

NECESSARY EVIL:
THE IMPORTANCE OF DESTRUCTION AND OCCUPATION IN WAR

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
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APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.



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


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


ABSTRACT

This study examines the relationship between destruction in war, occupation after war, and the establishment of a better state of peace. In order to better understand this relationship, case studies of wars in which high levels of destruction occurred in the defeated state will be examined. The first is the American Civil War, and more specifically the activities of General William T. Sherman and his army in their famous “March to the Sea” through Georgia. The defeat of the Confederacy demonstrates the importance of destruction during the war, but the lack of resources dedicated to the economic, political, and socially reconstruction created future issues for the country. Subsequently, the monograph examines Japan during and after World War II. This case highlights the difficulties in how different cultures work together after a conflict to create stability when the victor is willing to put forth resources and utilize the opportunities created by defeat. Both of these cases represent highly mobilized societies that supported war efforts until the end of the conflict. Eventually both the American South and Japan made fundamental changes in their societies, but they did so in different ways. Such case studies illustrate extreme examples in unconditional surrender, the likes of which are rarely seen in more recent conflicts. Therefore, this paper also looks briefly at more recent examples and what relationship, if any, physical destruction has with peace building in conflicts such as Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. Finally, it offers an assessment regarding how post-conflict society transitions away from pre-war behaviors, the ones that ultimately led to the conflict, towards post-war behaviors focused on stability and peace.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

To study war without taking into account the circumstances in which it is fought and the peace to which it led is a kind of historical pornography.

Michael Howard

In the twentieth century, the United States paid a grave price in fighting two world wars, the Cold War, and many other military conflicts. As the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle said, “We make war so that we may live in peace.”¹ How do nations plan for peace in hopes of preventing future wars? The relationship between war and peace is a complex and evolving phenomenon. While there are tenable links between the *conduct* of a state during war, and its *effects* in establishing peace, how that relationship plays out post-war varies depending on the context of the conflict. As B.H. Liddell Hart observed, “History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy.”² Therefore, destruction used as a means of eliminating the enemy’s will to resist can also be viewed as the first step in sowing the seeds of peace.

Destruction and how states use and manipulate it is are valuable tools in achieving political goals. Sometimes the simple act of threatening massive amounts of destruction can force an enemy to surrender. Other times, threats are insufficient, and substantial amounts of fighting are required to bring about a surrender. The threat, and sometimes the use, of destruction against society is one of the oldest strategies in war.

Ancient warfare featured a level of destruction hard to fathom today. For example, the Third Punic War witnessed the Romans inflicting complete destruction on Carthage. The three years that followed were plagued with continued fighting, starvation, and death. The remaining 50,000 Carthaginians, a small portion of the original pre-war population, were sold into slavery and Carthage was left a pile of ashes—the result of systematic burning at the hands of

¹ Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics* (trans. Thomson) 10.7.26-27.

² Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Meridian, 1967), 351.

the Romans. They razed the city walls, its buildings, and its harbor, strewing salt upon the ground in their wake.³

Such tactics continued into the medieval era. Prince Edward, known as “The Black Prince” during the Hundred Years’ War (1336-1452), employed a strategy that embraced societal destruction—the “chevauchée” strategy. His strategy was brutal in that its sole focus was to target the people. The method he chose to accomplish this brutality was the burning and pillaging of towns and farms, often slaying the occupants. While seemingly in contrast to the chivalric norms of the time, the strategy proved effective in accomplishing the goals of his campaigns and weakening the unity and economy of France.⁴

Today, the wanton infliction of destruction on another society is often viewed with distaste. Technological advances and innovation have made such tactics unnecessary, and in fact often counterproductive, in modern warfare. This change depends, in part, upon precision weaponry and the ability to wage war without including the population as a target, a constant struggle for political and military leaders. This laudable goal derives significant second and third order effects, one of which is the stability of a post-conflict society. Another critical component of war that is often overlooked is the physical occupation and reconstruction of post-war society. What many fail to recognize is that post-war societal interaction is as important as kinetically defeating the enemy. A well planned and implemented post-war strategy is vital to long term stability and peace. Conversely, the lack of adequate post-war planning can prove a major obstacle to achieving an enduring peace. Since destruction and occupation serve as constant reminders of defeat, the conduct of occupying forces and their interaction with the defeated people are equally important. This paper will examine the dichotomous relationship between societal behavior before and after war. What transition occurs between the end of fighting and the post-war occupation period that makes a state transform from a highly mobilized war

³ See Paul Bentley Kern’s *Ancient Siege Warfare* pgs. 289-298.

⁴ For an expanded explanation of chevauchée, see Kelly DeVries’s *Joan of Arc : A Military Leader* (Gloucestershire, 1999); for more information on Prince Edward of Wales see Richard Barber’s *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine* (London, 1978).

machine into a stable and peaceful society? Understanding this process can help illuminate how the victor can use destruction not only as a means in war, but also to influence the defeated state to change its behavior.

One important note about the scope and purpose of this monograph: it is not intended in any way as an advocacy piece for wanton destruction. Its purpose is to examine what connection exists between physical manifestations of war, destruction and occupation, and the state of peace after a conflict. Furthermore, it does not address the moral or legal implications inherent in the use of force. Those issues are extremely important to the debate on how and when to use military force as a destructive element, but they are not discussed in this paper. Rather, I will look at what historical connections might exist between destruction and occupation and the resulting state of peace. Chronologically, this study examines conflicts from the mid-19th century through current conflicts.

Comparing Germany Post WWI and WWII

The difference between post World War I Germany and post World War II Germany serves as an example on how destruction and occupation influence the better state of peace after the conflict. Separated by two decades, there is a striking contrast between the two German post-war societies. Both wars were similar in that they featured a highly mobilized modern society in full support of the national war effort; however, the outcomes were vastly different.

Germany in WWI

The differences between the two cases lie in the perceptions of defeat. Many post WWI Germans refused to internalize and accept defeat. The pristine conditions of German towns and the return of German combat units with bands playing and battle flags flying, provided little evidence that a horrific war had just ended badly for the Fatherland. Other than the soldiers, the German population never witnessed visual cues to the contrary. Yes, WWI carnage was immense; however, German civil society was insulated from seeing this horror, because they did not witness the devil's hand in war as they did during WWII. Not having to witness war's horrors provided German society a much different experience than the French or Belgians in WWI, whose countryside was forever scarred by

the trench line. In fact, German armies had been apparently triumphant until the last three months of the war.⁵ The German people felt dishonored and did not accept the guilt for the war that the Versailles Treaty thrust upon them. Therefore, German society was favorably disposed to any policy that promised to pursue the strengthening of their military and the restoration of national honor, which ultimately set the stage for follow-on conflict.

Upon returning home, German soldiers were initially met with a hero's welcome by the military, civilian authorities, the Workers' Councils, and employers.⁶ The Prussian War Ministry asserted in preparation for their return, "Our field-grey heroes return to the *Heimat* undefeated, having protected the native soil from the horrors of war for four years."⁷ However, German society had a difficult time reconciling the acceptance of the soldiers as heroes in the shadow of their overall defeat in the war. Thus, their unwillingness to accept defeat had further damaging effects on what was to be Germany's first democracy—for if the soldiers were not to blame, who was responsible for the tribulations of the post-war years? The German defeat and poorly constructed peace settlement following WWI can be blamed on two parties, the generals who chose to continue a blood soaked war of attrition, and the politicians who failed to implement a lasting peace, or even exercise control over the war policy. Unfortunately, German society refused to reflect on the war's outcome in this manner.⁸

In the 1920's and 1930's, the collective memory of German society morphed from a vision of a grateful public who welcomed the soldiers back into society, to the perspective of a demobilized hero returning home to an unappreciative, disrespectful, and scornful home front.⁹ In fact, many demobilized soldiers joined the paramilitary *Freikorps*, another threat to the stability of the new democracy. This was also exacerbated by a struggling German economy; many soldiers returned home to find no jobs available. This

⁵ Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?," *Survival* 41, no. 1 (1999): 132.

⁶ Richard Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 84.

⁷ Bessel, *Germany after the First World War*, 85.

⁸ Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?," 131.

⁹ Bessel, *Germany after the First World War*, 260.

fueled the idea that the military was stabbed in the back by unpatriotic political movements, by Jews and Communists, and it was the home front that had failed. This thought further played on the German public's guilt—the idea that millions of German soldiers were killed while the rest of society enjoyed the relative safety of the Reich.

Even more important than the German people not accepting the defeat and the terms outlined in the Versailles Peace Treaty was the absence of a much needed mental shift--the transformation from a society at war to a society at peace. There is a direct correlation between the number of occupation forces and a society's willingness to accept negotiated peace terms. Post WWI Germany initially witnessed a large number of US occupation troops waiting on the border to take action, but after the Versailles Treaty these numbers quickly dropped. The lack of substantial occupation troops meant there was no one physically in Germany to enforce the peace treaty. Left to their own vices, Germans were allowed to abandon their initial position as the defeated nation and stew in the rhetoric of how wrongly they had been treated. The small number of occupation soldiers physically present, according to the officer in charge of civil affairs, Colonel Irwin Hunt, lacked adequate training and organization to perform their duties.¹⁰ In his report on US military government in Germany after WWI, Hunt stated, "The American army of occupation lack both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty."¹¹ This observation demonstrates the importance not just of occupation, but of how organizing, training, and equipping the occupation force is essential to post-conflict success.

Germany in World War II

World War II brought with it advances in technology, both on the ground and in the air. These technological advancements, specifically regarding airpower, introduced a level of destruction never seen before. In contrast to

¹⁰ Brian M. De Toy, "Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign," in *Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 10.

¹¹ Earl Fredrick Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975), 3.

WWI, this war introduced every German –man, woman, and child--to the horrors of war. Almost every city and the people who lived there became intimate with death. In January 1943, at Casablanca, Allied leadership decided the objective of the strategic air forces was the “destruction and dislocation of the Germany military, industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”¹² The Allied strategy brought the war directly to the doorsteps of the German people. The amount of destruction throughout Germany was immense.

According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report:

Official German statistics place total casualties from air attack -- including German civilians, foreigners, and members of the armed forces in cities that were being attacked -- at 250,253 killed for the period from January 1, 1943, to January 31, 1945, and 305,455 wounded badly enough to require hospitalization, during the period from October 1, 1943, to January 31, 1945. A careful examination of these data, together with checks against the records of individual cities that were attacked, indicates that they are too low. A revised estimate prepared by the Survey (which is also a minimum) places total casualties for the entire period of the war at 305,000 killed and 780,000 wounded. More reliable statistics are available on damage to housing. According to these, 485,000 residential buildings were totally destroyed by air attack and 415,000 were heavily damaged, making a total of 20 percent of all dwelling units in Germany. In some 50 cities that were primary targets of the air attack, the proportion of destroyed or heavily damaged dwelling units is about 40 percent. The result of all these attacks was to render homeless some 7,500,000 German civilians.¹³

Prior to World War II, this level of destruction throughout a whole country was unknown. In contrast to World War I, the Germans could not escape evidence of their nation being at war, it simply surrounded them and wreaked havoc on their lives. As stated in the US Strategic Bombing Survey, “It [air power] brought home to the German people the full impact

¹² United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1945), 5.

¹³ Survey, *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)*, 15.

of modern war with all its horror and suffering. Its imprint on the German nation will be lasting.”¹⁴

Strategic bombing also played a major role in lowering the morale of the German military. Air attacks instigated fear and insecurity in the minds of the German troops. Colonel General Alfred Jodl, the German high command’s chief of operations, reported that, “The troops from the forward lines to the rear echelons always ‘griped’ about enemy air attacks . . . the question always arose, ‘Where is our air force?’”¹⁵ The heavy bombardment of the German home front also had further effects on German troops’ morale. A letter from a German soldier in mid-1942 to his mother reveals this tension: “It is no use for us to destroy the Russians here, while the English destroy our homes.”¹⁶

Post-WWII Germany looked nothing like post-WWI Germany. The Allied soldiers who occupied German territories in 1945 witnessed scenes of utter devastation. German cities lay in ruins, and basic services such as water, sewer, electricity, and telephones were non-functional. The governmental infrastructure fell victim to war’s destructive force, and the police force was nothing more than a ragtag operation struggling to hold on.¹⁷ Physical reminders of defeat were all around. No German civilian could ignore the bombed cities or the destruction brought by the invading forces. Contrary to WWI, with very few Allied forces ready to occupy the defeated country, on V-E Day there were 61 US divisions, 1,622,000 troops in Germany, and 3,077,000 in Europe.¹⁸ These troops’ primary responsibility was to establish population control measures, such as imposing roadblocks and curfews, and conducting security patrols.¹⁹ The large number of troops available as occupation forces allowed the military to exercise control over all parts of occupied Germany. In addition to providing security and squelching

¹⁴ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys: European War, Pacific War* (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1987), 37.

¹⁵ Survey, *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, vol. 64b (Washington U.S. G.P.O., 1945), 38.

¹⁶ Survey, *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, 41.

¹⁷ Kenneth O. McCreedy, *Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 1994), 8.

¹⁸ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, 320.

¹⁹ McCreedy, *Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations*, 9.

any resistance, the totality of this occupation was meant to demonstrate to the Germans that they were defeated and their country subjugated by Allied troops.

The level of planning for the post-war conflict is another important factor differentiating the two post-war societies. In the case of WWII, the US anticipated Germany's surrender and invested two years preparing for post-war occupation. By the time of the German surrender, the staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and Army Group headquarters had invested considerable resources into Operation ECLIPSE.²⁰ Within three months of surrender, the formations had disarmed and demobilized German forces, cared for and repatriated 4 million POWs and refugees, restored basic services to devastated cities, created local governments, reestablished police forces and courts, and discovered and suppressed insurgent threats.²¹ This forethought was critical in shaping how the post-war German population would view their defeat and their willingness to accept Allied authority in governing and reestablishing societal order.

Securing and rebuilding German infrastructure was accomplished by the army's tactical units, mostly at the company level. These units, after restoring and maintaining order, enlisted the help of locals and worked alongside them in rebuilding the cities.²² These troops guarded frontiers, key installations, bridges, banks, utilities and established rapid-reaction forces to respond to disturbances.²³ They also emphasized the need to quickly rebuild German infrastructure. Engineer units rebuilt and repaired roads, bridges, electric plants, sewage treatment facilities, and waterworks. For example, the capture of Bonn highlighted the huge impact the engineer units had on civil morale. Bonn was transformed from a war ravaged city to one having gas, water, and light services reestablished in the majority of the city within days of its occupation.

The German government was rebuilt from the bottom up in that the first priority focused on local elections and councils. Following this, attention was

²⁰ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, 163.

²¹ McCreedy, *Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations*, 18.

²² McCreedy, *Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations*, 19.

²³ McCreedy, *Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations*, 19.

given to state level contests and once established, national elections were considered.²⁴ Concurrently, the German political structure and process were highly regulated in attempts to prevent any resurgence of radicalism. This physical military presence remained in place during the emergence of the Cold War, and therefore, the resulting tensions afforded little opportunity for the occupying forces to redeploy.

So What?

The differences between the two post-conflict states reveal the different reactions of the same society to two wars. Two factors that stand out are the amount of destruction and the quantity of occupation forces. After WWI, the German population could not believe that it had been defeated. The message of defeat did not match what they experienced. No part of Germany had seen the physical signs of war. Its army had returned mostly intact, marching back to its homeland. In their collective minds, their loss was not because they had been defeated militarily, but because the politicians had given up. Thus, the German population was fueled by revenge and the desire to win back what was lost. WWII ended on much different terms. The message of defeat was seen through destruction as well as the millions of occupying troops. There was little doubt that Nazi Germany had been defeated militarily, politically, economically, morally, and socially.

What is Victory?

Military victory does not always bring about lasting political effects. Clausewitz states that, “at the highest level the art of war turns into policy—but a policy conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes.”²⁵ History is replete with examples when military victory did not yield political victory. Overall, strategic victory requires all the instruments of national power. The discussion of a peaceful society is incomplete without understanding the difference between tactical, operational, and strategic victory. According to Dr. Robert Mandell, professor of international affairs, “strategic victory entails

²⁴ De Toy, "Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign," 10.

²⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 607.

accomplishing the short-term and the long-term, national, regional, and global goals for which the war is fought. . . [It] is composed of interrelated informational, military, political, economic, social, and diplomatic elements.”²⁶ Because strategic victory also includes the non-military instruments of power, how defeated societies react politically, socially, and economically must be addressed. One measure of how effectively military action influences a defeated society is the level to which that society rejects its earlier behavior and transforms into a peaceful and stable society.

Michael Howard outlines two requirements for military force to be decisive: “First, the defeated people must accept the fact of defeat, persuaded and realize that there is no chance of reversing the verdict in the foreseeable future, whether by military revival, skillful diplomacy, or international propaganda. Second, they must be reconciled to their defeat by being treated, sooner or later, as partners in operating the new international order.”²⁷ Destruction in war plays a crucial role in filling these criteria. First, it is a visible demonstration of defeat to all involved. Second, because the victor plays a vital role in the post-war security and reconstruction, a partnership between the two is essential in laying the framework for the future. Additionally, it also forces the defeated people to turn to the victor and depend on the resources they offer in a way that encourages a working relationship between the two societies.

Physical destruction is not the only way to influence a society. In the mid-1960’s Thomas Schelling spoke of the importance of influence and coercion via deterrence and compellence. Instead of focusing solely on physical destruction, the threat of force is another way of persuading the other side to accept political or military terms. Schelling notes that, “If surrender negotiations are successful and not followed by overt violence, it is because the capacity to inflict pain and damage was successfully used in the bargaining process.”²⁸ From the perspective of the victor, a post-war occupied society is not immune from violence. Instead, violence and the threat of violence is still effective when used skillfully, not spent

²⁶ Robert Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory* (Bolder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 16.

²⁷ Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?," 132.

²⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 31.

solely in inflicting punishment.²⁹ A credible post-war deterrence focused around the threat of a use of force is powerful in influencing societal behavior. Deterrence is only effective if the other side believes you will carry through with your threat. This is very difficult to measure.

Contrary to popular belief, most wars are decided at the peace table rather than the battlefield. By itself, military victory only provides a political opportunity for the victors. Even then, there can be limitations on those opportunities by circumstances beyond the victor's control.³⁰ The stability or outcome of the conflict is usually based on the willingness of the vanquished to accept the verdict of battle.³¹ This means that three main "audiences" of a state must accept or internalize the defeat: the political elite, the military, and the people. The use of military force can be used to influence all three. However, since each has different motives, it is important to realize that physical destruction will affect each differently.

