

POST-COLD WAR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
WHAT, WHEN, AND WHY?

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APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

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ABSTRACT

This study assesses American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. As the world's sole superpower, American leadership has followed one of four policies in the post-Cold War period: unilateral engagement, multilateral engagement through existing organizations, multilateral engagement through *ad hoc* coalitions, and non-engagement or engagement through a third party. The author assesses three case studies for each policy category, identifying the intervening variables leading American foreign policy decision-makers to each outcome. The case studies identify six intervening variables: American interest, leadership, legitimacy, required capabilities, available multilateral organizations, and alternate willing actors. The author then constructs a framework for American foreign policy decision-making, applying the six intervening variables as they lead to each of the four possible policy outcomes. Following this, the writer uses one case demonstrating the critical need to adequately contextualize the situation in order to avoid inaccurate results emerging from the framework. Finally, two recent cases of American foreign policy, not yet mature enough to allow comprehensive analysis, validate the potential to apply the framework. Ultimately, the author concludes that, while there is no one foreign policy option for the United States to apply as the lone superpower, the correct analysis of the given situation results in predictable policy choices. The policy choices are recognizable not only for the American policy-makers, but also the domestic population as it scrutinizes its government and the international community as it tries to identify what it expects from the global leader. The framework produced offers a lens to examine American foreign policy-making for this purpose.

CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
DISCLAIMER	ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
GLOSSARY OF TERMS	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
1 UNILATERAL ENGAGEMENT	12
2 MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT THROUGH EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS	29
3 MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT THROUGH <i>AD HOC</i> COALITIONS	48
4 NON-ENGAGEMENT OR ENGAGEMENT THROUGH A THIRD PARTY	69
5 BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS	92
BIBLIOGRAPHY	110

Illustrations

Figure	Page
1 Foreign Policy Decision Framework	93
2 Foreign Policy Decision Framework with Historical Cases Added	99
3 Foreign Policy Decision Framework with Somalia Added	103
4 Foreign Policy Decision Framework with Test Cases Added	107

Glossary of Terms

APEC	Asian Pacific Economic Conference
AU	African Union
DoD	Department of Defense
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Mission
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LWR	Light-Water Reactor
OEF	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
OIF	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMID	United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur
UNITAS	Unified Task Force in Somalia
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operations in Cote D'Ivoire
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US CENTCOM	United States Central Command]
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which “the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong.” A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.

President George H. Bush, 1991.

The collapse of Soviet Communism left the United States as the world’s lone superpower, giving the United States a unique moment in history to exercise unprecedented hegemony. But what role should a lone superpower play in the world? Was it a time for American strength to unilaterally surge forward to impose a new world order or should the United States simply lead as a supervising partner to those who sought its alliance? Or was this a time for the United States to embrace multilateralism and the leadership of international organizations such as the United Nations, as President Bush suggested?¹

Despite the 1990s failing to meet the hopes of those envisioning a resounding peace following the Cold War, throughout the decade the global role the United States played showed an inconsistent hegemon. American political leaders struggled to determine how the United States should fit into the international community while at the same time focusing on domestic politics too. US strategic choices ranged from unilateral action to multilateral action either within existing organizations or creating alliances of purpose to disengagement while allowing others to lead. The differing application of power produced a variety of outcomes, each promoting American global interest in its own way. As the desired post-Cold War world order failed to materialize, the international role of the United States repeatedly came under scrutiny in the 1990s in Iraq, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslav republics, Somalia and throughout Africa, and into Asia. This scrutiny resurfaced in full force following the terrorist attacks of

¹ George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict, March 6, 1991, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2767&year=1991&month=3 (accessed November 26, 2010).

September 11, 2001 and again after the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and in multiple other instances before and after.

Throughout the United States and around the world, a diverse range of people, groups, and organizations all offered suggestions about what role the United States should play in the unipolar post-Cold War era. Should the United States take on the role of universal policeman, reluctant peacemaker, international sheriff, isolationist, peaceful leader, pragmatic director, or partner within organizations and regimes? While many pundits and international relations theorists offered definitions of these roles, few defined when to apply—or not apply—each role. Similarly, the United States has applied differing approaches to a variety of events. In this spectrum of possibilities lies the potential for misperception. Be it the policy-maker, the American public watching its government, allies looking to the decisions of the global superpower, and most importantly adversaries seeking to avoid escalating consequences they fail to predict, the inconsistent behavior of the United States as the sole superpower makes policy choices for a range of constituencies extremely difficult.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has made foreign policy decisions from the following four options:

1. unilateral action;
2. multilateral action through existing organizations;
3. multilateral action through *ad hoc* coalitions;
4. non-engagement or engagement through a third party.

Analysis of how the United States uses these choices reveals a distinct trend, which further reveals insights into predicting American policy choice. Recognizing this trend will allow the United States to target how it builds partnerships that better fit how it exerts its role as a superpower. At the same time, however, this analysis also allows allies and adversaries alike a practical lens to better predict American policy choices. The resulting framework identifies American policy choice for a given incident, based on the contextualizing variables of the situation.

Literature Review

The United States is a unipolar, hegemonic, superpower – perhaps. What is it is meant by each of these terms and are they correct to apply to the United States following the Cold War or at an intervening time since? In 1991 Charles Krauthammer declared the unipolar moment: “the immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar.”² By 1999 Samuel Huntingdon concluded that although the United States may be the only superpower, “that does not mean that the world is *unipolar*,”³ directly contradicting Hedley Bull’s assertion that there cannot be only one superpower.⁴ Later in 1999, David Wilkinson argued for “unipolarity without hegemony.”⁵ By 2003 G. John Ikenberry referred to the post-Cold War United States as “the world’s only superpower,” observing the “rise of American unipolarity.”⁶ That same year Robert Jervis summed up President George H.W. Bush’s policy goal as “the establishment of U.S. hegemony, primacy, or empire.”⁷ What this confirms is that hegemony, superpower, and unipolar are all descriptors without common meaning across the academic spectrum of international relations.

Robert Gilpin defines hegemonic power as “a single powerful state [that] controls or dominates the lesser states in the system.”⁸ In contrast Paul Schroeder assigns such a role to an imperial power. He sees a greater group leadership role applied to hegemony, declaring “a hegemonic power is the one without whom no final decision can be reached within a given system.”⁹ David Wilkinson’s affirmation that traditional hegemony also requires the ability to apply influence best bridges this contradiction. Without this ability, the traditional role of a hegemon is non-existent and therefore simply not

² Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70 no. 1, (January 1991), 23.

³ Samuel P. Huntingdon, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March/April 1999), 35.

⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* 3d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 194.

⁵ David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” *International Studies Review* 1, no. 2 (Summer, 1999), 141.

⁶ G. John Ikenberry, *Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity* (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, July 28, 2003), 1.

⁷ Robert Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire,” *Foreign Policy* no. 137 (July/August 2003), 83.

⁸ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29.

⁹ Paul W. Schroeder, “Is the U.S. an Empire?” in *Paradoxes of Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World* David Skidmore, ed. (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 73.

applicable. Wilkinson thus offers the better characteristics of a worldwide hegemon: “a unipolar structure of capability matched by a unipolar structure of influence.”¹⁰

What, then, is a unipolar structure? This term perhaps offers at least some consensus. It is ironic, however, that to successfully define unipolarity it is necessary to use some of Bull’s own words as he argued against the existence of a sole superpower (perhaps because he could never imagine a world so dominated by only one great power when he wrote in the 1970s international political climate). Unipolarity is the state of world affairs where there is a single superpower “able to ensure its own security unilaterally” against any other state or coalition of states.¹¹ The contrasts to a unipolar world are either a bipolar world where exactly two superpowers exist or a multipolar world where three or more great powers exist in closely equal status.

The last part of this discussion must be about superpower status. In 1991 Krauthammer confidently awarded superpower status to the United States: “American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself.”¹² While many now question the economic and political abilities of the US to control the global agenda, few did so back in 1991.

Since the end of the Cold War, pundits and others have hotly debated the role the United States should play in global politics. In his argument for an American unipolar world, Krauthammer claimed that the United States engaged in “pseudo-multilateralism” by pandering to the international community, and consequently was too embarrassed to act in the great power role it needed to fulfill.¹³ Without such a role, he asserted, international order would instead become international “chaos.”¹⁴ Colin Gray similarly defined America’s role as the reluctant global sheriff, not out of choice but necessity. He, like Krauthammer, concluded no-one else was up to the task.¹⁵ Max Boot concurred with Krauthammer and Gray’s assertions for strong American leadership. He saw the 1990s

¹⁰ David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” *International Studies Review* 1, no. 2 (Summer, 1999), 142.

¹¹ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* 3d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 195.

¹² Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1, (January 1991), 24.

¹³ Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1, (January 1991), 25.

¹⁴ Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1, (January 1991), 32.

¹⁵ Colin S. Gray, *The Sheriff* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 5.

not as an example of the rise of US hegemony but rather a decade where American influence declined due to insufficient global assertiveness.¹⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein agreed with Boot's suggestion, but traced a longer American hegemonic decline, going as far back as the 1970s.¹⁷

Andrew Bacevich also believed in strong American influence, but suggested the United States achieved this following a military solution model. Bacevich described America's post-Cold War foreign policy as "American militarism." The ongoing strength of the American military far exceeded the capacity of any other state. With this militarism came an increased willingness to use force, and "leading, in effect, to the normalization of war."¹⁸

In contrast to the image of America as the lone sheriff, others advocated for a more inclusive leadership role for the United States since the end of the Cold War than Boot and Krauthammer. What they commonly found missing throughout the 1990s, however, was coherent policy definition. Donald Nuechterlein described the Clinton era as one of an internationalist hegemon with uncertain leadership.¹⁹ Richard Haass described President George H.W. Bush's policy as "never flushed out" before accusing President William Clinton of proposing democratic enlargement theory that had "negligible impact on day-to-day affairs." Instead of precisely defining America's foreign policy, according to Haass, the Clinton administration lacked "a general framework" and "fail[ed] to articulate its foreign policy objectives."²⁰

Haass additionally proposed a greater focus on domestic issues than international concerns. Something Condoleezza Rice firmly advocated for in a *Foreign Affairs* opinion piece written for the 2000 Republican presidential campaign. Rice advocated for a new focus on America's national interest, particularly before committing American troops to humanitarian issues. Rice also called for establishing acceptable international

¹⁶ Max Boot, "The Case for American Empire," in *Paradoxes of Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World* edited by David Skidmore (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 89.

¹⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power* (New York: The New Press, 2003), 213.

¹⁸ Andrew J. Bacevich, "The New American Militarism," in *Paradoxes of Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World* edited by David Skidmore (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 76-8.

¹⁹ Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World* 2d ed. (Lexington, KY: Kentucky University Press, 2001), 294; Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Defiant Superpower: The New American Hegemony* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 109.

²⁰ Richard N. Haass, "Fatal Distraction: Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* no. 108 (Fall 1997).

norms rather than using international institutions, withdrawing from international conventions contrary to American national interest, and strengthening American power through a strong but selectively used military that is “not stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities [to deter, fight, and win wars].”²¹ These positions from the future National Security Advisor (NSA) stood in stark contrast to those laid out by Clinton’s NSA, Anthony Lake, in a speech in 1993 to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Lake outlined needing to move from containment to enlargement: promoting and spreading democracy and free markets; countering aggression against liberalization; pursuing a humanitarian agenda, growing NATO and international economic institutions, and increased interaction with private and non-governmental organizations. Finally, he accepted the necessary cost of a global military presence to sustain democracy and liberalization.²²

Samuel Huntington, contrasting Haass’ and Rice’s calls for a narrower national security policy, aligned with Lake in advocating for a superpower working with other “major states.” He recommended that the United States should not go it alone despite its superpower status. Instead, Huntington argued, the United States should seek legitimacy “through some international organization such as the United Nations,” allowing states to bandwagon with, rather than balance against, American interests. This approach, he said, was in decline by the end of the century as unipolar choices left the United States out of step with the rest of the world, particularly its regional hegemons.²³

As the twenty-first century dawned the United States experienced the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Eighteen months later American forces led an *ad hoc* coalition in an invasion of Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist regime. These events, combined with the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, spurred a new round of discussion about the American role in the global order. Charles Kupchan mapped out what he saw as a decline in America’s inclusive internationalism since the end of the Cold War, noting that the American public increasingly questioned why the United States should fund the new global order. He further noted a rise in challenge to America’s leadership from

²¹ Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000).

²² Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, “From Containment to Enlargement” (address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., September 21, 1993), <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html> (accessed May22, 2011).

²³ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 2 (March/April 1999), 39-47.

Europe and eventually Asia, as American domestic pressure compounded pressure from other states' for an international balancing of power.²⁴

Robert Jervis recognized the lone ability of the US to take on Saddam Hussein but suggested the fear America acting as a lone superpower could incite in the rest of the world. For Jervis, the only available solution was acceptance of “allied influence and values” rather than simply pursuing a solely American agenda.²⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski highlighted similar fears that the United States would fall from” position its “superpower plus” status at the end of the Cold War to a “superpower minus following the choice to invade Iraq and pursue a global war on terror.”²⁶

G. John Ikenberry suggested a change in global politics, where military strength that Condoleezza Rice advocated as so essential was longer the measure of power to challenge America. Instead, he suggested Europe would attempt to obtain control in international organizations and institutions to guide the debate to suit European needs²⁷ Joseph Nye countered Ikenberry’s fear of international institutions, instead arguing for them as the key to future American influence, wherein the United States provided order as it managed the public good from the international organization rather than simply benefitting from it.²⁸

Since the end of the Cold War, perceptions of American foreign policy have undergone change if not reinvention. The United States tested various roles, from the sole superpower in a unipolar world through an engaged partner of the democratic world; what President Clinton called “the world’s indispensable nation” and Madeleine Albright expanded on as “the indispensable nation, but not the only responsible nation.”²⁹ Since the 9/11 attacks and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a new discussion of the United States

²⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 203 & 120.

²⁵ Robert Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire,” *Foreign Policy* no. 137 (July/August 2003), 84-87.

²⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 214.

²⁷ G. John Ikenberry, *Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity* (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, July 23, 2003).

²⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 147.

