


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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

LEADING COUNTERINSURGENCIES EFFECTIVELY



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THESIS: The Full Range Leadership Development styles of Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, and Management by Exception are essential for success in counterinsurgency leadership.



INTRODUCTION

The United States (US) has been conducting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since October 7, 2001 and March 19, 2003, respectfully. Since these operations began, the US and their allies have seen 4,747 casualties in Iraq and 2,232 casualties in Afghanistan,¹ and their publics are tiring of their countries' involvement in these conflicts. Despite former President Bush declaring the war over in Iraq on May 1, 2003, the US has been fighting a formidable insurgency there ever since, and they have been struggling with the insurgency in Afghanistan since they toppled the formal Taliban rule in October 2001. A factor common to both of these countries was that *Foreign Policy* categorized them as failing states prior to coalition involvement. According to *Foreign Policy*, weakened states are often breeding grounds for extremism, terrorism, and destabilizing conflict.² Their 2010 Failed State Index considers 13 countries in their "Critical" category of becoming a failed state and numerous others in the "Danger" and "Borderline" categories based on social, economic, and political/military indicators.³ Many of the Middle East countries that saw major revolts in early 2011 were in this category, and the US currently finds itself involved in operations in Libya. These dire statistics point to the fact that conditions are favorable for nascent insurgencies similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Once insurgencies emerge, nations often depend upon the US to lead in quelling them and restoring order to these countries. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are not new for the US. The US has certainly faced numerous insurgencies since World War II (WWII) such as in Vietnam, in the Philippines, Somalia, and Cambodia, to name a few. However, the US has traditionally focused myopically on conventional conflicts and considered irregular operations as ephemeral aberrations. Consequently, the US tends to eschew preparing for non-conventional

confrontations. In Iraq and Afghanistan regular army leaders were initially not as effective in COIN operations as the US Special Forces and Marines Corps leaders because they lacked the training for this type of warfare.⁴

Further, the ineradicable idea that a military can handle what they consider lesser unconventional conflicts by preparing for conventional conflicts still permeates US military thinking. As a result of what this interminable focus on conventional warfare, the American way has been to separate the military from politics during war, a war of annihilation, an overweening reliance on technology, a faith in the uniqueness and moral on the mission of the US, and an aversion to unconventional warfare.⁵ Understandably, the US needs to be prepared to fight conventional conflicts, but the undeniable reality that the US is involved in defeating two insurgencies and that could be on the horizon obliges the US to be ready for these types of conflicts as well.

Significant theories on how to fight counterinsurgencies are readily available to avid learners. In the 1990s there was significant focus on “network-centric warfare” and most recent theorists have written reports on the “hearts-and-minds” approach through social political and economic reforms. There are a myriad of other theories, but while some theorists acknowledge that leadership can be a factor in the outcome of an insurgent conflict, they treat it as one of many factors with similar significance among other factors.⁶ Mark Moyar in *A Question of Command* asserts, “Counterinsurgency is ‘leader-centric’ warfare”⁷ and emphasizes counterinsurgent leadership as the vital factor to defeating insurgents.

Evidence from history highlights leadership as an overriding factor in COIN success. An interview of American and South Vietnamese veterans of the Phoenix program, a COIN initiative aimed at destroying the Viet Cong’s leadership during the later stages of the Vietnam

Conflict, revealed that their effectiveness hinged on the commanders' qualities.⁸ Further, the British military was adroit in defeating Malayan insurgents because they had an ample supply of leaders. These leaders gained experience in suppressing insurgencies in Burma and other British colonies.⁹ Mark Moyar asserts that counterinsurgent leadership requires all the attributes of conventional leaders plus additional ones and that a counterinsurgent leader will be a good conventional leader; but the reverse is not always true.¹⁰

However, leadership is a miasmic topic. Everybody has his own definition of what constitutes good and bad leadership. Therefore, a framework that categorizes leadership styles and establishes a common point of reference is useful in outlining how to apply efficacious COIN leadership. The Full Range Leadership Development (FRLD) model that the US Air Force (USAF) uses to teach their junior officers is an easily understood and cogent framework that provides a foundation for understanding the opaque topic of leadership in COIN warfare. By first recognizing the unique aspects of counterinsurgencies that drive counterinsurgent leadership and using the FRLD model, an examination British leaders in the Malayan Emergency and General David Petraeus reveals that the FRLD styles of Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, and Management by Exception are essential for success in COIN operations.

WHY COUNTERINSURGENT LEADERSHIP IS DIFFERENT

The demands of conventional and unconventional warfare differ so greatly that an organization optimized to succeed in one will have great difficulty in fighting the other.¹¹

Dr. John Nagl

Counterinsurgent leadership is different from other types of leadership because of the characteristics of counterinsurgencies and resource constraints. Counterinsurgencies are antithetical to the aforementioned aspects of war that the US traditionally prepares for.

Renowned COIN theorist David Galula points out that in counterinsurgencies politics should

take primacy over military power,¹² and even Carl Von Clausewitz avers, “Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa.”¹³ However, “for most Americans, war and politics are mutually exclusive enterprises. Politics cease when war starts and resume when war ends....which in turn encourages politically sterile wars.”¹⁴ Because of this separation of tasks between the military and the political body, the traditional US concept of war tends to emphasize significant firepower and destruction. Further, remote technologies that do not put friendly forces at risk are becoming commonplace concepts. However, effective COIN operations require different tactics.

COIN operations often require limited firepower and human interaction over massive firepower and remote technology since the counterinsurgent’s prime objective is the local population’s support. COIN tactics include not only destroying the insurgents in their physical domain, but also influencing the local population to support the COIN through the psychological domain. Consequently, COIN operations often require decentralized control of forces and decision making to allow smaller units who are in constant contact with the local population to work more effectively. General Petraeus’ COIN guidance for his forces reflects this understanding. His guidance in Afghanistan directs important COIN strategies of securing and serving the population, living among the people, helping Afghans build accountable government, consulting and building relationships with Afghans, and promoting local reintegration, to name a few.¹⁵ Further, Lt General Odierno’s guidance in executing the COIN campaign in Iraq also includes securing the people where they sleep, giving the people justice and honor, integrating civil and military efforts, and getting out and walking around amongst the local population.¹⁶ Some argue that these non-kinetic and national building tasks are not the soldier’s job. However, as renowned British COIN expert Frank Kitson highlights in his text *Low Intensity Operations*:

“although an army officer may regard non-military action required as being the business of the civilian authorities, they will regard it as being his business, because it is being used for operational reasons.”¹⁷ COIN operations are certainly human-centric and therefore culture is a significant factor.

COIN tactics vary depending on the culture of insurgents they oppose and the local population they are trying to influence. This has two implications. First, this demands flexibility and innovation and requires “the commander to become intimately familiar with the dynamics of the particular insurgent environment and use judgment and creativity.”¹⁸ Col MacMaster commenting on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), stated that “It would only be after American commanders and strategists started paying attention to the most basic human elements – tribes, blood feuds, and fights over water, money and women – that they would begin to understand the fight they were in.”¹⁹ Additionally, convincing the local population to counter the insurgent forces is often a more cogent way to fight them since the insurgent depends on the population’s support. Recruiting converted insurgents to the COIN’s side also proved to be effective in the US’s Vietnam Conflict and Britain’s Malayan Emergency, among others. Indeed, the emphasis on politics and human factors are significant aspects of counterinsurgencies, but the operations themselves are also significantly different from conventional operations.

