of values used throughout this chapter.

² William Jackson, *Withdrawal from Empire: A Military View* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 23.

³ Ibid.

⁴ James Morris, *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1968), 9.

⁵ Ibid., 38.

⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), 151.

⁷ David H. James, *The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 115.

Japan and the creation of a modern military.⁸ Not until the treatment of the Japanese at the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference did the Japanese Empire begin its arms race and eventual collision course with the United States.⁹ The start of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921 and the surrender of Japan in 1945 set this study's evaluation dates for the Japanese Empire.

Pax Americana began immediately after World War II in 1945.¹⁰ From 1945 to 1991 the U.S. was one of two superpowers in the world. This time represents the period when the U.S. assumed the mantle of an "Accidental Empire" as Ronald Steel asserts.¹¹ During this period the United States fought two wars in Asia, in addition to multiple smaller operations, and served as the catalyst for the spread of international liberalism.¹² Paradoxically, the U.S. role as empire has largely served to promote capitalism and anti-colonialism.¹³ Bookending the U.S. case-study between the end of World War II in 1945 and the end of the Cold War in 1991 best represents the timeframe to evaluate the American Empire as the rise of globalism and other powerful economic entities (e.g., European Union) since then have moderated the U.S.' global power.

⁸ Ibid., 127.

⁹ Sadao Asada, *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 65-95.

¹⁰ Jackson, 23.

¹¹ Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), 15-27.

¹² Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," *International Security* 23, no. 02 (Fall, 1998): 41.

¹³ Steel, 15-17.

Motives for Expansion (External Security; Need for Natural Resources)

External Security

Great Britain. From 1865 to 1899, Great Britain averaged a Composite Index of National Security (CINC) of .211.¹⁴ While this score remains relatively high with respect to the other values in the Correlates of War, the trends in this period are more telling. In 1865, Great Britain's CINC was .256.¹⁵ Thirty-four years later the score was .169.¹⁶ While this shows a decline in power and corresponds to a less secure empire it is still a full measure higher than France during the same period.¹⁷ In fact, Great Britain likely achieved the zenith of its power in the early nineteenth century and settled into a state of comfort as a great power.¹⁸ Accordingly, Great Britain's high CINC scores correspond to a secure nation at the height of its expansion.¹⁹

Moreover, by 1815, Great Britain had defeated Napoleon and helped to usher in a period of stability on the European continent for 100 years. By 1860, it had fought and defeated the Russians, Chinese, Egyptians, Persians, Afghans, Burmese, Sikhs, and forced treaties on Russia and China that significantly restricted each country's powers.²⁰ Britain was, at this point (1860), secure enough that its only wars were to safeguard its far-flung empire rather than out of a desire to expand.

¹⁴ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Kennedy, 151.

¹⁹ Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 156.

²⁰ David Gillard, *The Struggle For Asia, 1828-1914* (London: Methuen, 1977), 43.

During this time, the British military remained relatively small and not wholly prepared to carry out large scale operations beyond small police actions, which indicates an achieved rather than an expansionist view of security.²¹ Despite concern by some, no serious rivals remained to contest Great Britain on the land or sea.²² Given these factors and her CINC scores, Great Britain falls on the High end of the Security Scale.

Japan. From the 1868 Meiji Restoration through the fiery end of World War II in 1945, Japanese governments adopted a series of expansionist policies.²³ Japan's geographic separation in the world and its lack of natural resources limited its expansion, but made its control of its near-abroad critical. In the 1880's, the Japanese concluded that security of the home islands required domination of the Korean peninsula.²⁴ A crisis precipitated when China attempted to assert its control over Korea in 1884 resulting in the Treaty of 1885, and forced Japanese withdrawal from Korea.²⁵ This crisis also led to the Japanese increasing the defense budget to augment the Japanese army and navy.²⁶ This increase in the military budget precipitated a greater need for Japan to expand. The onset of the Russo-Japanese War, from 1904 to 1905, and the growing requirement for resources to support Japanese forces, beginning in Manchuria in 1931 exacerbated the requirement for security.

From 1920 to 1945 Japan averaged a CINC of .048. During this period Japan's National Policy stated that its "position ... [bore] sole responsibility for maintaining order

²¹ Kennedy, 153-154.

²² Ibid., 155.

²³ Snyder, 114.

²⁴ James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 7.

²⁵ William G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 44-45.

²⁶ Crowley, 8.

in the Far East. Consequently, it is imperative that [it] bear [its] claim to this responsibility on the rationale of actual power.”²⁷ Subsequently, the 1933 Foreign Policy of Japan laid out three objectives: Japan must be able to defeat the Soviet Army, capable of enforcing Japan’s leadership on the Chinese Government, and guarantee the security of the home islands against the American fleet.²⁸

In light of the definition of security, Japan’s security largely hinged on a perception of threats from the Asian continent, the U.S. fleet, and their ability to secure territory to access natural resources that could sustain their military.²⁹ The CINC scores correspond to these facts, showing a steady annual increase from .041 in 1920 to a score of .0671 in 1944, but still relatively low. Japan falls on the low end of the scale due to its self-perceived insecurity.

United States. By the end of World War II, the United States supplanted Great Britain in terms of dominance in the world, and the Soviet Union rapidly became the counterbalance to the U.S.³⁰ As Paul Kennedy notes, the U.S. level of security was artificially high at the end of World War II, reflecting the high level of U.S. military strength in comparison to the rest of the developed nations of the world.³¹ This new found power led the U.S. to find ways to help those in need, sometimes referred to as “welfare imperialism,” intended to build an empire on noble principles rather than colonization.³² This accidental imperialism, largely a result of the U.S. not suffering the high level of

²⁷ Ibid., 190.

²⁸ Ibid., 190-192.

²⁹ Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 297.

³⁰ Kennedy, 357, 365.

³¹ Kennedy, 357-358.

³² Steel, 15-17.

exhaustion of other nations after World War II put the U.S. in a stable position with respect to security and a desire to maintain that stability. With a moderate average CINC of .137 for the U.S. from 1945 to 1991 this measurement is higher than that of Japan during the 1930's, yet lower than Great Britain at the height of its empire.³³ The CINC score for the U.S. peaked at .384 in 1945, which should be expected given that was the last year of World War II, and but for a brief upturn from 1950-1953 due to the Korean War. Though it has been gradually declining ever since. These trends show that the U.S. degree of power did not cause it to expand like Japan in the mid-twentieth century, and that the U.S. has acted in the interests of security more often because it could expand its "sphere of domination," project power, or intervene to prevent the "immoralities of a corrupt world."³⁴ Given these factors, the United States would be ranked moderate, or in the middle, of the security scale.

Summary. These three cases demonstrate how a nation's competitors, or lack thereof, influence their need for security. In each case, the CINC scores alone indicate a high level of security, but absent the historical context the score would be misleading. While Great Britain, in its respective time period was without a true peer competitor, its CINC scores are high. Likewise, the U.S. has very high CINC scores that gradually decline and spike in times of war, and the study includes the period of the Cold War when the U.S. was not without a peer competitor. While both the U.S. and Great Britain display these high CINC scores it is for very different reasons than Japan. Great Britain and the U.S. achieved these scores because they were the super-powers of their times, not out of a

³³ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48. While these numbers definitely show the inadequacies of using the Correlates of War, the trend lines are more important.

³⁴ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (Nov-Dec 2004): 55; Steel, 4.

radical desire for natural resources or power. Conversely, Japan's military operations in Asia and their expansion in pursuit of natural resources drove up their CINC score.

Need for Natural Resources

Great Britain. Great Britain in the mid to late nineteenth century consumed five times more energy than the United States or Germany and 155 times that of Russia.³⁵ From 1865 to 1899 Great Britain's Primary Energy Consumption (PEC) increased approximately 51%.³⁶ At the same time Great Britain produced approximately 53% of the world's iron, 50% of the coal and lignite, and consumed just under half of the global cotton produced.³⁷ Additionally, Great Britain was responsible for 20% of world commerce and 40% of the global trade in manufactured goods.³⁸ Despite this high level of consumption, and production Great Britain falls in the middle of the scale, or at a moderate level when compared to the U.S. and Japan. Further, as outlined above, Britain was secure and stable at the time and had largely reached a high point in expansion. Following the loss of India and Pakistan in 1947, Great Britain's PEC dropped to half its 1899 total, largely signaling the end of its power and placing it as moderate on the scale.³⁹

Japan. Japan showed a 91% increase in its PEC from 1920 to 1945, with 1943 marking the highest year.⁴⁰ A review of the PEC for Japan shows a dramatic increase corresponding to Japan's aggressive expansion in pursuit of natural resources.⁴¹ This

³⁵ Kennedy, 151.

³⁶ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

³⁷ Kennedy, 151.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Robert Johnson, *British Imperialism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 185; Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

⁴⁰ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

⁴¹ Ibid.

increase in demand for natural resources coupled with the desire of Japanese leaders to become an autarky only further fueled Japanese expansion in this period.⁴² As noted by Kupchan, Japan's aggressive pursuit of natural resources corresponded to their increasing military strength to combat the Chinese in the 1930s.⁴³ Given these factors, Japan's need for natural resources placed it on the high end of the scale.

United States. The PEC for the U.S., from 1945 to 1991, rose to just under 70%.⁴⁴ This rate shows the general trend of increase, like all other countries, when 1991 became the highest year for energy consumption. Unlike Japan, the PEC does not correspond to aggressive expansion by the U.S. Even in the period of 1950-1953 during the Korean War and in 1968 at the height of Vietnam the PEC values for the U.S. rise at a consistent rate. This indicates a steady level of consumption and energy import compared to export and domestic energy stockpiling. As such, the PEC does not directly correlate with aggressive behavior.⁴⁵ Given these factors the U.S. need for natural resources remains on the high end of the scale, but indicates a defensive behavior.

Summary. A nation that does not have a significant amount, or any, natural resources must do what is necessary to ensure a flow of these resources, a situation best exemplified by Japan.⁴⁶ These case studies provide evidence that there is a correlation between a nation's requirement for natural resources and its potential for aggression. While this is not exclusively a reason for aggression it is worth pointing out that Japan's

⁴² Kupchan, 299.

⁴³ Ibid., 299-300.

⁴⁴ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48. Author made calculations.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 19-48.

⁴⁶ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma" *World Politics* 30, no. 02 (January, 1978): 169.

PEC increased exponentially where Great Britain and the U.S. had a gradual increase.

After all the United States' PEC from 1945 to 1991 rose at a rate significantly lower than Japan did from 1920 to 1945.

Form of Empire (Period of Industrialization; Nationalism; Foreign Policy Outlook)

Period of Industrialization

Great Britain. Great Britain was an early industrializer. While there is no established date for the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, many point to 1830 and the widespread appearance of steam railways in Britain as that beginning.⁴⁷ The PEC for Great Britain in 1830 was 29,988 million metric tons of coal equivalent (MMTC).⁴⁸ Using Jack Snyder's correlation between the period of industrialization and expansion suggests states that were in the early period of industrialization were typically more moderate with regard to expansion. In Great Britain this was the case, as the decentralized textile industry grew at a rate that allowed the landed elites to maintain diffuse interests and live off the income.⁴⁹ In other words, because Great Britain was arguably the first industrialized nation its economy grew at a steady, unchallenged pace since the United States remained its only near competitor, and the U.S. did not reach the same level until 1868.⁵⁰ Similarly, the PEC for Great Britain from 1861-1899 was an average of 133,631 MMTC, which is 25% higher than the U.S. during this time.⁵¹ Further, this moderate growth best correlates to a democratic style of government.⁵²

⁴⁷ Charles More, *Understanding the Industrial Revolution*, (London: Routledge, 2000), 3.

⁴⁸ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

⁴⁹ Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, 56-58.

⁵⁰ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

⁵¹ Ibid. The author took averages of the PECs for Great Britain, France, and the United States were taken for the period of 1861-1899 and compared to get these percentages.

⁵² Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, 58.

Japan. Japan did not reach the industrialized benchmark until 1919, or 89 years after Great Britain when it reached a PEC of 33,206.⁵³ Further, Japan in the mid-twentieth century, averaged a PEC of 45,662 MMTC.⁵⁴ By comparison its average during the late nineteenth century was 1,903 MMTC, a 96% change.⁵⁵ These numbers alone show Japan as a late industrializer when compared to Great Britain and the United States. Much of this is attributable to the Meiji Restoration, but more specifically the military transformation going on in Japan prior to WWI and into the interwar period.⁵⁶ Late industrializers like Japan, have less diffuse economic systems, a more authoritarian political system, and a reckless pursuit of expansion.⁵⁷ The Great Depression resulted in discredited ruling elites in Japan and the collapse of the parliamentary system, thus giving the Japanese military significant control over policy of expansion.⁵⁸

United States. As stated previously, the U.S did not achieve the industrialized benchmark until 1868, 38 years later than Great Britain, when its PEC was 31,646 MMTC.⁵⁹ The average PEC for the U.S. from 1945 to 1991 was 3,989,023 MMTC, an enormous increase when compared to all other industrialized nations.⁶⁰ While the PEC for the mid to late twentieth centuries does not necessarily indicate whether a nation was an early industrializer or not, Paul Kennedy points out that prior to the outbreak of the Civil War,

⁵³ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48. Calculation made by author subtracting 1918 from 1830.

