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1	DFMI Dept Head	Approve	<i>Talbot, 6-6, 1 July</i>	6			
2	DFER	Review	<i>Solte, 4522, 3 Aug 14</i>	7			
3	DFMI	Action		8			
4				9			
5				10			

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SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE: To provide security and policy review of the attached document prior to public release. NOTE: Due to DFER's request, the manuscript will be provided via e-copy.

2. BACKGROUND: Lt Col Michael Fowler, DFMI, has authored a journal-length article for potential publication.

Title: "A Brief Survey of Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy"

Abstract: This article represents an effort to review the evolution of the US policy of democracy promotion from a Presidential policy perspective and includes a summary of the author's findings. Highlights include US policy in Cuba and the Phillipines following the Spanish-American war, Cold War policies of Truman and his successors through the end of the Cold War, as well as our most recent post-Cold War leaders to the present day.

Release Information: Lt Col Fowler will provide his manuscript to the Journal of Democracy for review and potential publication, including the following release statement to be added: "the views expressed in this text are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the US Air Force Academy, the US Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US government." X ✓

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A Brief Survey of Democracy Promotion in US Foreign Policy

Introduction

Democracy promotion is a popular tool for US national strategy. Of course, it is not a new tool. Throughout the 19th century, US foreign policy used a form of passive democracy promotion, rooted in John Quincy Adams' concept of the "beacon on the hill." In this context, America was the shining light: a model of excellence for others to follow if and when they so choose. Official government efforts were limited to expressions of moral support. In contemporary parlance, early America used soft power to promote democracy. As the United States entered the international scene at the dawn of the 20th century, the United States began democracy promotion via hard power; actively expending government resources with the intent of improving the level of democracy in a country. The means of democracy promotion (i.e., rhetoric, economic aid, and military intervention) varied over the years. As national security objectives changed within and between presidential administrations, the ways and means of democracy promotion were fine tuned in an attempt to align with changing objectives.

Democracy promotion has been a centerpiece of US foreign policy for at least half a century.¹ But, there is significant variation in the application of democracy promotion as a tool of national security strategy. This article explores the role of democracy promotion in US foreign relations. While the quantity and quality of US democracy promotion policy evolved in a non-linear fashion, US presidents used democracy promotion as a way to achieve national security objectives. There is significant variation among US Presidents on the specific linkages between democracy and security, resulting in divergent policy applications and technical approaches. This study briefly surveys US democracy promotion efforts from 1821 to 2014 as explained in

¹ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War : The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Economics and Finance, 2008); Tony Smith, *America's Mission : The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994, Revised 2012); Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy : Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991), 221; Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 2.

the words of the public pronouncements of the Presidents of the United States.² This study explores variations in how democracy promotion fit into US foreign policy and national strategy.

Evolution of US Democracy Promotion

Early US Foreign Policy was a combination of idealism and interests. American idealism was based on individualism and republican values: small government, human rights, anti-aristocracy, and constitutionalism. Early US interests were primarily based on commerce and trade. The United States was unwilling to provide more than moral support to other democratic revolutions such as France or Latin America. Early policies often highlighted the difficulty in balancing ideological interests with economic interests. When the two interests conflicted, the economic interest tended to win.

The United States often deviated from republican values for financial gain. While US ideological interests in the 18th century supported a democratic France, economic interests in the unfettered trade of non-belligerents resulted in the 1798 Quasi-War with France. As democratic revolutions spread across Latin America in the 19th century, the United States provided no assistance. However, when American investments in Latin America were threatened by instability, the United States was quick to intervene.

For much of its history, the geographic position of the United States kept security concerns relatively low. The prominence of international security concerns in US foreign policy began to grow during World War I as the United States was a major factor in stimulating the creation of the League of Nations.³ As the United States accepted its leadership role after World War II, US interests grew from purely economic concerns into a complex interdependence of economic and security concerns.

Democracy Promotion: Early Efforts

² Special thanks to The American Presidency Project at University of California at Santa Barbara for their easy online access to Presidential documents; available online at: presidency.ucsb.edu.

³ It can also be argued that international security entered US foreign policy calculations upon declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. The intent is not to highlight a specific date of when security concerns overshadowed economic concerns in foreign policy, but instead to highlight that economic and security concerns both pre-dated active democracy promotion efforts.

For its first centennial, the United States was reluctant to provide anything more than moral support for democratic change in other countries. Early US policy was well summarized by John Quincy Adams:

[The United States] has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings....
Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be.
But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.
She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.
She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.
She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example.
She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom.⁴

During this early period, US policy on democracy was essentially limited to congratulating countries upon declaration of a republic. "The policy of the United States has ever been that of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, leaving to each to establish the form of government of its own choice."⁵ The US policy of non-intervention was a cornerstone to helping the United States remain uninvolved in the various European wars of the 19th century. The US' fledgling army and navy was no match for a major European power. Neutrality was designed to enable the United States to pursue a "peaceful course to unexampled prosperity and happiness."⁶ During the Revolutions of 1848, the United States was quick to recognize the Second Republic of France. After the dissolution of the French monarchy, President Polk praised the results of the revolution:

"all our sympathies are naturally enlisted on the side of a great people who, imitating our example, have resolved to be free....Our ardent and sincere congratulations are extended to the patriotic people of France upon their noble and thus far successful efforts to found for their future government liberal institutions similar to our own."⁷

Less than four years later, the Second Republic was dissolved. The Revolutions of 1848 were widespread across Europe, but failed to deliver lasting democratic change.