Conventional warfare tends to be more managerial-like, requiring leaders to allocate large numbers of resources and people based mainly on doctrinal principles.²⁰ “When a leader is in a conventional conflict, his intellectual problem amounts to determining which phase of the battle he finds himself in; then he applies to his particular situation the general rules governing the phase.”²¹ In counterinsurgencies, innovative rather than rigid doctrinal strategies are more useful

since the goal in these strategies is the population's support, which can often be both protean and unpredictable. Additionally, the transition from peace to conventional war is abrupt, and the military's objective is clear: destruction of forces and/or occupation of territory.²² "Both of these provide clear-cut criteria to assess gains, stagnations, or losses."²³ In contrary, the transition from peace to COIN warfare is gradual, and the objective is the population's support, which is not easily measurable. Finally, the means with which to reach the conventional objectives of destruction of forces or occupation of territory is by military action supported by diplomacy and economic factors.²⁴ The means with which to reach the populace in a COIN is not so much with military power. Rather, economic and diplomatic means are often more influential on the population. In addition to these significant differences between conventional warfare and counterinsurgencies, leaders in counterinsurgencies also do not have as many resources at their disposal.

Counterinsurgent leaders do not have the resources that conventional leaders have at their disposal because they are either not available or not appropriate in counterinsurgencies. Often, policymakers consider these conflicts limited, and thus, "strategy or policy allocates fewer personnel or material resources to local counterinsurgents than even the best counterinsurgency commander needs in order to succeed."²⁵ Consequently, counterinsurgent leaders commonly need to use their scant resources efficiently and innovatively. Further, since the objective in counterinsurgencies is supporting and defending the local population, COIN operations often dictate deploying with a minimum footprint. A large footprint can dissuade local population support. Dr. David Kilcullen, author of *The Accidental Guerrilla* and advisor to General Petraeus during OIF, proposed a few precepts to execute their COIN operations. These directed planners to "select the lightest, most indirect and least intrusive form of intervention that will

achieve the necessary effect.”²⁶ These constraints in resources combined with the nature of COIN operations drive the unique aspects of counterinsurgent leadership.

However, the term “leadership” is opaque. It means different things to different people. When asked what makes an effective leader or what someone needs to do as a leader to be effective, many people can easily list a set of traits or character qualities based on their specific experiences of what worked in a particular situation. Dr. Mark Moyar proposes ten attributes that are vital for a counterinsurgent leader in *A Question of Command*. These traits are initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization.²⁷ Indeed, these are useful for analyzing leaders’ characteristics, but they are not instructive in addressing the core definition of leadership: “influencing others to achieve a goal.”²⁸

Leadership goes beyond analyzing a leader’s traits. Instead, appropriate leadership analysis addresses how the leader influences his followers towards mission accomplishment. At its core, it addresses the interaction between a leader’s style of leadership and the subordinate’s response. Indeed, certain leadership styles are more apposite under certain situations and among different followers. If used incorrectly or at the wrong time, one style will not be as effective as in another circumstance and could even produce deleterious responses in followers. A cogent framework that categorizes appropriate leadership styles is the FRLD. A brief understanding of this model is essential before analyzing specific COIN leaders.

FULL RANGE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Expanding on Dr. Bernard Bass’s *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*, the FRLD is “supported by an extensive research base and applications in corporate, military,

religious, educational, and nonprofit training settings worldwide.”²⁹ Including Laissez-Faire, which is really a lack of leadership, seven styles exist within the three categories. However, before examining each, it is important to highlight some important notes on this model. First, it is not prescriptive-it does not prescribe when to use any of the styles. Rather, when to use these styles is the “art” of leadership and depends mainly on both the existing situation and the followers’ level of development. What might be appropriate in one situation may not be fitting in another. Further, the type of leadership used for one subordinate may not be appropriate for others and depends on their level of development, that is, their commitment and competency relative to the task. Finally, effective leaders can use all of these styles and some simultaneously to be more successful, but often the situation and followers’ development level dictate that some styles will take precedence over others. The utility of this model rests in giving leaders a framework for comprehending leadership application. It gives leaders an understanding of the different styles at their disposal for their particular situation, and certainly, some styles have proven to be successful repeatedly in the same circumstances over others. A review of all six are vital to counterinsurgent leadership is instructive.

First, Dr. Sosik and Dr. Jung mention Laissez-Faire (LF) as a style in *Full Range Leadership Development* to point out that it is really the antithesis of leadership. It is “non-leadership because there is no exchange between the leader and the follower.”³⁰ This person does not know nor care what goes on under his leadership. Clearly, this is undesirable for an organization. A LF leader’s subordinates lack direction, often the workplace is haphazard and left to the whims of subordinate leaders or the workers themselves, and the LF leader betrays his boss’s trust to accomplish the mission. As opposed to LF, the FRLD classifies the first two

positive leadership styles, Management-by-Exception (MBE) and Contingent Reward, as Transactional because subordinates' actions necessitate a response from the leader.

MBE "is a recognized and often effective way of managing systems, processes, resources and in some circumstances, even people."³¹ As the name implies, this leadership style involves the leader not giving any inputs unless something goes wrong, and Dr. Bass bifurcates MBE into MBE-passive and MBE-active. When a leader waits for mistakes to happen before stepping in to fix the problem, the leader displays MBE-passive. This may seem like LF from an observer's viewpoint, but the difference is that an MBE leader intervenes to correct deviations where the LF leader would do nothing. A simple example of MBE-passive is a police officer sitting at the police station waiting for a call to come in before responding.

Conversely, a MBE-active police officer would patrol the neighborhood while listening to his dispatch radio. MBE-active leaders do not wait to respond, but are instead active in seeking out substandard performance or changing conditions. These leaders constantly monitor their subordinates' performance and the process and step in at the earliest possible time to make corrections. Accordingly, these leaders will warn subordinates if they are getting close to a limit or specific level of performance and are not afraid to bring mistakes to the followers' attention.³²

Many associate the MBE-active style with micromanaging, but in micromanaging, the leader is actively giving inputs before the subordinate has a chance to make a decision on his own. Rather, MBE-active describes the situational awareness that a leader retains in what is going on below him. Of course, the MBE-active leader will step in if he sees a problem developing, but for normal decisions through the course of working through a problem, he will let subordinates make decisions. Further, MBE in COIN operations is essential. Due to rapidly changing conditions at lower levels and insurgents' use of variegated tactics, lower level leaders

need the authority to make decisions on their own and apply adaptive and innovative solutions to the problems they face. Operational level leaders should give those leaders below them the latitude to make those decisions and avoid applying punishment for reasonable decisions. However, there are times that punishment will be appropriate as well as reward, and Contingent Reward addresses that aspect of leadership.

Contingent Reward is the second category of Transactional leadership. Contingent Reward is a carrot-and-stick approach to leadership that relies on extrinsic motivation to drive subordinates towards accomplishing their mission.³³ The transaction is a reward or a punishment. The leader rewards a subordinate for meeting or exceeding standards and punishes the subordinate for not meeting standards. These can exist in numerous forms. For instance, rewards can be public or personal praise, a bonus, time-off, a quarterly award or a medal. Punishment can be a verbal reprimand, a demotion, confinement, or denial of some expected reward, for example. The leader must ensure the standards that he bases the rewards or punishment on are clear. Further, leadership has to understand what subordinates value when considering rewards and punishment under Contingent Reward. Naturally, followers will strive to do the things that get them a reward and avoid what gets them punished. Consequently, a reward structured around wrong behavior will induce subordinates to exhibit that behavior. Realizing that the award system was misplaced in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno stated, "I still tend to see...more rewards for teamwork, conformance and aggressiveness than I see for creativity, adaptability, outside-the-box solutions."³⁴ If counterinsurgent leaders want their subordinates to be creative and adaptive, they should structure their awards around those attributes.