⁵⁴ Ibid. The author took averages of the PECs for years 1920-1945 to get this number.

⁵⁵ Ibid. The author took averages of the PECs for Japan for years 1920-1945 and 1865-1899 and compared to get these percentages.

⁵⁶ Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, 57-58; Kupchan, 298-304.

⁵⁷ Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, 58.

⁵⁸ Kupchan, 301; Michael A. Barnhart, *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs: Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 20.

⁵⁹ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48. Calculation made by author subtracting 1918 from 1830.

⁶⁰ Ibid. The author took averages of the PECs for years 1945-1991 to get this number. China reached approximately the same number in 2007.

the U.S. economy was not equal to Great Britain, but surging past France.⁶¹ This assessment corresponds to the date of 1868 when the U.S. achieved the level of industrialization Great Britain had three decades prior; therefore, the PEC score comparison shows a quantitative representation of the same. The *Encyclopedia of the Industrial Revolution in America* points out that the key factors for an industrial revolution came together in the early nineteenth century in the U.S. just after those same factors joined together for Great Britain.⁶²

Summary. The United States and Great Britain were both early industrializers, which ultimately led to diffuse power structures that opposed imperial overextension. Conversely, later industrializers such as Japan, skipped early steps which ultimately acted as a catalyst for centralized power systems and led to, occasionally extreme, imperial overextension.⁶³ The overextension comes from a rapid shift in the dynamics of the population as industrialization produces a higher standard of living and a larger middle class putting additional strains on the system.⁶⁴ These strains are in addition to the military buildup that usually accompanies the need to better secure the resources acquired at greater distances from the mainland.

Level of Nationalism

Great Britain. Nationalism can take many forms, and when applying a lens to the level of nationalism in Great Britain during the nineteenth century, the British are liberal, Whig

⁶¹ Kennedy, 178-179; Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America Vol I.* (1835; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1956), 452.

⁶² James S. Olson, *Encyclopedia of Industrial Revolution in America* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), xiv-xxv.

⁶³ Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, 57-60.

⁶⁴ Hans J. Morganthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th Edition, Revised* (1973 repr., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 385-386.

nationalists as described by Ernst Haas.⁶⁵ Haas categorizes this type of nationalism as seeking “historic continuity to ethnic homogeneity”, thus making whatever area the nation occupies an extended part of that nation.⁶⁶ While this description is valuable, it is necessary to see where this concept originated and why that matters. The brand of nationalism practiced by Great Britain originated from its early industrialization, which made greater expansion possible and necessary, thus the power of nationalism gave them a sense of superiority over the nations they colonized.⁶⁷ This interpretation gives credibility to Great Britain as having a high level of nationalism in the nineteenth century that fueled the expansion of the empire.

Japan. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan gradually took on a Fascist ideology partially in line with Italy and Germany during the same time.⁶⁸ Haas describes this form of Fascism as embodying a permanent struggle, a need for survival, and an endemic hostility toward others.⁶⁹ An additional factor for consideration is Haas’ depiction of Fascists as perceiving a need to assure survival of their race.⁷⁰ In this case the Japanese blended these beliefs into a form of ethnic nationalism, which not only emphasized the cultural differences between Japan and the West, but also between Japan and the rest of Asia.⁷¹ Early believers in this form of nationalism believed it would eventually lead to a strengthening of the state. This seems to have been the case when Japan entered into war

⁶⁵ Ernest B. Haas, “What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study it?” *International Organization* 40, no. 03 (Summer 1986): 732.

⁶⁶ Haas, 730, 732.

⁶⁷ Timothy Parsons, *Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fall* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 295.

⁶⁸ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 298-304.

⁶⁹ Haas, 732.

⁷⁰ Haas, 732.

⁷¹ Kevin M. Doak, “Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,” *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 22, no. 01 (Winter, 1996): 90-91, 97-98.

with Russia early in the twentieth century.⁷² Yasuda Yojuro, a nineteenth-century author and leader of the Japanese Romantics, believed that Japan should achieve ethnic superiority separate and distinct from the “ideology of global politics of the white peoples,” despite the Meiji Restoration’s movement towards Western culture.⁷³ Given Japan’s Fascist and radical ethnic nationalism in the period of analysis it is reasonable to accept this as contributing to their aggressive behavior towards the U.S and Asia in the years prior to World War II. Therefore, their level of nationalism is high and strongly corresponds with aggression.

United States. The U.S. brand of nationalism is in many ways very similar to that of Great Britain. Haas describes the Jacobian Nationalism in the U.S. as more aggressive in its zeal, as demonstrated by Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson.⁷⁴ While Whig Nationalists tend to look inward, the Jacobins look inward, or domestically, with an eye towards global promotion of their ways.⁷⁵ Rather than U.S. nationalism originating from early industrialization or the need to expand an empire by accumulating colonies and territory like Great Britain, this type of nationalism comes from periods of strain on the country.⁷⁶ This anti-colonial mindset first appeared towards the end of World War II when the U.S. sought to expand its “empire” for capitalistic dominance rather than pure power.⁷⁷ As previously mentioned, the U.S. emerged from World War II seeing itself

⁷² Ibid., 82.

⁷³ Ibid., 98.

⁷⁴ Haas, 730.

⁷⁵ Haas, 730.

⁷⁶ Sergio Fabbrini, *The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European Discontent*, ed. Sergio Fabbrini (London: Routledge, 2006), 3-4. Fabbrini argues that when the U.S. is confronted with a crisis its reaction is to fall back on its founding ideals and its exceptionalism in the world. See also, Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States,” *International Security*, 32, no. 02 (Fall, 2007): 7-9.

⁷⁷ Christopher J. Bartlett, *The Rise and Fall of Pax Americana: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974), 88-91.

filling a role of protector of Europe and Latin America with the mission to free weak nations from the oppression of colonialism.⁷⁸ For this reason, the U.S. evaluation is a high level of nationalism with a tendency towards interventionist aggression.

Summary. Nationalism is evaluated in each case to determine the correlation between how a nation views itself and how this translates into its overall behavior. The difference between nationalism and culture clash is that culture clash is an actual determination of how two separate cultures are likely to behave with respect to each other. Nationalism often expresses itself as perceptions of one nation and then contributes to culture clash. In the case of Japan, its nationalism created a sense of superiority to all other cultures, this is separate from the how the fundamentals of Japanese culture would normally behave. Similarly, the U.S. and Great Britain have high levels of nationalism, but do not behave in the same belligerent manner as the Japanese. What is interesting to note is that American nationalism projects a positive image, while often the culture clash is the exact opposite as seen in behaviors of foreign nations that are counter to U.S. culture.⁷⁹

Foreign Policy Outlook

Great Britain. Great Britain has maintained a liberalist policy since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the subsequent philosophy of John Locke. One of the major outcomes of the Glorious Revolution was parliamentary government, rule of law, and the “right of rebellion against tyranny.”⁸⁰ John Locke’s theories formed the basis of the belief that governments exist to protect the right of the citizens before those of political

⁷⁸ Steel, 16.

⁷⁹ Thomas M. Begley and David P. Boyd, “Why Don’t They Like Us Overseas? Organizing U.S. Business Practices To Manage Culture Clash”, *Organizational Dynamics*, 32, no. 04, (November 2003): 357.

⁸⁰ Robert Roswell Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World* (1950; repr., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 181.

organizations, and to promote representative versus arbitrary government.⁸¹ Eventually, Adam Smith, and his work *The Wealth of Nations*, whose theories subordinated the political to the economic, transformed this form of liberalism.⁸² Besides Dewey, more modern theorists also acknowledge Adam Smith as a leading founder of liberalism as it came to be in mid to late eighteenth century.⁸³ Going one step further, Richard Cobden, a nineteenth-century British Liberalist, pointed out that free trade alters the world for the better, and free trade can help the world avoid war.⁸⁴ This positions Cobden as one of the first commercial liberalists, and arguably, representative of the British view of foreign policy during the late nineteenth-century.⁸⁵ Accordingly, this places Great Britain as a commercial liberalist nation and forms the basis for their international relations. As noted with external security, Great Britain was in a comfortable position in the world and its world view shows it was comfortable with the expansion of and dependence on international commerce. This approach has been successful for Great Britain and arguably why it has remained a strong state internationally with or without its empire.

Japan. On July 25, 1927 Baron Tanaka, the Prime Minister of Japan sent a letter to the Emperor outlining imperial expansion.⁸⁶ While most of the letter argued for a better approach to expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia, the end of the letter proposes a policy of “Blood and Iron” against the United States.⁸⁷ This letter is a great example of the core

⁸¹ John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action*, Vol 74 of *The Page-Barbour Lectures* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), 620.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 621.

⁸³ Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” 54.

⁸⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1959), 104-105.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Review: Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (January, 1988): 246.

⁸⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson eds., *Principles and Problems of International Politics: Selected Readings* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), 72.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 73-74.

beliefs of realism, a self-interested state competing for power and security.⁸⁸ More specifically, Japan would be considered an Offensive Realist because of their desire to “gain power at the expense of rivals...[and] be the hegemon in the system.”⁸⁹ Further, realism assumes that a state’s legitimacy comes from power, in this case military power equals legitimacy. As discussed in the security section, the Japanese government remained largely beholden to its military.⁹⁰ Japan displayed characteristics indicative of an offensive-realism view of foreign relations for a number of reasons, most importantly, by its manner of securing external resources regardless of the cost to offset perceived threats and gain power.

United States. The line of liberalist philosophers presented for Great Britain can serve as the starting point for the United States. John Dewey points out that John Locke’s theories greatly influenced the Declaration of Independence and Constitution, where his thoughts on government protection of rights are echoed in the task of providing for the public good conferred upon Congress.⁹¹ Reflecting upon the late twentieth century, Jack Snyder’s description of liberalism is, among other things, a belief that the world needs to be made safe for democracy, and all nations should enjoy the right to self-determination.⁹² The U.S. of the mid-twentieth century was very much influenced by Wilsonian Liberalism, more specifically, what has become known as liberal interventionism, or neoliberalism.⁹³

⁸⁸ Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” 59.

⁸⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 20-21.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁹¹ Dewey, 620-621.

⁹² Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” 58.

⁹³ G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3-4.

This world view makes sense when considering the themes of obligation to help those threatened by crisis, intervention to promote human rights, and strong anti-colonialism.⁹⁴

As Snyder notes, liberal nations frequently launch messianic campaigns against authoritarian regimes out of ideological reasons, not necessarily for the sole pursuit of resources.⁹⁵ This places the U.S. as a neoliberalist nation in the period of 1945-1991.

Summary. The case studies have shown that nations with liberalist foundations to their foreign policy are more stable and, arguably less likely to pursue aggressive behavior. The contrasting view is of Japan, with a realist foundation that executed foreign policy with the belief that if it did not act in its own interest then it would lose power. In order to increase its power it had to expand. In this case Japan's realist worldview meant that its power equaled control over others usually through violence.⁹⁶

Sustainment of Empire (Internal Stability; Culture Clash; Social Inequality)

Internal Stability

Great Britain. From 1861-1899 Great Britain's Rule of Law score was 3.96.⁹⁷ This is a relatively high score on the Rule of Law Data scale of one to five. It shows a strong commitment to order, which indicates domestic stability.⁹⁸ John Ruggie argues that the reason for "Great Britain's supremacy in the world...had much to do with the global expansion of this new economic order, and even more with its stability..."⁹⁹ Great Britain

⁹⁴ Ibid. Steel, 16.

⁹⁵ Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," 57.

⁹⁶ Morgenthau, 9.

⁹⁷ Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015). Average value calculated by averaging the scores for Legal Order for Great Britain from 1861-1899.

⁹⁸ Peter F. Nardulli, Buddy Peyton, and Joseph Bajjalieh, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Rule of Law Constructs, 1850–2010," *Journal of Law and Courts* 1, no. 1, (March, 2013): 185.

⁹⁹ John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization*, 36, no.02 (Spring 1982): 386.

at the end of the nineteenth century clearly represents a highly stable nation at the high end of the scale.

Japan. The onset of the Great Depression upset Japan's internal stability in the early twentieth century, and from 1920-1945 Japan's Rule of Law score was 2.49.¹⁰⁰

Amplification of this trend comes from accounts of the rising discontent among the population of Japan due to the collapse of the economy, the discrediting of the ruling elites, and even the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai by members of the Japanese Army in 1932.¹⁰¹ This instability largely contributed to the Japanese military's accumulation of power and the subsequent expansion of the Japanese Empire in the following years. The analysis, and the value of their Rule of Law Score, suggests a low level of stability, and that stability achieved by military forces predicts conflict.

United States. The American legal infrastructure has remained largely stable since the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁰² For example, the average Rule of Law score for the U.S. between 1945 and 1991 was 4.22.¹⁰³ This score was consistently one of the highest scores tabulated. Based on these results, the U.S. ranks on the high end of the scale.

