

IN THE SHADOW OF E. H. CARR:
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

BY

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The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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Lt Col Dave “Bull” Pittner stands 6 foot 2 inches and is an avid lover of the Kansas City Chiefs. He is 215 pounds of arrogant fighter pilot masquerading as a political theorist. Raised by self-made parents, he now has two offspring of his own. He inspires in others the true hope that those children will not grow up to look or act like their father. He somehow managed to snag a wonderful and attractive wife, whose most profound achievement is to make Bull seem socially acceptable. Bull enjoys reading, movies, sports, arguing, sport arguing, and spending time with his family.



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The interpretations and ideas within these pages are my doing, and mine alone. Yet, as I assume the lion’s share of the credit, I must also accept complete responsibility. Every misrepresentation, contradiction, error, and argumentative failure rests squarely on my shoulders. I can ensure you only that I put my best effort into crafting a coherent thesis, but accept that no manuscript, and certainly my own, is without fault. I welcome any and all open criticisms of my analysis and conclusions.

ABSTRACT

This Paper examines E.H. Carr's influence on past and modern international relations study. Carr first problematized the field as the study of power, morality, war, peace, and order. Within those five themes, Carr identified natural forces that caused conflict in international politics. He sought to unify the disparate schools of realism and utopianism and forge a new, peaceful world order. He challenged future international relations theorists to do the same while staying grounded in reality, but never forgetting the role of free will in human affairs.

The influence of E. H. Carr on the realist school is apparent. Then stay within his themes and examine the many issues that Carr outlined. Their focus was on the material forces of the world, and much of their argument went towards discounting the importance of free will. We examine Hans Morgenthau's realism, Kenneth Waltz' neorealism, and John Mearsheimer's offensive realism.

The liberal schools of international relations study focused on discounting the utility of power and emphasizing the effects of international interdependence. They promote the merits of cooperation and look to institutions as a method for ensuring peace. We examine Normal Angel's liberal theory, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's neoliberal institutionalism, ad John Ikenberry's institutional theory.

Alternative schools of international relations study have focused on the power of ideas. Alexander Wendt's constructivism promotes the power of ideas over that of material forces. Adam Watson's English school questioned the need for power politics if we could change our perceptions of sovereignty. Peter Haas' epistemic communities demonstrate the power of ideas to shape international policy.

Appendix A contains a proposal to combine these various theories of international relations into two models: the Pillars of Security, and a Hierarchy of State Needs. These syncretic models look to bridge the gaps between the various schools within international relations, and provide a coherent picture of the material forces that shape international politics. These models further elaborate on the original questions and concepts of E. H. Carr.

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Introduction

The Long Shadow of E.H. Carr

What is history? E. H. Carr asked and answered that question in an effort to shape the history field. His analysis centered on uncovering the dual nature of history. He sought to establish that history was more than just facts or a reporting of the way things were. History must contain a mixture of both events, and the way those events affected people, a mixture of both the past, and how it may influence the future. These mixtures were not *attributes* of historical work, but necessary components of it, without which there would be no history.

Carr understood history to be fundamentally *about people*, inseparable from the journeys and discoveries of humanity. History was additionally a story *from* people, and thus would always contain a mixture of interpretation and fact.¹ The very words used to recount history carried an unavoidable bias.² Thus, the purpose of history affected its telling and an author's perspective colored its message. Carr explained that events that had no effect on humanity are empty of meaning. Likewise, a story about people, absent material events and facts, provides no teaching. History is not just fact *or* interpretation. History occurs when facts and purpose combine to accomplish something.³

History also intertwines past and future.⁴ Without the examples provided by the past, humanity proceeds blindly. Without applicability to the future, history would be irrelevant. The actual *accomplishments* that history achieves occur at the intersection, when the impact of events on people of the past gives meaning and direction to decisions about our future. The *present*, however, is constantly moving forward. Specific conditions, norms, and ideas never repeat, and thus history never holds the same meaning twice.⁵ With these assertions, Carr was directly challenging the positivist notion that history was about presenting stark fact. History, like all human experience, had both a material side, and an ideational side.

¹ E. H. Carr, *What is History?*, (London: Palgrave, 1964), 70.

² Carr, *What is History?*, 25.

³ Carr, *What is History?*, 52-53.

⁴ Carr, *What is History?*, 107-108.

⁵ Carr, *What is History?*, 133.

Carr carried this natural dialectic into his writings about international relations (IR). E. H. Carr birthed the modern era of IR with his classic *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. Within its pages, Carr divides the field into its ideational and material sides: utopianism and realism, ethics and politics, theory and practice, intellectualism and bureaucracy, morality and power, naivety and sterility. He presents these dichotomies not as opposites, but as “two sides of the same intellectual coin.”⁶ We understand Carr’s position by applying his lessons about history. If IR study was to have a purpose, it must combine both material fact, and ideational meaning.

The purpose Carr sought was nothing short of world peace. Writing after World War I, Carr witnessed the great tragedies that had befallen mankind, and he feared the destructive potential of another global conflict. Even before the advent of nuclear weapons, Carr believed that the current course of international politics could lead to the ruin of humanity. He did not believe that IR theories and practices of the day were sufficient to prevent this. The utopian ideals that currently guided the great powers were purely ideational, and centered on notions of morality and ethics. The realist school only sought out the material facts within IR, and focused on explaining how natural forces influenced political behavior. Any progress toward peace would require “recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice, which can be attained only through a combination of utopia and reality.”⁷

The Twenty Years' Crisis

Carr began his treatise with a critique of utopian IR theories, attempting to dismantle their concepts of universalism. Particularly, Carr sought to refute notions of universal common interest that underpinned ideas like Jeremy Bentham’s greatest good or Adam Smith’s free market forces.⁸ Carr understood that utopian theorists “did valuable work” identifying the problems within the international system, but doubted that simply pointing out the need to change would serve as proper motivation to alter international politics.⁹ Using an analogy of alchemy, Carr points out that simply *needing*

⁶ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), xxiii.

⁷ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 14.

⁸ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 42-59.

⁹ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 8.

to change lead into gold did not *ensure* that a solution was possible.¹⁰ He believed that utopian solutions “had no logical [connection] with the conditions which created the problem.”¹¹ Thus, basing international policy, like the League of Nations, on these utopian notions doomed them to failure. The great danger lied in the fact that many states believed that the League could institutionalize peace, and thus they would be unprepared to deal with conflict and potential war should that League fail.

Carr was equally critical of realist theories, which overly focused on the material side of IR. He separates IR from natural science. Invoking his alchemy analogy again, Carr explains that a universal desire to change lead into gold would bring it no closer to reality; however, a true universal desire for world peace would make it easily obtainable.¹² Like history, IR possesses an ideational side that *can* affect the international political system. Carr stresses that any viable political solution must objectively account for the actual conditions that created political problems, but warns that overemphasizing the “irresistible strength of existing forces” and the need to account for them can “be carried to the point where it results in the sterilization of thought and the negation of action.”¹³ Blind acceptance of fate that discounted free will was unacceptable to Carr.¹⁴

Carr believed that one studied political science to change politics, not merely understand them. In fact, as with history, political thought itself is a form a political action; every political judgment we make modifies the facts on which it is passed.¹⁵ And modify them we must—the fate of humanity may depended upon it. Carr declared, “Our task is to explore the ruins of our international order and discover on what fresh foundations we may hope to rebuild it.”¹⁶ With this statement, Carr issued forth a clarion call that began the modern IR era. Theorists have picked it up and carried it through to today. It asks not simply how we can understand international politics, but can we fix them—create a new international order and eliminate war? IR policies of his day shared

¹⁰ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 6.

¹¹ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 8.

¹² Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 9.

¹³ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 10.

¹⁴ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 12.

¹⁵ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 6.

¹⁶ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 209.

this goal, but their sometimes myopic vision ignored the balance of theory and practice that Carr saw as critical to an international solution.

Carr's solution arose out of his analysis of the international political arena. Carr understood that politics, like history, was in constant motion—always in flux. This was an incontestable natural force in IR. There is *not*, however, a naturally occurring force that compels states to conform to change. Instead, a state has two options. It could accept such changes and adapt itself to new condition, which characterizes the ideational side within IR. Along these lines, Carr notes that people accept these kinds of changes and concessions when they identify with and belong to a larger group identity. Thus, in a direct personification of the state, any new international order that could ensure peace must resemble a community to which states would willingly submit their interests.

As realists are quick to point out, however, states always have a second choice: they can resist change. Resistance generates disagreement between a revolutionary state, one that desires change, and a status-quo state, one determined to keep things the same. Such disagreements are *political* disputes, in that they involve, or are resolved by, and contest of power. Carr understands that the current international system was not equipped to resolve such disputes without resorting to power politics. Any such power struggle threatened to disrupt the peace, and lead to intolerable war.

The utopian theories and institutions of the 1920s relied on universalisms, like morality, common good, or international law, to prevent political disagreements from arising. As Carr reminds us, however, these are *relative* forces, not natural laws. A revolutionary state may claim its desire for change is moral, while a status-quo state equally claims that it is illegal. Alternatively, a revolutionary state may challenge a great power on legal grounds, while a status-quo state claims a moral imperative to intervene and stop it. Either situation depends upon a relative interpretation of what is moral, or a static definition of what is legal, neither of which effectively prevents a state from resisting.

Carr's proposition for maintaining peace, then, is a new international order that states belong to as a group. The nature of the international environment, described above, suggests several barriers to making that international order a reality. We will group these barriers into three roadblocks. The first is the need to balance the realities of

power with the desires for morality within the international system. The second is to determine what role supra-state institutions can effectively play. The third is the need for the international system to accommodate peaceful change. In his conclusions, Carr identifies how a new international order must approach each of these roadblocks.

One of Carr's primary concerns is the need to account for the very real effects of power within international politics, whether it is military power, economic power, or power over opinion. He understands that superior power allows a state to resist any challenges. Because of this, states fear other states' power. If state A grows in power, state B may not be able to ensure its own security or interests. A new international order cannot simply abstract away the effects of power. Neither can it build upon the universalist notion that cooperation will emerge from each state pursuing power to defend its own interests. Rather, "the new international order can be built only on a unit of power sufficiently coherent and sufficiently strong to maintain its ascendancy without being itself compelled to take sides in the rivalries of [states]."¹⁷ The new system will require its own power, wielded legitimately and "generally accepted as tolerant and unoppressive."¹⁸

The key to achieving legitimate power is finding a balance between power and morality. Power must exist, but it cannot be the *reason* states comply—authority within the new international order must also arise from the consent of the governed.¹⁹ That consent derives from the moral application of authority, not from theories that purport a harmony of interest or equate morality to economic interest. Thus, morality works as an effect, not a cause. Morality has traction within the international system when acts that violate moral practice meet with sanctions. We should not expect states to forego power, or comply with direction, simply because we declare such action as moral.

In Carr's 1920s international order, institutions, treaties, and international law could capture and codify political arrangements, but could not alter them. Supra-state politics could legislate, but they lacked any ability to adjudicate disputes. As mentioned above, such attempts to reach a judgment in inter-state conflicts would amount to back-and-forth claims of relative legal or moral viewpoints. Even if an institution could arrive

¹⁷ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 216.

¹⁸ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 217.

¹⁹ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 216.

at a decision in such cases, its outcome would be subject to the possibility of a state rejecting its findings. Institutions possessed no capacity to enforce their decisions without essentially turning a consensual group back into a power competition. This will remain so until a supra-state polity, such as Carr's new international order, both possesses its own power and earns the consent of the states. Carr is essentially concluding that a dominant, morally constructed group must replace the territorially based state as the dominant actor in international politics—a recurring theme in IR.²⁰

Within this construct, Carr sees the potential for peaceful change. Carr's base tier asserts that change will happen, and that we must not equate preserving the status-quo with acting morally. As he states, "to establish methods of peaceful change is therefore the fundamental problem of international morality and of international politics."²¹ Accommodating peaceful change will require large states to make concessions of power to meet social ends. These concessions occur within a state, but must transfer to the international sphere.²² Likewise, small states must accept that their grievances will not "receive that same prompt attention as the grievances of the strong and the many."²³ Some concessions will simply be unacceptable. Peaceful change will require states to understand the difference, and an international body that can arbitrate the give and take.

Carr's Continuing Influence

Thus, we present here Carr's problematizing of IR in three tiers. The base tier consists of those natural forces of constant motion and the material reality of power that create tension in the international arena. The top tier is the potential solution—in Carr's case, a new international order acting as a common group—to alleviating the need for war within international politics. The middle tier contains the three roadblocks, produced by base tier forces, which we must overcome or account for in order to enact a stable top tier solution. These roadblocks are the need to balance power and morality in the new international order, the requirements of supra-state institutions, and a means for accommodating peaceful change.

²⁰ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 209-213.

²¹ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 202.

²² Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 219.

²³ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 216-217.

This problematizing has cast a long shadow over the field of international relations since *The Twenty Years' Crisis* first appeared. Directly or indirectly, most modern theory elaborates on these same concepts within their prescriptions for political action. This paper, over the next three chapters, will trace those modern contributions to Carr's early foundations. Chapter 1 will examine the evolution of the realist school, from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz to John Mearsheimer. It will delve into what realists say about the viability of a top tier proposal for global peace, into their contributions to a deeper understanding of the base tier forces at play in IR, and it will examine how those revelations affect the three roadblocks. Chapter 2 will provide a similar treatment of the liberal and neo-liberal schools. From Norman Angel to Bob Keohane and Joseph Nye to John Ikenberry, we will look at what their theories about conflict and cooperation contribute to Carr's findings. Chapter 3 will look at other IR constructs, notably constructivism, the English school, and epistemic communities, through the same three-tiered lens of E. H. Carr.

The real question through all of this examination will be, were any of these authors listening to Carr? Earlier we described Carr's critiques of both the realist and utopian schools of thought. As Carr states, "The complete realist, unconditionally accepting the causal sequence of events, deprives himself of the possibility of changing reality. The complete utopian, by rejecting the causal sequence, deprives himself of the possibility of understanding either the reality which he is seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed. The characteristic vice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility."²⁴ Have any of these various schools moved beyond such limitations, and actively sought to forge a marriage of realism and utopianism, material and idea, that Carr believed was fundamentally necessary to save the world?

Chapter 1 will show that while realism has greatly expanded upon the three tiers of Carr, and provided a greater understanding of base tier forces, it has not abandoned the idea that power is primary within politics and a new international system is highly unlikely. Chapter 2 offers a much greater hope of cooperation, but much of the liberal argument still abstracts away the realities of power and conflict. Chapter 3 presents works that begin to approach Carr's hope for achieving balance. Constructivism marries

²⁴ Carr, *Twenty Year's Crisis*, 12.

the ideational and material together, the English schools revolves around balancing power and order, and epistemic communities provide a model for institutional cooperation that crosses international boundaries. All of this will ideally lead to a better understanding of whether states will ever submit to a greater international authority. One aspect of Carr's problematizing that these theories largely neglect, however, is an attempt to summarize succinctly what is required for a state to submit in the first place.

This historiography of modern IR, viewed through the lens of E. H. Carr, will attempt to track the progress we have made since Carr first asked how we could maintain international peace. How have the problem, its implications, and its solution evolved as we progressed through 83 years of IR study? Did Carr ask enough, or the right questions? Should the existence of the state be a priori and does Carr's analysis hinge on that assumption? When does a harmony of interests exist, and can institutions help bring such conditions about? What concessions will never be acceptable to those in power? Can you enforce peace, or only make yourself peaceful? Can we strike the proper balance between power and morality to accommodate peaceful change?

What began with Carr's analysis may not find resolution within these pages. Indeed, if Carr's postulate on constant motion within the international arena is correct, then conflict may never be resolved, merely alleviated. The job of political science may not be to pave the road to peace, but rather to apply shocks to the international system sufficient to ride political bumps before the "Carr" shakes apart and states resort to war. To gain a clearer view of what dangerous bumps the road ahead may hold, we begin with the theories of contemporary realism.

Chapter 1

The Realist Response

E. H. Carr issued his challenge to “explore the ruins of our international order” in 1939. Chapter 1 will trace the realist attempts at such exploration through the works of three major realist authors. Hans Morgenthau first published his monumental tome of realist thought, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, in 1948. Revised over four decades by Kenneth Thompson and Morgenthau himself, this work defined the interests of states in terms of power and established the school of biological realism. In 1979, Kenneth N. Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* explored the effect that international structure has on state behavior. He established the school of defensive realism known as neorealism. In 2001, John J. Mearsheimer released the book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, which interpreted Waltz’s structure in a way that predicts state behaviors more akin to Morgenthau’s earlier analysis. This blend of power and structure established the school of offensive realism.

Over the past 60 years, realism has added depth to Carr’s problematizing of international politics but has also largely conformed to Carr’s critiques of sterility. Realism offers new base tier natural forces that alter some of Carr’s analysis of political roadblocks. Each school of realism offers a potential top tier solution similar to Carr’s concept of a “new international order,” but also provides various prerequisites and limitations that could preclude such solutions. The realists share Carr’s criticism of Utopian theories that seek to abstract away natural forces. Yet, realists fall victim to weighing those natural forces too heavily, almost equating them to inevitability. Carr sought to avoid such absolutes: IR theory should never focus simply on what we ought to change, nor should it look only at the things we cannot change. Instead, we should first find the limits of natural forces and then determine how we can change in spite of them—a charge that realists have continued to downplay or overlook.

Each realist school offers reasons as to why they downplay the prospects for a new international order. Morgenthau argues that while Carr’s balance of power and morality is a fine idea, the truth remains that states act first in accordance with their interests. Until that fact changes, Carr’s call for moral balance within a new international

order will go unheeded. Since Morgenthau believes that the “interest first” character of politics derives from unalterable human nature, he sees that change as unlikely. Thus, instead of seeking change, states would do best to forego moral pursuits, act in accordance with other interests, and wait for a time when change might be possible.

Waltz changes the argument from one about human nature to an exploration of structure. Several theories we discuss later offer evidence that human nature is neither unchanging nor strictly power seeking. Waltz tries to elevate above that debate. He contends that internal motivations do not shape state behaviors. Rather, the situation that states are in influences their behavior. Structural forces, emanating from the way states interact with one another, compel states to put interests first. Thus, Waltz’s prospects for a new international order are less optimistic than Morgenthau’s—even if we can change human nature, we cannot change the fact that international anarchy drives nations to put their own security interests first. Only changing anarchy could alter that.

Mearsheimer’s argument against Carr’s analysis is very similar to Waltz and Morgenthau. Mearsheimer accepts Neorealist ideas about the influence of external structural forces, but casts them in a different light. Instead of compelling states to seek security first, he concludes that they will oblige states to seek power in order to ensure that security. Thus, his motivations for state behavior mirror Waltz while his prognosis of world affairs resembles Morgenthau. Consequently, Mearsheimer’s impact on Carr also mirrors that of Waltz and Morgenthau.

Realists, through these three authors, have essentially focused on strengthening their own argument as opposed to seeking the relationship with utopian ideas that Carr desired. They do not seek the path to a new international order as much as they explain why that search may be futile. Carr aspired to find the ways around political obstacles; the realists aspire to describe those obstacles. These descriptions, however, do yield important findings that enrich Carr’s analysis of IR and inform our synthesis of base tier forces in appendix A. We will take an in-depth look at Morgenthau and Waltz, and examine all three of the realist school’s contributions now in turn.

Hans Morgenthau and Biological Realism

The title of Hans Morgenthau’s tome *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* reveals that he, like Carr, is concerned with the specter of war and

views international relations as a “struggle for peace.” He foremost founds his theory, however, on the conviction “that there exists an objective and universally valid truth about matters political, [and] that this truth is accessible to human reason.”¹ His truths stem from his definitions of politics and his assessment of human nature. From this, he deduces an important distinction about the types of changes that happen within IR—the difference between status-quo and imperial change. We will examine how that distinction colors Carr’s analysis of middle tier roadblocks, and how Morgenthau’s “truths” affect his potential top-tier solutions for peace. Finally, we will look at how Morgenthau’s concept of basing theory upon supposed truth colors his own analysis, and restricts his findings in ways that Carr foresaw.

Politics among Nations

Morgenthau begins *Politics among Nations* with six fundamental principles that define realism as a theory of IR. These principles are important to understand as they shape all of his analysis that follows. The first is that “politics...is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature.”² This simply asserts that certain natural forces (like the Carr’s base tier forces) exist, and that valid theories must account for them. The second principle separates political theory from other fields by defining political interests in terms of power.³ This does not imply that states have no interests outside of power, but rather that any interests other than power fall outside the realm of politics. His third principle concedes that “power” changes with context and era. International politics is always about the study of power, but what constitutes power and how politics react to its use may change over time.

Fourth, although Morgenthau accepts the “moral significance of political action,” he states that realism “considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of

¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), Preface to the Third Edition.

² Morgenthau, 4.

³ Morgenthau, 4. Defining politics in terms of power allows Morgenthau to differentiate political actions and motives from economic, legal, or moral concerns; this delineation makes his analysis possible. Morgenthau understands that the fields will overlap. Political actions will have economic and moral effects, and vice versa, but their respective theories and study remain distinct. This is the cornerstone of realist theory, divorcing the search for political laws from moral motives and ideological preference, and basing them upon the actual actions that statesmen pursue.

alternative political action—to be the supreme virtue in politics.”⁴ In short, political decisions should always consider power struggles and national survival before other concerns. After all, should a state cease to exist the morality of its intentions would be irrelevant. Additionally, Morgenthau’s fifth principle states that moral aspirations are relative, not universal. States may not share morals, but all states must account for interests defined in terms of power.⁵ Morgenthau’s sixth point is simply that his first five principles form a foundation for realism distinct from other schools of political thought.

Morgenthau states that, “intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere,” not confusing it with issues of economics, legality, or morality.⁶ A political realist asks, “How does this policy affect the power of the nation?”⁷ Morgenthau defines political power as “control over the minds and actions of other men,” and thus elevates the interest of control above other concerns within realism.⁸ In Morgenthau’s eyes, political theories that try to elevate issues about money, morals, or legality above those of power ignore certain “truths” and are not feasible. This is similar to Carr’s critique of utopian theory. Although Morgenthau’s deference to power and control is also critiqued by Carr, it does provide the logical framework for Morgenthau’s primary contribution in this analysis.

Morgenthau adds the concept of imperial change to Carr’s problematizing of IR. Carr’s base tier forces are the constant motion of the world that makes change inevitable, and the reality that power affects world affairs. Morgenthau combines those elements and derives two different kinds of political change with respect to power. There are changes that maintain the current power relationships, which he dubs *status-quo*, and

⁴ Morgenthau, 10.

⁵ Morgenthau, 11. Morgenthau expresses the value of this principle in both theoretical and concrete terms. Theoretically, if we take moral evaluations of state action to a logical conclusion, the result is that whatever a state deems as morally correct can justify destroying another state which may hold an opposing view. In this case, there would be no political “right” or “wrong” to evaluate; it would be a simple case of “he said, she said.” Defining interests in terms of power allows us to judge other states actions with the same criteria as our own and produce theoretical valuations. Concretely, purporting moral aspirations as universally governing has justified and created real destruction in the past, such as the crusades. Policy based on the importance of interests has conversely led to balancing of power behaviors that promoted peace and order.

⁶ Morgenthau, 11.

⁷ Morgenthau, 11-12.

⁸ Morgenthau, 28.

changes that reverse a power relationship, which he labels *imperial*.⁹ This is a gross simplification of Morgenthau's discussions of imperialism, but an acceptable one, because the delineation between status-quo and imperial change *itself* is the most important contribution. Carr did not make the distinction between such policies in his analysis.

Within biological realism, status-quo changes may be acceptable to a state, but imperial changes are far more difficult to accept. As determined by the six principles, the political realist defines politics in terms of power and control. How a state approaches power and control is driven by human nature. According to Morgenthau, human nature drives people to seek power. When society limits the power an individual can attain, individuals fulfill their aspirations for power through the state, like a father living through his son. Consequently, a state has an obligation to maintain power and control if for no other reason than to take care of its citizens. Imperial changes directly violate this nature. This reasoning drives Morgenthau to assess two of Carr's roadblocks differently than Carr.

The first roadblock Morgenthau's imperialism affects is peaceful change. Carr concluded that in order for peaceful change to occur large and small powers must make concessions. Carr depicted "unacceptable" concessions mainly as existential threats to a state. If Morgenthau is correct, then imperial changes are also intolerable. This means intentionally imperial policies jeopardize the possibility of peaceful change, but also suggests that occurrences such as disasters or technological and social developments, which could arise naturally during state development and trigger an imperial power change, can generate power struggles and conflict.

The second roadblock affected by Morgenthau's reasoning is Carr's need to balance power and morality within a new international order. Carr reasoned that this balance is necessary because power should not be the only reason that states submit to a supra-state polity. Morgenthau suggests that any submission is unlikely, whether moral or not, because a rising supra-state power constitutes an imperial threat. The loss of

⁹ Morgenthau, 38-71. In purely conceptual terms, if state A has a power of 10, and state B's power is only 5, a policy which seeks a respective change in power to 11 and 9, or 7 and 6, would be a status-quo policy. Policies that resulted in respective power levels of 19 and 20, or 3 and 4, are not status-quo. Any policy that seeks to reverse that relationship, even if both numbers raise or lower, is an imperial policy.

control inherent in submission goes against Morgenthau's conception of human nature projected through the state and the realist decree to place power concerns first within politics. Morgenthau is not as concerned with the tensions produced by the need to balance power and morality as much as he is concerned with the tensions that arise when people and states realize that they cannot balance them. What is morally desirable for an individual may be presently impossible for a state, and political leaders will thus have to serve as the "leader of public opinion, not its slave."¹⁰ Thus, we can see how the principles of biological realism affect the first two tiers of Carr's analysis. Those principles also inform Morgenthau's assessment of top tier solutions for peace.

Morgenthau's reasoning leads him to conclude that only two devices can possibly maintain international peace. "One is the self-regulatory mechanism of the social forces, which manifests itself in the struggle for power on the international scene, that is, the balance of power. The other consists of normative limitations upon that struggle, in the form of international law, international morality, and world public opinion."¹¹ It is beyond the scope of this paper to reconstruct or analyze Morgenthau's arguments about these mechanisms with the same depth and rigor as *Politics among Nations*. Instead, we will distill the argument down to his primary criticism and prerequisite for each mechanism.

The first mechanism is the balance of power, which has severe limitations.¹² First, it is uncertain—it is difficult to gauge accurately how much "power" each state really has, and what their intentions are for that power. Second, it is unrealistic—it attempts to maintain peace by invoking an imperial power shift (this time from a group of states, not a single state), which Morgenthau earlier predicted may increase, not decrease tensions. Finally, it is inadequate. The balance of power is just a mechanism for states to posture, for it to be effective it requires international consensus on key ideas: states must make their political calculations based on power and interest, one of those interests must be preservation of the international system, and that preservation must include Westphalian ideas about state sovereignty. The balance of power will not lead to peace if

¹⁰ Morgenthau, 567.

¹¹ Morgenthau, 23.

¹² Morgenthau, 178-201. By name, the concept of a self-sustaining balance of power is a power-based method for maintaining peace. Essentially, it refers to the idea that if one state becomes too powerful, others will naturally join against it to limit its aspirations.

states are on a moral crusade, if they seek to tear down the system, or if they believe that submitting to the demands of the balancing states could end their existence.¹³

Morgenthau, therefore, turns his analysis to normative restrictions, the first of which is morality. Morgenthau argues that morality does have both internal and external importance. Internally, a state must account for the response of its people to moral questions or risk “the disintegration of its own fabric in anarchy or civil war.”¹⁴ Externally, a state will incur sanctions from the international community if it acts outside of commonly held international concepts of moral action. Like Carr, he does not think of morality as a natural force that drives men’s actions, but as an effect that can limit action. Thus, in the end it is about interests, not morality. More significantly, though, is the fact that in order for an international community to generate morality-based sanctions such a community and commonly held concepts of morality must first exist.

Morgenthau’s treatments of international law and institutions mirror his argument about morality. Internally, they promote state cohesion. Externally, they can codify certain agreements, violation of which produces sanctions that may limit aggressive state behavior. Like Carr, Morgenthau understands that legislatively, institutions can forge agreements, but cannot adjudicate or enforce any changes within international politics. Enforcement only results from power competition or voluntary submission. Power competition can lead to war; voluntary submission requires a common acceptance of what constitutes “fair” and “legal” between the states and adjudicating party involved.¹⁵

Thus, morality, laws, and institutions operate similar to the balance of power. They can mask, but not replace interests and power in international politics. In order to lead to peace, Morgenthau explained how both of these mechanisms required some form of common world opinion. This world public opinion is not a replacement for Carr’s top tier solution, but a prerequisite for it. While Morgenthau understands that such a consensus could bring about peace, he sees its formation as unlikely because in order to be effective such an opinion would need to be ubiquitous. Morgenthau reasons that, “if the desire for power cannot be abolished everywhere in the world, those who might be

¹³ Morgenthau, 204-223.

¹⁴ Morgenthau, 436.

¹⁵ Morgenthau, 439-440.

cured would simply fall victims to the power of others.”¹⁶ Total peace only happens when we all agree to put down our weapons together; if one state reaches for a gun, we best all have a gun to defend ourselves.

In the absence of such unanimity the most states can do is acknowledge that political realism is correct and work toward a common understanding that all politics comes down to matters of interest. He admits that this idea “cannot compete in inspirational qualities with the simple and fascinating formulae” that ignore this reality.¹⁷ Morgenthau lists several suggestions about refocusing diplomacy specifically on interests, removing morality, militarism, and absolutes from foreign policy guidance.¹⁸ This is the necessary first step toward building world public opinion and lasting peace, “as there can be no peace without a world state, and there can be no world state without the peace-preserving and community-building processes of diplomacy.”¹⁹

Evaluating Morgenthau

Morgenthau listened to Carr’s arguments but failed to heed his advice. As Morgenthau builds the foundation for his political theory, he does so examining many of the same themes as Carr: power, morality, peace, war, and international order. Morgenthau’s overarching purpose is to explore the possibility of changing the international order to prevent wars that possess ever-increasing devastation. His discussions touch on the friction between the realities of power and morality, the role of international institutions, and the difficulties of accommodating change. Carr’s problematizing of IR certainly seems to have framed Morgenthau’s approach to IR, but Morgenthau’s analysis does not stray far beyond an explanation of these concepts.