To understand the conditions that best prepare post-war society for a peaceful transition, it is important to differentiate the two stages of war: "war winning" and "peace winning."³² War-winning involves states engaging in military actions and is completed when one side forces the other to concede. Peace-winning occurs when a state attempts to benefit from war activities in the final settlement. This includes stabilization, reconstruction, and post-conflict transition.³³ Frequently, military planners spend most of their time planning phase one operations. This is because the military is structured to excel in the planning and execution of direct military action. On the contrary, stage two operations are a little more blurred and in addition to the military, a myriad of additional players are introduced. They include members of a state's diplomatic, economic, informational, and judicial instruments, in addition to working with the defeated state's corresponding institutions. Unfortunately, introducing these

²⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 30.

³⁰ Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?," 130.

³¹ Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61.

³² Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory*, 16.

³³ Mandel, *The Meaning of Military Victory*, 13.

additional players introduces an environment plagued with miscommunication, inefficiencies, and most importantly, different agendas. The failure to capitalize on opportunities presented in both of these stages, war-winning and peace-winning, is why history is littered with examples of a state winning the military fight but losing the strategic one.

Samuel Huntington notes that a society with a highly active and mobilized public and a low level of political institutionalization often finds itself falling victim to instability, disorder, and violence.³⁴ Following defeat, a society's relationship to its government and institutions is highly volatile and chaotic. For that reason, the environment that exists immediately after a war is often ripe with uncertainty. Because war changed the pre-existing social and political norms, society is presented with an opportunity. How they choose to react to these new challenges, specifically the absence of the relationships and structures that previously provided stability, proves vital in reconstruction and future of their post-war society.³⁵ This susceptibility to rapid change presents both threats and opportunities.

If handled correctly, a victor can use these as opportunities to set the stage for a more stable and peaceful society. Ultimately, war is an act to compel our enemy to do our will.³⁶ This study tries to uncover the relationship between destruction and its role in compelling the defeated society to accept defeat and participate, and later maintain, a stable and peaceful post-conflict society. Additionally, the physical presence of an occupation force serves two purposes. First, it is essential to provide security and protect the citizens. Second, and most importantly, it is a constant reminder to the defeated that their country has been vanquished, a direct result of their government's inability to provide for its citizens.

³⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

³⁵ Harry R. Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 33.

³⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

Organization of the Case Studies

In order to better understand this relationship, case studies of wars, in which high levels of destruction occurred in the defeated state, will be examined. The first is the American Civil War and, more specifically, the activities of General William T. Sherman and his army in their famous “March to the Sea” through Georgia. This hotly debated military operation was the first foray of the Union Army deep behind Confederate lines to attack what General Sherman considered to be the real strength of the South, the people empowering the war effort. The defeat of the Confederacy demonstrates the role destruction plays, but the lack of resources dedicated to the economic, political, and social post-war reconstruction created future issues for the country. Subsequently, the experience of Japan during and after World War II will be examined. This case highlights the difficulties in how different cultures work together after a conflict to create stability, when the victor is willing to put forth resources and utilize the opportunities created by defeat. Both the Civil War Confederacy and WWII Japan represent highly mobilized societies that supported war efforts until the end of the conflict. However, while both populations were war weary and utterly defeated, their reconstruction was very different because of the level of post-conflict involvement by the victors. Eventually, both the American South and Japan made fundamental changes in their societies, but they did so in different ways.

Such case studies illustrate extreme examples of unconditional surrender, the likes of which are rarely seen in more recent conflicts. Therefore, I will also look briefly at more recent examples and what relationship, if any, physical destruction has played with peace building in conflicts such as Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. The case studies are presented in three sections, addressing policy, military actions, and post-conflict society. The policy section addresses issues that influence strategic decision making and the history of policy in each conflict. Next, it examines the specific military actions that were taken and how they contributed to destruction, target selection, and restrictions placed on military action. Finally, it offers an assessment regarding how post-conflict society

transitions away from pre-war behaviors, the ones that ultimately led to the conflict, towards post-war behaviors focused on stability and peace.



Chapter 2

Hard Hand of War: Sherman's March to the Sea

We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and we must make young and old, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war. We cannot change the hearts of these people of the South, but we can make war so terrible, and make them so sick of war that generations will pass away before they would again appeal to it.

Major General William T. Sherman

General William T. Sherman's March to the Sea has been exemplified as one of the greatest examples of the indirect use of military force. Unlike many other military commanders of his day, Sherman's focus after capturing Atlanta was to avoid force on force battles with the enemy army. As armies become larger and weapons' range greater, the desire and need to destroy an army completely becomes less prevalent. Military theorist Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart argued that "to interrupt the ordinary life of the people and quench hope of its resumption is more effective than any military result short of the complete destruction of the armies."¹ Beginning in November 1864, instead of seeking out the enemy's army, General Sherman sought a back door, an indirect way through attacking the economic reserves of the Confederacy and its popular will.² As the Commander of the Army of the West, Sherman aimed the brutality of war directly at the Southerners supporting the Confederacy—the plantation aristocracy. The destruction Sherman chose to employ was not deadly, because its aim was not killing. Instead, Sherman sought to destroy anything and everything that could be used to support the Confederate war effort. Sherman appreciated that "rude personal contact with the hostile forces is necessary to awaken the enemy people from these drugged dreams of unreality and to shock them into surrender."³ Unfortunately, before the war found its way into the heart of the South, years had already passed and hundreds of thousands of lives were lost. To understand the

¹ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1929), 429.

² Russell Frank Weigley, *A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 413.

³ Liddell Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American*, 430.

type of war being fought, and the type of peace created, it is necessary to examine the adjustments made to policy and military action. The role of destruction had a direct impact on ending the American Civil War and demonstrating the futility of continuing the conflict to Southerners. However, while civil warfare states has not returned, the lack of systematic reconstruction following this highly destructive conflict left remnants of racism and injustice in parts of Southern society.

Policy

The war between the Union and the Confederacy pitted both symbolic and actual brothers against each other, Northerners were fighting to reunify their country, and doing so seemed to dictate a type of conciliatory policy. Yet the Union armies were receiving devastating blows on the battlefield, which tempted them to lash out in unrestrained violence.⁴ This tension is reflected by the various policies on how the Union viewed and treated Southern civilians transformed throughout the war. In the beginning years of the war, Southern civilians were viewed through a “conciliatory” policy lens that intended to placate or reconcile the Southern civilian population. But eventually this evolved into a “hard war” policy, which intended to bring the full weight of war to bear onto southern civilians. The evolution in policy towards southern society took years and requires some explanation. To the Union leadership the conciliatory policy was attractive, because they assumed that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and would withdraw their support of the Confederacy if treated correctly.⁵ Therefore, the North sought to spare noncombatant white Southerners the full consequences of the war. This meant that their constitutional rights were left intact, their property respected, and even the institution of slavery, tied up as it was with property rights, was not targeted. While the two strategies resided on opposite sides of the spectrum, their goals were the same: detach Southern civilians’ allegiance from, and undermine their support of the Confederacy.

⁴ Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 73.

⁵ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, 3.

Conciliation policy focused on treating Confederate citizens with respect, while hard war policy applied intimidation and fear.

While some disagreed, most Northern generals supported the policy of conciliation through the initial stages of the war. The common belief was that war should be restricted to the battlefield. The fact that the Union initially applied a policy of conciliation is not surprising given their assumption that the majority of Southern society did not fully support secession. For the military professionals, all of their experiences were rooted in experiences that supported the idea of winning a war happens on the battlefield between two opposing forces. In such cases, civilian populations were spared and never targeted. The American War of Independence, the Napoleonic wars, and the recent conflict with Mexico were all interpreted as won or lost on the battlefield, where, it was believed, great restraint had been used when dealing with the civilian population. Wars where this was not the case—especially the Hundred Years’ War and the Thirty Years War—were barbarous relics of a more primitive age.

Shift in Policy – Abandoning Conciliation

The Union started to abandon the policy of reconciliation in the summer of 1862. The Battle of Shiloh, fought in the spring of 1862 in Tennessee, served as the first defining battle in changing future Union policy toward civilian populations. Although it was a victory for General Grant and the Union, the cost was great and forced reconsideration of US strategy. The North lost 20,000 soldiers—double the amount killed in Manassas, Wilson’s Creek, Fort Donelson, and Pea Ridge *combined* and the South seemed ready to continue the war, despite defeat at Shiloh.⁶ This costly victory served as the turning point for Grant and the North. Shiloh highlighted to Grant, who eventually served as the Commanding General of the United States Army, that the only way to defeat the South was through “complete conquest [because up] to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the

⁶ James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 413.

citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether Union or Secession.”⁷

Although there were Union victories in the west, in the east the failure of General George McClellan and his Army of the Potomac to conquer Richmond provided more ammunition for changing the Union strategy. Northerners believed that Richmond, “the Confederate capital was the heart of the rebellion, the lair of the ‘slave-holding aristocracy’ and ‘military oligarchy’ that had created and sustained secession.”⁸ Referred to as the Seven Days’ Battles, these actions around Richmond were a series of six major battles fought over seven days, from June 25 to July 1, 1862, between McClellan’s Army of the Potomac and Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. The result of the six battles was almost 30,000 casualties, a number that equaled the number of casualties in all the battles in the western theater during the first half of 1862.⁹ The increase in lethality of battle was difficult to ignore.

This strategic defeat at Richmond again forced Union leaders to rethink their policy. Before the campaign, Northerners believed the war would end with the fall of Richmond, and therefore, with mounting public pressure, the Lincoln administration concluded that it needed a harsher policy. While the military battles continued, political changes were also underway. Congress was passing a bill to confiscate the property of Confederates, and President Lincoln was making up his mind about the Emancipation Proclamation.¹⁰ These changes in policy provided Union armies the ability to confiscate Southern property and opened the door to use any and all resources needed to win. This change in policy was welcomed by Union soldiers, who, up until this time, had felt restricted by the conciliation policy.¹¹

General McClellan opposed the change in policy and stood firmly to his belief that conciliation was the morally preferable option. In his famous “Harrison’s Landing letter” to President Lincoln in June 1862, McClellan argued

⁷ Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, ed. E.B. Long (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1952), 191-92.

⁸ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, 67.

⁹ McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, 471.

¹⁰ McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, 489.

¹¹ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, 67.

that the government should conduct the war “upon the highest principles known to Christian Civilization” and should focus its actions solely against “armed forces and political organizations.”¹² He also argued that private property should be strictly protected, and if extreme military necessity demanded it be taken, monetary compensation was required. Finally, he stated that “pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited; and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked.”¹³ The debate over the conciliation policy represents one of the great tensions of the Civil War. The goal of the Union was to reunite the country and re-assimilate the Confederacy. However, a moral dilemma presented itself on which policy to adopt: continue with a failing policy of conciliation or turn the fight to punish the rebels and potentially drive a bigger wedge between the two sides. President Lincoln understood that time had run out for the limited struggle envisioned by General McClellan. This was a drastic change in strategy for the Union whose main goal was reunification. This new policy aimed at society threatened the post-war relationship between the North and the South.

In addition to the Battle of Shiloh and the failure to capture Richmond, the Battle of Antietam, fought on September 17, 1862, was the first battle to take place on Northern soil. The battle, fought near Sharpsburg, Maryland, remains the bloodiest single-day battle in American history. Photographers arrived on the scene shortly after the battle and were able to document the horrific images of death, a battle that shocked many Northerners.¹⁴ In one day, after some 23,000 casualties, the Battle of Antietam and its massive carnage transformed how Americans thought about war.¹⁵ President Lincoln capitalized on the victory at Antietam by delivering the Emancipation Proclamation, an act that delivered the final blow to the conciliation policy. The document outraged Southerners. Previously they did not expect or believe that Northern soldiers would stand and

¹² Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, 75.

¹³ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, 75.

¹⁴ David J. Eicher, *The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 363.

¹⁵ Eicher, *The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War*, 363.

fight for the cause of liberating slaves.¹⁶ In September 1862, President Lincoln delivered a speech aimed at the leaders of the Confederacy stating that unless they abandoned the war, Confederate slaves would be welcomed with everlasting freedom on 1 January, 1863.¹⁷ Lincoln incensed Southerners and any hope of swaying the remaining fence sitters was forever lost, driving an even deeper divide between the Confederacy and the Union. The policy of conciliation was ultimately abandoned as the chasm between the North and the South continued to grow.

The year 1863 marked a change not only in the type of destruction the Union troops inflicted, but also in the amount.¹⁸ In March of the same year it became evident that the change in policy away from conciliation needed clarification. General Halleck explained these changes with General Order 100, commonly referred to as “Lieber’s Code.” Although Lieber’s Code is often considered a humanitarian milestone, it also provided ethical justification for a war aimed at the destruction of the Confederacy. While it codified a change in policy, it also marked a significant change in Union attitudes towards destructive warfare. Instead of long, drawn out wars of attrition, war could be more humane if it were quicker and more decisive. Article 29 states, “The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace. The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”¹⁹ Thus, the Union quickly accepted that, in addition to the Confederate Army, influencing civilians via destructive means was also required to bring about a more humane war by making it shorter.

To avoid this new policy from opening the doors for Union soldiers to wreak havoc on the South, numerous restrictions were put on Union troops. Most Union army leaders were concerned how their troops would internalize this new freedom afforded them. This concern forced a number of leaders to classify the

¹⁶ Eicher, *The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War*, 366.

¹⁷ Emancipation Proclamation. <http://www.archive.gov>.

¹⁸ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, 143.

¹⁹ The Lieber Code of 1863. “General Orders No. 100.” <http://www.civilwarhome.com/liebercode.htm> (accessed 11/27/2010).

type of person who might be subject to foraging by Union soldiers.²⁰ Southerners were separated into three groups; hostile, neutral, and Union sympathizers. Union troops accepted these classifications and targeted and treated these groups accordingly.

It is important to note that some form of conciliatory and hard war policies existed in differing forms throughout the war. The type of warfare employed varied by region and commander, but the majority focused on hard war policy after the summer of 1862, or at least the pragmatic idea that the treatment of civilians was important, albeit secondary, to the focus on battle. The first, and most recognized campaign involving hard war policy, is General William T. Sherman's Savannah Campaign. Also known as Sherman's March to the Sea, this campaign started on 15 November from Atlanta and ended on 21 December, 1864. The march across Georgia took four weeks, but introduced the physical destruction of war to a population untouched for the previous three-and-a-half years.

Military Action in War

Sherman's Logic

General William Tecumseh Sherman replaced General Ulysses S. Grant as the Commander of the Union's Army of the West in 1864. His campaign from Atlanta through the Carolinas is perhaps the single best example of a military using destruction to influence an enemy without engaging its fielded forces. This grand strategy combined two different approaches: Sherman's strategy was directed against the enemy's mind, while Grant's was more focused on the enemy's fielded forces.²¹ In addition to hitting the Confederate people, Sherman saw this as an opportunity to maneuver behind and contain General Lee. This proved valuable because, up until this point, Grant's armies found themselves in a stalemate with Lee's army at Petersburg, Virginia. Thus, by performing a massive turning movement through Georgia and the Carolinas, Sherman could

²⁰ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865*, 155.

²¹ Charles Edmund Vetter, *Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace* (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1992), 234.

increase pressure on Lee and allow Grant the opportunity to break through, or at least keep Southern reinforcements away from Virginia.

General Sherman wanted to expose the inherent faults of Southern society and slavery and felt a war focused solely on enemy forces was incomplete. Rather, he saw the people that supported these forces as the center of gravity and the turning point to the war. Therefore, he understood he needed to influence these people by introducing them to the horrors of war. This is evident in his letter to General Halleck. Sherman writes, “This war differs from European wars in this particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war.”²² The campaign was similar to Grant’s innovative and successful Vicksburg Campaign. Both understood that moving quickly reduced their need for traditional supply lines and allowed them to achieve a speed previously unknown for an army of its size. To make up for the absence of supply lines, they needed to live off the land. Foragers, known as “bummers,” provided food seized from local farms, while the Army destroyed the railroads, manufacturing, and industrial infrastructure of the state. The speed of Sherman’s march was amazing in that he was able to move 62,000 men 10-15 miles every day, an unparalleled feat. Confederate leadership did not understand this change in warfare. After the fall of Atlanta, Jefferson Davis commented in a speech, “Sherman cannot keep up his long line of communication, and he must retreat.”²³ Without question, Sherman was taking an enormous risk by restricting his reliance on communication and supply lines. What Davis and other Confederate military leaders failed to recognize was that Sherman adopted a new type of warfare, one characterized by speed and autonomy, with hopes of exploiting the values of the Southern people.

Sherman’s concept of total war required a blitzkrieg type approach aimed at destroying anything that could be used to support the war. His ability to move troops so quickly and destructively through Georgia was shocking and

²² James M. Merrill, *William Tecumseh Sherman* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), 266.

²³ Vetter, *Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace*, 237.

psychologically damaging to Southern residents. Years later he reflected on the transformation of this thinking:

I know that in the beginning, I too, had the old West Point notion that pillage was a capital crime, and punished it by shooting, but the Rebels wanted us to detach a division here, a brigade there, to protect families and property while they were fighting . . . this was a one-sided game of war, and many of us . . . ceased to quarrel with our own men about such minor things and went in to subdue the enemy, leaving minor depredations to be charged up to the account of the rebels who had forced us into the war.”²⁴

His new war strategy was founded on two beliefs, one psychological and the other pragmatic. Destruction and foraging was a means to articulate to the Southern population that they were not exempt from the horrors of war, and he also saw it as a necessary evil. The evil being that it afforded his Army speed, autonomy, and the absence of cumbersome supply lines.

What Sherman Targeted

Sherman recognized that in addition to the Confederacy’s military, another center of gravity was its determined civilian population that continued to live untouched and unperturbed in well-stocked farms in areas such as Mississippi, Alabama, and the Carolinas.²⁵ Until Sherman’s march began, large industrial cities such as Savannah and Macon were immune to the war.²⁶ Sherman wanted to take the fight directly to the civilian populace; however, he exercised caution in his approach because he understood that killing civilians could pose a serious threat to future reunification. General Sherman wrote General Halleck on the eve before his march, “This movement is not purely military or strategic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the South. They don’t know what war means, but when the rich planters of the Oconee and Savannah see their fences and corn and hogs and sheep vanish before their eyes they will have something more than a

²⁴ Lloyd Lewis, *Sherman, Fighting Prophet* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), 442.