Whereas the MBE and Contingent Reward styles of Transactional leadership focus on an exchange between the leader and the follower, the Transformational leadership category focuses on inspiring followers to accomplish goals and perform beyond expectations.³⁵ It is an intrinsic versus an extrinsic leadership category. Inspirational Motivation falls within this category. Inspirational Motivation is the leader's ability to inspire subordinates through his words and/or by creating a vision for them to strive towards accomplishing. He causes his subordinates to internalize his vision through communication style and can enhance it using symbols and expressing confidence that his team will be able to accomplish their mission.³⁶ The communication style is one that relates directly to the followers and, in speech, often includes both verbal techniques and nonverbal gestures, such as direct eye contact, movement, hand gestures, and posture to enhance the communication's impact. Among other styles that Sir Gerard Templer used, he was adept at Inspirational Motivation. The effects of his communication are evident through a subordinate's testimony: "the impact was electrifying...I, for one, returned to Seremban the next morning feeling like an electric torch which has just been filled with new batteries."³⁷

Individual Consideration is the next leadership style on the FRLD spectrum. The ultimate goal in Individual Consideration is to develop followers into leaders themselves.³⁸ It first requires leaders to know their followers individually, recognize their unique growth and development needs, and mentor them. Implied within Individual Consideration is genuine concern for subordinates' welfare. Attila the Hun provides a relevant example of Individual Consideration leadership. Many know Attila the Hun as a brutal warrior, but he used Individual Consideration with his subordinates. The Huns could do everything on horseback, and horse and horsemen acted as a single being in battle, which required extensive preparation and training

tailored to each individual to be successful in this style of fighting. Further, Attila the Hun's rules were to "always be approachable and listen to both good and bad news from subordinate Huns."³⁹ Another one was to "pay proper courtesy to subordinate leaders in order to gain their respect."⁴⁰ These examples reflect the empathetic approach to his Individual Consideration leadership style.

Further, Individual Consideration is effective at all levels of command. Understandably, it would be impossible for high-level leaders to know all of their followers, but it is essential that they know and develop the subordinates at the immediate or second level of command below them. This is most apposite since they were probably at those levels prior to assuming their current position. Ideally, their subordinate leaders will apply Individual Consideration to their immediate subordinates, and this continues to further subordinate commanders.

A substitution to developing followers with Individual Consideration is simply to replace those leaders that do not have the experience in COIN operations. The British did this successfully in the Malayan security forces by importing officers from other parts of their colonial empire.⁴¹ Unquestionably, commanders should choose the best person for the job. However, leaders often have to work with who their superior assigns them and may not have the option to replace them. Additionally, sufficient replacements are not always available, namely in counterinsurgencies where experienced leadership in this distinct type of warfare is often scarce as it is in the US where the traditional focus is on conventional warfare. A side effect in replacing a commander is that it runs the risk of "creating such a fear of mistakes in other commanders that they would become less aggressive or stop trying innovative methods, as occasionally occurred in Vietnam."⁴² Assiduous and innovative leaders are essential in COIN operations. Instead of simply replacing leaders, using Individual Consideration to mentor COIN

leaders multiplies leaders that are adept in COIN operations. Ultimately, the commander should weigh the risk of keeping someone in command and coaching him or her to success versus simply replacing him. If they decide that replacement is the best option, they should ensure their subordinates know “that the relief was due to a lack of leadership rather than independence of mind and audacity.”⁴³

A fourth leadership style within the FRLD is Intellectual Stimulation. Leaders do not always have the answers to every problem, especially when they have subordinates who might have more time and expertise to come up with salient solutions. Through Intellectual Stimulation, leaders stimulate their followers’ creativity. They do this by questioning assumptions, processes, and existing paradigms and by forcing their followers to rethink their solutions to create new approaches to problems. Such leaders include their followers in decision-making and encourage them to look at problems from different angles.⁴⁴ Consequently, this includes some risk-taking in allowing subordinates to try appropriate ideas. Accordingly, leaders should not over-react when these ideas fail. Over-reacting can stifle further creative thought from subordinates and might dissuade them from proposing further creative ideas.

Intellectual Stimulation’s importance in counterinsurgent leadership stems from the constantly changing conditions and the variegated environments in which insurgents operate, both of which tend to cause decisions in COIN operations to be made at lower levels by junior officers depending on their situations. The basis of Mark Moyar’s ten leadership attributes in *A Question of Command* depends on two essential characteristics of all insurgent environments. One of those is that all insurgent environments presented variations and changes that demanded frequent adaptation.⁴⁵ In order to address this essential characteristic, leaders should cultivate independent and innovative thinking in their subordinates, who might be in a better position to

see what is happening and thus have the breakthrough ideas. In the nine case studies that Mark Moyar presented to support his ten attributes of effective COIN leaders, he points out that “the main function of senior leaders in achieving adaptation was to encourage innovation and risk taking at lower levels.”⁴⁶

Conventional and unconventional commanders alike can use Intellectual Stimulation when they face constraining and changing conditions. General George Kenney, Commander of Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific from 1942-1945 during World War II, had to overcome numerous constraints to be successful. The weather in the Pacific was erratic and unpredictable, and the inaccuracy of high-altitude bombing that the AF considered indispensable made sinking maneuvering Japanese ships difficult. He supported a subordinate’s idea by switching to low altitude bombing against ships, which questioned the AF’s dogma of high altitude bombing.⁴⁷ Additionally, he sponsored a subordinate to install four fifty-caliber guns on the A-20’s nose with 500 rounds of ammunition each, an unprecedented innovation⁴⁸ that made the A-20’s guns more precise at low altitudes. He was not the inventor of each of these innovative ideas. However, by “his focus on improving methods and a willingness to jettison established routines he encouraged innovation in his command.”⁴⁹ This ultimately allowed the Allied Air Forces to be effective in the Pacific during World War II. This example of Intellectual Stimulation highlights that it can be useful for conventional leaders. However, it is particularly important for COIN leaders who routinely face changing conditions in the midst of culturally influenced operations and often-minimal resources.

Individualized Influence is the final and most important style for counterinsurgent leaders. Idealized Influence is inspiring through actions and the leader’s example and thus tends to be the most compelling style of leadership. Leaders using Idealized Influence emphasize a

shared vision and collective values and sacrifice personal gain for the sake of the mission and subordinates. They take calculated risks and exhibit high levels of integrity and courage in the midst of danger.⁵⁰ Because they are highly credible and trustworthy, subordinates look to them as role models and desire to emulate them.

Seven of Mark Moyer's ten attributes of effective COIN leaders relate to Idealized Influence: initiative, judgment, creativity, empathy, charisma, dedication, and integrity. Often, leaders who personify these attributes find that they lead with Idealized Influence unintentionally. It results from the characteristics that they embody. They induce their followers and their subordinate leaders to higher levels of performance by demonstration. Idealized Influence is especially important for COIN leaders who frequently have subordinate leaders whose military has not prepared them for the unique aspects of COIN operations. Precocious counterinsurgent leaders need to show their subordinates through their actions how to execute COIN operations.

General Abrams was a leader who personified favorable attributes and led using Idealized Influence. He assumed command of US forces in South Vietnam in June 1968 after the Tet Offensive and after the US's waning performance under General Westmoreland. Overall, he understood COIN operations better, changed tactics soon after taking command, and influenced subordinates through his high standards of integrity. As an example, unlike previous policies, he directed that "the overall public affairs policy of this command will be to let results speak for themselves"⁵¹ and that "if an investigation results in bad news, no attempt will be made to dodge the issue."⁵² High standards of integrity such as these undoubtedly influenced subordinates and peers alike such as his civilian counterpart, the US Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam

Ellsworth Bunker, and William Colby who led the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).⁵³

As General Abrams demonstrated, Individualized Influence can be a very compelling style. However, Idealized Influence is also important because it relates and influences some of the other FRLD styles. First, Individual Consideration involves coaching and mentoring subordinates in order to develop them. Idealized Influence leaders tend to be highly credible and trustworthy as a result of their innate attributes, which gives validation to their coaching and mentoring. The apothegm that “you shouldn’t go a dentist who has bad teeth” applies here. Coaching and mentoring will tend to be ineffective if the leader lacks credibility or other attributes that he is trying to instill in his subordinates.