While Morgenthau takes pride in “truth,” this very pride limits his analysis of the future. Morgenthau believes that “the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of

¹⁶ Morgenthau, 33.

¹⁷ Morgenthau, 568.

¹⁸ Morgenthau, 561. Morgenthau list four fundamental rules and five prerequisite rules of diplomacy. His four fundamental rules are: remove universalistic crusading objectives from foreign policy; define foreign policy objectives in terms of national interests supported by adequate power; consider the point of view and interest of other states; and be willing to compromise on non-vital issues. Morgenthau’s five prerequisites to meeting those foreign policy goals are: focus on actual gains instead of abstract conceptions of what is “right;” do not proclaim absolutes objectives which you cannot retreat from; never allow a weak ally to force you into policy decisions; do not allow the military to dictate foreign policy; and remember that the government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave.

¹⁹ Morgenthau, 569.

view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them.”²⁰ Morgenthau never gets beyond mere natural forces to explore the question: “And then what?” His expansion of base tier forces and their ramifications is significant and it should influence our thinking about IR problems. His conclusion, however, is to essentially keep acting as humanity has always acted and hope that eventually change happens.

It is in this conclusion that we see the sterility about which Carr warned. Morgenthau’s theory and prescription stem from the probability of producing an answer more than they seek answers based on the whole situation. Morgenthau understands that international politics represent a terribly complex problem. If we can only measure variables like morality *relatively*, it may not be possible to formulate concrete solutions to these problems. Carr understood that we would find no fixed answers in complex, ideational matters, and thus stressed the need for an international community with the ability to constantly adapt and change. Morgenthau, however, concludes that we should only focus on the parts that have measurable, tangible solutions like interests and diplomacy. But, is a theory that rejects or subordinates ideational factors any less problematic than one that ignores power politics? Separating power from other interests may be required to formulate a theory of politics but should not extend into that theory’s recommendations. Morgenthau’s blind acceptance of “the way things are” often resulted in only partial explorations and caused him to miss several factors in his analysis.

First, if institutions truly increase the complexity of international relations, can they not also influence or assist the process of forming a world public opinion? Morgenthau claims that states learn from complex environments. The interaction of many factors produces restrictions on state action, which states eventually conform to as normal practice. If this is true, not just diplomacy but any situation or international institution that blurs the distinct lines of politics can promote a world public opinion.

Second, this learning can be piecemeal. While Morgenthau’s assertion that only ubiquitous world opinion can bring about *total* peace is reasonable, there is nothing to prevent smaller groups of opinion from forming in the meantime. Not every state must submit to a higher authority simultaneously. A merger of a few states in the world does

²⁰ Morgenthau, 4.

not invalidate the sovereignty of others. It is true that the European Union, should it coalesce into a single polity, would simply act like a new state, subject to the same natural forces as other states. This fact ignores, however, that there would be no more *realpolitik* among those European partners, which is clearly an incremental step toward peace and the construction of a global community.

Third, Morgenthau's delineation between imperial and status-quo change may not exist in reality as clearly as it does in theory. In a complex world, almost any change is imperial to someone—it is a matter of perspective. Yet peaceful change has and does happen within the world. After World War II, the United Kingdom peacefully accepted the imperial rise of US power in international waters. This suggests that the response to rising powers may be controlled by factors other than simple imperial change. After all, if balancing behaviors and sanctions can cause a state give up imperial foreign policies, as Morgenthau purports, should they not also be able to lessen the response to imperial changes? Besides, if our eventual goal is a single world power, who would be left to have an imperial power change with?

Finally, Morgenthau ascribes many attributes to human nature that are not internally consistent. Are aspirations for political power gain really the result of biological tendencies and rampant nationalism? The fact that Morgenthau claims that human nature leads us to both dominate, and to balance against dominance, suggests that internal motivations may be more security seeking than power seeking. Morgenthau also asserts that individuals submit to a state because it will seek power for us, but does not extend that same logic to the state, which could submit to an international coalition that does the same. Additionally, his assertion that internal power motivations simply override internal morality (despite both being a part of human nature) fails to logically convince us that power politics originate biologically. Perhaps a separate, structural force actually elevates power over morality. Kenneth Waltz explores both of these possibilities in his treatise on structural realism.

Kenneth Waltz and Neorealism

When Waltz first released his *Theory of International Politics* in 1979, he birthed a new school of realism known today as Neorealism. Much like Carr wrote in response to an up swell of utopian political trends, Waltz wrote his theory of structural realism to

get away from the focus on state behaviors that dominated IR study. Instead, Waltz sought to explain why states engage in such behaviors, attempting to deduce the forces that drive states to act in accordance with power interests. He finds the source of that force in the structure of the international political system itself. We will look at how Waltz defines structure and deduces the “balance of power” behaviors that it produces. We will examine how these base-tier structural forces affect Carr’s middle-tier roadblocks and proposal for a new international order. Finally, we will take a critical look at Waltz’s assumptions to ask whether his is the only way to interpret structure.

A Theory of International Politics

Waltz begins with a discourse on the contrast between inductive and deductive analysis. According to Waltz, data is just data. Statistics can plot and predict correlations, but they do not explain an event. For example, you could observe how tidal shifts align with the orbit of the moon around the earth and correlate the two events. Such correlation is an inductive, statistical finding. If it happens often enough, it may even rise to the status of a law. Yet that law only *describes* what is happening.

A deductive theory attempts to explain why that correlation exists. This is more useful to a political scientist because if he can explain why a correlation exists then he can determine how to assert control over it, or at least understand that control is impossible. From our example above, a deduced theory of gravity would *explain* the correlation between tides and lunar orbit—the moon’s gravity is pulling on the water. It also makes it clear that unless we can reposition the moon or alter gravity we cannot *control* the tide. Waltz makes this distinction clear to illuminate why he is developing his theory of structural realism.

Waltz offers a historiography of recent political thought. He states that, “today’s students of politics...display a strong commitment to induction.”²¹ Without proper explanatory power, these theories could lead to false conclusions and harmful political action. Political scientists could study the occurrence of war repeatedly (even demonstrate that all people go to war) without ever explaining why they fight. They reduce their explanations down to motivations of the units, like Morgenthau’s proposal

²¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press Inc., 2010), 4.

that states seek power because people are power seeking. As Waltz critiques, “such reasoning is circular, and naturally so. Once the system is reduced to its interacting parts, the fate of the system can be determined only by the characteristics of its major units.”²²

Waltz tries to mitigate these limitations by looking at international relations as a whole. As a systems theory, Neorealism understands that the whole is more than just the sum of its parts. It has a characteristic all its own. Within international politics, the very fact that states interact with one another produces effects distinct from the individual actions of each state. These effects exert influence on state behaviors, and because they emerge from the system—the structure of IR—they apply equally to every state. It is important to understand that Waltz is attempting to explain why “different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges.”²³ Although states have various internal motivations, they all have the same external forces on them. He wants to comprehend what those forces are and what behaviors they drive, namely, how states “will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish.”²⁴ In order to understand these international forces we must first understand international political structure.

Waltz begins by describing the attributes of a political structure. He explains, “A structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts. Only changes of arrangement are structural changes.”²⁵ From domestic politics, Waltz determines that structure is defined “first, according to the principle by which it is ordered, second, by the specification of the functions of the...units, and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units.”²⁶ Put simply, structure is how you arrange the parts, what is required of the parts, and the ranking of the parts.

The ordering principle of international politics is anarchy. Anarchy, in this sense, does not imply total chaos. Rather it indicates there is no authority above the state to which they can appeal to for help. As Carr and Morgenthau have discussed, supra-state institutions cannot adjudicate or resolve international disputes. Formally, each state has

²² Waltz, 63.

²³ Waltz, 72.

²⁴ Waltz, 72.

²⁵ Waltz, 80.

²⁶ Waltz, 82. Within a state, departments are arranged hierarchically (ordering principle) which leads to a division of labor (unit function).

equal rights; “None is entitled to command, none is required to obey.”²⁷ This makes each state ultimately responsible for its own success or failure—it is a *self-help* system. Because states must ultimately depend on themselves, they cannot divide their tasks the way people do within a hierarchy. Each state must provide for all of its own needs, which indicates that states are alike in function.

Within international politics, every state has the same specified function. Waltz assumes that “states seek to ensure their survival.”²⁸ Because each state seeks the same goal and each state is a sovereign autonomous political unit, then they are like units. This does not imply that states act *only* to ensure their survival or that every state will address its needs in the same fashion, but rather that every state is responsible for addressing the same needs and each is equally free to presume them as they wish. That freedom includes the option to resort to force. States must be prepared to defend themselves. This makes force the *ultima ratio* within international politics.²⁹

The distribution of capabilities within international politics is a game of relative power. Waltz equates power to influence insofar as an “agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.”³⁰ Nothing affects influence more than power itself, which is why shrewd states husband their economic and military power. The degree to which a state can best guarantee its own survival determines its place within the system. Thus, structural realism paints a positional picture of international politics. That is to say, it illustrates how states stack up against one another. The influence that structure exerts does not change unless structures change. Anarchy cannot change until there exists a world state to replace it. Thus, changes in relative power affect the structural positioning of states. The number of great powers and relative position determine how those forces apply to each state in particular.

A force that is often overlooked is socialization. If a state were free to act of its own volition—free from any consequences—then every different motivation would produce a different action. States are not free from consequence within a complex

²⁷ Waltz, 88.

²⁸ Waltz, 91. On page 134, Waltz explains that he makes this assumption because “survival is a prerequisite for the achievement of other ends.”

²⁹ Waltz, 113. With this phrase, Waltz is capturing the idea that states can always resort to force if the cannot resolve their disputes through maneuvering or bargaining. War always looms in the background as a possibility.

³⁰ Waltz, 192.

environment like international politics. A state can choose any course of action, but so can the others. Thus, a state must deal with the results of its action, the results of its opponent's action, and the blowback reactions to each other's actions.³¹ If a state feels a particular action can come back to threaten its power or survival, it is dissuaded from such action. As force is the *ultima ratio*, "the constant possibility that force will be used limits manipulation, moderates demands, and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes."³² Extreme and destabilizing actions become less attractive not just to me but to everyone. System feedback dampens aggression.

The fact that states are interacting with anarchy drives another like behavior. State behaviors will gravitate toward those that prove the most successful. This is true in any system in which units are responsible for their own success, whether a business in a free market, states within anarchy, or a sports team in a league. If one business, state, or team changes their ways and begins to earn more, gain more power, or win more, then their competition has two choices: adopt similar ways and share their successes, or ignore them and risk losing your business, your sovereignty, or your fans. This process of competition and selection drives every player in a self-help system to act similarly. Thus within international politics, when a state achieves large power gains their relative advantage will even out over time as other states mimic and also gain or as weaker competition dies off.

Waltz thus theorizes that within an anarchical system, if states desire their survival, then behaviors that balance against any aggressive or rising powers naturally result from socialization and competition. This balancing will occur against both benevolent and malign powers. It results from anarchy not state motivation—a base tier force that disposes states toward power balancing. Waltz does specify, however, that the expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another."³³

The key to our analysis is to understand what these structural forces mean to Carr's problematizing of international relations. The most notable affect is on Carr's first

³¹ Waltz, 75. As Waltz states, "Each is playing a game, *and* they are playing a game together. They react to each other and to the tensions their interactions produce." [emphasis original] This blowback is the feature of the whole that is greater than its parts.

³² Waltz, 113-114.

³³ Waltz, 128.

roadblock, the call to balance power and morality. As we explored above, morality does not affect the formation of structural forces, and the “balance of power” tendency applies to both sinners and saints. This tendency limits the degree to which a state can follow its own moral or economic desires. This does not imply that states never act morally, but rather that states that place morality above the need to ensure security may fail where other states succeed. This theory adds *explanation* to Morgenthau’s assertion that tension results from a state’s inability to act on moral desires, and suggests that we may not be able to live up to Carr’s desire to wield power in accordance with moral limitations.

Structure affects Carr’s third roadblock—peaceful change—in different ways dependent upon on the “distribution of capabilities” within the system. Carr’s primary concern regarding change was the capacity for states to accept concessions. Waltz argues that the number of great power “poles” within the international system can affect this roadblock. Waltz cites the Post WWII shift from a multi-pole, Europe-centric system, to a bi-polar US/USSR structure as an example. Because European states were no longer actively balancing against one another within the multi-pole environment, their risk of war decreased along with their relative security requirements. This freed up state resources, improved resiliency, increased the ability of European states to absorb loss, and made peaceful cooperation across Europe more likely; “conflicts of interest remain[ed], but not the expectation that someone would use force to resolve them.”³⁴

The relative power of a state can also affect its capacity to accommodate peaceful change. Both great powers and very small powers have a higher likelihood of working peacefully within the political arena. This seeming contradiction stems from the dual influence of power within the international system. Great power gives a state the ability to absorb larger sanctions in its international policies. Increased power also leads to state interests that span a wider geographic area and spectrum of issues. This produces more second and third order effects, more “blowback” that a state must account for. Thus, increased power dampens states freedom of aggressive action and increases a state’s ability to deal with that limitation. Take, for example, the United States, who has the resource to act unilaterally when required, but whose policies must account for the needs

³⁴ Waltz, 71.

of many alliances and security arrangements, such as NATO defense and Japanese commitments when dealing Russia and China.

In the case of small powers, the implications of their actions are often narrowly confined to a region or lack major impact, and thus escape scrutiny or opposition by other states. Their lack of resilience, however, makes them vulnerable to large missteps. They may adopt policies that are more aggressive in order to maintain a tenuous grasp on security, but their actions may go unchallenged and not disturb the peace. This phenomenon is evident in Venezuela's freedom to spout virulent anti-Western rhetoric, yet their inability to challenge seriously concrete Western institutions. Thus, Waltz sees the possibility for peaceful change within a system of states, but does not extend that possibility to the chance of uniting under a single world power.

Waltz clearly takes exception to Carr's top tier solution of a new international order and rising central power. In his conclusion, Waltz writes, "To promote a change of system, whether by building a world hegemon or by promoting an area to great power status by helping it find political unity, is one of history's grandiose projects. We should be neither surprised nor sad that it failed."³⁵ Waltz's theory explains that institutions are subject to, not determiners of, structural forces. States will balance against rising power whether it takes the form of a state or an institution. Waltz believes that without preexisting global coherence, "the prospect of world government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war."³⁶ Instead, order is best served by a system populated with two great powers and many much smaller powers.

Analyzing Waltz

The themes introduced in Carr's problematizing of international relations reverberate through *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz covers the issues of maintaining order, war and peace, and the role of power and morality (even if it is to explain away morality as a variable). Yet, a theory of structure is only half of the answer Carr sought. Waltz acknowledges this: "Structurally we can describe and understand the pressures states are subject to. We cannot predict how they will react to the pressures

³⁵ Waltz, 201.

³⁶ Waltz, 112.

without knowledge of their internal dispositions.”³⁷ Both system and unit level theories describe forces that affect state behavior. Free market forces of supply and demand do drive prices, but when a market glitch, unforeseen collapse, or abrupt qualitative advantage appears, monopolies can and do emerge. This phenomenon is possible in IR as well, as seen at the end of the Cold War. Waltz’s theory does not explain how the US emerged as a power monopoly; it only explains what should happen afterwards. Carr was looking specifically for a way to grow and maintain the monopoly. With his concept of a new international order, Carr was not trying to usurp structural forces, but find a way to alter the boundaries of where they start and stop.

Waltz was interested in explaining why state behaviors repeat. Like Morgenthau, his is less a theory of how to achieve peace than it is a theory of what we must overcome to maintain order. The point of his writing was “not to say how to manage the world...but to say how the possibility that great powers will constructively manage international affairs varies as systems change.”³⁸ It is a study of the obstacle, not a plan around one. As it is a groundbreaking new approach to studying the obstacle, we are compelled to include structural theory in Carr’s problematizing. Waltz does not explore in depth, however, exactly how his structural forces interact with internally generated pressures. Carr’s proposals require more analysis of the balance between these forces.

To begin, we can question whether Waltz’s characterization of international political structure is correct. He assumes that survival is the like function of states, which leads to his conclusions. If states seek more than just security, however, do they still socialize toward balance of power behaviors? Waltz suggested above that a transition to a bi-polar structure or residing at the extremes of relative power may cause a state to feel more secure within the system. Other factors, like geography or internal make-up, might also affect state security. If the sanctions that drive socialization are different for moral and immoral acts, states may balance heavier against perceived “evil” regimes, like the Third Reich, than they would against perceived “benevolent” world powers, like the *pax Britannica*. As states feel more secure, what are they concerned with next? Aggression and power gains may not generate the biggest blowback, but rather behaviors that limit

³⁷ Waltz, 71.

³⁸ Waltz, 210.

wealth or beliefs. The blowback onto states will be a product of the system we create and the world public opinion that we form. As Morgenthau said, the level of sanctions will depend on how other states feel and react to various inputs. Thus, socializing may always produce a likening effect, but could theoretically result in a likening affect to do just about anything.

A second question emerges about how well competition and selection will work as a homogenizing force in international politics. Certainly, within unregulated natural Darwinism, selection is a powerful force, but what if selection is artificially limited? Promoting peace is a goal of studying international politics. Within the Westphalian notion of sovereign state preservation, the whole idea is to prevent states from dying. If an entity cannot die, however, selection diminishes. Without selection, the impetus to socialize is weaker.³⁹ Yet, as Morgenthau said earlier, states may only respond peacefully to balance of power behavior *if* they have a strong expectation they will survive. Thus, a dilemma exists. Allowing state death would make the impetus to engage in peaceful balance of behaviors stronger, but would make the response to those behaviors more likely violent. Guaranteeing security allows for a more peaceful response to balancing powers, but also lessens the impetus to balance in the first place. This dilemma does not concern Waltz, because he is primarily concerned with the actions of the great powers that are strongly affected by structural forces. Carr, in a quest for global peace, is concerned with the behavior of every state.

Which leads to a final question about structure: is the state really a natural dividing line between anarchy and hierarchy? Within Neorealism, anarchy does most of the work, but does anarchy really *cause* self-help, or does an internal decision to pursue self-help *cause* anarchy? The thirteen colonies overcame anarchy when they chose to abide by a common constitution. The European Union could be on a similar path. Yet, a realm of anarchy occurred within Yugoslavia when Slovenia and Croatia chose to defend themselves. The answer to this question will not change the nature of structural forces that exist inside an anarchical relationship, but will certainly change when, how and if we can control these forces in the international political arena, which we address in appendix

³⁹ As we stated earlier with regard to weak states, polities that do not fear blowback can do as they please and live off the system provided by the strong as a free rider without incurring a risk of dying.

A. John Mearsheimer addresses some of our other critiques in his theory of Offensive Realism.

John Mearsheimer and Offensive Realism

John Mearsheimer explores alternative conceptions of structure in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. As others before him, Mearsheimer wrote in response to what he perceived as overly utopian ideas that began to dominate political guidance after the end of the Cold War. Mearsheimer, like Waltz, bases his theory on structure. His conclusions about structural forces, however, suggest that the external pressures on states drive them to behave more aggressively than Waltz predicts. He asserts that states will power maximize and act offensively, similar to the behaviors Morgenthau writes about in Biological Realism. We will briefly look at how Mearsheimer arrives at his theory, but our analysis of Offensive Realism will not be as in depth as that of Morgenthau or Waltz. Morgenthau's primary contribution to our study was that states might fear imperial change more than status-quo changes. Waltz added the important conception that structural forces may exist outside of moral perception, state motivation, or control. As Mearsheimer essentially combines these two elements, his impact on Carr does not vary greatly from what we have already discussed, nor would Carr's assessment of him. We will therefore focus on key elements that add novel contributions to our analysis.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

With one foot in Waltz, and the other in Morgenthau, Mearsheimer fashions a theory of *offensive realism*. Mearsheimer argues that the structure of the international system generates forces that causes a state to power maximize, "In anarchy...the desire to survive encourages states to behave aggressively."⁴⁰ His offensive theory derives from five assumptions: that the international system is anarchic, that any state power could be used offensively, that uncertainty exists between states, that a state's first need is to survive, and that states are rational actors.⁴¹ These five elements combine to generate fear among states within the international system. When a state combines fear with the responsibility for its own security, it will rationally seek a buffer to its security in an

⁴⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 54.

⁴¹ Mearsheimer, 3-32.

uncertain environment. The reach for that buffer yields power-maximizing, often aggressive state behavior.

The question then becomes, how much power does it take before a state feels secure? The transition from maximizing to balancing behaviors occurs once security rises and fear subsides. Mearsheimer offers three mechanisms for reducing fear: nuclear weapons, land power, and geography. Developing nuclear weapons and increasing military power both constitute power maximizing. Geography, specifically a water barrier between a state and its threat, can provide a security buffer significant enough to reduce fear, except from other regional hegemon. Thus, according to Mearsheimer, states cease power maximizing at regional hegemon status, as defined by water borders, and transition to power balancing activities to prevent the rise of other regional hegemon.⁴² Water borders also explain why insular powers, like the United Kingdom, routinely act as a traditional power balancer.⁴³

Mearsheimer's analysis offers findings similar to earlier realist work, but his study yields some important, novel insights. First, Mearsheimer introduces new factors into the structure equation such as geography. Not only will geography limit aggression externally, but internally "both geography and the distribution of power play a key role in determining whether threatened great powers will form balancing coalitions or buck-pass against dangerous aggressors."⁴⁴ He also introduces a larger role for ideational forces in IR by highlight uncertainty in new ways.

Mearsheimer also moves beyond a purely defensive interpretation of structure claiming, "There is no question that systemic factors constrain aggression, especially balancing by threatened states. But defensive realists exaggerate those restraining forces."⁴⁵ He goes beyond the assumption of survival motivations, stating, "In practice...states pursue non-security goals as well. For example, great powers invariably seek greater economic prosperity to enhance the welfare of their citizenry. They

⁴² Mearsheimer, 41.

⁴³ Mearsheimer, 135-136.

⁴⁴ Mearsheimer, 333.

⁴⁵ Mearsheimer, 39.

sometimes seek to promote a particular ideology abroad.”⁴⁶ These post-security goals create internal pressures that push against structural forces.

This brings into question Waltz’s characterization of socialization and competition. As Mearsheimer asserts, “states not only emulate successful balancing behavior, they also imitate successful aggression.”⁴⁷ Aggression has demonstrated benefits, and “states that initiate wars often win and frequently improve their strategic position in the process.”⁴⁸ After the world achieves balance, some state is bound to repeat disruptive behaviors in pursuit of regional hegemony. This does not predict that every state will forego security. As Mearsheimer tells it, “Great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories. On the contrary, before great powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about the balance of power and about how other states will react to their moves. They weigh the costs and risks of offensive against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment.”⁴⁹ Thus, socialization delays war, but it may not dissuade war.

These predictions of state behavior bode poorly for Carr’s first roadblock. As they are both structurally derived theories, Mearsheimer’s pessimism about balancing power and morality mirrors that of Waltz. Mearsheimer reasons that states, unable to accurately guarantee intentions or predict the outcome of a conflict, would be foolish to trust their security to the moral nature of other states or rising powers. A state could unilaterally act peacefully, disarm, or ignore a spiraling security dilemma, but those decisions render the state vulnerable should an opponent not do the same. A binding universal peaceful code would have to exist before unilateral moves toward peace became feasible—a theme common throughout realism. This, however, only provides a *need* for common belief, not a catalyst to produce it. Without it, the best way for states to reduce uncertainty is to become more powerful. States will act and react based upon fear and power, not ideology, thus morality has little chance of affecting actual state policy.

⁴⁶ Mearsheimer, 46.

⁴⁷ Mearsheimer, 166.

⁴⁸ Mearsheimer, 233.

⁴⁹ Mearsheimer, 37.

Mearsheimer's conclusions about institutions and peaceful change are similar to Morgenthau. According to Mearsheimer, institutions are not players within IR, but rather new arenas in which states compete, playing the same game of power politics. States will oppose the rise of any power that threatens their regional hegemony. Thus, the only changes that the system can accommodate peacefully are those that do not imperialistically threaten a regional hegemon's status.

Mearsheimer does not expect this pessimism to change. His five assumptions about structure "appear to be intact as we begin the twenty-first century."⁵⁰ Even if a new international order replaced the state system, Mearsheimer asserts that his base tier aggressive forces would remain. As he states, "Realism merely requires anarchy; it does not matter what kind of political units make up the system."⁵¹ Mearsheimer's prescription for promoting order is thus quite different from Carr. Much like Waltz, he concludes that the best chance for global stability derives from a bi-polar system of regional hegemons that check each other's expansion, along with the absence of other threatening powers throughout the world.

Assessing Mearsheimer

It is not difficult to deduce what Carr's analysis of Mearsheimer's work may have been. Mearsheimer clearly states that although he offers "mainly a descriptive theory [that] explains how great powers have behaved in the past...states *should* behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outline the best way to survive in a dangerous world."⁵² His is not a plan to improve the world, but a sterile demand to live with it. He believes that Carr and others reject realism because it does not align with our ideals, not because it is wrong. As his title suggests, Mearsheimer views this is a "tragedy," but spends most of his effort trying to convince us why pursuing utopian peace is a futile gesture. After all, realism is the result of anarchy.

Mearsheimer's grim predictions do leave room for questioning. While it stands to reason that if a state feels fear, then power maximizing is an option to overcome it—but are states always afraid of rising powers? If so, why is the US more concerned with an

⁵⁰ Mearsheimer, 363.

⁵¹ Mearsheimer, 365.

⁵² Mearsheimer, 11. [Emphasis original]

Iran armed with a single nuclear warhead than an Israel armed with several? Both have the potential for regional hegemony, yet clearly factor differently in US foreign policy. Without an automatic reaction to power, we may find that states “power maximize” when required rather than whenever able.

This reduces Mearsheimer’s concerns to questions of uncertainty. He claims uncertainty within international politics comes from many sources. First, one state can never *truly* know the intentions of another. Second, it is impossible to measure power accurately. Even if we could measure power, wars are fought by fallible men and thus power calculations would not suffice to predict outcomes. Last, the future is simply uncertain, and a state’s relative power could change overnight. Yet, these causes of uncertainty exist equally within both a hierarchy and anarchy. It is the fact that states must *self-help* that drives his offensive tendencies. Self-help derives from the lack of a higher authority that states can rely upon for security.

Thus, Mearsheimer’s argument against Carr’s top tier solution becomes perfectly circular: a central power cannot form because states fear one another due to the lack of a central power. It would stand to reason that a central power that alleviated fear and uncertainty could break this cycle. Anarchy need not be perpetual. Carr was interested in a realistic way to expand hierarchy. Our analysis in appendix A will look specifically at that issue.

The Realist Conclusion

Realists see themselves as members of a tradition that extends back thousands of years to the works of Thucydides. Realists rightly reject criticism that this fact renders their ideas outdated. Rather, they argue, it proves that realist principles are timeless. E. H. Carr did not set out to demonstrate that modern times had rendered realism obsolete. His description of sterility simply challenged the realists to avoid nihilistically accepting the world as it is. To date, realists have not answered that challenge, but have rather dug their heels in an effort to defend their sterility. Carr declared, “Our task is to explore the ruins of our international order and discover on what fresh foundations we may hope to rebuild it.”⁵³ The realists have *explored*, but have done far less *discovering*. This

⁵³ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Year’s Crisis*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 209.

exploration has, however, unearthed valuable understanding about the base tier forces and roadblocks we face on the road to a new international order.

Morgenthau provides a thick accounting of realist principles. His depth and breadth of analysis is unmatched by other realist thinkers, and he provides a rich understanding of the nuance involved in power politics. Morgenthau introduced the notion of imperial change into Carr's problematizing of IR. He also provided the idea of complex learning and the requisite notion of an underlying world public opinion to Carr's search for peace. Yet, his conclusion clung to the realist defense of the status-quo and recommended that because power politics are still primary in reality, they should be primary in policy as well.

Waltz took the study of international politics in an entirely new direction. His ideas on theory and introduction of structural analysis reshaped the field of IR. His ideas about balancing and perils of a world state are important considerations in the search for top tier solutions. Waltz argued that relative power not only *should* be primary, but also that structure, and its selective and socializing effects, mandate that it *will* be. It is important to remember, however, that his structural analysis is only half of the equation when looking for a solution to peaceful change. Internal motivations also play a role in determining state behavior, and may be vital to the move from anarchy to hierarchy.

Mearsheimer's contribution vitally addressed some of the rising Liberal, Neoliberal, and Constructivist critiques of realism, but without the depth of Morgenthau or the field altering impact of Waltz. His theory altered Carr's proposals less than the other two and thus merited a shorter analysis. Mearsheimer did contribute to our analysis by expanding upon the concepts of uncertainty and the fear that can result from it, and introducing the role of geography and nuclear weapons into the structural discussion. Although his conclusions were the most pessimistic view of the possibilities of peaceful change, he did begin to look at state actions beyond the realm of security.

Each realist does provide some notion that individual state behavior can change. Morgenthau talks about complex learning and Waltz offers a similar concept with socialization, which Mearsheimer echoes. They contend, however, that the real problem with anarchical interaction is *not everyone changes at the same time*. Piecemeal notions of peace simply invite defeat. Only system-wide wholesale change could make a lasting

impact. Morgenthau offers his version of this idea when discussing the slow process of forming a world opinion. Waltz claims that the only way to alter anarchical structural forces would be to install a global hierarchy. Either of these constructs could alleviate the fear inherent in Mearsheimer's theory. Each realist contends, however, that even though there is a need to change, there is no universal impetus to do so. States act in their own interest, and until this need for change aligns with state interests, we simply cannot force them to happen.