⁴ John Quincy Adams as U. S. Secretary of State, speech to the U.S. House of Representatives, July 4, 1821. Available from: <http://www.fff.org/comment/AdamsPolicy.asp>.

⁵ James K Polk, Special Message, April 3, 1848.

⁶ Millard Fillmore, Third Annual Message, December 6, 1852.

⁷ James K. Polk, Special Message, April 3, 1848.

These failures sparked debate within the United States on the necessity to take on a more active role in democracy promotion. Fresh from its victory over Mexico, the US military demonstrated its ability to export major combat operations, exhibiting impressive engineering and logistics capabilities. By the early 1850s, critics of the Fillmore administration argued that the United States “ought to interfere between contending sovereigns and their subjects for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchies of Europe and establishing in their place republican institutions.... and that it is consequently our duty to mingle in these contests and aid those who are struggling for liberty.”⁸

Ironically, as the Second Republic of France ended its short tenure, President Fillmore cited Revolutionary France and the corresponding Napoleonic Wars as a proof that the United States should continue its policy of nonintervention. Promoting democracy in Europe and staying out of European wars were seen as incompatible objectives. The active exportation of democracy was expected to bring the wrath of European monarchies and embroil the United States in the expensive and devastating contests of Europe. The desire to refrain from overseas military interventions outside of the Western Hemisphere retained its primacy until the dawn of the 20th century.

America’s first experiment at promoting democracy was something of an accident. The 1898 invasion of Cuba and the Philippines were not interventions in support of democratic revolutions. The United States rationalized war with Spain based upon a variety of economic, strategic, and humanitarian reasons. The public policy rhetoric that laid out the justifications for war with Spain primarily focused upon Cuba.

Although calls for liberation from Spanish tyranny were common, McKinley “did not go to war with Spain to make Cuba, much less the Philippines, into democracies. It was only after Spain had been defeated and the occupation of these foreign territories fell to the United States that attention was paid to their political development.”⁹ Prior to the US invasion of Cuba, President McKinley highlighted autonomy as the US desired end-state for Cuba:

“The existing conditions cannot but fill this Government and the American people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the part of our people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that

⁸ Millard Fillmore, Third Annual Message, December 6, 1852.

⁹ Tony Smith, *America’s Mission : The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 38-9.

measure of self-control which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country.”¹⁰

In his speeches leading up to war, President McKinley did not use the term “democracy” when discussing the future of Cuba. His references to Cuban freedom largely related to freedom from tyranny; freedom from a colonial master. While he made several references to autonomy and self-government, he did not specify what type of government was desired.

Cuba: Post invasion

Once Cuba was under US control, the McKinley administration designed its policy to “aid the Cuban people to attain to that plane of self-conscious respect and self-reliant unity which fits an enlightened community for self-government.”¹¹ By late 1899, McKinley’s vision for Cuba evolved from simple self-government and self-reliance to the need for democratic representative government through a national-level constitutional convention.

Unfortunately for Cuba, its economic importance and proximity to the United States sabotaged its chances for democracy. Political infighting over annexation of Cuba exacerbated the situation. US economic interests had a preference for Cuban stability over Cuban democracy. The primacy of economic interests can be seen in the results of the Platt Amendment which created restrictions on debt and foreign land transfers such that a majority of Cuban territory and businesses were owned by American investors.

Over the next 20 years, the US military intervened on several occasions primarily to minimize disruptions to the sugar economy. In 1906, after a rigged Cuban Presidential election turned violent, the Cuban government leadership disbanded. US leadership and troops filled the vacuum to stabilize the country until a new government was established in 1909. In 1912, Marines deployed from the US base in Guantanamo into Eastern Cuba “for the protection of American and other foreign life and property” which enabled the Cuban military to “use all its forces in putting down the outbreak.”¹² Similarly in 1917, Marines deployed to protect sugar plantations from insurgents-turned-bandits. In 1922,

¹⁰ William McKinley, First Annual Message, December 6, 1897.

¹¹ William McKinley, Third Annual Message, December 5, 1899.

¹² William Taft, Fourth Annual Message, December 3, 1912.

US forces returned to their base in Guantanamo. Meanwhile, military occupation of the other newly gained territory, the Philippines, continued for another two decades.

Philippines

Unlike Cuba, the Philippines was blessed with significant distance from the US coast (and US policy makers) and relative anonymity in US society compared to Cuba. But, democratization of the Philippines was not a result of an altruistic US foreign policy. Democracy promotion was the only viable option that the United States could use to extricate itself in an honorable manner that did not compromise its security interests. Returning the Philippines to Spain after vilifying their actions towards their colonies would have been publicly embarrassing and asinine. Departing without providing a solid government would leave a power vacuum that could be filled by an unfriendly government looking to expand in the Pacific, such as Germany. As the first US President to decide on the future government for a nation building enterprise, President McKinley set the standard by choosing to install a democracy.

The United States' willingness to establish self-government in the Philippines was thwarted by the outbreak of an insurgency. The insurgency "confronted our Commissioners on their arrival in Manila. They had come with the hope and intention of co-operating with Admiral Dewey and Major General Otis in establishing peace and order in the archipelago and the largest measure of self-government compatible with the true welfare of the people..... [However,] Civil government cannot be thoroughly established until order is restored."¹³

Presidents William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Taft shared a common view of the strategy in the Philippines. Their focus emphasized the importance of economics in order to contribute to state capacity. They believed that democratization required patience in order to avoid the creation of an oligarchy. In the end, they hoped "to do for them what has never before been done for any people of the tropics--to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations."¹⁴

¹³ William McKinley, Third Annual Message, December 5, 1899.