²⁹ William J. Clinton, Presidential Inaugural Address, January 20, 1997, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/01/1997-01-20-presidents-inaugural-address.html> (accessed May 20, 2011); Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, *News Hour*, PBS, March 6, 1997, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/fedagencies/march97/albright_3-6.html (accessed January 26, 2011).

undergoing foreign policy reverse and the end of its role as a peace broker has emerged again, combined with advocates both for and against a stronger unilateral diplomatic and military posture.³⁰ What is missing from the overall discussion is not the range of options available but when they are used and why. While many identify a specific episode and the policy applied, there is no overall description for what fits where. Only from such an analysis can we then formulate of a future expectation of policy for a given event.

Methodology

Analysis of cases since the end of the Cold War provides data to identify how and when the United States pursues particular foreign policy choices. The analysis divides American actions into four categories:

1. unilateral action;
2. multilateral action through existing organizations;
3. multilateral action through *ad hoc* coalitions;
4. non-engagement or engagement through a third party.

From this, trends outlining what type of situation will likely determine which response emerge. The choice of cases is neither exhaustive of possibilities, nor is it intended to target one type of situation, such as military involvement. Instead, the goal is to utilize a broad selection of international incidents in which limited cases do not immediately restrict the type of response. The case studies examine four instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic to determine American policy choice in a given situation. The categories themselves sequentially follow involvement level for American policy choices, starting with non-involvement or involvement through a third party, progressing to multilateral engagement within existing organizations, then action through *ad hoc* groups created for the specific event, and finally to the category the United States is most heavily committed in, unilateral engagement.

Various sources of information were utilized, particularly newspaper articles, United Nations (UN) records, government reports, speeches by the President and other senior government officials, government documents including departmental memos and

³⁰ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 29.

publications, and timely journal articles as well as books written following the event that assess the nature and outcome. Utilizing such a broad spectrum of information provides a picture not only of the decisions made in constructing American foreign policy but also the variables influencing to each decision. Identifying the decision-making variables allows a predictive mapping to emerge from the historical trends in US foreign policy.

The analysis chapter following the case studies builds a framework using analysis from the case studies. Six intervening variables, steering choices within the American Government's foreign policy decision making, emerge from the case study chapters. Each one drives the policy-maker either directly to one of the four possible policy choices or to another variable that further contextualizes the situation, further refining the decision-making, before arriving at a final policy choice. The six variables are: American interest; leadership; legitimacy; required capabilities; available multilateral organizations; and alternate willing lead actors. The framework provides both an analysis tool to assess established American foreign policy and a predictive capability to determine when the United States, given the contextual variables of the situation, will choose each of the four possible responses in its foreign policy. The framework creates the lens through which to assess future international incidents and identify an expected foreign policy response from the United States, allowing both domestic and international actors a level of predictability in assessing American foreign policy and its implications on the global stage.

The six variables identified drive the policy-maker toward one of the four policy decisions available. Accurately contextualizing the situation surrounding the variable allows analysts to refine the likely outcome. The first variable, American interest covers both of the common types of American national interests: national security interests and prestige interests. Carnes Lord correlates national prestige with honor. He goes on to assert it is often the intangible interest associated with prestige that causes political overreach and leads to war. Finally, though, he claims that large states, particularly the United States, rarely prioritize prestige interests ahead of security or prosperity.³¹ While Lord may correctly subordinate prestige to security, history is also replete with cases of

³¹ Carnes Lord, *The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 109-110.

American foreign policy engagement for prestige interests. Somalia in 1994 held little national security interest to the United States. However, the United States Government recognized an opportunity to demonstrate its global leadership through the UN and elevate its prestige within the international community.

National security interest is typically clearer, although political leaders still signal by their statements when situations rise to the significance of national security. On example of this is President Clinton's foreign policy speech in 1994 when he finally made American national interest in Kosovo explicit. He declared Kosovo the place where Yugoslav violence must stop before it spread into Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, or beyond.³²

Leadership focuses on which part of the United States Government leads the foreign policy decision-making. While the President is typically the United States' chief foreign diplomat and leads the majority of foreign policy decision-making, there are times when the Congress asserts its leadership over foreign policies. Congress' major tool for this consists of budgetary approvals; however, the Senate also maintains the authority to approve treaties and can, at times, chose to deny such approval. The choice by Congress to insert itself into the foreign policy leadership role significantly affects the expected outcome of policy choices.

Legitimacy is another intangible part of international relations between states. In its most basic form, American legitimacy reflects the approval of the international community for actions and policies executed by the United States. The intangible nature of legitimacy, however, provides vagaries within any definition. Prestige and legitimacy also bear correlation, with prestige providing validation for actions taken based on the overall perception of the United States within the international community at that time. This is, in fact, one reason the United States pursues policies reflecting only prestige interests, to improve its perception within the international community when it faces challenge to policies in the future. Legitimate policies typically are ones not challenged either legally or morally by significant numbers of actors throughout the international

³² *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1999 Vol 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 271.

community. While the actions to stop a humanitarian crisis rarely require additional legitimacy, invasion of sovereign territory usually faces questions of legitimacy.

Required capabilities are often a relative concept. While the United States remains the lone superpower in the post-Cold War period, technically capable of pursuing any policy independently, it can seek capabilities from other states either to mitigate the drain on American assets or to improve the efficiency of action. The case of Afghanistan in 2001 represents one that was possible without the physical capabilities of other states, or even the overflight authorization of neighboring states. The United States, instead, recognized the improved efficiency of the operation gained by including forces from the United Kingdom and access approval from multiple states.

Available multilateral organizations also exist on a relative scale. The historical cases within this study recognize times when multilateral organizations existed but did not align with the American policy option chosen either based on timeline or aligned interests among member states. At such times, this study considers the multilateral organization unavailable even if it technically exists. The example of the UN during the Kosovo crisis highlights the presence of a multilateral organization whose interests were not coincident with American foreign policy at that time. As a result, the United States opted for a path outside the UN.

Alternate willing actors represent other states or organizations willing to accept leadership responsibility for a situation. Typically, these occasions occur when the United States sees insufficient interest to lead resolving the situation itself. Rarely does an alternate willing lead actor equate to complete disengagement by the United States; it is simply that other state assumes the responsibility for leadership and decision-making within the given situation. Often the willing lead actor achieves gains for its actions, normally prestige within its area of influence whether that is a regional actor or globally in the case of the United Nations.

Chapter 1

Unilateral Engagement

This chapter analyzes American unilateral foreign policy decisions. Unilateral action represents American policy not subordinated to any multilateral organization or coalition. It is the antithesis of the following two chapters that analyze American policies specifically within such groups. Although the final path chosen in the following case studies is one of unilateral action, this does not infer an absence of international organizations. In each case the United States chose to act outside of any existing organization, either because the organization did not align with American policy or because the United States saw its interests better served acting separately from the available organization. The three cases analyzed are global climate control, the Nunn-Lugar Act, and Liberia in 2003. In the climate control and Nunn-Lugar Act cases, Congress led policy-making decisions, passing bills determining American policy. Each time the Congress placed immediate American interests ahead of any international resolution involving other states. In Liberia, the Executive Branch executed foreign policy through its control of the Department of Defense and Department of State. With legitimacy already established by calls for American intervention from the international community and the United States requiring no assistance from other actors, American policy-making resulted in a unilateral action.

The first case is international climate control. It represents a choice by the Congress to go against the collective decision of the international community, pursuing what it identified as America's best choice, even though the Executive Branch tried embracing a multilateral approach. The second case is the Nunn-Lugar Act. This case represents Congressional decisions to pursue unilateral actions it controlled in an expeditious manner maintaining the security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal rather than relying on an international organization influenced by multiple states and typically operating in a far slower manner.

The final case in this chapter demonstrates an American choice exercise solo military action outside an international organization to resolve the security problem in

Liberia in 2003. Responding to international calls for American military presence, President George W. Bush directed the Department of Defense to provide capabilities it organically possessed to assist in an already legitimized security operation. In doing so, the Bush administration presented a possible template for future limited American military operations.

Climate Control – The Kyoto Protocol

The United States produced almost one fifth of all greenhouse gases (GHG) in the world in 2000, more than numbers two through seven combined.¹ As a result, the United States plays a significant role in any global solution to climate control. This case examines a policy made by the Executive Branch to work within the international community followed by Congress' choice to exclude the United States from that collective solution, instead focusing strictly on American interests. It represents the different approaches to foreign policy made by the Executive Branch and Congress addressing American foreign policy. Although there are conflicting views on the significance of global warming, it was the potential cost to the American economy rather than the scientific debate that led Congress to reject the Kyoto Protocol signed by President Clinton.² As, Congress' decision to leave the Kyoto Protocol demonstrated a choice by the global superpower, and biggest GHG emitter to lead the world in a different direction. Ultimately, however, the international community continued its agreement and implemented the Kyoto Protocol without the United States, waiting until the next round of climate control negotiations to combine American policy back into international negotiations.

In 1992 the international community, including the United States, agreed on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a series of voluntary measures to control the major cause of global warming – GHG. Following the initial UNFCCC agreement, international negotiations continued toward an agreement on mandatory reductions. In December 1997, representatives from 150 nations, including

¹ Larry Parker and John Blodgett, *Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectives on the Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations*, CRS Report for Congress RL32721 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 16.

² Jeffrey Salmon, "Global Warming Does Not Pose a Serious Threat," in *Global Warming: Opposing Viewpoints*, ed. Tamara L. Roleff (San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 1997), 28.

the United States, met in Kyoto, Japan, to participate in the UN Conference on Anthropogenic Climate Change, meant to culminate mandatory reduction negotiations.³ The conference produced the Kyoto Protocol – an international plan to further reduce global output of GHG through mandatory levels of reduction for developed nations.⁴

While 150 nations attended the 1997 convention, the protocol's reduction targets applied only to developed nations rather than developing and lesser-developed countries. In July 1997 Senate Resolution 98 specifically warned the President that the Senate did not intend to ratify any treaty that did not include developing nations or would “result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.”⁵ Vice-President Al Gore attended the Kyoto Conference to negotiate a protocol more palatable to the United States. While unable to include developing nations in the final agreement, Gore was successful in negotiating other key changes, particularly a provision allowing trade credits for GHG, also called carbon trading, something strongly opposed by the European Union.⁶ Carbon trading allowed nations producing less GHG than their quota to sell credits of GHG emissions to nations producing excess GHG. It also allowed an option for states unable to afford the cost of GHG reduction to buy carbon credits instead.⁷ The Clinton Administration promoted this system as a use of “tools of the free market to tackle [a] difficult problem.”⁸ The market approach was an attempt to sell the Kyoto Protocol to a Republican-led Congress unwilling to ratify a treaty that could damage the American economy through costly monitoring and increased regulation.

Despite gains made by Gore in Kyoto, the failure to include developing nations assured conflict with the Senate. The Clinton administration recognized this conflict and said they would not submit the Protocol for Congressional ratification until achieving

³ Willis Witter, “US Bid to Rescue Kyoto Pact Draws European Snub,” *Washington Times*, December 10, 1997.

⁴ “Terms of the Kyoto Agreement,” *BBC News*, December 11, 1997, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/38690.stm> (accessed August 25, 2003).

⁵ S. Res 98, 105th Cong., 1st Session, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_bills&docid=f:sr98rs.txt.pdf (accessed May 10, 2011).

⁶ Willis Witter, “US Bid to Rescue Kyoto Pact Draws European Snub,” *Washington Times*, December 10, 1997.

⁷ Marco Verweij, “Curbing Global Warming the Easy Way: An Alternative to the Kyoto Protocol,” *Government and Opposition* 38 no. 2 (2003), 143.

⁸ Presidential Statement, December 10, 1997, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/12/1997-12-10-statement-by-the-president-on-climate-change.html> (accessed May 10, 2011); Vice-Presidential Remarks, “Remarks by the Vice President on Kyoto Agreement,” December 11, 1997, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/12/1997-12-11-remarks-by-the-vice-president-on-kyoto-agreement.html> (accessed May 10, 2011).

“meaningful participation by key developing nations.”⁹ The administration continued to work both within the UNFCCC and bilaterally with developing world nations such as China and India but was unable to change the Kyoto delineation of developed-developing world requirements gap and therefore did not submit the Protocol to Congress for ratification. In March 2001 President Bush announced the United States would not participate as a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, citing the non-inclusion of developing nations, the unattainable target levels, and the indefinable economic costs associated with implementing the agreement.¹⁰

Both Congress and the President tried sought American leadership in climate control. Katie McGinty, Chair of the Council of Environmental Quality, said in a White House press briefing that President Bush took the issue seriously both from an environmental and national security perspective. She went on to say President Bush “has also determined that the United States will show leadership here to join all of the countries in the world to taking responsible steps to meet this challenge.”¹¹ While President Bush tried a multilateral approach to climate control, the Congress drew a different line, viewing American leadership as necessary to move away from a flawed plan. They expected American withdrawal to kill Kyoto.¹²

In order to implement the Kyoto Protocol, at least 55 nations and 55% of the world’s polluters had to ratify it.¹³ When President Bush confirmed Congress would not

⁹ Vice-Presidential Remarks, “Remarks by the Vice President on Kyoto Agreement,” December 11, 1997, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/12/1997-12-11-remarks-by-the-vice-president-on-kyoto-agreement.html> (accessed May 10, 2011).

¹⁰ With cost estimates predicting everything from a \$200 billion gain for the US economy from implementing the protocol to the President, United Mine Workers of America testimony to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee of “economic losses in excess of \$100 billion per year,” Congress was not willing to risk derailing America’s economy over such uncertainty. Mary H. Cooper, “Global Warming Treaty,” *CQ Researcher* 11 no. 3 (2001); Cecil E. Roberts, “The Kyoto Protocol is a Fatally Flawed Treaty,” *Testimony Before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee*, March 25, 1999, quoted in *CQ Researcher* 9 no. 19 (1999), 441. Laura Peek, “US Turns its Back on Climate Treaty,” *Times*, March 29, 2001; Michael McCarthy, “Bush Declares He Won’t Sign Kyoto’s Landmark Treaty on Global Warming,” *Independent*, March 29, 2001; Toby Harnden, “US Rejects Global Warming Pact,” *Daily Telegraph*, March 29, 2001.; Daniel Bodansky, “U.S. Climate Policy After Kyoto: Elements for Success,” Policy Brief, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 15, 2002, 6.

¹¹ Katie McGinty, Chair of the Council of Environmental Quality, White House Press Briefing, July 24, 1997, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/07/1997-07-24-press-briefing-on-global-climate-change.html> (accessed May 10, 2011).

¹² Richard Schmalensee, “The Lessons of Kyoto,” *MIT Sloan Management Review* 23, no. 2 (2002), 96.