²⁵ Victor Davis Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny* (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 136.

²⁶ Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny*, 136.

mean opinion of the ‘Yanks.’”²⁷ In addition to wanting to win and end the war, General Sherman saw his strategy as an investment. Sherman understood that a strategy draped in destruction would deter any future desires of secession.

General Sherman’s army was not the murdering and plundering horde of Southern mythology. On the contrary, his soldiers were well disciplined and as a result only a few civilians were killed. General Sherman made sure of this by providing clear rules of engagement when implementing his hard war policy. In preparation for the Savannah Campaign, Sherman issued his Special Field Order number 120, specifically outlining who was authorized to carry out military actions. Field Order 120 follows the logic similar to the Lieber Code, that “war is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.”²⁸ For example, the authorization to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, and other structures was only given to corps commanders. The cavalry and artillery were permitted to appropriate horses, mules, and wagons; however, they were commanded to discriminate between the rich, who were considered hostile, and the poor, who were considered neutral or friendly.²⁹ Furthermore, he commanded, “In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or . . . otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.”³⁰ While the order allowed for the foraging parties to take mules or horses to replace exhausted animals, it was not heartless. All soldiers had to refrain from using abusive or threatening language,

²⁷ William Tecumseh Sherman, *Sherman's Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman*, ed. Brooks D Simpson and Jean Vance Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 736.

²⁸ The Lieber Code of 1863. “General Orders No. 100. Article 17”
<http://www.civilwarhome.com/liebercode.htm> (accessed 11/27/2010).

²⁹ Sherman’s Special Order 120, Articles 5 and 6.
http://www.sewanee.edu/faculty/Willis/Civil_War/documents/Sherman120.html (accessed 11/20/2010)

³⁰ Sherman’s Special Order 120, Article 5.

and furthermore, leave each family with a reasonable portion for their maintenance.³¹

Another strategic target for Sherman was transportation. His columns spread more than sixty miles wide and destroyed every mile of railroad track, railroad cars, bridges, and burned almost every train station.³² Miles of railroad was pulled up, and rails were heated up and twisted around trees to create “Sherman’s neckties” and “Sherman’s hairpins.”³³ This was critical in that it cut off lines of communication to Southern towns, an act that further isolated the Southern people and cut them off from both supporting, and being supported, by other Confederate sources. Sherman saw this approach as a necessary evil. Before his march, the war had been happening far away, but now it was in the backyard of every Confederate civilian. Now, the average Southerner was being introduced to the horrors of war and forced to rethink his or her position on secession.

The Impact on Southern Morale

As discussed previously, the war was initially viewed as a force on force battle. In reality, Sherman saw the bigger picture and saw the war as a battle between societies. By showing the vulnerability of the Rebel homeland, General Sherman was able to hold at risk the homes and families of the Confederate soldiers that continued the fight. As Victor Davis Hanson explains, “Men ran or deserted not so much from cowardice or lack of training, but from the realization that the cause for their families and property was lost, their immediate efforts, even if for a time successful, in the end vain.”³⁴ The fall of Atlanta and the March to the Sea was the devastating blow that undermined the sociological and psychological underpinnings of Confederate society.³⁵ Likewise, Sherman’s march was a visible reminder to the people of the South that they were vulnerable. General Grant wrote in his memoirs that “All the States east of the Mississippi

³¹ Sherman’s Special Order 120, Article 6.

³² Vetter, *Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace*, 247.

³³ Vetter, *Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace*, 247.

³⁴ Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny*, 142.

³⁵ Vetter, *Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace*, 243.

River up to the state of Georgia, had felt the hardships of war . . . Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees had been whipped from first to last. . . and now that they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.”³⁶ The assault by Sherman’s men took on a life of its own in the minds of Southern society.

General Sherman understood that above all else *property* was the chief concern of rich white planters.³⁷ This greed and cowardice on behalf of wealthy plantation owners found leaving behind family members, slaves, and workers to protect their land and discourage destruction of their property. Moreover, during the march, Sherman’s Army faced very little resistance from traditional armed forces. The lack of opposition surprised Union soldiers, but also highlighted one of Southern society’s greatest flaws as a chivalric and apartheid society: “rhetoric, costumes, polite manners, titles, and arcane traditions among a privileged elite hide weakness rather than strength.”³⁸ Sherman’s men were quick to exploit the feelings of inequality felt by poor Southerners or blacks. An Indiana officer noted, “The times were propitious for the ‘poor white’ to show the arrogant planter that ‘one man is as good as another’ and for the revengeful who had cherished a grudge to get even with his neighbor.”³⁹

Following Sherman’s March to the Sea, his Army of the West embarked on the Carolina Campaign in January 1865. He advanced north from Savannah through the Carolinas, with the intention of linking up with Union forces in Virginia. The defeat of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s army at the Battle of Bentonville in March, and Johnston’s surrender in April, represented the loss of the final major army of the Confederacy. Confederate resistance ended

³⁶ Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 576-77.

³⁷ Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny*, 172.

³⁸ Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny*, 174.

³⁹ Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny*, 175.

after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. The Union had won, but more pressing issues faced the reunification of the country. At the end of the war, Southern whites had been prostrate, expecting the worst from their conquerors. In her famous Civil War recollection, Mary Chesnut explained, “We are scattered, stunned, the remnant of heart alive in us filled with brotherly hate. We sit and wait until the drunken tailor who rules the United States of America issues a proclamation and defines our anomalous position.”⁴⁰ How the North handled the reconstruction of the South was vital to ensuring social, political, and economic change.

Post-War Reconstruction

Ultimately, while the North won the war, the Confederates were able to win the peace in that a lack of involvement led to a society that was able to continue to repress blacks. A faulty reconstruction strategy squandered the opportunity created by the hard war policy. The North did not invest the necessary resources required to rebuild the South. While the North forced the passage of the 14th, 15th, and 16th Amendments to the Constitution, they ignored the rights of blacks by allowing the Ku Klux Klan and other legal devices such as black codes designed to control the black population.⁴¹ This continued in the South through Jim Crow laws until the civil rights movement in the 1960's.

With the passage of these amendments, the North could be sure that slavery would not return. However, being war weary, the Federal government allowed the South to rebuild itself with little interference. The tremendous cost, both human and material, used to conquer the Confederacy left the people of the North with conflicting attitudes towards, and degrees of interest in, the challenge of Reconstruction.⁴² While there were conflicts over the appropriate role of government in rebuilding the South, especially due to various opinions on the issues of race, the greater chasm was due to the vast number who had sacrificed

⁴⁰ John D. Fowler, *The Confederate Experience Reader: Selected Documents and Essays* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 448.

⁴¹ Fowler, *The Confederate Experience Reader: Selected Documents and Essays*, 423.

⁴² David Herbert Donald, Jean H. Baker, and Michael F. Holt, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York: Norton, 2001), 479.

for the war and now wanted to ignore political matters and focus on their private affairs.⁴³

War weariness also led to the disbanding of Union armies. Northern people wanted relief from the heavy costs in maintaining a large military, especially since the costs were levied on people through local, state, and federal taxes.⁴⁴ People of the Union wanted to worry about how best to profit from the new markets created from the long war.⁴⁵ However, the Federal government lacked an administrative capability to oversee Reconstruction, except through the Freedmen's Bureau (an organization to aid former slaves through legal, food and housing, oversight, education, health care, and employment contracts with private landowners and only authorized to exist for one year) and the Army.⁴⁶ However, with the disbanding of Sherman and Grant's legions, the Union Army went from over one million men on May 1, 1865 to 152,000 by year end—it returned to its traditional role as a constabulary, Indian-fighting force.⁴⁷ Federal troop levels in the post-war South hovered just above 10,000 men, enough to serve as an irritant, but far too small to constitute an army of occupation.⁴⁸ By the spring of 1877, President Hayes announced the formal end of Reconstruction and pulled out the last Federal troops.

Economic Recovery

Except for the emergency relief given by the Freedmen's Bureau, the resourced provided for reconstruction barely touched the surface of what needed to be done. The Federal government refused to subsidize the South's economic recovery. There are a number of reasons for the lack of solid economic policy toward the South during Reconstruction. The war left its own set of economic and ideological legacies in the North. Workers in the North had been especially burdened by the cost of the war policies. Conscription was primarily levied on the working class as opposed to the wealthy, who could hire substitutes or pay

⁴³ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 479.

⁴⁴ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 481.

⁴⁵ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 481.

⁴⁶ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 481.

⁴⁷ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 481.

⁴⁸ Fowler, *The Confederate Experience Reader: Selected Documents and Essays*, 449.

commutation fees. Therefore, organized labor unions failed, and wages lagged behind the inflated prices created by greenback issues and excise taxes.⁴⁹ Additionally, these grievances, along with other demands, forced Republican political officials to focus more on their constituents' situations and influenced how they viewed the South and Reconstruction policy.⁵⁰ Perhaps the major cause of the growing unevenness of the distribution of wealth was the Federal government's decision to buy back bonds with the surplus of money gained through excise taxes on consumer goods and high tariff duties.⁵¹ These bonds were primarily owned by the North's private sector, and therefore, the trajectories of the two economies began very quickly to divide.

Agriculture served as the dominant sector of the South's economy, but it suffered from an over-farming of cotton and an under-farming of foodstuffs, thus forcing the South to rely on outside sources of subsistence. Southern agriculture had relied so heavily on slave labor that without it, production severely decreased, and this exacerbated the already declining productivity of farms. Much of agriculture depended on an ample supply of credit given to farmers while crops were in the ground. Without the ability to use slaves as collateral to secure this credit, Southern farmers found it difficult not only to afford farming, but also to create business models based on a non-slave based labor force.⁵² As one Freedmen's Bureau Agent stationed in Greenville, South Carolina, described, "Many of the planters seemed to be unable to understand that work could be other than a form of slavery, or that it could be accomplished without some prodigious binding and obligating of the hireling to the employer. Contracts which were brought to me for approval contained all sorts of ludicrous provisions."⁵³ Against the backdrop of widespread devastation and poverty, the undersized inputs of the Freedman's Bureau appear distinctly limited. They had barely touched the

⁴⁹ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 489.

⁵⁰ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 493.

⁵¹ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 492.

⁵² Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 502.

⁵³ William E. Gienapp, *The Civil War Reconstruction: A Documentary Collection* (New York: Norton, 2001), 382.

surface of the economic recovery and redevelopment reforms that were necessary. As a consequence, political recovery and reformation was significantly hampered.

Political Recovery

In the absence of functioning local and state governments, Southerners had an expectation that the Northerners would determine the character of civil governments in the former Confederacy. However, for months after April 1865, many rural and urban areas saw the collapse of law and order, as a wave of violence and crime spread across the South.⁵⁴ This violence was not just perpetrated by angry Southern whites on newly freed slaves, but initially by discharged Confederate soldiers against the communities they passed on the way home. On May 4, 1865 the Macon *Telegraph* declared that the people of the South “face a prospect of anarchy and barbarian [sic] warfare . . . without the protection arm of the law.”⁵⁵ In some of the larger cities, the Union army successfully set up and managed local governments immediately after the war. Richmond, Lynchburg, Atlanta, and other cities served as examples of the political inroads the Union Army could have made had it not been disbanded so quickly.

The period of time when the Republicans controlled Southern politics was punctuated by the endeavor to provide blacks with political rights, although this was quickly challenged by a white uprising of Southern Democrats who fought to reduce freedmen’s rights, and a federal government that lacked the teeth to fully implement necessary reforms to ensure protection of such rights for blacks. Eventually, this led to the Republican Party losing power in the South. White intolerance of Republican rules and violent persecution of freedmen occurred constantly throughout the Reconstruction period.⁵⁶

The South was not immune to the formation of groups using terrorism as a tactic to fight back against the forced social and political changes after the war. The rise of the Ku Klux Klan and its targeting of both blacks and Republicans in politically elected positions represented the backlash against a Reconstruction that

⁵⁴ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 495.

⁵⁵ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 495.

⁵⁶ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 593.

was failing to follow through with President Lincoln's promise of a conciliatory peace after the war. Although Southern Democrats publicly accepted the ideas of black suffrage and the finality of Reconstruction after 1868, terrorism by the Ku Klux Klan never ceased. This prompted the federal government to pass a series of laws known as the Force or Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871, aimed at securing blacks' rights under the 14th and 15th Amendments. The Fourth Enforcement Act, passed on April 20, 1871, specifically outlawed the Klan and similar groups that interfered with any citizen's political or civil rights while also empowering the president to suspend habeas corpus, declare martial law, and insert Federal troops into areas to stop Klan activity.⁵⁷ While these acts had an effect on the demise of the Klan, acts of terrorism never totally ceased, due in part to the decrease in federal response, starting in the spring of 1873.⁵⁸ The deficient response of the Federal government, largely controlled by Republicans, emboldened the opposition, who organized as armed paramilitary units known variously as White Leagues or Red Shirts. They openly paraded in daylight to intimidate black voters, disrupted Republican rallies, beat and shot blacks at polling places on election day, and "instigated anti-black riots that were little more than massacres."⁵⁹ Other white Southern groups took the form of armed insurrections seeking to remove Republicans from state legislatures and other government positions.

Northern Republicans largely abandoned Reconstruction after 1873, due to political constraints occurring elsewhere in the country. The abandonment of Reconstruction was caused by a shift in politics in Washington. Within the Republican Party, liberal Border States began to pressure President Grant on his continued support for Reconstruction. In addition, numerous Supreme Court rulings such as *United States v. Cruikshank* and *United States v. Reese* greatly narrowed the ability of the Federal government's ability to enforce the 14th and 15th Amendments.⁶⁰ The effect of these cases allowed States to impose any

⁵⁷ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 602-03.

⁵⁸ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 603.

⁵⁹ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 603.

⁶⁰ Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 623.

restrictions they wished on the right to vote, so long as they were not based on race. This provided an opening for a series of restrictive laws, such as poll taxes, that eliminated the right of blacks to vote.

Social Recovery

Just as the Southern economy was devastated, Southern society was in similar disorder. Emancipation had destroyed the centuries old system of social cohesion and forced sudden and severe changes in relationships between whites and freedmen and freedwomen. However, blacks quickly discovered there were significant gaps between what they hoped freedom meant, and the reality of post-war policies. Society after the war looked similar to that before the war, except for the secessionist ideas.⁶¹ While the Civil War and Reconstruction restored the unity of the nation, many of the underlying social and political issues, namely slavery and the rights of blacks, remained long after the end of Reconstruction. However, although initially greatly restricted, the addition of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments provided for the rights of blacks to be expanded in the 20th century. Furthermore, Southern society never again seriously considered secession from the Union, nor did they take any action to make changes to Northern or Western society. Instead, their focus lay in local and state-wide action.

In an effort to reconcile defeat, white Southerners began to pass down stories about the exploits of the war. The “Lost Cause” movement, popular at the turn of the century, attempted to reconcile the traditional white society of the Southern United States to the defeat of the Confederate States of America. Subsequent generations not only learned about the past, but were made to feel as if it had recently happened. Author Margret Mitchell confessed, “I heard so much about the fighting and hard times after the war that I firmly believed Mother and Father had been through it all instead of being born long afterward. In fact I was about ten years old before I learned the war hadn’t ended shortly before I was

⁶¹ Fowler, *The Confederate Experience Reader: Selected Documents and Essays*, 433.

born.”⁶² The focus was not on the defeats, desertions, and dissent, but of the great heroism against odds, the sacrifices when no more could be offered, and the lives lost for a cause greater than man.⁶³

Conclusion

Sherman’s March to the Sea has been called one of the greatest uses of an indirect approach to war. While destruction was not deadly, it was effective in sending a message directly to the enemy’s population that its actions leading up to the war, in addition to its support of the war, would not be tolerated. What is most surprising about Sherman’s Savannah Campaign is its lasting impact on Southern society. Prior to the war, people were immune from its horrors. Sherman’s march changed how war was fought and introduced a level of destruction never seen before against Southern civilians. Sherman’s campaign killed very few people, yet it is remembered as one of the cruelest forms of warfare in that it destroyed anything and everything that stood in its way. It demonstrated that the Union was willing to use massive amounts of force to oppose slavery and the Southern way of life, which it considered incompatible with American values. By using destruction of property, Sherman was able to convey this message to the Southern population and force them to reorganize economically, politically, and socially in ways that did not support slavery. The victory presented by Sherman’s hard war strategy opened the door for reunification. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the North failed to fully support this endeavor fully. They invested so much in the war, but came up short in reforming and reconstructing issues in Southern society. This proved fatal in that it delayed society’s reintegration and imposed years of hardship on Southern society. This case study illustrates a failure on many levels. The biggest failure is the North’s lack of commitment in tying strategy to task—the strategy being reunification and the task being rebuilding the South. The first step was accomplished via Sherman’s actions across the South, in that he prepped the South with a level of destruction never before seen. The March to the Sea opened

⁶² David R. Goldfield, *Still Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002), 27.

⁶³ Goldfield, *Still Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History*, 27.

the door, but the North ultimately failed to capitalize on this opportunity, and a prolonged and painful reconstruction period resulted.



Chapter 3

Absolute Destruction: Japan in World War II

It is my earnest hope—indeed the hope of all mankind—that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past, a world founded upon faith and understanding, a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish for freedom, tolerance and justice.

General Douglas MacArthur

The fighting during 1941-1945 in the Pacific remains perhaps the bloodiest, most destructive, and most costly war ever fought by the United States. From the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, until the surrender of Japan on 14 August 1945, millions were killed, billions of dollars were spent, and untold damage was done to homes, villages, and cities. But from all this terror emerged a country that has been peaceful and stable since its defeat nearly 70 years ago. This case study serves to demonstrate the connection between wartime destruction and how that became an impetus for reconstructing a nation and a society on a more peaceful basis. The first area to consider is the evolution of US national policy towards Japan and the accompanying internal debate between military and political leaders. Next, the chapter examines the military action which caused the massive destruction on the Japanese homeland. Finally, it explores how the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) and the occupation forces instituted political, social, and economic reforms within the devastated country. Did the terrible war's very destructiveness plant the seeds for peaceful reconstruction?

