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INOCULATING THE GENERAL FROM THE FRANCO- PRUSSIAN STAFF INFECTION

by

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Introduction

Recently, the US military has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief missions, and building partnership capacity, not Major Combat Operations. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, these trends will continue as emphasized by the six key missions, of which only one represents Major Combat Operations.¹ However, US military forces are still organized to fight attrition style warfare. Why? According to Title 10 of the United States Code, the Services bare the responsibility to organize, equip, and train forces. The Services have attempted to transform but there has been limited emphasis on organizational change beyond the presentation of forces. Therefore, the Services, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), and Joint Task Forces (JTF) must organize properly.

Since the earliest recorded history, successful military generals have surrounded themselves with advisors, soothsayers and sages to varying degrees of success. This paper presents the historical foundations of the Joint staff structure in order to understand current organizational proclivities. It explains organizational theory and proposes a theoretical model for staff organization, based not only on historical military organizational principles, but also on organizational theory principles. The analysis reveals the importance of organizational flexibility – a significant change from current doctrinal staff organization. Staffs have evolved into “an all-controlling bureaucracy, a paper octopus squirting ink and wriggling its tentacles into every corner.”² They restrain rather than free the commander to, quite simply, command.

The following discussion focuses on how the legacy of Franco-Prussian military structures influence current organizational designs and how organizational theory principles can enable

Joint Task Forces (JTF) of the future to effectively navigate the evolving geopolitical environment. This paper definitively shows how a more efficiently structured JTF staff can be designed to meet the operational level demands of counterinsurgencies by using organizational theory and operational design principles. There are some discrepancies between the Services and academics as to the definition of operational design. Therefore, operational design will be defined by Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 as: “[operational design] supports [the Joint Operation Planning Process] JOPP by providing a number of design elements to help the commander and staff visualize and shape the operation to accomplish the mission.”³ Additionally, “operational art encompasses operational design — the process of developing the intellectual framework that will underpin all plans and their subsequent execution. The elements of operational design are tools to help supported [Joint Force Commanders] JFCs and their staffs visualize what the joint operation should look like and to shape the commander’s intent.”⁴ The Joint Planning Group (JPG) chief and the commander should question the fundamental staff organization, not just develop the command relationships, before and during the operational design process.

The information technology (IT) revolution has not been thoroughly utilized in military organizational transformation – we continue to employ the same antiquated Napoleonic staff structure supplemented with a Prussian Chief of Staff protocol in order to command and control. Just as the Generals in World War I failed to adapt infantry tactics to meet the weapon systems technological revolution, so too has our command and control organizational structure not adapted to meet the realities of counterinsurgencies. The US military, more specifically JFCs, must create an agile organization grounded in organizational theory and operational design concepts, enabled by current and future IT solutions, in order to rapidly adapt to fluid, full spectrum operations.

JTFs are created and employed to conduct contingency operations; yet, our personnel system remains rooted in the Napoleonic structure. Both technology and our enemies continuously evolve; yet, our bureaucratic structure has been slow to embrace change. Further, the US military continues to organize the J-Staff functionally – not around Lines of Operation such as Security, Governance, Rule of Law, Capacity Building, and Stability.

Unfortunately, there are some difficulties associated with structure, and inflexibility is one of them. Once a structure is established, it is hard to change, and inflexibility can deter an organization in its attempt to adapt to environmental changes.

Another problem is that parochialism tends to set in and cause dysfunctional conflict. Members of squadron A tend to think the whole organization operates to support them regardless of the needs of squadron B. Maintenance and supply argue over who is responsible for an aircraft being out of commission. Each specialized area tends to emphasize its interest and forget the objectives of the larger organization.⁵

Organizational changes can be the most difficult and the most important aspects of any institutional change. Military organizational change involves many human factors such as social and psychological issues manifesting themselves in areas of tradition, norms, and culture. Notwithstanding the obvious challenges, “organizational change is central to transformation, because it codifies and institutionalizes new capabilities and ways of doing business.”⁶