¹⁴ Theodore Roosevelt, 1st Annual Message, December 3, 1901.

The democratization process in the Philippines was an extended, half-century endeavor. Early American efforts in the Philippines introduced an independent judiciary, political elections, and a professional civil service. The Americans were quick to involve Filipinos into the government, hiring them into the civil service and permitting them to hold political office including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The first elections (for municipal office) were held in 1901 though political participation was initially constrained to land owners. Despite the existence of elections and Civil Governor Taft's priority on decentralization, the bicameral Philippine Legislature had little independent power since it could not override the American Governor's veto, which was maintained until the Philippines was designated a commonwealth of the United States in 1935 during the FDR administration.¹⁵

Despite the increasing ability for the Filipinos to manage their own affairs, the United States had a strategic interest in maintaining a military presence in the Philippines. While President Theodore Roosevelt argued that development was the primary justification for retaining the islands, he recognized that possession was in the US national interest:

"the justification for our stay in the Philippines must ultimately rest chiefly upon the good we are able to do in the islands. I do not overlook the fact that in the development of our interests in the Pacific Ocean and along its coasts, the Philippines have played and will play an important part; and that our interests have been served in more than one way by the possession of the islands. But our chief reason for continuing to hold them must be that we ought in good faith to try to do our share of the world's work."¹⁶

President Taft's justification for continued intervention in the Philippines sounded similarly altruistic. He explained US efforts in the Philippines as a

"disinterested endeavor to secure for the Filipinos economic independence and to fit them for complete self-government, with the power to decide eventually, according to their own largest good, whether such self-government shall be accompanied by independence."¹⁷

As the former Civil Governor of the Philippines, President Taft had a personal stake in the outcome of the emerging country. By the end of his single term in office,

¹⁵ Paul D. Hutchcroft, "Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900–1913," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 2 (2000): 283–6.

¹⁶ Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message, December 6, 1904.

¹⁷ William Taft, Fourth Annual Message, December 3, 1912.

President Taft viewed the gradual transition of the government to the locals as a success.

The people of the Philippines

“have gradually been given complete autonomy in the municipalities, the right to elect two-thirds of the provincial governing boards and the lower house of the insular legislature. They have four native members out of nine members of the commission, or upper house. The chief justice and two justices of the Supreme Court, about one-half of the higher judicial positions, and all of the justices of the [peace] are natives. In the classified civil service the proportion of Filipinos increased from 51 per cent in 1904 to 67 per cent in 1911. Thus to-day all the municipal employees, over 60 per cent of the provincial employees, and 60 per cent of the officials and employees of the central government are Filipinos.”¹⁸

In 1935, the FDR administration designated the Philippines a commonwealth of the United States which transferred power from the American Governor to the locally elected President. The new Constitution expanded suffrage to all literate adult males (women’s suffrage was added in 1937) resulting in the election of Manuel Quezon as the second President of the Philippines.¹⁹ US Congress designed the commonwealth to be a ten-year transition to independence. However, due to World War II and the Japanese occupation, independence was delayed one year until 1946.

Arguably, President McKinley’s actions violated the US tradition of non-interference in the regime type of other countries. But, McKinley was not truly bucking the trend by supporting active democracy promotion of foreign countries. Once Cuba and the Philippines fell under the guardianship of the United States, US foreign policy no longer truly applied. This policy approach also explains the US intervention in early 20th century Panama. In 1903, US interest in Panamanian independence was largely correlated to its interest in an inter-oceanic canal. The criteria for formal recognition required only that the new government appear “republican in form and without substantial opposition from its own people.”²⁰ A decade later, President Taft directed an American commission to supervise the 1912 Panama Presidential elections. While democracy promotion became an element of the intervention, it was not a justification for the initial intervention. Beyond these aberrations, McKinley and his Republican successors, Presidents Teddy Roosevelt and William Taft, were merely continuing 150 years of tradition by confining democracy promotion to verbal support and recognition.

¹⁸ William Taft, Fourth Annual Message, December 3, 1912.

¹⁹ Emilio Aguinaldo was the first president of the short-lived First Philippine Republic.

²⁰ John Hay, Department of State telegram to Mr. Ehrman, November 6, 1903, sent 12:51pm from Washington, D.C.

It was not until the administration of President Woodrow Wilson that the United States would adopt a more concerted democracy promotion policy.

Democracy Promotion: The Rise and Fall

The decision to democratize the Philippines was a reactive policy. Little more than a decade later, President Woodrow Wilson would craft a new foreign policy that involved active democracy promotion. Ever since, democracy promotion has been a notable, albeit sporadic, element in US foreign policy.

Wilson's rhetoric was far more progressive than his Republican predecessors. He pushed for democracy in Latin America, promoted the peaceful aspects of democracy, and encouraged self-government. Wilson was an early believer in the democratic peace theory as he explained that

a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants....Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.²¹

Wilson's democratic peace theory was largely shaped by World War I. As a result, a significant amount of Wilson's democratization efforts centered on Europe and his vision for the League of Nations. However, he also attempted to encourage democracy in Latin America by adopting a policy of non-recognition of governments that came to power by unconstitutional methods.