¹³ Vladimir Isachenkov, “Climate Conference Split By Rift Over Kyoto Protocol That Hinges on Russian Ratification,” *Associated Press*, October 3, 2003.

ratify it and withdrew in 2001, only 33 nations had ratified the protocol, none of them major industrial nations. It seemed reasonable to assume the Protocol would die at that point. What resulted instead, however, was the United States ceded international negotiating power to Russia. In March 2002, Mali and Papua New Guinea were the 54th and 55th states to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, achieving one of the two requirements for implementation.¹⁴ Without the United States it took Russian ratification in November, 2004 to finally implement the Protocol. Russia's ratification, however, only came after the European Union supported Russian entry into the World Trade Organization. As the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, said: "The fact that the EU has met us halfway in negotiations on the WTO could not but have helped Moscow's positive attitude to the question of ratifying the Kyoto protocol."¹⁵

Congress selected an American-centric path about the Kyoto Protocol, determining the American economy was more important than the international consensus over climate control. By the time President Bush formally announced the United States' withdrawal, many were painting a picture of an isolated United States, certainly now excluded from future climate debate and possibly now lessened in diplomatic influence in other areas.¹⁶ This proved not to be the case when, in 2009, the United States again led global negotiations over climate change, this time in Copenhagen, Denmark. President Barack Obama personally held private meetings with the leaders of India, China, and Brazil as the leading actors among the developing nations to negotiation funding from the developed world nations. Additionally, China continued its policy avoiding inspection of emissions, claiming that to be a violation of its sovereignty.¹⁷ The final product from

¹⁴ United Nations Framework on Climate Control, "Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol," United Nations Framework on Climate Control, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (accessed March 20, 2011).

¹⁵ Andrew Osborn, "Kyoto Treaty to be Binding After Russian Ratification," *Independent*, October 23 2004.

¹⁶ Daniel Bodansky, "U.S. Climate Policy After Kyoto: Elements for Success," Policy Brief, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 15, 2002, 1; Eileen Clausen, quoted in Mary H. Cooper, "Global Warming Treaty," *CQ Researcher* 11 no. 3 (2001), 50; Richard Schmalensee, "The Lessons of Kyoto," *MIT Sloan Management Review* 23, no. 2 (2002), 96; William A. Nitze, "Beyond Kyoto: a Plan to Bridge the U.S.-EU Gap," *European Affairs*, Summer 2001.

¹⁷ "Copenhagen Climate Talks (UNFCCC)," *New York Times*, December 18, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/united_nations_framework_convention_on_climate_change/index.html (accessed May 10, 2011); Edward Felker and Matthew Mosk, "Deal Reached in Copenhagen Climate Talks; China Joins US in Nonbinding First Draft of Accord," *Washington Times*, December 19, 2009.

Copenhagen was a non-binding agreement that left all parties still engaged but none committed to any mandated GHG emissions reductions. The developed world nations were to submit national plans to the UNFCCC, while the developing world nations received promises of funding to adapt existing technology and mitigate future emissions.¹⁸ The United States was again involved in the discussions, but the limits of Congress to protect the American economy and include developing nations still constrained any agreement the President could offer in his negotiations. The non-binding agreement avoided a battle with Congress. There was no official treaty to ratify, and the expectations for each nation were to implement whatever their national plan was, something Congress could determine through legislation.

In 1997 the United States negotiated an international climate control agreement. The goal of President Clinton was to slow global warming and demonstrate American leadership in the process. What emerged was a Congressional determination of American interest that conflicted with that of President Clinton. In refusing to ratify any treaty that threatened the American economy, the Congress selected a unilateral path for the United States hoping that the rest of the world would follow. Instead, the world tried to resolve the climate control problem despite the absence of the United States, the largest polluter. Although the international community implemented the Kyoto Protocol without the United States, it was also happy to allow American leadership back in ensuing climate negotiations, welcoming both the leadership of the American President in the negotiations and the offers of financial assistance in the final agreement. Ultimately, this case demonstrates the American-centric focus of the Congress when it enters into foreign policy decisions and the need from the rest of the world for American leadership.

¹⁸ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009*, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, March 30, 2011, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf> (accessed May 10, 2011).

Post-Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction

By 1991 we were seeing something unaccustomed: the first-ever impending disintegration of a nuclear power

Ashton B. Carter, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy

The case of international climate control demonstrated a choice by the United States to depart from an international accord, recognizing it was not in its best interest. The study of nuclear weapons security following the break-up of the Soviet Union presents a stark contrast. In this case the United States acted unilaterally from the outset. Although there were other parts of the Soviet breakup addressed by organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the other great nuclear power in the world – the United States – stepped in to address the security and reduction of nuclear weapons.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, 27,000 nuclear weapons suddenly had new owners, as four new nuclear states, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, now had custody of nuclear weapons. Of these, only Russia wanted to maintain a long-term nuclear arsenal.¹⁹ That same year, 1991, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) met President Michael Gorbachev in his office in Moscow, just after an attempted coup where Gorbachev had spent several days under house arrest away from the Soviet capital. Nunn asked Gorbachev if he had been in control of the nuclear arsenal, in particular the launch briefcase, during the whole episode. The unconvincing answer Nunn received elevated his concern about the control of Soviet nuclear weapons as the arsenal became split among countries undergoing massive social, political, and economic upheaval with differing military capabilities.²⁰ The recent coup attempt highlighted the immediate nature of the problem. Nunn wanted the problem resolved with certainty and expediency, factors he could control within Congress far better than through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or United Nations. As a result, Nunn's concerns led directly to the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (SNTRA).

¹⁹ Ashton B. Cohen, "Reducing the Nuclear Dangers from the Former Soviet Union," *Arms Control Today* 22, no. 1 (1992), 10-11.

²⁰ Samuel A. Nunn, "Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War World" in *Dismantling the Cold War: US and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program*, ed. John M. Shields and William C. Potter (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), xv-xvi.

Nunn returned from Moscow increasingly worried about the security of the former Soviet nuclear weapons. However, his first attempt to resolve this was ill-timed. As Congress worked to pass the 1992 Defense Appropriations Act, Nunn teamed with House Representative Les Aspin to propose a last-minute humanitarian package to the appropriations package that included provisions to handle nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. In the rush to attach such a measure, Nunn and Aspin did not seek White House support nor did they confer until the last minute with Democrat or minority Republican Congressional leaders.²¹ As Nunn acknowledged, “Les Aspin and I decided to do something very unusual. We decided to try to put his humanitarian aid package and my concerns about weapons of mass destruction together in a conference initiative, even though nothing of this nature appeared in either the house or the Senate bill. In a word, we did not get away with it.”²² Congressional leaders dropped the proposal before being debated in either chamber.

Nunn’s ignorance of nuclear issues prevented him from introducing a resolution to deal directly with what he saw as a critical threat to American national security. On November 19, 1991, the knowledge he needed arrived courtesy of a meeting in Nunn’s office with Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, arranged by David Hamburg, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Hamburg had invited Ashton Carter and William Perry (future Secretary of Defense for President Clinton) to discuss a report Carter had just released at Harvard University on controlling the Soviet nuclear arsenal.²³ The Harvard Report not only laid out the problems, but also what needed to be done, including inventory and data exchange, dismantling weapons, and disposing of radioactive materials.²⁴ Two days after the meeting, the two Senators arranged a breakfast for Carter to brief his study to a group

²¹ Paul I. Bernstein and Jason D. Wood, *The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 5.

²² Samuel A. Nunn, “Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War World” in *Dismantling the Cold War: US and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program*, ed. John M. Shields and William C. Potter (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), xvi.

²³ Ashton B. Carter, “The Origins of the Nunn-Lugar Program” (Presentation, The Presidential Conference on William Jefferson Clinton: The “New Democrat” from Hope, Hofstra University, November 11, 2005), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/hofstra_presidential_conference_presentation_november2005.pdf (accessed March 19, 2011).

²⁴ Paul I. Bernstein and Jason D. Wood, *The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 7.

of senators from both parties. From this breakfast, Nunn and Lugar “gathered the support of the senators... for a \$500 million proposal to provide assistance for the safe transport, storage, destruction, and nonproliferation of Soviet weapons of mass destruction.”²⁵

Recognizing the domestic pressure on Congress both in spending and in supporting former arch-enemies, Nunn and Lugar published an op-ed piece in the *Washington Post* the next day laying out their plan for nuclear accountability. They highlighted requests for assistance from leaders of former Soviet states, the risks of nuclear proliferation, particularly Libya and Iraq, and, perhaps most importantly for Washington support, that the investment of tax dollars to aid the former Soviet states was a wise expense in direct support of American national security: According to Nunn and Lugar, “This is not foreign aid. This is a prudent investment to reduce a grave threat that we otherwise must be prepared to deter and, if need be, defend. It would be shortsighted and irresponsible to let this opportunity pass.”²⁶

On December 12, 1991, Congress passed HR 3807, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act of 1991, which included SNTRA. The SNTRA clearly stated that “it is in the national security interests of the United States (A) to facilitate on a priority basis the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities, and (B) to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation.” Congress authorized up to \$400 million dollars to be used in support of the act and up to an additional \$100 million for humanitarian assistance to former Soviet republics, all from the established defense budget.²⁷

In October 1992, Congress expanded this aid to the former Soviet states in the Freedom Support Act. This act moved beyond nuclear weapons security to include further humanitarian assistance and economic and democracy promotion coordinated through a new office within the State Department, the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction. Additionally, Congress increased funding for the Soviet Nuclear Threat

²⁵ Paul I. Bernstein and Jason D. Wood, *The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 7.

²⁶ Samuel Nunn and Richard Lugar, “Dismantling the Soviet Arsenal; We’ve Got to Get Involved,” *Washington Post*, November 22, 1991.

²⁷ HR 3807, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991, sec. 211, 221, and 232, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c102:5::/temp/~c102qMlchD::> (accessed March 19, 2011).

Reduction Act from \$400 million to \$800 million to more adequately provide for the reduction and control of nuclear weapons.²⁸

The Nunn-Lugar Bill represents a very different case from that of the Kyoto Protocol. The United States did not pursue nuclear weapons security as a problem for the international community to solve. The IAEA and UN were possible organizations to address the former Soviet nuclear weapons, but Nunn recognized the immediacy of the problem following the failed Russian Coup attempt in 1991. This was a problem too critical to American national security for UN bureaucracy. Instead, Congressional leaders used control and expediency they possessed within their institution, reaching a swift decision to use the unique economic capacity and military expertise of the United States to take the lead.

The choice demonstrated the United States as a benevolent hegemon in the new post-Cold War order while protecting American national security interests. Nunn-Lugar ensured the secure handling of the emergence of four nuclear powers from the former Soviet Union, both in the immediate control of the nuclear weapons and in a longer-term approach through economic development aid and by ensuring employment for skilled Soviet nuclear scientists in controlled settings, not sold to the highest global bidders. As Nunn described in remarks to a conference in Monterey, California, in 1995, “We are going to have a unique relationship with Russia for many years ahead, because we are the only two countries in the world that can destroy each other completely in the span of a few hours.”²⁹

Liberia, 2003

The choice to introduce military forces into Liberia serves as an example of American post-9/11 intervention policy, engagement in international incidents without committing an already stretched military open-ended multilateral intervention. This case highlights the variables of legitimacy and capability in American unilateral actions. The international community repeatedly called for American involvement in Liberia, thus

²⁸ S. Res 2532, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, sec 102, 498, and 506, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c102:5::/temp/~c102weWArO::> (accessed March 19, 2011).

²⁹ Samuel A. Nunn, “Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War World” in *Dismantling the Cold War: US and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program*, ed. John M. Shields and William C. Potter (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), xv.

providing a clear legitimacy for action. Additionally, the United States, according to many, had a moral responsibility, considering its slave-owning heritage and role in founding Liberia. Once tasked to engage, the Department of Defense possessed all the capabilities required for the limited mission specified, without any need for multilateral assistance.

Liberia had suffered civil war since the death of its President, Samuel Doe, in September 1990.³⁰ During much of the civil war, peacekeeping forces from the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) tried to maintain order through the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).³¹ In September, 1993, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) following the signing of a peace treaty that June, providing for ECOWAS and UN oversight. According to UN Security Council Resolution 866, ECOMOG maintained responsibility supervising military provisions of the agreement and the UN role was “to monitor and verify this process.”³² In 1997, former warlord Charles Taylor became President of Liberia, elected by over 75% of the vote.³³ In 1999, political stabilization allowed ECOMOG to withdraw from Liberia. Unfortunately, the elections did not bring long-term peace and stability. By 2000 rebel groups revived the civil war, this time to overthrow Taylor because of his exclusionary and violent rule.³⁴

By 2003, while much of the international community focused on the American war in Iraq, the civil war in Liberia worsened, resulting in more and more civilian deaths. As media and diplomatic attention started to highlight the increasing death toll in Liberia, the United States continued to avoid any military commitment. In June the situation in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, destabilized to the point that French Special Forces had to

³⁰ Sean D. Murphy, “U.S. Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia,” *The American journal of International Law* 98, no. 1 (2004), 193.

³¹ Ikechi Mgbefi, *Collective Insecurity: The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, and Global Order* (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2003), 22.

³² United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 866, “Liberia,” September 22, 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/513/89/PDF/N9351389.pdf?OpenElement>.

³³ Jimmy Carter, “There’s Hope in Liberia’s History,” *New York Times*, July 13, 2003.

³⁴ Sean D. Murphy, “U.S. Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia,” *The American journal of International Law* 98, no. 1 (2004), 193.

evacuate foreigners from the city by helicopter, including approximately one hundred Americans.³⁵

Throughout the rest of June newspapers around the world reported growing calls for an American-military stabilization force in Liberia.³⁶ Although the UN normally turned to former colonial powers to handle problems in Africa, “the problem [was] that Liberia, founded by freed U.S. slaves in 1847, was never a colony.”³⁷ Focused primarily on Iraq, the United States officially distanced itself from the deteriorating situation in Liberia. Internally, however, the government was divided over its course of action between the Defense Department, which claimed no clear strategic interest for the United States, and the State Department, which promoted a moral obligation to help a country with which the United States had such a deep historical link.³⁸

As a compromise to the internal government debate, President Bush rerouted the USS *Kearsarge* and its contingent of Marines on its way home from Iraq to a position off the Liberian coast.³⁹ As the DoD announced the *Kearsarge* tasking, forces on all sides in Liberia discussed another ceasefire, this one signed on June 17.⁴⁰ Renewed calls for American military involvement accompanied the new ceasefire, now to oversee the ceasefire. Britain’s Ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, called the United States “the nation that everyone would think would be the natural candidate,”⁴¹ while former President Jimmy Carter penned an editorial in the *New York Times* recommending

³⁵ Michael Dynes, “Foreigners Rescued from Siege of Liberian Capital,” *Times*, June 10, 2003; Brian Knowlton, “Foreigners Evacuated From Liberian Capital; French Helicopters Fly Scores to Safety,” *International Herald Tribune*, June 10, 2003.