In a similar manner, Idealized Influence relates to Intellectual Stimulation in that the leader demonstrates to subordinate leaders how to lead using Intellectual Stimulation by being willing to implement appropriate changes that subordinates suggest. Understandably, leaders should not implement all proposed innovations, but rather ones whose benefit they appropriately weigh against the risk of failure. However, by demonstrating a willingness to implement others’ innovative ideas, especially ones that are radically different, the leader not only sends a message that innovation is important, but also that he has the courage to implement what is often an unproven tactic. Leading through example in this manner encourages subordinate leaders to replicate this practice with their subordinates, which can ideally cause an environment of innovation to permeate further throughout the organization.

By understanding the aspects of COIN warfare that drive the distinct type of leadership and using the FRLD model as a lens to view leadership styles, an examination of historical leaders will prove productive. As a caveat however, most biographies and historical texts focus

on individuals' accomplishments. Certainly, these are easier to codify, and the argument that a person should be judged on what his leadership accomplished regardless of the effect of that leadership on subordinates, also holds some validity. However, leadership, defined as "influencing others to achieve a goal,"⁵⁴ requires an understanding of that influence with the underlying premise that effective leadership influence will result in greater accomplishments and motivation. Uninfluenced testimony and subordinate's reactions to the leader's style are perhaps the clearest evidence of a leader's influence on them. However, this data is often difficult to find. Further, it would be impossible to cover every counterinsurgent leader to verify Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, and MBE are the predominant styles. However, these three styles and data that reflect the influence of a leader's style of leadership surface enough throughout counterinsurgent leaders' analysis to assert that they are the most salient ones. Analysis of counterinsurgent leaders in the Malayan Emergency and an analysis of General David Petraeus reveal a considerable dependence on Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, and MBE.

LEADERSHIP IN THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

*In all this welter of trouble 'the man' is what counts.*⁵⁵

Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery

WWII was ongoing and Japan, allied with the Axis, was making inroads into China and other parts of the Asia. Malaya was a British colony, and Malayan demographics included several different population groups, but mainly consisted of Malays, Chinese, and indigenous people in addition to the British colonialists. Among the mostly Chinese population existed the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP was an insurgent organization formed from Communists in China with the ultimate goal of taking over Malaya. However, the Japanese penetration into China increasingly shaped the MCP's policies,⁵⁶ and Britain's support to China

during WWII urged the MCP to support the British.⁵⁷ Further, after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, the MCP quickly abandoned British opposition and went so far as to offer its assistance to the colonial administration in Malaya, an offer that the British rejected.⁵⁸ However, this putative support for the British colonial efforts existed only because of their common Japanese enemy. Secret MCP documents revealed that they would expel the British as soon as possible after the Japanese threat abated, and that they were supporting the “anti-Japanese front only as a means of extending its influence”⁵⁹ among the Malayan population.

When the Japanese invaded Malaya in 1941, the MCP proposed to form a military force armed by the British to fight the Japanese. The Government of Malaya (GOM) initially rejected this proposal, but after the military situation deteriorated, they reversed this decision. Soon afterwards, British leaders released MCP political prisoners, and guerrilla units led by British officers were formed among the MCP and the Malayan population to fight the Japanese invaders. However, this lasted no more than two months with the British surrender to the Japanese in Singapore in early 1942, which also included surrender of Malaya. Many of the MCP escaped to fight later, establishing their headquarters on the southern tip of Malaya in Johore.⁶⁰

After WWII ended, the British came back to take over Malaya and found that the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the military arm of the MCP, had established de facto control of much of the country. Initially, the British made concessions with these insurgents, but soon the MCP turned its tactics to labor agitation, strikes, and terror in an open insurgency to take over Malaya. In early 1948 after the MCP killed three local planters and the British were under considerable pressure from the local population to do something, they declared a “State of Emergency”⁶¹ and initiated COIN operations against the MCP insurgents.

The British Army retained vast experience in COIN operations against insurgent forces throughout their historical colonial policing operations. Dr. John Nagl describes how the British Army's organizational culture evolved through these operations. Some notable aspects of this culture include that they considered the role of kinetic force in COIN operations to be limited, the role of the army to be expeditionary, decentralized and small unit tactics, the location of the leadership to be local and the nature of the war to be protracted and shades of gray instead of binary.⁶² These aspects address the aforementioned specific differences required in a COIN operation over a conventional operation. However, more relevantly to the topic of leadership, these aspects of the British Army's organizational culture drove their leaders to apply effective leadership in combating the MCP insurgents in Malaya. Although the British Army's overarching organizational culture was attuned to COIN, many of the individual leaders involved in colonial policing died during WWII. Those leaders in WWII executed mainly conventional battles in WWII. As a result, the initial leadership in Malaya suffered serious shortcomings.⁶³

The British government selected Sir Gurney to lead the civil administration as high commissioner in Malaya in October 1948 soon after the insurgency started. Overall, Gurney was an "aloof and uninspiring" leader. He spent most of his time in his office handling administrative duties and seldom traveled outside the capital. This restricted his comprehension of the conflict and prevented any sense of urgency into civil administration.⁶⁴ His leadership was largely LF. He failed to understand the nature of the conflict, and as a result, subordinates lacked definitive direction, which led them to apply some tactics counter to those required in an insurgency. During these initial years, his feckless leadership and lack of oversight resulted in frequent beatings of Chinese citizens that resulted in an erosion of their support to the British. Gurney condoned some of this behavior because he thought it would terrify the Chinese local

into cooperating with the government.⁶⁵ Instead, it drove them to cooperate with MCP insurgents.

Additionally, leaders that lacked experience in counterinsurgency operations “often began by launching clumsy large sweep operations, which the insurgents spotted well in advance and dodged.”⁶⁶ With a lack of overarching direction from above, military leaders applied these largely conventional tactics that they had experience with from WWII. However, during this period, “some of the military officers were veterans of past jungle and guerilla wars and knew how to stalk small guerrilla units.”⁶⁷ There are also accounts of un-named British leaders applying Intellectual Stimulation to encourage their subordinates towards innovation. Dr. John Nagl contends that this was in part due to the British Army’s learning culture: “Flexible senior officers emphasized the interrelationship of political and military goals and encouraged the creation, testing, and implementation of more effective counterinsurgency doctrine.”⁶⁸ The results on subordinates were positive: “the new tactics yielded results, reinforcing the learning process by providing the innovative junior leaders with tangible proof of the importance of their efforts.”⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the results in Malaya against the insurgents during the initial years in Malaya continued to be dismal. Senior British leaders in England needed someone who could develop an effective overarching COIN plan. They brought Sir Harold Briggs out of retirement to assume overall direction of the COIN effort as director of operations.⁷⁰

Briggs served as the military counterpart to Gurney’s civilian position. He was largely effective bringing strategic direction to the COIN operation in Malaya, implementing untraditional tactics, and creating the plan, coined the Briggs Plan, which proved vital to defeating the insurgents. The direction that Briggs brought to operations was the realization of how important the local population’s support was to their success. The center of gravity in the

Malayan Emergency was the local population. Clausewitz defined the center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends...the point of which all our energies should be directed.” The insurgents relied on the Chinese squatter population for their supplies, recruits, and intelligence against COIN forces. In order to capitalize on this, British and Malayan forces would need to fight for the local Chinese squatters’ support and sever links between the insurgents and the Chinese squatter population. Additionally, Briggs understood the importance of sound intelligence in COIN operations. He created an intelligence coordination committee, the Federal Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee, to coordinate the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence from civil, police, and military agencies.