As Carr asserted, we should use the findings of realism as our starting point. Our realists recommend we engage in interest driven diplomacy and promote a bi-polar world free from other rising powers. This arrangement offers the best chance at stability. Carr warned, however, about equating stability to peace. Stability and order can mask the need for peaceful change, but never fully and repress it.⁵⁴ Carr wanted more than the temporary restriction of war. He sought a path to lasting peace.

Realism is a study of where we are, not a vision of where we are going, but we ought to consider their modifications of Carr's analysis as we look ahead. We should accept that while anarchy exists, states would likely consider security first, and economic and morality interests second. We should understand that states may act defensively or offensively at times, and will continue to do so until the building of a hierarchy is complete. Last, we should search for understanding and requirements about how to provide impetus that begins the change to a new international order.

There is the possibility that the Realist school has overlooked some mechanisms of political struggle that may be in a state's interest, but are not based upon relative power. The realists may put too much stock in their claims of the benefits that self-interest and war have produced for states in the past. Their primary analysis, through the lens of Carr, was about the struggle between power and morality. Their contributions to institutional influence and peaceful change are secondary implications. Within their conclusions, is there a role that institutions and ideas can fill they have failed to analyze? This is the focus of the next two chapters.

⁵⁴ This idea is similar to Mearsheimer's view that balancing delays and masks aggression, but does not destroy it.

Chapter 2

The Liberal Narrative

In his final estimations, E. H. Carr concluded the world required both realism and utopianism, like “two sides of the same intellectual coin,” to chart a course to peace. Chapter 2 follows four major liberal authors who sought to navigate that course. Norman Angell wrote about the decreasing returns on military conquest in 1909. His work offers valuable insight into the economic futilities associated with war, but suffered from many of the utopian shortcomings we outlined in the introduction. His work, *The Great Illusion*, was one of many liberal writings that prompted Carr’s analysis in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*. It was from Carr’s springboard that the realists launched their assault to solidify the “truths” of power politics. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye published *Power and Interdependence* in 1977 an effort to swing the political debate back away from stark realism. They endeavored to show how economic interdependence could serve as a form of power, and that cooperation could in fact serve the self-interest of states. Keohane followed that work with *After Hegemony*, which expanded on the cooperative benefits of regimes after the decline of a hegemon. John Ikenberry wrote *After Victory* in 2001 to explore the role of regimes and institutions at the birth of hegemony. Together their efforts helped forge the field of neoliberal institutionalism.

Since the days of Angell, liberalists have explored the areas of international politics beyond the pure struggle for power. They have looked outside to fields like economics to uncover the entanglements that may serve as base forces within IR. The primary question for this chapter will be to ascertain whether these liberal theories stayed within Carr’s mandate to begin their analysis with the real world. Do their workarounds to Carr’s roadblocks fully account for the nature of these obstacles as both he and the realists have described them? We will discover that as liberalism progressed, so did their ability to follow Carr’s mandate. Yet, as with any theory that blends both realists and utopian concepts, some portion of their theories must rely upon choice and free will. Each author we examine tries to offer a theory of why that choice for peace or cooperation is within the best interest of a state.

Angell sets off on a quest to convince the world that that war does not pay. He provides a sound argument about the way in which modern, industrial economies have changed the ability of a state to “acquire” the wealth of another through conquest. He reasons that this should reduce motivations for aggression, and could eventually lead to world peace. His reasoning, however, falls victim to Carr’s critique of the harmony of interests. His analysis abstracts away the power and morality based motivations states may still harbor to act aggressively. Our analysis of Angell cannot fault him for failing to listen to Carr, since his book arrived decades earlier! Thus, our analysis will take a more descriptive look at *The Great Illusion* to uncover how it shaped both Carr’s arguments and the liberal field.

Keohane and Nye change the dynamics of institutional study by conceding that states may act on their interests first. They begin by accepting many parts of realism, yet look for alternate means of power and ways in which cooperative behavior can align with self-interest. Their work on interdependence, regimes, and institutions serve to expand the realist concepts of complex learning and socialization. They argue that in a changing world, these complex forces can and often do outweigh the structural forces that drive states toward *realpolitik*. They provide alternatives to power politics, but do not actually discount them. Their arguments, however, are more demonstrative than explanatory, and never fully materialize as a roadmap to peace.

Ikenberry will follow Keohane and Nye’s work to expand on their ideas in a post-cold war environment. He tries to avoid some of the earlier criticisms of neoliberal institutionalism by tying the themes of interdependence and institutions directly to the security concerns of states. He provides analysis of how, when, and why strong states should pursue institutional linkages, even at the costs of their own power, in order to secure long-term prosperity and security. His theory centers on the idea of extending the constitutional framework of domestic politics into the international arena. Ikenberry attempts to find Carr’s “course” to a new international order, but the conditional nature of his top tier solution (which applies best to democracies at the conclusion of wars) limits its universal applicability. It is a course for Western Democracies only.

As a whole, our liberal authors provide relevant insights into the international workings that go beyond power politics. They offer alternatives means of power, and

political limitations that could affect state behavior, but all concede that power politics are still possible. Though they share realist origins, they often focus too much on discounting realist conclusions, which limits the prescriptive value of their theories. Thus, the criticism that liberals have abstracted away power, war, and conflict is perhaps misdirected. As long as we can trace the origins of state action back through the “truths” of realism, then their arguments should not be seen as spurious, but continuations of the political dialogue.

Norman Angell and Liberalism

British born Norman Angell wrote in the same era as E.H. Carr but published his most famous work before the events of WWI. First released in 1909, *The Great Illusion* sought to dispel ideas about national military power, arrest the arms race with Germany, and avoid a costly war. The *cost* of war was his primary concern. Never formally a liberal, Angell wrote to dispel both Marxist ideas that economics should lead to war, and the jingoistic politics of the right. He argued that the world had changed economically, and that conquest could no longer produce the spoils of war. Military power no longer translated to national wealth. Angell equally disputes arguments behind fighting for morality or patriotism. In his reasoning, interest was king and the days of equating military power to interest had passed. If war does not pay, there should be no motive to attack. Reducing the motive to attack lessens the threat of attack. If states are not threatened, they have no need to defend. Angell proposes that once state leaders see the truth behind this reasoning, they can end the cycle of power politics that inevitably leads towards war.

Angell’s work is referenced directly by E.H. Carr, who wrote largely in response to the resurgence of these utopian concepts in the peace following WWI. As outlined in the introduction, Carr contended that such utopian arguments were limited in their analysis. They relied upon universalist ideas and lacked concrete mechanisms to implement or guarantee their promises. We will examine many of Angell’s arguments in turn and highlight the contributions he makes to our problematizing of international relations studies. Unlike previous authors, however, we cannot analyze Carr’s influence on Angell. Thus, this section will strike a more descriptive tone and examine the aspects

of Angell's work that fueled Carr's conceptualization of base tier forces and roadblocks to a peaceful international order.

The Great Illusion

Norman Angell wrote to dispel the "great illusion"—the widely held assumptions about the nature of power and politics. Particularly, he sought to dismiss the ideas that "national power means national wealth...that the strong nation can guarantee opportunities for its citizens that weak states cannot" and that a citizen's "wealth is largely the result of his political power."¹ Angell concedes that military power can win wars and prevent conquest. He also says that this fact is irrelevant. Power can destroy armies, but it does not subsume wealth or win hearts and minds. The conquered will retain their wealth and their beliefs. Nations are free to go to war, yet war is anything but free.

We can break down Angell's argument against the profitability of war into three main categories: economic, military, and psychological. These areas interact and overlap, but represent the major ideas Angell was hoping to dispel to prevent war with a rising Germany. Angell built his argument on the belief that commerce and interdependence had fundamentally changed world politics. Old notions of relative power applied to agrarian societies that could conquer and exploit each other's territory. This no longer held true. Angell summarizes his argument brilliantly within his synopsis.

Wealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit and commercial contract (these being the outgrowth of an economic interdependence due to the increasing division of labour and greatly developed communication.) If credit and commercial contract are tampered with in an attempt of confiscation, the credit-dependent wealth is undermined, and its collapse involves that of the conqueror; so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile. Thus the wealth of conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory.²

Economically, war does not pay for industrialized countries because it relies on trade. Trade in the "modern" world of 1911 required both a trade partner, and a financial institution to support that trade. Angell explains that war can destroy both. If I attack a

¹ Sir Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, (New York :Cosimo Classics, 2007), 11-12.

² Angell, viii.

country that I trade with, I destroy either a source that I rely upon to fuel my industrial production, or a consumer that I rely upon to buy my goods. Waging war to eliminate economic competition is self-defeating. As Angell tells us, “A customer must also be a competitor, a fact which bayonets cannot alter. To the extent which [I] destroy him as a competitor, [I] destroy him...as a customer.”³

Likewise, war damages an international monetary system that relies on credit. The very concepts of credit and international exchange of currency require certain trust and understandings to exist between nations. Credit is not based upon the size of a state’s armies, but on “confidence in the fulfillment of obligations, upon security of tenure in titles, upon the enforcement of contract according to law.”⁴ States must abide by a “general code of economic morality” to build that credit and benefit from the international system.⁵ War damages the trust that makes international trade work, hurting both sides in the process.

Angell’s argument against the military utility of war builds on the dangers of disrupting the economic integrity of states. Power does not produce gain the way it had before industrialization and international trade. In agrarian states, the victors in war can settle and farm any conquered lands. In the modern world of specialized production, division of labor, diverse natural resources, trade, and rapid communications, such transfer of wealth is nigh impossible. Annihilating conquered population to replace them with one’s own is futile. If a state’s economic power resulted from uneven trade with a competitor, absorbing that competitor would remove any previous relative advantage; they would now essentially be trading with themselves. The only way to gain from such situations would be to extract tribute, which would obligate the conqueror to ensure their competitor’s economic viability. Thus, as conquest adds land, it also adds the responsibility for the upkeep and defense of that land.

Angell therefore argues that within modern commerce we cannot come to own a territory through conquest. A state best ‘owns’ an “Empire by allowing its component parts to develop themselves in their own way, and in view of their own ends, and all the empires which have pursued any other policy have only ended by impoverishing their

³ Angell, 75.

⁴ Angell, 72.

⁵ Angell, 71.

own populations and falling to pieces.”⁶ Although Angell’s was an argument against colonial conquest, his concepts about the need to rebuild your enemies and the incurrence of protection costs have replayed in Japan and Germany after WWII, and again in Iraq after 2003.

Peace and prosperity result from rebuilding your enemies; conquest is an illusion. Conquering Holland would not make the people of Germany any richer than if the “London County Council were to annex the county of Hertford.”⁷ He contends, “Modern government is mainly, and tends to become entirely, a matter of administration.”⁸ Winning wars or redrawing political boundaries does not affect the facts on the ground, and the “mere size of administrative area has no relation to the wealth of those inhabiting it.”⁹

These are just some of the reasons that greater relative military power may not translate into state wealth. The key point Angell pulls from this argument is that if military power cannot gain wealth, then it cannot threaten wealth either, “power is on the one hand no obstacle to, and on the other no guarantee of, prosperity.”¹⁰ Thus, relatively weak nations can be very prosperous. Although Holland can be threatened *politically*, its “economic security is assured.”¹¹ Security does not solely derive from power.

Angell’s argument against the psychological propping up of militarism follows a similar theme. Again, Angell is trying to dispel the common moral and nationalistic sentiments that political leaders employ to justify power politics and war. The first is the idea that those who do not defend themselves face extinction. This dovetails into the second main idea, that states need great power to ensure freedom of action. Angell does not subscribe to the platitude that the strong do as they please while the weak suffer what they must. Perhaps once true, the modern world invalidates this line of reasoning.

Angell counters the fear of extinction by pointing out that natural selection is a misapplied concept in international politics. As he demonstrated above, eliminating competition is no longer a viable strategy, and as such, “war...does not make for the

⁶ Angell, 77.

⁷ Angell, 44.

⁸ Angell, 45.

⁹ Angell, 38.

¹⁰ Angell, 38.

¹¹ Angell, 39.

elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fit.”¹² The true threat is the “struggle of man with the universe, not man with man.”¹³ Again, we see Angell reframe the issue as economic—both strong and weak benefit from everyone being more prosperous. From that point of view, the evolution of humanity drifts away from conflict and towards cooperation.¹⁴

People benefit by belonging to a prosperous group. Cooperation lessens waste and avoids expending resources on unnecessary military power. Angell illustrates this through anecdote. Early hunters learned to cooperate to secure bigger game and avoiding waste. If both hunters kill a boar, most of each of their meat spoils. If they kill the boar together, they expend less, waste less, and both remain fed. In combat, they realized taking slaves, instead of annihilating their enemies, provided a work force. Eventually, they discovered that work force produced more and cost less when left to their own development. Thus, slavery gave way to serfdom and serfdom to military service. The use of force to extract gain slowly becomes pointless and unacceptable. Dueling to resolve differences, slavery, and pillaging for profit have disappeared within groups (today’s political states) that understand the true nature of natural selection.¹⁵ Human nature is the same, but our understanding and thus our behaviors are changing.¹⁶

Angell understands that some people will argue against the purely interest based evolution of cooperation, and point to the need to defend or spread national ideologies within the world. He believes that this notion is another fallacy used to encourage power politics. Fighting for national ideology subscribes to the “assumption that the political delimitation coincides with the economic and moral delimitation” of a state, which is no longer true.¹⁷ Religions extend across state borders, science and industry bring together international groupings of professionals, and people within a modern state are as likely to despise one another as they are to disagree with the morality of foreigner. Angell asks, “Why, therefore, should we be asked to entertain for foreigners a sentiment we do not

¹² Angell, 235.

¹³ Angell, 187.

¹⁴ Angell, 189.

¹⁵ Angell, 188-190.

¹⁶ Angell, 212.

¹⁷ Angell, 298.

give to our own people?”¹⁸ Nationalism is a conjured fiction, like the assumptions about conquest above, which relies entirely on misperception to justify power.

Angell contends that men who appeal to higher motives than economics are self-deluding. Their higher goals are often, “better conditions for the great mass of people, the fullest possible lives, the abolition of poverty...lives prolonged,” so they can become “better educated” and enjoy “individual dignity and courtesy and the graces of life.”¹⁹ All of these ideals are “pure self-interest—all bound up with economic problems, with money.”²⁰ Being powerful does not ensure self-interest; preserving prosperity will.

Additionally, Angell argues that state power does not grant freedom of action, it simply restricts the powerful in different ways. He illustrates this with a passage from Herbert Spencer, which asks us to imagine a conqueror holding the rope that binds his slave.²¹ Although the slave can go only where his master allows, the master can also only go where he is able to maintain control of the rope. The conqueror cannot come and go as he pleases. He must feed and shelter the slave, ensuring at all times that the rope is accounted for. Thus, conquest encumbers a state with the economic burdens, as shown above, but adds political restraints as well. Morgenthau warned of such restraints when he called for states to avoid manipulation by the weak. State power cannot guarantee autonomous state freedom of action.

All of these arguments against the rationale for war comprise what Angell labels the “great illusion.” We only think war is profitable. Arguments about patriotism, nationalism, and ideology do not hold up to reason. We no longer exist in a world where military power automatically guarantees greater wealth. Only cooperation furthers our interests, and force should support that notion. Angell claims this is “the key: force employed to secure complete co-operation between the parts, to facilitate exchange, makes for advance; force which runs counter to such co-operation, which attempts to replace the mutual benefit of exchange by compulsion...makes for regression.”²² Power should police, not conquer. Once state leaders accept this reality, their motivation to initiate voluntary wars of aggression should disappear.

¹⁸ Angell, 357.

¹⁹ Angell, 177.

²⁰ Angell, 177.

²¹ Angell, 267.

²² Angell, 259.

It is also important to emphasize what Angell is *not* arguing. He is not arguing that all war will end, but rather that war should not be encouraged.²³ He concedes that passion can get the better of us, and our actions may not always follow reason. This fact, however, should not prevent us from dispelling the fallacies of aggression. Likewise, Angell is not suggesting that people should cease to defend themselves.²⁴ His argument that conquest does not change wealth is not an invitation to sit idly by as a foreign nation conquers your own. Rather, he is hoping it dissuades the conqueror from venturing out in the first place.

Angell wanted his work to provide the basis for a greater understanding, like the “world public opinion” that Morgenthau sought. Dismantling incorrect beliefs that motivate war was Angell’s first step toward a peaceful international order. Angell did not analyze the path toward that new order in the same depth as Carr, but his arguments do inform our analysis of base tier forces and the roadblocks to peace.

Angell does not discuss the relationship between power and morality as much as he argued away power and abstracted away morality. These omissions drew much of Carr’s criticism—his alleged discounting of reality within Utopian theory. Carr introduced the need to balance power and morality because he accepted the very real perception and consequences of both. While Angell may be guilty of discounting power and morality, he rightly introduces economic concerns into the riddle of establishing a legitimate supra-state authority. As stated in Chapter 1, a policy based solely on power interests can be as useless and dangerous as one based solely on moral concerns. Angell suggests there may be ways other than power to provide security, and that the struggle between “people and the world” should form a third leg in that analysis.

As with the argument of balancing power and morality, Angell does not specifically address the role of institutions. His ideas on interdependence deal more with the interaction itself than with the mechanism by which it happens. His thoughts on economic interdependence, however, reflect later realist concepts of complex learning, socialization, and competition, and fuel liberal thought on interdependence, institutions, and regimes. As Angell, Carr, and the realists point out, this interaction constitutes a

²³ Angell, 163.

²⁴ Angell, 322.

need for learning and coordination but does not necessarily provide an impetus to institute positive change. It is the feedback, but not the control.

Within the third roadblock, Angell and Carr's analysis clearly diverge. Angell does not believe that accommodating peaceful change would be any different from abolishing aggression. Both goals simply require political leaders to accept that a cooperative, interconnected system benefits everyone and that attempts to overthrow the system damage oneself. Angell's top tier solution—universal education about the futility of aggression—does not need to accommodate change; it calls for states to try to prevent it. Carr understood that despite the shortcomings of war, there are some concessions that states will simply not accept.

Weighing Angell

To summarize Norman Angell's stance: once modern states realize that it benefits everyone to preserve the system without resorting to war, then aggression can subside and realist concerns over security dilemmas and relative power can fade with them. This leads to two primary areas of analysis: is the system actually profitable for everyone, and are economic interests really the sole foundation of why states fight? E.H. Carr wrote *The Twenty Years' Crisis* largely to address the first question.

Carr rejects Angell's conclusions on several levels, most of which we have laid out in the introduction. Carr does not believe that the failure of utopian principles within politics is due to ignorance, but rather on fundamental errors within their reasoning. Chief among those errors is the concept of the harmony of interests: the idea that all men working toward their own best interest benefits all men. The flaw in this theory is that it is "unconcerned with the problem of the distribution of wealth."²⁵ Within any static international system, some states are going to be, and perhaps remain, poorer than the others. As a domestic analogy, someone in society has to dig the ditches. States, unhappy with the disparity, may challenge the system, as seen today in the North-South political divide and the growing concerns over expanding Chinese economic influence.

Additionally, Angell's theories on economic gain do not address problems of scarcity. Angell's examples about the evolution of cooperation among people assume

²⁵ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 44.

that enough natural resources exist to satisfy the new cooperative group. He proposes that man's struggle is with nature not each other, but what happens when multiple men, groups, or states struggle over the same piece of nature? When four dens of lions compete for three gazelles, one of them will go hungry.

Both scarcity and economic disparity could generate the rationale to go to war. The fact that aggression inflicts self-damage may not matter to states whose goal is to bring the system down. All of the deterrents to aggression that Angell hypothesizes apply to status-quo powers, not to revolutionary states. This conclusion led to Carr's third roadblock: the need to accommodate revolutionary states peacefully without upsetting the entire international order.

Angell does much within the pages of *The Great Illusion* to make his case for economic interests and against power and morality. There are aspects of this argument, however, that he fails to consider. The first is the question as to who will be responsible for the creation and upkeep of his new order. When Angell abstracts away power and aggression, he places all of the multi-polar European states on even footing. His intention is for cooperation between the states to develop naturally. What will that cooperation look like? Who will first establish, and then maintain the system that is to be mutually beneficial? As we shall see later in the chapter, neoliberal institutionalism suggests that hegemonic power provides an opportunity to establish such order. Thus, Angell misses that although power may be irrelevant within cooperation, it may be required to create it.

Likewise, Angell ignores some fundamental ideas when he abstracts away beliefs and morality. When he equates a moral cause to interests, he ignores the point that people have to make those interests important. The foundational beliefs and priorities of a population affect the level of politicization of economic interests. Angell also points out that religious and moral beliefs do not necessarily correspond to political borders within Europe. The point that Angell ignores is that both of these realities are due to particular attributes of the European states. Allowances for popular representation and freedom of religion are not universal characteristics of a state. Once those rights exist, Angell's case for the "primacy of economic interests" gains traction. Aggressive use of

reformatory power may be required, despite its economic costs, to secure those rights. Self-sacrifice has long been an attribute of populations at war for their beliefs.

Thus, the primary argument missing from *The Great Illusion* is that the deterrence factor inherent within interdependence can be conditional. While Angell made several errors of omission, he did contribute valuable insight on concepts of cooperation. He demonstrated how self-interest could lead to the formation of cooperative groups.²⁶ He discussed how this evolution could occur piecemeal, one group at a time, starting with the industrialized nations of Europe. His thoughts on interdependence leading to political restrictions still echo through IR study. While two world wars would occur after Angell's plea for non-aggression, his ideas have found a place in the Europe of today.

His work did leave many questions unanswered. What mechanism provides the learning and coordination necessary to handle interconnectedness? What balance among power, morality, and economic interest can generate stability in an international system? What must the international system provide before states develop trust and group identities? Many of these questions still fuel IR study today. They led to Carr's criticism of Utopianism, they compelled realists to elevate the natural role of power in international order, and they sparked the neo-liberal Institutionalists' study of interdependence, institutions, and security. We will look at some of those neo-liberal findings next.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye teamed together in 1977 to produce the first edition of *Power and Interdependence*. They focused on the dialectic between the two title concepts, contrasting the realist conception of *power* politics with a system characterized by *complex interdependence*. Revised after the rise of structural realism, their work attempted to address some of the questions left by Waltz's neo-realism and early liberal works like *The Great Illusion*. Specifically, they add to Carr's problematizing of IR by equating interdependence to power, and exploring how structure and domestic level forces interact. Keohane would follow this work with his own book, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, which

²⁶ Angell, 189-190.

expands upon the role regimes play and further contributes to the idea that self-interest can be compatible with cooperation.

We will break from the descriptive character of the last section and return to our earlier approach, analyzing these two books through the lens of E. H. Carr. We will outline Keohane and Nye's primary contributions about interdependence as a base tier force, its interaction with power and realism, and the possible role that regimes play in top tier solutions. As we examine how they influenced Carr's three roadblocks, we will discover much of the value in Keohane and Nye's work came from counter-balancing realist assertions. In the end, their primary success is in returning the IR debate to many of the same conclusions that Carr arrived at back in 1939.

Power and Interdependence / After Hegemony

The first major contribution of Keohane and Nye is their formulation of interdependence. Their conceptualization takes *realpolitik* beyond pure calculations of military strength and national resource by introducing asymmetric interdependence, vulnerability, and sensitivity as forms of power. Keohane and Nye define power as "the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do."²⁷ Power is the potential to influence other states. Interdependence exists between states "where there are reciprocal...*costly* effects of transactions."²⁸ A state can use its ability to inflict cost as a form of influence. The amount of influence will depend on a state's sensitivity and vulnerability to that cost. A state is sensitive if a small action inflicts a large cost or affects a particularly critical area of national survival. A state is vulnerable if it has no alternative but to absorb that cost.²⁹ More inflicted cost equates to more influence.

Relative power can therefore be a product of incongruent military capacity, as realists assert, or it can result from incongruent levels of vulnerability and sensitivity in

²⁷ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), 11.

²⁸ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 9. [emphasis added] The key to their definition of interdependence is the idea of cost. If interactions affect one another but without significant cost, it is simply interconnectedness. If state A can take actions that inflict cost on state B, and B can damage A as well, then they are interdependent. Thus, the ultimate example of interdependence would be state on state war. Economic interdependence can result from multiple sources, such as resource imbalance, trade imbalance, or international division of labor.

²⁹ For example, a highly industrialized state like the US would be very *sensitive* to a middle-east oil embargo. Their transportation and production relies on foreign oil. However, the US is only *vulnerable* to that embargo if it cannot secure an alternative, such as Canadian oil, or a replacement, like natural gas.

economic issue areas. Power, Keohane and Nye say, is physically and situation derived. Realists often proclaim force the *ultima ratio*—Keohane and Nye say it depends. They deduce that “exercising more dominant forms of power brings higher costs. Thus, *relative to cost*, there is no guarantee that military means will be more effective than economic ones to achieve a given purpose.”³⁰

From this conclusion, they set up a dichotomy between two theoretical ideal types of political interaction: realism and *complex interdependence*.³¹ In a purely realist world, coherent states could always exercise their military power, and military security matters would thus sit atop a hierarchy of political agendas. Reversing these assumptions yields ideal *complex interdependence*, which features multiple layers of state interaction, the absence of a hierarchy among issues areas, and the use of non-military forms of power. The primary method to differentiate between the two extremes is to ask whether states can *link* different issue areas—can they effectively use their incongruent power in one area to influence a political outcome in another area.³² Within the realist ideal, “one expects linkages between issues to be made principally by strong states, using their power in one area of world politics (particularly their military power) to coerce other states on other issues.”³³ Under complex interdependence, conversely, linking force to other policy areas will be difficult, though a “variety of linkages will be made, frequently by weak states through international organizations.”³⁴

Keohane and Nye use these “ideal types” and their concept of linkage to analyze interdependence in the modern world. Their primary goal is to discover “the major features of world politics when interdependence, particularly economic interdependence,

³⁰ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 17. [Emphasis original] Keohane and Nye concede that force can generate the greatest influence. Pressure on a vulnerable economic issue creates less sway than military destruction, and pressure on a merely sensitive issue yields the least impact. Military power, however, may also be the costliest power to employ in an interdependent world, as Angell detailed above. Pressuring a vulnerable issue area risks large self-damage also, as states may target your vulnerable areas in response. Pressure within sensitive issue areas often produces the least political and economic blowback.

³¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 23. The authors are careful to note that calling these “ideal types” does not imply they are perfect, but that they do not represent reality. They are theoretical extremes, bookends in dialectic argument, to which Keohane and Nye will compare the world. In this paper, the term “complex interdependence” will refer to this ideal type.

³² Examples of linkage could be middle-east states threatening an oil-embargo to influence international fishing rights, and the US effectively threatening military response to force them to back down. On both sides of the issue disagreement, states could use their non-issue area power as bargaining chips.

³³ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 122.

³⁴ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 122.

is extensive.”³⁵ To do so, they derive four theories that predict how states would attempt to affect regime change under conditions ranging from ideal realism to complete complex interdependence. They overlaid those theories onto case studies of real regime changes in issue areas like ocean rights, international monetary exchange, and bilateral agreements. They compared the predicted linkage patterns with the historical cases to determine which theory provided the most explanatory power. They conclude that as a trend, “the complex interdependence ideal type seems to be becoming increasingly relevant,” and thus “new theories based on issue structure and international organization models will frequently be needed for understanding reality and framing appropriate policies.”³⁶

Keohane and Nye essentially declare realism incomplete in its description of international politics and offer several counter proposals. They assert there is no predetermined hierarchy among the means of exercising power, and relative military advantage may not always afford states the ability to affect international political outcomes. They show how complexity upsets the coherence of a state, and thus when acting in self-interest, a state must first ask “which self, and which interest?”³⁷ They claim the international system consists of both *structure* and *process*—both the “distribution of capabilities among similar units” and the “allocative or bargaining behavior within a power structure.”³⁸ They submit, “Interdependence affects world politics and the behavior of states; but governmental actions also influence patterns of interdependence” by creating regimes.³⁹ Thus, interaction between system and unit level forces happens through regimes.⁴⁰ Their bottom line is that international cooperation can

³⁵ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 5.

³⁶ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 161.

³⁷ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 34.

³⁸ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 20-21. To illustrate their point about structure and process, Keohane and Nye offer the analogy of a poker game. The outcome of the game will be affected by the distribution of cards and chips at the start of the hand, but also by the manner in which each player plays the hand he is dealt.

³⁹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 5.

⁴⁰ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, 1st Princeton classic ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 64. According to Keohane, “regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors, or ‘intervening variables,’ between fundamental characteristics of world politics such as the international distribution of power on the one hand and the behavior of states and non-state actors...on the other.”

and does exist, and states often choose to submit to regimes, institutions, or other supra-state authorities.

Keohane and Nye's second major contribution is their conceptualization of regimes, which generated more interest and study than their theories on complex interdependence or linkage.⁴¹ Keohane's *After Hegemony* elaborated on the role and utility of regimes, focusing on "relations among the advanced market-economy countries."⁴² His study repeats many of the themes from *Power and Interdependence*, such as starting with realist assumptions, the limitations of realism, and the importance of both structure and process within international politics. He defines regimes as the "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures" within an issue area.⁴³ As politics within the system, regimes are part of the IR structure. Regimes also define international processes. We must understand both roles to understand cooperation.⁴⁴ Keohane is careful to differentiate cooperation from harmony of interests. Harmony implies that interests naturally align. Cooperation occurs within discord, when states make concessions in order to coordinate despite opposing interests. As we have examined earlier, a failure to compromise leads to power competition.