Summary. Just as the threats, real or otherwise, from outside the nation can lead a nation to increase its security posture, the state of internal stability can greatly affect how an imperial nation behaves.¹⁰⁴ When a nation's internal stability is high it reciprocally

¹⁰⁰ Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015). Average value calculated by averaging the scores for Legal Order for Japan from 1920-1945.

¹⁰¹ Kupchan, 320.

¹⁰² Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh, 184.

¹⁰³ Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015). Average value calculated by averaging the scores for Legal Order for the U.S. from 1991-2007.

¹⁰⁴ Waltz, 81.

allows that nation to expand as the case with Great Britain and the U.S. to a lesser degree. Conversely, Japan's internal stability was lower, allowing for the government to fracture and pursue a course of action eventually leading to defeat. While the interim instability contributed to the expansion of the Japanese Empire, it was a short term gain only resulting in failure due to the imbalance in political forces acting against each other in Japan. The result of this imbalance was that increased military power in Japan contributed to external security while making Japan domestically very unstable.

Culture Clash

Great Britain. From 1869 to 1899 three countries, India, Singapore, and Pakistan, existed as part of the British Empire. The trends that emerge in Table 2.1 show that Power Distance Indicator (PDI), or how societies view inequality amongst their citizens, is low for Great Britain compared to India, and Singapore, and to a lesser degree Pakistan.¹⁰⁵ This indicates that while there was a class system in Great Britain it did not reach the caste systems in India and presumably Singapore.¹⁰⁶ More precisely, a low PDI value indicates a society where minimization of inequality is the standard, versus a high PDI where inequality based on class is normal and accepted.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), 79.

¹⁰⁶ Hofstede, 98; Hofstede, "VSM 2013"; Johnson, 32, 33, and 123. Johnson refers to the Indian caste system several times in his book, but no mention is made of a caste system in Singapore. Based on the PDI values presented, the author has made the assumption that it is on par with that of India.

¹⁰⁷ Hofstede, 98.

Table 2.1: Cultural Comparison of Great Britain with Previous Colonies¹⁰⁸

VSM 94 Score – British Empire 1869-1899						
	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
Great Britain	35	89	66	35	51	69
India	77	48	56	40	51	26
Singapore	74	20	48	8	72	46
Pakistan	55	14	50	70	50	0

Conversely, the level of individualism (IDV) is much higher than that of the other three countries showing that Great Britain was a more self-centered, modern society, while the lower values show societies that are much more traditional, and collectively oriented.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, there were significant cultural differences between Great Britain and its colonies. Ultimately, these cultural differences contributed to the decolonization of the empire, but several points of friction arose that hastened the end.¹¹⁰

Japan. The Japanese Empire from 1929-1945, extended its span of control significantly in the Pacific.¹¹¹ Japan occupied Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines prior to and during World War II. Each of these countries provides a good example of how the Japanese and native cultures either meshed or clashed as depicted in Table 2.2.

¹⁰⁸ Hofstede, "VSM 2013".

¹⁰⁹ Hofstede, 98; Hofstede, "VSM 2013"; Johnson, 26. Johnson references the British views of Indian cultural backwardness, but no mention is made of Singapore or Pakistan. Based on the IDV values presented, the author has made the assumption that the British viewed both nations in the same way as India.

¹¹⁰ Sandra Feiler Brazaitis O'Leary, "British Decolonization: A Case Study in Approaches to Analyzing the Decline of Empire" (Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1979), 165-166, 173-175.

¹¹¹ While one of Japan's major occupations was in Manchuria that will not be analyzed under culture as there is no way to separate out one portion of China from the rest of the country, thus the trends would not be indicative of the particular region.

Table 2.2: Cultural Comparison of Japan with Occupied Nations in WWII¹¹²

VSM 94 Score – Japanese Empire 1929-1945						
	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
Japan	54	46	95	92	88	42
Korea	60	18	39	85	100	29
Thailand	64	20	34	64	32	45
Philippines	94	32	64	44	27	42

When looking at the Masculinity (MAS) scores Japan has a significantly larger value. One of the traits of nations that have values this high indicates sympathy for the strong.¹¹³ There are other traits that fall under high MAS scores that do not appear to fit with Japan, such as the ego-centric and the individualistic nature of people. Longer Term Orientation (LTO) scores show that Korea and Japan are close, but differ substantially from Thailand and the Philippines. A high LTO indicates a higher sense of shame, an adaption of traditions to new circumstances, and government by men. Conversely, low LTO indicates a short term view of reality where quick results are expected, shame is not a common feeling, there is respect for traditions, and government by law.¹¹⁴ Finally, the UAI values also indicate an appeal of racial purity.¹¹⁵ What these trends begin to show is the friction that occurred at various levels between the Japanese and their “colonies.”¹¹⁶

United States. When looking at the U.S. from 1945-1991, there are no colonies. The countries selected here represent countries where the U.S. maintained a long-term military presence either during the entirety or majority of the period of 1945-1991, in this case South Korea, Japan, and Germany.

¹¹² Hofstede, “VSM 2013”.

¹¹³ Hofstede, 298-299; Hofstede, “VSM 2013”.

¹¹⁴ Hofstede, 360, 366; Hofstede, “VSM 2013”.

¹¹⁵ Hofstede, 160-161; Hofstede, “VSM 2013”.

¹¹⁶ Doak, 97-98.

Table 2.3: Cultural Comparison of Nations with a Lasting U.S. Military Presence¹¹⁷

VSM 94 Score - United States 1945-1991						
	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
United States	40	91	62	46	26	68
Korea	60	18	39	85	100	29
Japan	54	46	95	92	88	42
Germany	36	67	66	65	83	40

The first trend observed in Table 2.3 is that the values for the U.S. and Germany are closer than the U.S. and Korea or Japan. This is not the case in LTO, likely due to the U.S. short term view versus Germany's long term views on savings and frugality.¹¹⁸

Other obvious contrasts arise under the IDV score where the U.S. has a high degree of independence, and a very self-centered nature compared to Korea and Japan. While there are obvious differences in the values, the U.S. maintained a relatively benign presence in each of these countries for almost 70 years.

Summary. The dynamics of cultural interaction offer insight into the context of a nation seeking to expand its power and how that interaction will contribute or mitigate success. If a nation intends to negotiate for natural resources in a neighboring country then the similarities in culture will likely make the process friendlier and likely less contentious compared to a nation thousands of miles away where the cultures are very dissimilar. Samuel P. Huntington comes to the same conclusion. The dynamics of which side a nation is on have been replaced with the dynamics of who a nation is culturally, and the

¹¹⁷ Hofstede, "VSM 2013".

¹¹⁸ Sheldon Garon, "Why We Spend, Why They Save," New York Times, November 24, 2011, online edition. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/opinion/why-we-spend-why-they-save.html?_r=0 (accessed October 12, 2015).

more similar the cultural dynamics, the less likely there are to be fault lines or friction points.¹¹⁹

Social Inequality

Great Britain. At the height of its empire in the nineteenth century, Great Britain was a model of domestic stability. Great Britain's Human Development Index (HDI) value in 1870 was .500, which is exactly in the center of the HDI scale of zero to one.¹²⁰ By comparison, Australia's HDI was .516 (the highest), the U.S. scored .506 and Finland came in at .239 (the lowest calculated) in the same year.¹²¹ What these values indicate is that general standard of living in Great Britain during the mid to late nineteenth century was about as high as could be achieved in the world at the time. Therefore, Great Britain's level of social inequality was considerably low.

Japan. During the interwar period (1920-1937), the average Japanese HDI was .571, very similar to that of Italy (.577) during the same period.¹²² While this HDI is middle of the road, it is approximately the same standard of living achieved by Great Britain and the U.S. sixty years prior. The HDI for the U.S. in the same time period was .723.¹²³ These figures support accounts of Japanese social stratification becoming greater in the 1920's as Japan continued to industrialize. Specifically, as Japan continued to industrialize, their agricultural production increased, leading a small group of property owners to squeeze

¹¹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 125.

¹²⁰ Nicholas Crafts, "The Human Development Index 1870-1999: Some Revised Estimates," *European Review of Economic History*, 6, no. 03 (December 2002): 396.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 396.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 396-397. Average value calculated by averaging the scores for Italy's HDI from 1913 and 1950, as there are no actual indices for the years prior to 1980 these values were extrapolated by Nicholas Crafts. Average of values at 1913 and 1950.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 396-397. Average value calculated by averaging the scores for the U.S.' HDI from 1913 and 1950, as there are no actual indices for the years prior to 1980 these values were extrapolated by Nicholas Crafts. Average of values at 1913 and 1950.

peasant production to greater and greater degrees.¹²⁴ These indications of social inequality in Japan are significant for the time period, but because Japan was not categorized at the levels of the lowest HDI for nations at the time (e.g. India at .195) they equate to a moderate level.

United States. Just like Great Britain in the nineteenth-century, the U.S. continues to have one of the highest HDI scores. Measured from 1950 to 1990, the U.S. had an average score of .863 which would have placed the U.S. a very close second in the world in 1990.¹²⁵ Australia was the highest in 1990 (.866) and is the number two globally for the lowest levels of social inequality; Great Britain ranks fourteenth.¹²⁶ Given this trend, the U.S. is assessed as low on the scale of social inequality.

Summary. The level of social inequality in a nation is useful to provide a separate metric for the levels of domestic instability that contributes to successful or unsuccessful empires. Because the HDI scores account for wages earned, life expectancy, and birth rate, amongst other considerations, this category supports other cultural categories by providing an indicator for successful expansion.¹²⁷ While Great Britain had a very high HDI for the time period their expansion was a result of a high standard of living and the need to support it. Japan, on the other hand, had an HDI which shows a level of stratification that resulted from rapid industrialization and mistreatment of the lower classes. Further, this supports the earlier analysis identifying Japan as a late industrializer. The U.S. high HDI also supports the argument for expansion, yet compared to Great

¹²⁴ Moore, 286-287.

¹²⁵ United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Index" Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed October 8, 2015).

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Crafts, 401-402.

Britain and Japan, the U.S. has not expanded in the traditional sense. The U.S. largely remains content to remain somewhat isolationist, despite a need to find ways to support its high standard of living.

Conclusion

Table 2.4: Case Study Results

Conditions	Categories	Great Britain 1861-1899	Japan 1921-1945	United States 1945-1991
Motives for Expansion	External Security	High	Low	Moderate
	Need for Natural Resources	Moderate	High	High
Form of Empire	Period of Industrialization	Early	Late	Early
	Level of Nationalism	High	High	High
	Foreign Policy Outlook	Commercial Liberalist	Offensive Realist	Neoliberalist
Sustainment of Empire	Internal Stability	High	Low	High
	Culture Clash	Moderate	High	Low
	Social Inequality	Low	Moderate	Low

This chapter employed the methodology for measuring success of imperial expansion by examining three case studies of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. Table 2.4 summarizes the findings made in the course of this analysis. The first conclusion is that no one, or even two, of the categories on their own can explain the success or failure of imperial expansion. It is only upon examination of each category as it relates to its respective condition and in concert with the other conditions that a pattern begins to emerge and the intricacies of interdependency become available. Specifically, in the case of Japan the relationship between a low level of internal stability and a high

level of social inequality due in large part to the late industrialization created a perilous situation.

Second, it is very easy for each of these case studies to have the same, or similar results, in multiple categories, but underscores the importance in examining each country in its historic context. While a nation may feel the need to expand out of concerns for external security, making their outward intentions appear aggressive, this can be offset with a high level of domestic stability, low levels of social inequality, and liberalist approaches, in general, to foreign policy. The U.S. and Great Britain are excellent examples of this. However, when the same high level of external security is paired with low levels of domestic stability, an extreme need for natural resources due to late industrialization, radical views on culture, and a foreign policy that lends itself to self-preservation, the combined conditions can lead to disastrous results. The history supports this conclusion and can be seen in Japanese actions leading up to World War II.

In this narrow example, what stands out is that nations like Japan that did not gradually progress through industrialization appear to place themselves in dire situations. They are stuck in an infinite “do loop” spinning faster and faster that eventually leads to a cycle of despair and increasing aggression.

Chapter 3: A New Belt or Punching Eyelets in an Old One?

Like eyelets in a belt, China's One Road, One Belt plan seeks to add ports or stops along a path that will secure its economic and imperialistic goals. This chapter will apply both the original methodology and the insights from historical contextualization to the transportation hubs of the One Road One Belt plan in two specific areas under development, Sri Lanka and Kenya.¹

Motives for Expansion (External Security; Need for Natural Resources)

External Security

China experienced a 29% increase in its CINC from 1997 to 2007.² During this period, China became more assertive in its desires to reunify the mainland with Taiwan, in its military buildup to include a host of standoff weapon systems, and its general belligerence in the South China Sea.³ In the same decade China's military spending grew by 73%.⁴ These factors likely correspond to the increase in power China has experienced in recent decades as well as a feeling of relative security. However, as China continues to build out the One Road One Belt it will need to secure its interests at greater distances from the mainland. Given China's lack of deployment experience, and their proclivity

¹ See Appendix 5 for a complete list of values used in this chapter.