Further, Briggs implemented an untraditional tactic of arming some of the Chinese squatters with shotguns to take their share in operations against insurgents and in security roles. This was a possible risk since some of the Chinese squatters supported the insurgents covertly. Nevertheless, Briggs understood that giving them responsibility for their own security would cause them to take ownership of the operation as part of his campaign to win their support.⁷¹ Finally, he directed that battalions and companies would not be able to execute sweeping movements any longer in search of the insurgents due to their lack of success. Instead, he directed decentralized control by pushing decision-making authority to more junior commanders, instructing: “Flexibility of operations in the jungle must be the keynote.”⁷² However, Briggs is most renowned for the Briggs Plan.

The Briggs Plan’s most dominant feature was relocating the local population into compact fortified settlements, called New Villages.⁷³ In an attempt to permanently sever the links between the local population and the insurgents in the jungle-heavy environment, they had to resort to this method. They incorporated strict accountability, curfews, and food rationing to

sever any possible links with the insurgents. Further, this forced the insurgents to attack the New Village security forces at a disadvantage to the insurgents. The New Village concept was extremely effective in Malaya and was an instrumental part of subsequent leaders' strategies. Overall, Briggs' leadership was effective not only in creating the specific organizations and strategies that would ultimately lead to success, but he also demonstrated effective leadership styles.

Although there is only scant testimonial data to verify the direct effects of Briggs' leadership style on his subordinates, one can surmise that it consisted of heavy doses of both Idealized Influence and Intellectual Stimulation. His unorthodox ideas in fusing intelligence collection sources, arming the local population, pushing decision-making authority to junior officers, and the New Village strategy indicate that he did not prescribe to a strict dogma of adhering to only strategies that have worked in the past. Instead, he demonstrated flexibility and risk taking to implement strategies that were effective. By risking unproven, yet well thought out strategies, he demonstrated Idealized Influence by encouraging risk taking. This innovative and untraditional style of leadership was certainly indicative of the British Army's organizational culture, and his example would have stimulated subordinate leaders to innovate on their own about new strategies that would work. Briggs' leadership was short-lived however due to ill health and death. He was unable to see his strategies result in overall success, but they continued under subsequent leadership.

Along with Briggs leaving his post as the military leader, insurgents ambushed and shot Gurney in his Rolls Royce on his way to his weekend resort in October 1951.⁷⁴ Also during that year, the British General Elections resulted in Oliver Lyttelton becoming the new Colonial Secretary. He examined the triumvirate command structure in Malaya consisting of the civilian

High Commissioner position that Gurney held, the military Director of Operations that Briggs held, and the Commissioner of Police held by Colonel Grey whom many expatriates complained to Lyttleton about.⁷⁵ Lyttleton concluded that they should consolidate the triumvirate structure. He told the British Cabinet that what was needed “was one man, a strong man who could hold all the reins in his hands and combine the three roles of High Commissioner, Director of Operations, and Commissioner of Police.”⁷⁶ The man that Lyttleton suggested to Prime Minister Churchill was Sir Gerald Templer.

When Templer arrived in Malaya, the situation was bleak and COIN forces’ morale was at nadir levels. Gurney’s assassination motivated the insurgents and depressed the British forces’ spirits, which affected their operations. “In mid-February, the British writer, Malcolm Muggeridge observed in the Daily Telegraph, ‘Over large areas of the country law and order have, to all intents and purposes, broken down.’”⁷⁷ According to a declassified assessment of the Malayan Emergency by the Royal Air Force, security forces casualties rose steadily from 360 to 1,195 between 1948 and 1951 before Templer took command.⁷⁸ Additionally, civilian casualties rose from 554 to 1,024 in those same years.⁷⁹ However, under Templer’s bravura leadership the trends in both of these indicators reversed. Both the 1,195 security forces casualties fell to 664, and the 1,024 casualties fell to 632 the following year after Templer took over. The triumvirate authority that Templer held facilitated greater unity of effort, and the successful Briggs Plan that was already in place when Templer took command was also partially responsible for this success. Further, Templer made many favorable management changes once in office. However, these were secondary factors to Templer’s leadership. A 1972 Rand Corporation assessment, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, confirms that, “Templer’s chief contribution was in dynamic leadership and driving energy rather than in his management changes.”⁸⁰

Endowed with the authority of all three positions, Templer “fell on Malaya like a thunderbolt: in the words of one Colonial officer, ‘he really made things hum’. Commanding both the military and civilian powers, he accepted no excuses for delay or failure.”⁸¹ Oliver Lyttelton, his hierarchical boss in the British colonial structure, was no longer worried about Malaya under Templer’s leadership. He states, “In short, he dominated the scene....In a few months I had almost dismissed Malaya from its place in my mind amidst the danger spots. My role had become simple: it was to back him up and support him.”⁸² John Cloake, who wrote a biography on Templer, highlights Templer’s general strategy for success:

1. Get the priorities right
2. Get the instructions right
3. Get the organization right
4. Get the right people into the organization
5. Get the right spirit into the people
6. Leave them to get on with it⁸³

The last two are particularly instructive to the FRLD leadership styles, but number five, “Get the right spirit into the people,” was Templer’s forte. This one addresses both getting the right perspective in subordinates towards their COIN operations in Malaya and motivating them, both of which Templer was exceptionally skilled at doing. He did this by using several of the FRLD styles, but he primarily used Idealized Influence followed by Intellectual Stimulation.

The predominant leadership style Templer used was Idealized Influence. As Dr. Mark Moyar points out in his text *A Question of Command*, “leaders like Templer...use their charisma and personal example to inspire subordinate commanders to heightened initiative, dedication, and integrity – to such an extent that they can make the difference between victory and defeat.”⁸⁴

Templer brought a rare energy to his leadership that permeated throughout his command. A Police Superintendent in a Malaya recalled how Templer would meet one of them to drive through their district, and once finished, a new Police Superintendent would get in to do the same thing.⁸⁵ In another instance, the same Police Superintendent describes a situation where he was working at his desk one morning to find Templer standing on top of it.⁸⁶ One may consider an action like this to be crazy, but the overall effects in Malaya, in the words of this Police Superintendent, were that Templer “energized the situation.”⁸⁷ He was also assiduous in touring the countryside to keep a pulse on how operations were proceeding and to emphasize the importance of the COIN effort.

In contrast to the aforementioned description of Gurney who tended to rule from behind his desk, subordinates saw Templer out in the field and concerned with the operations. “Templer was forever on the move, visiting most parts of the country, even small villages where the population would assemble around his helicopter or staff car to hear a speech.”⁸⁸ Upon visiting one of the plantations, one planter attests to the effect of Templer’s visits saying that Templer’s “visit was greatly appreciated and everyone on the estate had an opportunity of airing his views, asking questions and meeting him face to face. No previous High Commissioner had taken the trouble to do this.”⁸⁹ Additionally, pictures abound of Templer on jungle patrol with the Gurkhas, on the firing range with his men, and on elephant rides throughout the country.⁹⁰ This sense of concern for operations throughout the country imbued the same sense of seriousness and direction for his subordinate leaders as well. In addition to constantly touring the countryside, Templer’s outlook toward the local population served as an example for subordinates.

The attitude among many British colonial officers had traditionally been one of pomposity towards the native population. However, Templer did not personify this

comportment. When he first arrived in the Government House where he lived, he was informed that the British do not shake hands with their Asian servants. He disagreed and sent for all his servants, shaking each one's hand.⁹¹ "Templer had no time for snobbery or pomposity,"⁹² and "many of the settlers and planters felt that Templer was too friendly with the natives and not paying enough attention to their own interests and security."⁹³ However, many saw what Templer was trying to do in his attempt to gain the support of the local population even with these small acts, and they gave him their full support.⁹⁴ Templer understood that the COIN fight was for support of the local population against the insurgents, and he understood how important the British attitude was towards the population. He personally set the example for subordinates. His examples through Idealized Influence significantly influenced the British's COIN effort in Malaysia. Another part of his leadership that proved successful was Intellectual Stimulation.

