A U.S. Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: By Design or Default It's about the Policy Options
Abstract
U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal reductions are not new. However, wading headstrong into nuclear abolition without an understanding of the policy options forfeited by these actions is dangerous and potentially destabilizing. If blindly pursued, U.S. strategic arsenal reductions will, at a point dictated by default and not by design, back U.S. policymakers into the forced adoption of a minimum deterrence strategy (MDS). In doing so, those policymakers must understand the ramifications such an adoption will have to U.S. security policy options, including the ability to conduct preventive nuclear first strikes, the ability to strike targets other than population centers, and the ability to offer extended nuclear deterrence to allies and partners. This study examined how other nuclear weapons nations adopted and then employed an MDS with the purpose of providing an understanding of U.S. policy options available accompanying the adoption of an MDS associated with a significant reduction to the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. This study researched how and why four lesser nuclear weapons nations (the UK, France, India, and China) chose or were forced to adopt an MDS, how their nuclear arsenal acquisitions, strike strategies, and targeting schemes supported their MDS variation, and finally how each nation communicated their nuclear deterrence capabilities and will of use. When available, the exploration expanded to include other lesser nuclear weapons states such as Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa (the only nation to acquire and then forfeit its nuclear weapons). The study made comparisons between how and why each case-study nation adopted its variation of an MDS, how and why it placed limits on its arsenals composition, and the clarity with which it communicated its deterrence messaging. The research shows a number of specific findings including an updated definition for deterrence along with a recast arrangement between deterrence, coercion, and compellence,
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- AD1019369
Entities
People
- Mark C. Dmytryszyn
Organizations
- Air University