² David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48. CINC .199 in 2007. .142 in 1997. 29% change in 10 years.

³ Michael Pillsbury, *The Hundred Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015), 145-146; Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 231; David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 271-272.

⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database", http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (accessed October 26, 2015).

towards aggressive or at least antagonistic behavior it raises the question as to what the resulting experience will be.

By all accounts it seems likely that China's CINC score will continue to rise. Aaron L. Friedberg postulates that the PRC has a desire to become the "preponderant power in East Asia, and perhaps in Asia writ large."⁵ When placed in context of the CINC it gives the impression that an aggressive approach using military force is likely, but not absolute. Thus far, China has kept its growing military presence to its own sovereign territory and its littoral areas, but this still places China on the high end of the external security scale.⁶ Examples of this are China's 1979 invasion of Vietnam and their handling of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, a trend of becoming increasingly aggressive.⁷ More recently, the PLA conducted small deployments to Africa, but have yet to test their ability to project significant force at great distances.⁸ Regardless, Chinese history is replete with examples of warfare playing a major role in the establishment of all major political states, so there is no reason to believe that China's rise will differ.⁹

Need for Natural Resources

Chinese industrial expansion and growth of the middle class are driving China's almost unquenchable need for natural resources. In 1997, China had a PEC of 1,909,844

⁵ Friedberg, 157.

⁶ Shambaugh, 269.

⁷ Andrew Scobel, *China's Use of Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2003), 119-123, 171-181.

⁸ Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden, "What's Motivating China's Military Push in Africa?" *The Huffington Post*, July 2, 2015, online edition, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-olander/china-military-push-africa_b_7708368.html (accessed on October 31, 2015).

⁹ Peter Worthing, *A Military History of Modern China from the Manchu Conquest to Tian'anmen Square* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), vii-viii, 1.

MMTC.¹⁰ Ten years later China's PEC more than doubled to 4,116,892 MMTC.¹¹ In 2010, China became the largest consumer of energy in the world, largely due to the rapid industrialization of the country and the growing divide between an urban middle class and poor rural class.¹² In 2013, 68% of China's energy use came from coal—largely mined in China, 18% from oil, and the remaining 14% from renewable resources, natural gas, and nuclear power.¹³ That same year, China imported approximately a third of its oil from Africa, including Kenya.¹⁴ As the urban middle class in China continues to grow and become more affluent this percentage will increase substantially, making the One Road One Belt even more critical strategically, and will increase the need to pursue and acquire resources aggressively.¹⁵

While Sri Lanka does not offer the access to oil that Kenya does, it is a major exporter of textiles and rubber to China.¹⁶ Looking towards the future, the likely increase in cars for a growing middle class and large trucks to move consumer goods will increase the demand for rubber tires and other products, making Sri Lanka a valuable component in the One Road One Belt. Given these growth factors, China's need for natural resources is high and likely to increase aggression to ward off potential shortages, a rise in social unrest, and thus a threat to regime security.

¹⁰ Data only goes to 2007. Calculations made by author.

¹¹ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48. PEC for 1997 and 2007 taken and calculation made to determine that there was a 56% increase in ten years.

¹² Andrew Stocking and Terry Dinan, *China's Growing Energy Demand: Implications for the United States*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office Working Paper, June 2015), 3; Shambaugh, 73.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ The Observatory of Economic Complexity "What does Sri Lanka export to China? (2013)" http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/lka/chn/show/2013/ (accessed on October 27, 2015).

Form of Empire (Period of Industrialization; Nationalism; Foreign Policy Outlook)

Period of Industrialization

China did not reach the benchmark PEC score until 1934, or 104 years after Great Britain.¹⁷ Moreover, from 1977 to 2007, China's PEC rose 92%, further confirming previous analysis that points to China as a late industrializer.¹⁸ As highlighted earlier, China has a need primarily for oil, even though it's current ability to mine and burn coal accounts for 68% of their energy consumption.¹⁹ Finally, China's urban population grew 79% from 1979 to 2003 as part of the rapid migration from rural areas due to the industrialization going on at the time.²⁰ This rapid change in China's industrial base occurred late and it will continue to create demand for more resources to support the growing population migrating to these centers. Because of the rapid change the demand for raw materials to support industry continues and consumer demands of the more affluent population will likely increase.²¹ All of this points to China as a very late industrializer with respect to the other nations in this analysis and suggests a high likelihood for an aggressive demand to support a growing industrial base.

Level of Nationalism

China's brand of nationalism is different from those examined up to this point. Given Mao Tse Tung's influence in the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China falls in the Marxist category.²² This type of nationalism would include borrowing from other

¹⁷ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48. Calculation made by author subtracting 1934 from 1830.

¹⁸ Ibid. Author did the calculations.

¹⁹ Stocking and Dinan, 3.

²⁰ Song, Huasheng, Jacques-François Thisse, and Xiwei Zhu. "Urbanization and/or rural industrialization in China." *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 42, no. 1 (2012): 126.

²¹ Stocking and Dinan, 3. The CBO estimates a 45% increase in demand overall for China by 2040.

²² Ernest B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study it?" *International Organization* 40, no. 03 (Summer 1986): 732; Shambaugh, 27.

Marxists, a need to bring about a classless society, a permanent struggle, and hostility towards others.²³ Li Ta-chao, arguably the first Chinese Communist and acknowledged first leader of the party, used Marxism for solely nationalistic means.²⁴ His brand of nationalism was expressly anti-foreign, despite the paradox created with Marx' belief that nationalism was alienation, a human created form of idolatry, and true communism would overcome all forms of alienation, including nationalism.²⁵ Mao echoes this in published writings whereby he eschews the universal proletariat preached by Marx in favor of a wholly new brand of Chinese communism with a nationalist bent.²⁶ However, after the death of Mao, China began to change in specific ways. The concept of the China's Hundred Year Marathon shows a traditional syncretistic attitude, influenced by Confucianism.²⁷

However, as China begins to shake off a "century of humiliation" at the hands of the West, the Chinese may set aside traditional attempts to rationalize competing systems and become more aggressive. Additionally, the perception of a "century of humiliation" provides a common cause that the PRC can unite its citizens and further its brand of nationalism.²⁸ What is likely to happen as more and more of the One Road One Belt begins to materialize is that China's brand of Nationalism will lead to an assertive disregard for the concerns of the nations where construction is taking place—a reflection of the Chinese view of relativism of good and evil discussed earlier. While not directly

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 176-179.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Dan N. Jacobs and Hans H. Baerwald, eds., *Chinese Communism: Selected Documents*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 75-77.

²⁷ Haas, 733.

²⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 81.

tied to the One Road One Belt an example of this behavior took place in Tanzania when China built a power plant but dictated where the power could go, thus leaving the residents of Tanzania without power despite their need.²⁹ Further, there is a correlation between low IDV scores, as China, Sri Lanka, and Kenya all have, and a susceptibility to nationalist movements and the associated propaganda due to their society's unquestioning loyalty.³⁰ This presents a likelihood that all of these societies would be very susceptible to propaganda and support of nationalist movements.³¹

These examples are likely a lens to speculate about the future of the One Road One Belt, especially in poorer, developing countries, where the PRC will dictate the terms and use to their advantage and leave the indigenous citizens in the same, if not worse condition than before. Based on this analysis China's level of nationalism is assessed as high.

Foreign Policy Outlook

China's reluctance to engage in multilateral agreements, strategic nonalignment, and peaceful development points to a realist view of the world even though several authorities disagree on what type of realist viewpoint radiates from Beijing.³² Alastair Iain Johnston, through analysis of the Seven Military Classics and historic Ming dynasty

²⁹ Hilary Matfess, "Tanzania to Export Electricity While Most of its Citizens Lack Power," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, August 7, 2013, <http://fpif.org/tanzania-to-export-electricity-while-most-of-its-citizens-lack-power/> (accessed on September 4, 2015).

³⁰ Hofstede, 227; Suisheng Zhao, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?" *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005-06): 135.

³¹ Liza G. Steele and Scott M. Lynch, "The Pursuit of Happiness in China: Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being during China's Economic and Social Transformation," *Social Indicators Research* 114, no. 1 (November 2013): 444.

³² Hongying Wang, "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2000): 478. Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (Nov-Dec 2004): 55; Shambaugh, 31.

military leaders, argues that Chinese foreign policy is strictly influenced by offensive realists.³³ Conversely, Huiyun Feng concludes that China employs defensive realism in its foreign policy approach.³⁴ Finally Jack Snyder points out that China's realist-influenced foreign policy "is grounded in...ideas that date back millennia."³⁵ Hans Morgenthau distills realism down to "a state's interest is power, and power being anything that enables control of one over another."³⁶ This concept states Chinese foreign policy very succinctly. John Mearsheimer emphasizes that offensive realists seek to increase power in order to ensure survival, China's actions most closely resemble this behavior.³⁷

In the Cold War, China employed a realist-inspired foreign policy when it sought to balance power against the U.S. in the Korean War, and later with the U.S. as a balance against the Soviet Union.³⁸ In more recent years, China sought to increase its power regionally, the best example being in the South China Sea, while always refusing to engage in multilateral talks or agreements that might diminish or bind its power.³⁹ China's foreign policy outlook is most closely associated with offensive realism, and shows no indication of changing in the near future.

³³ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 249.

³⁴ Huiyun Feng, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War*, (London: Routledge, 2007), 1.

³⁵ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (Nov-Dec 2004): 55.

³⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power*, (1948. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973 ed.), 5, 9.

³⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 21.

³⁸ Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter, 1993-1994): 44.

³⁹ Chheang Vannarith, "Cambodia: With an Eye on China, Vietnam and Japan Move Closer," *Phnom Penh Khmer Times Online*, September 19, 2015, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/SER2015092714773309#index=1&searchKey=20682514&rpp=10 (Accessed on October 23, 2015); Shambaugh, 310.

Sustainment of Empire (Internal Stability; Culture Clash; Social Inequality)

Internal Stability

China remained fairly stable from 2000 to 2010 with a Rule of Law score of 4.5.⁴⁰ However, China's approach to law and order is draconian. In several cases Chinese ruling officials employed extreme measures to put down dissent, such as using lethal force against peaceful Tibetan protests in March 2008.⁴¹ They routinely jail citizens who oppose the party, such as Zhao Changqing and Xu Zhiyong, for promoting government transparency and anti-corruption.⁴² They restrict their citizens' access to the internet and social media websites in an effort to stymie efforts to access media and information not controlled by the state.⁴³ In the case of minority groups in China, such as the Uighurs in Xinjiang, protests in July 2009 over a previous fight between Uighur and Han Chinese factory workers were put-down and resulted in 156 killed.⁴⁴ While China makes every effort to project an image of a peaceful and content society the evidence suggests otherwise.⁴⁵ While the level of instability is likely manageable, the likelihood of increase

⁴⁰ Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015). Average value calculated by averaging the scores for Legal Order for China from 2000-2010.

⁴¹ Sophie Richardson, "I saw it with my own eyes," Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/07/21/i-saw-it-my-own-eyes/abuses-chinese-security-forces-tibet-2008-2010> (accessed October 26, 2015).

⁴² Amnesty International, "China: Rejection of detained activist's appeal makes a "mockery of justice," <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/china-rejection-of-detained-activist-s-appeal-makes-a-mockery-of-justice> (Accessed on October 26, 2015). These are only two examples of the heavy handed approach to dissent practiced in China.

⁴³ Beinia Xu, "Media Censorship in China," Council on Foreign Relations <http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515> (accessed October 26, 2015).

⁴⁴ Kyodo, "156 Killed In Xinjiang Clash, Biggest Ethnic Unrest in Decades," *Kyodo World Service*, July 6, 2015. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/JPP20090706969093#index=1&searchKey=20307833&rpp=10 (accessed on September 12, 2015).

⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch, "Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses," <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/13/tiger-chairs-and-cell-bosses/police-torture-criminal-suspects-china> (Accessed on October 26, 2015).

exists. Because of the means used to achieve stability, China will likely need to increase the frequency and intensity of its response to events that might undermine its ability to maintain control. After all, it spends close to 6% of its national budget on the People's Armed Police (PAP) versus nearly 9% on the military.⁴⁶ The PAP, similar to the Japanese military a century before, is the PRC's primary tool to suppress internal unrest.⁴⁷ The PAP was primarily responsible for the massacre at Tian'anmen Square along with the murder of a national party leader.⁴⁸ While this behavior is alarming it should come as no surprise when taken in the context of the Seven Military Classics which notes repeatedly the conduct of "righteous war" as suppressing or punishing rebellions.⁴⁹

The Rule of Law score is an indication of society's willingness to adhere to law rather than how it is imposed.⁵⁰ So, while a high Rule of Law score should place China on the high end of the scale for internal stability, their methods for achieving this place them at a moderate level on the scale due to the escalation potential inherent in their approach.