Policy

US national policy for waging World War II was on one level very simple. Its focus was on massing overwhelming force, via the mobilization of millions of American and Allied soldiers and Western industrial might against the Axis powers. There were significant policy issues debated, like unconditional surrender versus negotiated peace, and invasion versus blockade and bombardment. Additionally, there were debates over where to allocate the limited

resources. The debate was focused on the question of where to focus the thrust of forces, island hopping towards the Philippines, in the Southwest Pacific, or a naval campaign across the Central Pacific. In the end, the US was able to pursue multiple options, as it was able to generate enough resources. Ultimately, the US was convinced an amphibious invasion of the home islands was necessary to defeat Japan. It was no secret that this was going to be extremely costly in terms of American and Allied lives.

The spring of 1945 welcomed the defeat of Germany, and the full brunt of US and Allied efforts could now focus on Japan. The USSR would enter the war against Japan 90 days after V-E Day. However, many in Washington were fearful that Japan would never surrender. Although Japanese naval and air forces had been severely reduced, the opinion was they could still amass a large army, reinforced by a fanatical population, which could impose a severe cost on the US.¹ Secretary of War Henry Stimson expressed his concern when he wrote that the Allies “would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply demonstrated its ability to fight to the death.”² Unknown to American leadership at the time was the peace movement within the Japanese government, whose efforts either never made it to the appropriate level in the US government, or whose overtures were never accepted.³ Perhaps the peace faction in Japan did not have enough power to pursue this option. Whatever the case, the Allies stuck to the demand of unconditional surrender as the only possible outcome. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) wrote Roosevelt and Churchill that the general objective in the Pacific was still to bring about, by the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of Japan.⁴ This would be accomplished through air bombardment, air and sea blockade, destruction of Japanese air and naval assets, and finally the invasion of the industrial heart of Japan. Although the American public did not

¹ Walter S. Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969), 161.

² Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 161.

³ Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 176.

⁴ Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 176.

want massive destruction and killing, by 1945, many Americans had accepted mass destruction in warfare, as indicated by the lack of criticism of incendiary bombing.⁵ The Allies wanted the quickest possible end to the war in the Pacific and were willing to use extreme measures to make this happen, while minimizing the loss of American lives, a strategy of attrition of the Japanese.

There were different assessments on the need for an invasion force and the effectiveness of bombardment and blockade. By mid-1944, following the successful European OVERLORD invasion, Joint planners in Washington concluded that “while the bombing and blockade of Japan will have a considerable effect upon Japanese morale and their ability to continue the war, there is little reason to believe that such action alone is certain to result in the early unconditional surrender of Japan.”⁶ The Joint planners pushed to continue plans for an invasion, because they were unable to assess the psychological effects of the bombardment and blockade. What is more, it was impossible to discern the relationship between the psychology and will of the people and the actions of the government. According to the Joint Chiefs, “the only sure way, and certainly the quickest way to force surrender of Japan is to defeat her armies on the main Japanese islands.”⁷ However, the Joint Chiefs also understood that the strategies of bombardment and invasion were not mutually exclusive. Regardless, the Allies sought unconditional surrender and were willing to unleash unlimited, total warfare against the Japanese.

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the US, Republic of China, and Great Britain issued the Potsdam Declaration calling for “the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action.”⁸ While the Allies did not threaten the use of nuclear weapons, which

⁵ John D. Chappell, *Before the Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific War* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky 1997), 151.

⁶ Herman S. Wolk, "Sixty-Five Years On: Plans and Strategy to Defeat Japan in World War II," *Air Power History*, no. Fall 2010 (2010): 8.

⁷ Wolk, "Sixty-Five Years On: Plans and Strategy to Defeat Japan in World War II," 10.

⁸ Potsdam Declaration. "Article 13," <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html> (accessed 4 March 2011).

were successfully tested only 10 days prior, the declaration elucidates that “[t]he alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.”⁹ Following the release of the declaration, the Japanese government considered the demands and some, like Foreign Minister Togo, argued for entering into negotiations with the Allies in order to obtain clarification and revision of the document.¹⁰ However, on the morning of 28 July, the Japanese press published an edited draft of the declaration, as well as a statement declaring that the Japanese government had decided to *mokusatsu* the declaration, in essence kill it with silence.¹¹ By ignoring the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese government left the Allies, and the US in particular, with no choice but to ratchet the destruction to the next level, thus setting the stage for Truman’s decision to use the atomic weapons.

History suggests that there was never any doubt on the calculated use of the atomic bombs, nor is there any debate that they would have been used against Germany had they been ready in time. President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that the weapon was to be made ready and used as soon as weather permitted.¹² President Truman later recorded, “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me . . . [I] never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and [Churchill said] he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war.”¹³ On August 6, 1945 the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. For three days after the detonation, the US awaited a response while continuing to press with other attacks. With no response forthcoming, Nagasaki was attacked on August 9. Early in the morning on August 10, US monitoring devices picked up a broadcast transmitting the Japanese offer to accept conditionally the Potsdam Declaration.¹⁴ Of particular interest in the waning days of the war was the debate over the future status of the Emperor. To handle this

⁹ Potsdam Declaration. “Article 13,” <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html> (accessed 4 March 2011).

¹⁰ Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 248.

¹¹ Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 248.

¹² Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 256.

¹³ Harry S. Truman, “The Truman Memoirs Part V: Greatest Thing in History” *Life* 39, no. 17 (1955): 103.

¹⁴ Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 271.

situation, the US responded on August 11, “From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers [SCAP] who will take such steps as he deems proper . . . The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”¹⁵ This allowed the Japanese the possibility that the Emperor might remain, while still satisfying the Allied demand for a SCAP with far-reaching powers. On August 14, the Japanese government accepted the terms proposed in the US note of August 11. The war officially ended with the formal surrender aboard USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945.

Military Action

The amount of death and destruction in WWII Japan is evidence that the Devil’s hands are forever present in war. Compared to today’s belief that war can be waged with minimal death and destruction, the atrocities that accompanied the Pacific War are somewhat hard to comprehend. The rapid devastation brought to bear on the Japanese people from aerial bombardment, coupled with the slow strangulation of its economy by the loss of its naval and merchant marine vessels, culminated in one of the most devastating collapses seen in the history of war. Until World War II, the island of Japan had never been the victim of an enemy attack.¹⁶ In fact, the soil of Japan was never “sullied by the boot of an enemy soldier” until August 28, 1945, when Colonel Charles Tench, a member of MacArthur’s staff, arrived in a C-47 on Atugie’s bomb-pocked runway.¹⁷ By June 1944, the skies over Japan were filled with endless waves of aircraft raining bombs and incendiaries on wooden cities. Perhaps most importantly, the Japanese lacked the capability to defend their homeland from these attacks.

Strategic Bombing

The initial bombing of Japan occurred on April 18, 1942 when Colonel Jimmy Doolittle and his raiders executed what the Japanese thought was impossibility, an attack on Japan. Since the US lacked a base within striking

¹⁵ Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, 272.

¹⁶ William Manchester, *American Caesar* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 441.

¹⁷ Manchester, *American Caesar*, 442.

distance of Japan, the Navy and Army collaborated to launch 16 B-25 Mitchell medium range bombers from the USS *Hornet* to strike targets in Tokyo, Kobe, Yokohama, and Nagoya.¹⁸ Doolittle's raiders were forced to launch 150 miles earlier than planned, because their position was compromised. The earlier than expected launch was instrumental in the subsequent loss of all the aircraft; however, the psychological effect on Japan was enormous.¹⁹ In addition to boosting American morale and creating heroes at a time they were desperately needed, most importantly it shattered the Japanese illusion of security. In an attempt to thwart future attacks, the Japanese attempted to extend their defensive perimeter by attacking Midway Island. The Japanese defeat there in June 1942 changed the course of the Pacific War.

Not until 1944 did another bomber strike targets in Japan. The arrival of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress, the USAAF's most modern bomber, was highly anticipated and long overdue. The enormous build up of the more capable B-29's afforded the allies the increased range and payload they needed to strike Japan. Following successful missions against Thailand, the USAAF began combat mission against Japan. On 15 June, 1944, B-29's left Chengtu, China on a 1500 mile flight to bomb the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on Kyushu. Of note, only one B-29 was lost to enemy defenses.²⁰

Staging out of China proved to be too distant and costly for continued operations against Japan. Allied commanders quickly saw the Marianas Islands as the answer. Even though flying out of China proved costly, it did allow attacks on Japan to start six months earlier than they would have, if the allies had waited for access to the Marianas Islands. These initial sorties also highlighted a serious deficiency in Japanese air defenses. These initial findings from the Chinese based sorties afforded B-29 crews the information needed for the tactics they later employed from the Marianas, placing them six months ahead of where they would have been had they waited.

¹⁸ Daniel L. Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan* (Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999), 3.

¹⁹ Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan*, 8.

²⁰ Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan*, 10.

General Curtis LeMay, handpicked by “Hap” Arnold to take over XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas, brought with him the use of new technologies from the European theater. General LeMay understood the opportunity incendiary weapons presented through his continued study of these weapons used by the British against Germany.²¹ The first fire raid on a Japanese target occurred on December 18, 1944, at the urging of the Joint Chiefs, and targeted the city of Hankow. The attack was a complete success in that it left the city burning for three days.²² However, battle damage assessment from the sorties highlighted that high altitude bombing (25,000 or 30,000 feet) caused the bombers to place less than 6 percent of their bombs within 1,000 feet of the target; therefore, LeMay decided to alter tactics from high-altitude to low-altitude, night incendiary bombing.²³ In his description of Japanese life post-war, Associate Press journalist Russell Brines graphically portrayed the scene near the end of the war, “Frenzied, flaming months now, Japan—the land of catastrophe—had been rocked by its greatest earthquake. Whole city blocks, whole towns erased in minutes. Timetable precision made the holocaust more awful. First came the dread roar of a few planes; then, if at night, the slow, twinkling descent of red flares, like the fireworks Japanese children love. The flares settled on the corners of a gigantic coffin across city blocks. Suddenly, everything within these outlines erupted into flames.”²⁴ The most deadly fire raid spanned two days in March, 1944. On 9 March, 325 B-29s launched Operation MEETINGHOUSE against targets in Tokyo, in which 279 aircraft dropped 1,665 tons on urban areas from altitudes less than 10,000 feet.²⁵ The glow of the fires in the city was visible from 100 miles away. Many aircrew members recalled plunging headlong into black clouds of smoke that obliterated the fires from below and then exiting the smoke to see

²¹ Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan*, 11.

²² Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan*, 12.

²³ Kenneth P. Werrell, *Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan During World War II* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 156-57.

²⁴ Russell Brines, *MacArthur's Japan* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1948), 15.

²⁵ Barrett Tillman, *Whirlwind: The Air War against Japan 1942-1945* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 147.

the blazing inferno below.²⁶ The target location was a three by four mile area estimated to house 750,000 workers and family-operated factories.²⁷ The 10 previous non-incendiary attacks accounted for less than 1,300 deaths. However, this firestorm left some 83,000 dead, and more than one million lost their homes.²⁸ Japanese military and civilian leaders commented on the destructive nature of the Tokyo bombing. An official from the Ministry of the Interior stated, “It was the great incendiary attacks [on Tokyo] which definitely made me realize the defeat.”²⁹ Many historians argue that the raid on Tokyo had a powerful effect on the Emperor himself. Similar attacks occurred until the end of the war in other cities, killing thousands more and destroying substantial numbers of homes and industries. According to Prince Fumimaro Konoye, “The thing that brought about the determination to make peace was the prolonged bombing by the B-29s.”³⁰

Unrestricted Submarine Warfare

In addition to the air campaign, many other factors contributed to the Allied victory over Japan. Japan was critically wounded by military defeats on land and sea, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade.³¹ One of the most effective military campaigns causing the destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet was the “Silent Fleet,” American submarines. The unrestricted warfare against all Japanese naval and merchant vessels had begun before the smoke cleared over Pearl Harbor, launched by Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.³² Although the first year of operations was plagued by problems of US torpedo ineffectiveness, by the end of 1942, US submarines had sunk 180

²⁶ Werrell, *Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan During World War II*, 161.

²⁷ Tillman, *Whirlwind: The Air War against Japan 1942-1945*, 147.

²⁸ Mark Clodfelter, *Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010), 187.

²⁹ Tillman, *Whirlwind: The Air War against Japan 1942-1945*, 154.

³⁰ Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan*, 37.

³¹ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington U.S. G.P.O., 1946), 16.

³² Joel Ira Holwitt, *Execute against Japan: The Us Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009), 162.

ships with for only seven American submarines lost.³³ The numbers of Japanese losses grew rapidly throughout the war. By 1943, the US Navy was essentially able to stop the Japanese from convoying merchant ships on the Pacific.³⁴ At the end of the war, US submarines had sunk 1,113 Japanese merchant ships and 201 warships.³⁵ Not only did this have an effect of strangulation on the Japanese homeland, but it also affected the Japanese troops throughout the Pacific. Being unable to get necessary supplies to the warfront meant that starvation and related illnesses such as beriberi, a nervous system ailment caused by a thiamine deficiency, became the major cause of death among fighting men.³⁶

For whatever reason, throughout the war, the Japanese failed at protecting their own merchant marine, the lifeline for the island nation. This is often attributed to the refusal of the warlords to face the facts that they might have to wage a defensive war. It was not until the end of 1943 that the Japanese organized an escort fleet, but it was never able to protect the merchant fleet with any effectiveness. At the end of the war, they had the exact same anti-submarine equipment as they started with in the beginning.³⁷ Materially, the combination of bombardment and blockade cost the Japanese economy approximately one-quarter of its wealth, including four-fifth of its ships, one-third of its tools, and almost a quarter of its vehicles.³⁸ This scale of destruction, both on land and at sea, had a massive impact on the people of Japan and their ability to wage war.

Lack of Japanese Air Defense

The incapability of the Japanese to defend their homeland from air attacks also demonstrates their lack of foresight and assumed

³³ Holwitt, *Execute against Japan: The Us Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare*, 165.

³⁴ Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 496.

³⁵ Holwitt, *Execute against Japan: The Us Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare*, 166.

³⁶ Holwitt, *Execute against Japan: The Us Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare*, 167.

³⁷ Morison, *The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War*, 497.

³⁸ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 45.

invulnerability. By the time Allied aircraft began attacking the homeland, it was impossible to sustain the quality and training of Japanese pilots seen at the beginning of the war. By late 1944, new pilots in front-line units had a precipitous decline in flight hours during training, and were completely inadequate to replace the lost, more experienced pilots.³⁹ Additionally, Japanese aircraft production could not match attrition rates, unlike American industry, which had little difficulty producing massive amounts of aircraft. The Japanese leadership failed to recognize the need to impose economic demands in order to support its military strategy, because they never saw a long war with the US as a possibility. Instead they had relied on a swift negotiated victory after their initial attacks.⁴⁰

By the summer of 1945, General LeMay understood the Japanese defenses posed little threat to his inbound bombers. In fact, he was so confident that cities were going to be destroyed, that he felt morally obligated to warn citizens by any and all means available, whether through leaflet drops or radio broadcasts.⁴¹ LeMay understood the impact of psychological warfare in that he knew he was not going to attack every city he warned, but the enemy did not. By threatening these cities, he fully understood that a psychological impact was going to be felt by the people, highlighting that destruction, and the threat of destruction, not death, was the objective of these missions.

Amount of Damage

Before Pearl Harbor, Japan was known as the “workshop of Asia,” after the war, it became Asia’s “scrap heap.”⁴² At the end of the war, the total area of the Japanese empire was reduced by 81 percent. The resources once used to make the Japanese empire flourish were drastically cut, and the Japanese homeland suffered from extensive destruction. According to the US Strategic Bombing Survey:

³⁹ Tillman, *Whirlwind: The Air War against Japan 1942-1945*, 177.

⁴⁰ Richard J. Overy, *The Air War, 1939-1945* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 152.

⁴¹ Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan*, 25.

⁴² Manchester, *American Caesar*, 464.

In aggregate some 40 percent of the built-up area of the 66 cities attacked was destroyed. Approximately 30 percent of the entire urban population of Japan lost their homes and many of the possessions. The physical destruction of industrial plants subjected to high-explosive attacks was similarly impressive. The larger bomb loads of the B-29s permitted higher densities of bombs per acre in the plant area, and on the average somewhat heavier bombs were used. The destruction was generally more complete than in Germany. . . The Japanese labor force declined in efficiency due to malnutrition and fatigue, the destruction of much of the urban housing and the difficulties of local transportation. Production hours lost through all causes including absenteeism, sickness, air-raid alerts and enforced idleness rose from 20 percent in 1944 to over 40 percent in July 1945.⁴³

In a mid-October 1945 letter to President Truman, special envoy Edwin Locke, Jr. reported that “the American officers now in Tokyo are amazed by the fact that resistance continued as long as it did.”⁴⁴ As far as the levels of destruction, Locke noted that, “the entire economic structure of Japan’s greatest cities have been wrecked. Five million of Tokyo’s seven million have left the ruined city.”⁴⁵ The damage Tokyo sustained was almost indistinguishable from that done via the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Statistics on the number of Japanese killed are estimated around 2.7 million including both combatants and civilians. This equates to roughly three to four percent of the total population. The number of people injured, sick, or malnourished is unknown, but estimated to be well into the millions. According to the US Strategic Bombing Survey, “Japan, by the time of the surrender, was a thoroughly defeated nation. Her war machine was starved for materials by the blockage and smashed by bombardment; her population was burned out, injured, and caused to flee in large numbers. . . At the time the surrender was announced, [low morale] was rapidly becoming of greater importance as a pressure on the political and military decisions of the rulers of the country.”⁴⁶ What these statistics illustrate is that the bombardment

⁴³ Survey, *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)*, 17-19.

⁴⁴ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 44.

⁴⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 44.