Historical Staff Development

Swedish Influence

The history of the U.S. Military General and Advisory staff systems starts with the work of Gustavus Adolphus, draws on the French concept of a functional staff, and borrows the Prussian concepts of mission-type orders, decentralized execution, and the general and advisory staffs. Gustavus Adolphus, the King of Sweden from 1611 to 1632, is credited with being the

creator of the current military staff system.⁷ His design included special staff officers such as: Chaplains, a chief of Engineers, and a chief of Artillery. They also retained their authority as chiefs of their respective branches while simultaneously serving as his principle staff officers. King Adolphus also developed the basic system of Courts-Martial and military law still in use today. His concepts were so influential that European leaders patterned their armies after his method for 300 years posthumous. Oliver Cromwell provided the next significant addition by adding a commissary general, ensuring all were paid for their services.⁸ This was a novel concept at the time and underpinned his philosophy of command and egalitarian ideals.

French and Prussian Influence

The Napoleonic revolution followed with the *levee en masse*. Napoleon failed to utilize a general staff, preferring his own council to that of any advisors, which debilitated his staff. Nevertheless, the writings of Napoleon's Chief of Staff Marshall Berthier influenced Theibault to develop the first real staff manual. These observations and analysis on staff function, led to the largest French contribution to the staff. The French impact left a lasting legacy – by the end of the 1800s all French staffs were organized into three groups called Bureaus: 1st Bureau – Supply and Administration, 2nd Bureau – Intelligence, and the 3rd Bureau – Operations. After World War I the French split 1st Bureau adding a 4th Bureau for Supply to address shortfalls they experienced. “By the end of the twentieth century the basic French staff model had been adopted by virtually all major Western armies and [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO.”⁹

The Prussian contribution to the American way of war began with Frederick the Great, who in 1765 established an academy for training in diplomacy and military arts. He commissioned a war academy, authoring courses of instruction for the first staff officer schools, which included proper staff development. Around 1800, Colonel Von Massenbach insisted that

staff officers rotate back to troop duty – a concept followed by almost all present day staffs.

Furthermore, Prussian chiefs of staff maintained a peculiar relationship to both the commanding general and higher headquarters.

It was almost but not quite, a system of dual command. This peculiar relationship between the commander and his chief of staff was unique to the German army. On purely operational matters, the chief of staff could protest to the next higher-echelon chief of staff the decision of his commander with which he did not agree. This right, however, was exercised very rarely in the German army. Thus, the chief of staff functioned as both a subordinate of his own commander and as the High Command's liaison to that commander. He was not, however, an all encompassing chief of staff as in the American or French armies.¹⁰

Following the Prussian defeat at Jena (1806), Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst, chief of the General Staff, reorganized the General Staff into the *Generalstab* (General Staff), the *Großber Generalstab* (Great General Staff), and the *Truppengeneralstab* (General Staff with Troops). The Prussians also developed the concept of the *Weisungsfurung* – (leadership by directive) which has evolved to represent mission-type orders, and the *Vollmacht* (authority) – delegated to staff officers to issue orders directing change without consulting the commander.

US Influence

The US military J-staff adaptation has roots in these European concepts, but it was not adopted whole-heartedly. General Von Steuben introduced the Prussian Staff System to the Continental Army under George Washington; however Congress did not authorize the General Staff System as Washington recommended. As a result, the Continental Army remained poorly staffed and organized for over 100 years. It was not until after the America's performance in the Spanish-American War that Congress would authorize the establishment of a general staff. The spark to this tinderbox was a comment attributed to "the then commissary general to the effect that his office was running perfectly until the war disrupted and disorganized it."¹¹ The

catastrophe of the large Army call-up for the Spanish-American War set the conditions for Secretary of War Elihu Root, who “established a command and staff school in 1902 and in 1903 obtained from Congress authorization to set up a general staff. He set up the general staff to include the duties performed by the Prussian General Staff with the organization based on that of the French. The general staff was to undergo many changes as a result of the two world wars, but the basic concept remained the same.”¹²