In 1916, he deviated from Presidential tradition by promising Filipino independence. But, the actions of the Wilson administration tended to be less idealistic than his rhetoric. The promise of Philippine independence was somewhat hollow with little substantive change to come for almost two decades. Military intervention with democracy promotion as a primary objective was limited to Mexico. Even that effort was a half-hearted attempt at regime change.

In accordance with his non-recognition policy, President Wilson refused to recognize General Victoriano Huerta's government when he seized power in Mexico.

²¹ Woodrow Willson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany, April 2nd, 1917.

US pressure on Huerta to step down culminated in the US occupation of Veracruz, in 1913-1914, with 7,000 troops. The Huerta regime did fall although the American intervention was arguably only a minor contributing factor along with numerous others (particularly rebel activity) in the Mexican Civil War.

Besides Mexico, President Wilson's other military interventions were less directly related to democracy promotion. Military occupations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic were attempts to achieve stability. Similar to the Philippines, democracy promotion was an after-thought once the occupation had begun. The United States helped draft a Haitian Constitution, but political opponents would criticize that the administration was trying to "jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by U.S. Marines."²² Unlike the Philippines, attempts to build democracies in Haiti and the Dominican Republic did not work out.

Wilson supported the non-democratic government of Nicaragua in an effort to avoid civil war while protecting US personnel and economic interests in the country. The US Marine landing of 1910 in Bluefields, Nicaragua may have indirectly contributed to regime change. US forces were on a defensive mission to protect American citizens as well as their land and facilities. However, their very presence degraded the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan government and provided a safe haven for Nicaraguan rebels. The interventions in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, extended by Republican Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, did temporarily provide political stability and intrastate security, both important to US economic interests in the region. Ironically, Wilson's interventions across Latin America failed to produce any significant increases in democracy.

Further, Wilson's efforts in Europe were not entirely based upon a paradigm of democracy promotion. Much of his talk about freedom during World War I focused on anti-militarism. Wilson's Fourteen Points is often considered a dramatic endorsement of democracy promotion. In it, Wilson advocated the "principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one

²² Warren G. Harding, *Speeches of Warren G. Harding of Ohio, Republican Candidate for President, from His Acceptance of the Nomination to October 1, 1920*. 1920. Reprint. Hong Kong: Forgotten Books, 2013. 91.

another.”²³ While some interpreted this to mean that Wilson felt that all nationalities should be free across the globe, the context of the speech, although somewhat ambiguous, indicated that Wilson was advocating that war-occupied territories needed to be evacuated and returned to their free status.

For a variety of reasons, the succeeding Republican Presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover did not follow Wilson’s strong pro-democracy rhetoric. In part, this was a Republican response to Wilson’s failed League of Nations. After the end of the Great War, an isolationist current ran strong throughout the United States. The 1920s economic boom allowed Americans to ignore the troubles of the world. The 1930s brought the Great Depression and the perception that democracy and capitalism might not be such good ideas after all. Within this context, active democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective was extremely limited. For example, during the Coolidge administration, US military forces helped monitor the 1924 Presidential elections in Nicaragua. The Second World War propelled a drastic change in US interest in democracy promotion.

Democracy Promotion: The Resurgence

Predictions of the death of democracy were greatly exaggerated. The rise and failure of militant fascism highlighted that democracy might be a preferred government after all. President Franklin Roosevelt’s ability to shape his own peacetime foreign policy on democracy was somewhat constrained by the Great Depression and World War II.

As World War II raged, FDR eloquently supported the need for democracy. Democratization was critical for US security. In the summer of 1941, FDR stated “that the United States will never survive as a happy and fertile oasis of liberty surrounded by a cruel desert of dictatorship.”²⁴ Shortly after entering the war, FDR adopted a campaign of democratization: “the American people have made an unlimited commitment that there shall be a free world.”²⁵ Even before the United States had entered the war, the United States drafted an agreement with the United Kingdom to “respect the right of all peoples

²³ Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace, January 8th, 1918.

²⁴ Franklin Roosevelt, Address at Hyde Park, July 4, 1941.

²⁵ Franklin Roosevelt, Address to the International Labor Organization, Nov 6, 1941.

to choose the form of government under which they will live" and provide international peace to "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."²⁶

While the Atlantic Charter was aimed primarily at Japan and Germany for their occupation of other countries, FDR's vision of freedom was broader than just non-occupation. FDR was a staunch opponent of colonialism. At the 1943 Casablanca Conference, FDR suggested that France should spread democracy throughout its colonies. He also indicated support for independence in British India.

But by 1945, FDR's desire for maintaining friendly relations among the Allies took priority over his desire for democratization. The Declaration of Liberated Europe triumphantly declared that the United States, United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were dedicated to "assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems...to create democratic institutions of their own choice..."²⁷ But, the reality was different. While the declaration had specifically emphasized the need for free elections in Poland, the United States essentially ignored Soviet designs to create a pro-communist regime. As Warren Kimball aptly noted, "the Declaration on Liberated Europe was a vision of what could be, not a strategic plan of what the West would attempt to do. Churchill and FDR both recognized that the Declaration on Liberated Europe was a public relations gambit that the Soviet Union was already working to circumvent."²⁸

Of course, FDR had dabbled in realism long before the end of the war. FDR supported the authoritarian regimes in Turkey and China as a measure to prevent encroachment of their Imperialist neighbors. In his Good Neighbor Policy, FDR essentially committed to a policy of non-interference in Latin American politics. In effect, this policy indicated that the United States felt it was more important to have allies than democratic governments. While he certainly invoked democracy promotion at a

²⁶ Franklin Roosevelt, Statement on the Atlantic Charter Meeting with Prime Minister Churchill, *August 14th, 1941*.