³⁶ Somini Sengupta, “UN Leader Calls for Peacekeeping Force in Liberia, Possibly Led by US,” *New York Times*, June 29, 2003; “Bodies of Children Taken to Embassy,” *Adelaide Advertiser*, June 28, 2003; “Furious Crowds Besiege Embassy,” *Belfast New Letter*, June 27, 2003; James Astill, “Civilians Flee as Rebels Advance in Liberia’s Capital,” *Guardian*, June 26, 2003; Jonathan Clayton, “Liberians Applaud Peace Deal, But Doubts Remain,” *Australian*, June 19, 2003; “An American in Liberia,” *Washington Times*, June 15, 2003; “Liberians Swarm the US Embassy,” *St Petersburg Times*, June 8, 2003; “Lawmaker Joins Calls for Interim Govt ...Recognizes America's Influence,” *Africa News*, June 3, 2003; James Astill, “Liberian Leader Clings on to Power,” *Observer*, June 22, 2003.

³⁷ Steven Edwards, “Fighting in Liberia Raises Dilemma at UN: No Former Colonial Power to Step In. Pentagon, U.S. State Department at Odds Over Whether and How to Commit Aid,” *Montreal Gazette*, June 19, 2003.

³⁸ Steven Edwards, “Fighting in Liberia Raises Dilemma at UN: No Former Colonial Power to Step In. Pentagon, U.S. State Department at Odds Over Whether and How to Commit Aid,” *Montreal Gazette*, June 19, 2003.

³⁹ “Marines Steam to Liberia,” *New York Times*, June 15, 2003.

⁴⁰ Jonathan Clayton, “Rebels Agree Deal to End Liberia’s Years of Civil War,” *Times*, June 18, 2003.

⁴¹ Tim Butcher, “Bush Threatens to Pacify Liberia,” *Daily Telegraph*, June 27, 2003.

“a relatively small but significant presence of perhaps 2,000 troops should join the coalition.”⁴² Liberians protesting outside the US Embassy in Monrovia called on the United States to step in to assure the peace, blaming a lack of American action for the high death toll.⁴³ Stalling any American commitment, the American Ambassador to the UN said focus needed to be on the effectiveness of the ceasefire ahead of any American military involvement.⁴⁴

Throughout this time, the agreed ceasefire failed to maintain any of the planned peace. Described by the *Economist* as “long forgotten,” more attacks by rebel groups on Monrovia replaced the ceasefire, as they fought to oust Charles Taylor from his urban stronghold.⁴⁵ In July, the American National Security Council intensified discussions about possible intervention in Liberia. The National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, reportedly said “the president does believe that Liberia and the stability of West Africa [are] important to US interests,” while President Bush publically stated that Taylor must leave office.⁴⁶ By the end of the month, Bush clarified his position, stating “Our commitment is to enable ECOWAS to go in.”⁴⁷ The President was ready to assist security in Liberia, but not without ECOWAS committing necessary troops and an assurance Charles Taylor would honor the ceasefire. Bush was unwilling to engage the American military in an already well established and bloody civil war.

On July 31, ECOWAS finally agreed to send 1,500 Nigerian troops, backed by troops from other ECOWAS nations in a multinational force, to implement the June ceasefire. Due to arrive in Liberia within a week, the new force, designated the

⁴² Jimmy Carter, “There’s Hope in Liberia’s History,” *New York Times*, July 13, 2003.

⁴³ Jonathan Paye-Layeh, “Liberians Blame US As Carnage in Capital from Rebel Attacks Continues for Third Day: Bodies of Children Laid At US Embassy,” *Montreal Gazette*, June 27, 2003.

⁴⁴ Steven Edwards, “Fighting in Liberia Raises Dilemma at UN: No Former Colonial Power to Step In. Pentagon, U.S. State Department at Odds Over Whether and How to Commit Aid,” *Montreal Gazette*, June 19, 2003.

⁴⁵ “Liberia’s Civil War: Fiddling While Monrovia Burns: The Reluctance of Outsiders to Intervene,” *Economist: Middle East and Africa Section*, July 24, 2003, <http://www.economist.com/node/1944472> (accessed March 23, 2011); Kirk Semple, “US to Back Liberia Peace Force,” *International Herald Tribune*, July 26, 2003.

⁴⁶ Linda Feldmann, “Is US Inching Toward Intervention?” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 2003.

⁴⁷ Suzanne Malveaux, “US Would Aid Liberia Peacekeepers,” *CNN*, July 26, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/07/26/otsc.malveaux.liberia/index.html?iref=allsearch> (accessed March 23, 2011).

ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), could resurrect the peace deal.⁴⁸ The following day the Security Council passed a Resolution 1497, recognizing ECOMIL and declaring readiness to implement the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to assume its transitional government role while leaving the peacekeeping role to ECOMIL.⁴⁹

Two days after ECOWAS agreed to return troops to Liberia, President Taylor announced he would resign effective August 11, 2003, but did not explain where he would go or when.⁵⁰ Taylor's announcement provoked two reactions. First, because the United States had consistently required Taylor's departure as part of any commitment of American troops, Taylor's planned resignation brought the Marines stationed off the coast back into the picture.⁵¹ Secondly, rebel groups fighting for Taylor's eviction no longer had a common enemy to fight against and instead started maneuvering to best position themselves for a post-Taylor Liberia by claiming strategic positions, such as the port in Monrovia where almost all aid would enter.⁵² Despite the increased concerns of inter-rebel violence, the Nigerian forces arrived as planned, received by cheering crowds of Liberians.⁵³

As August 11 approached, Liberians and the international community waited to see if Taylor would follow through with his planned resignation. On August 7, he submitted his resignation to the national parliament, and finally, on the 11th he stepped

⁴⁸ Karl Vick, "West African Force is Set for Liberia; Peacekeepers to Begin Arriving Monday; Quick Departure for Taylor Envisioned," *Washington Post*, August 1, 2003; Marcus Warren, "Battle-Wearied Liberia Hails Peace Scouts," *Daily Telegraph*, August 1, 2003.

⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1497, "Liberia," August 1, 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/449/48/PDF/N0344948.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵⁰ Key to the issue of Taylor's departure was his indictment by the war crimes tribunal in neighboring Sierra Leone for his involvement in the civil war there. While Nigeria ultimately offered Taylor exile to expedite his departure from Liberia and implantation of the peace plan, many nations wanted Taylor delivered directly to face the charges of the tribunal. Declan Walsh, "Battles Flare as Liberian Leader Finally Agrees to Step Down," *Independent on Sunday*, August 3, 2003; Somini Sengupta, "Taylor Ready to Leave Office Aug. 11, But With a Condition," *New York Times*, August 3, 2003; Rory Carroll, "Taylor Names the Day He'll Quit: Leader is on the Verge of Leaving – and There is No Lack of Claimants to his Title," *Observer*, August 3, 2003.

⁵¹ Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Support for Multinational Intervention in Liberia," *The American Journal of International Law* 98 no. 1 (2004), 193; "A Despot's Last Deal," *Economist*, August 9, 2003.

⁵² Somini Sengupta, "A Port Deal and a Clash in Liberia," *International Herald Tribune*, August 14, 2003.

⁵³ Karl Vick, "Peace Force Cheered in Liberia: Arrival of First Troops Dampens Fighting," *Washington Post*, August 5, 2003; Rory Carroll, "Cheering Crowds Welcome Peacekeepers to Liberia," *Guardian*, August 5, 2003.

down as promised, leaving his Vice-President, Moses Blah, in charge until October.⁵⁴ Taylor enjoyed one last opportunity in his resignation speech to blame his demise on the United States, claiming the United States had forced him from office and supported the rebels.⁵⁵ The next day newspaper reports again cited calls from Liberians for an American presence in Liberia now that Taylor was gone. Secretary of State Colin Powell forestalled any immediate action, stating “if the cease-fire remains in place, I would not expect any large commitment of U.S. forces.”⁵⁶

Within three days the United States landed a force of 200 Marines in Monrovia to provide immediate security as ECOWAS troops continued deploying. Major General Norton Schwartz, heading the Joint Staff’s operations, described the American force in a short-term and strictly supporting role for the ECOWAS troops, but still able to respond with force if needed: “They will withdraw once a second battalion of Nigerians arrives, probably by the end of the week.”⁵⁷ The Marine force consisted of two components: 150 formed a quick reaction force designed to respond in support of the ECOWAS troops, if required, while 50 Marines would secure the airport and port area against already active looters so that humanitarian aid could arrive unhindered.⁵⁸ No United States Marines were subordinated to ECOMIL and none were expected to remain long.⁵⁹

Despite the prompt entry into Liberia once Taylor departed, the United States continued to pursue a restrained policy. As the flow of ECOWAS troops moved slowly, the ECOMIL commander requested additional American forces.⁶⁰ However, no

⁵⁴ Somini Sengupta, “Liberian President Resigns as Peacekeepers Enter Capital,” *New York Times*, August 8, 2003.

⁵⁵ Sudarsan Raghaven, “Liberian President Lashes Out at US: About to Leave Office, Charles Taylor Accused the US Government of Causing His Demise,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 11, 2003; Tim Butcher and Christopher Munnion, “Taylor Will ‘Sacrifice’ Presidency to End War,” *Daily Telegraph*, August 11, 2003; Somini Sengupta, “Taylor Tells Liberians He’s Forced Into Exile,” *International Herald Tribune*, August 11, 2003.

⁵⁶ Karl Vick, “Taylor Resigns, Leaves Liberia; Ex-Warlord Flies into Exile in Nigeria, Meet’s Bush’s Condition for Peacekeepers,” *Washington Post*, August 12, 2003.

⁵⁷ Elaine Monaghan, “US Ready to Land Marines in Liberia,” *Times*, August 14, 2003.

⁵⁸ Greg Jaffe, “About 200 Marines to Enter Liberia to Help Open Port to Aid,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 14, 2003; Declan Walsh, “US Forces Pour into Liberia with M16s and Razor Wire,” *Independent*, August 15, 2003; Glenn McKenzie, “Civilians, Rebels Pillage Oil, Grain in Liberia’s Main Port: US Waiting to Send in 200 Marines,” *Montreal Gazette*, August 14, 2003; Tim Weiner, “200 Marines Land in Liberia to Aid African Force,” *New York Times*, August 15, 2003.

⁵⁹ Nicole Itano, “As US Arrives, Peace Hits Liberia,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 15, 2003; Karl Vick, “Liberian Rebels to Hand Over Port: Move Would Open Capital to Relief,” *Washington Post*, August 14, 2003.

⁶⁰ Karl Vick, “Additional US Troops Requested for Liberia,” *Washington Post*, August 17, 2003.

increased commitment emerged beyond the original 200 embarked to bridge the security gap until ECOWAS troops arrived; assuring the American mission did not suffer incremental expansion. By August 24 the second Nigerian battalion arrived and the Marines departed almost as swiftly as they had arrived, leaving ECOMIL and the UN to oversee Liberia's transition.⁶¹

The repeated international and Liberian calls for American intervention in Liberia, a state with historical ties back to the United States, provided ready legitimacy for the United States military involvement in Liberia. Responding to international political and media pressure, the Bush administration demonstrated the capability of 200 Marines to reinforce a regional force built specifically to implement the June, 2003 peace plan and provide it with further credibility. The capability existed wholly within the Marine force deployed to the situation. No assistance was required from other actors or organizations. Combining the established legitimacy with the organic capability of the Marines, the United States formulated a unilateral response to the calls for action. The administration ensured that the limited goals of the military presence were clear, and that they were not exceeded, allowing a rapid exit rather than a prolonged mission propping up ECOMIL's capabilities. It serves as a possible template for how an independent United States mission can align itself parallel to regional and UN solutions to maximize America's power without removing the strength remaining of those organizations after the United States departs.

Summary

These three cases represent a diverse set of foreign policy decisions all leading to unilateral action by the United States. While both the Nunn-Lugar Bill and the American withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol demonstrate the role of Congress in prioritizing American interests, Liberia demonstrates a different case where the United States acted out tightly scoped foreign policy, within the accepted norms of the international community, and without requiring outside assistance. In the Kyoto Protocol case, the tension between the Presidential role representing the United States within the

⁶¹ Tom Masland and Jonathan Clayton, "Thank You, George Bush," *Newsweek*, August 25, 2003; "Reports of Fighting as Marines Retreat," *Montreal Gazette*, August 25, 2003; "150 Marines Leave Liberia," *CNN*, August 24, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/08/24/liberia.marines/index.html?iref=allsearch> (accessed March 23, 2011).

international community and Congress's domestic focus demonstrated the willingness of the Congress to forgo international acceptance before it accepts the subordination of American interests, particularly the economy. The Nunn-Lugar Bill took the initiative to control the Soviet nuclear arsenal before the United States faced expanded proliferation of nuclear weapons outside of its control or misuse of the weapons by the governments who had inherited them. Rather than relying on international bureaucratic institutions to work through the problem, Congress acted swiftly, utilizing legislative authority it possessed to extend American expertise and ensure the United States would not have to react further down the road to out of control nuclear weapons. Finally, the extremely limited use of American troops to support the troops provided by ECOWAS fulfilled the call by the international community for the United States to intervene. The legitimacy established by the international community calls, combined with the self-contained ability to execute the tightly constrained mission allowed the United States to act unilaterally, without becoming embroiled in a long-term operation that is still ongoing as of 2011.

Chapter 2

Multilateral Engagement Through Existing Organizations

This chapter examines three cases of the United States engaging multilaterally, through organizations already in existence. The most prevalent organization of this type is the United Nations and, as such, features throughout both the 1991 Gulf War case in a lead role as well as in Kosovo, demonstrating its insufficiency to play its lead role in certain situations. Beyond the United Nations, NATO is now one of the most longstanding and important alliances for the United States. The role of the US and NATO in Kosovo provides insight to American use of NATO's legitimacy, as well as the potential shaping of a future NATO role. The final case examines China's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), providing a look into how the United States utilized an economic multilateral organization to force another state to act according to American acceptable standards of behavior under the auspices of international legitimacy.