The National Security Act of 1947 established a separate Air Force – but did not fundamentally change the Franco-Prussian staff structure. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 forced Jointness – without any change of the basic staff organization. Further, the Army’s Transformation initiative of the 1990s – Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) – was too reliant upon a technological bias, and did not fundamentally change staff organizational designs.¹³

The basic staff model from the last revolution in military affairs remains in effect. The US military has not done a comprehensive reevaluation of its organization to cope with current and future conflicts. The current staff structure is accepted *a priori* to any JTF planning. Nevertheless, in order to be an adaptive, learning organization, the military must be encouraged to question these basic assumptions and not just yield to tradition. The US military must understand their own historical J-staff construct and be willing to analyze and implement current and future organizational trends in order to prepare for the “broad range of security challenges.”¹⁴

Organizational Change

Organizational Behavior

Organizational behavior (OB) is an interdisciplinary field of study focusing on individuals and their behavior within their workplace environment. Stephen P. Robbins and Timothy A. Judge, authors of *Organizational Behavior*, define OB as “a field of study that investigates the impact that individuals, groups, and structure have on behavior within organizations, for the purpose of applying such knowledge toward improving an organization’s effectiveness.”¹⁵ OB is a systematic examination of relationships through the behavioral sciences psychology, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Each discipline contributes to the study of OB through varying units of analysis from the individual layer to the entire organizational system respectively. As such, this section focuses on three sub-divisions of organizational behavior: organizational culture, structure, and design.

Organizational Culture

What is organizational culture and why is it important to JTFs? First, let’s work through the definitions. A widely accepted definition of an organization is a “consciously coordinated social unit, composed of two or more people, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals.”¹⁶ Organizations have a management structure serving a multitude of purposes including the determination of relationships between functions and positions as well as delegating authority, roles, and responsibilities for defined tasks. Most importantly, some level of individual control becomes the foundational principle of organizations. Therefore, organizations are groups of people, which exist to solve problems and complete tasks through structured relationships.

There are a plethora of culture definitions from sources throughout the social sciences; however, most bare a similarity to the definition espoused by Edgar Schein, Professor Emeritus at the MIT Sloan School of Management and prominent organizational culture expert. Schein defines culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”¹⁷ Schein further explains that “personality: individual; culture: group”.¹⁸ Thus, culture becomes the sum of our environment or a system of shared beliefs that are passed from one generation to the next. Armed with these definitions, how does an organizational culture matriculate?

According to Schein, culture is composed of three observable levels: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and basic underlying assumptions.”¹⁹ Imagine these levels stacked on top of each other representing a “cultural pyramid” with basic underlying assumptions forming the foundation. Artifacts represent the most visible structures and processes about an organization but are often undecipherable physical, behavioral, and verbal manifestations.²⁰ Examples of U.S. military artifacts include uniforms and grooming standards, change of command ceremonies, “there I was” stories, PowerPoint presentations, and customs and courtesies. These artifacts provide insight but do not flatly describe what is of value to an organization. Schein elucidates this point by espousing; “observers can describe what they see and feel but cannot construct from that alone what those things mean in the given [organization].”²¹

Beliefs and values form the second layer of organizational culture and are not typically observable. They represent basic convictions and acceptable standards of behavior within the organization. “Organizational members hold values and conform to norms because their

underlying assumptions nurture and support the norms and in-turn, encourage activities that produce surface-level artifacts.”²² However, organizational conflicts arise when espoused values are not supported by actual actions. For instance, U.S. military organizations champion their belief in teamwork but actually reward *individuals* with promotions. This dichotomy produces an incongruence that can only be explained by delving further into the “cultural pyramid.”

Basic assumptions represent the lowest level of Schein’s description of organizational culture. These ideas, concepts, and beliefs are unequivocally accepted as truths. According to Schein, basic assumptions define what things mean and prescribe emotional and physical actions in various situations. They are resultant from continually validated and reinforced values. This cultural level provides organizations with a basic sense of identity and self-esteem.²³ For example, the United States Marine Corps’ belief that “every Marine is a rifleman.”