⁴⁶ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale* (Washington D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1947), 5-6.

campaign, including the use of the atomic weapons, certainly played a major role in the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Post-War Reaction of the Population

Compared to today's belief that wars can be waged with minimal loss of life and damage, the amount of death and destruction in WWII Japan exceeded most people's comprehension. Post-war Japan consisted of a complex mix of psychological and social paradoxes. The Japanese people answered their nation's call to arms and fully embraced their duty to fight to the death, most clearly exemplified by the Kamikaze campaign. Their willingness to defend their country carried on through years of unlimited war, further exacerbated by the Japanese government's continuous lies and propaganda about the true situation of the war. While the people embraced the Emperor's call to fight until death, the years of war had taken a severe toll on them economically, socially, and politically. Their allegiance to Emperor Hirohito, both religiously and politically, made them view things differently than Westerners would. A common mistake when analyzing Japanese post-war behavior is trying to compare it with Western values, instead of understanding what actually happened. What is often confusing to a western way of thinking is how a whole society went from being prepared to fight to the death, to rejecting militarism and embracing an occupation force within months. The physical evidence of defeat was evident in much of the country. However, the people were anticipating the Emperor's speech on August 15, 1945 to rally the Japanese people around a final charge to defend the homeland.⁴⁷ Instead the speech stated, "We have ordered our government to communicate to the [Allied governments] that Our Emperor accepts the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration."⁴⁸ What is interesting to note is that the speech included no reference to an apology, defeat, or sense of wrong doing. Instead, the Emperor stated that the war turned out "not necessarily to Japan's advantage."⁴⁹ The speech concluded with, "Let the entire nation continue as one

⁴⁷ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 14.

⁴⁸ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 20.

⁴⁹ Stephen S. Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography* (London: Routledge, 1992), 192.

family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities and the long road before it.”⁵⁰ The speech had a profound impact in that it initially saddened most Japanese; however, at the same time it signaled an end to the horrors of war while also providing a collective way forward.

The high level of destruction to cities, villages, and industry, coupled with the annihilation of Japanese naval and merchant marine capabilities, left behind a completely devastated society lacking the means to provide even basic necessities to its population. Food was in such short supply, and the people therefore felt a sense that their government, ruled by a few militaristic leaders, was incompetent, had led them astray, and left them in the lurch.

As for the US, the overarching policy for post-war occupation was simple, Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, stated that the US would ensure, “the present economic and social system in Japan which makes for a will to war will be changed so that the will to war will not continue.”⁵¹ According to the Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive (JCS 1380/15), measures included “the carrying out of the Cairo Declaration and the limiting of Japanese sovereignty to the four main islands and such minor islands as the Allied Powers determine; the abolition of militarism and ultra-nationalism in all their forms; the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make war; the strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes in governmental, economic and social institutions; and the encouragement and support of liberal political tendencies in Japan.”⁵²

The greatest achievement of the occupation force was the speed with which it got to work. The initial directives sent out across the country do not suggest that the occupation was thrown together last minute, by a force which had just scrapped a combat invasion plan.⁵³ Instead, within three months SCAP had

⁵⁰ Brines, *MacArthur's Japan*, 21.

⁵¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 77.

⁵² Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan. “JCS 1380/15” dated 3 November 1945. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryō/01/036/036tx.html> (accessed 4 Feb 2011).

⁵³ Brines, *MacArthur's Japan*, 73.

achieved success in a variety of areas. These included: establishing the new framework of government, destroying military capabilities, eradicating of the war government's intricate system of physical control, dismantling the financial oligarchy, ascertaining basic freedoms of individuals.⁵⁴

Social

Although Japanese society is highly traditional, there was a precedent for even dramatic social change. Beginning with the Meiji Restoration in the 1860's, Japan had gone through various major social transformations. From the Japanese perspective, the war was concerned with advancing Japanese interests in order to catch up with the advanced industries of the West. People were expected to embrace these changes with open arms, as directed by the Emperor towards achieving the "New Political Structure" and the "New Economic Structure."⁵⁵ Thus, when the occupation began, the notion of embracing change in hopes for a "new" Japan was not foreign to its citizens. Additionally, General MacArthur's role, as a secluded virtual co-Emperor, was familiar to Japanese society. Therefore, his top-down reformations were accepted, in part, because they were accomplished in a way similar to how change was previously enforced.

The long and highly destructive nature of the war brought an incredible burden on the Japanese population, and the surrender brought with it widespread exhaustion and despair. Known as *kyodatsu* condition, it was essentially war weariness or fatalism. After the war, pre-surrender officials noted in confidential correspondence that the effects of war were having a drastic impact on the morale of the population.⁵⁶ *Kyodatsu*, or low morale, as it was referred to by the US Strategic Bombing Survey, was understood by US officials as a potential problem for post-war reconstruction and as an obstacle to promoting democracy in a shattered country.⁵⁷ Empowering a defeated people also proved to be a serious challenge to the occupation force.

⁵⁴ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 74.

⁵⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 178.

⁵⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 89.

⁵⁷ Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale*, 146.

Of particular interest in the social response to the end of World War II is whom Japanese society chose to blame for the massive amounts of destruction. One would think the daily presence of bomber aircraft, delivering death and destruction on a daily basis, would provoke anger and resentment. However, post-war interviews soon discovered that the Japanese people blamed their own government for its inability to protect them. Interestingly, the Japanese called the bombers “B-san” (“Mr. B”), showing a level of respect. From the start, the occupation uncovered large numbers of Japanese nationals who wanted to try Japanese militarists and other war criminals for their actions during the war.⁵⁸ They took a strong stand against the government for misleading them and called for every person involved to acknowledge their “war responsibility.”⁵⁹ Another reason for such focused anger against the militarists was based on Japanese culture and their resounding belief that defeat is shameful. By losing the war, the inaction of the militarists was in stark contrast to this cultural belief, and the population wanted to hold the warlords responsible for the greatest crime of all, defeat. Coupled with the frustration of defeat was the people’s bitterness and anger at the incompetence of the government to provide basic post-war needs to the people.⁶⁰ These grievances toward the government served as a pivot, turning the population to look in a new direction for social change.

Without question, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, played a key role in the post-war occupation. General MacArthur’s occupation force understood, in a general sense, the differences between Western and Japanese culture. It was this cultural sensitivity that helped the General and his forces successfully rebuild the country. Daily, they walked a fine line between forcing change and respecting Japanese culture. However, at the same time, General MacArthur understood that drastic changes contrary to pre-war culture needed to be addressed. Of his major reforms, General MacArthur’s first act was to give women the right to vote. After being warned that it would not be favorably accepted by Japanese men, General MacArthur

⁵⁸ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 109.

⁵⁹ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 109.

⁶⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 119.

commented, “I don’t care. I want to discredit the military. Women don’t like war.”⁶¹ This reform was instrumental in advancing women’s rights and became a major part of the reforms in democratic Japan. Before and during the war, if a woman walked line abreast with a man, it would have been considered immoral and was frowned upon by society.⁶² The occupation introduced new ways of interacting. These were initially seen by Americans on the streets in major cities where US soldiers were stationed.⁶³ While some argue that this change “unmanned” Japanese males, the status of women in Japan remains equal to men in many ways today.

During his first meeting with the new Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Kijuro Shidehara, General MacArthur surprised him by ordering social reforms be undertaken as rapidly as possible. In addition to the emancipation of Japanese women, other social reforms included: encouragement of the unionization of labor as a means of eliminating exploitations, liberalization of the schools to teach that government was a servant, rather than the master, of the people, abolition of systems which keep people in constant fear through secret inquisition and abuse, and democratization of economic institutions to distribute income more widely and ownership of production and trade.⁶⁴ While some reforms such as disbanding the feared special police, the *Kempeitai* (known as the Japanese Gestapo), were easy to implement, others proved more difficult. For example, the education or re-education proved to be challenging and lengthy, since the very bureaucracy that dealt with the issue was full of men still thinking in the old ways.⁶⁵

Throughout the occupation, the force monitored the Ministry of Education through the SCAP Civil Information and Education Section.⁶⁶ At the end of the war, the Japanese education system was in shambles—18 million students with only 20 percent of the necessary text books available and four thousand schools

⁶¹ Manchester, *American Caesar*, 440.

⁶² Shunsuke Tsurumi, *A Cultural History of Post-war Japan 1945-1980* (London: KPI, 1987), 11.

⁶³ Tsurumi, *A Cultural History of Post-war Japan 1945-1980*, 10.

⁶⁴ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 48.

⁶⁵ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 50.

⁶⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 247.

destroyed.⁶⁷ This had the effect of forcing the Ministry to become one of the country's greatest proponents for democracy and peace and allowed for new criticisms of the previously oppressive regime.⁶⁸ In textbooks, the government had students blacken over all passages deemed to be militaristic, nationalistic, or in any manner undemocratic.⁶⁹ In essence, they sent the message that students could, and ultimately should, criticize something previously considered sacrosanct. While many educators had difficulty changing overnight from preaching the importance of emperor-system orthodoxies to the benefits of democracy, many were filled with guilt and grief over the deaths of their former students.⁷⁰ In fact, this guilt and grief is what led many teachers to embrace the ideals of democracy and peace with great fervor.⁷¹ With the focus of education on democracy and anti-militarism, the next generations of Japanese society were shaped in a fundamentally different direction.

Social reforms mainly occurred because of the political decisions made by SCAP. General MacArthur understood that while his force was acting as a primer for this change, in the end the reforms needed to be implemented by the Japanese people because they needed to internalize the changes in order to make substantive long-term reform. General MacArthur's understanding of Japanese culture and values highlighted that the Emperor, and his influence over his people, was essential in making these changes happen.

Political/Diplomatic

One of the most influential thinkers on how to handle post-war Japan was Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, MacArthur's military secretary and the chief of psychological-warfare operations. General Fellers suggested that the occupation force drive a wedge between the emperor and the military leadership.⁷² This was

⁶⁷ Edward R. Beauchamp and Jr. James M. Vardaman, *Japanese Education since 1945: A Documentary Study* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 6.

⁶⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 247.

⁶⁹ Beauchamp and James M. Vardaman, *Japanese Education since 1945 : A Documentary Study*, 7.

⁷⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 249-50.

⁷¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 250.

⁷² William P. Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 360-61.

meant to show the people, according to Fellers that the gangster militarists “have led the Son of Heaven, Divine Ruler of the Empire, to the very precipice of destruction.”⁷³ General Fellers understood the importance of the Emperor to the Japanese people. Thus, any recommendation from the Emperor would serve as a rallying cry for the Japanese people and could bring them together instead of fragmenting the society. He also understood that while peace terms must be strict, dethroning or hanging the Emperor would be political suicide, something comparable to the crucifixion of Christ to the western Christian world. Therefore, the solution was to remove the military from the responsibility of the Emperor, and surround him with a liberal government, essentially creating a constitutional monarchy.⁷⁴ These observations and suggestions became the foundation of post-war policy.

By using the Emperor’s spiritual and political control over the population, while respecting his position within Japanese culture, the US was able to make reforms through a system that was not totally foreign to the Japanese. Furthermore, SCAP’s refusal to try the Emperor for war crimes was seen as hypocritical and anti-democratic by many, but as a sign of respect for Japanese culture by most Japanese. Ultimately, the Allies’ determination was that a trial would have accomplished nothing more than to pacify international anger and calls for vengeance. General MacArthur later said, “I came here with the idea of using the emperor more sternly. But that wasn’t necessary. He is a sincere man and a genuine liberal.”⁷⁵ General McArthur was able to control much of the reforms by showing he understood and valued the position of the Emperor, but also because the Emperor himself was open to reform. To the Japanese people, General McArthur was viewed as co-Emperor. Letters flooded SCAP praising his “exalted and godlike benevolence” and thanking him for giving hope and happiness to people that were initially fearful of alien occupation.⁷⁶ The fact that so many people were willing to write to General McArthur demonstrates that a

⁷³ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 282.

⁷⁴ Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese Religions*, 361.

⁷⁵ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 97.

⁷⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 229.

significant change had taken place. To the people, the Emperor was considered holy, divine and unreachable. Now, the Japanese had a figure they held in similar regard, but the difference was his accessibility to the average citizen.

The Military Tribunal for the Far East had been structured in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Declaration, and the Moscow Conference. There was much disagreement among the Allies about whom to put on trial. Additionally, the Japanese people did not expect the War Crimes Trials to be against the war leaders of Japan, but instead against those who violated international law by actions such as ill-treating prisoners of war.⁷⁷ However, when leaders of the Japanese war government were put on trial, they understood the necessity of justice imposed by the conquerors as a modern legal cover for a primitive form of retaliation, a type of victor's justice.⁷⁸ This was a revolutionary concept to the Japanese, to make something criminal that was not considered criminal when committed.⁷⁹ In the end, 28 wartime leaders were tried during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, but thousands more were arrested and tried throughout the country.

In general, the American occupation force was able to overcome inexperience or lack of cultural awareness by having superior knowledge of specialized fields and a basic idea of an end state. The timing and pace of General MacArthur kept the government bureaucracy "off balance, apprehensive and too cowed to attempt anything but the most covert sabotage."⁸⁰ Initially this was difficult to do because of the occupation forces' limited numbers. However, in time, the numbers of people working at SCAP grew, making oversight of the new reforms more manageable. Over the course of two years the numbers grew from 1500 civilian and military bureaucrats to 3200. These bureaucrats formed a "new super-government" that effectively commanded the reforms in basic political, economic, social, and cultural policy.⁸¹ Likewise, there were large numbers of troops stationed throughout Japan. The initial occupation force

⁷⁷ Tsurumi, *A Cultural History of Post-war Japan 1945-1980*, 13.

⁷⁸ Tsurumi, *A Cultural History of Post-war Japan 1945-1980*, 15.

⁷⁹ Tsurumi, *A Cultural History of Post-war Japan 1945-1980*, 17.

⁸⁰ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 76.

⁸¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 205.

numbered 250,000 troops.⁸² The large presence in the country, aimed at making substantial reform, helped to quickly move the Japanese government in the direction of democracy.

Economic

As part of General MacArthur's major reforms, breaking down the last vestiges of feudalism proved to be a catalyst for follow-on reforms. In fact, one of Washington's first directives to SCAP was to favor policies "which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade" and for the "dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations [*zaibatsu*] which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry."⁸³ While the dissolution of large financial groups had little effect, in essence, because they reformed later, land reform had a profound impact on the Japanese mentality, because this allowed farmers to think of themselves as property owners.⁸⁴ SCAP was able to strip away land from the rural landowners and dissolve family-held *zaibatsu* holdings due to hyperinflation, and because such holdings were seen as obstacles to the creation of a peaceful and democratic Japan.⁸⁵ Labor laws were also instituted quickly. In December 1945, under pressure from the GHQ, the Diet passed the Trade Union Law, guaranteeing workers rights to organize, strike, and collectively bargain.⁸⁶ By the end of 1945, unions had some 380,000 members, and, by mid-1948, the number peaked at over six million members, comprising more than half of the non-agriculture work force.⁸⁷

In many ways, destruction of the economic system actually stimulated reform and initiative. Many small- or medium-sized companies flourished after the defeat due to their resourcefulness at meeting the demands of consumers, while large companies became passive and pessimistic. Although it had been a

⁸² Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 74.

⁸³ Brines, *Macarthur's Japan*, 129.

⁸⁴ Tsurumi, *A Cultural History of Post-war Japan 1945-1980*, 8.

⁸⁵ Laura Elizabeth Hein, *Fueling Growth: The Energy and Economic Policy in Post-war Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1990), 62.

⁸⁶ Hein, *Fueling Growth: The Energy and Economic Policy in Post-war Japan*, 59.

⁸⁷ John Price, *Japan Works: Power and Paradox in Post-war Industrial Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 41.

target for much of the bombing campaigns, a considerable percentage of Japanese industrial plants remained untouched and were used for economic recovery. Japanese industrial potential became an asset in the recovery of the economy. Not only did it help to rebuild the country, but the Korean War gave Japanese industry a significant boost. By 1950, Japan was the only industrialized country in the region that had spare engineering capacity that the Allies could use to fulfill orders for necessary machine parts. This business spurred a boom in the Japanese economy.⁸⁸ In the end, the “special procurements” for the Korean War brought in an estimated \$2 billion to the Japanese economy between June 1950 and the end of 1953, more than the US aid given from 1945 through 1951.⁸⁹ The first year of the Korean War alone brought in an estimated 149 million dollars, five times the volume of stock sales in 1950.⁹⁰ Even after the war, Japanese industry gained from the reconstruction of South Korea. This boost was especially necessary, because it came in the form of dollars instead of just aid, which was mostly in the form of food and material deemed essential to keep the economy afloat. The role of the Korean War was decisive in expediting the transition and restoring the Japanese economy.⁹¹ It provided a large demand that Japan was able to fulfill, and contributed to making Japan an ally and partner in handling regional issues.

The shortage of food and other basic necessities in the initial post-war period cannot be overstated. Starvation and malnutrition took an incalculable toll on the Japanese population. Elementary school children were significantly smaller in 1946, compared to 1937.⁹² In fact, the Allied policy of economic strangulation choked off supplies to both the war front and the home front. Sadly, blockades usually affect the weakest members of society, thus having serious ramifications on future social change. The lack of food was further compounded by the devastating harvest of 1945 which was mismanaged by the incompetent

⁸⁸ Takatoshi Ito, *The Japanese Economy* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 60-61.

⁸⁹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 542.

⁹⁰ Kozo Yamamura, *Economic Policy in Post-war Japan: Growth Versus Economic Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 39.

⁹¹ Yamamura, *Economic Policy in Post-war Japan: Growth Versus Economic Democracy*, 52.

⁹² Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 92.

and unconcerned government elites.⁹³ Food shipments from the US were necessary to avoid further tragedy and served to enhance the image of US occupation forces, for US personnel were able to provide necessary food where the previous Japanese government had been unable.⁹⁴ This reemphasizes the necessity for a strong occupation force to be ready and able to supply basic needs for a population following a destructive defeat.

Conclusion

In total, the massive amounts of destruction on the Japanese homeland and its merchant shipping combined to have a devastating impact on Japanese society. The population suffered not only from the impact of such destruction, but also from the unwillingness of the government to protect them from such horrors of war. The success of the post-war reforms was enabled by the level of destruction inflicted on the people of Japan. This forced the Japanese people to reassess the effectiveness of the old institutions (military, political, and economic). By discrediting these institutions, reforms were better able to take root and form a society that turned away from military imperialism towards a peaceful democracy.

Coupled with the frustration of defeat was the people's anger at the incompetence of the government to provide basic post-war needs to the people. In actuality, US occupation forces initially had little understanding of Japanese culture and society, but they were quick to provide basic needs and institute reforms. The decision to keep the Emperor as a figurehead demonstrated the cultural understanding, if not political savvy, of SCAP. Although not all Japanese considered the Emperor to be sacred after the war, his position and influence was central to bringing the Japanese society together and moving them in a new direction. Perhaps the most important aspect of post-war occupation was the American ability to implement reforms quickly. Although this depended greatly on previously existing bureaucracy, the occupation force was able to start many changes immediately because of the planning that started long before the

⁹³ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 90.