The other part of "Getting the right spirit into the people" was encouraging innovation in subordinates. Templer was adept at using Intellectual Stimulation to encourage subordinates to be innovative. As Dr. Nagl confirms in his text, *Learning to Eat Soup with A Knife*, Templer "encouraged innovation from below and demanded a new approach to solving the problems of Malayan society."⁹⁵ He further says, "Templer played an essential role in creating an institutional climate in Malaya predisposed toward a wider view of the conflict and a spirit of innovation throughout the command."⁹⁶ Templer himself attested to the need for innovation and adaptation saying, "I have not come here with any ready-made, clear-cut solution to Malaya's present problems."⁹⁷ As aforementioned in the description of this FRLD style, one of the most significant things a leader can do to encourage this in subordinates is to support their innovative ideas. Examples of Templer supporting innovative ideas abound.

In one instance, among some townspeople he instituted an anonymous ballot where they could identify who among them were supporting the insurgents. These people were afraid to overtly point out the supporters for fear of reprisal. The anonymous ballot tactic resulted in the arrest of forty Communist supporters in the town.⁹⁸ Templer did not come up with the anonymous ballot idea, but rather an Irish police officer suggested it.⁹⁹ In another example, Templer sponsored innovative uses of helicopters for several tactics. They used helicopters to support planters throughout the countryside who were under threat from insurgents by providing these planters with UHF radios that the planters could use to call for support. Helicopters were also used to insert soldiers deep into the jungle¹⁰⁰ and, in a truly unique way; they outfitted helicopters with loudspeakers for psychological operations in order to turn insurgents to the counterinsurgent's side.¹⁰¹ These were not innovations that Templer came up with, but rather ones of subordinates that he sponsored. Although not always successful, by being willing to sponsor sometimes-unorthodox ideas, he encouraged innovation in subordinates. When these ideas were successful, innovation became contagious and more subordinates were stimulated to come up with innovative solutions. One young British officer describe Templar as “dynamic, enthusiastic, energetic, and for someone in my position a hero, who was always open to ideas from junior officers like myself.”¹⁰²

In addition to examples of Templer implementing subordinates' ideas, Templer also encouraged innovation under his leadership by eschewing strict adherence to doctrine. “Although he promoted doctrine, Templer was not doctrinaire but pragmatic and suspicious of abstractions, particularly theories that applied everywhere.”¹⁰³ Soon after he took command, Templer ordered the creation of the manual titled *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* to capture the drills and techniques that had proven successful in Malaya. He ensured

this document was sent to his police and army units.¹⁰⁴ The prescriptions in this document were useful for officers new to Malaya and those that did not have any COIN experience, but did not provide solutions to most COIN problems. Nor did it give any definitive methods for accomplishing some of the more essential tasks. Rather, it instructed, “successful military operations demanded successful leadership, not just comprehension of methods.”¹⁰⁵ It specifically read, “Operations in Malaya consist of small patrols”¹⁰⁶ and “The success or failure of these operations therefore depends on the standard of junior officers.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, the primary document that Templer sanctioned outlining lessons learned in Malaya eschewed strict adherence to doctrine and rather encouraged innovation.

Templer was also skilled in using Inspirational Motivation to inspire his followers. Recall that this style is where the leader uses speech delivery techniques as well as creates a vision for his audience to spur them towards action. Templer’s unremitting visits inspecting operations were accompanied by rousing speeches to bolster the morale and motivation of hit units. One British official wrote, “The impact was electrifying. Templer combined high powered vitality and a slightly Machiavellian expression with ruthless determination and an infectious sense of humour.”¹⁰⁸ Additionally, Templer’s ultimate task was to transfer governance to the people of Malaysia, and he advocated for a vision of nationalism amongst them. This was something that they bought into, proving vital to winning the “hearts and minds” of the population and winning the population’s support toward the British side and against the insurgents.¹⁰⁹ In addition to Inspirational Motivation, Individual Consideration was also a method that he used effectively.

Dr. Moyar avers, “professional armed forces have long understood how to bolster the charisma of officers from the lowliest lieutenants on up, through training and coaching.”¹¹⁰

Certainly, Templer understood this precept. He used Individual Consideration by mentoring, listening, and instructing those below him, and displaying his concern for both his soldiers and the local population. Dr. Nagl describes how “Templer’s magnetism and his attentiveness to the soldiers, police, and civil servants made him a popular man in all of the government’s branches and at all levels.”¹¹¹ Also, as previously mentioned, a planter testified, “Templer’s visit was greatly appreciated and everyone on the estate had an opportunity of airing his views, asking questions and meeting him face to face.”¹¹² Both of these indicate his individual consideration for those that he led. Additionally, cognate to the way Templer’s COIN manual, *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*, suggested Intellectual Stimulation in subordinates, it also directed subordinate leaders at the company level to develop their subordinates. It states, “The company commander plays the major part in the selection and training of the junior leader.”¹¹³ Additionally, it says, “By operating with each platoon in turn, he can give help and advice to junior leaders, earmark future leaders and can generally do more in a few days to improve junior leadership than a cadre [training group] could do in three weeks.”¹¹⁴

In addition to transformational leadership styles, Templer used transactional leadership to compel subordinates to action. He used Contingent Reward by applying punishment to both his subordinates and the local population to compel them to perform. This is the “stick” part of the “carrot and stick” aspect of Contingent Reward leadership. In one instance, after a terrorist attack that killed twelve and wounded five in a repair party working on a water supply system, Templer decided to impose collective punishment on the town as a reprisal for the lack of information on the insurgents from the inhabitants.¹¹⁵ “He imposed a twenty-two-hour curfew, cut the rice ration in half, and closed the school.”¹¹⁶ He also used the “carrot” side of Contingent Reward to those “New Villages” that were declared “white” or free from ties to the insurgents.

In those areas, he lifted curfews and food controls, and the subsequent results were that local support for the COIN efforts intensified.¹¹⁷ Additionally, those insurgents that were willing to surrender were paid bounties for their surrender,¹¹⁸ and for those in the population willing to bring in an insurgent they were given payments ranging from \$28,000 for the Chairman of the Central Committee to \$875 for a soldier.¹¹⁹

While all of these leadership styles address his directive to “Get the right spirit into the people,” the final directive, “Leave them to get on with it,” applies to MBE leadership. This type of leadership is appropriate for COIN operations since it suggests decentralizing decision making for day-to-day operations to subordinates who are in a better position to make decisions at their level based on their particular situation. However, its success depends on first accomplishing the previous five of Templer’s directives:

1. Get the priorities right
2. Get the instructions right
3. Get the organization right
4. Get the right people into the organization
5. Get the right spirit into the people¹²⁰

These are prerequisites to number six, “Leave them to get on with it,” to ensure subordinates have the overarching guidance and structure to make proper decisions on their own. Further, by ensuring that subordinates have met these preconditions, the leader can trust that they can make appropriate decisions and then can tend to pressing issues at his level. Templer implemented several initiatives that reflected MBE leadership.

He created the Combined Emergency Planning Staff consisting of an airman, a police officer, and a civil servant whom he trusted to be his “eyes and ears, making unannounced

inspection tours.”¹²¹ He trusted these groups to keep an eye on the countrywide operations and report back to him any problems. In this manner, he demonstrated MBE-active in allowing subordinate units to execute operations, while at the same time being aware of what was going on and where he might need to step in and make corrections. Additionally, Templer understood that success in COIN relied on decentralizing decision making to subordinates. Dr. Moyar points out, “Rather than forcing his commanders to adhere closely to the new counterinsurgency manual, Templer granted them freedom to adapt general counterinsurgency principles to the specific environments they faced and the specific forces they possessed, both of which varied from one part of Malaya to another.”¹²² In the district officer position, Templer removed some of the horizontal and vertical chain of command restraints, thus allowing them to make decisions easier at their level based on their particular situation. He even went so far as to give these district officers his phone number in case someone tried to interfere with them making decisions at their level.¹²³ Finally, the COIN manual that he sponsored, *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*, emphasized, “Operations in Malaya largely consist of small patrols,”¹²⁴ and “the success or failure of these operations therefore depends on the standard of junior leaders.”¹²⁵ It therefore underscored the importance of decentralizing day-to-day decision making to those junior leaders that led small patrols.