Organizations become incredibly comfortable with others who share their same set of truths and very uncomfortable in situations where different assumptions operate - because of our own cognitive biases – thus making organizational change an anxiety producer.²⁴ To truly decipher an organization’s culture, one must fully understand the basic assumptions as they are inextricably linked to its beliefs, values, and artifacts. As Schein states, “the essence of a group’s culture is its pattern of shared, basic taken-for-granted assumptions, the culture will manifest itself at the level of observable artifacts and shared espoused values, norms, and rules of behavior.”²⁵

Organizational Structure

The first step of establishing an effective organizational structure is to have a thorough understanding of an organization’s cultural artifacts, values, and assumptions. Cultural aspects lay the foundation for effective and efficient organizations; however, organizational structures

can, and will, shape attitudes and behaviors. Robbins and Judge describe organizational structure as “how job tasks are formally divided, grouped, and coordinated.”²⁶ They posit six key elements of organizational structure: work specialization, departmentalization, chain of command, span of control, centralization and decentralization, and formalization.²⁷ Work specialization, or division of labor, refers to the degree to which activities or tasks in the organization are divided into separate jobs. Job specialization produces subject matter experts as well as increases efficiency by encouraging the development of specialized tools. The cons of dividing work into smaller parts are losing the “forest in the trees” and the higher “transaction costs” when transferring work from one specialist to the next. Alternatives to work specialization include rotating personnel through jobs, adding responsibilities, or empowering people to perform with more discretion.

Once the division of labor is established, jobs are organized into meaningful categories through the process of departmentalization. This grouping permits coordination and integration of common tasks. Examples include but are not limited to functional and geographic groupings. Functional departmentalization arranges activities by function performed, allowing for increased specialization and seeking to achieve economies of scale by placing people with common skills and orientations into common units. Geographic departmentalization organizes activities via territory. Departmentalization is important; nonetheless, “rigid, functional departmentalization is being increasingly complemented by teams that cross over traditional departmental lines.”²⁸

Chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate that exercises command or “is an unbroken line of authority that extends from the top of the organization to the lowest echelon and clarifies who reports to whom.”^{29,30} Self-managed and cross-functional teams, matrix organizations, and the increasing capabilities of

information technology have contributed to the decreased relevancy of chain of command and unity of command in today's business world. While the U.S. military must maintain aspects of command authority, age-old concepts should not preclude the establishment of new organizational structures. The military must evolve with the changes in information technology, advances in the education of its workforce, and proven organizational concepts to develop organizations that are more flexible, resilient, mission capable, and mission ready.

Span of control, a fundamental management concept, refers to the number of subordinates one person can efficiently and effectively direct.³¹ For instance, if an organization contains 4,096 personnel and its span of control is four vs. eight personnel, there are 780 more managers in the previous organization than the latter. Organizations with narrow spans of control allow managers to communicate quickly, receive more effective feedback, and reduce the skill level required of middle management. However, narrow spans of control have some significant shortcomings. Specifically, they increase the operating cost of an organization by adding successive layers of management and bureaucracy, tend to isolate upper management, and significantly contribute to micro-management of lower level employees. Wider spans of control and decreased reliance on chain of command in the business world have become more effective because the information technology revolution led to the inherent ability to reach employees faster.

Centralization and decentralization are key thought provoking concepts when creating an organizational structure. The more centralized an organization the more decisions are made by a single entity or group. Whereas decentralized organizations tend to push decision-making authority down to the lowest level. As Ori Brafman says, "a centralized organization is easy to understand. You have one clear leader who's in charge, and there's a specific place where

decisions are made.”³² However, decentralized organizations distribute power, “there’s no clear leader, no hierarchy, and no headquarters.”³³ The main organizational hesitation with decentralization is the willingness of employees to delegate authority.

