Gaming the System: A Game Theory Analysis of Theater Airborne ISR
Abstract
Using game theory as a framework and recent operations in Afghanistan as a case study, this work demonstrates that the current joint ISR allocation game is almost exclusively driven by operational priorities without substantive regard for the intelligence value of the requirements. The current system operates on the assumption that subordinate units are self-policing and only submit well-considered collection requirements with optimized Essential Elements of Information. While this is true in many cases, ground components possess organizational cultures that favor maximizing the number of assets allocated, so collection managers naturally pursue bidding strategies to that end. Efficiency and effectiveness of ISR employment are secondary considerations because neither affects subsequent allocation. To change this requires a new definition of success about ISR that is less focused on quantity of assets allocated and more focused on effects achieved. The joint community can accomplish this by developing policy, doctrine, and codified tactics, techniques, and procedures that change the game from zero-sum (i.e., win-lose) to non-zero sum in which win-win is not only possible but incentivized. While Afghanistan serves as the case study for this project, the findings and recommendations are not unique to that conflict. Without action, the ISR mistakes of Afghanistan will be repeated in the next conflict. As the United States cannot count on facing a conventionally weak adversary in the future, any mistakes will incur far greater costs than in either Iraq or Afghanistan. One must remember that while game theory provides insights, the stakes could not be higher life and limb of those in harms way depend on the ISR overhead.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 13, 2014
- Accession Number
- AD1019173
Entities
People
- Jason B. Lamb
Organizations
- Air War College