Culture Clash

Application of Hofstede's Values Survey Module (VSM) to enable a comparison of cultures between China, Kenya, and Sri Lanka indicates the likelihood of cultural friction. (See Table 3.1)

⁴⁶ Paul Dibb and John Lee, "Why China will not Become the Dominant Power in Asia" *Security Challenges* 10, no. 03 (2014): 10; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database", http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (Accessed October 26, 2015).

⁴⁷ Graham Hutchings, *Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 335.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Johnston, 69.

⁵⁰ Peter F. Nardulli, Buddy Peyton, and Joseph Bajjalieh, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Rule of Law Constructs, 1850–2010," *Journal of Law and Courts*, 1, no. 1, (March, 2013): 141.

Table 3.1: Cultural Comparison of China with Nations on the One Road One Belt⁵¹

VSM 94 Score - China						
	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
China	80	20	66	30	87	24
Sri Lanka	72	28	35	53	49	64
Kenya	64	27	41	52	32	40

The countries' initial values in the Power Distance Indicators (PDI) appear relatively close to each other. But, it is necessary to review what those values imply about the respective cultures. The PDI measures how different societies handle human inequality, and the degree of inequality in power between two entities, people or countries.⁵² Further, a high PDI can be indicative of perceptions that a few people in society should be independent while most should be dependent.⁵³ China's PDI is 8 points higher than Sri Lanka, but 16 points higher than Kenya, reflecting the Chinese Sino-centric view of the world with respect to independence, but also indicates how China will view the populations of Sri Lanka and Kenya as it builds up facilities in these countries.⁵⁴

Next, Individualism (IDV) measures the relationship between the individual and the collective that prevails in a given society.⁵⁵ A high IDV score indicates an "I" consciousness, or self-centeredness, while a low IDV score is indicative of people who are born into extended families or clans, or have a "We" consciousness.⁵⁶ The values of

⁵¹ Geert Hofstede, "VSM 2013," Geerte Hofstede, <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/vsm2013> (accessed September 19, 2015).

⁵² Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), 79, 83; Hofstede, "VSM 2013".

⁵³ Hofstede, 98.

⁵⁴ Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, *Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present* (New York: Prentice Hall, 2010), 8; John Agnew, "Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese Particularity," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51, no. 5 (2010): 577, 579.

⁵⁵ Hofstede, 209.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 227.

China, Sri Lanka, and Kenya are all within 8 points and are generally indicative of their respective societies, which will likely not be an area of friction.⁵⁷

However, the Long vs. Short Term Orientation (LTO) index suggests friction. This is a measurement based on results of the Chinese Value Survey in 1985.⁵⁸ The LTO is reminiscent of the teachings of Confucius and encompasses the ability to solve well-defined problems.⁵⁹ East Asian countries score highest in this category, Western countries on the low side, and third world countries the lowest.⁶⁰ A high LTO, such as China's, indicates persistence, perseverance, and a common sense of shame, or good and evil, remain dependent on the circumstance.⁶¹ A low LTO indicates an expectation of quick results, respect for traditions, importance of leisure time, a belief in absolute guidelines about good and evil, and government by law.⁶² Additionally, shame is not a common feeling.⁶³

The LTO measurement indicates several issues on the horizon. First, the difference in values between China and Sri Lanka is very significant. This difference would indicate that there will be issues on the conduct of the projects under way in each country. Allegations earlier this year that the previous Sri Lankan president, Mahinda

⁵⁷ Maurice Freedman, "The Family in China, Past and Present," *Pacific Affairs* 34, no. 04 (Winter 1961-1962): 324; Claudia Buchmann, "Family Structure, Parental Perceptions, and Child Labor in Kenya: What Factors Determine Who is Enrolled in School?" *Social Forces* 78, no. 04 (Jun., 2000): 1350; Swarna Jayaweera, "Continuity and Change: Women Workers in Garment and Textile Industries in Sri Lanka," in *Tracking Gender Equity under Economic Reforms: Continuity and Change in South Asia*, eds. Swapna Mukhopadhyay and Ratna M. Sudarshan (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2003), 198-226. Each of these articles and books provide insight into the family dynamics in the respective countries. As with the chapter on Sri Lanka, the family dynamics are discussed throughout and provided the author the general understanding of family dynamics in Sri Lanka.

⁵⁸ Hofstede, 351.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., 360, 366.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

Rajapaksa, borrowed heavily from China to finance infrastructure projects suggests defaulting on these loans would give the Chinese “ownership” of strategic port facilities in Colombo without Sri Lankan oversight.⁶⁴ The implication is that China offered quick loans at amounts they knew the Sri Lankan government would be unable to pay back in order to gain leverage over a key port to the One Road One Belt. This is just one example, but is likely to be replayed in various forms across the breadth and depth of the One Road One Belt.⁶⁵ China’s understanding of the problem and their willingness to use the likelihood of default to serve their own good indicates that their perception of good and evil are purely relative to the achievement of their own long-term interests.

Social Inequality

China’s Human Development Index (HDI) score has been trending toward increasing inequality since 2010.⁶⁶ In 2013, China scored .719 which ranked them 91st in the world, below Tunisia. The same UN report emphasizes this fact by pointing out that China’s poorest 40% have experienced a substantial decrease in the level of consumption, a reduction in the availability of health care, and a significant loss of jobs in certain textile industries suggesting growing inequality in the society as a whole.⁶⁷ Despite the PRC’s launch of “Harmonious Development” in 2005, or the balance of growth between

⁶⁴ East Asia Forum, “Controversy over Chinese Investment in Sri Lanka” June 5, 2015, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/05/controversy-over-chinese-investment-in-sri-lanka/> (accessed October 27, 2015). Ryan Manuel, “One Belt, One Road, Many Mixed Messages,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, September 1, 2015, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/One-Belt-One-Road-many-mixed-messages> (accessed October 23, 2015).

⁶⁵ Avinash Godbole, “Indian Commentary Analyzes Foreign Policy Strategy of China under Leadership of Xi Jinping,” *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 03 (May 1, 2015), 298-302. This article provides further insight into the implications of the One Road One Belt.

⁶⁶ United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience* (New York, 2014), 36-38, 161.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 39, 90, 122.

urban and rural areas, there are striking inequalities at the regional and provincial levels that result in tension.⁶⁸ The increasing stratification amongst regions of China presents internal challenges, to the extent that it appears two different countries might emerge. China historically relied on the “peasant workers” in rural areas to provide the abundance of food, but the dynamic continues to shift as workers continue to migrate to cities.⁶⁹ Further, these workers are treated as second class citizens in the cities indicating a compounding the split between classes.⁷⁰

As pointed out in the methodology, this type of growing division among “classes” in a society can create further separations in the division of labor. In the past twenty years, the reform of state-owned enterprises, once considered a solid life-long job, resulted in the lay-offs of millions of workers.⁷¹ Growing Chinese cities found themselves faced with large populations of unemployed workers.⁷² Additionally, the separation of classes began to have more impact on the outlook for China’s college graduates. Increasingly, these graduates are unable to find white-collar positions and remain unemployed or compete with the “lower classes” for menial or agricultural positions.⁷³ The increasing stratification creates an added strain because these lower

⁶⁸ Shenggen Fan, Ravi Kanbur, Xiaobo Zhang, “China’s Regional Disparities: Experience and Policy,” *Review of Development Finance* 1, no. 1 (January-March 2011): 47-48; Wang Hongxin and Wang Hao, “Harmonious Development: China Ways in the Face of Fast Urbanization,” Proceedings of 2008 Conference on Regional Economy and Sustainable Development, ed. J. Hung, Z. Ruimei, and W. Zhang. 2008, Allawah Nsw: M D Forum. 76. The coastal regions of China have a GDP twice as high as the inner, more rural regions of the country. The coastal regions include Beijing, Liaoning, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shaghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Harmonious Development is an effort to balance the rapid growth of urban areas with the more rural areas.

⁶⁹ Ma Rong, “Population Growth and Urbanization,” in *Understanding Contemporary China*, ed. Robert E. Gamer (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 228-231, 238.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 242-243.

⁷¹ Martin King Whyte, “China’s Post-Socialist Inequality,” *Current History* 111, no. 746 (September 2012): 232.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., 233.

classes find it increasingly difficult for their children to matriculate into schools because of the competition with middle to upper class families who already dominate over 75% of admittance.⁷⁴ China could choose to use these unemployed masses to build portions of the One Road One Belt, a possibility that could have significant impact on Sri Lanka, Kenya, or any other country associated with the One Road One Belt. China routinely employs its own citizens in construction projects overseas, which has begun to cause discord among local workers who find themselves unemployed.⁷⁵ If China were to employ its unemployed to build the One Road One Belt, in an effort to mitigate internal problems associated with social inequality, it would increasingly agitate relations with foreign nations and decrease the likelihood of success without the need for military force.

As China continues to grow it is very likely that their classes will continue to move further apart. China is repeating the same trend as Japan by squeezing its peasant classes to greater and greater degrees as the nation become more industrialized. While there has been no large scale reaction by the relatively pacified lower classes to the stratification of society, the loss of entitlements, and shrinking educational opportunities may serve as an eventual catalyst.⁷⁶ China is likely poised to have some form of reaction to this division of society. While there is no guarantee of success when the lower classes react, the response by the PRC will likely be reminiscent of their treatment of the

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Chris Alden & Martyn Davies, "A profile of the operations of Chinese Multinationals in Africa," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Summer/Autumn, 2006): 94; World Bank, "Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled International Labor Organization estimate)," 2011-2015, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS> (accessed March 6, 2016). According to the World Bank, Kenya had 17.4% youth unemployment (ages 15-24) from 2011 to 2015, or almost a fifth of its workforce without work but available for and seeking employment. Sri Lanka was at 19.1% for the same period.

⁷⁶ Alvin Y. So, "The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 33, no. 03 (August 2003): 363-364.

Tibetans or Uighurs. Similar to Internal Stability, the level of social inequality could create enough internal friction that China's efforts to build or maintain the One Road One Belt will fall short either by the need to increasingly focus on domestic issues, or in reaction to nations where the One Road One Belt is being built. Therefore, China's degree of social inequality is high.

Conclusion

The application of the conditions and categories in Table 3.2 shows China will likely experience short term success with this economic expansion, but long term success is highly unlikely. While China's expansion in some ways resembles that of Imperial Japan, its strong desire for resources, with little actual colonization more closely resembles the U.S. brand of imperialism outlined in the previous chapter.⁷⁷ China's One Road One Belt plan has the promise to bring a dynamic economy to portions of the world that likely need the infusion of capital. Up to this point, China's motivations for expansion have been largely economic and pseudo-territorial when compared to Great Britain (physical and economic), Japan (physical and economic), and the U.S. (non-territorial, ideological, and economic).⁷⁸ However, when examining a small portion of this plan, with the methodology established, it becomes very clear that China's current expansion could eventually lead to a need to seize territory to maintain the expansion. This conclusion is in contrast to conclusions of the Chinese as published by Michael Swaine that largely depict the One Road One Belt and the larger strategic efforts of China

⁷⁷ Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), 15-17.

⁷⁸ Shambaugh, 310.

as relatively benign.⁷⁹ Conversely, other Asian nations have shown a growing angst over the implications of this plan, specifically that unless they play by China's rules they will be punished, through fear of China's perceived willingness to use force, and China's aversion to appealing to international organizations to settle possible disputes.⁸⁰

While the Chinese have a slightly higher level of internal stability, level of social inequality is higher than that of the Japanese. In all likelihood that degree of inequality will drive the level of internal stability lower in the coming years, which could precipitate a retraction of their economic expansion.

Table 3.2: China Analysis Results

Conditions	Categories	China	Japan 1921-1945
Motives for Expansion	External Security	High	Low
	Need for Natural Resources	High	High
Form of Empire	Period of Industrialization	Late	Late
	Level of Nationalism	High	High
	Foreign Policy Outlook	Offensive Realist	Offensive Realist
Sustainment of Empire	Internal Stability	Moderate	Low
	Culture Clash	High	High
	Social Inequality	High	Moderate

⁷⁹ Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 44 (Summer, 2014): 6-7, 14, 27; Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 47 (Summer, 2015): 5-9, 13-16.

⁸⁰ David Arse, "China's Two Silk Roads: Implications for Southeast Asia," Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, January 22, 2015, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/SEL2015012220899008#index=1&searchKey=21153238&rpp=10 (accessed on December 19, 2015).

When the methods used to maintain internal stability and deal with growing social inequality are taken in context with China's international outlook and practices, there is once again a strong resemblance to Japan one hundred years earlier. While Japan falls on the opposite end of the spectrum from Great Britain, China arguably falls even farther to the extreme than Japan. What this evaluation depicts is an aggressive economic plan with strategic ramifications that will increase the need for resources and yet lower the equitable distribution and opportunities for these resources in the next several decades. When it does it will create the opportunity for the United States to reassert itself and its power in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. In the meantime, China's internal struggle will afford the U.S. chances to develop regional allies and alliances to hasten the inevitable strategic outcome and maintain influence.

