The Effects of Army and Air Force Institutional Theories of Victory on Operation Desert Storm
Abstract
War is inherently a joint undertaking. The functional forms of warfare are constructed by the military services, each with a distinctive theory of victory. In the blending of these dissimilar modes of warfare, the planning and conduct of warfare becomes shaped by inputs from these theories of victory. The purpose of this thesis is to aid leaders, strategists, and practitioners in avoiding the resultant friction when these theories of victory diverge, which if not constrained can impair the prudent joint planning and conduct of war. The research question for this thesis is; How did the interaction between institutional theories of victory of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army manifest itself in military-strategic choice before and during Operation Desert Storm? To answer this question, this thesis parses the motivations for what and how the military services do what they do. Each military service has a theory of victory. Each theory of victory identifies, describes, and estimates the relative priorities of the services critical attributes and tasks of warfare. If the logic from each institutional pillar tells the military service how and what it does, the theory of victory explains why it does these things.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2015
- Accession Number
- AD1015809
Entities
People
- Richard F. Ganske
Organizations
- Air University