Keohane determines that regimes and the international cooperation that results from them can serve many purposes. His "central conclusion" is that "international regimes can facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty."⁴⁵ Regimes educate their participants and generate information about international processes. The knowledge and procedures create mutual expectations among states and thus reduce the uncertainties that Mearsheimer theorized about. Regimes reduce transaction costs and unilateralism by coordinating state efforts and stimulating information sharing. Increased communication can reduce instances of *asymmetric information* and alleviate some of the burden created by *moral hazard* and *free riders* within the system.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 251, 253.

⁴² Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 6.

⁴³ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 57.

⁴⁴ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 26. As Keohane describes it, trying to comprehend international cooperation without regimes would be like "trying to account for competition and collusion among...business firms without bothering to ascertain whether their leaders met together...or had developed informal means of coordinating behavior."

⁴⁵ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 97.

⁴⁶ Asymmetric information refers to a situation in which one state knows a critical piece of bargaining information that a partner state does not. The advantaged state can use that information to "cheat" on deals,

As we discussed in chapter 1, regimes and institutions cannot enforce punishments on non-compliant or burdensome states, but they can increase cooperation by informing the system of who to trust and when “cheating” occurs. Thus “dilemmas of collective action are partially solved through the device of reputation,” a result of process, as well as from physical loss inflicted by structure.⁴⁷ For all of the reasons we have listed, cooperation through regimes can serve even the strictest definitions of self-interest. If we relax self-interest criteria, whether through Keohane and Nye’s earlier argument about non-coherence, by accepting sufficing over pure rationalism, or by introducing empathy into state motivations, the benefits of regimes only increase.⁴⁸ Traditional notions within liberalism, like empathy or bounded rationality, benefit cooperation, but are not necessary for it to exist

For our analysis, we must next consider how these concepts of interdependence, linkage, process, and regimes affect Carr’s tiers of international relations. Carr’s primary base tier forces were the reality of power and the inevitability of change. Keohane and Nye demonstrate how interdependence and process have a reality of their own. They also elaborate on Carr’s notion of change, noting that it can result from the evolution of international regimes, changing economic and technological circumstances, changes in the importance of transnational actors, or issues of scarcity.⁴⁹

These base tier additions expand Carr’s analysis of the first roadblock to a new international order. Carr warned that relying on power to enforce compliance within the international system could lead to war. He therefore sought to balance power with morality. Like Angell, Keohane and Nye offer an economic alternative to morality. Their analysis of interdependence showed how incongruent power in issue areas could serve as a non-military form of power. They claim that states will weigh the costs and

like insider trading information on Wall Street, or knowledge that a car is a “lemon” when negotiating a purchase price, which invites unilateral behaviors. Moral Hazard describes the situation that arises when states agree to share costs in a venture, and then one state uses that fact to take unnecessary risks. This is like a man who purchases car insurance and then intentionally crashes his vehicle. Free riders are those that benefit from a system without sharing any of the cost burdens, like lifelong welfare recipients. Both moral hazards and free riders add cost to the group as a whole.

⁴⁷ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 105.

⁴⁸ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 131. The primary point Keohane is trying to make with this argument is that traditional notions within liberalism, like empathy or bounded rationality, benefit cooperation, but are not necessary for it to exist.

⁴⁹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 120-121.

benefits of exercising different kinds of power and choose the one that best promotes their self-interest, thus finding ways to make non-military power the most attractive serves as an alternate path to a top tier solution. They do not seek to balance power with morality, but expand the definition of power to include economic and moral factors; “The trick is not to ignore self-interest but to redefine it, to make it less myopic and more empathetic.”⁵⁰

Regimes offer a method to propagate those new concepts of power. Institutions may not be able to adjudicate or enforce, but “in a world of multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and trans-governmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased.”⁵¹ Carr sought a supra-state polity that could enforce and govern without resorting to pure realist power politics. As Carr notes, such enforcement requires submission. Submission by states implies some shared idea of a group identity, whether states formally recognize that group or not. Keohane and Nye submit that regimes, rather than some hegemonic power, can provide the processes and information that generate submission. As above, for this “non-hegemonic leadership to be effective...all major parties must believe that the regime being created or maintained is indeed in their interests.”⁵² The regime and major parties must also remain non-threatening.

Keohane and Nye’s linkage and regime theories provide insight into Carr’s call for peaceful change as well. They have shown that in many issue areas, powerful states have made concessions on non-vital issues. Through regimes, they try to explain how. Regimes can sever or provide the linkage mechanisms for strong and weak states respectively. They contend that often the “intensity and coherence of the smaller state’s bargaining position” allows them to link more issues and exert their power. Large states have to be more representative; they are composed of more competing internal interests and belong to several regimes. They must weigh the collective costs and benefits of breaking them before linking issues. Thus, their explanations for limitations on states are very similar to the complex learning and socialization of realism. Keohane and Nye conclude, however, that peaceful change is easier within complex interdependence

⁵⁰ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 257.

⁵¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 35.

⁵² Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 231.

because of the strength of those limitations and the fact that regimes help secure a state's interests, even should their great power status fade.

Although their analysis navigates the same roadblocks as Carr, it leads them to a different top tier solution. Keohane and Nye assert, "Interdependence in the world political economy generates conflict."⁵³ Increasing coherence and linkage is not always good; it could drag disputes toward power and away from the issue based strength and leverage of small states. This loss of influence could threaten the submission of states. Likewise, powerful nations are likely to resist a central authority; "So long as the world is characterized by enormous inequality among states...citizens are likely to resist the dismantling of national sovereignty."⁵⁴ Thus, a large, central institution is not the answer. Keohane rejects the notion that only options within international politics are hegemony or conflict. Cooperation "is not enforced by hierarchical authority."⁵⁵ A peaceful international system contains multiple rotating regimes that ebb and flow with the importance of issues and changes to the system. These changes can be economic, like technological advancements or alterations in national standards of living, or the traditional changes in relative power standing. Such a regime based international order is "a viable alternative to recurring fantasies of global unilateralism."⁵⁶

The Impact of Keohane and Nye

Carr's first mandate of international relations was to ground the utopian quest for peace in the realities of the world situation and power politics, and Keohane and Nye have attempted to do just that.⁵⁷ They sought to study interdependence as a process and alternative form of power, but not a replacement for realism. Their analysis shows that "complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism."⁵⁸ Thus, realism is incomplete, but "to exchange it for an equally simple view—for instance, that

⁵³ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 243.

⁵⁴ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 229.

⁵⁵ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 237.

⁵⁶ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 282.

⁵⁷ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, xi. In the preface to the second edition, the authors state that they were taught to see the world through realist glasses and seek to expand that vision, but stress "the importance of governments' wielding of power in pursuit of their conceptions of self-interest."

⁵⁸ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 23.

military force is obsolete and economic interdependence benign—would condemn one to equally grave, through different, errors.”⁵⁹

Keohane and Nye’s writings, however, do not fulfill Carr’s charge of *creating* a peaceful order. They state their “level of analysis is the world system, rather than national policy.”⁶⁰ Their work, like the realists before, goes further toward admiring the problem than solving it. In *Power and Interdependence*, the authors claim, “We have not proposed set of detailed blueprints for the construction of policy. Rather we have addressed the policy problems at its foundation by analyzing the changing nature of world politics.”⁶¹ *After Hegemony* looks at “how cooperation has been, and can be, organized in the world political economy when common interests exist. It does not concentrate on the question of how fundamental common interests can be created among states.”⁶² They “failed to develop any theory of linkage that could specify under what conditions linkages would occur.”⁶³ Their accomplishments are to expose realism and hegemonic regime theory as limited, not to construct viable alternative recommendations.

Part of the problem is the nature of Keohane and Nye’s analysis. The method they choose—the study of regime change—to explore interdependence is circular and lacks explanatory or predictive power. They define complex interdependence as the opposite of realism and then seek out examples of when realism is absent to describe interdependence. They are aware of this issue: “A methodological problem immediately arises. Since we *define* complex interdependence in terms of the goals and instruments of state policy, any general arguments about how goals and instruments are affected by the degree to which a situation approximates complex interdependence or realism will be tautological.”⁶⁴ To use Walt’s definitions, they can deduce that interdependence exists and complexity is on the rise, but they inductively arrive at all of their other conclusions.

Those conclusions, despite the assertions of Keohane and Nye, are not as compatible with realism as they may first appear. Interdependence defined as cost does not depart from realism, but rather elaborates on the concepts of complex learning and

⁵⁹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 5.

⁶⁰ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 223.

⁶¹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 221.

⁶² Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 6.

⁶³ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 253.

⁶⁴ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 255.

socialization that are often underdeveloped within realism. The fact that it occurs more often does not guarantee peace, it just buffers peace. Keohane and Nye's analysis begins where violence and power end (by definition), and thus tells us little about the situations when states *can* resort to violence. Keohane admits, "it would be highly desirable...to analyze the linkages between economic and security affairs in more detail."⁶⁵ Such analysis may find the two sets of affairs antithetical. As Waltz notes, open economic systems are set up to favor the products of efficiency and economic performance, but within "international politics 'efficiency' has little system-wide meaning. The producers, not the products, are of paramount concern."⁶⁶ The survival of the state, not the overall health of politics, concerns a statesman. Keohane notes that security affairs compel a state to keep many courses of action open, but limiting freedom of action helps maximize economic self-interest and international reputation.⁶⁷ He recommends, in the rising tide of interdependence, that we should opt for the latter. This favors the product over the producer and presents a need to align international politics with economic self-interest, but not a means.

If Keohane and Nye's claims about an absence of hierarchy among issues of power are correct, then their recommendations are viable. Their claims about the absence of a hierarchy applies to the *means* of resolving discord; the costs and benefits of force, incongruent vulnerabilities, and sensitivities may reduce force as the primary tool in politics. In terms of the *ends* they serve, however, security concerns still dominate economic issues. Keohane and Nye litter their writings with illustrations of the primacy of security concerns. They write that "military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means alone are likely ineffective against the serious use of military force."⁶⁸ Keohane notes that Europeans were less likely to defer to American initiatives when they no longer believed that they "must do so in order to obtain essential military protection against the Soviet Union."⁶⁹ They note that ocean issues began to resemble

⁶⁵ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 137.

⁶⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press Inc., 2010), 136-137.

⁶⁷ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 259.

⁶⁸ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 251.

⁶⁹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 49.

realism more once they became a “vital” resource,⁷⁰ and that “policies of self-abnegation are rarely followed when threats to independence are severe.”⁷¹

When Keohane and Nye transplant their deductive findings about the means of power to their inductive analysis of the corresponding state policies, their recommendations break down. Their primary contribution remains conceptualizing incongruities within interdependence as a source of power. Their discussions on sensitivity and vulnerability are critical in regards to whether states should treat an issue area as an economic problem or a security threat. Their findings that cooperation can be compatible with self-interest expand the possibilities within international relations, but we require more analysis to determine how and if that can translate into lasting political peace. They cannot tell us how to find a way to induce strong states to make concessions and weak states forego revolt when change becomes necessary, though they have described what it looks like when it happens. Thus, their analysis of our roadblocks has raised new questions, but provided few answers.

We therefore find ourselves nearly where Carr left us, but now with further thoughts on regimes, interdependence, new concepts of power, and a hierarchy of state priorities. Keohane and Nye have reintroduced the idea that power and interdependence are “indeed, two sides of a single coin,”⁷² that international politics are built upon dangerous, shifting sands. They declare that supra-state polities must appear legitimate, and should avoid power as a coercive tool.⁷³ All of this is remarkably familiar, yet valuable in the sense that if Waltz had pulled the debate to the realist side with theories of structure, Keohane and Nye have launched from that platform to shift IR back to the center. They have provided us new methods to balance power and foster supra-state legitimacy, but not much explanation as to why or when to apply them. These aspects of neo-liberal institutionalism receive much-needed application in *After Victory*.

John Ikenberry and Neoliberal Institutionalism

G. John Ikenberry wrote *After Victory* in the wake of the cold war. He, like many IR scholars, considered what this radical shift in the world political system should mean

⁷⁰ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 134.

⁷¹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 122.

⁷² Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 249.

⁷³ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 234-235.

for US foreign policy. He builds on Keohane and Nye's theories about the self-interest serving nature of regimes and institutions "and attempts to extend it in two directions—where institutions matter and how institutional constraints are manifest."⁷⁴ Ikenberry's work suggests that after major power shifts, the international order can be shaped by the way in which a victor wields its newly won power.⁷⁵ Given the large power disparity present and the increasingly democratic nature of the system, Ikenberry recommends that the United States use international institutions to ensure long-term security. By restraining itself, the US could allay the fears of other states to create a constitutional international order. We will look at the reasons why Ikenberry believes such an arrangement is possible, and examine what his concepts of restraint and constitutionality mean to Carr's problematizing of international relations. From this, we will see that Ikenberry, more than other authors this far, pursued Carr's "fresh foundations" upon which to construct a new international order.

After Victory

Ikenberry builds upon the themes of our earlier liberal authors. He too believes that the world is changing, that evolution toward cooperation is possible, and that the key to achieving that cooperation is to discover its self-serving nature. He wrote *After Victory* in the years preceding the events of September 11, 2001. With a seemingly blank canvass in front of US policy makers, he attempted to ask and answer a straightforward question: "What do states who have just won major wars do with their newly acquired power? [His] answer is that states in this situation have sought to hold onto that power and make it last, and that this has led these states, paradoxically, to find ways to set limits on their power and make it acceptable to other states."⁷⁶ He outlines the way in which powerful nations can trade restraint for the promise of long-term gains and security.

Ikenberry sees post conflict international order as path dependent. Unlike Waltz, he does not believe that the balance of power behavior amongst states must always manifest as a competition for relative military power. Instead, great powers can pursue

⁷⁴ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 17.

⁷⁵ Throughout this section of the paper, we will use the term "victor" to denote the state (or states) that emerged as the most powerful after a war or major power shift. This term is objective and does not seek to celebrate that state or imply a sense of "correctness" in their power gains.

⁷⁶ Ikenberry, xi.

three different strategies that result in different characters of political systems. A victor can coercively wield its power in an effort to *dominate* world politics, which yields a *hegemonic* international order. In this situation, weak states “cooperate with the hegemon because of threats and inducements,” but only until the hegemon’s dominant power erodes.⁷⁷ An isolationist victor could hoard its power and *abandon* the world political system. This strategy produces a classic *balance-of-power* order “in which restraints on state power are maintained exclusively by countervailing coalitions of states.”⁷⁸ Weaker states compete for their own security in the absence of leadership. In Ikenberry’s third strategy, a victor tries to *transform* the system. Instead of wielding or hoarding its power, a victor may openly restrain it in an effort to create a *constitutional* political order. In this case, the states maintain a balance of power through shared agreement over rules of order and institutions that bind state power in ways that are difficult to alter.⁷⁹ Ikenberry does not set up his three political orders as absolutes; every system has a blend of hegemonic, balance-of-power, and constitutional characteristics.

The essential take-away from Ikenberry is the notion that constitutional order can exist internationally. This goes to the heart of Carr’s questions about submission within groups. Traditional realism holds that states contend with internal hierarchy and external anarchy. Ikenberry sees this as a false distinction. Rather than examining authority as internal or external, we should see it as coercive or voluntary. Ikenberry concedes that international power politics are very real and that many states maintain hierarchy through the acquiescence of their citizens. Yet, “in some countries, politics can be extremely ruthless and coercive, whereas some areas of international politics are remarkably consensual and institutionalized. The domestic-international divide is not absolute.”⁸⁰

Ikenberry describes the logic behind an international constitutional order as an “institutional bargain” between states of unequal power.⁸¹ The victor wants to preserve its power and set up specific international conventions that will help it do so. It could use its power to coerce the weaker states in agreement, but as we have examined that is costly and damages legitimacy. Instead, the victor uses the promise to restrain its power in

⁷⁷ Ikenberry, 36-37.

⁷⁸ Ikenberry, 36.

⁷⁹ Ikenberry, 30-31.

⁸⁰ Ikenberry, 6-7.

⁸¹ Ikenberry, 258-259.

exchange for the compliance of other states. It builds mechanisms into the agreement that bind its use of power. As a strong state, it can afford to make these short-term sacrifices to set up institutions that benefit it over the long term. The weak states, on the other hand, are worried about their survival. Their primary concern is that the victor will use its power to *dominate* or *abandon* the system. Either of those options would be costly for the weak states to balance against, and as the deficient powers, they do not have much resource to waste. It is cheaper for the weak states to comply with the strong state's initiatives. The weaker states receive early returns on their compliance: they gain security and a voice within the new international order. In return, they understand that they are giving up the full capacity to take advantage of any future rise in their own power.

States have always shared these incentives to strive for cooperation, but "the means and ability of doings so has changed over time."⁸² Ikenberry explains that the strength of the institutional bargain will depend upon the size of the power disparity within the system and the credibility of the institutional power restraints. The former is largely determined by the way in which a war ends, and the latter can depend on the political character of the victor. Ikenberry examines the peace settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945 and concludes that post-war conditions characterized by large power disparities and democratic victors provide the best chance to create a constitutional order.

Ikenberry uses this concept of constitutional political order to tie traditional neoliberal ideas to security issues. While Angell, Keohane, and Nye demonstrated many economic benefits of cooperation, the classic counter to their arguments is one of issue importance. Ikenberry attempts to sidestep that argument, believing that "liberal theories grasp the ways in which institutions can channel and constrain state actions, but they have not explored a more far reaching view, in which leading states use intergovernmental institutions to restrain themselves and thereby dampen fears of domination and abandonment by secondary states."⁸³ Essentially keying off the ideas of Mearsheimer, Ikenberry argues that if uncertainty can exasperate security concerns, then reassurance should ease security needs and foster increasingly peaceful relations.

⁸² Ikenberry, 4.

⁸³ Ikenberry, 15.

The question of “when” this formation should happen is important, and Ikenberry places his analysis after major wars for specific reasons. As mentioned, the stronger and more persistent the institutions that bind state power, the more the institutional bargain can foster reassurance and peace. Any talk of political strategies that “transform” order into more peaceful arrangements run in direct contrast to that requirement. Thus, his strategy works best after a major upheaval of the system when old orders stand ruined and fresh shifts in power beg for resolution. This is when power disparities and institutional bargaining chips will be the greatest. Here he sees the opportunity to create new regimes and institutions that are “critical at the beginning of hegemony—or after “victory”—in establishing order and securing cooperation between unequal states.”⁸⁴

The emergence of a constitutional international order is Ikenberry’s top tier solution for peace. As we have outlined, a constitutional order succeeds only when it contains *agreed upon rules and mechanisms to limit power that are difficult to alter*. Those three requirements align with Carr’s roadblocks of balancing power with morality, the role of institutions, and peaceful change.

E. H. Carr argued that for an international order to achieve peace, it must reward the moral application of power such that it can gain the consent of its members. Ikenberry echoes that sentiment. Within an international constitutional order, states must mutually recognize and submit to the “rules” of the system. As per the institutional bargain, a victor “must overcome the fears of the weaker and defeated states that it will pursue the other options: domination or abandonment.”⁸⁵ All of this hinges on trust in the ruling powers, and thus “the ideological appeal and prestige of the hegemonic state are...relevant to its ability to form a stable order.”⁸⁶ Appeal and prestige, however, do not have to come from a shared morality.

Ikenberry lists several mechanisms a states may employ to strengthen ideational trust. A state can open itself up, because “when a state is open and transparent to outside states, it reduces surprises and allows other states to monitor the domestic decision making that attends the exercise of power.”⁸⁷ A state can tie itself down by entering into

⁸⁴ Ikenberry, 17.

⁸⁵ Ikenberry, 4.

⁸⁶ Ikenberry, 29.

⁸⁷ Ikenberry, 62.

multiple treaties, institutions, or agreements that increase complex interaction. A state can also make itself more accessible, allowing weaker states a role in the decision making process. This is why Ikenberry concludes that democracies are better suited to build credible constitutional orders. Democracies are naturally more transparent and accessible than authoritarian regimes. Democracies also enjoy a policy viscosity that makes them more predictable. Thus, Ikenberry's view of the first roadblock goes beyond Carr to consider morality, domestic political structure, and institutional mechanisms when counterbalancing power.

These institutional mechanisms do not require an overwhelming power of their own. One realist criticism and the source of Carr's second roadblock is the inability of institutions to enforce their positions. States with sufficient power could simply resist the institution, resulting in the continuation of power politics. "The conventional view is that [power and institutions] tend to be antithetical: more of one entails less of the other and, because power is the ultimate determinant of outcomes in international relations, institutions do not matter. But power and institutions are related to each other in a more complex way."⁸⁸ Within a constitutional order, neither states nor institutions should practice coercion. Rather, institutions derive utility from their ability to "bind (particularly democratic) states together, constrain state actions, and create complicated and demanding political processes that participating states can overcome worries about the arbitrary and toward exercise of power."⁸⁹ Institutions promote security by reducing fear, not generating it.

Institutions can also help states deal with change in the political system.⁹⁰ The logic behind Ikenberry's institutional bargain addresses most of Carr's concerns within the third roadblock. Strong and weak states make concessions because "the leading state wants to reduce compliance costs and weaker states want to reduce their costs of security

⁸⁸ Ikenberry, 273.

⁸⁹ Ikenberry, 35.

⁹⁰ Ikenberry contributes a particular notion of change that aids our understanding of base tier forces. He describes how changes in technology not only affect the capabilities of states and the distribution of power, but it can change their security *needs* as well. Advanced technologies that require greater specialization or resource to construct may change the minimum geographic area a state may require to maintain economic or military viability. For example, the development of nuclear weapons required the United States to expand its sphere of influence over states with known uranium deposits. This could work in reverse as well, such as advanced agricultural technology that reduces the land required to feed a population.

protection—or the costs they would incur trying to protect their interests against the actions of a dominating lead state. This is what makes the institutional deal attractive.” Institutions set low returns on power, so that states cannot translate momentary advantages in power and wealth into permanent advantage.⁹¹ The system shields weak or failing states from potential domination by strong or rising states. This lessens the friction in imperial power changes, and reduces revolution behaviors because “losers are more likely to agree to their losses and prepare for the next round.”⁹²

These incentives only matter if the system can assure them in the future. Drawing on a domestic analogy, Ikenberry explains, “If specific social forces or class interests are able to subvert legal and governmental rules, the polity loses its constitutional character, and the system reverts to the simple rule of domination by the powerful.”⁹³ Likewise, in an international order, “If binding institutions and credible commitments give way, the order loses its capacity to reassure otherwise threatened or insecure states. The constitutional logic is lost—it loses its stability—and it will move back toward a more traditional balance-of-power or hegemonic order.”⁹⁴

Ikenberry claims that the stability of his top tier solution results from the increasing returns to institutions and the spread of democracy within the world political system. Institutions tend to persist because of their sunk costs and the potentially large start-up costs associated with replacing them. States also align internal organizations and processes with institutions, adding to the difficulty and cost of change.⁹⁵ Ikenberry adds those increasing returns to the spread of democracy (and its associated advantages in cooperation) to conclude that the potential for cooperation is increasing. Like the other liberal authors, he believes the transformation to a constitutional order can be evolutionary, existing between select groups of states before it expands. While realists may declare this vision a utopian fantasy, Ikenberry claims that the “decision of Soviet leaders in the late 1980s to allow peaceful change in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself—shows evidence of the ability of the United States and the other Western

⁹¹ Ikenberry, 266.

⁹² Ikenberry, 266-267.

⁹³ Ikenberry, 47.

⁹⁴ Ikenberry, 48.

⁹⁵ These increasing returns are why Ikenberry describes the time just after war as critical to instituting change within the international order; it is one of the few times states are not fighting against such returns.

democracies to establish institutionalized restraint in great-power and superpower relations.”⁹⁶

Assessing Ikenberry

John Ikenberry’s *After Victory* has come closer to fulfilling Carr’s mandate than our previous six authors. He began his analysis with realist assumptions, he tied his arguments to national security issues instead of arguing them away, and he prescribed a course of action toward a cooperative international order. Ikenberry, however, did end with more of a focus on stability than peace. A constitutional order buffers peace more than it ensures peace. Even if security exists among participating member states, a significant potential for conflict remains between the cooperative group and non-member states or a second cooperative group. This is less a criticism of Ikenberry than it is an observation about any evolutionary learning system. It does, however, lend credence to realist claims that a potential for power politics will always remain until an ubiquitous world public opinion or global hegemon emerges.

Ikenberry added to our understanding of base tier forces. Just as the realists emphasized a state’s interests in physical security, and Angell, Keohane, and Nye argued for the importance of economic interests, Ikenberry adds an ideational side to the needs of states within an international order. His attempt to link institutions to security revolves around concepts of reassurance and the perception of security. This supports Carr’s earliest ideas about the duality of material and purpose within international relations—a theme which is picked up by Alexander Wendt in Chapter 3.

Although Ikenberry advanced *our* analysis of the base tier forces and roadblocks to peace, he never offers a coherent articulation of the forces he is trying to overcome. He understands that simply creating the conditions for cooperation to form does not guarantee its success, but when he makes the statement, “Even if the leading state seeks to construct a mutually acceptable order, however, agreement is not certain,” he does not articulate why.⁹⁷ He concludes that the balance of fear and reassurance will determine the acquiescence of a state, but this is a bit like saying that whether I am hungry or not determines when I eat. This is a system level observation, and requires further

⁹⁶ Ikenberry, 255.

⁹⁷ Ikenberry, 51.

investigation to understand what unit level needs must be accounted for within cooperation. What makes a state hungry? What makes it feel full? We explore this idea further in appendix A.

Without this unit level analysis, Ikenberry could miss some of the potential pitfalls within his constitutional order. Within his institutional bargain, Ikenberry describes that strong states make power sacrifices to lock in long term economic and security guarantees, whereas weak states accept these conditions in order for power and security returns. This arrangement does not pay close attention to potential issues with the distribution of wealth. It ensures that states cannot change a wealth advantage into a power advantage, but discounts the unrest that economic disparity can generate in a system. His approach essentially masks the issue—because it does not translate into a security problem, it should not be a problem.

His theory, like all prescriptive theories, is also conditional. It requires a victorious state to *want* to create a constitutional order. Ikenberry points out all of the advantages for doing so, but he relies on the education of the lead state to operationalize his theory. Unlike Waltz, he does not see this solution as a naturally occurring function of the system. Had Germany won WWII, very little of Ikenberry's theory would have been relevant. Even educated states may not be able to follow Ikenberry's advice if internal political constraints, such as a war weary and isolationist populace, intervene. He acknowledges that when it comes to building a constitutional order, "democracies are better able to do so, but are also often unwilling."⁹⁸ Again, this is no particular fault of Ikenberry's writing as much as it is a natural characteristic of prescriptive theories.

This brings us to a final issue when analyzing Ikenberry from the perspective of Carr. Carr sought to prevent war; Ikenberry requires it. While this is intentionally facetious, Ikenberry did title his book *After Victory*, which assumes that it is preceded by conflict. As with his example of the Soviet Union after the Cold War, Ikenberry's hope is that the current world system can peacefully resolve future bipolar or multipolar stand-offs as well. A hypothetical question would thus be—if an internal US collapse granted a rising China sudden ascendancy, would the United States accept a position in the world as a lesser power knowing that it had its institutions in place to ensure economic

⁹⁸ Ikenberry, 51.

prosperity? Or would a sudden power reversal signal the time in which China should exercise its new found status to abolish the old institutions and reinvent a constitutional order in its image?

The Liberal Conclusion

E. H. Carr began his treatise on international relations with a scathing account of the shortcomings of utopian theory. Our analysis has shown that liberal study has, whether consciously or not, yielded to his critiques. As with Carr, contemporary neoliberal theorists do not set out to demonstrate that modern times have rendered realism obsolete. Rather, they declare realism incomplete. They seek alternatives to *realpolitik*, focusing on the conditions that make power politics unattractive to rational actors. Yet, most of their theories still contain a large “if.” If our enemies realize that conquest is self-damaging, then we can avoid the need to focus on relative military power. If the benefits of compliance with regimes and interdependent commitments outweigh the costs, then state behaviors may change. If great powers can convince weak states that they are self-restraining, then cooperation can flourish. The crux of the realist-liberal debate reduces down to: what if those “ifs” are wrong? Realists illustrate what state behavior will look like when they are.

Under certain circumstances, however, those “ifs” have proven true. Liberals attempt to describe political interaction under such circumstances. In doing so, they have each made valuable contributions to Carr’s problematizing of international relations. Angell provided good, if limited, observations about a shrinking world. He contrasted the view of natural selection within politics with the concept of cooperative evolution into groups. His early look into the modernization of industry and communications informed us how the diminishing returns on conquest would affect the world political arena. He believed, however, in a static solution for peace. His analysis missed forces beyond economics that could motivate revolutionary states, thus generating the need for an adaptable system that can accommodate change.

Keohane and Nye brought alternate conceptions of power to our understanding of world politics. Their objective look at interdependence, devoid of celebratory bias, introduced the valuable concept of incongruent vulnerabilities and sensitivities as instruments of state power. Their examinations into the self-serving qualities of

cooperation gave rise to the school of neoliberal institutionalism. Most importantly, Keohane and Nye rooted their studies in reality. The descriptive nature of their work, however, left room for future expansion.

Ikenberry took up that challenge and endeavored to fill in many of the holes from our earlier liberal authors. He added some “when, how, and who” to Keohane’s regime theory. He also tied issues like institutions and complexity back to national security. His ideas on constitutional order beyond state borders provide a direct critique of neorealism and valuable insight into post-victory regime building. His recommendations, however, suffer from a Western centric view; valuable for peace in today’s world, but perhaps inapplicable to a world with a rising Asia.

Our interpretation of their findings has produced many insights into Carr’s three tiers of international relations. Carr asserted that viable political theories must account for the reality of change and power within the system. Waltz added the reality of structure, and neoliberal institutionalism has added the reality of the *group* and *process*. Group identity and processes exist on an international level and provides structural level forces on states. Although the arrangement of these forces may be determined by states, they are not controllable through internal domestic politics.