⁹⁴ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 93.

occupation. Reforms were started in the first weeks of the occupation in a society that badly needed basic necessities. In many ways, it was the physical destruction of the much of the old economic system that provided an opportunity for new reforms and initiatives to take place.



Chapter 4

Destruction and Occupation in Limited War

Democratic state-building is now an urgent component of our national interest.
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, 2008

Recent military actions involving the United States feature a different type of conflict with limited objectives. To begin, the previous case studies are examples of nearly unlimited, or total wars. Since the end of the Cold War, military conflicts have assumed a more conservative and limited aspect, with a greater emphasis on state-building. While recent wars differ from the unlimited nature of the Civil War and World War II, a relationship still exists between the better state of peace and the use of overt destruction against specific targets, followed by the occupation and reconstruction of a society. This chapter will examine recent US conflicts that demonstrate the cradle-to-grave relationship between policy and strategy making, targeting, the resulting physical destruction, occupation, and the state of long term peace that results. Together, these examples help flesh out our understanding of what specific physical destruction means to a post-war society. The examples discussed here all involve the United States, but there are other noteworthy examples, including the Israeli actions in Lebanon or the Russian operations in Chechnya, that might also repay further study. Regardless of the timeframe or objectives, however, in order to be victorious, the victor has to progress beyond military triumph to preserve the political control needed to secure an advantageous and enduring peace settlement.

What is Different Today

The end of the Cold War gave rise to new types and levels of conflict. The new security environment involves a broad range of issues, some of which include proliferation, terrorism, pervasiveness of international organized crime, and ethnic cleansing. These recent threats to international security are strikingly different than the ones presented during the World Wars that threatened the survival of the United States. As such, public support plays a major role in the launching and sustainment of these limited conflicts. Long gone are the days

when the American public was willing to sustain and support wars at levels similar to the Civil War or either of the World Wars. Additionally, advances in information have introduced the world to a new way of interacting with war. The ubiquity of information provides the public with images and testimony of real-time events occurring in war. It has become difficult to filter the information that reaches domestic and global audiences. Moreover, the images are rarely presented in an unbiased manner. Instead, they are often exploited in a way representative of the media source—to include emotive sound bites, shocking photographs and video, and gripping personal accounts. Imagine the effects on US national will if the heartbreaking personal stories of women and children in Dresden or Tokyo that became available after the war had appeared in real time. The advances in information and technology have made the American public (not to mention world opinion) less forgiving when it comes to death and destruction. They expect precision targeting and question anything less. They rarely understand the fog and fiction of war and are ruthless in their demands for a victory almost entirely devoid of civilian casualties. Culturally, it would be incorrect to say that Americans have lost their “stomach” for war; however, the lack of immediate threat to US survival certainly inhibits their support, especially when it is wrapped in death and destruction. Additionally, the emphasis on human rights and information’s ability to expose these terrible occurrences has seen a greater impetus from both home and abroad for the US to take action.

Selection Criteria for Recent Examples

There are numerous campaigns that demonstrate this relationship, but three fill the criteria previously mentioned. It is essential to look at the campaigns that were not chosen, in order to better understand the spectrum of presented operations. Specifically, conflicts during the Cold War were avoided because they occurred in the context of a greater conflict, and therefore are contaminated by external politics. Examples of these Cold War conflicts not chosen are Korea and Vietnam. Both were limited in nature and objective, as they served as a subset of the Cold War and a direct result of America’s desire to contain the spread of communism, but not ignite World War III. The ultimate objective in

both conflicts was halting communism, not defeating the enemy, occupying the country, and reconstructing society (even though some argued this should have been the case in Korea). Therefore, they do not provide the range of conflict, destruction through post-war reconstruction, required for this study.

The on-going conflict in Afghanistan is not representative of this relationship because of the states pre-conflict condition of infrastructure and society. Afghanistan is challenging because of the preexisting level of destruction and instability present throughout the country before the start of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). OEF is not a typical state versus state war. Instead, it is characterized as state versus non-state conflict with a strategy focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. After the initial retaliatory strikes on Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the strategy morphed into one focused on nation building. Finally, because major combat operations are still ongoing, it is still too early to assess if a relationship exists between the better state of peace and the use of overt destruction against specific targets, followed by the occupation and reconstruction of society.

Thus, three post-Cold War cases were chosen, because they highlight the relationship between destruction, occupation, and a society's response to conflict. They are Operation DELIBERATE FORCE (ODF) in 1995, Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) in 1999, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 2003. All three demonstrate the relationship between military actions taken before, during, and after the conflict. All contained a measure of destructive firepower delivered from the air, in the first two cases almost exclusively. Additionally, they also highlight post-war considerations and how actions, taken during the conflict, play a major role in implementing and maintaining the peace.

Operation Deliberate Force/Deny Flight

The intervention in the Balkans is typical of the types of conflicts the US fought in the aftermath of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet bloc. It is illustrative of how a small amount of destruction on key military targets, followed by a large contingent of occupation forces, can bring about a stabilized peace. Conflict between ethnically divided groups within former Yugoslavia and the

atrocities that surfaced as a result, bringing about international demands for humanitarian intervention, are what ultimately garnered US attention. While Bosnian society was tearing itself apart along ethnic lines, it is imperative to understand the sustaining causes of the conflict. Essentially, the collapse of the existing federal system, and the resulting lack of governance, instilled a fear that caused Bosnians to react with violence and ethnic cleansing. While ethnic tensions have been historically endemic to Bosnia, interethnic violence was episodic. By the latter part of the twentieth century, Bosnians from each ethnicity looked like each other and spoke dialects of the same root language. Contrary to popular belief, Bosnians had lived together peacefully for long periods of time. Explanations vary, but most identify some combination of three underlying forces as the predominant cause of their choice: historic ethnic and religious tension, cynical inflammation of ethnic tension by national and provincial politicians in pursuit of personal power and other political ends, and a military imbalance grossly in favor of one Bosnian ethnic group—namely the Serbs.¹ Therefore, of all the people in Bosnia, it was the political elite that was actively exploiting and exacerbating ethnic tensions. They had established control of their respective political and military means and understood that members of the society would follow leaders along ethnic lines.

NATO actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in very limited form in October 1992 as a part of Operation SKY MONITORY, following a UN resolution banning flights by any aircraft without approval from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). It was renamed Operation DENY FLIGHT and given the authority by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816 to intercept and, if necessary, shoot down aircraft violating the prohibition in April 1993.² By July, the mandate expanded and allowed for close air support (CAS) to UN peacekeepers. In August non-CAS airstrikes were approved in an attempt to retaliate for and deter attacks against peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.³

¹ Robert C. Owen, ed., *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 2000), 458.

² Owen, ed., *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, 19.

³ Owen, ed., *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, 19.

Being part of a coalition occasionally inhibited American desires to react forcefully against the Bosnian Serbs. Following the deadly 4 February 1994 attack by Bosnian Serbs against a marketplace in Sarajevo, the US wanted to take immediate retaliatory action but was unable to convince other NATO countries, namely Great Britain and France, of the necessity of doing so.⁴ However, the marketplace attack served as a turning point, ultimately leading NATO to demand the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) withdraw from a 20-kilometer-wide exclusion zone around Sarajevo within 10 days or face NATO bombing. The first CAS attacks against BSA targets occurred on 10 and 11 April.⁵ Coalition aircraft continued similar attacks throughout the year, but many were limited due to NATO members' concerns about the possibility of conflict escalation.

NATO's military strategy changed after the July 1995 sacking of Srebrenica, a supposed safe haven under UN protection. European countries, especially Great Britain and France, had grown weary of the lack of progress of UNPROFOR, and were ready to support increased NATO intervention. On 30 August Operation DELIBERATE FORCE commenced when UN aircraft and ground forces attacked Bosnian Serb targets in the southeast zone of action as well as around Sarajevo. Target selection focused predominantly on military assets: command and control facilities, air defense, military facilities, aircraft, tanks, and artillery. This focus, and the subsequent willingness of the Bosnian Serb political elite to forego further violence, demonstrate that the targets destroyed were of significant value. The Bosnian Serb leadership feared domination by other groups; therefore, maintaining its means to fight off domination, namely their military capabilities, was essential.⁶ Simply put, the destruction, or threatened destruction, of these capabilities underscored the potential costs of further resistance and noncooperation.

The bombing and direct destruction in Bosnia were by no means the only factors responsible for bringing the three parties, especially the Bosnian Serbs, to

⁴ Owen, ed., *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, 20.

⁵ Owen, ed., *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, 22.

⁶ Robert S. Ehlers, Jr., "Searching for the Silver Bullet: Coercion Mechanisms and Airpower Theory" (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Command and Staff College, 2002), 25.

the table. Economic sanctions, political isolation, the Serbs' inability to respond to joint air/ground operation, and a continued ground offensive by the Bosnian/Croat forces proved too much to handle.⁷ Yet destruction from the air proved a powerful component of this coercion. As a saber-rattling demonstration of NATO airpower, Ambassador Holbrooke had numerous USAF combat aircraft parked and fully loaded on the VIP ramp of Wright-Patterson AFB, OH during the peace negotiations to end the Bosnian conflict. As every member of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian delegations deplaned, they walked past the symbols of the most formidable Air Force in the world.⁸ By the time of the Dayton Agreement, more than 2,000 kilometers of roads, 70 bridges, half of the electric network, and more than a third of the housing was destroyed.⁹

Post-Conflict Bosnia

NATO's effort in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina included Stabilization Force (SFOR) from December 1995 until December 1996, and Implementation Force (IFOR) from December 1996 until December 2004. SFOR's initial mandate, in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accords, was to: enforce the cease fire, control Bosnian airspace, separate warring factions, and supervise boundaries.¹⁰ NATO's mission in the post-conflict environment was significantly different from previous examples. Specifically, the UN was tasked solely with peace enforcement, not peacemaking or nation building, as is often the case in less limited conflicts. After Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, there was no significant change to either the ruling political elites or the warring militaries. Instead, NATO forces attempted to enforce the framework agreed to by the warring factions and ensure state stability. This put the focus on creating stability and separating the warring factions but did little to create an effective state.¹¹

⁷ Michael O. Beale, *Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1997), 46.

⁸ Beale, *Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 47.

⁹ Garland H. Williams, *Engineering Peace* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 115.

¹⁰ Dayton Accords. <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton> (accessed 2 April 2011).

¹¹ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 114.

By separating the armies and ethnicities NATO actually set back the goal of unifying Bosnia. The forces were divided into three sectors, Multi-National Division (MND) North led by the US, MND Southeast led by France, and MND Southwest led by the United Kingdom. IFOR numbered 54,000 ground troops from both NATO and non-NATO countries.¹² By late 1996, it was obvious to NATO leaders that the lack of progress in civilian reconstruction and continued friction between ethnic factions required a continued presence of peacekeeping forces. NATO authorized SFOR to assume responsibility after IFOR's mandate expired on December 20, 1996. Although reconstruction efforts suffered from serious logistical difficulties, by 1999 the reconstruction program had repaired a third of the housing, and most urban infrastructure had been restored to prewar levels, from telephone lines to electric power generation, from water services to the number of primary schools.¹³

Today Bosnia remains ethnically divided. Under the Dayton Accords, Bosnia was divided into two autonomous regions, each with its own parliament. The majority of Serbs live in the Serb Republic, while the Bosnian Muslims and Croats live in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rival nationalist parties of the three major groups have a firm grip on power, but there is little consensus.¹⁴ The Peace Implementation Council, a group of 55 nations and agencies that oversees the Dayton Accords and appoints an international viceroy, has been attempting to restore full sovereignty to Bosnia.¹⁵ Unfortunately, their attempt to transform Bosnia into a pluralistic democracy continues to suffer from significant ethnic tensions. An estimated quarter of a million people died during the four-year war, and two million people were displaced, about half of Bosnia's population.¹⁶ By 2003, one million displaced refugees returned to their homes,

¹² Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 71.

¹³ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 75.

¹⁴ Sylvia Poggioli, "Post-war Bosnia Hamstrung by Ethnic Divisions," in *National Public Radio* (2010).

¹⁵ Craig Whitlock, "Old Troubles Threaten Again in Bosnia: 14 Years after War, Leaders Suggest U.S. Should Step in to Rewrite Treaty," *The Washington Post*, 23 August 2009.

¹⁶ Fred De Sam Lazaro, "After the War," in *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* (PBS, 2003).

largely without incident.¹⁷ By 2002, the force had drawn down to 12,000, and by December 2004, when SFOR's mission officially ended, it was replaced by the European Union's EUFOR Althea, numbering around 800.¹⁸

As a result, the Bosnian economy is struggling. Almost 40 percent of the population is unemployed and a staggering (by European standards) 20 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.¹⁹ The country faces a myriad of issues that range from political corruption to bureaucratic dysfunction.²⁰ These issues are causal for the lack of change in political leadership. The Dayton Accords stopped the fighting but failed to implement change in the political power relations. The same people who occupied these positions before the war are still there. Former UN High Representative for Bosnia, British politician Paddy Ashdown, said that international authorities were too slow to shake up the old order, allowing rampant corruption to continue.²¹ The longer it is allowed to exist, the more difficult it is to change, both politically and socially.

The physical appearance of Bosnia has changed since the war ended. As *Washington Post* journalist Craig Whitlock reported in 2009, "Sarajevo's Old City, which was bombarded for three years by Serbian forces now bustles with smiling families snacking on cevapcici, a minced-meat kebab venerated as the national dish. Thousands of damaged houses, churches and mosques in the hilly countryside have been rebuilt with foreign aid."²² However, many Bosnians argue that Sarajevo's bustling atmosphere is deceptive and indicates the massive presence of thousands of foreigners working for various international agencies.²³ The high unemployment rate causes social problems. As one Bosnian said, "We are actually hardworking people, but when you don't have work and when you have such low employment rates, then you have people left with a lot of time.

¹⁷ Lazaro, "After the War."

¹⁸ For more information on EUFOR see <http://www.euforbih.org/>

¹⁹ Poggioli, "Post-war Bosnia Hamstrung by Ethnic Divisions."

²⁰ Whitlock, "Old Troubles Threaten Again in Bosnia: 14 Years after War, Leaders Suggest U.S. Should Step in to Rewrite Treaty."

²¹ Lazaro, "After the War."

²² Whitlock, "Old Troubles Threaten Again in Bosnia: 14 Years after War, Leaders Suggest U.S. Should Step in to Rewrite Treaty."

²³ Lazaro, "After the War."

And then you start to think about other things, and it leads to quarrels and conflicts.”²⁴

Today ethnic violence is rare in Bosnia, but that does not mean that ethnic tensions have decreased. This leads many to question the future of Bosnia. Currently Bosnian education, which could foster a multicultural society, continues to be manipulated by ethnic groups.²⁵ Even within the same school, ethnic groups are segregated and given different material.²⁶ However, will these divisions equate to future wars?

Ethnic fighting caused the majority of destruction in Bosnia, not NATO bombing. NATO bombing is responsible for the damage inflicted on high value military targets. The aerial bombing forced various political decision makers to rethink their position, which ultimately led to their return to negotiations. NATO bombing served as the mechanism for communicating international resolve, the message being that the international community will not stand idle in the face of atrocities. To further their stance, NATO inserted a 54,000 stabilization force to ensure that regional peace is afforded the opportunity to grow.

Bosnia remains ethnically divided. However, this division takes a different form than that existing in pre-war Bosnia, because the different groups do not resort to violence as they did previously. Instead, Bosnians choose to maintain a divided but peaceful society for two reasons: they understand the price paid in terms of the destruction to Bosnia’s infrastructure and the lives lost, and they have also had the time to experience the benefits that are a direct result of this societal transformation.

Operation Allied Force

In the late 1990’s, NATO again took military action in the Balkans, this time against The Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Between March 24 and June 9, 1999, NATO conducted an air war against Yugoslavia and its President, Slobodan Milosevic. The objective of this campaign was to halt and reverse the human-rights abuses being committed in Kosovo, a semi-autonomous and

²⁴ Lazaro, "After the War."

²⁵ Poggioli, "Post-war Bosnia Hamstrung by Ethnic Divisions."

²⁶ Poggioli, "Post-war Bosnia Hamstrung by Ethnic Divisions."

ethnically distinct region of Yugoslavia. Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF) was a campaign that showcased what airpower can do when applied almost in isolation. Unlike NATO operations in Bosnia in ODF, military actions in OAF were much more subject to international politics, and thus suffered from micromanagement. One of NATO's greatest challenges was not simply making Milosevic capitulate, but maintaining harmony among the various members of NATO. This difficulty made changing strategy all the more exigent, since it required every member of the alliance to approve each target. As a result, it took time when NATO realized it needed to start pursuing and destroying targets in Serbia that directly affected the population.

The initial assessment of Milosevic and his willingness to fight for Kosovo was based on faulty assumptions. In his attempt to understand Milosevic, General Clark remembered the Serbian leader's comments during the Dayton Accords. He said that, "It was your NATO, your bombs and missiles, and your high technology that defeated us."²⁷ From this General Clark mistakenly assumed that a similar campaign that demonstrated NATO's willingness to adopt a serious bombing offensive would force the Serbs to cease their atrocities in Kosovo. NATO's focus was on airpower as the sole direct use of military force. Airpower was viewed as an attractive option for this mission, because it provided the ability to escalate the conflict without demanding a commitment beyond what the many coalition members were willing to make.²⁸ To them, airpower could influence the entire spectrum of conflict, to include the ability to vary the intensity and control the amount of damage inflicted in accordance with their needs.²⁹ The use of precision guided munitions (PGM) played a major role in maintaining cohesion amongst the alliance. Overall strategy was influenced by concerns over collateral damage and civilian casualties, thus the use of PGMs was a political necessity. OAF also had some of the strictest rules of engagement (ROE) seen to date. Prior to OAF, the ROE presented to airmen were more lenient in that pilots had greater

²⁷ Dag Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble : Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 109.

²⁸ Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble*, 49.