In sum, Templer framed his overall strategy within his six steps. However, he capitalized on his ability to “Get the right spirit into the people” and then “Leave them to get on with it.” While he used styles that span the range of the FLRD, he was particularly adept at using Idealized Influence to be an example to subordinates with his energy, concern for subordinates and the local population, and his emphasis on innovation. Often, words, rewards, and punishment can go only so far, but nothing speaks louder than actions, and Templer’s examples

spoke loud in compelling his subordinates to action. He also imbued a spirit of innovation in his people with Intellectual Stimulation by using several techniques. This goes hand-in-hand with letting subordinates implement decisions at their level through MBE. Once subordinates understood the importance of using innovative methods along with the overarching characteristics of the COIN they were engaged in, Templer liberated them to make decisions on their own. Over 50 years later, General David Petraeus would use many similar techniques for COIN.

LEADERSHIP IN IRAQ UNDER GENERAL PETRAEUS

*In war, it is extraordinary how it all comes down to the character of one man.*¹²⁶

General Creighton Abrams

General David Petraeus has had a long and distinguished career, and certainly, it is not over as he is currently the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Consequently, this analysis covers only some of his experiences up to and including his position in Iraq as the Commander, Multi-National Forces- Iraq (MNF-I), with the exception of references to his current ISAF COIN guidance.

General Petraeus had many unique experiences that helped him develop into the leader he is today. He entered the US military academy at WestPoint in 1970 and becoming a “Star Man” by earning the right to wear a small star on his collar for graduating in the top five percent of his class.¹²⁷ However, what was also important during his tenure at WestPoint was that he met his wife who was also the daughter of WestPoint’s commandant at the time and later a four-star general, General William Knowlton.¹²⁸ Consequently, this led to many mentoring sessions early in his career from someone who had vast military experience. However, Petraeus had another mentor that was more instrumental in his development, General Jack Galvin. Both Knowlton and Galvin took interest in Petraeus’ development and displayed Individual Consideration to

develop him. Working for Galvin as his aid, Galvin urged Petraeus to “Think beyond the foxhole, about history and strategy, about relations between the military and their civilian bosses in Washington, about the next war, he urged.”¹²⁹ Galvin states, “We had lots of discussions on decision-making, the problems of command. We were always discussing leadership, what to do in what kind of circumstances.”¹³⁰ In addition to mentors at key points in his career, he had unparalleled drive.

Many senior leaders recognized Petraeus’ potential and dedication to duty early on. He was promoted early to captain, a master parachutist, top of his class at Ranger School, and exemplary fitness reports.¹³¹ He worked for Gen Galvin in the Army’s National Training Center, attended Command and General Staff College, and then went to Princeton to earn his PhD. As an interesting side note, he ended his dissertation at Princeton with a criticism on the “Pentagon’s view that the US military should only be committed to wars in which it could use overwhelming force to achieve clear objectives.”¹³² He would later become the Commander MNF-I, which would require limited force with unclear objectives. However, the time he spent at school and at “the elbow of senior generals had caused him to miss all of the nation’s previous wars, big and small, over his thirty-year career.”¹³³ His first real opportunity would be as a Major General leading the 101st Airborne Division in Northern Iraq during OIF.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, he proved to be successful as a COIN leader. Prior to assuming the position as the MNF-I Commander in 2007, casualties remained at about 900 per year.¹³⁵ However, after assuming command, casualties dropped to 328 in 2008 and continued to decline.¹³⁶

Similar to Templer, Petraeus was adept at using Idealized Influence. Like Templer, in order to “focus on local community engagement and generating bottom-up buy-in from ordinary Iraqis,¹³⁷ Petraeus adopted a hands-on leadership style by constantly being out on the ground,

observing, encouraging, coaching, directing, stamping his authority on the force as the new style of operations took hold.”¹³⁸ Additionally, Petraeus’ Operations Officer when he was the 101st Airborne Division Commander in Mosul describes how he would spend the day meeting with Iraqis and battalions scattered around the four Northern provinces.¹³⁹ He points out that Petraeus’ overall message was “What have you done for the Iraqis today?”¹⁴⁰ He also added, “The only way Iraqis would know that they were an army of liberation, not occupation, was through the troop’s actions.”¹⁴¹ Finally, his current COIN ISAF Guidance directs his forces to “Consult and build relationships, but not just with those who seek us out.”¹⁴² Petraeus’ certainly understands the importance of garnering the local population’s support in COIN. He personally demonstrated this importance and directed it in his guidance. This undoubtedly has an influence on subordinate leaders’ perspectives. In addition to his emphasis on this important aspect of COIN, his personality also played an important role in his Idealized Influence leadership.

Petraeus demonstrated an interminable realistic and calm outlook under stress. When Petraeus was appointed the Commander MNF-I, the media, congress, and the president considered Petraeus as being “key to victory in Iraq.”¹⁴³ Consequently, he was under tremendous pressure. Nevertheless, Killcullen avers how he was impressed with Petraeus’ “calm, courageous and measured way he handled what must have been almost unbearable stress and pressure.”¹⁴⁴ Further, Thomas Ricks, author of *The Gamble*, testifies, “Petraeus adopted a posture of much lowered expectations.”¹⁴⁵ He adds that one of Petraeus’s most striking characteristics was to discern the reality of events in the midst of the fog and friction in war and to, “neither be overly optimistic nor pessimistic...seeing every minor victory as a triumph and every partial setback as disaster.”¹⁴⁶ He testifies that through his composure, and realistic and objective outlook, he “set the tone for his entire command.”¹⁴⁷ Further, he injected a new spirit

in his senior commanders that they could succeed.¹⁴⁸ Retired Gen Jack Keane explains the effect of General Petraeus' leadership on his subordinates: "He took over a command with a sense of futility and hopelessness about it and almost overnight he changed the attitude and brought them hope and a sense that we can do this, we can succeed at this."¹⁴⁹ He inspired his senior commanders from hopelessness to a "we can do it" attitude not just by his words, but more through his character and outlook. This demeanor and attitude is essential in COIN, where there is significant amount of uncertainty and personality factors play a large part in influencing not only subordinates, but also the local population's perception towards the COIN forces. Some might mistake his calm demeanor as insouciance, but this is certainly not the case.

Instead, he maintained high standards himself, and this influenced others to maintain similar standards. "He believed a leader's job was literally to set the pace, demonstrate the standards, and overcome obstacles."¹⁵⁰ Certainly, his performance at academic academies and his performance reports reflect high standards, but he also demonstrated this by maintaining stratospheric fitness standards. He believed that "a commander should be up front, leading by example."¹⁵¹ At home station he usually ran eight to ten miles, and five to six on deployment.¹⁵² Additionally, a soldier accidentally shot Petraeus in the chest during a training exercise, and within a month, he was back in the field with his battalion for their first big training exercise.¹⁵³ Further, he broke his pelvis while skydiving during his free time, which required months of therapy, yet at fifty years old he recovered quickly and was still more fit than the vast majority of his younger soldiers. He had the scores on the Army's physical fitness test to prove it.¹⁵⁴ Physical fitness is certainly a characteristic that is essential for military forces in general, but it is also important in COIN because it represents the tenacity required to persevere through the additional uncertainties and setbacks present in COIN operations. Petraeus' current ISAF

guidance that directs “Fight hard and fight with discipline”¹⁵⁵ and “Live our values”¹⁵⁶ has teeth since Petraeus lives these axioms himself. Analogous to Templer, Petraeus’ primary leadership characteristic was Idealized Influence, but he also used Intellectual Stimulation.