Our analysis of the liberal tradition has also deepened our understanding of middle tier roadblocks. With the concepts of interdependence as power, and reassurance as security, we have expanded the first roadblock from a balance between power and morality, to a balance of power, morality, and economic and ideational forces. The roadblock of institutional power changed when Ikenberry expanded Carr’s idea that hierarchy can result from coercion or submission. The value of institutions to a constitutional order may not be its ability to act as judge, jury, and executioner, but as an informant and method to limit the returns on power. Finally, liberal concepts about the self-interest serving nature of cooperation help to dampen concerns around peaceful change within the system.

Perhaps the largest change to Carr’s original problematizing of IR involves the nature of a top tier solution for peace. Carr’s theory of global peace involved the rise of a singular polity to supra-state status to form a world hierarchy. Whether it is Mearsheimer’s prediction of regional hegemons, Waltz’s warnings of a global hierarchy,

Morgenthau's skepticism of a ubiquitous world public opinion, Angell's concept of the evolution of group cooperation, Keohane's call for multiple regimes, or Ikenberry's theory of institutionally bound states, no author has fully supported the concept of a "one world" government. The sovereignty of states remains a staple of contemporary realist and liberal thought.

All of the authors in this chapter sought alternatives to pure power politics. We have endeavored to illustrate that the divide between the two schools is not as distinct as often portrayed. Realist may claim that liberal notions of politics beyond the concept of power are simply "low" politics. Yet, if these "low" matters affect states or limit decisions, especially over matters of war, then they are very relevant to Carr's quest for a new international order. The real question is how and when do they overlap and interact? Unlike Carr's observation that they are two sides to the same coin, our analysis shows them to be more of two poles on a sliding scale. In our review, many realist and liberal analyses look similar: interdependence and complexity in the political system, security first, the danger of one world government. We will try to expand on those concepts in the appendix. Before then, however, we will look beyond the realist liberal debate. Although this debate birthed Carr's modern IR study, the field continues to evolve beyond it. Chapter 3 will examine some of the directions political study continues to expand.

Chapter 3

Alternative Approaches to IR

The study of international relations does not begin and end with the realist-liberal debate. E. H. Carr believed that a fusion of material reality and human free will would be required to forge a new international order. In chapter 3, we will examine three authors that have attempted to achieve that fusion in different ways. Alexander Wendt released his work, *Social Theory of International Politics*, in 1999. Although his work followed our other two authors chronologically, his book explores the foundations of constructivism and helps explain many of the concepts that permeate their earlier works. Our second book is *The Evolution of International Society*, written by Adam Watson in 1992. Watson's work is the capstone of the English School of international relations theory, and explores our concepts of international autonomy and order have evolved over time. Our final work is *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, edited by Peter Haas, and released in 1992. Haas explores the role of epistemic communities within international policy coordination. Together their works help define and expand the constructivist role of ideas within international politics.

Wendt's work attempted to consolidate the many constructivist ideas that had begun to circulate within international relations study. His book casts a wide net, and addresses nearly every aspect of neorealism and neoliberalism. He hoped to provide a new ontology for IR and challenge many of the assumptions that earlier theories built upon. He begins by explaining the role that ideas play in formulating state interests and identities. He argues that power, fear, uncertainty, and wealth are not natural forces, but socially constructed ones. He uses that argument to show how states can shape structure and anarchy, and form bonds strong enough provide peace. Wendt's work does not contain much practical advice, however, and thus he leaves us with many questions at the end of his thesis.

Watson's work is a change of pace from the other theories within our analysis. Watson founds his theory in the comparative study of international societies throughout history. He discovers that each society held its own view of the legitimate role of power in international affairs; a view shaped by the opposing influences of autonomy and order,

but also by precedent. Watson contends that international society has evolved over time, but has not always included the concept of absolutely sovereign states. Watson's theory thus brings together many of the ideas from realism and neoliberal institutionalism. His units of analysis and description of past societies lack definition, however, and he leaves much of the logical deduction up to his reader. This gives his book an unfinished feel, which lacks true prescriptive potential.

Peter Haas rounds out our constructivist viewpoint with his work on epistemic communities. Epistemic communities are essentially small, cohesive groups of specialists who have knowledge about issue areas of importance to political leaders. In an increasingly complex world, these leaders turn to the communities for policy advice, and thus the viewpoints of these communities find their way into politics. Because these communities are often international, states end up adopting similar stances on political issues, which increases instances of peaceful coordination and cooperation. The effects of epistemic communities are largely unpredictable, however, because they may not always be politically relevant, and may end up influencing public and political opinions in uncontrollable, unforeseen ways.

As a whole, these three authors shed powerful light on the role ideas can play within international politics. They move the debate a long way towards Carr's goal of including free will in discussions of power and authority. The primary question will be whether they shift the discussion too far in the theoretical direction. Do their ideas translate to working, viable solutions for peace? Have they provided new paths for statesmen to follow in political decision-making, or have they merely expanded our knowledge of the theories we have already discussed? As we seek to answer those questions, we will see valuable examples of how to combine many of the concepts we have explored thus far, and we will take many of those examples forward with us into appendix A.

Alexander Wendt and Constructivism

The international relations school of constructivism coalesced in the 1999 release of Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*. Though many of the ideas within his work were already present in other constructivist works, Wendt brought them together into a single volume that left few areas of IR study untouched. His arguments

are known to most students of IR, and are often summarized by the phrase “anarchy is what we make of it.”¹ Wendt’s work was largely a deconstruction of Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism. As such, just like Waltz before him, Wendt hits many of the major themes in IR laid down by E. H. Carr. Wendt’s conclusions, however, are less an elaboration of Carr, and more of an argument that Carr may have been incomplete and thus derived his base tier forces and roadblocks incorrectly.

We will not attempt to reconstruct Wendt’s entire argument, but rather focus in on the points that lead us to his conclusions about Carr’s base tier forces and roadblocks.² Wendt begins by agreeing with Waltz and accepts that anarchy within the international system *can* create structural forces that lead to a power-based struggle for survival. Wendt goes on to argue, however, that it can *also* produce systems dominated by economic interests, international cooperation, and periods of peace. He says the difference is one of ideas. We will examine how Wendt alters the concepts of structure, process, and collective identity with his foundation of ideas. We will then look at his closing argument about social learning, which Wendt claims could lead to international trust. Not superficial trust, but lasting trust that could replace the roles of power and interdependence in international relations theory and present a path to peace.

¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 250. Interestingly, although this was the title of an article written by Wendt, on page 250 of *Social Theory of International Politics* he caveats this statement by stating, “Thus, even though I show that the structure of anarchy varies with relationships between states, I do not argue here that ‘anarchy is what states make of it.’”

² It may be necessary to summarize Wendt’s argument for those who are unfamiliar. Wendt believes in a form of “skinny” constructivism, which means the world is largely constructed of ideas, but that those ideas must account for material constraints. These ideas can explain behaviors, perhaps not in a causal fashion like deductive science, but in a constitutive fashion, which explains what our behaviors are and how they form. Wendt also states that ideas form the foundation of our actions. As a part of our desires for the world, and our beliefs about the world, ideas help form the purpose for our actions. As such, ideas do not simply explain state’s interests, but actually constitute state interests. By altering these ideas, states can alter their interests and thus shape their group identities and their collective security within the international system. This allows for three forms of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. Hobbesian anarchy results from states adopting the role of enemies, which compete violently in a deadly struggle for survival. Lockean anarchy results when states see themselves as rivals, competing over interests, but not locked in a fight to the death. Kantian anarchy results from states identifying themselves and others as friends. Such states see each other’s interests as their own, and will collectively bargain and defend one another. Wendt believes that states can internalize these identities of enemy, rival, and friend to different degrees. States may be *forced* to adopt a certain identity (the First Degree), they may adopt an identity out of *self-interest* (the Second Degree), or they may view an identity as *legitimate* (the Third Degree). Wendt argues that states can achieve Third Degree “friend” status, even within anarchy, through social learning and reflected appraisal. By repeatedly acting with self-restraint and by *expecting* each other to act as friends, states can form an “elicited” trust and a legitimate collective identity. With this trust, states can forego the use of power or restraining institutions to ensure international cooperation.

Social Theory of International Politics

As a constructivist work, *Social Theory of International Politics* expands Carr's earliest concepts of the duality of politics to a higher level. Carr believed that certain unalterable material forces, which we have dubbed base tier forces, lead to political roadblocks that statesmen must overcome to construct a peaceful new world order. Alexander Wendt shares Carr's goal. Wendt undertakes his study not simply to understand our world, but to change it. He explores the dual ideational and material sides of most of the theoretical concepts we have examined this far. Wendt's exploration, however, leads him to conclude that ideas are as important, if not more important than material forces. He does not deny the "existence of the real world," but makes "the point...that the real world consists of a lot more than material forces *as such*."³ This perspective of the base tier leads to different conclusions about political roadblocks. Wendt contends that our task is not to overcome these challenges, but to change our ideas such that they stop being roadblocks all. Wendt's "central thesis is that the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas," and thus Carr's base tier forces and roadblocks are only impediments to progress because we think they are.⁴

Wendt begins by exploring the role that ideas play in shaping our behaviors and interests. According to Wendt, most of the political theories we have examined so far accept some form of rational choice theory. Simply put, our actions are not random or baseless, but are rather a product of our desires (interests) and our beliefs. Desires and beliefs are separate entities in this formulation. Our desires define what we want from the world; our beliefs define how we think the world can provide it. Only a combination of the two results in action. For example, I must be thirsty (desire), and I must believe that water quenches thirst (belief), before I will actually engage in the behavior of drinking. Wendt points out, "it does not matter whether these beliefs are accurate, only that actors take them to be true."⁵ Beliefs do not provide motivation; they are purely ideas about what the world is, and how that world can be of utility to us. The motivation comes from our desires.

³ Wendt, 136. [Emphasis original]

⁴ Wendt, 96. It is important to note the Carr again emphasizes that "brute material forces have some effects on the constitution of power and interest, and as such [his] thesis is not ideas all the way down."

⁵ Wendt, 117.

Both Wendt's analysis and our own demonstrates that while most IR theories accept the formulation that *desire plus belief equals action*, they differ in their conception of what constitutes a state's desires. "Classical realists offer varying permutations of fear, power, glory, and wealth as candidates" for state desires.⁶ Neorealists debate whether states are more motivated by fear or power. Carr's primary critique of utopianism was that they abstracted out material realities from desire when formulating their theories of international cooperation. Neoliberals deflected that criticism by showing how cooperating could result in material economic and security gains. Thus, the neorealist against neoliberal debate turned to one of interests, arguing whether states desire relative or absolute gains, security or wealth. Wendt understands that these "are important disagreements, but all sides seem to accept the key rationalist premise that desire (the national interest) causes states to act in certain ways."⁷

Wendt argues, however, that this formulation misses a critical ideational concept. He claims, "the extent to which the 'material base' is constituted by ideas is an important question that has been largely ignored in mainstream IR, and one that bears on the transformative potentials of the international system."⁸ There are two ways that ideas pervade the "desire" variable in the equation. First, we can have different ideas about how well our material needs must be satisfied. All people get thirsty, but some are comfortable with greater levels of thirst than others are. Second, people can deliberate and choose between conflicting desires. If I am both hungry and thirsty, I may trade some of my water for food; or if both my son and I are thirsty, I may share more water than if I were with a thirsty stranger. If I value my self-image as a "generous person," I may share more water in either case. Wendt formulates the second concept as *desire plus belief plus reason equals action*, which is very similar to Carr's earlier argument about the inclusion of free will in political theory.

This new role for ideas and identities alters our IR analysis. Wendt explains that these new formulations do not violate the logic that desire and belief must constitute two separate logical entities; "desires are no less desires for being constituted by beliefs."⁹

⁶ Wendt, 118.

⁷ Wendt, 118.

⁸ Wendt, 95.

⁹ Wendt, 125.

He goes on to suggest that if desires were purely material, then all states should share the same interests. Instead, the world contains status quo, revisionist, and collectivist nations. In either the first or the second cases above, actors shared a thirst and a belief about water. Variations in *ideas* and *identities* shaped their interests such that they behaved to secure different amounts of water. Although “the distribution of material capabilities at any given moment helps define the possibilities of our action...ultimately it is our ambitions, fear, and hopes – the things we want material forces *for* – that drive social evolution, not material forces as such.”¹⁰ Wendt contends that this holds true for individual and state interests.

Wendt’s reformulation affects every aspect of international relations theory that flows from a given conception of state interest. If his argument holds true then systemic processes, states’ decisions to resist or submit, international collective identity, and even anarchy itself become malleable. If ideas and identities can change international politics then the schools of realism and liberalism are incomplete. Contrary to realism, states would not seek power to overcome uncertainty and fear because it is part of human nature, or because structure compels them to. States would seek power because they reason that other states are *enemies* or *rivals* who are trying to damage them. As Wendt says, “fear and anxiety themselves are socially constructed.”¹¹ Likewise, contrary to liberalism, states would not choose to cooperate because wealth is a stronger state desire than security. States would cooperate because they reason that their partner state is a *rival* or a *friend* that is not out to destroy them.

These three identities, *enemy*, *rival*, and *friend*, shape the international political arena into three different cultures of anarchy.¹² The first culture, which Wendt dubs “Hobbesian” anarchy, results when states see themselves and others as *enemies*. Enemies do not recognize the natural right of other enemies to exist and thus will not willingly limit violence toward one another. This creates an anarchy of true natural selection—the “kill or be killed” self-help anarchy that realists describe. The second “Lockean” culture of anarchy emerges when states view one another as *rivals*. Rivals compete against other

¹⁰ Wendt, 113. [Emphasis original]

¹¹ Wendt, 132.

¹² For a deeper understanding of the three cultures and their degrees of internalization, see chapter 6, “Three cultures of anarchy,” on pages 246-312.

rivals, at times resorting to violence, but do not attempt to dominate, conquer, or destroy one another.¹³ This recognition of sovereignty results in neorealist balance-of-power and neoliberal institutional behaviors. These first two cultures of anarchy are largely just reformulations of earlier political theories.

Wendt's third culture of anarchy represents his unique contribution to our study and his prescription for peace. Within "Kantian" anarchy, states see each other as friends. Friends "observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid)."¹⁴ These rules are separate and equal. When states expect each other to adhere to both rules, they can forge special "trust" relationships and collective identities such as the current relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. We have used the US/UK bond as an exception to many of our realist theories. Wendt does not view friendship as an anomaly, but rather as a critical component of his theory and potential path to peace.

Wendt understands the criticism and difficulties using trust and friendship as suggestions for peace. "The key problem with this logic, as emphasized by Realists, is our inability to read others' minds and thus uncertainty about whether they will in fact restrain themselves in the absence of third party constraints. This problem is especially serious in a self-help system where costs of a mistaken inference can be fatal."¹⁵ The realist recommendation is thus to secure a relative power advantage to hedge your bets. Wendt also understands the forces that act against cooperation, and admits, "Total identification, to the point of sacrificing one's basic needs for the Other, is rare. Individuals want to meet their basic needs, which compete to varying degrees with the needs of groups, and this predisposes them to worry about being engulfed by the latter. The same is true of groups relative to other groups."¹⁶ He knows that "individuals will resist forming groups if this threatens the fulfillment of their personal needs, and groups

¹³ Wendt, 283-285. Within Lockean anarchy, states simultaneously accept and constrain warfare. *Constrained* does not imply bloodless, but rather non-existential—the "death rate" of states is low. The Peace of Westphalia was a codification of this kind of relationship.

¹⁴ Wendt, 299.

¹⁵ Wendt, 360.

¹⁶ Wendt, 337.

will resist forming higher groups if this threatens the fulfillment of group needs.”¹⁷ These concerns led to earlier conclusions that in order to ensure peace, all of political culture would have to change together. Yet, Wendt maintains that states can build a lasting trust to hold international society together in a peaceful political order. Playing power politics will destroy our chances to do that.

To explain how states arrive at special *friend* relationships, Wendt combines his concepts of socially constructed interests and identities. Within each culture of anarchy, states still compete and interact with one another. States enter into various agreements, construct institutions, form alliances, and develop normal patterns of behavior. Simply put, they engage in diplomacy. As we mentioned above, the realist, liberal, and constructivist schools propose three different reasons why states do so: “because they are forced to, because it is in their self-interest, and because they perceive the norms as legitimate.”¹⁸ Wendt does not think we should treat these as separate conceptions of state interest. Because each interest must filter through *reason* (including how states identify themselves and others), Wendt believes “it is more useful to see them as reflecting three different *degrees* to which a norm can be internalized, and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced—*force*, *price*, and *legitimacy*.”¹⁹

Wendt applies these three degrees to each culture of anarchy. The difference between first, second, and third degree Hobbesian anarchy is minor. Whether states treat others as *enemies* because they are forced to, because it is in their self-interest, or because they believe it is legitimate, they still risk competing to the death and few lasting groups result. When states internalize the role of *rival* to different degrees, however, relationships change. First-degree rivals, who act as such only out of coercion, must guard against the potential risks that will arise should that external coercive force go away. This drives states to act in a very realist fashion. When states reach the third degree, and legitimately view each other as rivals, then the assurances that Keohane and Ikenberry discussed become much easier to attain, and cooperation increases.

¹⁷ Wendt, 364.

¹⁸ Wendt, 250.

¹⁹ Wendt, 250. The emphasis in this quotation has been modified. In the original text, the words degree, force, price, and legitimacy appeared in quotation marks. They were changed to italics for ease of reading and to maintain the style of this paper.

For Wendt, the three degrees of friendship are what distinguish constructivism from the other schools of IR. First-degree friendship is tricky to conceptualize—states *coerced* into non-violence and mutual aid. Wendt suggests that coercive non-violence is like deterrence, such as the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Coerced mutual aid may result when states must work together in the face of global threats, such as nuclear proliferation or environmental collapse. The key is that states act like friends against their will.

Within second-degree friendship, states do not actively oppose, nor are they internally driven to act like friends. Instead, friendship becomes a strategy to maximize their interests. The neoliberals have provided many reasons why states may pursue such strategies, but as Wendt points out, “few cultures will be stable in the long run if their members are engaged in an on-going calculation about whether compliance serves their individual interests.”²⁰

The lasting, special relationships occur when states internalize the role of *friend* to the third degree. A good analogy for third-degree friends is family. In an international family, “states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but literally as being their own.”²¹ Within a family, we willingly make sacrifices for one another. This does not imply irrational altruism; states are “still rational, but the unit on the basis of which they calculate utility and rational action is the group.”²²

Wendt explains that international relations can evolve up through the degrees and cultures of anarchy through the process of social learning. This learning is what makes the *Social Theory of International Politics* “Social.” Even in Hobbesian anarchy, states begin to interact when expanding boundaries, security needs, and interdependence drive them together despite the risks. Incentives to cooperate could include a common threat, a common goal, an economic or security benefit, or an overwhelming power advantage or disadvantage. Through constant interaction, states learn what actions benefit them, what actions hurt, which states they should avoid, and which states they should trust—progressing from rivals to friends. This social learning shapes a state’s desires. Though

²⁰ Wendt, 305.

²¹ Wendt, 305.

²² Wendt, 337.

they may begin with purely material needs, “biological drives explain few of the almost infinite goals human beings seem to be capable of pursuing. Most of these are learned through socialization.”²³

The third-degree role of *friend* becomes “sticky” through the process of reflected appraisal. Wendt explains that we (individuals, groups, or even states) form not only our interest through constant interaction, but also our identities. We naturally assume the identity that others project on to us. If you treat me like an enemy, I see myself as an enemy. If you treat me like a friend, I begin to see myself as a friend, and “through repeated compliance states gradually internalize the institution of the pluralistic security community to the third degree.”²⁴ This explains why the realist prescription to engage in power politics as a form of reassurance is ultimately self-damaging. If both actors see themselves as friends, but treat the other as an enemy, then their self-identities and reflected identities do not reinforce one another, and their relationship eventually degrades. This leads to phenomenon like the security dilemma. But when both parties see them themselves as friends and treat one another as friends, the self and reflected identities reinforce, eventually leading to third-degree internalization. Wendt calls the trust that forms between third-degree friends “elicitative” trust “since actors elicit cooperation from others by communicating that it is expected.”²⁵ Once this occurs, states no longer require an external force to cooperate; trust is just as effective as institutions or power for securing international order.²⁶

²³ Wendt, 123; 323-324. In Wendt’s full argument, he explains that there are two ways for a system to evolve, through natural selection and through cultural selection. He claims natural selection is more likely in case of life and death, as in Hobbesian anarchy. Cultural selection happens outside of that threat. He then divides cultural selection into two forms: imitation and social learning. His concept of imitation is similar to Waltz’s earlier argument about socialization and competition, and thus we will not cover it in detail in this section. Instead, we will focus on Wendt’s concept of “social learning” that goes beyond Waltz’s earlier theorizations.

²⁴ Wendt, 360.

²⁵ Wendt, 347.

²⁶ Many ideas Wendt’s concepts appear in our other theories, but with different explanations. Wendt’s formulation of different cultures of anarchy reflects Ikenberry’s assertion that states have two reasons to possibly cooperate, force or voluntary submission. Wendt’s concept of elicitive cooperation backs up the neoliberal ideas of reassurance and self-restraint. Neoliberals argued that institutions could become sticky due to increasing returns, and Wendt suggests the same thing about identities. Finally, Wendt’s assertion that we cannot internalize friendship while practicing power politics reinforces Norman Angell’s claim that power politics are strictly relative. I cannot call myself a friend and treat others as enemies while expecting other to treat me as a friend any more than I try to maximize my relative power without expecting the others to try to gain more power than me.

This special trust has clear implications for Carr's problematizing of IR. The need to balance power or morality is only a problem when states have something to fear. Wendt believes fear is socially constructed, and disappears in a third-degree friendship. With trust, states do not need a relative power advantage, and thus there is no requirement to wield power morally. Instead, morality should drive our relationships to increase trust. While Wendt claims this "approach suggests new possibilities for foreign policy and systemic change," he does claim that it will be easy. He caveats, "In raising this issue it should be emphasized that saying interests are made of ideas does not mean they easily can be changed in any given context. Idealism is not utopianism, and it is often harder to change someone's mind than their behavior."²⁷

In circumstances when trust can form, Carr's need to empower institutions also diminishes. Wendt's primary point on this issue is that "real assurance here comes not from a Leviathan who enforces peace through centralized power (an 'amalgamated' security community), but from shared knowledge of each other's peaceful intentions and behavior."²⁸ Crafting dominant third party institutions in order to arbitrate disputes would be counterproductive. Instead, we should develop institutions to build trust and change ideas—concepts that Peter Haas and Adam Watson explore later in this chapter.

Within Kantian cooperation, states will not fear invasion or destruction. Competition will still exist, but the consequences of losing will not be existential. This facilitates peaceful change, which can result when declining nations realize that they do not need to resort to power politics or maintain a relative power standing. Wendt claims that this largely explains Soviet actions at the end of the Cold War; "Soviet behavior changed because they redefined their interests as a result of having looked at their existing desires and beliefs self-critically."²⁹

Wendt's top tier solution is thus similar to Carr's in form, but very different in function. Unlike many solutions outlined in chapters 1 and 2, Wendt does not see lasting peace occurring between multiple groups of disparate states that learn to work together. A truly peaceful international order would be a single group, with a collective *friend* identity. Such a group does not require an "us and them" mentality or an external force

²⁷ Wendt, 134.

²⁸ Wendt, 299.

²⁹ Wendt, 129.

to keep it together. While Wendt believes that international society is evolving, he does believe that we can guarantee a worldwide society of friends. State relations and “the passage of time may simply deepen bad norms, not create good ones.”³⁰ Wendt does believe, however, that “even if there is no guarantee that the future of the international system will be better than its past, at least there is reason to think it will not be worse.”³¹ Once states enjoy higher trust relations, only a large “exogenous shock” would set them back.³²

Constructing an Assessment

Despite the fact that Wendt disagrees with many of Carr’s findings, Carr’s problematizing clearly influenced *Social Theory of International Politics*. Wendt focuses on many of Carr’s core concepts: power, order, peace, and war. Wendt shares Carr’s vision of searching for peaceful change within a new international order.³³ Wendt, however, did not follow Carr’s mandates about how to formulate that theory of political change. Wendt may have begun his thesis with realism, but he certainly did not start with material reality. His main goal was to reverse the long held logic (which we have traced back through Carr) that material base forces dictated the nature of international politics. As such, Wendt did not provide “detailed propositions about the international system,” but rather his “book is about the *ontology* of the states system, and so is more about international theory than about international politics.”³⁴

This large step away from Carr leaves us with a laundry list of questions about Wendt’s work. These questions revolve around three primary themes. First, did Wendt’s theory strip away too many practical concerns to be viable? Wendt would say he has abstracted away a lot, but not too much. His theory is intentionally trans-disciplinary, not just interdisciplinary. If we boil his thesis down to a single argument, however, it seems to be that states can learn to get along. This begs the important question, are reflected appraisal and third-degree internalization powerful enough to overcome 2500 years of

³⁰ Wendt, 311.

³¹ Wendt, 312.

³² Wendt, 312.

³³ Wendt, 8.

³⁴ Wendt, 6. [Emphasis original]

realist power politics? Wendt rightly claims that he is not utopian, and does not guarantee this development, but he leaves other aspects of this question unaddressed.

A *friend* relationship requires at least two partners. What happens if one state hits third-degree internalization and the other state does not? Does that matter? Is it akin to two individuals who date, yet only one of them falls in love? Does this increase or decrease the chances of violence between the former pairing of states? Also, what happens when two groups of third degree friends interact with one another? Are there such things as incompatible third degree groups? Can the commitment that states make to their third degree collective identity transfer up to another level? What if one member of a friend pairing forms another friend pairing with a third party state, but its original partner does not?

These questions lead us to our second major theme: are his propositions about Carr's middle and top tier complete? Wendt's conception of peaceful change addresses state concerns about declining power and imperial change. Does it apply equally to revisionist states tired of their standing at the bottom of the global distribution of wealth? Can these states form friendship within a system that they believe does not serve them well? How bad must their economic situation be before forming *rival* or *friend* identities becomes impractical?

Also, is de-evolution among friends really as difficult as Wendt proposes? Do states retain trust the way people do, even if democratically elected governments roll over every few years? Does Wendt consider the slow rise of tyrants to power an exogenous shock to the system? or accidental breaches of trust? Wendt does not address whether breaking a third-degree friendship is more likely to lead to war than breaking a simple alliance. We earlier equated third degree friends to family. Betrayal from a wife of 20 years is potentially more damaging than betrayal by a first date. Is the same true in international politics? Until we have answers to these questions, it is difficult to formulate policy based on the ideas of Wendt, whether or not that mattered to Wendt when he wrote them.

Which present our third major theme: absent detailed propositions, how should statesmen put this theory into practice? How do states operationalize Wendt's policies? Wendt recommends policies of self-restraint. He provides the overt actions of the Soviet

Union to demonstrate they were self-limiting their power as example of states acting on his constructivist principles. Does Wendt have specific recommendations for states that are not in a natural decline, however? What should a rising hegemon do with its newfound power? We understand that it may be damaging to engage in power politics, but how do statesmen get around that? How do political leaders know when then hit third degree trust and not just an enemy façade? What should they do in the meantime while they are uncertain? If a state forms a third-degree friendship with one, or just a handful of states, how does it engage in power politics with those states that remain enemies without upsetting the balance within the group?

While this seems like an overwhelming number of questions, the United States faces nearly all of these questions today as it tries to maintain relations with both Israel and the Arab world, both NATO and Russia, both Japan and China, all while dealing with states like Iran. These difficulties arise from complex arrangement of relationships that exists within a system of multiple sovereign states. This suggests that the answers may lie outside of the concept of the sovereign state. Adam Watson explores the historical precedent of such international systems in the next section.

Adam Watson and the English School

When Adam Watson completed *The Evolution of International Society*, he was the sole remaining chairman of the British Committee on the Theory of Internal Politics. Commonly known as the English School, their work had revolved around the study of systems and societies of states as a whole. Published in 1992, Watson's work continued this theme and traced the evolution of political systems from ancient Sumer through to the 1990s. Watson discovered that the cohesion and interconnectedness of these systems fluctuated throughout history, but trended toward a common central position. We will examine the criteria Watson used to categorize his systems of states in an effort to discern what his "fluctuation" and "evolution" mean to E. H. Carr's problematizing of IR. While Watson's work does not greatly alter our base tier forces or roadblocks, his fluctuation does suggest that realist and liberal thoughts on the tiers will apply to different degrees depending on the overall character of the system. Watson's thoughts on the evolution of the system will inform our analysis of base tier forces in appendix A.

The Evolution of International Society

As the title implies, *The Evolution of International Society* examines the history of international political interaction. From this historical study, Watson demonstrates how “our ways of managing the relations between diverse groups and communities of people have evolved from previous experience, and that future arrangements will evolve from ours.”³⁵ With this concept of precedent, he goes on to examine why our current political theories often differ from reality. He asserts that, “sometimes we endow our current assumptions and beliefs...with a permanence that the record no way justifies.”³⁶ He argues that values and priorities within international systems fluctuate over time, and thus fixed IR assumptions can lead to false predictions or unrealistic visions of the future.

One of the assumptions that Watson was trying to dispel was the notion that international relations are always about the anarchical struggle of sovereign states. Watson had become “increasingly doubtful about the sharp distinctions between systems of independent states, suzerain systems, and empires.”³⁷ Many political theories begin with the concept of the sovereign state that recognizes no superior. Watson finds this to be a limiting postulation. Watson concedes that any political system, by definition, must be a collection of individual polities (which we will generically refer to as “states” throughout this section).³⁸ These states, however, can be independent Greek city-states, semi-autonomous colonies, or communities within an empire.