Intentionally left blank

Chapter 4: Rough Seas Ahead, Please Tighten Your Seat Belts

As demonstrated in the previous two chapters, analysis of a small portion of China's One Road One Belt shows a nation that is rapidly expanding in an imperial manner resembling both Japan prior to World War II and the United States during the Cold War. The methodology shows modern day China existing on an extreme end of the spectrum bookended by Great Britain and Japan. The United States falls in the middle of the spectrum and appears to be much like a ship being tossed about on rough seas. Looking at specific comparisons from Table 4.1 better highlight the seemingly inevitable outcome of China's current path.

Table 4.1: Complete Results

Conditions	Categories	Great Britain 1861-1899	Japan 1921-1945	United States 1945-1991	China
Motives for Expansion	External Security	High	Low	Moderate	High
	Need for Natural Resources	Moderate	High	High	High
Form of Empire	Period of Industrialization	Early	Late	Early	Late
	Level of Nationalism	High	High	High	High
	Foreign Policy Outlook	Commercial Liberalist	Offensive Realist	Neoliberalist	Offensive Realist
Sustainment of Empire	Internal Stability	High	Low	High	Moderate
	Culture Clash	Moderate	High	Low	High
	Social Inequality	Low	Moderate	Low	High

When looking at the motives for expansion holistically, China more closely resembles Japan than either Great Britain or the United States. However, regarding external security China is not much different than the U.S. working to foster a system of rules conducive to its political and economic wellbeing, albeit with a pseudo-territorial interest as demonstrated by its island building in the oil rich South China Sea and its high interest bankrolling of infrastructure projects in South Asia and Africa. Moreover, China's recent proclivity towards aggressive behavior raises the question as to what its resulting experience will be.¹ China's Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores are comparable to those of the United States at roughly the same time, but still not as high as Great Britain's at the peak of its empire.² At this point, the One Road One Belt plan remains an economic endeavor, but the possibility exists for a need to seize territory and therefore resources. Should this come to pass, the One Road One Belt will require aggressive security at great distances, and history has shown that China's behavior is more aggressive than that of Great Britain, and arguably equivalent to Japan, especially in its willingness to use violence to achieve self-serving goals. This is amplified by a recent survey by the Pew Research Center that shows the majority of China's neighbors (e.g., 91% in the Philippines to 62% in India) are very concerned over territorial disputes with China.³

¹ David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 309-310.

² David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48.

³ Pew Research Center, "Concern about Territorial Disputes with China," Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/02/how-asia-pacific-publics-see-each-other-and-their-national-leaders/asia-map/> (accessed on February 4, 2016).

Unlike the United States, China does not have the luxury of being rich in natural resources and, therefore, desperately needs to expand access to secure resources. China's large population and some of the highest rates of consumption in the world further indicate a growing urgency in its need for resources. Moreover, it lacks the energy reserves of the United States. This trend is eerily similar to the plight of Japan in the years leading to WWII.⁴ Moreover, China's increased demand for natural resources, while portrayed as beneficial to all by China, is beginning to create global alarm.⁵

China again most closely resembles a form of empire like that of Japan. China is a late industrializer, even more so than Japan. For instance, in 1977 China had a Primary Energy Consumption (PEC) of 742,712 MMTC.⁶ This PEC is equivalent to the PEC of the U.S. in 1918 and Great Britain in 1919.⁷ From 1977 to 2007, China's PEC rose 92%, a growth rate greater than Japan's from 1921 to 1945.⁸ When considered in concert with the need for natural resources, China is expanding to feed a rapid industrialization with natural resources, a finite entity, and represents an alarming rate of growth. There will come a point when China will have to seize control of resources, which its current financial tactics set the stage for, in order to maintain its industry. As these resources

⁴ International Energy Data and Analysis, "China's Key Energy Statistics," China <http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=CHN> (accessed on October 27, 2015); Kennedy, 419.

⁵ Interview, "China's Peaceful Development Initiatives to Benefit Itself and Others: U.S. Expert," *Xinhua*, September 2, 2015.
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/CHR2015090258219380#index=1&searchKey=20406467&rpp=10 (Accessed on September 4, 2015); United Nations Environmental Program, "China Outpacing Rest of World in Natural Resource Use," UNEP News Center, August 2, 2013.
<http://www.unep.org/NewsCentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2723&ArticleID=9584> (accessed on February 22, 2016).

⁶ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 19-48.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid. Author did the calculations.

become more scarce, other nations will behave similarly—a recipe for disaster and an escalation of violence.

China, and the other nations considered in the case studies, evaluate as having a high level of nationalism. While on its own, nationalism does not appear to be a significant factor according to the methodology, it becomes an amplifying consideration in the context of external security, culture clash, and foreign policy outlook. The high level of nationalism will continue to spark and serve as a justification for the aggressiveness China demonstrated, making these other categories more relevant.

China's offensive-realism oriented world view will serve to amplify its aggressiveness much in the same way as its level of nationalism. Going back to Morgenthau's premise that realism is simply the interest in power, then China's One Road One Belt is the power play. All of China's foreign policy directed at this expansion is to gain power over resources, power over neighbors, and power over the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions of the world.

China's Moderate level of internal security should raise concern as well. China maintained a fairly stable trend in Rule of Law from 2000 to 2010, only increasing by 2% in that time period, a positive move.⁹ Compared to Great Britain and the United States, this would indicate a nation that is very stable domestically, contributing to an ability to expand outward. However, the Rule of Law data is misleading in that it does represent a strong sense of order domestically, but it does not represent how that order is established. As shown in the previous chapter, China's internal security is heavy handed and it begs

⁹ Data only goes to 2010. 4.51 in 2010. 4.43 in 2000. 2% change in 10 years.

the question as to how long China can maintain this approach vis-à-vis domestic stability before the lower class revolts.

Culturally, friction points will arise the farther China expands beyond the Asia-Pacific Region. Hofstede's model clearly shows this in the differences between Sri Lanka and Kenya. China's Sino-centric cultural underpinnings create a feeling of cultural superiority stemming from the nation's longevity combined with an ambivalent attitude toward other countries.¹⁰ Much like Japan's view of superiority over the rest of Asia in the run up to World War II, China views itself as culturally superior.¹¹ The Sino-centric outlook means that the Chinese expect other countries to assimilate to their ways. Expressed another way, the Chinese have a mentality similar to colonial masters in that they regard other cultures as savages.¹² Ultimately, these views and friction points will cause other nations to pull away and resent the Chinese influence. This will present an opportunity for the U.S to leverage these nations' desires to maintain their cultural identities as it did in the Philippines in WWII.

China has the highest level of social inequality measured in this study. When viewed in the context of the rapid industrialization creating a greater gap between lower and middle classes the level of instability becomes even higher. Put another way, China is making few efforts to stem the degree of inequality in ways that Great Britain or the U.S. might consider. These factors suggest a point where the internal stability of China

¹⁰ Ernest B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study it?" *International Organization* 40, no. 03 (Summer 1986): 733; Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, *Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present* (New York: Prentice Hall, 2010), 6.

¹¹ Kevin M. Doak, "Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 22, no. 01 (Winter, 1996): 97-98.

¹² Elleman and Paine, 8.

becomes so weak that it has no choice but to abandon its imperial aims, or escalate oppression of an order similar to Tiananmen Square.

This analysis shows China's One Road One Belt is a plan that will ultimately fail due to its inability to sustain an empire based on acquisition of resources and, to a lesser degree, power when its neighbors fear the motives for expansion. The interrelation of the categories and conditions of the methodology present a China that is expanding at a rate greater than Japan prior to World War II and time has shown that that model is not sustainable without conflict, either internally or externally. While China and Japan are very similar, they differ in both internal stability and social inequality in that they are almost the inverse of each other. This potentially creates a situation where the level of social inequality will affect the level of internal stability to a point that China is unable to maintain its international expansion while also addressing its domestic situation. Conversely, sustainment of the expansion for long periods of time is not possible without something giving way, much in the same way Great Britain pulled back from its empire in the mid twentieth-century because it was unsustainable. China will likely begin to feel the strains of their plan in the next two decades. Ironically, the United States only needs to simply use Chinese foreign policy as espoused by Deng Xiaoping, and "hide our [intentions] and bide our time."¹³ Similarly, in a speech on December 14, 2015 Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work said, "China's words have been about peaceful rise, and about defense. But its actions will be the true test of its commitment to peace and stability

¹³ Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng," *China Quarterly*, no 142 (June 1995): 301.

in the current international order.”¹⁴ By encouraging China’s expansion the U.S. is simply allowing the PRC to facilitate its own failure due to its inconsistent behaviors.¹⁵ Further, this collapse allows the U.S. to strengthen, reinforce, or reestablish its partnerships, presence, and unity of effort in the Asia-Pacific Theater, goals specifically outlined in the 2013 United States Pacific Command (PACOM) strategy. By default of its expansion and the resulting issues, China will alienate the people, leaders, and countries of the One Road One Belt, providing the necessary conditions to reinforce or expand U.S. interests provided America maintains its presence and partnership with its allies in the Pacific.¹⁶

¹⁴ Honorable Bob Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech CNAS Defense Forum December 14, 2015,” Department of Defense Website <http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum> (accessed on February 4, 2016).

¹⁵ Shambaugh, 316.

¹⁶ United States Pacific Command, *2013 USPACOM Strategy* (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, January 22, 2013), 3, 7-8.

Intentionally left blank

Appendix 1: A Note on Quantitative Data

To better assess the trends and dynamics of each country in a quantitative manner required specific studies and indices. David Singer's data sets, used in the *Correlates of War: I Research Origins and Rationale*, are significant because they show general trends in the security, need for natural resources, and period of industrialization categories.¹ The Correlates of War (COW) also provide data on a nation's need for natural resources and period of industrialization. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score is a measure computed by summing all observations on 6 capability components for a given year.² Those components are: iron and steel production in thousands of tons, military expenditures in U.S. dollars, number of military personnel in thousands, primary energy consumption in thousands of coal-ton equivalents, total population in thousands, and urban population living in cities with a population greater than 100,000 in thousands.³ Using the data set of Primary Energy Consumption (PEC), measured in thousands of coal-tons, this quantitative trend line is determined. The PEC values come from the equation $\text{Primary Energy Consumption} = ((\text{Energy Production} + \text{Energy Imports}) - \text{Energy Exports}) - \text{Change in Domestic Stocks}$.⁴ PEC comes from (and is computed using data about) four broad categories of sources—coal, petroleum, electricity, and natural gas.⁵

¹ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48.

² Correlates of War Project, "National Material Capabilities," Correlates of War Project Website, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities> (accessed October 17, 2015).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Correlates of War Project, "National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0, June 2010" Correlates of War Project Website, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/nmc-codebook> (accessed October 17, 2015).

⁵ Ibid.

The category of culture clash will use data and concepts from Geert Hofstede's *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*. Specifically, the data gathered from Hofstede's Value Survey Module (VSM) will demonstrate where cultures different are likely to work well together, or create friction points. The comparison of power distance index (PDI), masculinity and femininity index (MAS), individualism (IDV), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), long term orientation (LTO), and indulgence versus restraint index (IVR) values will show trends where different cultures can likely expect conflict.⁶

Specifically, the power distance index (PDI) is a measurement of how different societies handle human inequality, and can further measure the degree of inequality in power between two entities (people or countries).⁷ A high PDI can be indicative of perceptions that a few people in society should be independent while most should be dependent.⁸ Power is a basic fact in society, its legitimacy is irrelevant; therefore, power holders are entitled to privilege.⁹ A low PDI equals a belief that all people should be independent, society should minimize inequality, and power use should be legitimate.¹⁰

The masculinity and femininity index (MAS) accounts for how different societies cope in different ways with respect to the duality of the sexes.¹¹ Societies have had to cope in different ways and this manifests across the breadth and depth of a society.¹² A high MAS shows a belief in individual decisions, promotion by protection, and is more

⁶ Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences*, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), 9-11; 432-433.

⁷ Ibid., 79 and 83.

⁸ Ibid., 98.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 279-280.

¹² Ibid.

likely a score from a poor country.¹³ A low MAS accounts for a belief in group decisions, promotion by merit, and is likely to be found in rich countries.¹⁴

Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) is not the same thing as risk avoidance, but accounts for a society's known uncertainty of the future, the anxiety that comes with it, and how a people will cope through technology, law, and religion.¹⁵ A high UAI value represents a society where expression of emotions are normal, rules should not be broken, there is a suspicion of foreigners, and only known risks are taken.¹⁶ Therefore, a low UAI indicates a society where emotions have to be controlled, rules can be broken if necessary, there is acceptance of foreigners, and a willingness to take unknown risks.¹⁷

The basis for the long term orientation (LTO) measurement comes from Hofstede's Chinese Value Survey conducted in 1985, and encompasses what extent virtuous living is a goal, as well as the ability to solve well-defined problems.¹⁸ The LTO is reminiscent of teachings of Confucius; therefore, East Asian countries score highest in this category, Western countries on the low side, and third world countries the lowest.¹⁹

Individualism (IDV) describes the relationship between the individual and the collective that prevails in a given society.²⁰ A high IDV score is representative of individualism, and a person's right to a private life.²¹ Conversely, a low IDV is representative of people born into extended families or clans, which protect them in

¹³ Ibid., 298-299.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 145-146.