The last key element of organizational structure is formalization. This concept refers to the degree to which jobs within the organization are standardized.³⁴ Highly standardized jobs and organizations produce consistent and homogeneous outputs. Further, these organizations prescribe clearly articulated procedures and processes, alleviating employees from engaging in alternative behaviors and potentially decreasing employee creativity.

Organizational Design

Given the key elements of organizational structure and the aspects of organizational culture, commanders and leaders can embark on designing their organizations. First, why are there different structures and designs for organizations? Many factors influence those decisions, but quite simply, one size does not fit all. What works for General Electric and Zappos, may not work for the US military. Each organization is shaped differently by their respective environments; differ in size, technology, and most importantly through their own organizational strategies. Simply stated, design and structure exist to help organizations achieve their goals, which should be directly linked to their strategic end state that is influenced by individual differences and cultural beliefs, norms, and assumptions.

Setting the left and right bounds of design, are the mechanistic and the organic models. The mechanistic model is characterized by a substantial structure, high formalization and specialization, rigid departmentalization, clear chain of command, narrow spans of control, and is extremely centralized.³⁵ Examples of the mechanistic model are the Internal Revenue Service and the US military. The organic model, is exactly opposite of the mechanistic, and is a flat

organization characterized by cross-functional and cross-hierarchical teams, free flows of information, low formalization, and wide spans of control.

Organizational design is simply the creation or change of an organization's structure. Focusing on four design structures: simple, bureaucratic, team, and matrix allows for a wide breadth of organizational possibilities while simultaneously showing how organizations can and should integrate mechanistic and organic models in order to achieve strategic ends. The simple structure is "characterized by a low degree of departmentalization, wide spans of control, centralized authority in a single person, and little formalization."³⁶ The simple structure is ideal for small organizations because it is extremely fast, flexible, and flat, allowing for rapid decisions. As organizations grow, the low formalization and centralized authority yield to information overload at the top.

The bureaucracy follows the mechanistic model almost to the letter, grouping personnel into like divisions based on similar activities, expertise, skill, and resources. The bureaucratic design is characterized by "highly routine operating tasks achieved through specialization, very formalized rules and regulations, tasks that are grouped into functional departments, centralized authority, narrow spans of control, and decision making that follows the chain of command."³⁷ Inefficiencies arise when personnel encounter problems for which no pre-programmed decision support templates have already been established. Further, personnel obsess over rules and regulations and therefore may lack the acumen to find innovative ways of dealing with problems. Since bureaucracies have extremely formalized rules and regulations, they can get by with lackluster performance from mid and lower level leadership positions. However, the major strength of the bureaucracy is its ability to efficiently perform standardized operations. Would you really want an organic structure collecting your taxes or building your vehicle?

The team structure primarily organizes around ad-hoc or permanent cross-functional teams composed of personnel from different departments, but similar hierarchical locations, who work together to solve problems. The primary characteristics of the team design are that “it breaks down departmental barriers and decentralizes decision making.”³⁸ The Joint Planning Group (JPG) is an example of a cross-functional team without the decentralized decision-making. As Robbins suggests, before embarking on a team structure, designers should ask themselves a few questions: (1) can the work be done better by one person; (2) does the work create a common purpose greater than the aggregate goals; (3) are the members of the group interdependent?³⁹ If the answers to these questions are affirmative, then the team structure should be combined with or supplant the current organizational design. Simply, the benefit of using teams must exceed the costs. If teams are to be utilized, implementation of some sort of 360-degree evaluations should be adopted in order to alleviate individual competitiveness.

Matrix organizations strive to blend functional departmentalization, or bureaucratic designs, with cross-functional teams. By doing so, a matrix organization breaks down the traditional chain of command by introducing dual lines of authority as required. Personnel are allocated to functional departments and project, product, or task teams. Matrix organizations, much like team designs, are likely to exist on a temporary or ad hoc basis. Speed and flexibility are the primary advantages of matrix organizations through information exchanges that are channeled both vertically and horizontally. Further, matrix organizations work most effectively in organizations staffed with professionals, thus affording personnel greater technical and general management training across functional areas. The major disadvantage of matrix organizations is the establishment of two bosses, breaking unity of command.