Collections of states can take the form of political *systems* or *societies*. A *system* consists of simple interaction among states, “an impersonal network of pressures and interests that bind states together closely” and compel states to consider the affects their actions will have on one another.³⁹ A system becomes a *society* when a superstructure of “common rules, institutions, codes of conduct, and values, which...states agree to bound by,” are “consciously put in place [by statesmen] to modify the mechanical workings of

³⁵ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1992), 2.

³⁶ Watson, 2.

³⁷ Watson, 13.

³⁸ For ease of language, and to mirror the author’s usage, we will use the term “state” generically throughout this section to refer to this broad definition of possible polities within a system. The term “sovereign state” will indicate the contemporary notion of an individual nation state without a superior.

³⁹ Watson, 4.

the system.”⁴⁰ The key notion is that as a system progresses toward a society, states voluntarily concede some autonomy to establish order. Watson identifies, however, an “inevitable tension between the desire for order and the desire for independence.”⁴¹ Order can benefit a society, but may feel oppressive to its states. Greater autonomy can loosen constraints and ease oppression within a system, but simultaneously reduces the economic and military security of its members.

As a result, actual political systems exist on a sliding scale between independence and empirical rule. Watson finds that, “A system of absolutely independent states, and a heterogeneous empire wholly and directly administered from one centre, are theoretical extreme cases” that do not occur in practice.⁴² In order to compare systems of states throughout history, Watson divides the spectrum between absolute autonomy and absolute control into four broad categories: independence, hegemony, dominion, and empire.⁴³ By analyzing the actual practice and administration of past political systems, he finds that “the relation of the various communities to each other shifts constantly along the spectrum over time.”⁴⁴

Watson thus describes the nature of political systems as a pendulum that swings along an arc between independence and empire. The pendulum analogy should not imply that the system oscillates with a certain regularity, but rather that there is a natural “gravitational” pull away from extremes and a certain momentum to systemic changes. Within his historical survey, Watson found that, “the further the pendulum swung up the arc, either towards independent states or towards empire, the greater was the gravitational pull towards the center, between hegemony and dominion.”⁴⁵

The “gravity” is an analogy for the interaction of opposing and unequal forces. When states strive for independence, they hope to become more autonomous members of

⁴⁰ Watson, 4, 311.

⁴¹ Watson, 14.

⁴² Watson, 4.

⁴³ Watson, 14-16. *Independent* states individually retain the ultimate ability to make external and domestic political decisions. A *hegemony* contains some source of authority that can shape the operations of the system and dictate the nature of external political interaction among states but cannot affect others internally. A *dominion* contains an authority that shapes, but does not completely control, the external and internal governing of the states while leaving their identity as separate polities intact. An *empire* implies direct administration of different communities from an imperial center.

⁴⁴ Watson, 16.

⁴⁵ Watson, 122.

a system, not independent *from* it. They still seek binding collective military and economic security alliances, and thus pull themselves away from independence. On the other side of the spectrum, the physical limitations of power restrain empirical aspirations, and the moral desire to maintain political, cultural, or religious autonomy pulls states away from strict empirical control.⁴⁶ As such, “the advantages of the imperial side of the spectrum are practical; but the pull towards independence is mainly a moral and emotional one.”⁴⁷ Watson’s study found that states are “inclined to favour what they believe ought to be, even when it is not in their material interest.”⁴⁸ Moral is stronger than material, and thus gravitational pull away from empire is stronger than the pull away from independence.

One measure of a political system is its legitimacy. A system achieves legitimacy when its member states perceive that the actual use of power within a system corresponds to their attitudes about power. In short, when states *believe* that the pendulum is sitting where they *want* it to sit, they deem the system legitimate and become accepting of authority. For example, among the independence-minded Greek city-states, force used to balance against rising hegemonies was deemed legitimate, despite the fact that it led to numerous wars. In ancient China—a far more empire inclined culture—communities were more accepting of power used to administrate and control communities. Culture, power, and continuity played a role in determining legitimacy, because

Watson’s assertion that moral factors outweigh material ones affects legitimacy in two ways. First, legitimacy derives from moral factors like beliefs the “dominant culture in a society, [which] helped to prescribe the position along our spectrum which seemed legitimate and proper to the communities concerned, and to which the society tended to gravitate.”⁴⁹ The practices within a system result largely from material factors. Thus, when the two differed significantly, practice tended to change to conform to legitimacy, rather than the other way around. Second, states were more likely to grant legitimacy when authority was used only to direct material matters. Within empires, local

⁴⁶ Watson contends that power extends out radially, weakening at the edges. Adjacent regions naturally receive more influence from a central authority than remote areas. Historical empires thus appeared as empirically administered cores, surrounded by domestically autonomous dominions, bordered by an area of hegemonic influence, with independent states involved in the periphery of the system.

⁴⁷ Watson, 125.

⁴⁸ Watson, 130.

⁴⁹ Watson, 122.

communities were prepared to pay tribute and fulfill troop quotas in exchange for security and prosperity, because “what really mattered to them was to...retain the political and religious autonomy of their society.”⁵⁰

This demonstrates how *The Evolution of International Society* shows considerable overlap between concepts like the continuity between systems, international societies, order and autonomy, independence and hegemony, the swing of the pendulum, legitimacy, and the relevance of a dominant culture. Watson wrote that “though we may distinguish these themes for the purpose of analysis, in practice they were so closely interwoven, and each so affected the others” that we should consider them as a complex whole.⁵¹ Every system displayed characteristics of these themes in different combinations and weights, but a few trends relevant to Carr’s problematizing of IR still emerged. First, the base tier force of change within political systems—the constant swing of the pendulum—was driven by a combination of material needs, legitimacy, and the gravitational pull away from extremes. Second, friction and conflict arose when forces pushed the pendulum away from its point of maximum legitimacy. Last, although our modern international system inherited and then elevated the concept of the sovereign state to near principle, history shows that other positions of the pendulum have historically existed and been deemed legitimate by the prevailing society of states.

Three points combine to generate a different perspective of Carr’s three roadblocks to a top tier solution. The first is the balance of power and morality. While Watson would agree that wielding power within a system of independence-minded states could lead to conflict, he would argue that trying to make “power” appear “moral” addresses the symptom, not the problem. Efforts to balance power and morality are simply attempts to shift states’ perception of what is actually happening within a system; they are trying to fool states into believing that the pendulum and legitimacy align. A more stable choice would be to align the dominant concept of legitimacy with the actual workings of the system. Watson agrees that this is a harder solution—our beliefs trump material reality—but it is not an unprecedented one.⁵²

⁵⁰ Watson, 124.

⁵¹ Watson, 251.

⁵² It is also a solution that is greatly added and supported by Wendt’s concepts of “beliefs all the way down” and that “anarchy is what we make of it.”

In this way, Watson largely turns the tables on the realists. Realist conceptions of sovereignty, anarchy, and relative power have passed from the Greek city-states to renaissance Europe and into today's contemporary world. They do not represent, however, the *only* legitimate worldview of past international societies, nor do they represent the reality of most systems. History suggests, "In practice if not nominally, some degree of hegemony is apparently always present," and "even the most heterogeneous systems...were a long way from anarchy."⁵³ Thus, the realists' strict adherence to the notion of extreme independence is in fact the utopian idea, and our attempts to build a new political order should start with that understanding. Doing so would help alleviate the tensions within the "peaceful change" roadblock. States would fear the rise and fall of powers less within a system that naturally accepts some degree of hegemony and dominion.

Watson would thus not expect institutions to usurp state power, or provide the role of hegemon as the pendulum swings that direction. Instead, hegemons would fulfill that role through the administration of institutions. Institutions provide some of the "mechanisms" that turn systems into societies. Institutions can bridge culture gaps and abate fears about the disparity between the perception of the pendulum and legitimacy. They can communicate across international societies with different cultures, as they did between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. In this way, Watson sees the primary role of institutions as information collectors and distributors, similar to Keohane and Ikenberry.

We should avoid portraying Watson as anti-realist, however. Watson's main point was that the world was never strictly realist or liberal, independent or empire, but rather a constantly shifting blend of the two. Thus, his top tier solution for peace is not static. Realist principles and solutions apply best when both the pendulum and legitimacy are further up the independence side of the spectrum—Watson simply would not expect them to stay there. Nor would Watson advise a "one world government" solution, far up the empire side of the spectrum. He notes that "most of the benefits of the imperial half of the scale can be obtained, not absolutely but to a considerable extent,

⁵³ Watson, 127, 123.

with less integration than a single system-wide government.”⁵⁴ Solutions at the bottom of the pendulum arc, where many neoliberal concepts reside, would be the most robust.

Primarily, we should avoid artificially inflating one concept over the other. Locking in the notion of state sovereignty at Westphalia elevated independence to principle. The natural pull of the system towards hegemony upset European states who, in response, engaged in balancing activities that eventually led to WWI. Post WWI, these same nations attempted to impart a very imperial system through the League of Nations without the mechanisms to enforce it. The disparity between this system and Germany’s view of legitimacy led to their rise and challenge of the system and a second world war. Thus, we should avoid searching for which IR theory is correct or incorrect, and instead ask which theory is currently applicable and not applicable. Watson, like Carr, saw universality as the enemy.

Elementary My Dear Watson

Watson plays a valuable role in fulfilling Carr’s vision of constructing a peaceful world order. If we relate each school of international relations study to a portion of Carr’s original problematizing, then realism was the study and advancement of base tier forces, liberalism promoted the possibilities within middle tier roadblocks, and the English School focused on the flip of Carr’s 2-sided coin. Watson looked at how that coin flips, when it flips, where it might land, and where it would be best to land. This helps to fill one of the major holes in our analysis. We have looked at the similarities across many of our theories, and attempted to pull out their unique contributions, but Watson provides a notion of how they may all fit together.

A critique Carr could make about *The Evolution of International Society* would regard its focus on settled systems and societies throughout history. Watson has provided us many insights about what makes a system stable or volatile, accepted or resisted. Apart from his idea about the “continuation” or “evolution” of systems, however, he tells us little about the construction of these systems or the transitions between them. Carr worried about these periods of change because therein laid the wars. In today’s independence leaning world, if a more imperial China continues to rise then how might

⁵⁴ Watson, 320.

war and violence result? How do we make sure the system remains peaceful? Watson certainly provides us many of the variables needed to address such a question. He suggests that “First, none of the states that operate the concert can be stronger than the others combined.” “Second...they must all recognize the advantage of managing the pressures of the system and making the society work.” Third, they must possess “a degree of mobility in their relations.”⁵⁵ Without direct study of the transition periods, however, Watson cannot advise how to bring these qualities into being.

Part of the reason for this lack of prescription in Watson’s work is the empirical nature of his analysis. As Wendt warned, such inductive study of IR can provide correlations, but few explanations. Watson demonstrated that two distinctly alien cultures, like early Europe and the Ottomans, may not be able to form a society; but how alien is too alien? Watson describes the moral as stronger than the material, yet claims that outlier states will conform to the dominant culture within a society. How strong must the need for order be before this happens? Is it greater in a system, with less order, or a society, with more systemic benefits? Watson’s work feels incomplete in this regard, leaving much of the synthesis of his ideas up to the reader. This again leaves us wondering how we make Watson’s ideas applicable. How do we turn them into policy?

These same attributes of Watson’s work bring into question his notion of evolution within the international system. Does evolution have a direction, or is it simply change? Watson uses his evidence to support the idea that societies of states have existed before and today exist on a global scale. But the imprecise nature of his terms and the overlap in his units of analysis blur this issue. Though a “substantially independent” culture and view of legitimacy has passed from ancient Greece to Europe and then the world, this “evolution” was far from continuous. It was interspersed with periods and cultures of religious domination, feudalism, and empires. The Cold War contained two distinct cultures—a US portion of the world with a highly independent pendulum, and a very imperial Soviet sphere of influence. Watson claims that this was one society because the two sides shared similar diplomatic institutions and methods of interaction. Yet Watson deemed a similar situation between Europe and the Ottomans as a system. Watson seems to vary his terms to support his thesis.

⁵⁵ Watson, 322.

Watson declares the difference between systems and societies one of “tightness” and capitulation, dictated by a balance of autonomy and order. His concept of independence and empire, a measure of state-to-state intrusiveness, is also driven by the competing tensions of autonomy and order. If this is accurate, how does one fall while the other rises? What is the clear division between the two concepts? Without a clear distinction we ask, were the post-cold war breakups of the Soviet Union and states like Yugoslavia the de-evolution of large international groupings, or the evolution of worldwide independence? What exactly does Watson think is evolving? the size of our global society? the beliefs of the culture within that society? the legitimacy of independence? Watson’s omissions leave room to doubt his evolutionary forecast.

Peter Haas and Epistemic Communities

Our next work, *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, hit the IR world in 1992. Edited by Peter M. Haas, this collection of essays sought to explore the impact of epistemic communities on international relations. Haas and his colleagues find that epistemic communities draw their influence from the uncertainties about cause and effect within world affairs. Epistemic communities provide guidance when states face these uncertainties. Because these communities extend beyond national borders, spreading common ideas and normative commitments, they provide a homogenizing force within international public policy-making. Epistemic communities do not influence Carr’s problematizing of IR in ways novel to our analysis. We will explore, however, how they demonstrate constructivist ideas in action and add to our understanding of international coordination.

Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination

In our early evaluation of E. H. Carr, we discovered his concept of the dual nature of history and politics, the combination of material facts and our perception of those facts. At the beginning of this chapter, we saw how Wendt expanded that notion, giving rise to contemporary constructivism. Before Wendt’s study, Peter Haas and others scholars used that same idea to explore epistemic communities. According to Haas, a “limited constructivist view informs the analyses presented by most of the authors” who

contributed to *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*.⁵⁶ They contend that a material world exists, but that we socially construct our understanding and interpretation of that world. Thus, statesmen do not act based on the “truth” of the material world, but on their consensual acceptance of it. Epistemic communities can help shape that acceptance, which may change and evolve over time

The concept of epistemic communities bridges many ideas from neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Although epistemic communities are like institutions that spread out internationally, they are not system level entities like Waltz’s structural forces. They are unit level players that affect political leaders on a domestic level. Like structure, however, they have a homogenizing effect on states’ behavior. The rational actor model assumes that every statesman makes rational decisions. Epistemic communities are a way of providing them a *common* rationale. Haas describes them as “channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country.”⁵⁷ Unlike structural forces, however, the influence of epistemic communities is shaped by ideas, not material arrangements or power. Thus, where a state stands “is associated with factors other than ‘where they sit.’”⁵⁸

Haas has essentially added a new unit of analysis to our IR study. Haas defined an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.”⁵⁹ It is a tight-knit group of specialists, like scientists, who share an understanding of a specific complicated issue, like nuclear deterrence or ozone depletion. Inside the community, members share information and research. They all see the problem the same way. They agree on what information is true or false, relevant or irrelevant. They come to similar conclusions, which instill common values and principled beliefs within the group. This group is often international, and thus their ideas spread across borders. Outside of the group, comparatively little knowledge exists about that subject area. This gives the epistemic community an authoritative, cohesive voice within their issue area.

⁵⁶ Peter M. Haas, *Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination* (Columbia: South Carolina Press, 1997), 23.

⁵⁷ Haas, 27.

⁵⁸ Haas, 10.

⁵⁹ Haas, 3.

Their voice influences political decision-making. By advising domestic political leaders, epistemic communities create a way for “expectations and values enter into the political process.”⁶⁰ Once the voice is heard, “these ideas help define the national interest, which then becomes a conceptual and normative input to the international game.”⁶¹ They shape our vision for what international institutions and bargains should aim to accomplish. When other states have members of this same community generating similar influences in their countries, these visions stand a better chance of aligning than if the two states acted without an epistemic community’s advice.

Before an alignment of visions can occur, political leaders must turn to an epistemic community for advice. Leaders are more apt to do so as “growth in the complexity of the international system” continues.⁶² Our modern world has increased interconnectedness between states, generating a greater number of increasingly technical issues for political leaders to balance, often with limited knowledge and no clearly defined “best” answer. This “undermines the utility of many conventional approaches to international relations, which presume that a state’s self-interest are clear and that the ways in which it interests may be most efficaciously pursued are equally clear.”⁶³ Information can help bridge the gap between our complex world and clear political direction, and thus “under conditions of uncertainty...decision makers have a variety of incentives and reasons for consulting epistemic communities.”⁶⁴ Epistemic communities help leaders determine cause and effect and elucidate the linkages within complex systems and helps define their interests. For example, a statesman may know that he wants to increase trade, but may not know whether increasing or lower tariffs will create that affect. A group of economists can provide him answers to that question. At times, statesmen may simply want information to justify their preconceived policies.

Haas suggests several ways in which epistemic communities may shape policy. They may present political leaders with options they had not conceived of before. They may be able to point out the reasons that preconceived ideas are not viable. They can help leaders select among various policy options, or they can build coalitions to help push

⁶⁰ Haas, 373. Conc.

⁶¹ Haas, 373-374. Conc.

⁶² Haas, 12. Intro.

⁶³ Haas, 14. Intro. This is similar to

⁶⁴ Haas, 15, Intro.

a particularly advantageous option. Epistemic communities can also affect the bargaining process itself. International politics rarely contains a straightforward decision to either cooperate or disagree. Rather, it entails a process of bargaining that must first determine how cooperation will increase overall value, then decide how states should divide that value. Epistemic communities can help define the region in which cooperation between states is possible, and within that region, “to the extent to which multiple equilibrium points are possible in the international system, epistemic communities will help identify which one is selected.”⁶⁵

Throughout *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, the authors looked for just these sorts of community influences in issue areas like international trade, nuclear arms control, whaling rights, ozone depletion, and international food aid. They found that epistemic communities indeed shape policy when they have both opportunity and ability. Leaders turn to epistemic communities for help charting a course to a resolution, determining what that resolution should be, or both, and “insofar as a community exists, is cohesive, and is well placed with respect to the decision-making process, the prospects improve for the adoption and implementation of its policy project.”⁶⁶

Haas’s collection thus traces how, when, and why an idea can travel from the minds of a cohesive few, to implementation on a global scale. Haas is not trying to discount the effect of power or structure on international behavior, and concedes that the “range of impact that we might expect of epistemic and epistemic-like communities remains conditioned and bounded by international and national structural realities.”⁶⁷ He does argue, however, that “while traditional studies of the balance of power in international relations may increase our understanding of whose preferred vision of world order is likely to prevail, they do not address the question of how the preferred and alternate visions are formed and how they change in response to new technology and

⁶⁵ Haas, 373.

⁶⁶ James K. Sebenius, “Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities,” edited by Peter M. Haas in *Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination* (Columbia: South Carolina Press, 1997), 362.

⁶⁷ Haas, 7.

understandings of cause-and-effect relationships.”⁶⁸ Epistemic communities provide that missing step in their theories.

Epistemic communities are not institutions per se, but certainly affect the role and impact of institutions within international politics. Epistemic communities will not possess adjudication or executive authorities, but may convince states to create institutions that do. As happened with the GATT and strategic arms reduction treaties, epistemic communities guided states to create international regimes and worked to convince states that accepting binding agreements was in their best interest. The resulting “binding” creates the socialization that Waltz and Wendt wrote about, it helps reduce uncertainty, and can lead to the sorts of reassurance that Ikenberry said was critical to peaceful cooperation. Thus, epistemic communities can help overcome the roadblocks of building institutions and making their power acceptable to individual states.

Epistemic communities can also harden the system against the impact of change. Similar to Wendt and Watson’s idea of evolution, and Ikenberry’s notion of increasing returns, Haas believes that once ideas enter a system, they are hard to get out. He talks about the power of precedent, and claims, “institutional choices are influenced to a greater extent by historically inherited preferences and styles than by external structural factors.”⁶⁹ When statesmen turn to epistemic communities in times of uncertainty, those communities get to form the political equivalent of first impressions, and their “initial identification of interests and decision-making procedures will have a major influence on subsequent policy choices, alternatives deemed possible, and actual state behavior.”⁷⁰ Once these policy choices take effect the “established patterns of cooperation in a given issue-area may persist, even though systemic power concentrations may no longer be sufficient to compel countries to coordinate their behavior.”⁷¹ Thus, rising and falling nations may not be able to upset the system.

The effects of epistemic communities on Carr’s three roadblocks look similar to many effects from our earlier political theories. There is, however, an important

⁶⁸ Haas, 388.

⁶⁹ Haas, 33.

⁷⁰ Haas, 33.

⁷¹ Haas, 4.

distinction between them. In earlier theories, regimes and institutions are created by states for the intent purpose of furthering that states interest, thus control of the policy rested with the state. Epistemic communities exist outside of politics, and their influence does not originate with elected leaders, regional hegemons, or powerful state leaders. This takes a degree of control away political leaders, and places it in the hands of a privileged few. As we pointed out in the beginning of this section, this is a mixture of system and unit level attributes that adds a new dimension to our understanding of international relations, and represents the unique contribution of Haas's work.

Thus, Haas offers the possibility for a top tier solution that is not based on power. He contends that, "In the absence or aftermath of a hegemonically created world order, an alternative order based on shared cause-and-effect understandings, practices, and expectations may be possible."⁷² Such a top tier solution can bring peace because as "epistemic communities make some of the world problems more amenable to human reason and intervention, they can curb some of the international system's anarchic tendencies, temper some of the excesses of a purely state-centric order, and perhaps even help bring about a better international order."⁷³

Burning Down the Haas

Peter Haas worked within the boundaries laid down by E. H. Carr. He examined the system for what it was, took account of the role of power and security in international politics, found a gap in realism's explanatory power, and then tried to fill it with his theory of epistemic communities. Haas tried to balance reality with free will and "erase the artificial boundaries between international and domestic politics so that the dynamic between structure and choice [could] be illuminated."⁷⁴ He found an expanding role for ideas within politics as "the increasing uncertainties associated with many modern responsibilities of international governance have led policymakers to turn to new and different channels of advice, often with the result that international policy coordination is enhanced."⁷⁵ Yet, ultimately Haas's theory may fall short of Carr's goal.

⁷² Haas, 389.

⁷³ Haas, 390.

⁷⁴ Haas, 367.

⁷⁵ Haas, 12.

While epistemic communities provide a useful instrument for the analysis of IR, as a tool used to forge a new political order they are ungainly to wield. Haas did not pursue a general theory of international politics, but rather sought “to specify a set of constrained conditions under which order is possible, based on the creation of collective meaning”⁷⁶ We cannot create those “constrained conditions” artificially. For epistemic communities to play an active role in policy formation, a complex and uncertain environment must drive political leaders to seek the advice of a single community with an authoritative, cohesive, shared vision of a politically relevant issue. While Haas demonstrates how this has happened in the past, epistemic communities are not a prescription that we can apply to every security issue within international politics. We do not seek to generate uncertainty just to make epistemic communities more viable. Nor does every security issues have a single, cohesive group of experts associated with it.

Beyond making epistemic communities relevant, it may not be possible for political leaders to ensure that their influence is always peaceful. Haas argues that epistemic communities can help forge a new international order, but “whether or not that order will be a better international order depends largely on the extent to which it is also based on shared values, rather than individual states interests, and on moral vision.”⁷⁷ Epistemic communities could use their influence to tear apart cooperation and generate mistrust or conflict. Watson showed us that a single international society might contain multiple cultures. If they exist internationally throughout one culture, but not the other, could they drive them apart? By Haas’s definition of epistemic communities, would McCarthyism, Qutbism, or the Muslim Brotherhood count? The start of the cold war left many political leaders scrambling for answers and few issues are more complex then religion. Within each environment, a cohesive group of like-minded specialists emerged to shape public opinion and influence political leaders across borders. That influence strengthened ties within one culture while destroying ties with another. Even if these cases stretch the definition of epistemic communities, they certainly demonstrate a similar role of ideas acting on international politics.

⁷⁶ Haas, 368.

⁷⁷ Haas, 389.

Thus, the work Haas has compiled on epistemic leaves us with several questions. What types of ideas and norms increase, rather than impede, cooperation? How do we make epistemic communities more relevant in issue areas with broad levels of expertise? How do we ensure that an epistemic community will hold ideas that align with a current international order, rather than advocate its destruction? If a particular epistemic community, such a climate change specialists, present us with notions that we do not feel are in the interest of our country, such as the Kyoto Protocol, should we abide by its influence to promote cooperation, or resist its influence because of our power? In short, while epistemic communities may have aided international cooperation in the past, we cannot control when they will apply, the issues they will influence, or the nature of the influence they will have on the system.

Summing Things Up

E. H. Carr launched us on our journey through IR with two fundamental mandates: start with reality, and end with peace. The first mandate shaped Carr's problematizing of IR and spawned our formulation of base tier forces and the roadblocks to peace. The realists expounded on and expanded our understanding of the base forces in the world. The chapter 3 authors have called all of that analysis into question. They have split, in three different directions, from the classic realist and liberal debate, and worked more to question Carr than to follow him. Their work provides us with new ontologies, fresh perspectives, and renewed possibilities.

Alexander Wendt brought the power of ideas back to the forefront of political theory. His work serves as a culmination of many of numerous scholars who had begun to question not just our actions in the world, but our very understanding of it. Carr framed our political challenge as a struggle between ideas and material force. Wendt shifted the variables and placed ideas in the foundation of state actions. This led to new definitions of anarchy and "trust" as a binding concept. Wendt moved constructivism from philosophy to political theory. He stopped short, however, of constructivist policy, which leaves us with many new questions to answer.

Adam Watson cast further doubt on the realist standpoint. His walk through history revealed that some of our foundational truths might be closer to assumptions. Sovereignty, independence, and a system of states are all a constructions of the modern

world. Despite our system's firm roots in the past, other societies and perceptions of legitimate rule have existed in our world. He suggests that our path to peace may involve bringing those ideas to the world once again. Struggle and conflict lessen when our beliefs and actions align, and if material needs drive us to conditions of hegemony and limited sovereignty, then our minds must follow. Watson suggests that this does happen, and that the role of ideas is constantly evolving. He leaves us wondering, however, "evolving into what?" Watson, too, has left many questions in an unfinished theory.

Peter Haas provides us with a third mechanism for translating ideas into reality. Epistemic communities serve as channels for moving shared beliefs into domestic interests, across state boundaries, and onto the world political stage. They are not structure, process, or units, but a separate unit level player that acts with structural effect. As an agent for states, for scientific communities, or for any shared paradigm, epistemic communities can shape policy in times of uncertainty. The effectiveness of these communities is circumstantial, however. Without proper conditions, they become just one more voice in raging political debate. And when their voices do penetrate international politics, there is no guarantee that their effect will be benign. Divisive and damaging ideas have the same chance of pervading international politics as the peaceful ones do. Thus, Haas adds another variable to our increasingly complex problematizing of IR.

All three of these works contain a mix of realist and liberal thought. Their cumulative utility lies in showing how and when those theories may apply. Our reading of Wendt would suggest that systems of friends and low degree rivals benefit most from a realist perspective, while societies of friends can work more toward liberal goals. Watson similarly explains that every system tends to follow the influence of its dominant culture. When that culture leans "independent," states lean neorealist, and when that culture shifts "dominion," less balancing occurs. Haas offers the possibility that either theory could apply, depending on who has access to the decision makers that shape domestic and international agendas. Each one finds a role for ideas in the machinations of international politics.

Together, these authors modify, more than address, our roadblocks to peace. They call into questions the way in which we should seek to balance power and morality,

suggesting that the answer may lay in our ability to erase the need for power, rather than our ability to learn to wield it effectively. This, in turn, alters our perception of the role of institutions. They become transformation engines, designed to educate statesmen, not arbitrate state actions. Perhaps their most contentious modifications to our roadblocks are their views on peaceful change. Each author (Wendt and Watson in particular) put forward some notion of evolution in international society, which indicates a momentum toward increasingly peaceful relations. Although change is part of their theories, they suggest this change has direction, and that backtracking is unlikely. Thus, they imply that change should eventually slow and international society will ultimately settle into some evolved form. Their proof of such a vectored evolution is largely empirical.

This leaves us with little finality in declaring a top tier solution for international peace. As we stated at the beginning of our analysis, many of these theories share common views about the foundations of our political debate, but see in them very different implications. Carr's second mandate was to seek a "common destination" for all humanity—to go beyond the study of international relations and strive for a path to peace. Chapter 3 leads us to conclude that Carr's path may not appear as a line on a map, with decipherable directions and a final destination. Instead, it may involve an ontological shift, away from our focus on "destination," and toward the importance of "common." Perhaps the drive is unnecessary, and stopping our cars on the roadside to get out and talk is our most promising prospect for peace.

Conclusion

Our analysis began with E. H. Carr's problematizing of international relations. We divided his work into layers: our base tier forces, the middle tier roadblocks, and the top tier conceptions of a peaceful world order. Essentially, Carr asked and answered three foundational questions. First, what causes conflict and tension in our world? Second, how do those tensions work to prevent peaceful international relations? Third, what would a peaceful system, able to overcome those conflicts, need to look like? Carr posed those same questions to future political theorists, and our analysis shows that they responded. The long shadow of E. H. Carr has stretched across a century and multiple schools of thought.

By breaking our analysis into these three layers, we hoped to achieve some understanding of IRs common ground. As we anticipated, our theories varied in their perception of the repercussions of global political interaction. The realists suggest that security is our greatest concern. Whether it results from biology or structure, states cannot escape the fact that they must look out for themselves when competing within anarchy. Liberals suggest that the competition itself may be self-defeating. Cooperation can offer more economic benefits, and perhaps even more security. The constructivists hypothesize that either could be true, depending on how we think about the world. The English school let us know that not every civilization in our history has thought the same way, and that the secret to peace lies in making sure that our thoughts and reality align. Within the system, structural forces, microstructures, states, and other agents such as epistemic communities all vie for influence over our thoughts and actions. Bringing the summary full circle, the realists then argue that given this uncertainty it is best to default to a position of strength, as they had offered in the first place.