The three cases reveal a clear pattern of choice for the United States, addressing global issues through multilateral organizations rather than single-handedly. This multilateral approach affords the United States legitimacy within the international community a unilateral action cannot always assure. Despite the multilateral approach, there is also ample evidence of bilateral negotiations using American prestige and power to ensure the actions taken through the multilateral organization pursue American foreign policy.

The 1991 Gulf War

Less than two years after the Berlin Wall fell and the West looked towards a new peace culminating from the end of the Cold War, President Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi army into Kuwait on August 2, 1991. Until this incident, the United States spent over a decade supporting Iraq during its war with Iran solely because, as Freedman and

Karsh assert, “Iraq’s most promising feature was that it was Iran’s enemy.”¹ Actions earlier in 1990 demonstrated the American-Iraqi partnership as the United States attempted to limit diplomatic damage done when Iraq was discovered illegally importing components for a massive gun from the United Kingdom.²

Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait followed a buildup of diplomatic rhetoric by Iraq towards the Arab world. Ultimately, Iraq faced an economic problem. Years of war with Iran cost Iraq billions of dollars, draining its foreign exchange reserves and leaving, instead, an \$80 billion debt.³ Further, “by mid-1990 cash reserves were available for only three months of imports.”⁴ Combined with the massive debt, the cost of oil – the largest part of the Iraqi economy – fell 20% in the first three months of 1990, principally because of overproduction by OPEC states, 75% of it by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), according to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.⁵ In May 1990, President Hussein called the overproduction a form of economic war, saying for every \$1 decrease in the cost per barrel, Iraq lost \$1 billion per year – money Iraq no longer had to lose.⁶ In the same speech he demanded \$2.4 billion from Kuwait for allegedly “‘stealing’ Iraqi oil by slant drilling beneath the border in the Rumaila oilfield.”⁷

On July 16, 1990, Hussein laid out Iraq’s complaints in a memo to the Arab League. They included: excess oil production above OPEC quotas; the theft of Iraqi oil by Kuwait; limited assistance for Iraq from Arab states while it secured the “Eastern front” against Iran in the 1980s; and the expansion of Kuwaiti “military establishments, police posts, oil installations, and farms on Iraqi territory.” To resolve these grievances, Hussein demanded OPEC raise the price of oil to \$25 per barrel, the end of Kuwaiti theft of Iraqi oil and payment of the \$2.4 billion compensation for oil already stolen, a

¹ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 24.

² US State Department, Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs to Richard G. Darman, Director, White House Office of Management and Budget, April 10, 1990, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cat/displayItemId.do?queryType=cat&ItemID=CIG01315> (accessed February 2, 2011).

³ John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, *The Gulf War Assessed* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 33.

⁴ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 39.

⁵ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 41.

⁶ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 46.

⁷ John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, *The Gulf War Assessed* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 37.

“complete moratorium on Iraq’s wartime loans,” and a plan to compensate Iraq for the losses it incurred during the Iran-Iraq war.⁸ Ultimately, it is a list of Iraq’s immediate economic problems and cures. To reinforce the sincerity of his threat, Hussein also ordered the start of the Iraqi Army build-up in southern Iraq.

The United States government also took note of Iraq’s threats to Kuwait in July. However, the United States Ambassador in Bagdad assured Washington that Iraq’s complaint to the Arab League “does not quite rattle sabers at Kuwait (and the UAE) but comes close.” Instead, she said, its major purpose was to raise the price of oil thereby providing critically needed cash to fund Iraqi civilian and military projects.⁹ State Department instructions to its embassies in the region highlighted American determination to “ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz and to defend the principle of freedom of navigation. We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf with whom we have deep and longstanding ties.” The instructions then went on to highlight America’s concern over the “hostile implications” of Iraqi statements and “Iraqi statements [suggesting] an intention to resolve outstanding disagreements by the use of force.” Unfortunately, while expressing concern over oil flow and threat of force, the American message also included the statement “we take no position on the border delineation issue raised by Iraq with respect to Kuwait.”¹⁰ Given the direction received from the State Department, when Ambassador Glaspie met with President Hussein the next day, July 25, she assured him “any disagreement between Iraq and Kuwait would be viewed as a local affair and that the USA had ‘no opinion on inter-Arab disputes.’”¹¹

Also on July 25, the Joint Staff J-5 prepared a position paper for the Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, outlining its assessment of the Iraq situation. The paper argued the United States held “no formal relationships/treaties with the UAE

⁸ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 47-8.

⁹ US Ambassador to Iraq Memo to Secretary of State, July 18, 1990. Document is now declassified, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsm&rft_dat=xri:dnsm:article:CIG01461 (accessed February 2, 2011).

¹⁰ US Secretary of State Memo to American Embassies in Tokyo, Baghdad, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Sanaa, Muscat, Amman, Manama, and Doha, July 24, 1990. Document is now declassified, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsm&rft_dat=xri:dnsm:article:CIG01475 (accessed February 2, 2011).

¹¹ John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, *The Gulf War Assessed* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 39.

or Kuwait,” the America’s vital interest was to “keep the flow of oil to the Western world,” the economic situation in Iraq was unsustainable, and President Hussein “wishes to avoid a confrontation with the US.” The most significant statement in the memo, however, was about American capability: “Realistically, if Iraq moves on Kuwait, militarily there is nothing the US can do to stop it.”¹² In their book assessing the Gulf War, John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey assert the same message reassured Hussein the United States neither would nor could respond militarily when it was publicly reiterated at Congressional hearings.¹³

During the same period Ambassador Glaspie indicated a policy of non-American involvement between Iraq and Kuwait, King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt both assured President Bush that Saddam Hussein promised each of them he would not invade Kuwait. President Bush placed a great deal of faith in his personal relationships with other world leaders, with King Hussein and Mubarak the most trusted Arab leaders. Therefore when both assured him Iraq would not invade Kuwait, Bush took them at their word.¹⁴

Given the assuring messages from the State department, the assessment by the Defense Department, and the reassurances of Arab leaders, it is not surprising Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 caught the United States off guard. Equally apparent, however, was the Iraqi President’s incorrect assumption the rest of the world would stand idly by as he annexed Kuwait. The same day Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush issued Executive Order 12722, which blocked all physical and financial exports or imports to and from Iraq or Kuwait and banned travel of Iraqis to the United States and Americans to Iraq.¹⁵ The same day, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 660 condemning the Iraqi invasion and demanding immediate withdrawal to pre-invasion

¹² The Joint Staff J-5, Position Letter: Heightened Tensions Between Iraq-Kuwait-UAE, July 25, 1990. Document is now declassified, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cat/displayItemId.do?queryType=cat&ItemID=CIG01487> (accessed February 2, 2011).

¹³ John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, *The Gulf War Assessed* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 39.

¹⁴ Maureen Dowd, “Confrontation in the Gulf; the Longest Week: How President Decided to Draw the Line,” *New York Times*, August 9, 1990.

¹⁵ Executive Order 12722, Blocking Iraqi Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Iraq, August 2, 1990, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23563#axzz1N6Cbfsm0> (accessed May 22, 2011).

positions.¹⁶ On August 5, the President highlighted the international response to the invasion, telling reporters “I view very seriously our determination to reverse this aggression. There are an awful lot of countries that are in total accord with what I’ve just said. We will be working with them all for collective action.... This will not stand.” At the same time he announced Defense Secretary Dick Cheney would fly to Saudi Arabia to discuss halting Iraqi aggression into Saudi Arabia by placing American troops there.¹⁷

On August 6 the UN Security Council passed another resolution on the issue, this time imposing physical and financial import and export sanctions similar in manner to Executive Order 12722.¹⁸ The next day, President Bush stood with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner, stressing the global nature of the support and hopes to enforce the sanctions peacefully rather than through a naval blockade (although American, British, and French naval ships were already in or en route to the Gulf). Central to the sanctions was closing pipelines transporting Iraqi oil through Saudi Arabia and Turkey. To facilitate this, Secretary of State James Baker travelled to Turkey, holding discussions with the exiled Emir of Kuwait there to assure Turkey financial compensation for its loss of revenue from closing the pipeline. While Baker and Cheney pressed nations to close their pipelines, Vice President Quayle approached Argentina and Brazil to sure up the arms embargo side of the Iraqi sanctions and Venezuela to increase oil output to make up for the loss of oil from Iraq and Kuwait. As he prepared to leave for Turkey, Secretary Baker also continued a dialogue with his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, gaining assurances the Soviets would continue to support the UN sanctions.¹⁹ What is clear from the outset was America’s international focus, seeking to leverage American influence throughout the world, even beyond its traditional allies, and gain global legitimacy for its response to Iraq’s invasion.

¹⁶ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 660, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” August 2, 1990, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, “The Iraqi Invasion; Bush, Hinting Force, Declares Iraqi Assault ‘Will Not Stand’; Proxy in Kuwait Issues Threat,” *New York Times*, August 6, 1990.

¹⁸ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 661, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” August 6, 1990, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/11/IMG/NR057511.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁹ Thomas L. Friedman, “Security Council Votes 13 to 0 to Block Trade with Baghdad; Facing Boycott, Iraq Slows Oil: the Iraqi Invasion; Blockade is Hinted,” *New York Times*, August 7, 1990.

As President Bush spearheaded an international response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Arab world sought an Arab solution. Within the Muslim world concern existed over a non-Arab solution. While few explicitly condoned Iraq's action, some states, including Jordan, Libya, and Yemen, were far from explicit in their condemnation.²⁰ The North African states, historically recognized for battles between each other, found common ground in their opposition to Western intervention.²¹ The Arab League sought an immediate local solution. After talking with the Iraqi leader and President Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan called President Bush requesting a 48-hour opportunity to find an Arab resolution to the problem prior to international threats of military action.²² The general consensus among Arab leaders was that, following the invasion, discussions at a hastily arranged conference in Egypt would bring settlement between Iraq and Kuwait, primarily involving money to Iraq.

Unfortunately the summit failed before it even officially convened, as Arab leaders, united in anti-western sentiment, failed to find unity in objecting to or resolving the invasion. The *New York Times* quoted Kuwait's Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs saying "The crisis is an Arab one and Arabs will solve their own problems, God willing." Meanwhile, King Hussein of Jordan was reported saying "I can only say that any foreign intervention, be it Israeli or otherwise in the Arab world, will have a very, very bad reaction and could set the whole area ablaze." Finally, Libya's leader, Momar Qaddafi, concluded a Libyan-Palestinian counter-plan "is better than any Arab summit. It cuts off the road before any foreign intervention, realizes peace in the region, averts the world from the consequences of this crisis and meets the wishes of the concerned people of the Arab region."²³ Having allowed the Arab League its opportunity, President Bush responded to the failure to resolve anything saying: "all that this time had produced was waffling by certain Arab states."²⁴

²⁰ John Kifner, "The Iraqi Invasion; Arabs' Summit Meeting Off; Iraqi Units in Kuwait Dig in; Europe Bars Baghdad's Oil," *New York Times*, August 5, 1990.

²¹ Raymond William Baker, "Islam, Democracy, and the Arab Future: Contested Islam in the Gulf Crisis," in *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994), 476.

²² John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, *The Gulf War Assessed* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 42.

²³ John Kifner, "The Iraqi Invasion; Arabs' Summit Meeting Off; Iraqi Units in Kuwait Dig in; Europe Bars Baghdad's Oil," *New York Times*, August 5, 1990.

²⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, "Security Council Votes 13 to 0 to Block Trade With Baghdad; Facing Boycott, Iraq Slows oil: The Iraqi Invasion; Blockade is Hinted," *New York Times*, August 7, 1990.

Although the Iraqi conflict is usually remembered for the international military effort expelling Iraq from Kuwait, the first American military build-up served a different purpose. Rather than immediately threatening force to evict Iraqi forces, the initial military deployments deterred further aggression by Iraq, particularly into Saudi Arabia. While the forces placed in Saudi Arabia ultimately pushed Iraq out of Kuwait, initially fears of further Iraqi expansion facilitated permission for large American troop numbers in Saudi Arabia.

As the Iraqi Army solidified its position in Kuwait, the Security Council passed three additional resolutions in August. Resolution 662 declared the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait illegal and therefore null and void,²⁵ while Resolution 664 demanded safe passage for all “third-state nationals” out of Kuwait,²⁶ and finally Resolution 665 directed naval forces to enforce the sanctions of Resolution 661 through inspection and verification of “all inward and outward maritime shipping.”²⁷ This final resolution in August resolved concerns expressed by Britain, the Soviet Union, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Finland, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen, and Zaire that Resolution 661 only required any naval ships to observe maritime movements and report suspected violations to the UN.²⁸ Over the next two months five more UN Security Council resolutions reiterated the need for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait and identified humanitarian requirements.

By November, with Iraqi forces now firmly entrenched in Kuwait, the world faced a rising probability that military action was the only resolution to the crisis. One of the bluntest assertions coming from the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher: “Time is running out for Saddam Hussein. The implacable message from this house must

²⁵ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 662, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” August 9, 1990, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/12/IMG/NR057512.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 664, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” August 18, 1990, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/14/IMG/NR057514.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁷ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 665, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” August 25, 1990, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/15/IMG/NR057515.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁸ Each of the states expressing concern over Resolution 661 was either an Arab state or held a seat on the UN Security Council (rotating or permanent). As such, each held significant diplomatic influence in the international support for proposals to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Paul Lewis, “Confrontation the Gulf: Security Council’s Rare Unity May Be Threatened Over US Warships in the Gulf,” *New York Times*, August 11, 1990.

be: either he gets out of Kuwait soon or we and our allies remove him by force, and he will go down to defeat with all its consequences. He has been warned.”²⁹ Meanwhile, the United States and others debated the need for further UN authorization to use military force. The United States government said legal grounds for military action already existed as part of a collective action to protect a sovereign state. The Soviet Foreign Minister, however, demanded an explicit UN mandate, saying: “decisions about using force [must] be made under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.”³⁰ Similar calls for a specific Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force came from Turkey, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China.³¹ As the discussion over need for further resolutions occurred, the United States announced its forces were now strong enough to repel any attack by Iraq into Saudi Arabia. On the same day, however, it also announced the deployment of another 200,000 troops, signaling preparation for a military showdown with Iraq.³²

Ultimately, on November 29, 1990 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678. The resolution carried two key messages: a deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait and authority to enforce any failure to comply militarily.

*Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.*³³

With this statement the international community now had a message for President Hussein defining what to do, and by when. Otherwise military action could replace peaceful resolution.

As the international community awaited Iraq’s response to the UN ultimatum, diplomatic attempts continued on both sides throughout December. At a NATO meeting

²⁹ *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, 6th ser., vol. 180 (1990), col. 34.

³⁰ David Hoffman, “Soviets: Force Not Ruled Out in Gulf; Shevardnadze Repeats Kremlin Preference for Political Solution,” *Washington Post*, November 9, 1990.

³¹ Thomas L. Friedman, “Mideast Tensions; Allies Tell Baker Use of Force needs UN Backing,” *New York Times*, November 8, 1990.

³² Ann Devroy, “Bush Orders 200,000 More Troops to Gulf,” *Washington Post*, November 9, 1990.

³³ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678, “The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait,” November 29, 1990, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement>.

the US Secretary of State warned of a partial pullout of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as the UN deadline approached, simply as a tactic to fracture international unity. A statement after the NATO meeting promoted efforts by the UN Secretary-General as well as the European Community to find diplomatic resolutions through meetings with Iraqi officials.³⁴ The next day President Mitterrand of France reinforced France's resolve to enforce the UN resolutions, providing 9,500 troops towards a military force assembling in the Gulf. He also pressed home the complete withdrawal mandate – “every square meter” – and accepted the chances of “avoiding a war were slight.”³⁵ On January 9 talks in Geneva between the US Secretary of State and the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, proved unsuccessful.³⁶ Aziz declined a letter from President Bush to President Hussein because “the language in this letter is not compatible with the language that should be used in correspondence between heads of state.... He should use a polite language.... Because the language of that letter was contrary to the traditions of correspondence between heads of state, I declined to receive it.”³⁷ On January 15, 1991 the UN deadline passed with Iraqi troops still firmly established in Kuwait. On January 16, 1991 the UN coalition, led by American forces, started the air war against Iraq.

The United States response to the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was always an international solution, particularly when it came to a military action expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. By working through the UN Security Council, American policies translated to international policies carrying the legitimacy of UN mandates. By allowing the Arab League time to seek its own solution, President Bush furthered the international resolve, bringing the Arab world into the UN solution after it failed to resolve the problem internally. The choice to work through the UN was also established from the outset. Following the thaw in East-West relations, President Bush seized the opportunity to work through the UN Security Council, now finding a common resolution to a cause

³⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, “Standoff in the Gulf: A Partial Pullout by Iraq is Feared as Deadline ‘Ploy,’” *New York Times*, December 18, 1990.

³⁵ Steven Greenhouse, “Standoff in the Gulf: Mitterrand Says Kuwait Pullout Means ‘Every Square Meter,’” *New York Times*, December 20, 1990.

³⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, “Baker-Aziz Talks on Gulf Fail; Fears of War Rise; Bush is Firm; Diplomatic Effort to Continue,” *New York Times*, January 10, 1991.

³⁷ “Confrontation in the Gulf; Excerpts from Iraqi Foreign Minister's News Session After Geneva Talks,” *New York Times*, January 10, 1991.

all parties could rally behind. The United States, leading this discussion, reaffirmed its position as the new world leader.

The Kosovo Conflict

The Kosovo crisis represents an American move away from UN solutions. In Kosovo the United States still chose to engage through international organizations even when the UN was not unified enough to execute. While attempting to stop humanitarian atrocities, the UN Security Council lacked the unity of agreement to coordinate the response. Russia and China were unwilling to support a breakaway province in Serbia at the same time as they fought similar battles within their own sovereign states. Additionally, Russia's traditional ties to Serbia gave it the opportunity to reassert its presence in world affairs almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly to the previous case, the first step was sanctions. This time from the UN and EU, the sanctions attempted to dissuade violence against civilians and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Again, the sanctions failed to achieve their desired goal quickly enough and, in response to growing alarm over atrocities in Kosovo, NATO ultimately stepped in.

The situation in Kosovo faced three major hurdles: the perception it was a matter internal to the state of Serbia and therefore not within the bounds of the UN – something Serbia was certainly keen to encourage;³⁸ a lack of perceived significance to the western world; and a lack of international unity regarding any solution. As a result, the UN failed to represent a forum through which both sides, the Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanians, could be engaged. This is not to say that the UN was silent through the process, but rather it was not the lead agency. As early as 1993 Security Council Resolution 855 included concerns over violence in Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Croatia.³⁹ However, by March 1998, when Serbian forces moved into Kosovo responding to bombing attacks by Kosovo Albanian rebel groups, the UN, European Community, Russia and the United States were still all simply expressing diplomatic

³⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 65 & 77; Dmitry Zaks, "Yeltsin Claims Success with Milosevic," *The Moscow Times*, June 17, 1998.

³⁹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 855, "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," August 9, 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/441/84/IMG/N9344184.pdf?OpenElement>.

concern over Serbian attacks on Kosovo Albanians, with no further consensus over what to do, instead.⁴⁰

In 1998 multiple states and organizations presented various options for Kosovo. European leaders, working through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) promoted diplomatic options for peace maintaining Kosovo as part of Serbia. The United States supported an autonomous Kosovo within Serbia with its Special Representative, Richard Holbrooke, as the lead. However, within American domestic politics opinions varied. President Clinton had yet to identify any American national interest connected to the Kosovo case. However, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright firmly supported a military push to secure the safety of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians, promoting a humanitarian mission aligned with American values and prestige.

NATO was discussing possible military operations providing protection for Kosovo's Albanians. Russia, while against the use of force to settle any Kosovo issue, primarily expressed its desire to be a part of the solution, not left on the sidelines as NATO pursued a course of action without Russia. As part of its posturing, Russia also demanded any use of force, airstrikes or ground forces, have a UN mandate.⁴¹ Finally, a collection of six states named the Contact Group, originally founded with five member states in 1992 during the Croatia and Bosnia crises, provided an avenue for the major powers coordinating a largely diplomatic approach. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and finally Italy compromised The Contact Group.⁴²

The last group was the United Nations. In March, 1995 the UN replaced UNPROFOR with a new mission, the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).⁴³ UNPREDEP was a holding force, designed to ensure the troubles in Kosovo did not spill south into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or beyond. As such, UNPREDEP did not protect the population within Kosovo. The Security Council issued a total of four resolutions regarding Kosovo in 1998, but none threatened military action

⁴⁰ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 67.

⁴¹ Dmitry Zaks, "Yeltsin Claims Success With Milosevic," *The Moscow Times*, June 17, 1998.

⁴² Christoph Schwegmann, "The Contact Group and Its Impact on the European Institutional Structure," Institute for Security Studies – Western European Union, June 2000, 4, <<http://www.ppl.nl/ebooks/files/occ16.pdf>> (accessed 17 Mar 2011).

⁴³ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 983, "Establishment of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," March 31, 1995, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/094/33/PDF/N9509433.pdf?OpenElement>.

if ignored. Resolution 1160 established an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, and called for the UN Secretary General to determine requirements for an enforcement regime. It also tied future Yugoslav international participation to peace in Kosovo.⁴⁴ Resolution 1186 called for an increase to UNPREDEP's size and extended its duration without changing the mission beyond Macedonian security.⁴⁵ Resolution 1199 finally cited Serbian forces in Kosovo as the cause of the violence and humanitarian violations, but only threatened "further action."⁴⁶ The Secretary General's report dated August 5, 1998, explained the lack of threat, identifying his inability of the Secretary General to establish sufficient support from UN member states. "All the organizations I contacted have stated their readiness to contribute actively to the monitoring of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998). At this stage, however, the overall resources pledged by those organizations would not allow for the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring regime as envisaged in resolution 1160 (1998)."⁴⁷ As a result, the Security Council was left with no forceful means even if it chose to increase its coercive tenor. The final resolution, 1203, simply confirmed the UN role, doing nothing but endorsing agreements signed between the Serbia and the OSCE and Serbia and NATO.

Without the UN, Russia, NATO, the Contact Group, France, the United Kingdom and the United States surfaced as potential leading bodies. Russia, as previously stated, sought primarily to remain relevant in the discussion, using their historical tie with the Slavic Serbians as justification for a seat at the table.⁴⁸ In June Russia had severely hampered the NATO's moves toward armed intervention by announcing an agreement between Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic. The Serbs would cease the security force attacks in Kosovo, engage in negotiations with

⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1160, "the letters from the United Kingdom (S/1998/223) and the United States (S/1998/272)," March 31, 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1186, "the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," July 21, 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/212/96/PDF/N9821296.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1199, "the situation in Kosovo (FRY)," September 23, 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/279/96/PDF/N9827996.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁷ United Nations Secretary-General, "Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998)," August 5, 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/227/91/PDF/N9822791.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 90.

opposition groups, but not withdraw its forces from Kosovo until the threat of terrorism was resolved.⁴⁹ While recognizing the move toward dialogue, Western leaders highlighted Milosevic's previous failures to follow through with promises and reiterated the threat of force if this happened again.⁵⁰ Although Britain pressed NATO for armed intervention, not all member states initially agreed. Spain and Turkey were reluctant to support Kosovo's autonomy, fearing a precedent applicable to groups within their own states. Italy expressed its own concern about military intervention, fearing a new Albanian refugee flow into Italy.⁵¹

By October 1998 Milosevic was reneging on his promises to Yeltsin, allowing Russia to start reducing its private objections to the use of force.⁵² In his book on the Kosovo War, Tim Judah describes an informal October 8 meeting where Igor Ivanov, Russia's foreign minister, privately told his British, American, German, and French equivalents, along with Richard Holbrooke, any proposal brought to the Security Council on the use of force would be vetoed, while any action performed without UN mandate would cause the Russians to make "a lot of noise" but nothing more.⁵³

Later in October Holbrooke and Milosevic reached an agreement designed to verify withdrawal of Serbian forces to pre-conflict levels. Signed in two parts, one agreement was diplomatic, officially signed by the OSCE, and established the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM); the other part allowed "unarmed NATO aircraft to operate over Kosovo."⁵⁴

Despite the hopes of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, violations occurred as Kosovar Albanian groups continued bombings and the Serbian forces continued attacks on both the terrorist groups and other civilians. By January the situation was largely

⁴⁹ Michael Gordon, "Milosevic Pledges Steps to Hold Off Attack from NATO," *New York Times*, June 17, 1998; Dmitry Zaks, "Yeltsin Claims Success with Milosevic," *The Moscow Times*, June 17, 1998; Robin Lodge, "Milosevic Agrees to Kosovo Talks," *The Times*, June 17, 1998; Inga Saffron, "Yeltsin, Serb Say Kosovo Pact Set / Milosevic Agreed to a Cease-Fire. But He Wouldn't Agree to Withdraw Troops," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 17, 1998.

⁵⁰ Michael Binyon, "NATO Keeps up Threat of Force Despite Milosevic Pledge on Talks," *The Times*, June 18, 1998; Martin Sieff, "Sharp Words Show How Kosovo Issues Split Russia, US; Albright Still Calls Military Force an Option," *Washington Times*, June 17, 1998; Seven Erlanger, "Serb's Promises are Just a First Step, US Says," *New York Times*, June 17, 1998.

⁵¹ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 86.

⁵² Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 91-2.

⁵³ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 183.

⁵⁴ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 98-99.

unchanged with a massacre in the town of Racak where Serbian forces killed over 70 civilians.⁵⁵ On January 26 President Clinton finally declared “we have a clear national interest in ensuring that Kosovo is where this trouble ends. If it continues, it almost certainly will draw in Albania and Macedonia, which share borders with Kosovo, and on which clashes have already occurred.” He went on to lay out the potential threat spreading even further, ultimately into Greece and Turkey.⁵⁶

On January 29, the Contact Group stepped up pressure further giving both sides a 21-day deadline to “complete the negotiations on a political settlement.”⁵⁷ The next day the North Atlantic Council gave the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, authority to direct when the Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) should commence an air attack, thus providing the credibility behind the Contact Group’s ultimatum.⁵⁸ On February 6, the Contact Group hosted both sides, meeting for two weeks of negotiations in Rambouillet, France, followed by a 48-hour deadline extension. After this came and a further two weeks for each side to discuss at home a proposed 3-year interim agreement including a ceasefire, withdrawal of Serbian forces, and a referendum in Kosovo over its future status by the end of the agreement period. During the negotiations, Russia continued to publicly oppose the use of force while the United States steadily increased pressure, breaking from the Contact Group negotiations in France and sending an American representative directly to Belgrade where Milosevic remained. Additionally, the United States assumed leadership of the Rambouillet negotiations through Madeleine Albright.⁵⁹

At the end of the two weeks of separate talks the parties met again in Paris. The Kosovo Albanians arrived presenting a letter of intent to sign the agreement. The Serbians arrived with a counter-proposal including Serbian forces remaining unrestricted in Kosovo and restricting the autonomy of Kosovo.⁶⁰ Still with no common agreement, the Albanian leaders ceremoniously signed the Contact Group agreement on March 18,

⁵⁵ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 155 & 118.

⁵⁶ Remarks by the President, “Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy,” February 26, 1999, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/02/1999-02-26-foreign-policy-speech.html> (accessed March 13, 2011).

⁵⁷ The Contact Group, “Chairman’s Conclusions – London,” January 29, 1999, http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3558 (accessed March 17, 2011), para 8.

⁵⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 127.

⁵⁹ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 135 & 140.

⁶⁰ Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 146 & 148.

with Serbia given a one week deadline to do the same.⁶¹ The march toward NATO attack increased as Milosevic declared on the same day, “If they attack us, we shall fight back. We are ready to defend our country.”⁶²

According to General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in 1999, “After diplomatic efforts failed to gain Milosevic’s agreement to a peace plan, endorsed by NATO and the Contact Group, including Russia, NATO responded on 24 March. *Operation Allied Force* launched a systematic air campaign to attack, disrupt and degrade Serb military potential and deter further Serb actions.”⁶³ Recognizing the inability to gain UN Security Council approval, the United States and NATO chose to pursue their actions without explicit approval rather than risk a mandate of non-approval.⁶⁴ By working with allies through NATO, the United States asserted international legitimacy for its actions to resolve a humanitarian crisis from the approval of NATO member states, even some who initially expressed reservations over action in Kosovo. At the same time, the United States led a possible model for demonstrating a post-Cold War image of NATO relevance.⁶⁵

China’s Membership in the World Trade Organization

While the two previous cases both contain a military outcome, the case of Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) represents America’s use of an economic multilateral organization to bring legitimacy to its growing interactions with China. In December, 2001 China joined the WTO following over 49 years of managing its international trade from outside the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).⁶⁶ Chiang Kai-Shek withdrew China’s original GATT membership in 1950 as he fought the Chinese Communists from his base in Taiwan. In 1982 China requested observer status in GATT and in 1986 the government of the

⁶¹ Charles Trueheart, “Kosovars Sign Peace Accord; Belgrade Remains Defiant,” *Washington Post*, March 19, 1999.

