Cybersecurity Figure of Merit
Abstract
Over time, Navy warfighters have grown accustomed to the promise of reliable information technology, based on the experience of more than 30 years of relative peace in this domain. However, inspections, Red Teams, and actual adversaries have shown that this reliance on interconnected technology is not well-founded. In 2012, the Defense Science Board determined that nearly every conceivable component within DoD is networked. These networked systems and components are inextricably linked to the Departments ability to project military force and the associated mission assurance. Yet, DoDs networks are built on inherently insecure architectures that are composed of, and increasingly using, foreign parts. While DoD takes great care to secure the use and operation of the hardware of its weapon systems, the same level of resource and attention is not spent on the complex network of information technology (IT) systems that are used to support and operate those weapons or critical IT capabilities embedded within them. In many cases, the Navy bases its strategic and operational plans on the very capabilities a cyber enemy will deny or exploit in war. In an interview with CHIPS (2014) magazine, Matt Swartz, Director, Communications and Networks Division Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N2/N6) and Navy Task Force Cyber Awakening (TFCA) Lead said, Recent real world events and attacks on our Navy systems make clear the cyber threat is increasing. The risk calculus in the cyber domain has changed. Our reliance on connected capabilities has significantly increased the potential consequences of a cyber-attack.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 30, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1016749
Entities
People
- Brian Erickson
Organizations
- Naval Information Warfare Systems Command