We have uncovered, however, as many similarities between the theories as we have differences, whether the theories acknowledge this similarity or not. For example, both realists and liberals assert that complexity and interdependence changes a state's decision calculus. They simply disagree over whether that influence enables or prevents cooperation and peaceful change. They have couched their differences in arguments over the true interests of states. They debate about which theory truly grounds itself in reality.

We often paint these theories as incompatible, divergent views of humanity and political workings. Their differences may seem extreme, however, because of way they have framed these debates.

E. H. Carr worried about the end of the world. Whether or not his fears were unfounded we do not yet know. He tried to motivate others to break away from sterile thinking and chart a course toward peace. Carr declared, “Our task is to explore the ruins of our international order and discover on what fresh foundations we may hope to rebuild it.”¹ He defined our concerns in terms of power and morality, order, war, and peace. Carr challenged us to ground our thinking in reality, but never lose sight of the fact that we can control our own destinies. He started a tradition of international relations study over 100 years ago, and that field has grown and progressed even since.

So why do we still read *The Twenty Year's Crisis* today? We read it because Carr made us ask the all the right questions. His questions led to the theories we examined in chapters 1 through 3, and inspire the models we present in appendix A. It was Carr who first articulated dissatisfaction with the strict separation of the realist and utopian schools of thought. He teaches us that there is no firm, universal, realist truth. Nor is there a single idea that can save the world. The truth lay in balance, in asking the right questions, and knowing when and how to look at things a different way.

Carr may not have understood every aspect of international relations, but he knew what statesmen must do. He guided international relations study to the right issues in order to help those statesmen along their way. Carr knew that we must try to comprehend the basic forces that drive politics and behavior in our world. He encouraged us to appreciate how those forces would make peace difficult. Then he inspired us to work like mad until we found a way around them.

Carr's work was a monumental leap forward in the international relations field. His concept of the duality of material and purpose launched an entire school of study. In Thomas Kuhn's terms, Carr's work was a paradigm shift.² We have been performing normal science within that paradigm ever since he first published. These 100 years have brought us new understandings of his themes and his tiers of IR. This paper has tried to

¹ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Year's Crisis* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 209.

² Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996)

bring those understandings together by synthesizing key elements of realist, liberal, and constructivist theories to help us understand war and peace, conflict and cooperation.

The realists greatly expanded our understanding of the base tier forces and elaborated on the many difficulties in the roadblocks to peace. Hans Morgenthau staked out the realist position with a breadth and depth that still serves as a touchstone today. He gave us new ways to think about political change, and offered laid out the role that diplomacy should play in international peace. Kenneth Waltz changed the field when he introduced his theories of structure. He swung the IR pendulum firmly back to the discussion of material forces within international politics. His work has resonated throughout the field with same impact of Carr. John Mearsheimer expanded our views of uncertainty and fear. His ideas play a key role when assessing the actual actions of states, and challenge us to think beyond the rational actor model in international politics.

Our liberal authors took the discussion beyond issues of power. Although the realists claim these issues are subordinate to power discussions, they offer important insights into a final formulation of top tier solutions. Norman Angell outlined the ramifications of interdependence in our modern world. Even if Carr disagrees with his conclusions, we cannot ignore his arguments in our analysis. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye took this theme of interdependence directly into Waltz's world of structure. By redefining cooperation as compatible with self-interest, they opened the door to the reconciliation of realist and liberal ideas. John Ikenberry took Carr's final step, and began to bring together these concepts in a map toward a new political order. He showed us how institutions could help serve all of the pillars of security, and make possible the formation of peaceful supra-state solutions.

Our authors in chapter 3 brought the arguments full circle around to some of Carr's original questions. Alexander Wendt reopened the door for ideas in international relations study, pulling Carr's concept of free will back into the structural debate. His theory led us to many of our conclusions about how to manipulate the perceptions of states to maintain peace. Adam Watson's evolutionary theory furthered Carr's concept of the link between realism and utopianism. In our quest for peace, he challenged us think beyond solutions within our current system of states. He got us question our assumptions about the very system itself. Peter Hass showed us that theories about ideas are not just

theoretical. States and states agents can change policy with the power of ideas. He brought physical reality to constructivist theory.

Many questions remain for the future. Within our analysis, we never addressed the question of whether anarchical struggles contain some merit that a hierarchy cannot provide. Perhaps long-term legitimacy stems flows better from an open struggle to the finish than it does from arbitration. Do we need conflict in this world to resolve some of our antithetical ideological divides? If we can reduce the threat of global extermination that Carr was worried about, can wars and conflict play a valuable role in establishing a future peace? We did not address these issues, but perhaps set the stage for future studies.

I believe that E. H. Carr would be proud of the progress that international relations study has made thus far. As we progressed through our authors, we saw increasing adherence to Carr's mandates. The theories progressively worked to stay more and more grounded in the reality of the international situation, and each theory set the goal of evaluating our chances for peace, stability, and order. Carr may not have agreed with all of our conclusions, but he would agree with the direction that our studies have taken.

Our final analysis began with Carr's questions. His dissatisfaction with extreme views of politics resonates throughout our study here, and is still pervasive in IR theory today. The IR community continues to move toward a comprehensive amalgamation of realist and utopian ideas. The human search for peace did not begin in 1919, but our quest to find a path to international peace has been in E. H. Carr's shadow ever since.

Appendix A

The Beginnings of a Theory

Our analysis ended with many questions, and this is as it should be. Until the day when we have solved world peace, we must continue to ask questions. It was Carr's questions that drove much of IR and much of our analysis. In tracking the answers to these questions, IR theory has taken many different paths. There are true contentions between the various of schools, but as we have seen, there are also considerable similarities. The question we begin to address in this appendix is whether or not we can reconcile some of those contentions by changing the language and perspectives within some of these issue areas. Can we frame the IR debate in a way that takes into account the many concerns and ideas within IR?

We hope to gain a fuller understanding of the security environment and some of the base tier forces we have discussed earlier. Our analysis will follow the problematizing of E. H. Carr. We begin with the assumption that every theory we have examined so far has been correct—but correct only in certain circumstances. We will take a syncretic approach to arranging these ideas to try to discern what those circumstances are. The goal is to reconcile these apparently divergent theories by redefining the way we look at state's interests. In doing so, we hope to demonstrate that these theories are not so much sides of a coin, but simply different aspects of a larger, working, coherent political puzzle.

We start with a look at the various portrayals of anarchy. In doing so, we hope to change the argument from one about hierarchy and anarchy to one about submission and power. Many of our authors have questioned the assumption that there exists a strict break between state and international politics. I contend that this delineation is socially constructed, and it blurs our definitions and recommendations within IR. From this discussion, we arrive at picture of politics constructed not of sovereign states within anarchy, but of a global intermeshing of individuals, groups, and groups of groups.

Our next goal is to understand the needs of these groups. I use the term needs specifically, because although our theories differ in their descriptions of group desires, they share similar ideas about their needs. To bring things together in a syncretic way,

we will define these needs in the negative—asking what it is that groups must *avoid*, or else risk losing coherence as a group. I call these needs the *pillars of security*.

Once we have defined the pillars, we will look at how they relate to one another. We will draw on our earlier discussion of hierarchy and anarchy, and the findings from our first three chapters in order to expand on the concept of the pillars and arrange them into a hierarchy. Once our hierarchy is complete, we will demonstrate how and where the various schools of IR fit into this *Hierarchy of State Needs*.

We finish this appendix by looking at our findings in relationship to Carr's problematizing of IR. We hope to show how our construction can offer a clearer picture of base tier forces and roadblocks. We close by offering some examples of how the language and ontology of the *pillars of security* and the *hierarchy of state needs* alters our perspective on some of the political issues facing the world today.

A Question of Anarchy

Many of our theories have discussed the effects that anarchy produces at the international level. To understand them we must first ask, what do they mean by anarchy? The proposition is that because no higher or more powerful entity exists above the modern state, those states are in anarchy. States have no entity to turn to, and must therefore rely upon themselves. Below the state level, individuals, cities, counties, and provinces all have the nation-state to turn to. This argument would imply that any time two groups exist, and one group sits at a higher level of organization than the other group, then the forces of anarchy cease to apply to the lower group. The top of the totem pole is sovereign and self-help, while all others are subject to hierarchic arrangements. This description of anarchy is a gross misrepresentation of reality.

Imagine that within a state, two citizens have submitted to the state's authority. As long as both citizens A and B abide by the rulings of the state, then they exist within a hierarchy. When citizen A and B disagree, they turn to the state to arbitrate. Their interactions are defined by the presence of the state. If citizen B defects from his submission and turns to a life of crime, then these relationships change. Citizen A is still within a hierarchy—he relies on the power of the state to protect him from and punish citizen B. Citizen B has placed himself in an entirely different relationship. He is in his own self-help struggle against both Citizen A, and the state. When the state uses its

power to subdue and punish that person, we currently call it a hierarchy—but why? Is it because the state possesses overwhelming power and can force him to comply? How is this a hierarchy, and yet US relations with Madagascar are not? Is it simply because we “say” that Madagascar is sovereign? Does overwhelming power automatically equate to establishing a hierarchy? In reality, the difference between self-help and cooperative systems is not determined by whether or not a hierarchy exists, but whether or not individuals or sub-groups choose to abide by that hierarchy. Any individual, or group of individuals, can place itself *within* a hierarchy simply by choosing to submit to a group identity. Likewise, any group can subject themselves to the structural forces of anarchy at any time, simply by choosing to engage in a power struggle. Anarchy does not cause self-help behavior, the decision to engage in self-help behavior creates anarchy.

Yet, we clearly understand that there is a difference between citizen B’s decision to resist the authority of the United States, and Russia’s decision to resist the authority of the United States. In the first circumstance, the contest of power is nearly a foregone conclusion. In the second, the outcome of that contestation is very much in doubt. This demonstrates two important concepts. First, positive control of group X by another group Y can occur either because group X submits to group Y, or because group Y possesses overwhelming power. Either of these situations creates an ordering of the groups and elevates group Y to the role of sovereign, but the first order possess the traditional attributes of a hierarchy, while the second faces all the challenges of a self-help relationship. Second, this demonstrates that although any group is free to choose to resist authority, not every group can freely choose to be in control.

The key takeaway is that the difference between control and submission is not the same as the difference between anarchy and hierarchy. This applies both domestically and internationally. Think back to Angell’s anecdote about the master and slave. Although it appears that one is free while the other is not, the truth is that it is simple matter of degree, determined by levels of need and power. The slave is not free to determine his own path, but the master is not free to let go of the rope. The master must provide for, feed, and shelter the slave, and should the master’s burden grow too large, he may have to release the rope to tend to his own needs. Can we not say the same about criminals, civil wars, or collective security struggles? Although there is an ordering, the

power struggle has not ceased. The relationship between master and slave only changes character when the slave chooses to freely follow his former captor.

To illustrate this point, I ask: where does hierarchy begin and anarchy end after conquest? When the United States toppled the Hussein regime, did the new Iraqi government become sovereign the moment they stood up? Did their requirement to engage in self-help activities end because the international community dubbed them sovereign? The answer is no, groups at the top of a hierarchical arrangement can still engage in power politics with their “subordinate” groups. We can define a sovereign power as the top group that can exercise control over a particular population of sub-groups, but there is a distinct difference between sovereign authority and sovereign legitimacy. Any authority gained through coercion is actually an ongoing power struggle, whether it has broken into open conflict or not.

While these two “sovereigns” may seem the same, their internal operations and struggles are distinctly different. Structural realism suggests that this does not matter. The difference between them is profound, however, when we are trying to formulate a new international order. Many of our theories have argued over the viability of achieving peace through a supra-state structure. They frame the debate as a choice between creating an international hierarchy, or just finding a way for states to work together within anarchy. Our reasoning suggests this is a false dichotomy.

Trying to define order as “hierarchical” or “anarchical” is a distraction, and causes many theorists to talk past one another. Both solutions are attempting to achieve the same thing—the formation of an international “group” above the state level. What they are really arguing over is the viability of creating international sovereign authority versus trying to create international sovereign legitimacy. These are two markedly different methods for expanding domestic cooperation to the international level.

Much like the theories in chapter 3, this offers an alternative view of the world political system. We often conceive of our world as a collection of hierarchical states, existing as units in an anarchical mix. Alternatively, we can picture the world as global mesh of individuals, individuals in groups, and groups of groups, arranged through a series of control or submission relationships. We can imagine controlling entities above other groups, but with coercive relationships represented as downward arrows and

submission relationships represented as upward arrows. Figure 1 depicts these models side by side. Within the mesh formulation, all we require to form a supra-state entity is agreement between two or more states to work together. This creates a group identity through submission, and empowers that grouping with legitimacy.

A critical aspect of forming higher order groups through submission is that it requires compliance from all of its composite entities. As the realists have warned, if one




Figure 1: “Classic” and “Mesh” Depictions of the International System

unit defects, it changes the relationship to one of power politics. As we described in our example of citizens A and B, however, we should remember that this does not change the relationship of everyone within that group. One state defecting from an international alliance places that state at odds with the group, not at odds with each individual member of the group.

If we accept this formulation, then we can begin to discuss and diagnose what internal attributes—like power and legitimacy—help a group maintain its integrity. Furthermore, we can separate those forces from the purely external issues—like fear, uncertainty, structural forces, and imperial change—which may threaten a group or make cooperation more difficult. As Ikenberry suggests, it is about extending the same cooperation that happens within a state to a higher international level. This brings us

back to Carr's critical, but less explored question from *The Twenty Year's Crisis*: what makes people submit to a group? A better way to ask that question might be, "what needs of individuals (or sub-groups) must a group meet in order to make submission possible?"

Many of our theories have examined states interests, but few have articulated them as requirements for submission. Our formulation of the *pillars of security* will attempt to do just that. We base our pillars on the three central concepts that have appeared in every theory we have studied thus far: security, economics, and morality. We see these themes repeated not just in international relations, but in every political and security field we encounter. Whether it is Thucydides' concepts of fear, honor, and interest, constitutional amendments guaranteeing life, liberty, and property, or the US Army War College listing of "core U.S. interests [as] physical security; promotion of values; and economic prosperity," these themes are pervasive.¹ From our earlier analysis, we will attempt to deduce their interrelations. Particularly, we want to understand how these three issues interact to either bring together, or pull apart, a group. From there we will construct our *hierarchy of needs*, which will allow us to articulate when cooperation starts, and what makes it stop.

Constructing the Pillars

In the mode of Norman Angel, we begin our conversation on the *pillars of security* with a thought experiment. Imagine early cavemen, struggling for survival in a vast prehistoric wilderness. They have yet to form any societal structures, but their growing numbers and search for sustenance slowly bring them into contact with one another. As two cavemen fish on opposite sides of a pond, they witness a third caveman being bludgeoned by a massive fourth, who steals his food and shelter.

The two weaker cavemen, fearing the return of their would-be assailant, band together in order to defend their pond. As long as their vulnerability persists, they will fish and live together, sacrificing some freedoms in the process. They could lose their need to collaborate in one of two ways. Either their threat disappears, in which case they

¹ Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Profession: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, (Westport: Praeger Security Intl., 2008), 120.

are free to go to separate ponds, or through their cooperation, they both become such skilled warriors that they can defend themselves, despite the outside threat.

Overcoming their need for collective security does not automatically drive our cavemen apart, but rather it transfers their decision to “submit” to the group or “resist” their pairing to the next issue: surviving the elements. As our cavemen worked together, they had to provide themselves with necessities like food and shelter. If the two men cannot catch enough fish to feed them both, it drives a wedge between them. When the threat existed, this sacrifice seemed acceptable, but now it motivates them to go separate ways. Conversely, if they can *only* provide sufficient food and shelter when working together, say hunting game instead of fishing, this strengthens their bond. If either man alone can catch enough fish to provide for himself, however, there is no requirement to stay together, nor is there an impetus to leave.

With abundant food and no security threat, the decision to continue submission to their newfound tribe transfers to a third issue: cultural values. There is no impetus to defect from the group if they share common interests. If one caveman, however, revels in blood sport while the other abhors mindless killing, then there is motivation to split. Both cavemen move to form separate groups that represent their own ideologies, again assuming that this new group can defend and feed itself. These ideas may be very powerful, the thought of killing innocents so offends one that he vows to end the practice, and the two groups now find themselves in conflict. While this story is fiction, it illustrates the rudimentary workings of the *pillars of security*. This anecdote intentionally ignores the possibility of self-sacrifice and altruism. These are important issues that we will discuss later, but not until after we more firmly define our pillars.

From our thought experiment, we see that “submission” has two basic modes, and thus we should actually have three different relationship “arrows” on our “mesh” concept of international society. First, we have elevation of one group over another by force, which we represent as a downward arrow. Second, we have the concept of submission contingent on external pressure. This still appears as an upward pointing arrow, but it requires outside circumstances to generate that arrows, much like Alexander Wendt’s first and second-degree friend identities. Last, we have internally reinforcing submission, another upward arrow. Unlike Wendt’s concept of third-degree friends, however, this

arrow requires more than just trust. Per our anecdote, a group must meet all three *pillars of security* in order to generate a sustainable upward arrow.

Attempting to define the pillars as interests that our cavemen were trying to attain, however, leads to difficulties when we try to assign them a priority. In our caveman example, our protagonists first needed power to secure themselves and their food, and next required food to live before they cared about culture. As Angell pointed out in chapter 2, however, power is only required when someone is actively threatening you. Our cavemen could have achieved similar results by moving to a distant pond away from the threat, or perhaps sharing their food with the fourth caveman. Additionally, if we focus on positive gains (like adding power, control, money, or wealth) as interests, then when we proscribe them as policy, they become relative measures.

We cannot have two cavemen that are both stronger than the other is, or that both have control over one another. It is a paradoxical proposition. Carr demonstrated the same phenomenon when states attempted to elevate moral principles to obligations within politics. Thus, trying to discern which interests states should pursue first in order to satisfy their *pillars of security* is a futile task. I contend that this is why most of the friction and conflict exists between the various schools of IR. The only way to describe the pillars that meets the “logical conclusion” litmus test is in terms of *negative objectives*, not positive gains.² Put another way, we should determine what states are trying to prevent. This is how we will define our pillars.

The first *pillar of security* is the need to avoid anthropogenic selection.³ A group provides this pillar when it prevents its subordinate individuals or sub-groups from being actively eliminated by other individuals or groups. This wording is very specific. We should appreciate that it does not imply that states must render themselves invulnerable. It is not simply a reach for power. Great power *can* secure this pillar by increasing resilience and deterring challengers, but as Morgenthau mentioned, having very little power can also make a state less of a target because no one cares about them.

² Recall that Norman Angel offered a test to determine the coherence of a particular theory. We must take that theory all the way to its logical conclusion on both extremes, and ensure that it did not end in a paradox, like the aforementioned problem of trying to have two cavemen both with superior power.

³ If natural selection implies the passive elimination of unfit entities because of their inability to compete in the natural world, then anthropogenic selection implies the active elimination of entities as the result of deliberate human targeting of that entity.

States can work to provide this pillar through multiple, often cumulative mechanisms. As Mearsheimer described, oceans, water barriers, and geography can add to this pillar. This helps explain why the territorial state is such a powerful political concept. Cohesive territory is far easier to defend than disparate or diaspora populations. Simply reducing the possibility of attack also bolsters this pillar, for example, when institutions make state actions more transparent, when Wendt's trust exists between states, when Watson's pendulums align, or when cultural beliefs do not conflict as in our caveman example above.

None of these actions increase power, but all reduce the probability of active elimination, thus the difference between positive gains and negative objectives. This perspective helps explain why the United States considers the United Kingdom, with hundreds of nuclear warheads, less of a threat than Iran armed with one. If these actions do not provide a perception of security, then states often try to ensure this pillar by pursuing the paradoxical "most powerful goal," which often triggers a security dilemma. Alternatively, a state can account for this pillar by preventing its subordinate individuals or sub-groups from doing anything about their fears.

The second *pillar of security* is the need to avoid natural selection. A group provides this pillar when it prevents its subordinate individuals or sub-groups from being passively eliminated by the inability to provide for essential needs. This is again a wordy but deliberate description of the pillar. Whereas fear and the security dilemma drove our first pillar, scarcity drives the second pillar. A state can provide this pillar in multiple ways beyond the pursuit of wealth. While economic success does provide for the pillar, so does North Korea's sabre rattling, which secures them desperately needed international economic aid. States can ensure this pillar through expansion, extortion, conquest, trade, cooperation, bandwagoning, the lowering of internal expectations, or the forceful subjugation of its citizens.

We separate the first two pillars despite the fact that a single entity or action could threaten them simultaneously. We must remember that the *pillars of security* focus on what a group must provide downward to its subordinates, not on what endangers those subordinates. It is true that a cognitive opponent could deliberately try to eliminate an opponent by removing their essentials, as occurred in castle sieges and naval blockades.

Despite this overlap, meeting the needs of the people requires two steps. First, we must defeat our opponent's siege army or end the blockade. Next, we must obtain food for the members of our group. Simply defeating the threat does not automatically guarantee our survival.

The third *pillar of security* is the need to prevent infringement upon our beliefs. A group provides this pillar when it prevents external entities from imposing undesired cultural norms onto its subordinate individuals or sub-groups. This is not the equivalent of the Western concept of freedom of expression. It is closer to John Stuart Mill's concept of self-determination.⁴ This pillar does not assume that every group strives for a culture of freedom, but that all object when they cannot determine their own culture. This could be a culture of democracy, monarchical rule, communism, abject poverty, or sharia law. It is easier to identify the minimum requirements for our first two pillars than for our third. We know when a state falls below a minimum amount of protection or provision because people die, but what do minimum beliefs look like?

It helps to answer this question if we also think of the third pillar in terms of negative objectives. What does a group morally oppose? What are they trying to prevent? Through such a lens, societies appear as collections of intolerances. We see these intolerances manifest at three different levels within a group: *cultural*, *political*, and *enforcement*. At the *cultural level*, we are talking about the core beliefs that guide most citizens' behaviors in everyday life—things that are generally not acceptable. For example, in the United States we are generally intolerant of corruption, prostitution, alcoholism, polygamy, speeding, lying, blackmail, insider trading, monopolies, slavery, racism, sexism, or infringements on our speech.

These, of course, will not apply to every individual in the group (which is one key to understanding the interworkings of the pillars that we will discuss later), but do represent what a particular group espouses as intolerances. It is harder to say that every American wants to make as much money as they can, then it is to say that no American wants his money stolen. Some of these intolerances remain at the cultural level, while others—usually the more deeply held ones—elevate to the next level.

⁴ I probably need to write something really fancy about JS Mill here, with some kind of citation. It would be great if I had two really brilliant IR professors helping me with this paper that knew how to do that.

At the *political level*, the group codifies these intolerances into punishable offenses. Within a state, they become laws. Many of the aforementioned US intolerances are part of our constitution and our legal code. Others, like lying, may only be illegal under certain circumstances. Groups further delineate the importance of intolerances at the *enforcement level*. The punishment for speeding is less harsh than for grand theft or murder. Interpreting the laws of a group can help us determine which intolerances are most critical to protect when trying to maintain acquiescence within the group.

When these levels of intolerance do not align, it threatens the internal coherence of the group. Strict cultural taboos that are not legally enforced cause disquiet. Actions that harshly enforce unpopular ideas, or do not reflect the core values they are trying to protect (such as enforcing democracy at gunpoint) can appear illegitimate and fail. No individual shares every ideal of their group, but they accept some degree of impingement on personal beliefs for the benefits of the other two pillars. If the group infringes too much, they may defect. If an individual and the group (or two sub-groups within a group) hold antithetical intolerances, then the fracturing of the group may be unavoidable.⁵

From this description, we see that although the third pillar is about group beliefs, it is not purely abstract. Many of these beliefs are about the handling of material goods and resources while others are strictly ideational, but each intolerance is, at its core, a perception of legitimacy. There is no material minimum for these perceptions. Instead, states must strike a balance between the values its subordinates place on their intolerances and the material minimums of the first two pillars. Thus, a state could account for the third pillar in two different ways. It could adapt its *political* and *enforced* intolerances to match the *cultural level*, thereby increasing its legitimacy; or, a state could suppress *cultural intolerances* by leveraging the first two pillars to maintain control. Put simply, a state could threaten or starve its people into abandoning their beliefs.

⁵ We will expand on this idea in the next section.

We will refer to the three pillars of security as the *anthro pillar*, the *natural pillar*, and the *belief pillar*, respectively. These pillars are similar to the three basic literary conflicts: man versus man, man versus nature, and man versus himself. To remain coherent, a group must account for protection, sustainment, and the alignment of internal beliefs. Again, this does not imply that states seek power, wealth, and freedom. States could use isolation and nuclear deterrence, communist food distribution, and the violent put down of protestors to account for the pillars, as we see in North Korea. To use our earlier language, states can meet these needs with upward or downward arrows, but they must account for all three or the group will fracture. We do see up arrows in many Western democracies, when strong national defense, open markets, and democracy satisfy their citizens. These are not, however, the only ways to achieve up arrows. As the neoliberals and Adam Watson explained, achieving up arrows is more about aligning the provisions of the group with the expectations of the sub-group than about any particular political mechanism.




Figure 2: The Pillars of Security

If a state wants to avoid downward coercive power relations within the group, it has two options. First, a state can use (or create the perception of) external forces that drive citizens to comply with the group despite its limitations. Essentially, external realities or perceptions must make the state appear as the lesser of two evils. Second, it

can compose itself such that all of the arrows point up. There are certain material realities, however, that can prevent us from achieving upward arrows. These material realities are our base tier forces. When scarcity prevents a group from meeting minimum *natural pillar* needs, or when antithetical intolerances prevent a group from forming a coherent *belief pillar*, it drives the group back to the first option.

If a state cannot effectively employ either option, it must resort to downward coercion if it wants to remain whole. If the state is willing to transform, or if its citizens act reform it, then these arrows can transition back to upward arrows. This transformation can take several forms. To relieve scarcity issues a state can eliminate part of its population, lessening its material requirements. This could happen peacefully, allowing individuals to emigrate to another state, or it could happen violently, when the state actively opposes that emigration or acts to kill off some citizenry.

In order to switch the belief pillar back to an upwards arrow, a state must annihilate one of the antithetical beliefs within its population. This can happen peacefully by allowing citizens to emigrate to a group with aligned beliefs, or the state can eliminate the idea through education or constructivist social learning. This could also occur violently, should the state choose to eradicate all of the people that hold that idea. Alternatively, the state could fracture into two separate sub-groups in a civil war. The transition to multiple sub-groups may be violent, but afterwards, the antithetical beliefs will be separate and the newly formed states can achieve upward pointing arrows. These violent transformations are of course not recommendations, but simple descriptions of ways in which states or their citizens can end downward coercive relationships.

We want to use this understanding of the *pillars of security* as a bridge between unit level analysis and systems level analysis within IR. The needs that hold together or fracture a state are the same that bind or split international groups of states. We defined the pillars as “negative objectives” in an attempt to show that although our various IR theories disagree about what states want, they may agree on what states want to avoid. One of Carr’s primary lessons, repeated by many of our theorists, was that downward arrows in the international system are potential sources of war. Thus, the study of peace should focus on how to build international group identities with upward arrows, avoiding

the aforementioned violent transformations. These arrows will point up either because of the internal alignment of the pillars, or because of external international forces.

The pillars are necessary, but not always sufficient conditions for self-sustaining cooperation within any group, domestic or international. At the risk of repetition, it may benefit us to analogize the *pillars of security* with a three-legged stool. When the stool has all three legs, it can stand on its own. This does not mean that the stool will always have a group resting on top of it, but the stool could support one. If one leg disappears, the stool can still hold up a group, but only with outside forces to balance the situation and keep it upright. Remove that exterior force, and the cooperation will topple. Likewise, on a single leg, there is still enough strength to hold up a group, but even greater force is required to keep the stool balanced at all times.

None of these ideas about the *pillars of security* should sound new. They simply offer a new perspective of the theories we have already examined—a reformulation of the problematizing of IR. The pillars offer possible explanations for various political situations, such as alliance theory. When a strong enemy appears, the threat to states' *anthro pillar* is high enough for a temporary group to form. This group balances on a single leg of cooperation, held up by the presence of the common enemy. When that enemy falls, if the other two legs of economic assurance and belief preservation do not exist, then the stool will tip and the alliance dissolves. In a case like NATO, formed against the threat of the Soviet Union, the arrangement provided for economic gain and process simplification, both benefiting the *natural pillar*. Additionally, NATO is composed of states with similar Western democratic ideologies, and NATO possesses enough representation and voting to account for the individual beliefs of each member state. Thus, even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the stool had a chance to stand.

Arranging the Hierarchy of State Needs

With the pillars defined, our next challenge becomes how arrange them. We must ask how these pillars interact with one another. Is it possible to have an upward arrow in one pillar, but not in another? Can a group that accounts for its own pillars with downward arrows, like North Korea, ever belong to a higher-level group through an upward arrow, for instance openly submitting to the United Nations? Are any of the

pillars material prerequisites for the other pillars? Is any single pillar more important or necessary than another? We will explore these kinds of issues in this section.

Because of the way we have defined the pillars, they have an inherent theoretical order or priority: the *anthro pillar* first, *natural pillar* second, and *belief pillar* third. An entity cannot consume and gather resources if it is being actively destroyed by another entity. Likewise, it matters little what this entity believes if it starves to death. Thus, if a collection of polities tries to form a new international grouping, it must secure the pillars in order. Most of our earlier analysis supports this ordering of the pillars. The realists clearly believed that security was the first priority of states. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye admitted that cooperation would only occur after security was guaranteed, and Ikenberry argued for institutions in order to gain security. Even Wendt acknowledged that violence had to end (we had to move out of a Hobbesian anarchy) before beliefs began to shape international politics. Theories may have argued against power, but none disputed the requisite nature of survival.