¹⁶ Ibid., 160-161.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 351.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 209.

²¹ Ibid., 227.

exchange for loyalty or a collective orientation.²² A low IDV is indicative of a shame culture.²³

Finally, the indulgence versus restraint index (IVR) is actually two measurements, indulgence and restraint. Indulgence, a high score, stands for a society which allows relatively free gratification of some desires and feelings, especially those that have to do with leisure, merrymaking with friends, spending, consumption, and sex.²⁴ Restraint, or a low score, is the opposite of indulgence and stands for a society which controls such gratification, and where people feel less able to enjoy their lives.²⁵

Rule of Law Data, from the Cline Center for Democracy, provides an excellent way to observe trends in civil unrest and crimes, thus providing trend lines to assess internal stability.²⁶ The values represent a quantitative measurement gauging the role of law as a constraint on the behavior of both citizens and government officials as well as an indicator of the extent to which a nation institutionalized a law-based social order is the state of its legal infrastructure.²⁷ Specifically, the data accounts for how effective a nation is in realizing the ideals and principles of the rule of law by measuring the education of aspiring lawyers, the regulation of legal decision-makers (e.g., judges, lawyers, paraprofessionals), the ability to provide for on-going professional education, and the conduct of intellectual dialogues on legal matters.²⁸

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Geert Hofstede, "VSM 2013," Geert Hofstede, <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/vsm2013> (accessed September 19, 2015).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

Finally, the United Nations Development Program offers the Human Development Index (HDI), which evaluates categories such as GDP, life expectancy, and earnings into an assessment of the well-being of individuals in a nation.²⁹ These values provide general trends when evaluating social inequalities in various countries.

²⁹ United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Index” Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed October 8, 2015); Nicholas Crafts, “The Human Development Index 1870-1999: Some Revised Estimates,” *European Review of Economic History*, 6, no. 03 (December 2002), 396.

²⁹ Ibid.

Intentionally left blank

Appendix 2: Respective Values for Great Britain¹

Great Britain 1861-1899				
Year	CINC	ROL	PEC	HDI
1861	0.2583892	3.943085194	81520	
1862	0.2505943	3.92553544	82989	
1863	0.2509915	3.920239925	87608	
1864	0.2433951	3.883038282	90450	
1865	0.2564121	3.885656834	93014	
1866	0.2482816	4.043929577	95236	
1867	0.2531385	4.016555786	95812	
1868	0.2531005	4.130259514	97358	
1869	0.2463554	4.171539783	100633	
1870	0.2416341	4.169472694	103698	0.500
1871	0.2415633	4.092517376	108646	
1872	0.2377545	4.087537766	112120	
1873	0.2324554	4.05929327	117821	
1874	0.2316298	4.052242756	115524	
1875	0.2355151	4.069392681	120906	
1876	0.2349572	3.998011351	120198	
1877	0.2332203	3.983489752	121069	
1878	0.2282531	3.908210754	119929	
1879	0.2236606	3.865664959	120249	
1880	0.2184708	3.921833277	131039	
1881	0.2164771	3.940221071	138269	
1882	0.2116762	3.934479713	139087	
1883	0.2113786	3.913343668	144374	
1884	0.2080532	3.926947594	140583	
1885	0.2157365	3.969902277	139339	
1886	0.200533	3.952446461	137935	
1887	0.1946572	3.945314407	141800	
1888	0.1886506	3.94133091	147484	
1889	0.1892983	3.958654165	152628	

¹ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48; Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015); United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Index" Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed October 8, 2015).

Great Britain (Continued)				
Year	CINC	ROL	PEC	HDI
1890	0.1794749	3.936350107	156388	
1891	0.1783746	3.891365767	158759	
1892	0.1729992	3.897987127	156213	
1893	0.1703931	3.885467052	139713	
1894	0.1779257	3.876388788	159644	
1895	0.1719241	3.88283205	161765	
1896	0.1736574	3.857701063	165596	
1897	0.1658213	3.83894515	170127	
1898	0.1574313	3.817817688	170616	
1899	0.1686449	3.823084831	183524	

Appendix 3: Respective Values for Japan¹

Japan: 1921-1945				
Year	CINC	ROL	PEC	HDI
1913				0.466
1921	0.0424822	2.444355249	28323	
1922	0.0408667	2.448935509	30457	
1923	0.0396947	2.453454256	32325	
1924	0.0421336	2.45791316	34193	
1925	0.0397	2.46231389	35578	
1926	0.0406716	2.466657639	36028	
1927	0.0402106	2.470946074	39288	
1928	0.0396984	2.475180626	40968	
1929	0.0396826	2.479362726	42324	
1930	0.0398823	2.483493328	39844	
1931	0.0411423	2.487573862	37235	
1932	0.0488892	2.49160552	37878	
1933	0.0491846	2.495589733	42393	
1934	0.0493325	2.499526978	47521	
1935	0.0468279	2.503418922	50666	
1936	0.0463168	2.507266283	49942	
1937	0.0534113	2.511070251	53902	
1938	0.0590805	2.514831543	56939	
1939	0.0590574	2.51855135	60216	
1940	0.0507177	2.522230625	66212	
1941	0.0666311	2.525870085	66842	
1942	0.0614425	2.529470682	64275	
1943	0.060228	2.533032894	66476	
1944	0.0670793	2.536558151	61792	
1945	0.0528761	2.540046692	34266	
1950				0.676

¹ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48; Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015); United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Index" Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed October 8, 2015).

Intentionally left blank

Appendix 4: Respective Values for the United States¹

United States 1945-1991				
Year	CINC	ROL	PEC	HDI
1945	0.3838635	3.959189177	1219068	
1946	0.3639884	3.966113091	1188144	
1947	0.3099419	3.972963572	1315777	
1948	0.2946597	3.979742289	1396394	
1949	0.2731664	3.986450672	1199344	
1950	0.284443	3.99309063	1241836	0.851
1951	0.3194995	3.999662876	1325948	
1952	0.3113674	4.006169319	1309824	
1953	0.3111584	4.012610912	1347597	
1954	0.2809401	4.018989563	1302449	
1955	0.2664225	4.025305271	1415958	
1956	0.2606138	4.031560898	1492506	
1957	0.2550486	4.037755966	1494767	
1958	0.23447	4.04389286	1437859	
1959	0.2289647	4.049972057	1513627	
1960	0.2154438	4.055994511	1421218	
1961	0.2106549	4.061962128	1447002	
1962	0.2099114	4.067874908	1508570	
1963	0.2079665	4.07373476	1589655	
1964	0.2029826	4.079541683	1610682	
1965	0.2015391	4.085297585	1700357	
1966	0.2086695	4.091002464	1784048	
1967	0.2085481	4.096657276	1903194	
1968	0.2039257	4.102263927	1985402	
1969	0.1975469	4.107821941	2034492	
1970	0.1798439	4.113333225	2469126	0.881
1971	0.1688821	4.118797779	2497135	
1972	0.1632864	4.124217033	2576787	
1973	0.1571975	4.129591465	2672528	
1974	0.1513209	4.134921551	2621686	
1975	0.1425023	4.140208244	2570153	

¹ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48; Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015); United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Index" Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed October 8, 2015).

United States 1945-1991 (Continued)				
1976	0.1408845	4.145452023	2715656	
1977	0.1401722	4.150654316	2805234	
1978	0.1381623	4.155815125	2818576	
1979	0.1356744	4.160934925	2866804	
1980	0.1317046	4.166014671	2799174	
1981	0.1365281	4.171055317	2713720	
1982	0.1281606	4.176056862	2594129	
1983	0.131504	4.18102026	2597045	
1984	0.1313398	4.185946465	3177672	
1985	0.1332526	4.190834999	3161485	
1986	0.1320948	4.195687294	3285852	
1987	0.1312786	4.200503349	3430381	
1988	0.1327556	4.205284119	3725148	
1989	0.1466928	4.210030079	3844484	
1990	0.139376	4.214741707	3936181	0.858
1991	0.1355988	4.219419479	4041865	

Appendix 5: Respective Values for China¹

China				
Year	CINC	ROL	PEC	HDI
1997	0.1420133	4.408486366	1909844	
1998	0.1471962	4.416514874	1800368	
1999	0.1506723	4.424118996	1912317	
2000	0.1557135	4.431308746	2034879	0.591
2001	0.1585387	4.438090801	2077386	
2002	0.1673592	4.444469452	2237503	
2003	0.1692473	4.450447559	2619506	
2004	0.1825703	4.459866047	3107549	
2005	0.1839221	4.468893051	3420636	0.645
2006	0.1902642	4.477537155	3798933	
2007	0.1985779	4.485802174	4116892	
2008				0.682
2010				0.701

¹ David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48; Cline Center for Democracy, "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)," SID Rule of Law – Data, <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (Accessed on October 9, 2015); United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Index" Human Development Reports, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed October 8, 2015).

Intentionally left blank

Bibliography

- Agence France-Presse. "First 'Silk Road' train arrives in Tehran from China," Yahoo News Website, entry posted February 15, 2016. <http://news.yahoo.com/first-silk-road-train-arrives-tehran-china-134703954.html> (accessed on February 15, 2016).
- Agnew, John. "Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese Particularity." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51, no. 5 (2010): 569-82.
- Alden, Chris and Martyn Davies. "A profile of the operations of Chinese Multinationals in Africa." *South African Journal of International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Summer/Autumn, 2006): 83-96.
- Amnesty International. "China: Rejection of detained activist's appeal makes a 'mockery of justice'." News. <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/china-rejection-of-detained-activist-s-appeal-makes-a-mockery-of-justice> (accessed on October 26, 2015).
- Arse, David. "China's Two Silk Roads: Implications for Southeast Asia." Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, entry posted January 22, 2015. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_1211_23_43/content/Display/SEL2015012220899008#index=1&searchKey=21153238&rp=10 (accessed on December 19, 2015).
- Asada, Sadao. *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
- Bagolin, Izete and Flavio Comim. "Human Development Index (HDI) and its Family of Indexes: An Evolving Critical Review." *Revista De Economia* 34, no. 2 (2008): 7-28.
- Barnhart, Michael A. *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.
- Bartlett, Christopher J. *The Rise and Fall of Pax Americana: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974.
- Beasley, William G. *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Begley, Thomas M. and David P. Boyd. "Why Don't they Like Us Overseas? Organizing US Business Practices to Manage Culture Clash." *Organizational Dynamics* 32, no. 4 (2003): 357-71.

- Betts, Richard K. "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War." *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 34-77.
- Betts, Raymond F. *Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth Century*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.
- Buchmann, Claudia. "Family Structure, Parental Perceptions, and Child Labor in Kenya: What Factors Determine Who is Enrolled in School?" *Social Forces* 78, no. 4 (June 2000): 1349-78.
- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002.
- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2006). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006.
- Carbaugh, Donal. "From Cognitive Dichotomies to Cultural Discourses: Hofstede, Fouge`re and Moulettes in Conversation." *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 2, no. 1 (February 21, 2007): 1-6.
- Cline Center for Democracy. "Rule of Law Data File (Excel Format)." SID Rule of Law – Data. <http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/sid/rule/> (accessed on October 9, 2015).
- Correlates of War Project. "National Material Capabilities Data Documentation Version 4.0, June 2010." Correlates of War Project Website, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/nmc-codebook> (accessed October 17, 2015).
- Crafts, Nicholas. "The Human Development Index, 1870–1999: Some Revised Estimates." *European Review of Economic History* 6, no. 3 (December 2002): 395-405.
- Crowley, James B. *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- de Tocqueville, Alexis. *Democracy in America Vol I*. 1835. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1956.
- Dewey, John. *Liberalism and Social Action*. Vol. 74. New York: Capricorn Books, 1963.
- Dibb, Paul and John Lee. "Why China Will Not Become the Dominant Power in Asia." *Security Challenges* 10, no. 3 (2014): 1-21.
- Doak, Kevin M. "Ethnic Nationalism and Romanticism in Early Twentieth-Century Japan." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 22, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 77-103.

- Dorsey, James M. "China and the Middle East: Embarking on a Strategic Approach." *Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentary*, no. 183 (September 16, 2014).
<https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/38402/CO14183.pdf?sequence=1>
 (accessed September 4, 2015).
- East Asia Forum, "Controversy over Chinese Investment in Sri Lanka" June 5, 2015,
<http://www.easiaforum.org/2015/06/05/controversy-over-chinese-investment-in-sri-lanka/> (accessed October 27, 2015).
- Elleman, Bruce A. and SCM Paine. *Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present*. New York: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2010.
- Fabbrini, Sergio. *The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European Discontent*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Fallon, Theresa. "The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping's Grand Strategy for Eurasia." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 37, no. 03 (May/June 2015): 140-147.
- Fan, Shenggen, Ravi Kanbur, and Xiaobo Zhang. "China's Regional Disparities: Experience and Policy." *Review of Development Finance* 1, no. 1 (January-March, 2011): 47-56.
- Feng, Huiyun. *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- Frankel, Joseph. *International Relations*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Freedman, Maurice. "The Family in China, Past and Present." *Pacific Affairs* 34, no. 4 (Winter, 1961-1962): 323-36.
- Friedberg, Aaron L. *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*. New York: WW Norton & Company, 2011.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War." *International Security* 17, no. 03 (Winter 1992-1993): 5-58.
- Garon, Sheldon. "Why We Spend, Why They Save." *New York Times* (November 24, 2011). http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/opinion/why-we-spend-why-they-save.html?_r=0 (accessed October 12, 2015).
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective." *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1962.