The Future J-Staff

Joint Doctrine

JP 3-33, “Joint Task Force Headquarters” represents the current doctrinal approach toward a hybrid staff organization and is defined as a “Cross-functional Approach to Staff Organization.”⁴⁰ This concept is achieved through the bureaus, boards, centers, cells and working groups (B2C2WG) process. Successful joint and coalition operations require the synchronized and coordinated sharing of information across traditional J-Staff directorates, the current solution adopts “centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams” and they can be either temporary or enduring depending upon the problem they are created to manage.⁴¹ These entities “facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the commander, and execution by the HQ.”⁴² While these teams are cross-functional in their processes, they usually remain assigned to their functional staff directorates. Several Combatant Commands implement what they term “functional organization” structures, organizing the staff by other than the traditional J-code functional organization. The intent of this organizational structure is to promote close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The reason for this adaptation is the provision of a more conducive atmosphere for unity of effort (coalition and whole of government) and a better focus on key mission areas such as Security Cooperation.

Conceptually, JP 3-33 posits that “when brought together in a cohesive organization such as a JTF headquarters, B2C2WG’s enhance collective staff understanding, facilitate more effective planning and enhance critical decision-making” – allegedly strengthening the staff’s analytical process and improving the commander’s decision-making ability.⁴³ In practice however, it typically falls short. Unfortunately, these “types of organizations experience several

‘growing’ challenges: confusion in delineating respective counterparts in other ‘J-code’ military headquarters; education and training of incoming staff personnel; different, unforeseen ‘seams’ that may require Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups.”⁴⁴ There remains a “continuing challenge in the staffs on balancing the potentially large number of B2C2WGs necessary for full staff analysis and integration with the limited number of personnel on the staff, time available, and other competing scheduling requirements for the principals and leaders.”⁴⁵

Vision

Commanders and leaders at all levels should assume that Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) operations would be part of any US operation in the near future; planning cannot culminate with the successful accomplishment of Phase III objectives in a Major Combat Operation (MCO). “Modern warfighting concepts like Rapid Decisive Operations and schemes of maneuver designed to speedily defeat adversaries” are no longer a wise or feasible approach.⁴⁶ This reality is complicated since, as Conrad Crane states, State-building and peacekeeping operations are not the US military’s *coup de grâce*.⁴⁷ While we agree with this assessment, the reality is that the US government currently has no better institution for the task than the US military. Whether planning MCO or COIN, the Joint Planning Group (JPG) must maintain flexibility throughout the campaign planning process through the use of Operational Design and Art: evaluating, questioning, and critically assessing the basic organizational structure of the JTF in order to defeat hybrid warfare methods across the range of military options.

Instead of analyzing probable solutions, current joint doctrine deemphasizes innovative organizational designs and continues to rely upon antiquated concepts. JTF staffs remain primarily organized via functional departments with little to no cross-communication,

representing a textbook mechanistic model. During Phase I of the JOPP, Initiation, the JPG chief should answer the three questions posed by Robbins in the preceding section. For example, campaign planning is better suited for a team structure, it does share a common purpose, and the members of the group are interdependent. Therefore, the JPG chief should recommend comprehensive organizational changes to the commander in order to effectively plan the campaign. The commander, utilizing the JPG chief recommendations, should then establish a matrix staff organizational structure, consisting of functional departments and permanent cross-functional Lines of Operations (LOOs) teams. These teams should be comprised of members from each functional department, members of other governmental organizations, personnel from nongovernmental organizations, and civilian academics whose research has been influential in fields associated with the respective LOOs. For example, the Capacity Building LOO team should consist of military personnel with an affinity towards or who are functionally involved in economic development, Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, State, and United States Agency for International Development personnel, as well as prominent academics from civilian institutions. The whole of government and prominent professors will provide significant reach-back capability throughout the campaign.