This is not to say that our theories espoused the *anthro pillar* as the most important political interest. Quite to the contrary, nearly all of our theorists indicated a reverse preference for the pillars. They suggest that people value morality first, wealth second, and power last. Carr wrote of the need to wield power morally. Angell, Keohane, and Nye all elevated wealth over power. Wendt and Watson put ideas and legitimacy above that importance of material reality. Even Hans Morgenthau suggested that people are troubled by the fact that they desire to act morally, but are constrained to act on power.

Our *pillars of security*, then, possess this same internal conflict. Materially, the *belief pillar* cannot exist until the *natural pillar* is secure, and we cannot secure the *natural pillar* until we account for the *anthro pillar*, yet states desire them in the reverse order. States do not have to act morally, but should they desire to, they must account for physical survival first. We see evidence of this today when very liberty oriented nations relinquish some civil rights in the name of security, as the United States did in the Patriot Act and other legislation since 9/11. This reinforces the realist view that security must be our primary concern, but also shows that methods other than power can account for that security. This internal conflict between the physical ordering and ideational priority of

the pillars thus emerges as a more elaborate view of Carr's roadblock of balancing power and morality, redefined to suggest that it is more about balancing security and morality.

To increase our understanding of this internal conflict, we must explore the assumption that individuals and groups always desire to survive. Does the fact that individual members of a group can choose to sacrifice themselves violate our physical ordering of the pillars? Because of the way we have defined the pillars, it does not. Remember that the first pillar is the need to avoid anthropogenic selection. Our theory states that if we desire to form a group, then that group must account for this pillar. If we form our group with downward arrows, then we can simply repress this need. If we desire a cooperative group, formed with upward arrows, then the group must provide for that need, but *only* to a degree that satisfies its joining members. The same holds true for the second pillar. Thus, if a group's members *want* to sacrifice themselves in an act of altruism, then the first pillar and the second pillars are *de facto* provided.

This begs an important follow-up question. If individuals can act altruistically, can a group do the same? A group can sacrifice its own integrity should internal tensions demand it, but this is not the same as foregoing its pillars. Each new group that forms after the old group fractures must account for the three pillars of its members. This is true even if the state fractures involuntarily. When the United States split over the issue of slavery (a result of an antithetical belief pillar), the South had to believe that it could defend itself from the North and provide food for its people. Although many Southerners were willing to die for this cause, the South itself had to have the potential to survive in order for them to make that sacrifice. Had the South not promised to provide all three pillars, the split would not have happened.

This highlights an important aspect of altruism; it requires a viable group identity above the unit level. When an individual or sub-group sacrifices itself, such as servicemen and women, religious martyrs, or even a frustrated Tunisian merchant who self-immolates, they do so to advance the cause of those left behind. This identification of a common cause *is* a group identity, a common *belief pillar*, even if the group is not formally recognized. Altruism without a higher group identity is just suicide. Thus, sub-groups can be altruistic, but the highest order collective, the "sovereign" grouping, cannot sacrifice itself. This concept explains why Morgenthau believed that a world public

opinion was a prerequisite for international cooperation. None of Carr's "give and take" (that we require for peaceful change) can happen without it.

The highest order collective, or "sovereign," will be established either by choice, or by circumstance. As we said earlier, any group that chooses to resist grouping and engage in self-help becomes "sovereign." That group may not last long, but it is responsible for all of its own pillars of security. When such a group accounts for all of its pillars with downward coercion, as in our North Korean example, it is unlikely that they will form an upward arrow with other states. It is hard for them to make concession to an alliance when they require all of their state power to hold down the pillars of the people.

Circumstances may also limit the highest level of grouping among states. Scarcity or antithetical beliefs may prevent cooperative grouping. We have talked about how a common threat to the *anthro pillar* can bring a group of states together in a classic "balance of power" manner, but an exogenous force may not always be present. That would leave only downward dominance to form an international grouping, and states may lack the requisite power to establish such control over their neighbors. Thus, international grouping stops when no higher organization can account for all three pillars, and the highest level of organization is "sovereign."

This definition of sovereignty is decidedly different from most of our IR theories. By this definition, not every state is sovereign, and many non-state groups may exist that are. For example, the Pashtun people in the mountains of Pakistan are sovereign. They choose to resist Pakistani rule, they have no external threat that drives them to acquiesce to others, and no state possesses the power to force them to. Old "wild west" townships in 1800s frontier America would have fallen into the same category. Other states, which rely on international institutions or alliances to provide their pillars, are not sovereign. Their level of control is closer to the "dominion" that Watson wrote about. In those arrangements, it may be a partner nation like Russia, or an organization like NATO or the UN that holds sovereignty.

Defining sovereignty in this way can help us describe the evolution of international society. For example, it can help us conceptualize the struggle between monasticism and feudalism in the middle ages. Even if individuals aligned their belief pillars more with the church, as financial structures shifted and mercantilism rose,

territorial rulers could better provide the *natural pillar*. Likewise, changes in military technology, weapons, training, and the financial support needed to maintain it, all shifted to the feudal lord. Soon, a peasants only choice to meet his first two pillars, or the pillars of his family (a sub-group), was the feudal lord. As princes rose, they had to account for the fact many peoples beliefs still aligned across borders with the church. Some princes would crack down with inquisitions, while others would develop a tolerance for freedom of religion. Once all three pillars resided in the territorial “prince,” they became sovereign. As Morgenthau explained in chapter 1, the “sovereignty” of the prince existed in fact before it existed in theory or policy. We are simply using new language to describe that concept.

Layering the Pillars

These pillars do not physically exist. They are merely conceptualizations, like Archimedes’ center of mass. They allow us to predict how individuals, groups, and sub-groups will react when they are pushed in different ways. When a group loses the ability to provide for one of its pillars, it must compensate or change. Up until now, we have only discussed the minimums of these pillars. Our authors have illustrated quite clearly, however, that state interests extend beyond minimum protection and sustenance levels. Our cavemen could form a tribe not only because they had to, but also because it benefited them. History also shows us that states have often sought power, wealth, or the spread of their ideologies beyond any needs of their own. All of these further state interests still fall within our three broad pillar categories: protection from men, protection from the elements, and protection of intolerances. We will account for these interests by breaking our pillars up into three layers. The bottom *critical layer* represents the level to which a group must provide the pillars in order to maintain coherence. Threats to the *critical layer* are existential for the state. The middle *preferred layer* represents the level to which states must expand their pillars in order to maintain their current interests and way of life. Failing to provide for the *preferred layer* will cause tension, but will not fracture the group like the *critical layer*. The top *dominance layer* represents state expansion for expansion’s sake. The layered pillars are depicted in figure 3 below.

These layers clearly mean different things to different states. There is an actual minimum to each of the pillars. There exists a division between deterrence and non-

deterrence, between losing and not losing a war. There are a minimum number of calories needed to sustain a population, and a limit to the beliefs a population will sacrifice before it revolts. These minimums, however, are unknowable, fraught with uncertainty, subject to interpretation, and responsive to the whim of the people. Besides, few subordinates will wait until they actually starve or die before defecting. That is why, when describing the pillars and how states must account for them, we have continuously used the word “perception.”

The divisions between the layers are determined by the perceptions of each group. Sub-groups must perceive they are secure, perceive they are sustained, and perceive their beliefs are adequately represented in order to stay submissive. Likewise, the perception of how much expansion is too much expansion will vary between groups. In fact, the perception of the division between layers is one of the beliefs that the state must account for in the *belief pillar*. To better understand the divisions between layers, we will discuss each of the *preferred layer* pillars in turn.




Figure 3: The Complete Pillars of Security

The *preferred layer* follows the same physical ordering that our *critical layer* of pillars did. The members of a state cannot indulge more of their intolerances unless they can secure the means to provide for them. They cannot secure extra means if they cannot protect those additional resources and themselves from people trying to harm them. Thus, after a state achieves its minimum *critical layer* pillars, becoming a stable group, it

will seek enough protection to “feel” secure again. Now, instead of simply securing the existence of its members, a state must secure its members, their resources, their beliefs, and enough buffer to expand their resources and beliefs to a desired level.

This requires different amounts of the *anthro pillar* depending on internal desires, technology, legitimacy, size, and international standing. As Waltz explained, the more of a global player you are, the more your interests extend beyond your borders, and thus the harder it is for you to “feel secure” about all of your interests. The US may feel it needs enough power to keep any nation from adjusting the status-quo anywhere on earth, whereas Ethiopia may only worry about its direct neighbors. Thus, the minimum and maximum points on the *preferred level* of the *anthro pillar* fluctuate from state to state.

The *preferred natural pillar* is similar. A majority of the citizens of United States have a private residence, a telephone, a television, and transportation. Their perception of minimum levels of sustenance will differ from our friends in Ethiopia. A rising middle class brings with it growing expectations, and once people achieve certain levels of success, they are often reluctant to give them up. Likewise, their views of a legitimate top end will differ. Thus, the *preferred layer* of the *natural pillar* varies from state to state, but it also tends to trend upward internally over time.

This variance and growth can cause conflict. The “growth” gives our scarcity issue a second dimension. Even if a state’s population and goods remain steady, growing expectations can create the perception of scarcity. The variance provides friction between states when trying to cooperate or interact. The United States may feel justified in fighting for oil or trade rights, whereas less developed countries might view that as *dominance layer* activity. Both groups are “right,” in that they accurately reflect the perceptions of their subordinates, thus economic perception is another relative measure within IR that can generate discord. This analysis supports Carr’s assertion that the “harmony of interests” is a flawed concept, and that policies that rely on such a harmony will eventually lead to conflict.

The division between the *critical layer* and the *preferred layer* of the *belief pillar* is difficult to pinpoint. To help express it, we return to our earlier concept of intolerances. I offer that intolerances can be of two natures, either inclusive or exclusive. An inclusive intolerance means that an act is acceptable, but only conditionally so. An

exclusive intolerance refers to a universally forbidden act. An example of an inclusive intolerance in the United States today would be alcohol consumption. We are intolerant of people drinking, but only if they are too young, drink while driving, or drink too much in public. Some forms of drinking are still “included.” Prohibition, on the other hand, was an exclusive intolerance. Two divergent inclusive intolerances stand a better chance of finding peaceful resolution than an inclusive and an exclusive intolerance. If I believe the drinking age should be 19, not 21, then we could compromise at age 20, and the society could enforce it with varying regularity or punishment. The compromise was only one of degree, and the law still resonates with our core intolerance—that age should somehow limit alcohol consumption.

An inclusive and exclusive intolerance, however, cannot co-exist. There is no way to compromise on the “degree” of prohibition. Take again, our example of the Civil War. The South’s belief pillar included slavery for wealthy, white landowners. The North held an exclusive intolerance—no human being should ever own another. These two viewpoints cannot reconcile without sacrificing one of their core intolerances. Their beliefs were antithetical, and to exist as a single United States, our country had to eliminate one of those intolerances.

As we have said, not all “elimination” leads to violence. The current abortion debate is a contest between an inclusive and an exclusive intolerance. In order to end that debate, one of the two interests must sacrifice its position or be eliminated. This is unlikely to lead to civil war, however, because of the state of the pillars within the United States. Unlike civil war times, if the United States split today the two halves would not be able to provide the same pillars that US as a whole can provide. First, the two sides would be unlikely to defend themselves well because there is no geographic divide between the pro-life and pro-choice camps, and thus no coherent group to form after the split. Second, the ability of each group to defend itself from foreign threats would significantly lessen. When the South succeeded, this was not the case. Because no US sub-group can provide what the country as a whole can provide, the sides are inclined to avoid self-help to resolve the matter.

A clash of exclusive intolerances does often produce conflict, however. Some examples would be the Arab-Israeli conflict over Israel’s right to exist, or the Third Reich

view of fascist expansion. The key is that these clashes cannot end with compromise. We can repress them, but without the total surrender of one side, the clash remains. Groups can compromise on inclusive clashes. This distinction marks the separation between the *critical layer* and *preferred layer* of the *belief pillar*. The need to resolve an antithetical clash is critical, where the need to negotiate a compromise is preferred.

The top end of the *preferred belief pillar* involves the export of ideals from one group to the next. This does not imply that groups will seek conquest, but as a group expands and looks for partners, it naturally seeks aligned belief pillars. A state may be compelled to work with states that do not align, out of the necessity to meet the other preferred pillars. Our earlier chapters have shown that states in those circumstances often feel pressure to influence the partner state to align beliefs. We see this happen when the United States promises aid to other nations in exchange for democratic reforms. It can also happen without impetus, such as the US push for human rights and the UN pledge to oppose genocide. Many states may feel these worthy causes, but states can only act outwardly once it accounts for its first five pillars.

There is then the top, *dominance layer* of the pillars. This layer represents the lustful side of humanity. This layer does not always exist, nor should it be a driving force in international politics, but it can exist and causes great conflict when it does. The pillars in this layer follow the same requisite order as in the others. First is *anthro dominance*—the drive to expand our reach and perception of security globally, until we have nothing to fear from anywhere. Second is *natural dominance*—the drive to control all resource such that we will never want or need for anything. The last pillar is then *belief dominance*—the drive to end all clashes of intolerance and make the world believe as we do. Taken in order, these nine pillars form the *hierarchy of state needs*.

The fact that the three “dominance needs” are at the top of the hierarchy should not suggest that they are desirable, or the ultimate goal of states. Rather, they are at the top of the hierarchy because they cannot manifest until a state has accounted for all of the proceeding pillars. From this construction, we see nine distinct needs of a group that accounts for. We use the phrase “accounts for” intentionally, because it can entail providing for them, repressing them, controlling them, or ending them. Since groups may compete to provide for these pillars, they are potential sources of conflict. Without sufficient handling, they can lead to war. Critical layer wars would manifest as a war for survival, a war for land, or a war of liberation. Preferred layer wars are like balancing wars, wars of colonial expansion, and humanitarian interventions. Dominance layer wars are like ancient Hun marauding, imperial conquest, or religious crusades.




Figure 4: The Hierarchy of State Needs

If we accept these models of the *pillars of security* and the *hierarchy of state needs*, then we can clarify how our schools of thought tend to talk past one another. When the realist schools talk about the preeminence of security and force, they are discussing international relations that occur down in the *critical layer*, where failure to provide for any of the three pillars is an existential threat. The realists consider this “high” politics while dealings in the preferred layer are “low” politics. When the neoliberals talk about cooperation and total gains, they are talking about pillars in the *preferred layer*, where relative power is not required because the loss of a pillar is not

existential. Depending on where a state currently sits on its hierarchy of needs, either of their theories could be correct.

Other aspects of our authors exist in various places on these models. The liberals and constructivists assertion that you can account for security without power fits with our conception of upward and downward arrows. When Carr and Morgenthau discussed the need to make concessions in order to facilitate peaceful change, but warned about “unacceptable concessions,” they were referring to the split between the *preferred layer* and the *critical layer* of needs. These models may even lay the groundwork for operationalizing constructivist learning in the international system and guiding strategic information campaigns.

Perceptions, and thus ideas, play a key role in our models. They differentiate how each state sees its own divide between the critical and preferred layers. Perceptions also determine how each state views another state’s evaluation of their own pillars. States do not really interact with other states in international politics. When I sit at a bargaining table, my perception of myself interacts with my perception of you. Likewise, your perception of yourself interacts with your perception of me. We can never truly know or appreciate where each state sits on the hierarchy, or thinks they sit on the hierarchy. We can only know where *we* think they sit.

Disparity between those perceptions creates conflict. The United States labeling a state as “weak and failing” is another way of saying the United States perceives that state to be operating in the *critical layer* of pillars. If that state also believes it is in the *critical layer*, it may welcome US intervention and accept some dominance by the United States. If it does not believe it is critical, these efforts may meet with opposition. Likewise, if the United States perceives intervening actions as legitimately within its preferred pillars, but other states believe the US actions fall in the dominance layer, then those states may choose to balance against the United States rather than support them. By clearly understanding the problem, states can better attempt to address it with policy and strategic messaging. Aligning Watson’s pendulums now becomes about changing either my perception or your perception of where we both sit in the hierarchy of needs.

Our authors explained how institutions, openness, and social learning could bring those perceptions closer to one another. This should not suggest that aligning beliefs is

easy or even possible. There will never be a meter or opinion poll that shows exactly where a nation sits on the hierarchy. And as Carr first mentioned, circumstances are constantly changing. Furthermore, international perceptions are not bilateral pairings. Each state's perception interacts with all others in a complex web. The way the United States interacted with Iraq changed Libya's perception of its own pillars enough to reverse their policy on weapons of mass destruction. Thus, policies for peaceful change may be easier to depict with our models, but they are no easier to accomplish than before.

As we mentioned in our introduction, we may not solve Carr's dilemmas within these pages. These models do not solve anything, but they provide a new perspective for looking at possible solutions and arguments. They show how liberal and realist theories could fit together in a single conceptualization of the international system. Carr suggested that they are two sides of same coin. Our models suggest that they offer two different but equally relevant arguments about politics within two different regions of the hierarchy of state needs.

In the Shadow of E. H. Carr

We now hope to assess how these models affect our understanding of Carr's problematizing of IR. To do so accurately, we must review a few key insights. These pillars exist for every group and sub-group, all the way down to the individual. A group must provide for all three critical pillars before those individuals or sub-groups will submit. Thus, the highest level "grouping" that can account for all of them will get cooperative submission. Groups that cannot provide the pillars can still account for them, but must either have an external impetus, or choose to force compliance, which generates a "self-help" power struggle. In this sense, we are less concerned with identifying hierarchies and anarchy than we are with determining when cooperative or coercive relationships exist. From our understanding of Carr and the many theories we have examined, the coercive relationships hold the greatest potential for war, whether internal or external to the state. Thus, our search for peace is about making cooperative relationships possible.

Through this lens, we first gain a better understanding of how Carr's base force of constant change can affect the international system. Changes in technology can make it harder or easier for states to defend themselves, and thus change their perceptions of the

anthro pillar. The march of time can also make it easier or more difficult for states to ensure resources. Expanding populations make it harder to feed the nation, but technological farming advancements can make it easier. Other advancements, like the industrial revolution, can increase a state's resource needs, while other technology, like green energy sources could reduce them. These fluctuations change a state's perception of their natural pillar.

As the needs and size of a state expand, they interact with larger numbers of people. Larger populations generally generate more intolerance clashes. The needs of the first two pillars may hold these larger groups together. If external pressures disappear, like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, those intolerance clashes can split as state, as we saw in Yugoslavia. Additionally, if technology arrives that makes it easier for two sub-groups to defend themselves, such as the advent of the crossbow and gunpowder, then old sovereign groups can begin to split.

Thus, we see how change can drive conflict. Two states in a stable, peaceful relationship can suddenly find themselves at odds. As these states grow, they begin to step on each other's pillars. Should this contention drive scarcity, then conflict arises, just like Watson's description of the early Sumerian city-states. As these cities collided, they may have hoped to merge into a single group, but the disparate beliefs of the each city made a peaceful merger unlikely. Again, this does not resolve Carr's base tier force, but it elaborates upon it and it changes our conceptualization of Carr's roadblocks.

We can restate Carr's first roadblock, balancing power and morality, as the need to maintain legitimacy to ensure submission within your group. As we just mentioned, when your group and your needs expand, maintaining this legitimacy over an ever-growing population becomes difficult. As a state's needs expand, it may try to form a larger international group. When this effort fails, a state has only one choice, and that is to expand its reach. If a state has sufficient power or influence to extend its reach, it will continue to work within the system. If it cannot extend its reach to meet its needs, it risks being replaced by a group that can meet the citizen's pillars. In such a case, the state will try to reform the system. In this sense, the *hierarchy of state needs* drives revisionist behaviors, a significant roadblock to peace.

We would therefore define the second roadblock not as the need to create institutions to manage interstate affairs, but to manage state's problems with reach. Institutions can expand the reach of the state, help the state form new international grouping to aid its reach, or simply work to lessen internal state expectations about the preferred pillars and thus reduce the need for reach. Institutions must manage the expectations and fears within states and groups of states, as Ikenberry suggested. Our pillars help pinpoint exactly which expectations those institutions need to manage.

The need to accommodate peaceful change is still the biggest roadblock. Per our examination of the pillars of security, there can be circumstances when a state has no choice but to engage in coercive power politics struggles. If these struggles happen in the preferred layer of the hierarchy of state needs, states may be able to change perceptions and stave off war. If this conflict dips down into the critical layer of needs, then a state can only prevent war with a population shift, a fracturing of the state, or annihilation. *If* we are determined to maintain a system of sovereign states driven by nationalism, then conflict in those circumstances is inevitable. This diagnosis is distinctly more nihilistic than Carr would have liked.

This view of our roadblocks highlights one key difference between individuals forming groups, and sub-groups forming groups. Up until now, we have treated the two situations as the same. Morgenthau and others have explained that in any high level grouping, the member of that group do not like changes in their standings—they oppose imperial change and reductions to lower standards of living. In a group of groups, like the international society of states, state cannot avoid eventually dealing with such changes.

Groupings of individual people, however, have a natural mechanism built in to help alleviate that tension—we die. Once our lives end, our wealth may pass to our children or others, but we do not need to be concerned about how “I” will feel about having less money or control. As humans progress through life, we start low, with minimum wage and low expenses, and gain throughout life. Death resets this. The natural churn of life and death provides a constant outflow of “have’s” and a constant inflow of “have not’s.” Groups and states do not have that same life cycle. They must “live” through their decline, and therefore must either accept or fight against it.

This lack of a life cycle sets up a dilemma, similar to the one we highlighted in the realist chapter. Allowing state death would alleviate the tensions of change and help drive socialization and cooperative behaviors, but we must avoid any fear of death if we want states to accept decline peacefully. This paradox is just one more base force that statesmen need to balance, but might never overcome.

These findings suggest that a top tier solution for peace could take several forms. One possibility is a global grouping. This is not a single world government, but a single group identity with a set of intolerances able to accommodate all of the cultures of the world. Short of annihilating all counter-minded people (which runs counter to our desire for peace), however, this seems unlikely. If we could achieve Wendt's third-degree friendship on a global scale, then this might be possible. Our pillars suggest, however, that existing antithetical beliefs would prevent the sort of repeated cooperation needed to build that friendship bond.

A second top tier solution is multiple societies of states. Each society would be its own group with an internally acceptable culture. In order for these societies to interact peacefully two things must occur. One, technology must be present to avoid bottom level scarcity in the second pillar. Two, the separate societies must allow citizens to freely flow between societies in order to best align their belief pillars. This requires movement. Either states need to have malleable borders (like a virtual state) that they could redraw around individuals, depending on their beliefs, or people need to be willing to uproot and move themselves to compatible cultures. If we could avoid scarcity, and keep states from opposing border or population movement, then larger peaceful international groupings could continue to form. This solution is similar to the piecemeal, evolutionary proposals of Ikenberry, Wendt, and Watson.

The third top tier solution our models suggest is some large exogenous threat that holds the world together. However, this exogenous force would only bring the world together peacefully if all states perceived it equally. If a state perceives it is higher on the pillars than other states, and resilient enough to survive that threat, it could defect from our global grouping. Likewise, that grouping is only going to work together peacefully if they can agree on what actions to take to stave off this threat. Disagreements on protective actions represent a split in the belief pillar, which could split the group. This

explains why some threats like climate change and pollution, although global in scale, have not produced international unity. Short of alien invasion, this solution may be unfeasible.

Thus, our best proposition for peace seems to be lifting states out of their critical pillars of security. This can happen by pursuing technologies that allow all nations to meet their critical needs, or by altering state perceptions of their situations. Neither solution is simple or guaranteed to work. This is not a deliberately pessimistic outlook, but one, as per Carr, founded in reality. Our analysis does show that the march of time seems to generate larger and larger sovereign groupings, like the transition from city-states to kingdoms, kingdoms to states, and states to United States or the European Union. It also shows, however, that time could fracture those groupings, or force an eventual showdown between increasingly large groups with antithetical interests.

The Pillars and Hierarchy in Use

We have mentioned throughout this appendix that the *pillars of security* and *hierarchy of state needs* models can help determine which theory is most applicable to a given situation and elaborate on what shortcoming is causing a conflict. In order to translate that knowledge into policy, we must know how to apply the models. We know that realism deals mainly with the critical layer, liberalism with the preferred layer, and constructivism with the breaks in between, but it can be difficult to tell where a state is operating within the hierarchy of needs. There is no “hierarchy meter” for statesmen or IR scholars to read. Instead, we should start with the nine “needs” of a state and try to project what conflict on each of the nine levels would look like. We should ask what concerns it would raise in the actor and the other state. We then overlay each of those nine projections onto a situation to see which most closely aligns. From there we can start to deduce more about the situation.

Take, for example, the recent US and NATO actions in Libya. We can ask, from the US perspective, was this a matter of national survival or an existential threat to our economy or values? Was it a “fourth need” extension of security? Did it more closely resemble a “fifth need” grab for resources, or an export of ideology? In this case, the United States seemed to be operating between the fifth and sixth steps of the hierarchy of state needs. Additionally, this can tell us about Libyan behaviors. What step was

Gaddafi working on? Did his regime provide all three pillars to every citizen? Did the rebels provide them better after they split? The international system did not help the State of Libya provide for its needs after the uprising. Does this help explain Libya's reaction to the international demands?

In translating the ideas of our theorists into the language of the pillars and the hierarchy, we have tried not change their arguments. We simply want to talk about and arrange them in new way. We have used these concepts in the many examples of the previous sections. We will attempt to show how some other known political behaviors appear when we view them through our "appendix A" lens. This will reinforce the concepts we have tried to explain, demonstrate some of the explanatory potential they possess, and highlight some areas that require further study.

First, we will look at the Democratic Peace theory. Our models would suggest that it is not democracy *per se* that leads to peace. Instead, it is the fact that our modern democracies are all operating in the preferred layer when interacting with one another. Throughout the era of "democratic peace," the presence of United States has accounted for the *anthro pillar* of every democracy in that grouping. All of our Western democracies have produced or secured enough food and material resource to satisfy its citizens, at times with US assistance. This transferred the states' decision to submit to the group to the belief pillar. As the name implies "democratic peace" is about a group of democracies, and thus the states had a pre-existing cultural likeness in intolerances. Thus, our modern democracies have formed a supra-state group identity.

Although being democracies was part of this peaceful grouping, it is not the only aspect. The pillars suggest that those other aspects could change, and thus "democratic peace" could break down. Any democratic state could start pursuing (or others could perceive them as pursuing) a dominance layer campaign of conquest. This could trigger critical layer fears in the other democracies. Additionally, global famine, a global economic crisis, new weapons technology, or nuclear proliferation could push concerns in the natural and anthro pillars down into the critical layer. Would this be enough to lead to war? Although Wendt suggests that a strong enough friend bond could prevent war, our model suggests that if the downturn is bad enough to threaten the lives of citizens, then a potentially violent break from the group is entirely possible.

Second, we will take a quick look at Waltz's structural realism. When Waltz conceived of his structure, he declared that states have a like function, which is to survive as states. Inserting the hierarchy of needs into Waltz's structure as the "like function" of states alters his conclusions about state behaviors. Things remain largely the same when states operate down in the critical layer, but change as those states move up the hierarchy. In the preferred layer, they act as if they were in a Lockean anarchy, and as they progress toward the dominance layer, they act like Mearsheimer's regional hegemony seekers or Gilpin's cyclical hegemons.⁶ This shows a synthesis of the various theories, but also another nexus between unit and system level theory.

Third, these models could provide insight into security studies. Take, for instance, the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. The concept that individuals will migrate toward that group that best supplies their pillars aligns with many counterinsurgency studies. We saw this pattern emerge during the surge in Iraq. Once the US Army could provide security for the Iraqi civilians, and provide power, water, and other goods, they began to earn the trust of the Iraqi people.

When studying terrorism, our definition of the belief pillar helps explain the dangerous power of Qutbism. Qutb's teachings create an exclusive intolerance not just of other religions, but of the entire world system. In the past, states could overcome religious disagreements by allowing for freedom of religion. Qutb teaches that anything except sharia law is an affront to god. According to Qutb, the freedom to choose—simply having freedom of religion—is the act of placing man's law above Allah's, and thus it is forbidden.⁷ This is a perfect intolerance to incite conflict. It places his followers at odds with every non-believing individual in the system, and at odds with the very system itself.

Last, our pillars can inform the topic of the decline of the nation state. They suggest that the demise of the state is unlikely, not because states are dubbed sovereign, but because today, given technology, resource needs, and the character of the world, the state is the group that best provides all three pillars of security. Thus, they constitute a

⁶ Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Gilpin theorizes that the international systems trends toward a succession of hegemons as a natural state, as opposed to Waltz's conclusions that multi-polar "balancing" situations are typical.

⁷ Seyyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Damascus, Syria: Dar Al-Ilm), 24-25.

viable sovereign group. Religion can only provide the belief pillar. Virtual states will not be feasible until they devise some way to resist raw power and provide security. Institutions are powerful, and may influence the actions of a state, but they can only provide for the natural pillar and will therefore not replace the state.

The pillars also provide a blueprint for our new world political order, however, and describe that we could grow a viable non-state sovereign. Radical Islam can now offer levels of protection and provide for their people, and it certainly provides a belief pillar. As it moves into remote locations, it can become a sovereign entity, much like the Pashtun people. Other, more desirable supra-state group identities are beginning to form, such as NATO and the European Union, because they have the attributes to attract the upwards arrows of states. With our knowledge of the three pillars and the hierarchy, we may be able to mold these organizations in order to expand voluntary submission.

We have presented here new conceptualizations and language to talk about IR theory. Our models can offer new insights into existing theories and expand upon some of their assumptions, just as many of them did to the concepts of E. H. Carr. We hope that our models can add explanation to many observations, and do so in a way that bridges the many schools of IR. My hope is that these concepts seem familiar, or even simplistic. The more this hierarchy appears to be common sense or repetitious, the clearer its concepts become.

Acronyms

EU – European Union

IR – International Relations

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UN – United Nations



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