²⁹ Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble*, 49.

autonomy when addressing in-flight targeting decisions. Aircraft were limited to a 15,000-ft altitude floor. This was established to limit the exposure of allied aircraft to enemy air defenses, specifically anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The restrictions this artificial floor placed on the aircrews' ability to accomplish the mission was further exacerbated by weather, a significant problem when employing laser guided bombs, the most widely used PGM.³⁰ These strict ROEs were due to the highly political nature of the conflict and an allied aversion to losing aircraft. Following the Djakovia incident, where 60 ethnic Albanians were regrettably killed by USAF F-16s, even more restrictive ROE were implemented. When tasked with striking questionable targets, pilots were required to obtain clearance from the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Often the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), General Short, approved or disapproved the strike after reviewing real-time video feed.³¹ OAF was different from previous operations, because NATO leadership, civilian and military, adopted a new way of implementing control and execution. This paradigm shift was contrary to (especially) the US Air Force's basic tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution in that NATO leaned more towards centralized control and centralized execution. They were able to conduct operations in this manner because of the absence of ground troops and technological advances in command and control.

Crony Targeting

One of the most illustrative points from OAF was the change in target sets near the middle of the operation. Instead of targeting military assets inside Kosovo, NATO began to focus on target sets inside Serbia that would greatly affect the interests of the ruling elite, or "cronies," supporting Milosevic. While no formal "crony attack" strategy was ever officially revealed, the targeting of Serbian dual-use entities like industry, infrastructure, electrical power, and media

³⁰ The cloud cover over Kosovo was greater than 50 percent for more than 78 percent of the air war's duration, significantly impacting the flexible targeting effort. 3,766 planned sorties, including 1,029 designated close air support sorties, had to be cancelled because of weather (Lambeth *NATO's Air War for Kosovo* 125).

³¹ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 125-26.

indicated a change in targets ultimately aimed at putting pressure on those who most influenced Milosevic. Serbia was particularly susceptible to this type of attack due to its concentration of power in a few select hands. A post-communist parliamentary system divided power among the “political elite” which included party leaders, industrialists, and media kingpins . While Serbia was an authoritarian state, Milosevic drew power specifically from a small ruling coalition of leaders drawn from these groups.³²

Thus, when NATO shifted its strategy following the 23-25 April Washington Summit commemorating NATO’s 50th anniversary, it began to see positive results.³³ NATO leaders agreed at the summit that “[w]hatever it takes, we will not lose.”³⁴ This desire was evident when they decided to allow air attacks against things important to Belgrade’s political elite—a target set previously off-limits. Allowing strikes on these targets proved to be a game changer, because they had the potential to influence Milosevic’s domestic power base. By targeting the political and economic elite, NATO was able to use a combination of airpower and information operations to target Milosevic’s base of support. Ultimately, NATO’s willingness to alter its strategy and strike where it mattered most demonstrated how serious they were about stopping ethnic cleansing and human rights violations in Kosovo.

Throughout OAF, NATO targeted seven “counter-regime” targets. They included a presidential villa, the Serbian Interior Ministry Police (MUP) headquarters, and the presidential retreat.³⁵ Additionally, numerous petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) and other infrastructure sites were dealt a decisive blow by NATO airpower. Since Milosevic’s cronies occupied positions of authority, many of whom were adorned with major benefits, the direct targeting by NATO dealt a strategic blow to his support base.

³² For more on crony attack see Tolbert, Julian H. *Crony Attack: Strategic Attack’s Silver Bullet?* School of Advanced Air and Space Studies thesis, June 2003.

³³ Lambeth, *Nato’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 38.

³⁴ Comments made by recollection of NSA Samuel Berger, quoted in Lambeth’s book *NATO’s Air War*, 38.

³⁵ Julian H. Tolbert, *Crony Attack: Strategic Attack’s Silver Bullet?* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, 2003), 45.

What Caused Milosevic to Capitulate?

It is still unknown what factors led to Milosevic's decision to cease operations in Kosovo and return to peace negotiations. It is widely accepted that a combination of escalated bombing, loss of Russian support, prospect of a NATO ground invasion numbering 175,000 troops, and loss of domestic support from VJ elites finally caused Milosevic to relent.³⁶ While bombing alone cannot take credit for the victory, it is responsible for setting the conditions necessary to *achieve* victory. Many, including CFACC Lt Gen Mike Short, argue that results would have come quicker had NATO targeted the "head of the snake" earlier. However, the length and extensive amount of destruction resulting from the escalating 78-day campaign of bombing was necessary in order for events to unfold slowly and allowed Milosevic the ability to see the commitment of NATO.³⁷ Before the air campaign, Milosevic was unable to accept the initial NATO position at Rambouillet before OAF, because it would have given NATO access to all of Yugoslavia, instead of only Kosovo, and would have been political, if not personal, suicide.³⁸ By challenging NATO, Milosevic felt he could exploit the differences within the alliance, forcing a conflict of interest among them throughout the campaign.

Another goal of the NATO strategy was to drive a wedge between the Serb populace and its political leadership. General Clark complained that until attacks brought the conflict to Belgrade, OAF had been "the only air campaign in history in which lovers strolled down riverbanks in the gathering twilight and ate at outdoor cafes and watched the fireworks."³⁹ Initially, by framing the conflict as "Serbia versus NATO," Milosevic rallied the Serbian people around their government and continued to incite ethnic tensions. The Serbian population did not feel they were subject to attack, because the conflict was in Kosovo, not Serbia. However, this comfortable assumption was challenged as NATO attacked Serbian infrastructure, a target set with direct impact on the Serbian people. After

³⁶ Lambeth, *Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 77-81.

³⁷ See Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, Santa Monica, California, RAND, MR-1351-AF, 2001.

³⁸ Lambeth, *Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 78.

³⁹ Lambeth, *Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 43.

a month of feeling these attacks and the direct impact they had on their way of life, the Serbian people began to see the conflict through a different lens. They realized their government did not have the ability to protect them and their interests. Therefore, Milosevic's ability to appeal to ethnic tensions and convince Serbia to fight for Kosovo started to fall on deaf ears. After feeling the pains brought on by the destruction of war, the Serbian people started to understand that the only way to end the brutality was for Milosevic to capitulate and return to negotiations.

The amount of damage done in Serbia after NATO shifted its focus was significant. On May 3, F-117s attacked five transformer yards on Yugoslavia's electrical power grid, an attack that cut 70 percent of the electricity to the country.⁴⁰ By the midpoint of the conflict, bombing halved Yugoslavia's economic output and cost more than 100,000 jobs, a bigger economic effect than was achieved in World War II by Nazi and Allied attacks.⁴¹ As the war continued, attacks on industry, media, and electrical power grids escalated until the last two weeks. In all, the attacks against Serbian infrastructure left 80 percent of the country without power or water for significant periods of time.⁴² While the damage inflicted against the Yugoslavian population was great, it did not force them to rise up and overthrow Milosevic. However, it did have a direct impact on his ability to garner public support. This is evident in the lack of street dancing and carefully orchestrated demonstrations seen early in the conflict. Following the bombing, the dancing and demonstrations were replaced by weariness and a feeling of defeat among most residents.⁴³ The early support Milosevic received from the Serbians quickly subsided after they felt the "hard hand of war."

Post-Conflict Kosovo

Reconstruction efforts in Kosovo were led by NATO and greatly supported by the European Union. They demonstrated the need for the existence of a stabilization force to maintain security while reconstruction and

⁴⁰ Lambeth, *Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 41.

⁴¹ Lambeth, *Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 42.

⁴² Steven Erlanger, "Bombing Unites Serb Army as It Debilitates Economy -- Production Cut in Half, Experts Say," *New York Times*, 30 April 1999, 115.

⁴³ Lambeth, *Nato's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*, 42.

democratization efforts occurred. As such, KFOR provided this security by ensuring a quick departure of Serbian forces. Additionally, they also ensured that the Kosovar Albanian groups were demilitarized. These actions were essential in order to facilitate the quick implementation of post-conflict actions. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo was an agrarian society largely devoid of infrastructure. Years of extensive Serbian oppression forced Kosovar Albanians to take matters into their own hands and create their own parallel governments.⁴⁴ The obvious lack of resources caused them to abandon infrastructure and concentrate on their future via education.⁴⁵ What little infrastructure did exist was targeted and destroyed by NATO bombing. At the cessation of hostilities, Kosovo felt the effects of nearly one million refugees. There was little water and electricity, homes were destroyed, roads mined, bridges ruined, and schools and hospitals were incapable of functioning.⁴⁶ Prior to the conflict, agriculture and forestry accounted for approximately 60 percent of employment in Kosovo, but, by 1999, the spring growing season was largely forgone, 50 percent of the cattle and 85 percent of the poultry were lost or killed, dealing a devastating blow on the economy and society.⁴⁷ The lack of infrastructure and the poor status of housing, hospitals, and public works left a huge gap for follow on stability and reconstruction forces to fill.

International intervention in the form of a NATO Kosovo force (KFOR) took place under UN Resolution 1244 immediately after its issuance on June 10, 1999. NATO troops stationed in Albania and Macedonia quickly moved into Kosovo and established control while Serb forces withdrew. On 12 June 20,000 NATO troops entered the province divided into six brigades (France, Germany, Italy, the United States, and two from the United Kingdom). Within six days, all lead elements had arrived in Kosovo and began handling issues of stabilization and security.⁴⁸ KFOR's immediate priority was to establish security and fill the

⁴⁴ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 122.

⁴⁵ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 122.

⁴⁶ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 127.

⁴⁷ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 131.

⁴⁸ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 126.

void left when the Serbian forces left. In 11 days, Yugoslavian forces left Kosovo, and KFOR established itself as the only legitimate military force.⁴⁹

Humanitarian issues posed a major hurdle in the reconstruction of Kosovo. The Serbian military displaced nearly one million people, requiring NATO to set up refugee camps and reception centers. The 20,000 NATO troops provided the security needed to introduce NGOs into the region. The UN Mission in Kosovo (USMIK) set-up operations and deployed personnel to assume all administrative state functions.⁵⁰ These included legislative, executive, and judicial powers; however, due to a lack of resources and manpower, UNMIK was unable to exercise control over a lot of Kosovo's territory. This vacuum was quickly filled by a criminal element that embraced and occupied local administrative structures.⁵¹ Fortunately, KFOR quickly intervened and was able to neutralize this threat. Although it suffered through many difficulties, KFOR is an outstanding example of how an occupation force can quickly move in and stabilize a situation, allowing other players the freedom to do their jobs.

Today KFOR still maintains a presence in Kosovo. In February 2010, NATO announced that KFOR had fulfilled its first milestone, an accomplishment that brought with it the withdrawal of thousands of troops. Within NATO, the NAC has also recommended that KFOR be further reduced to 5,000, in accordance with achieving its Gate Two goals.⁵² The amount of reconstruction accomplished in Kosovo and the lack of further ethnic tensions is evidence that occupation forces, when given resources and manpower, can help plant the seeds of lasting peace. Although KFOR's mission continues, its role is diminishing in the region as the various groups in the Balkans learn to live peacefully.

⁴⁹ Williams, *Engineering Peace*, 126-28.

⁵⁰ Jens Narten, "Assessing Kosovo's Post-war Democratization: Between External Imposition and Local Self-Government," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (2009): 135.

⁵¹ Narten, "Assessing Kosovo's Post-war Democratization: Between External Imposition and Local Self-Government," 137.

⁵² NATO homepage. "NATO's Role in Kosovo."

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed 19 April 2011)

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) provides an example of what happens when the civilian population is specifically not targeted. Using OIF as a case study has limitations, because military operations are still ongoing. However, the campaign offers valuable insight into the relationship between destruction in war, occupation, and conflict resolution. Ramifications from military actions, both during the initial conflict and the counterinsurgency phase, will continue to be seen. Thus, drawing conclusions regarding the coalition's strategy and its implementation will be incomplete. However, studying the immediate effect of destruction and on the immediate post-conflict phase may provide some lessons.

Planning and the Air Campaign

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in March 2003 was a military campaign aimed at removing Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, and his repressive regime. There was a constant struggle between some senior military members and the Secretary of Defense over the number of troops needed to defeat, police, and stabilize Iraq. CENTCOM's initial plan, calling for 400,000 troops, was immediately denied by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who wanted a much smaller footprint. Comparing Iraq to previous operations reveals that if the US used the same ratio used in Bosnia, it would have required 364,000 troops, while using the ratio used in Kosovo, it would require 480,000.⁵³ At the start of the invasion, 200,000 troops were in theater and less than half of them were in Iraq when Baghdad fell.⁵⁴ This imposed severe limitations on the coalition's ability to provide the troops necessary for immediate stability and security. In addition to the emergence of anarchy, secondary effects included unguarded ammunition dumps and national borders and a nonexistent response to looting—an activity that set the stage for the counterinsurgency that followed.⁵⁵

Most of the coalition air power during OIF focused on supporting the ground war, which included the Third Infantry Division and the First Marine

⁵³ David C. and Robert W. Tucker Hendrickson, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute 2005), 8.

⁵⁴ Hendrickson, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War*, 8.

⁵⁵ Hendrickson, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War*, 8.

Division.⁵⁶ The limited “Shock and Awe” air campaign was short in duration and in actuality consisted of a limited attack on Iraqi leadership and C2 (command and control) targets. Planners took extreme caution to limit casualties and collateral damage. The “Shock and Awe” strategy was predicated on the assumption that small precision hammer-like blows from the air would shock the Iraqi population into accepting defeat. The desired coalition message was simple: target the Iraqi regime, not the Iraqi people. However, the Iraqi people did not receive this message. According to Secretary Rumsfeld, “Every single target has been carefully selected, and the direction in which the weapon is delivered has been carefully examined.”⁵⁷ Attacks were scheduled for certain times of the day when their impact on civilians would be minimized. US and UK policy makers stated that as a result of the desire to limit collateral damage, electricity, water supplies, TV, and radio broadcast centers were not to be targeted.⁵⁸ Target acquisition was further restricted by strict rules of engagement. This included the requirement for visual identification in addition to extensive real-time fusion of data from forward air control aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and moving target indicator platforms like JSTARS.⁵⁹ The scenes in television broadcast across the world showed a series of government buildings exploding at the hands of coalition forces intended to send the message of a quick and precise war aimed at an unscrupulous few. Nevertheless, was that the message received by the Iraqi population?

Air campaign planning focused on effects-based operations (EBO). This allowed planners to see Iraq as a system of systems in which the elimination of key nodes would bring victory without the need to inflict widespread damage on a country’s infrastructure or casualties among its population. In essence, the enemy was analyzed as a system and the ultimate goal was systemic collapse. While most of the infrastructure was spared, government complexes were not. They

⁵⁶ John Andreas Olsen, ed., *A History of Air Warfare* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2010), 280.

⁵⁷ Nick Cook, "The First Week of the Air War: Shock and Awe?," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (2003).

⁵⁸ Cook, "The First Week of the Air War: Shock and Awe?."

⁵⁹ Michael Knights, "Iraqi Freedom Displays Transformation of Us Air Power," *Jane's Defence Weekly* (2003).

were targeted as a means of demonstrating that the military campaign was directed against the regime rather than the people. One by-product of this type of attack is that EBO failed to demonstrate publicly the desired end-state of regime change. Instead of the expected direct fight, forces dealt with a shadowy regime, led by Saddam Hussein, that eluded the coalition. Along with the military, the Iraqi political leadership appeared to simply vanish.⁶⁰ In some sense, EBO backfired, since it lacked legitimacy among the Iraqi people, who were not seeing the regime change the coalition promised. Instead, they received mixed messages of an attack that was seemingly unable to destroy the Iraqi regime. This was a weakness exacerbated by Iraqi TV and radio broadcasts.⁶¹ Though laughable to western viewers watching “Baghdad Bob,” the mixed messages coming from the Iraqi government and the coalition introduced confusion to the Iraqi population. Visible symbols of government, like bridges, power grids, and industry, were spared attack to demonstrate the coalition’s will to target the regime without impacting the people. Yet many Iraqis were unaware of this choice since power, water, sanitization, and other public services were interrupted. While the coalition wanted to send a message of purposefully limiting attacks to the regime alone, the message was not fully received or understood by the Iraqis. Likewise, the messages the Iraqis wanted to send to the coalition forces were not understood. The coalition had a hard time comprehending that they were considered invaders and occupiers instead of liberators.

Reaction of the Iraqi Population

The initial reaction of the majority of the Iraqi people was in a nonchalant manner, which came as a shock to coalition forces. John Keegan explains, “Perhaps most mysterious of all, much of the population of Iraq, the ordinary town dwellers and country people, exhibited a complete indifference to the war going on around them, carrying on their everyday lives apparently oblivious of its dangers . . . traffic often travelled as normal, civilian cars and trucks proceeding

⁶⁰ John Keegan, *The Iraq War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 1-8.

⁶¹ Cook, "The First Week of the Air War: Shock and Awe?."

headlong into the middle of firefights and stopping only if shot at.”⁶² Images from Baghdad during the air strikes appeared to be a city going about its normal daily life, seemingly unconcerned about the danger of attack. What emerged from this was unexpected, a sense of anarchy that occurred throughout Iraq, most specifically in Baghdad.

Of the coalitions many missteps in handling stability in Iraq, one of the most detrimental was the inability of coalition forces to thwart the widespread looting that occurred immediately following the collapse of the regime. One theory explains that “American officials in the first few days made no attempt to stop the looting because they believed that the mob would direct its anger at the symbols of the old regime and take revenge on the same people that US forces were themselves pursuing.”⁶³ The Iraqi people sadly realized that coalition forces were not going to stop the looting and anarchy. They quickly realized that, comparatively speaking, things were not much better (or even worse) with Saddam out of power, an attitude and mentality that helped set the stage for the follow-on insurgency. The inability of coalition forces to provide basic services for the Iraqi people helped push young and impressionable Iraqis into swelling the ranks of the insurgency.

Establishing Governance

The two challenges faced by the coalition after the end of combat operations were security and reconstruction. Since the coalition was unable to provide security and stability, reconstruction was going to be that much more difficult. An assumption made by American officials was that Iraqi government institutions would remain solvent. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated, “The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces. You would be able to bring in new leadership, but we were going to keep the body in place.”⁶⁴ Prior to the war, US military planners, via intelligence, expected entire military units to

⁶² Keegan, *The Iraq War*, 2.

⁶³ Hendrickson, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War*, 12.

⁶⁴ Michael R. and General Bernard E. Trainor Gordon, *Cobra li: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 351.

surrender in good order.⁶⁵ Instead, many units dissolved and vanished back into society. There was no plan in place to organize, train, and equip these forces to act as police forces for the new Iraq. Instead, the assumption was that they would remain cohesive units and provide security for their new government.