- Gillard, David. *The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914*. London: Methuen, 1977.
- Godbole, Avinash. "Indian Commentary Analyzes Foreign Policy Strategy of China under Leadership of Xi Jinping." *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 03 (May 1, 2015): 298-302.
- Haas, Ernst B. "What is Nationalism and why should we Study it?" *International Organization* 40, no. 03 (Summer, 1986): 707-44.
- Hart, Jonathan. *Contesting Empires: Opposition, Promotion, and Slavery*. Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Herkenhoff, Linda MacGrain. "A Socially Intelligent Approach to Global Remuneration." *World Journal of Management* 1, no. 1 (September, 2009): 118-40.
- Hofstede, Geert H. and Geert Hofstede. *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 2001.
- . "VSM 2013," Geert Hofstede. <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/vsm2013> (accessed September 19, 2015).
- Hongxin, Wang and Wang Hao. "Harmonious Development: China Ways in the Face of Fast Urbanization." Proceedings of 2008 Conference on Regional Economy and Sustainable Development, ed. J. Hung, Z. Ruimei, and W. Zhang. 2008, Allawah Nsw: M D Forum.
- Human Rights Watch China Team. "Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police Torture of Criminal Suspects in China." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/13/tiger-chairs-and-cell-bosses/police-torture-criminal-suspects-china> (accessed on October 26, 2015).
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
- Hutchings, Graham. *Modern China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Ikenberry, G. John, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith. *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- International Energy Data and Analysis. "China's Key Energy Statistics." China. <http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=CHN> (accessed on October 27, 2015).

- Interview. "China's Peaceful Development Initiatives to Benefit Itself and Others: U.S. Expert." *Xinhua* (September 2, 2015).
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/CHR2015090258219380#index=1&searchKey=20406467&resp=10 (accessed on September 4, 2015).
- Iriye, Akira. *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Jackson, William. *Withdrawal from Empire: A Military View*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
- Jacobs, Dan Norman and Hans H. Baerwald. *Chinese Communism: Selected Documents*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
- James, David H. *The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951.
- Jayaweera, Swarna. "Continuity and Change: Women Workers in Garment and Textile Industries in Sri Lanka." In *Tracking Gender Equity Under Economic Reforms: Continuity and Change in South Asia*, edited by Swapna Mukhopadhyay and Ratna M. Sudarshan, 196-226. Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2003.
- Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30, no. 02 (January, 1978): 167-214.
- Johnson, Robert. *British Imperialism*. Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Johnston, Alastair I. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Kagan, Robert. "Power and Weakness." *Policy Review* 113 (June/July, 2002): 3-28.
- Kalha, RS. "An Assessment of the Chinese Dream: 2015." *Strategic Analysis* 39, no. 3 (May, 2015): 274-9.
- Kelsen, Hans. *General Theory of Law and State*. Vol. 1 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.
- Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House, 1987.

- Kerbo, Harold R. "Social Stratification." In *21st Century Sociology: A Reference Handbook*, edited by Clifton D. Bryant and Dennis L. Peck, 228-236. Beverly Hills: Sage, 2006.
- Kupchan, Charles A. "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall, 1998): 40-79.
- . *The Vulnerability of Empire*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- Kupchan, Charles A. and Peter L. Trubowitz. "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States." *International Security* 32, no. 2 (Fall, 2007): 7-44.
- Kurth, James R. "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes." *International Organization* 33, no. 01 (Winter, 1979): 1-34.
- Kyodo. "156 Killed In Xinjiang Clash, Biggest Ethnic Unrest in Decades." *Kyodo World Service* (July 6, 2015).
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_1211_23_43/content/Display/JPP20090706969093#index=1&searchKey=20307833&rpp=10 (accessed on September 12, 2015).
- Lebow, Richard Ned. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783*. 1890 Reprint. New York: Dover Publications, 1987.
- Manuel, Ryan. "One Belt, One Road, Many Mixed Messages," *Nikkei Asian Review* (September 1, 2015). <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/One-Belt-One-Road-many-mixed-messages> (accessed October 23, 2015).
- Matfess, Hilary. "Tanzania to Export Electricity While Most of its Citizens Lack Power." *Foreign Policy in Focus* (August 7, 2013). <http://fpif.org/tanzania-to-export-electricity-while-most-of-its-citizens-lack-power/> (accessed on September 4, 2015).
- Mearsheimer, John J. "China's Unpeaceful Rise." *Current History* 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160-162.
- . *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001.
- Meisner, Maurice. *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road." Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China.
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367 (accessed December 20, 2015).
- Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship*. Boston: Beacon, 1966.
- More, Charles. *Understanding the Industrial Revolution*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power*. 1948. Reprint, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.
- Morgenthau, Hans Joachim and Kenneth W. Thompson. *Principles and Problems of International Politics: Selected Readings*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.
- Morris, James. *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1968.
- Munich Security Conference. "China: Doubling Down?" In *Munich Security Report 2016: Boundless Crises, Reckless Spoilers, Helpless Guardians*. (Munich: 2016): 10-13.
- Nardulli, Peter F., Buddy Peyton, and Joseph Bajjalieh. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Rule of Law Constructs, 1850–2010." *Journal of Law and Courts* 1, no. 1 (March, 2013): 139-92.
- Nathan, Laurie. "Domestic Instability and Security Communities." *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (June, 2006): 275-99.
- Neumayer, Eric. "The Human Development Index and sustainability—a Constructive Proposal." *Ecological Economics* 39, no. 1 (October, 2001): 101-14.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "Review: Neorealism and Neoliberalism." *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (January, 1988): 235-251.
- O'Leary, Sandra Feiler Brazaitis. "British Decolonization: A Case Study in Approaches to Analyzing the Decline of Empire." Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1979.
- Observatory of Economic Complexity. "What does Sri Lanka export to China? (2013)." Visualizations.
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/lka/chn/show/2013/ (accessed on October 27, 2015).

- Olander, Eric and Cobus van Staden. "What's Motivating China's Military Push in Africa?" *The Huffington Post* (July 2, 2015). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-olander/china-military-push-africa_b_7708368.html (accessed on October 31, 2015).
- Olson, James Stuart. *Encyclopedia of the Industrial Revolution in America*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002.
- Oxford English Dictionary, Online Edition, s.v. "Natural Resources." <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/125333?redirectedFrom=Natural+Resources#eid35412885> (accessed September 16, 2015).
- Palmer, Robert Roswell and Joel Colton. *A History of the Modern World*. 1950. Reprint. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992.
- Parsons, Timothy. *Rule of Empires: Those Who Built them, those Who Endured them, and Why they always Fall*. Cary: Oxford University Press, USA, 2010.
- Pattanaik, Smruti S. "Controversy over Chinese Investment in Sri Lanka." *East Asia Forum* (June 5, 2015). <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/05/controversy-over-chinese-investment-in-sri-lanka/> (accessed October 27, 2015).
- Pew Research Center. "Concern about Territorial Disputes with China." Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/02/how-asia-pacific-publics-see-each-other-and-their-national-leaders/asia-map/> (accessed on February 4, 2016).
- Pillsbury, Michael. *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015.
- Qian, Xuming. "The 'One Road One Belt' Strategy and China's Energy Policy in the Middle East." Middle East Institute (entry posted May 20, 2015). <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/%E2%80%99Cone-belt-one-road%E2%80%99D-strategy-and-china%E2%80%99s-energy-policy-middle-east> (accessed on November 10, 2015).
- Richardson, Sophie, ed. "'I saw it with my own eyes' Abuses by Chinese Security Forces in Tibet, 2008-2010." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/07/21/i-saw-it-my-own-eyes/abuses-chinese-security-forces-tibet-2008-2010> (accessed October 26, 2015).
- Rong, Ma. "Population Growth and Urbanization." in *Understanding Contemporary China*, edited by Robert E. Gamer, 227-254. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36, no. 02 (Spring, 1982): 379-415.

- Saull, Richard. "On the 'New' American 'Empire'," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 02 (June, 2004): 250-253.
- Scobell, Andrew. *China's use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*. Cambridge: Press Syndicate of Cambridge University press, 2003.
- Scott, Emma. "China's 'One Belt, One Road' Strategy Meets the UAE's Look East Policy." *China Brief* 15, no. 11 (May 29, 2015): 12-15.
- Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972.
- Snyder, Jack. "One World, Rival Theories." *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (November-December, 2004): 52.
- . *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- So, Alvin Y. "The Changing Pattern of Classes and Class Conflict in China." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 33, no. 3 (August, 2003): 363-76.
- Song, Huasheng, Jacques-François Thisse, and Xiwei Zhu. "Urbanization and/or Rural Industrialization in China." *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 42, no. 1 (January, 2012): 126-34.
- Spector, Paul E., Cary L. Cooper, and Kate Sparks. "An International Study of the Psychometric Properties of the Hofstede Values Survey Module 1994: A Comparison of Individual and country/province Level Results." *Applied Psychology* 50, no. 2 (April, 2001): 269-81.
- Steel, Ronald. *Pax Americana*. New York: The Viking Press, 1967.
- Steele, Liza G. and Scott M. Lynch. "The Pursuit of Happiness in China: Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being during China's Economic and Social Transformation." *Social Indicators Research* 114, no. 1 (November 2013): 441-451.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database
 (accessed October 26, 2015).

- Stocking, Andrew and Terry Dinan. *China's Growing Energy Demand: Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, June 2015).
- Swaine, Michael D. "Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy." *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 44 (Summer, 2014): 6-12.
- . "Chinese Views and Commentary on the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative." *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 47 (Summer, 2015): 1-24.
- Talbott, Strobe. "Why NATO Should Grow." *New York Review of Books* 42, no. 13 (August 10, 1995): 27-30.
- Tamanaha, Brian Z. *On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Thornton, A. P. *Imperialism in the Twentieth Century*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978.
- Tyler, Patrick E. "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop." *New York Times* (March 8, 1992). <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-insuring-no-rivals-develop.html?pagewanted=print> (accessed on September 30, 2015).
- United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience*. New York: United Nations Development Program, 2014.
- United Nations Environmental Program. "China Outpacing Rest of World in Natural Resource Use." UNEP News Center (entry posted August 2, 2013). <http://www.unep.org/NewsCentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2723&ArticleID=9584> (accessed on February 22, 2016).
- United States Pacific Command. *2013 USPACOM Strategy*. Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, January 22, 2013.
- Van Evera, Stephen. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Vannarith, Chheang. "Cambodia: With an Eye on China, Vietnam and Japan Move Closer." *Phnom Penh Khmer Times Online* (September 19, 2015). https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/SER2015092714773309#index=1&searchKey=20682514&pp=10 (accessed on October 23, 2015).

- Viers, Alexandra. "Evaluating China's New Silk Road," The Cipher Brief (entry posted January 25, 2016). <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/evaluating-chinas-new-silk-road> (accessed on January 30, 2016).
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the State and War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- . *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 1979.
- Wang, Hongying. "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 3. (May-June, 2000): 475-91.
- Whiting, Allen S. "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng." *China Quarterly*, no 142 (June 1995): 295-316.
- Whyte, Martin King. "China's Post-Socialist Inequality." *Current History* 111, no. 746 (September, 2012): 229-34.
- Work, Honorable Bob. "Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech CNAS Defense Forum December 14, 2015." Department of Defense Website <http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum> (accessed on February 4, 2016).
- World Bank. "Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled International Labor Organization estimate)." 2011-2015. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS> (accessed March 6, 2016).
- Worthing, Peter. *A Military History of Modern China from the Manchu Conquest to Tian'anmen Square*. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Xu, Beina. "Media Censorship in China." Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515> (accessed October 26, 2015).
- Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?" *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005-06): 131-144.

Intentionally left blank

Vita

LTC Jay W. Haley was commissioned a Field Artillery Officer in 1996 upon graduation from the University of Arizona. As an Artillery Officer he served as a Company and Battalion Fire Support Officer, Platoon Leader, Battery XO, and Aide-de-Camp. After transitioning to Military Intelligence he served in command positions at the company and battalion levels for both Military Intelligence and combined arms units. His staff positions include Armor Battalion S2, Military Intelligence Battalion Assistant S3, S3, and XO, and Analysis Control Element Chief at the Army Component Level. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, the Military Intelligence Officer Transition and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, and the Command and General Staff Officer Course. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from the University of Arizona in Chemistry and a Master of Arts Degree in Management from Webster University.