⁶² Tom Walker, “Serb Troops ‘Ready for Martyrdom’” *Times*, March 19, 1999.

⁶³ Wesley K. Clarke, Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe, “When Force is Necessary: NATO’s Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis” *NATO Review* 47 No. 2 (1999), 15.

⁶⁴ Peter W. Rodman, “The Fallout from Kosovo,” *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (1999), 48; Alex J. Bellamy, *Kosovo and International Society* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 86-88.

⁶⁵ Peter W. Rodman, “The Fallout From Kosovo” *Foreign Affairs* 78 no. 4 (1999), 46.

⁶⁶ The World Trade Organization, “Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers,” the World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed March 15, 2011).

People's Republic of China formally requested to resume its GATT membership. Rather than simply reinstating China, however, GATT directed China to negotiate for terms of membership as a state seeking new membership.⁶⁷

To the United States, China's membership in the WTO served two mutually beneficial, but not equally important, purposes: first, it represented one of a series of agreements to integrate China into international community practices. As Senator Joseph Biden said during Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in 2000, WTO membership was not about American-Sino trade relations, it was about using the legitimacy of the international community to force China to either play by international rules or face reprisal.⁶⁸ The second purpose was a chance for increased American trade and investment in China.

The road to Chinese membership involved ongoing negotiations both between the WTO and China and bilaterally between the United States and China – something that is a normal part of the accession process according to WTO Special Economic Advisor Constantine Michalopoulos.⁶⁹ Following international outcry following the Chinese Government handling of protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 the process for WTO membership was suspended until spring, 1992.⁷⁰ Once the process restarted, however, the 1990s represented a back and forth period of negotiations between the US Trade Representative and Chinese officials as each sought to maximize their position.

The United States initially focused on opening Chinese markets for foreign investment, removal of non-tariff measures on agricultural products, intellectual property rights, and removing state price-fixing over market forces. By 1996 the American position also included human rights issues such as restrictions on prison and child labor,

⁶⁷ Anna Lanoszka, *The World Trade Organization: Changing the Dynamics in the Global Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 210-211.

⁶⁸ Senate Hearing 106-744, *Giving Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status to Communist China: National Security and Diplomatic, Human Rights, Labor, Trade, and Economic Implications: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 106th Cong., 2d sess., July 18-19, 2000, 3, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_senate_hearings&docid=f:67840.pdf (accessed March 15, 2011).

⁶⁹ Constantine Michalopoulos, "WTO Accession for Countries in Transition," working paper (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1934, June 1998), 8-9, <<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/1934.pdf?expires=1300487876&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=A80C89CE867C451D44AAD7F7186B2E22>> (accessed March 18, 2011).

⁷⁰ Anna Lanoszka, *The World Trade Organization: Changing the Dynamics in the Global Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 212.

but still focused primarily on the opening of China's markets to foreign investment and imports. In response China's main tactic consisted of displaying limited interest in WTO membership as it faced the prospect of world scrutiny and forced liberalization including its state-owned enterprises. China justified its limited interest position by pointing out it "already enjoyed trading relations with nearly 200 countries."⁷¹

While China would obviously gain from long-term global trade relations, the United States chased an opportunity to make foreign investment for its multinational corporations more secure, particularly after Hong Kong returned to China in 1997.⁷² A breakthrough occurred in the 1996-97 trade discussions when Chinese negotiators offered compromises aligning future Chinese practices to already accepted international norms: no new laws inconsistent with WTO policies, reducing tariffs, phasing out quotas, phasing out import licensing requirements, already pursuing intellectual property rights violations in China, banning subsidies on agricultural exports, and compliance with WTO rules and transparency of operation for state-owned enterprises.⁷³ While not reconciling the existing and past malpractices of the Chinese economy, the compromise allowed the negotiations to move beyond a stalemate.

Two years later, in November 1999, the United States and China signed a bilateral trade agreement, opening the door for American support for Chinese WTO membership. The agreement followed one last set of negotiations after NATO warplanes inadvertently bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia during their Kosovo operations, again demonstrating China's willingness to delay WTO progress over other areas of foreign policy.⁷⁴ Despite requirements for WTO negotiations to be completed and a congressional requirement to ratify the trade agreement, newspapers in Europe, Canada,

⁷¹ Raj Bhala, "Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga," *American University International Law Review*, October 2000, 1486-91.

⁷² Anna Lanoszka, *The World Trade Organization: Changing the Dynamics in the Global Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 212.

⁷³ Raj Bhala, "Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga," *American University International Law Review*, October 2000, 1493-1494.

⁷⁴ Anna Lanoszka, *The World Trade Organization: Changing the Dynamics in the Global Political Economy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 212; Erik Eckholm, "The Trade Deal: The Overview; US Reaches an Accord to Open China Economy as Worldwide Market," *New York Times*, November 16, 1999.

America, and Hong Kong all viewed the agreement as the step required to shore up China's WTO membership.⁷⁵

In signing the bilateral trade agreement, the United States did, indeed, open the way to Chinese membership of the WTO. Though undoubtedly enabling trade, it is perhaps the foreign policy speech given by President Clinton in February 1999 that best defines what the goal of America's support for China's membership became: "We have to ask ourselves, what is the best thing to do to try to maximize the chance that China will take the right course, and that, because of that, the world will be freer, more peaceful, more prosperous in the twenty-first century? I do not believe we can hope to bring change to China if we isolate China from the forces of change."⁷⁶ By using the legitimacy of a recognized multilateral organization, the United States drew China further into acceptable norms, securing American economic interests within China and continuing to integrate China into a greater acceptance of international standards of behavior. American economic power ensured the United States could negotiate bilaterally with China beyond the strict limits of economic trade discussions, while operating under the umbrella of WTO international legitimacy.

Summary

Through the three cases analyzed it is possible to identify variables leading to a multilateral foreign policy approach by the United States. Although all three examples demonstrate the use of existing multilateral relationships, their methods of use are varied. The Gulf War and even the Kosovo conflict demonstrate America's first choice when facing military engagement is the United Nations. While it successfully led to a clear mandate in Kuwait to displace Iraqi forces, Kosovo demonstrates that when the UN is unable to coordinate agreement among its power members, the United States will turn to

⁷⁵ Joe McDonald, "US Pact Clears Way for Dramatic Reform: Steps Closer to WTO," *National Post (Canada)*, November 16, 1999; Joseph Kahn, "The Trade Deal: News Analysis" *New York Times*, November 16, 1999; Philip Browning, "Turning a Page? Beijing Signs for Open Trade," *International Herald Tribune (France)*, November 17, 1999; John Burgess, "US, China Agree on Trade; Pact on Entry into WTO Climaxes 13 Years of Talks," *Washington Post*, November 17, 1999; Mark O'Neil, "US and China Sign WTO Deal," *South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)*, November 16, 1999.

⁷⁶ Presidential Remarks, "Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy," February 26, 1999, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/02/1999-02-26-foreign-policy-speech.html> (accessed March 13, 2011).

its traditional allies in seeking a multilateral approach, this time through the NATO alliance.

Each of these three cases also highlight the American approach to international relations through organizations offering a forum for discussion rather than bilateral or isolationist tactics. It is this same approach of bringing countries into the discussion, engaging them in an attempt to normalize their behavior in line with existing organizational tolerances that assures the legitimacy the United States seeks through its engagement in multilateral organizations, whether that country is Iraq, Serbia, or China.

The other theme all three cases demonstrate is the bilateral and multilateral negotiations the United States continued beyond the multilateral organization, both securing American foreign policy options and ensuring the choices made by the multilateral organization succeeded. It is this leadership role that perhaps still demonstrates the unique position of the United States in global affairs.

Chapter 3

Multilateral Engagement Through *Ad Hoc* Coalitions

Despite the many organizations the United States maintains membership in, there are occasions the United States chooses to step outside of them, but still act multilaterally. By forming *ad hoc* coalitions of like-minded states, the United States assures a focused group agreeing on a specific subject without the restraints of an overall membership, mandate, or ideals within an existing organization. At the same time, these groups establish legitimacy for the foreign policy decision, avoiding the perception of a unilateral actor unwilling to work within the international community of states to achieve its foreign policy goals. As noted in Chapter 2, using policy options other than existing multinational organizations does not exclude their presence. Instead, their role exists outside or paralleling the priority attached to the *ad hoc* group.

This chapter analyzes three cases: Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and the Six-Party Talks to address the North Korean nuclear weapons program since 2003. Although American involvement in Afghanistan faced little Western opposition and experienced ever-increasing connection to the NATO alliance, the initial stages of the October 2001 invasion were not under a unified NATO flag. Instead, the United States gathered a select group of states, each offering specific capabilities towards initial goals of capturing key Al Qaida leaders and overthrowing the Taliban. As the operation progressed, the number and roles of coalition partners grew and evolved, with the changing requirements.

In contrast to the generally accepted invasion of Afghanistan, the American-led Iraq invasion in 2003 faced far more international community resistance. Although declaring United Nations (UN) Security Council approval for its actions, the United States established a coalition of willing states when no pre-existing international organization offered its legitimacy executing the mission in Iraq. With less international support for the Iraq invasion, the United States worked harder to demonstrate a broad coalition of states involved in many aspects of the actual invasion from the outset. In doing so, the United States sought international legitimacy of its operation through the quantity of involved states.

The final case is the Six-Party Talks designed to address the North Korean nuclear program. The program faced opposition in the international community but a group not uniquely defined by any existing international organization handled the issue. While the negotiations involve the major nuclear actors of the post-Cold War era, Russia and the United States, they also incorporated other regional parties influential to able providing both legitimacy and leverage to the negotiations.

All three cases demonstrate a situation of importance not only to the United States but also other states. Each time the United States grouped these concerned states, establishing a multilateral front to address the specific at hand. Three themes exist throughout the analyzed cases: first, the absence of any organization already situated to handle the problem in a manner acceptable to American interests; second, multilateralism over unilateralism both in initiation and ownership of the outcome provided legitimacy; and finally, the *ad hoc* membership avoided any pre-existing mandate or ideals from an already established organization.

Afghanistan 2001

In this war, the mission will define the coalition – not the other way around.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

On September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda hijackers on commercial airliners attacked the United States. 28 days later the United States led an ever-growing coalition into Afghanistan after the Taliban government failed to hand over Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders.¹ Two specific factors contributed to how the United States built its coalition for Afghanistan: legitimacy and capability. The world largely rallied around the United States following September 11. The American Government, therefore, did not have to build a consensus of support for its action just to ensure the international community recognized a legitimate use of force. Additionally, the time taken between the events of September 11 and the first strikes in Afghanistan was very short, precluding the opportunity to build a complex multinational plan involving decision-makers from many states.

¹ Statement of the President, October 7, 2001, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html> (accessed March 27, 2011).

Cornell University professor, Sarah Kreps, describes the American-led coalition as the “logic of consequences,” where the United States focused on the capabilities offered by coalition partners, not their political legitimacy;² a selection method described in the *International Herald Tribune* as: “we’ll call you if we need you.”³ While Kreps questions the truly multilateral nature in Afghanistan, it is because she requires equality among the coalition partners to attain multilateralism, where each party has an opportunity to influence the planning and execution of the operation.⁴ This was something Kreps and others acknowledged the United States was not looking for.⁵ Kreps’ constrained definition of multilateralism builds on Robert Keohane’s assertion that multilateralism simply identifies “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states.”⁶ Keohane’s definition, however, allows for the utility of a coalition beyond the actual capabilities required. It provides for an international legitimacy through inclusion. This was, undoubtedly, as important to the long-term success of America’s war in Afghanistan (and its broader Global War on Terror) as any specific military forces from other states. It was not, however, the requirement for the initial invasion.

In the weeks following the attacks on New York and Washington DC, the American Government began building a coalition capable of pursuing those responsible for the attacks. When Afghanistan’s Taliban government failed to hand over Al Qaeda’s leaders, they too became the targets of America’s anger. A policy of association articulated by the United States and endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 11368.⁷

The initial coalition the United States built for Afghanistan can be dissected into three parts: those contributing military forces directly to the operation; those allowing

² Sarah Kreps, “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan,” *Security Studies* 17, no. 3 (2008), 538.

³ John Vinocur, “America’s ‘We’ll Call You If We Need You’ War,” *International Herald Tribune*, October 3, 2001.

⁴ Sarah Kreps, “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan,” *Security Studies* 17, no. 3 (2008), 535-6.

⁵ Stephen Castle, “Air Strikes on Afghanistan: Coalition – Key Allies Rally to Support US-Led Military Response,” *Independent*, October 8, 2001.

⁶ Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” *International Journal* no. 45 (Autumn 1990), 731.

⁷ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1368, “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” September 12, 2001, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement>.

basing, intelligence, or access for the operation; and those solely expressing support for the United States-led operation. On October 7, when strikes into Afghanistan began, only two states acknowledged military personnel or assets directly involved: the United States and the United Kingdom. Expectations were, however, that Australia, France, Canada, and Germany would have troops participating in the very near future.⁸

Beyond combat troops, the next category of coalition members consisted of those states providing basing, intelligence support, or overflight privileges to the coalition. These included Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Oman,⁹ Afghan neighbors including Pakistan and Uzbekistan,¹⁰ and states farther from the front-line used either for air transit and staging hubs such as NATO's European states, or intelligence information.¹¹ This second group served a dual purpose. Primarily, they permitted forces to access and execute the operation. Beyond the direct benefit however, these countries also furthered the already accepted international legitimacy for the Afghanistan invasion. By openly allowing the use of their territory they made a clear and positive statement of their beliefs.