During Mission Analysis and Course of Action development, it is not sufficient for the JPG solely to establish command relationships between component commanders. The JPG must critically analyze their headquarters staff organization as well as their component headquarters. While developing the campaign's Cognitive Map, the JPG develops Lines of Operation to "connect actions on nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s)."⁴⁸ For the purposes of COIN or Phase IV and V Operations, the following broad categories are normally associated with corresponding LOOs: Security, Economic Development,

Governance, Rule of Law, and Stability. Therefore, these LOOs could and should represent the benchmarks for cross-functional or interdisciplinary teams within the extremely mechanistic structure of the JTF or Combatant Command (COCOM) staff, thus decentralizing decision authority and most importantly developing a successful campaign plan.⁴⁹

As mentioned earlier, a significant “downfall” of matrix organizations is the appearance of a “dual” chain of command. The commander and JPG chief can mitigate this by setting staff priorities, implementing 360-degree evaluations, empowering team members, and providing the Prussian concept of *Vollmacht* to lower ranking officers. The new matrix organization can exploit their organization’s new found speed and flexibility and thus more clearly articulate decisive and decision points; enabling the Joint Task Force Commander to win the battle of decision cycles and more effectively mitigate the fog and friction of war.

Recommendations

There are four recommendations requiring further research and development to ameliorate the uncovered issues. First, there is a significant gap in Joint Doctrine regarding the headquarters organization for employment and the deliberation and timing of that decision, which must be repaired. Nothing currently exists in Joint Doctrine questioning the staff organization during the JOPP process. JP 3-33 speaks to some aspects of Joint headquarters organization, but it is divorced from the planning process and is often executed on an ad hoc process devoid of the requisite deliberate decisions necessary to succeed in complex, ill-structured environs. Unfortunately, old habits die hard as evidence by the writings of GEN (ret) Luck when he stated in a 2008 publication, “we still find the J-code structure as the preferred basic staff structure, particularly at the JTF level. It provides a common reference point on where

expertise, staff oversight, (e.g. intelligence or logistics) and accountability exists on the staff, allows for easy cross talk with external organizations, and effectively supports other staff integrating structures such as functional boards, cells, and working groups B2C2WGs.”⁵⁰ Operational design must include an analysis and recommendation for core staff organization, based on the cognitive map, and question fundamental staff organizational assumptions.

A step *must* be included in the operational design process, which forces the staff to critically organize a B2C2WG-like process and develops the necessary staff organization to implement and successfully prosecute the LOOs developed. While some staff organization may be operational art, the majority of the function Battle Rhythm organization for decisions and the root structure of the staff – whether a historical J model, or a functional one, logic should drive the process rather than a “react to contact” or improvised implementation.

Second, the personnel management system must fully embrace the idea of a hybrid organization; possibly changing not only organizational structures, but also the entire accessions and Joint Professional Military Education process. An adoption of a truly matrix organization requires robust personnel system changes. The process for evaluation reports, rating schemes, promotions, awards, etc. all derives from an MCO, attrition based replacement model. Given the potential nature of future conflicts and the changing geopolitical landscape; the personnel system must adapt and change to meet the needs of this complex environment – business as usual will not suffice. While beyond the scope of this paper, we recommend that further research be conducted to determine the most efficient and effective way to restructure the entire military personnel system – using an operational design approach toward determining true requirements and not just placating entrenched bureaucracies.

Third, an early adoption of the whole of government approach must occur during the very earliest phases of planning. Assuming that the US military will operate in a joint, interagency, multinational environment; Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) should strive to permanently establish other governmental agency, nongovernmental agency, and coalition partner representatives to JPGs full-time and not just on an ad hoc basis as contingencies develop. If GCCs cannot establish permanent LOO teams or decide to exercise their prerogative, they should realize that a whole of government approach is required during Phase 0 and Phase I. Further, they must ensure that the right planners are present in the JPG so that the Phase IV and Phase V planning efforts have enough lead-time to ensure integration and synchronization across government and non-governmental organizations. Within the COIN landscape, it is incredibly difficult to maneuver. The solutions hide within a complex web of tribal, religious, historic and geographic contexts – which prove mystifying to the short-term outside observer. These problems often require long-term, resource intensive solutions, which are ill suited to military only solutions. Civilian expertise and perspective are indispensable for successful mission accomplishment. It is foolhardy to under resource the very individuals and agencies vital to the mission. An analysis of civilian integration in Regional Command-East under the 82nd Airborne during the period of May 2009 to May 2010 should be conducted to gleam possible ways to implement a hybrid DoD/DoS model.