Unfortunately, many military members faded underground and joined the insurgency, because they were not being paid. This error had a serious impact on post-war Iraq in that the forces needed to secure the city were absent. There is also evidence to suggest that Saddam planned to foster such anarchy by releasing some 100,000 criminals from Iraqi prisons months before the invasion and trained Iraqi intelligence agents to destroy government institutions.⁶⁶ Whatever the cause, there is little doubt that the coalition's plan to defeat only the Iraqi regime quickly and decisively did not achieve its goals.

In the aftermath of the conflict, the Iraqi government was not in any way functional when Lieutenant General (retired) Jay Garner's Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) began Baghdad operations in April 2003. The problem of establishing governance was exasperated by the lack of available US and Iraqi personnel. Even if the coalition troops had been available, few had the training required to help with nation building, a task previously accomplished by the State Department. Thus, it was not just a numbers problem, but also the lack of training and preparation. The disintegration of the Baathist Regime forced coalition forces into supporting the under-resourced mission of nation building. Whatever progress was achieved by ORHA was quickly lost when Paul Bremer stood up the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003. CPA's first order was to remove top levels of the existing Iraqi government in an effort to purge the government of Baathist influence or anyone still sympathetic to the old regime. Seen as the equivalent of the de-Nazification of Germany after World War II, the order did nothing more than alienate tens of thousands of knowledgeable people, many of whom had

⁶⁵ Hendrickson, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War*, 14.

⁶⁶ Hendrickson, *Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War*, 13.

nothing to do with the abuses of Saddam's Baathist regime.⁶⁷ This policy affected large numbers of senior defense officers, interior ministries, schoolteachers, and other mid-level functionaries, many of whom were apolitical and only chose to become party members, because doing so made it easier to obtain employment.

Likewise, CPA Order Number 2 had a similar impact on dissolving Iraq's armed forces, the Ministry of the Interior, and the presidential security units. This decision was, and continues to be, highly controversial in that it seemed counter to the initial strategy. Many attribute the decision to disband the armed forces as the single most devastating decision made by the coalition. It significantly undermined the plans made to incorporate the Iraqi military into stability operations and had major effects on security. Col. John Agoglia, a war planner for Gen. Tommy Franks at the US Central Command, said the idea of using the Iraqi Army as a police force had been an element of the invasion strategy from day one. "Starting in June 2002 we conducted targeted psychological operations using pamphlet drops, broadcasts and all sort of means to get the message to the regular army troops that they should surrender or desert and that if they did we would bring them back as part of a new Iraq without Saddam."⁶⁸ With no Iraqi military, the coalition would have to start from scratch, after isolating thousands of trained Iraqi troops.⁶⁹ The quick victory actually lulled the coalition into a false sense of victory, compounded by the disappearance of the Iraqi army. Eventually the quick victory faded and left a brutal emerging insurgency and civil war. This miscalculation proved critical in the ability to deal with post-war Iraq, since reconstruction could never get started until security and stability were established.

Conclusion

⁶⁷ Hans De For, "Japan and Iraq: A Comparison " (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), 7.

⁶⁸ Michael R. Gordon, "Fateful Choice on Iraq Army Bypasses Debate," *The New York Times* 2008.

⁶⁹ It should be noted that Paul Bremer argued, in his memoir *My Year in Iraq*, that the Iraqi army had already melted away and that his order did nothing more than acknowledge the facts on the ground.

The technical advancements of precision weapons and the arrival of the information age have brought new capabilities to the forefront of military power. They afford the military instrument of power the ability to fight war like never before. A war that is quicker, more precise, and requires fewer people is preferable. However, recent examples challenge this paradigm shift. Although limited in the scope of the political objectives, the Balkan and Iraqi conflicts demonstrate the complex relationship between violence in war and its direct relationship to the post-conflict environment.

Years of civil war left Bosnia devastated, and NATO's actions only served as the finishing act in force negotiations. Additionally, diplomatic efforts sent Bosnian Serb leadership a clear message that if they continued to fight in Bosnia they would be met with the full brunt of NATO airpower. NATO's action in Serbia and Kosovo showcase how specific targeting sets can directly influence political decision making. In the short-term, targeting Milosevic's cronies indirectly placed pressure on him, forcing him to alter his strategic calculus. A different approach to targeting, focused on civilian infrastructure, had longer term consequences. Destroying targets of value to the Serbian population weakened Milosevic's support and eventually led him to surrender power and ultimately be tried for war crimes at The Hague. Ethnic tensions remain in Bosnia and Kosovo; however, unlike previous conflicts, there have not been significant amounts of blood spilled in response.

In contrast, OIF made every effort to limit attacks on targets only indirectly tied to Saddam's regime in an attempt to keep the Iraqi people shielded from the war. This lack of destruction, coupled with the insufficient numbers of troops, sent confusing messages to the Iraqi people. The result of this miscalculation was a broken Iraqi state in desperate need of security, something the undermanned coalition could not provide. The anarchy and subsequent decisions by the CPA created thousands of disenfranchised Iraqis with no voice in their future and fragile government. These examples also reveal the fact that societies become heavily dependent on the occupying forces. By establishing stability and security, occupying forces become a part of rebuilding a new society

and economy. This can be difficult to disentangle. The tension between occupation duration and the instabilities created when the force leaves remain problematic for decision makers.



Chapter 5

Conclusions and Implications

Destruction in war and occupation by military forces in the post-conflict phase are unavoidable components of most conflicts. As the previous case studies have demonstrated, destruction and follow-on occupation provide unique opportunities to facilitate the establishment of a better state of peace. In fact, when used correctly, these two expressions of military power often set the conditions for a more peaceful and stable post-conflict society. Destruction in war is not simply a ways and means of winning, but of shaping an environment to change the behavior of the defeated people that contributed to starting the conflict. From the case studies this paper has developed the following list of purposes that destruction and occupation serve throughout the phases of conflict:

Table 1 – Various Audiences and Messages in Conflict

<u>Target Audience</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
1. Military/Political Decision Makers	a. Affecting the enemy's ability to wage war
	b. Changing enemy's focus to internal protection instead of offensive actions
	c. <i>Post-conflict</i> : Providing stability and security for the new political and military powers to grow and squelch resistance
2. Political Decision Makers	a. Undermining the ability of the government to protect the population
	b. Sending message to end conflict via negotiated settlement or surrender
3. Population/Society	a. Undermining the ability of the government to protect the population
	b. Demonstrating victor's resolve to continue conflict
	c. Putting the society on the "edge of chaos" where reordering exists
	d. Highlighting the need for the society to reject previous behaviors/beliefs and embrace change
	e. <i>Post-conflict</i> : Providing a stable/secure environment to facilitate social, political, and economic change

Source: Author's own work

The allure of a destructive war policy is that it can shorten a war with the added benefit of potentially saving lives. The regrettable part is that it can be extremely costly. War, and a state in the aftermath of war, is part of a complex adaptive system. Due to the highly volatile and chaotic environment that exists during war, a society is often at the tipping point of chaos. By shaking up the existing social and political norms, members of society have an opportunity to either react both collectively and individually to new challenges to the relationships and structures that previously provided stability.¹ As the level of complexity and chaos increases, the environment moves into a state of self-organizing criticality, which is highly susceptible to a radical new rebalancing.² This susceptibility to rapid change presents both threats and opportunities. War can often serve as a mirror to illuminate the ugliness of a defeated nation. Previous cultural values such as discrimination, genocidal tendencies, and feudalistic legacies were exposed during the wars.

Another important factor is that the strategic message needs to stay consistent between strategy and target selection. For example, in Bosnia the use of airpower to deter or coerce an opponent was undermined by a different ground strategy, one that emphasized humanitarian relief and lightly armored and outnumbered ground forces.³ It is vital that destruction and the use of force mirror the strategic message, which needs to stay constant throughout the war, lest it sends mixed signals. Destruction is the message, the ability to demonstrate through the threat and use of force and physical presence that the security of a society, and of the individuals within it, is at risk. The security of the government is already threatened, and then the only option is to turn to the victor and work to establish a better state of peace.

Finally, destruction in war has the ability to create opportunities in the post conflict period. Much of the reform that occurred in the Japanese economic and political systems directly resulted from losses during the war. The massive

¹ Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, 33.

² Yarger, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, 35.

³ Beale, *Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 47.

impact of destruction throughout the war by both air and sea power forced the Japanese people to reassess the effectiveness of their previous political, military, and economic institutions. Coupled with the shame of defeat, these institutions were discredited, thus allowing for reforms to take root and form a society that turned away from militarism and imperialism and towards a peaceful democracy. It was not only the destruction that shook these beliefs from Japanese society, but also the planning and the dedication of occupation forces and resources committed to get Japan back on its feet. In essence, destruction in this case helped facilitate a change, but it required follow-on forces to help make a lasting transformation.

Framework Applied to Case Studies

Taken as a whole, each case study presented in this paper demonstrates an important relationship between how a war is fought, how the post-conflict phase is handled, and the possibilities for a stable peace. If destruction and occupation play a role in shaping an enduring state of peace, it is also influenced by other factors. This is not an argument for additional destruction and occupation *solving* the conflict, but that they are means to help shape and achieve the ends. In some cases, however, the use of destruction was necessary to achieve military victory. This was demonstrated in both the Hard War policy of the Union in the Civil War and in the US aerial attacks against mainland Japan in WWII. Never before had the people of either the South or Japan been the victim of attacks directed against their persons, property, and industries. In addition to undermining their governments' ability to protect their populations, both cases also reveal that the destruction sent a message to each society about its values and beliefs.

General Sherman's March to the Sea attacked only the wealthy white slave-owners and those that supported secession. His troops on the whole showed restraint in only attacking property and resources that could be used to continue the war. The Army of the West killed relatively few people, but left visible and lasting damage in its wake. The American South was exposed as a hierarchical slave-owning society that cared more for its property and possessions than for human life. Spectacular battlefield successes in the North (Gettysburg) and West

(Vicksburg) did not translate into southern capitulation, and thus the war had to be taken directly to the people. Unfortunately, the United States missed a key opportunity to facilitate necessary changes in Southern society. The North's exhaustion from the years of bloody war led it to abandon the South during the reconstruction period. Thus, similar social issues, like segregation, Jim Crow, terror, and a struggling economy were left to fester.

Likewise, Japanese society had supported the militarism and imperialism that brought massive devastation to much of Asia. The Japanese military's insatiable desire for expansion led the Japanese people into one of the most devastating wars in history. The Japanese case study, however, provides a successful example of the use of post-conflict occupation forces. In Japan, SCAP was able to frame the post-conflict order in terms that are still within the society's "sacred values." General MacArthur understood the importance of the Emperor to Japanese society. By not charging Hirohito with war crimes, as many argued he richly deserved to be, General MacArthur was able to use the Emperor to help institute necessary change.

Destruction and occupation also played a significant role in the conflicts in the Balkans and Iraq. Social behavior in the Balkans has changed, but the underlying beliefs and ethnic tensions remain. The value of destruction in both Bosnia and Kosovo centered around how it affected the political decision makers. Both the Bosnian Serb and the Serbian political leadership changed their calculus when NATO demonstrated its resolve. In OAF, Milosevic was further influenced by his cronies when they were attacked. As Serbian society began to feel the consequences of Milosevic's actions in Kosovo, he lost public support. Eventually many Serbians rejected his policies altogether, and by October 2000 he lost his political power. In Bosnia and Kosovo, there were significant numbers of occupying forces that were able to capitalize on negotiated peace agreements. This provided a framework to begin stabilization, security, and eventually reconstruction.

The case of Iraq illustrates a different path. In OIF, military planners sought to cause as little destruction to national infrastructure as possible. Every

effort was made to limit the impact of the conflict on the Iraqi people. Moreover, the light, fast moving force used to bring down the Iraqi regime proved to be insufficient to occupy the post-conflict state. Anarchy and looting quickly resulted, and a growing insurgent force began harassing the occupiers. The coalition forces were initially unprepared to meet this challenge, and attempts to begin reconstruction failed in the insecure post-war environment.

Implications for Future Use of Destruction and Occupation

Destruction in future wars needs to be examined in the context of not only what advantage it brings in war, but also what advantage it brings to the post-war environment. Destruction is not just a necessary evil inherent in military force, it also creates a new environment and opportunities that can be used by the victor. These opportunities, however, must be capitalized on quickly by the post-conflict occupation forces and rebuilding effort.

Today the United States finds itself in a peculiar position. The number of troops needed to fight wars has decreased significantly, as technology and innovation have improved the American capability to wage wars. However, the number of troops needed to win the peace has not changed at the same rate. In fact, the two may be inversely proportional. As the number required to complete quick wars with little destruction decreases, the number required to secure and win the peace may have increased. Thus, the following considerations must be contemplated when developing strategy for a victory in war and in peace.

Destruction's Role in War

Understanding the Nature of War

Perhaps the greatest negative side-effect of the quest for a quick, decisive, and clean war is that such a desire fundamentally misunderstands the complex nature of war. In its attempts to bring about a decisive victory, it does not address the underlying issues that brought about the conflict in the first place. It may lull political decision makers into a false sense that winning a war can be achieved in a quick and sanitized manner instead of the truly bloody and horrific event it is. It is difficult to argue against what did *not* happen. For instance, after the opening night of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, when more than 1500 bombs and cruise

missiles struck Iraq, the media coverage focused on the civilian casualties. President Bush later remarked, “It was not understood that the United States had found a way to wage war that as much as possible spared civilians, avoided collateral damage and targeted the leaders and their means to fight and maintain power. War of annihilation, carpet-bombing, and fire-bombing of cities should be a thing of the past.”⁴ While this sentiment is largely true, it appears that wars of precision and wars that contain large amounts of physical destruction do not produce the same outcome. The termination of a conflict by targeting leadership alone does not appear to mirror the termination of conflict when whole societies have had to face widespread destruction. Inherently, the post-conflict society appears to react differently. As Clausewitz noted, “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.”⁵

The Reputation of the US

The US needs to invest in a deterrence strategy. Enemies should be afraid of what the US will do militarily, instead of holding onto the belief that the US is inherently afraid to use force. Many recent conflicts have begun because of the belief that the US was in retreat. As mentioned in chapter one, “If surrender negotiations are successful and not followed by overt violence, it is because the capacity to inflict pain and damage was successfully used in the bargaining process.”⁶ Furthermore, the effective use of deterrence or influence depends greatly on how the other side perceives capabilities and intentions. It is very difficult to measure how a society views the capability and intentions of another state.

Difficulty in Measuring a Population’s Feelings

It is extremely challenging to see the effects of destruction until the war is over. Was it too much or too little? But that does not diminish its importance to

⁴ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 45.

⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 30.

the overall message sent to a society. Nor does it mean that destruction isn't an important component of the overall victory. One implication of these case studies seems to be a relationship between how vulnerable a society believes itself to be before or during the war, and how it handles destruction. Those societies that initially believed themselves to be immune, such as the Japanese or the American South, from the ravages of war were more vulnerable to the effects of destruction. On the other hand, destruction had less of an effect on those that had been subject to destruction before. However, in all cases, the use of occupation forces that facilitated stability, security, and reconstruction added to the possibility of successfully changing a society's behavior.

Destruction's Role in Peace

Importance of Stability Operations and Force

An essential part of long term success is the stability and reintegration of a defeated state into the international community. As such, the Department of Defense needs to establish firmly that stability operations are a strategic priority of the armed forces. Furthermore, stability and reconstruction need to be treated as a mission as important to America's security as high-intensity combat operations.⁷ In their 2005 report to the Council on Foreign Relations, former National Security Advisors Samuel Berger and Brent Scowcroft called for significant changes in military leadership, force structure, and training. They suggest the creation of an assistant secretary of defense for stabilization operations, the development of doctrine and educational programs to support civilian-led stabilization operations, and the understanding that stabilization forces may require more personnel than high-intensity fighting forces.⁸ At some point, the occupying forces change from combat troops meant to fight and destroy in order to bring about surrender, becoming an occupying force meant to facilitate reconstruction of the vanquished society. Our military force must be trained appropriately to handle both missions.

⁷ Samuel R. Berger, Brent Scowcroft, and William L. Nash, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), 15.

⁸ Berger, Scowcroft, and Nash, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities*, 14-18.

Further complicating this issue is the inability of civilian agencies to move quickly into a post-conflict environment. President Bush noted during a speech in 2005, “One of the lessons we learned from our experience in Iraq is that, while military personnel can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world, the same is not true of US government civilians.”⁹ Military officials are reluctant to accept nation-building as a military mission and desire to hand off responsibility to civilians as quickly as possible. The time between stabilization and reconstruction had proven to be a continuing problem that lacks sufficient thought and doctrine.

How Long Can Forces Stay

The idea that the victor should get out of a defeated states as soon as possible, or leave infrastructure undamaged, so that it can be used right away, lacks some understanding of the overall role destruction and occupation can play in war. The lack of physical presence does not allow society adequate time or visual cues in order for them to grasp the existence of a war. Instead, the victor state must be willing to invest substantial time, manpower, and money into rebuilding a new society. This must be done quickly, to capitalize on the reorganization of political and social relationships in a way most beneficial to the occupying force. However, extended presence often leads to an overreliance on the occupation forces to provide governance and economic contribution. This must be dealt with as a common consequence of any occupation.

Conclusion

Attempting to lessen the amount of destruction and occupation forces during and after a war is a laudable, but potentially dangerous, goal for a strategist. History has shown that instead of simply being the evils of war, they actually serve as a vital part of war, which should not be divorced from the overall conflict. Oftentimes the efforts made to protect the enemy population supporting and fueling the war effort cause hostilities to extend and become more lethal. War planners need to avoid targeting populations without purpose, but should understand that, if a mobilized society supports the cause of a conflict, it must

⁹ Berger, Scowcroft, and Nash, *In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities*, 9.

also bear the brunt of war. Furthermore, as technology requires fewer people to fight precision wars, it is mistaken to think that fewer troops are also required to reconstruct a post-conflict society. Today more than ever requires substantial planning and a commitment to provide occupation forces to ensure security and stability before reconstruction can begin. Destruction and occupation are merely physical reminders of defeat, but they can also provide powerful opportunities to reform and rebuild a more peaceful society.



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