²⁷ Franklin Roosevelt, Joint Statement with Churchill and Stalin on the Yalta Conference, February 11th, 1945.

²⁸ Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 173.

limited level, FDR did bring democratization back into the fold of US foreign policy. After FDR's death, President Harry Truman took democracy promotion to a whole new level.

President Truman faced a time of major transition in US foreign policy. The United States finally embraced a leadership role as a global power. The United States recognized the relationship between international (or, at the least, European) security and US security. The threat of the spread of communism was perceived as a serious threat to that security. Truman's foreign policy advocated democracy as a means to contain the spread of communism in an effort to minimize the threat.

But Truman went far beyond rhetorical support for democracy. As US foreign policy evolved during World War II, Truman was presented with additional policy options beyond diplomacy and military force. The necessity of rebuilding the nations of Europe in order to contain Soviet expansion provided Truman with another arrow in his quiver: foreign economic assistance. In Truman's case, the rhetoric was a necessary part of procuring the foreign assistance funds.

President Truman's primary address on democracy promotion, commonly known as the Truman Doctrine, declared that democracy promotion was synonymous with national security because totalitarian governments were a threat to US national security. For Truman, economic aid was the primary method of supporting democracy. Truman argued to Congress that "assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation...to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy..."²⁹ Truman justified his funding request for economic aid in order to support democracy through a cost-benefit analysis: it was cheaper to provide foreign assistance than to fight another war. While the Truman Doctrine provided funds to assist Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan was introduced to help Western Europe on a broader scale.

Beyond diplomacy, economic aid, and military force, Truman had found a fourth option for democracy promotion: covert operations. Truman used covert operations to bolster pro-democracy forces in Western Europe primarily by providing financing to anti-communist forces. Funds were covertly provided in three primary areas: election

²⁹ Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947.

influence in France and Italy; the development of anti-communist unions in France, Germany, and Greece; and conferences for anti-communist intellectuals known as the Congress for Cultural Freedom.³⁰

Truman's desire to avoid the use of force for democracy promotion is certainly logical. A portion of his military forces were already being used to occupy and promote democracy in Japan, Germany, Austria, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, South Korea. The rebuilding of Japan and Germany into democratic societies was conducted by a process characterized by Tony Smith as the "four Ds"- Demilitarization, Democratization, Decartelization (i.e. break up the oligarchies and the military-industrial complex, land reform), and Deprogramming (via education & media).³¹ Demilitarization was the goal. Democratization, Decartelization, and Deprogramming were the means to attain that goal. In many respects, decartelization and deprogramming were key aspects to achieving a sustainable democracy. Otherwise, the oligarchs and nationalists would sweep democracy away.

Another democratization legacy of the Truman era is the United Nations (UN). The UN, since its inception, has been an advocate for democracy. With considerable US influence, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government." Today, the UN encourages "Human development [which is] a process of enlarging people's choices and enhancing human capabilities (the range of things people can be and do) and freedoms, enabling them to: live a long and healthy life, have access to knowledge and a decent standard of living, and participate in the life of their community and decisions affecting their lives."³² As the UN defines it, human development is reliant upon freedom, making democracy promotion a priority cause which it implements through a trust fund called the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF).

Truman's policies were by far the most successful democracy programs in the past century. His policies converted four fascist governments into democracies (Germany, Italy, Japan, and Austria), rebuilt Europe while minimizing communist

³⁰ Muravchik, 124-134.

³¹ Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

³² "The Human Development Concept," *Human Development Reports* (UNDP web site); available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/>

parties, and created an international organization that continues to promote democracy to this day. Despite these successes, as the threat of the Cold War grew and as the United States transitioned from a Democratic White House to a Republican White House, democracy promotion was put on hold.

President Dwight Eisenhower's speeches on democracy and freedom were window dressing. Eisenhower's use of the words "free" and "freedom" were not measures of democracy. "Free" indicated those countries that were not communist. Countries that faced becoming a Soviet satellite were endangered of losing their "freedom." The Eisenhower Doctrine captures this essence, claiming that US foreign policy is intended:

to deter aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world....It would...authorize...employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.³³

To Eisenhower, the free world was security interdependent. Eisenhower supported freedom and was willing to use military force to do it. Eisenhower had the same end goal as Truman: ensure security through the containment of communism. However, Eisenhower did not perceive democracy as a means to achieve security. Three cases from the 1950s highlight Eisenhower's support of anti-democratic forces: Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam. Iran and Guatemala were both democracies that were overthrown in US-supported coups. The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the United Fruit Company, respectively, indicated a move towards socialism (presumably, a step towards communism) and a threat to western economic interests. Vietnam, on the other hand, was highly supportive of Ho Chi Minh, a well-known communist. The Eisenhower administration encouraged South Vietnam to avoid democratic elections in order to avoid what appeared to be a sure communist take over.

Only the case of Lebanon could be argued to be democracy promotion under Eisenhower. In 1958, President Eisenhower ordered US forces to protect the freely elected democratic government of Lebanon from insurrectionists. Since the

³³ Dwight Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, January 5, 1957.

insurrectionists were supported by the Soviets and the United Arab Republic, even this case can still be classified as communist containment vice democracy promotion.

