Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab
Abstract
This study examines the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign against al Shabaab in Somalia. It concludes that, while al Shabaab was weakened between 2011 and 2016, the group is by no means defeated and may resurge if urgent steps are not taken to address the political, economic, and governance challenges at the heart of the conflict. In the past year, Somalia has made only halting progress on the political front, the security situation seems to be backsliding, some international donors are tiring, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operations have stagnated. Nevertheless, al Shabaab has lost territory, fighters, finances, popular support, and cohesion. Against the backdrop of this continued threat, Somalias bloody past, and its history of weak governance, this progress was encouraging. This study finds that a tailored engagement strategywhich involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, provide intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operationswas key in degrading al Shabaab. This strategy used a limited U.S. military foot print, which minimized the risk of U.S. casualties, financial costs, and likelihood of triggering nationalist or religious blow back. It involved working with and supporting the Somali National Army, AMISOM,and clan forces, which were in the lead. There were several other factors that weakened al Shabaab, such as internal friction among al Shabaabs senior cadre caused by poor leadership, battlefield losses, personality clashes, clan dynamics, and ideological disputes.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1017498
Entities
People
- Andrew M. Liepman
- Nathan Chandler
- Seth Jones
Organizations
- RAND Corporation