Petraeus underscored the significance of innovative approaches in COIN through both actions and writing. He “considered adaptive leaders essential because of the demand in counterinsurgency for complex stability and support operations, as well as offensive and defensive military operations, and because of the variations in counterinsurgency environments over time and place.”¹⁵⁷ Part of Intellectual Stimulation involves the leader willing to allow subordinates to take appropriate risks with new approaches. When Petraeus took over command in Iraq, “he urged commanders to take bigger risks and assured them that mistakes and setbacks resulting from sensible risk-taking would not be punished.”¹⁵⁸ Additionally, when Petraeus was called back to the US to preside over the army’s brigadier general board, he “believed that the US Army was still not putting adequate emphasis on developing and promoting officers with the flexibility and creativity demanded by counterinsurgency.”¹⁵⁹ Innovation and creative solutions had always been a hallmark axiom for Petraeus, and even as a colonel commanding the 1st Brigade one of his captains recalls how Petraeus “forced us to challenge every assumption, ask why, question everything,”¹⁶⁰ adding that “he never accepted ‘that’s the way we have always done it.’”¹⁶¹ In addition to his words and actions, he also codified principles of Intellectual Stimulation in doctrine and guidance.

Petraeus and Marine General Mattis led a group of current and former officers to create a new joint COIN manual, FM 3-24/Marine Corp Warfighting Publication 3-33.5.¹⁶² The manual “attached the greatest weight to adaptation, calling on leaders to be flexible and use judgment and creativity to find solutions.”¹⁶³ It de-emphasized the traditional perspective on doctrine as

providing specific solutions and emphasized decentralized command.¹⁶⁴ It also called for greater risk tolerance in commanders to allow subordinates the latitude to take the initiative with innovative approaches to their problems.¹⁶⁵ In addition to FM 3-24, Petraeus also adjusted “the Army’s training and education to require soldiers to deal with uncertainty and problems for which no textbook solution existed, in order to test and improve their flexibility.”¹⁶⁶ Further, Intellectual Stimulation’s significance in COIN is also reflected in Petraeus’ current guidance to ISAF military forces. It directs forces to “Learn and adapt more quickly than the enemy. Be cunning. Outsmart the insurgents. Share best practices and lessons learned. Create and exploit opportunities.”¹⁶⁷ It also states, that the “strategic sergeants and strategic captains” are the ones who “turn the big ideas in COIN operations into reality on the ground.”¹⁶⁸

Similar to Templer, Petraeus was also skillful in using Inspirational Motivation effectively, but in a different manner than Templer. Whereas Templer can be described as effusive, Petraeus can be described as taciturn. Instead of motivating subordinates with words as Templer did, Petraeus was precocious at using symbols and ideas to motivate. For example, when he was the 101st Airborne Division Commander in Mosul, he took on the character of a sort of King David from the bible with an understanding of the Iraqi culture that “craved strong leadership far more than abstract concepts such as democracy.”¹⁶⁹ He stated, “I don’t know where the King David thing came from, but you had to play the role a little bit.”¹⁷⁰ This manner of motivating the local population not only points to his understanding of the role that culture plays in COIN but also his willingness to use innovative techniques. Another example of symbology is his use of the “The Mesopotamian Stampede,” a 1908 work that depicts a cowboy riding for his life as a herd of cattle panics under breaking thunderstorm.¹⁷¹ He used this as a metaphor to explain “the need to be comfortable with slightly chaotic circumstances.”¹⁷²

Finally, Petraeus understood how vital it was in COIN operations to use MBE by allowing subordinate commanders make decisions at their level. As the Commander of the 101st Airborne Brigade, he “didn’t worry so much about what his brigade commanders were doing as long as they were spending money, which he used as the best measure of whether they were winning over Iraqis.”¹⁷³ As aforementioned, he told subordinate commanders that he would not apply punishment for setbacks or mistakes resulting from sensible risk-taking, thus encouraging them to take the initiative in making decisions without his inputs or approval.¹⁷⁴ Further, numerous parts of FM 3-24 that he sponsored contain directions for leaders to use their own judgment and creativity in solving problems.¹⁷⁵ It also promotes greater risk tolerance in leaders letting subordinates use their creativity and judgment in making decisions.¹⁷⁶ Finally, his last guideline in his current ISAF COIN guidance instructs forces to use initiative and “In the absence of guidance or orders, figure out what the orders should have been and execute them aggressively.”¹⁷⁷ Clearly, he put significant value to decentralizing decision-making to lower levels in COIN not only through his actions, but also in doctrine and guidance.

Throughout analysis of Petraeus, it is clear that he understood COIN operations. Undoubtedly, he studied many historical COIN operations through his education and in his dissertation on the Vietnam Conflict. His role model¹⁷⁸ was French COIN leader Marcel Bigeard, who he read numerous books about,¹⁷⁹ and he even hung a picture of Bigeard above his French paratrooper certificate in his office when he was the 101st Airborne Division Commander.¹⁸⁰ Petraeus recognized the importance of setting the example for subordinates in the COIN environment by interacting with the local population, demonstrating a composed, yet realistic outlook under pressure, and maintaining high standards of perseverance. Further, he appreciated the value of encouraging innovation and creativity in subordinate leaders through

Intellectual Stimulation and then giving them the latitude to make decisions at their level. He codified both of these precepts in doctrine and guidance for COIN operations. Finally, he was also adept at using other leadership styles, but the weight of data shifts heavily to his reliance on Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, and MBE in COIN operations. Both Petraeus' and Templer's analysis are instructive for the future.

CONCLUSION

The greatest leader is not necessarily the one who does the greatest things. He is the one that gets the people to do the greatest things.

Ronald Reagan

A comparison of Petraeus and Templer is pedagogical for future COIN leaders. Although it is impossible to cover every act of leadership that they portrayed, but the predominance of data points that they both used Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, and MBE extensively. Further, both produced successful results as verified by the decreased number of friendly casualties after they assumed command. They understood how to use Idealized Influence effectively to be an example to subordinates. They both demonstrated an understanding of the COIN environment by engaging the local population instead of relying solely on remote technology and massive firepower against the insurgents. They did this by getting out from behind their desks and walking through the countryside and streets to engage the population. Subordinate leaders emulated their example and won much of the population's support.

Petraeus and Templer also demonstrated strength of will through perseverance and keeping a realistic and composed demeanor. Additionally, both leaders sponsored doctrine documents to codify COIN lessons, but also devalued strict and perfunctory compliance with doctrine. Rather, they encouraged subordinates to look to doctrine as a "lessons learned" document and expected them to improvise and innovate to be successful. Both of them took a

dyadic approach to this by encouraging both innovation in subordinates and taking the initiative to make decisions on their own. These attributes are essential for COIN operations because COIN involves significant social/political factors as well as military force in the right circumstances. Also, COIN tactics can vary widely based on the population's culture and insurgent tactics.

Undoubtedly, the US will find itself in these COIN operations in the future. The US's current involvement in Libya could be an augury of the US's next COIN operation. Dr. Steve Metz states, "whatever happens in the coming weeks or months, one thing is clear: The chances of a drawn-out insurgency in Libya are very high."¹⁸¹ However, due to the variegated nature of insurgency environments, they will most likely not be the same as ones they have executed in their past. However, one important factor that will determine future military operations' outcomes will be leadership as it has been in the past. This will require unique and innovative approaches to be successful. It will require leadership different from traditional conventional leadership that the US military has prepared for in the past. The FRLD provides a framework, and leaders like Templer and Petraeus provide concrete examples of which styles are most important in COIN operations. Leaders who find themselves responsible for future COIN operations will need to emphasize Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, and MBE leadership for their particular circumstances to be successful.

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