In the 1950s, the fear of communism was on the rise. The Soviets and Chinese backed the North Korean invasion of South Korea. The Soviet nuclear arsenal was growing. The Soviets were winning the “space race.” Variations of Eisenhower’s domino theory or Dean Acheson’s rotten apple contagion analogy were prevalent. It was feared that communist victories in the developing world could strengthen communist parties in the developed world. Such an occurrence could threaten the collapse of the NATO alliance, allowing the Soviets to dominate European affairs. As the communist threat took shape, the importance of democratization was temporarily shelved in US foreign politics.

A Second Resurgence

As President John Kennedy was inaugurated, he moved the banner of democratization back into the forefront of US foreign policy claiming “that [the United States] shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”³⁴ Unlike Eisenhower, JFK’s speeches on freedom actually related to democracy. JFK created a democratization policy for Latin America that linked socioeconomic aid to political reform. JFK intended his Alliance for Progress

to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living, and all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom. To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress. Our Alliance for Progress is an alliance of free governments, and it must work to eliminate tyranny from a hemisphere in which it has no rightful place.³⁵

Like Truman’s foreign assistance before him, JFK’s policy provided indirect assistance to democracy promotion. The Kennedy administration assumed, like many other administrations, that aid would lead to economic development which would lead to

³⁴ John Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Jan 20, 1961.

³⁵ John Kennedy, Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics, March 13, 1961.

democracy.³⁶ Within this context, JFK created two additional aid programs that could contribute to democracy: the Peace Corps and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The JFK legacy left US foreign policy with a lasting institution for democracy promotion (i.e. USAID).

The JFK legacy also left some lasting repercussions from other policies. Military interventions in Cuba, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam focused more on freedom from Communism than democracy promotion. While democracy may have been a long term goal for the government of Southeast Asia, short term efforts focused on preventing Communist take-overs. US recommendations for democratic reforms had no weight behind them. While JFK considered South Vietnam “free,” the government was essentially a dictatorship.

The Vietnam War had a chilling effect on democracy promotion. Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford showed little interest in democracy as a means to contain communism. Johnson supported Mobutu in the Congo, Suharto in Indonesia, and a coup in Greece. Nixon supported a coup against democratically elected, but leftist, Allende in Chile. Nixon also ignored moves away from democracy in El Salvador, the Philippines, and Nicaragua. There was a general ambivalence about the type of governments as long as they were anti-communist. One exception to the rule was Johnson’s occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965-1966. As with many US occupations, though, democracy promotion was not the objective of the intervention, but the perceived means to achieve the end of extraction from the situation.

By the time that Ford left office, the US Congress had tired of the overdose of anti-democratic activities in US foreign policy. The Harkin Amendment in 1975 tied economic assistance to human rights. The Church Committee publicized US covert actions to install and prop-up authoritarian regimes. On the international scene, Western Europe had convinced the United States and the Soviets to sign the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which included an international human rights agreement.

The groundwork had been done to facilitate President Jimmy Carter’s revival of democracy promotion. But, Carter’s objective was no longer security, but the protection

³⁶ Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad* (DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 21.

of human rights. Carter hoped to create a more moral and humane foreign policy, articulated in his inaugural address:

We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation earns is essential to our strength...there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.... Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.³⁷

In order to implement his policy, the Carter administration created a human rights strategy. After an experimental period, the strategy was implemented in a Presidential Directive on Human Rights setting

the objective of the U.S. human rights policy to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person (e.g. torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; lengthy detention without trial, and assassination) and to enhance civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the press; and the right to basic judicial protections).³⁸

Carter encouraged democratization across the developing world. In an attempt to target the worst abusers of human rights, Carter cut economic aid to Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. Critics, especially Ronald Reagan, would blame Carter's foreign policy on the fall of two US allies: Iran and Nicaragua.

President Ronald Reagan staunchly opposed Carter's foreign policy. Reagan began his tenure by embracing the friendly dictatorships that the Carter administration had ostracized: Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, and South Korea. After this initial anti-Carter reflex, President Reagan gradually adopted a democracy promotion policy though it was clearly not Carter-esque. Despite their considerable differences in how they perceived the world, Presidents Carter and Reagan both used democracy promotion as a means to improve international peace and U.S. national security. However, these two Presidents had considerably different beliefs on how democracy was going to achieve peace. This created a major distinction in the priorities and execution of their democracy programs.

³⁷ Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, January 20th, 1977.

³⁸ Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive / NSC-30, February 17, 1978, 1.

President Carter envisioned democracy promotion as the cornerstone to improve human rights. Carter's predecessors affected a double standard for human rights in their foreign policy—human rights were expendable if deemed necessary to promote U.S. security interests. Carter argued that such behavior was counterproductive to US security because it created trust issues and resentment by those abused. The global improvement of human rights was supposed to lead to international peace. On the other hand, Reagan saw economic prosperity as the key to international peace. Just as Carter saw democracy as the cornerstone to human rights, Reagan saw democracy as the cornerstone to economic prosperity. While adopting similar means and similar ends, the variation in the understanding of the causal linkage created a divergence in democracy promotion priorities and the tactical execution of democracy programs.

Reagan's foreign policy message endeavored to convince countries that if they wanted to prosper, they needed to adopt a free market. Additionally, in order to have a functional free market, they needed to democratize. At the end of his tenure, Reagan hypothesized that "these democratic and free-market revolutions are really the same revolution."³⁹ Reagan took major steps to facilitate these revolutions in 1983 with the creation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the National Endowment for Democracy.