Lastly, apply research money and effort to the humanities and social sciences in the same way it is applied to advanced technologies. The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) should pursue the human terrain as well – and not just from a technology perspective. Entities such as DARPA do an amazing job of researching, developing, and implementing new technologies. Yet, there is a distinct lack of research into the human terrain. The US government

should collaborate with civilian institutions for policy, peace, conflict resolution, and International Relations to ensure that the lessons learned can be translated into policy and action; ensuring we solve the right problems, and not unintentionally create even worse second and third order effects.

Conclusion

Over the past 20 years, the US military has primarily been engaged in missions that span the full spectrum of conflict with minor excursions into Major Combat Operations. This trend seems to be continuing based on the current and predicted geopolitical environment. However, US military forces are still stuck with an antiquated organizational structure based on tradition, not innovative best practices from industry. While not all organizational designs are best suited for the US military, a matrix organization consisting of functional departments and permanent cross-functional LOO teams appears to work, and the question of appropriate organizational structure must be a part of the operational design process for the JTF Commander and staff.

¹ Quadrennial Defense Review, 2.

² Fuller, *Generalship*, 66.

³ JP 5-0, IV-2.

⁴ Ibid., IV-4.

⁵ Hunsicker, *Organization Theory for Leaders*.

⁶ Bolkcom, *Air Force Transformation*, 4.

⁷ Davidson, *A Study of Staff Functions and Relationships in Line-Staff Organizations*, 12.

⁸ Ibid., 13.

⁹ Zabecki, *Chief of Staff Volume 1: Napoleonic Wars to World War I*, 5.

¹⁰ Ibid., 10.

¹¹ Davidson, 16.

¹² Ibid., 17.

¹³ Adams, *The Army After Next: The First Post-Industrial Army*,

¹⁴ QDR, i.

¹⁵ Robbins, *Organizational Behavior*, 9.

¹⁶ Ibid., 753.

¹⁷ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 18.

- ¹⁸ Ibid., 14.
¹⁹ Ibid, 23.
²⁰ Gerras, *Organizational Culture: Applying a Hybrid Model to the U.S. Army*, 5.
²¹ Schein, 24.
²² Gerras, 5.
²³ Schein, 29.
²⁴ Ibid., 29.
²⁵ Ibid., 32.
²⁶ Robbins, 754.
²⁷ Ibid., 537.
²⁸ Ibid., 541.
²⁹ Joint Publication 1.
³⁰ Robbins, 541.
³¹ Ibid., 542.
³² Brafman, *The Starfish and the Spider*, 19.
³³ Ibid., 20.
³⁴ Robbins, 545.
³⁵ Ibid., 555.
³⁶ Ibid., 545.
³⁷ Ibid., 547.
³⁸ Ibid., 550.
³⁹ Ibid., 356.
⁴⁰ JP 3-33, II-10.
⁴¹ Ibid., II-10.
⁴² Ibid., II-10.
⁴³ Weaver, 39.
⁴⁴ Luck, *Joint Operations 2nd Edition Insights and Best Practices*, 22.
⁴⁵ Luck, 21.
⁴⁶ Crane, *Phase IV Operations*, 11.
⁴⁷ Ibid., 11.
⁴⁸ JP 5-0, IV-20.
⁴⁹ This is not meant to be prescriptive, but a starting assumption regarding the need to approach organizational structure from a different perspective. Since we are likely to be fighting in and among the population, and are likely to at some point fight another COIN, it is logical to start the discussion early about the JTF organizing around likely COIN LOOs.
⁵⁰ Luck, 21.

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