Although economic prosperity was a prime selling point to other nations, Reagan's policy also sought to achieve greater freedoms for others. Reagan argued that "Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few; it is the universal right of all God's children....Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy."⁴⁰ Arguably, many of Reagan's speeches on freedom, democracy, and self-government were aimed at the Soviet empire. Reagan was advocating for the end of Soviet repression in its satellite countries. Meanwhile, Reagan's support for the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and authoritarianism in El Salvador indicate that he did not perceive democracy promotion as a universal tool to achieve his policy goals.

Interestingly, Reagan resurrected Wilsonian-style military intervention for democratization. Reagan supported "freedom fighters" in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. He claimed that military intervention had potential for

³⁹ Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Dec 16, 1988.

⁴⁰ Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, Feb 6, 1985.

“producing a unified democratic Lebanon.”⁴¹ Perhaps the most direct military intervention in the name of democracy was the invasion of Grenada. In each of these cases, anti-Communism was a security interest. Each intervention was essentially a proxy war in the broader, global Cold War against the Soviet Union. But, by the end of the second Reagan administration, the United States was encouraging democracy in the Philippines, El Salvador, Honduras, and South Korea.

Reagan’s former Vice President, President George Bush (41) adopted Reagan’s pro-democracy ideals. In 1989, Bush (41) expressed a serious commitment to democracy promotion: “we seek a partnership rooted in a common commitment to democratic rule.... Our battlefield is the broad middle ground of democracy and popular government; our fight, against the enemies of freedom on the extreme right and on the extreme left.”⁴² As the Soviet empire collapsed, support for right-wing dictatorships evaporated. Bush suspended support for the insurgents in Nicaragua and encouraged free elections. For Bush, democracy had a direct link to security. At the end of his administration, he defended his democracy promotion efforts by explaining that “abandonment of the worldwide democratic revolution could be disastrous for American security.”⁴³ While human rights and economic prosperity remain foreign policy goals, the Bush administration no longer perceived these as required intervening variables between democracy and security.

While Reagan’s foreign policy followed the political science theory that democracy caused economic prosperity, the Bush administration transposed the causal linkage, basing their foreign policy on the theory that free markets led to democracy. Further, Bush’s democratization policy was a more modest plan, limiting its scope to two geographic regions: Latin America and Eastern Europe. The 1989 Brady Plan provided debt relief to Latin American countries under conditions that required economic reforms. The United States encouraged democratic transitions in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. At the end of the Cold War, the Support for East European Democracy Act offered foreign aid with conditional requirements for democratization.

⁴¹ Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada, Oct 27, 1983.

⁴² George Bush, Remarks to the Council of the Americas, May 2, 1989.

⁴³ George Bush, Remarks at Texas A&M University, Dec 15, 1992.

During his single term in office, President Bush embarked upon three major and one minor military intervention. Two of the major interventions, Iraq and Somalia, were unrelated to democracy promotion. In a rare instance in the twentieth century, one US intervention had a goal of democracy promotion as its primary, and perhaps sole, purpose. While limited in scope, the Bush administration ordered a US airpower show of force to deter a coup attempt against newly democratically-elected Filipino President Corazon Aquino. President Bush's other major military intervention, Panama, involved a variety of security interests including democracy promotion.

After years of deteriorating relations with Manuel Noriega, right-wing dictator of Panama, in late 1988 the Bush administration imposed economic sanctions on Panama with the objective of "a return to civilian constitutional rule and the development of an apolitical military establishment in Panama."⁴⁴ Rhetorically, President Bush encouraged free and fair elections signaling to Noriega that "The days of rule by dictatorship in Latin America are over. They must end in Panama as well.... The people and Government of the United States will not recognize fraudulent election results engineered by Noriega. The aspirations of the people of Panama for democracy must not be denied."⁴⁵ Instead of heeding the warning, Noriega rigged the election and had his opponent physically beaten. Panama-US relations continued to deteriorate, increasing concerns for the safety of US forces based in Panama. The crisis culminated in December 1989 as President Bush directed US forces to invade Panama to "safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty."⁴⁶

The case of China indicates that there were limits on President Bush's willingness to promote democracy. Critics argue that Bush (41) failed to seize the opportunity to push the democracy agenda in China immediately following Tiananmen Square. However, considering the US involvement in three other military interventions during his administration and the potential security risk of antagonizing the government of China,

⁴⁴ George Bush, Message to the Congress Reporting on the Economic Sanctions Against Panama, April 6, 1989.

⁴⁵ George Bush, Statement on the Presidential Elections in Panama, April 27, 1989.

⁴⁶ George Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama, December 20, 1989.

Bush's choice not to promote democracy in China appears a practical balance between democracy promotion and security interests.

President William Clinton continued to embrace Reagan's and Bush's linkage between economy and democracy, arguing that "Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another."⁴⁷ Despite the government transition from Republican to Democrat, the strategy remained remarkably similar: democracy promotion as a means to achieve U.S. security interests by improving the prospects of international peace. Within this context, Clinton supported Boris Yeltsin and democratization in Russia. Clinton used force to return the democratic government to power in Haiti. The administration made democracy promotion a major focus area within USAID. While other factors were involved, the timing of the shift correlates to major increases in democracy across East Asia and Africa. Military interventions with NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo were designed to prevent conflict and ethnic cleansing, though democracy promotion undertones permeated the post-conflict construction of those new nations.

President George Bush (43) continued the policy of using both economic and military force to spread democracy. On the economic side, Bush enacted the Millennium Challenge Corporation which provided economic assistance conditional on progress towards democratization, market liberalization, and other factors. Bush's use of force to promote democracy paralleled that of many other Presidents. Democracy was not an objective for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but democracy became a core part of the reconstruction strategy for both countries. The Bush administration also endorsed democracy as a key component to its counter-terrorism strategy.

While it is too early to adequately summarize President Barack Obama's democracy promotion policy, early signs indicate a return to rhetorical support for democracy. President Obama continued Bush's democracy promotion policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Obama gave democracy promotion a prominent role in his foreign policy "because governments that respect these values are more just, peaceful,

⁴⁷ President William J. Clinton, *The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 1996, p. 2.

and legitimate. We also do so because their success abroad fosters an environment that supports America's national interests. Political systems that protect universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful, and secure."⁴⁸ President Obama voiced support for democracy in the Middle East, Tunisia, Burma, Egypt, and the Ukraine. The military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan appeared to have tempered the enthusiasm for other interventions, such as Syria. While President Obama encouraged democracy promotion in post-conflict Libya, the US and NATO objective for intervention in Libya was protection of civilians.

Summary

The relative importance of democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool has ebbed and flowed since the inception of the United States government. For more than a hundred years, the United States kept a tradition of confining democracy promotion to verbal support and diplomatic recognition. While the government praised democratic revolutions, the Napoleonic Wars were "proof" that military involvement in democratic revolutions would be catastrophic for the nascent United States. After the capture of Cuba and the Philippines from the Spanish in 1898, the United States gradually adopted more aggressive democracy promotion policies over the next 115 years. Perhaps this gradual adoption could be envisioned as a sine wave with increasing amplitude over time.

President McKinley, as the trailblazer in active democracy promotion, adopted a reactive policy. Considering the "you broke it, you bought it" analogy, once the United States displaced Spain and occupied Cuba and the Philippines, McKinley's options for installing a new government were constrained by domestic politics and the international security situation. Presidents Truman and Bush (43) would follow McKinley's example and push for democratic governments in occupied Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

It seems somewhat ironic that some political scientists equate modern day pro-democracy liberalism as a type of Wilsonian idealism. While Wilson talked big on democracy, his foreign policy actions did not match his rhetoric. Wilson's intervention

⁴⁸ President Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 37.

in Mexico was a half-baked concept with no clear idea on how this was going to bring about democracy. The regime change in Mexico was almost entirely incidental.

The biggest pro-democracy success story is Truman. His policies were instrumental in laying the foundation for long-lasting democracies throughout most of Western Europe. The international institutions put in place by the Truman administration continued to push countries towards democracy throughout the developed and developing worlds. At this point, democracy was a means to an end. Democracy was a tool to contain communism for Truman and Kennedy. Yet, in many societies, the allure of communism and income equality it supposedly promised was strong. In order to avoid the democratic adoption of communism, many US Cold War presidents supported right-wing dictators. It is here that President Johnson left the Democrat stereotype and adopted a more realist (vice liberalist) approach to democracy promotion.

As academia wrestled with the causal linkage between democracy and security, policy makers adjusted their implementation for democracy promotion policy. While many presidents adopted the view that democracy would improve international security, there was significant variation in their perception of the causal linkage. During the early 20th century, democratization of the Philippines appeared to be an end in itself. While the United States had security interests in the Philippines, there appeared to be no causal arguments about democratization in order to improve security.

At the beginning of the Cold War, democracy was defined as a means to achieve the end of international security. Since communism was viewed as a threat to international security, Truman and JFK adopted democracy as the antidote to communism. Carter took a different approach. Carter adopted democracy promotion policy as a method to improve human rights which would in turn improve security. Reagan, on the other hand, encouraged democracy in order to improve economic prosperity. This economic prosperity in non-communist countries would improve the relative strength of the free world and serve as a deterrent to the communist threat. Bush (41) and Clinton continued democracy promotion as a means to achieve U.S. security interests by improving the prospects of international peace. It is interesting to note that many administrations saw the democracy-economic prosperity linkage as bi-directional. Kennedy, Reagan and Bush (43) tried to incentivize democratic reforms with

economic aid. Carter attempted economic coercion as a punishment for those that failed to democratize.

It is tempting to categorize the administrations of the twentieth century into two distinct camps of Democratic Party, pro-democracy liberalists and Republican Party, security-first realists. The actual execution of democracy promotion policy was far too nuanced for such an over-generalization. While this stereotype is largely accurate for the periods before and during the Cold War, the end of the Cold War changed the calculus for democracy promotion. Ironically, the post 9/11 world may yet again change the democracy promotion equation. While the Bush (43) administration embraced democracies as the solution to terrorism, the rise of extremist Islam as a political power has given the Obama administration pause over the universal embrace of democracy.

Democracy is not seen by US foreign policy as an end in itself. Democracy promotion is not a decision to subordinate US security and economic interests to the spread of democracy throughout the globe. Democracy promotion is merely an activity selected by some to protect US security and economic interests over the long-term. Democracy promotion is a means to an end. That end might be international peace, economic prosperity, human rights, withdrawal from an occupied country, or US national security. This suggests that presidents will choose democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool when they perceive that it will help achieve their desired end.