The final group consisted of states expressing support for the coalition's actions without any direct contribution of forces or territory to the operation. States fitting this group included Russia, China, Japan, and Egypt.¹² This group, perceivably outside the actual coalition, still provided a necessary long-term function, further solidifying international acceptance of the military strikes in Afghanistan. In stating their support for

⁸ Statement of the President, October 7, 2001, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html> (accessed March 27, 2011); Brian Knowlton, "Bush: 'Battle Joined,'" *International Herald Tribune*, October 8, 2001; Elizabeth Thompson, "We'll Aid in Struggle: Chretien," *Montreal Gazette*, October 8, 2001; Anton La Guardia, "Support is Firm From Russia and the West," *Daily Telegraph*, October 8, 2001; Robert Garran, "Nation Prepares for War," *Australian*, October 5, 2001; Mark Forbes, "PM Commits 1000 Troops," *Age*, October 5, 2001.

⁹ Andrew Buncome, "War on Terrorism: Strategy – US Cannot Use Our Bases, Saudi Official Say," *Independent*, October 1, 2001; Michael Gordon, "A Nation Challenged: Pentagon Chief; Rumsfeld Secures Aid of Quiet Desert Ally," *New York Times*, October 5, 2001.

¹⁰ David Sanger and Michael Gordon, "US and Britain Make Late Push to Forge Coalition for Combat," *New York Times*, October 6, 2001; Geoffrey Allen, "Pakistan's Delicate Balance: Support for the US War Against Terrorism Holds Grave Risks," *Canberra Times*, October 3, 2001; Andrew Buncome, "War on Terrorism: Strategy – US Cannot Use Our Bases, Saudi Official Say," *Independent*, October 1, 2001.

¹¹ Stephen Castle, "Air Strikes on Afghanistan: Coalition – Key Allies Rally to Support US-Led Military Response," *Independent*, October 8, 2001.

¹² Suzanne Daly, "The Allies: European Leaders Voice Support," *New York Times*, October 8, 2001; Ian Cobain, "West Gives Bush Full Backing to Defeat Terrorists," *Times*, October 8, 2001; Anton La Guardia, "Mubarek Rejects Afghanistan Role Egypt," *Daily Telegraph*, October 5, 2001.

the action, the leaders of these countries left those opposing the attacks, primarily Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, in an increasingly minority position.

Once the United States and United Kingdom executed the initial strikes, the coalition grew rapidly. A Congressional Research Service Report issued only one week after the initial strikes stated 71 states had, in some public manner, demonstrated support for the operation. While discounting Iran who elsewhere publicly denounced the strikes in Afghanistan, the other 70 states can be broken down according to the three categories outlined. Seven states were actively contributing military forces (this includes the Northern Alliance within Afghanistan), with five more offering to send troops but not yet involved. 47 states provided some kind of contribution other than troops, twelve of these consisting solely of coalition aircraft overflight authorization and an additional four cooperating strictly in intelligence-sharing operations. Finally, 11 states were not contributing but expressed their support for the operations taking place.¹³ By May 2002, seven months later, the DoD reported fourteen states with military forces participating in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and another ten with forces supporting the new UN International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), providing humanitarian assistance or operating hospitals.¹⁴

Kreps asserts that the United States built its plan for Afghanistan not worrying about the world perception. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, she claims there was no need to further validate American action to the international community. Instead, the United States determined a “coalition had to be hand-selected to accommodate the operational needs of the conflict, rather than mold the operational plans to the availability of allies.”¹⁵ Kreps is correct asserting the United States strictly limited

¹³ Of note, the CRS report includes Iran as pledging support because Iran closed its border with Afghanistan and pledged to rescue any distressed American military in Iran. The report also notes, however, that Iran had specifically declined joining any US coalition. David J. Gerleman, Jennifer E. Stevens, and Steven A. Hildreth, *Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military and Intelligence Support*, CRS Report for Congress RL31152 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001).

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism* Fact Sheet (Washington DC: Department of Defense, May 22, 2002), <http://www.defense.gov/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf> (accessed March 28, 2011).

¹⁵ Sarah Kreps, “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan,” *Security Studies* 17, no. 3 (2008), 541-2.

partners in the actual combat operations. Only in the long-term did American coalition-building morph to assume sustained legitimacy. This longer-term was the focus for writers such as Stephen Castle when he asserted: “The contributions of America's closest Western allies are probably more important for their political effect in demonstrating the solidarity of the Western world.”¹⁶ After its initial invasion success, the United States also recognized the long-term nature of its broader war on terrorism and therefore saw the international legitimacy as an enduring assurance for continued support of its global agenda against terrorism.

Ultimately, the United States did not have the time to coordinate a military campaign in Afghanistan compromising multiple nations within an already existing organization, each with their own thoughts on how the operation should be executed. There was an urgency to respond to the strikes of September 11 before its Al Qaeda ringleaders escaped and while American citizens demanded action. The technical interoperability of American and British Special Forces and strike aircraft allowed a rapid bilateral military operation that later fed in other, equally skilled units from Australia, France, and Canada. From there, the coalition slowly progressed to a point where the United Nations could securely implement its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul in December 2001.¹⁷ NATO only took on the ISAF mission two years later, and finally in March 2010 the United States merged its military operations in Afghanistan into the NATO ISAF mission, finally ending its *ad hoc* coalition.¹⁸

The case study of the United States-led coalition in Afghanistan is one of a small, highly selective group of partners that slowly grew the as specific capabilities focus gave way to the need for a greater international flavor of coalition operations, enabling long-term legitimacy. The contrasting case of Iraq in 2003, an operation that sought broad

¹⁶ Stephen Castle, “Coalition – Key Allies Rally to Support US-Led Military Response,” *Independent*, October 8, 2001.

¹⁷ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1386, “The Situation in Afghanistan,” December 20, 2001, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁸ Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force, “About ISAF: History,” <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html> (accessed March 31, 2011); Michael Innes, “A New Command Structure in Afghanistan,” *Foreign Policy.com*, March 18, 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/18/a_new_command_structure_in_afghanistan (accessed March 31, 2011).

coalition involvement from the outset will demonstrate the use of a coalition to provide immediate legitimacy in an operation.

Iraq 2003

The bottom line is a coalition of the willing will disarm Saddam Hussein, no matter what.

Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary

In 2003 the United States formed a coalition of willing states to overthrow the government of Iraq after the United States government failed to find support in any international organization. The American urgency to strike in Iraq while its successes in Afghanistan were still fresh forced it to establish a coalition of states willing to lend their involvement to a list demonstrating international legitimacy for American policy. The night military operations commenced in Iraq, President Bush told the American people, “coalition forces have begun selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage war.... More than 35 countries are giving crucial support.”¹⁹ From the outset, Bush and his administration presented Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) as a coalition of international states combining to pursue what was best for the international community and working together to ensure a safer world. In contrast to the Afghanistan coalition, this one started with advertisements of its broad nature, seeking to justify the legitimacy of the operation by the number of states participating.

While the United States enjoyed almost universal support in Afghanistan, the debate over Iraq in 2002 and 2003 pitted the United States against multiple influential states. The German Prime Minister, Gerhard Schroeder, won re-election in the fall of 2002 running on a platform including an anti-Iraq war theme.²⁰ The French President, Jacques Chirac, spent the previous 12 months condemning American plans for a military overthrow of Saddam Hussein, particularly any plan not involving UN approval.²¹

¹⁹ Statement of the President, March 19, 2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html> (accessed 31 March, 2011).

²⁰ Peter Finn, “US-Style Campaign With Anti-US Theme,” *Washington Post*, September 19, 2002; Steven Erlanger, “For Now, Trading Allies for Votes,” *New York Times*, September 15, 2002; Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 190.

²¹ Matthew Campbell, “France Takes Pop at ‘Flintstone’ Bush,” *Sunday Times*, May 26, 2002; Roland Watson, “Allies Remain Lukewarm,” *Times*, July 11, 2002; Anne Penketh, “Chirac Urges Restraint Over

Russia and China, two more permanent members on the UN Security Council, also expressed opposition for war in Iraq during 2002.²² With the lack of support, particularly from France, Russia, and China, the United States recognized scarce chance for endorsement through the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, that same organization offered the legitimacy needed by Britain's Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to maintain domestic support for war in Iraq.²³ It was also the voice of legitimacy President Bush needed to assure those considering joining his coalition that it was the right choice.

In summer 2002, the Bush administration feared any attempt to gain a UN mandate would provide a forum for opponents to stall or halt an Iraq invasion.²⁴ Under pressure from coalition partners, particularly the United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain, however, the United States and United Kingdom pressed for a UN mandate in the Security Council.²⁵ The American approach for the UN was one resolution threatening the use of force if Iraq failed to comply with weapons inspection requirements imposed since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. France and Russia, however, saw the push towards war as too fast, with a French diplomat quoted saying: "we don't want it [use of force] to be automatic. We want a two-step process."²⁶ It took until November to even produce step one from the Security Council. On November 8, Resolution 1441 passed; it involved a two-step process. States had to immediately report any Iraqi failure to comply with Resolution 1441 to the Security Council, followed by an immediate convening of the Security Council. Nothing in Resolution 1441 directly authorized the use of force. It simply laid the path for a second resolution, should it be necessary.²⁷

Iraq," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 30, 2002; "US Shoring Up Support in Europe," *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney, Australia), September 28, 2002; Roland Watson, "France and Russia Vow to Vote 'No' In Security Council," *Times*, March 11, 2003.

²² E.J. Dionne Jr., "One Enemy, Two Camps," *Washington Post*, August 30, 2002; Roland Watson, "Allies Remain Lukewarm," *Times*, July 11, 2002; Caroline Overington, "Three Big Powers Tell US It's Wrong on Iraq," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 30, 2002.

²³ Kamal Ahmed, "No War Without UN, Warns Poll," *Observer*, September 29, 2002.

²⁴ E.J. Dionne Jr., "One Enemy, Two Camps," *Washington Post*, August 30, 2002.

²⁵ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 183.

²⁶ "US Shoring Up Support in Europe," *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney, Australia), September 28, 2002.

²⁷ Note: United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 was issued in 1991 following the end of combat operations in the Gulf War. It required Iraq to cease any biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs and allow weapons inspectors into Iraq to validate the work. United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 687, "Iraq-Kuwait," April 3, 1991, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf?OpenElement>; As Resolution 1441 asserted, there had been no inspectors allowed in Iraq since December 1998. United Nations Security

Despite Iraq's failure to comply with all the requirements of Resolution 1441, the Security Council never reached accord over the second step of a UN mandate. Mounting further pressure on the UN, Secretary of State Colin Powell laid out the American assertions to the UN Security Council on February 5: "the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction."²⁸ Five days later, President Chirac still promoted a non-war choice, stating after a meeting with President Putin of Russia: "Nothing today justifies war.... Russia, Germany and France are determined to ensure that everything possible is done to disarm Iraq peacefully."²⁹ On February 24 the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain brought the matter to a head at the Security Council, introducing the second step resolution.³⁰ On March 10, the Presidents of Russia and France both vowed to veto the second resolution at the Security Council, effectively killing any chance for a UN mandate for a use of force.³¹ Mr. Chirac went on to warn "For the United States to wage war without the assent of the international community would set 'a dangerous precedent.'"³²

On March 17, the American, British, and Spanish leaders made a combined decision to proceed without the UN, withdrawing the proposed resolution.³³ That night, President Bush addressed the United States, giving Iraq's president an ultimatum: "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing."³⁴

Council (SC) Resolution 1441, "The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait," November 8, 2002, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁸ Colin Powell, Secretary of State, Speech to United Nations Security Council, 58th Year, 4701st Meeting, February 5, 2003, UN Document S/PV.4701. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N03/236/00/PDF/N0323600.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁹ Peter Finn, "US-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq," *Washington Post*, February 11, 2003.

³⁰ Raymond W. Copson, *Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview*, CRS Report for Congress RL31715 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003), 3.

³¹ Charles Bremmer, "Chirac Pledges to Veto Second UN Resolution," *Independent*, March 11, 2003; Anthony DePalma, "Support at Home, But Not In France, Battle Plans and Basketball," *New York Times*, March 11, 2003.

³² Elaine Sciolino, "France to Veto Resolution on Iraq War, Chirac Says," *New York Times*, March 11, 2003.

³³ Raymond W. Copson, *Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview*, CRS Report for Congress RL31715 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003), 3.

³⁴ Statement of the President, March 17, 2001, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html> (accessed April 1, 2011).

Without a UN mandate, the United States led an invasion force that, on the first day of the war, differed very little in national make-up from that of the Afghanistan war. American, British, and this time Australian forces were the only ones to engage in combat operations on the first days of the war.³⁵ Eventually others from the so-called coalition of the willing followed with varying levels of involvement. Perpetually missing, though, was the support and involvement of other major powers. The day the war began, Russia, France, Germany, China, Pakistan, India, Finland, Greece, and Iran all criticized the attacks.³⁶ Opponents of an invasion charged that states supporting the coalition with ground troops did so because they required American support elsewhere – “nations ready, unwilling and not so able” according to the *Times*.³⁷ The list of those willing to be identified supporting the coalition released by the State Department (15 of the 45 did not wish to be publicly acknowledged) did little to counter this argument.³⁸

By March 2003, the United States could not find a multilateral organization willing to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Instead, the United States built an *ad hoc* coalition able to execute its foreign policy without the restrictions of the UN Security Council veto system or the unwillingness of European allies in NATO. Only the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia used combat troops at the start of the war. Despite this, the United States presented the operation as a broad international coalition, attempting to demonstrate international legitimacy to its policy of regime change in Iraq.

³⁵ Richard Beeston, “Critics Deride the US Claim of a Broad Coalition,” *Times*, March 20, 2003.

³⁶ Hugh Muir and Paul Cheston, “Saddam’s Scuds Just Miss Allies,” *Evening Standard*, March 20, 2003.

³⁷ Richard Beeston, “Critics Deride the US Claim of a Broad Coalition,” *Times*, March 20, 2003.

³⁸ The list of 30 states willing to be identified in the initial coalition of the willing was: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and Uzbekistan. BBC News, “US Names Coalition of the Willing,” March 18, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm> (accessed May 14, 2011); “Inside the Coalition of the Willing,” *Advertiser*, March 20, 2003.

The Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

In 2003 the United States changed its approach to North Korea's nuclear weapons program from bilateral to multilateral. The new multilateral group, known as the Six-Party Talks, involved North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.³⁹ This new policy approach sought to legitimize American efforts to denuclearize North Korea throughout the international community, and particularly with American allies in the region. By bringing in regional partners, the United States avoided North Korea's attempt to "divide the United States from its South Korean ally."⁴⁰ Similarly, Japan became an involved partner in the negotiations of its own region rather than observing through its ally, the United States. Involving Russia provided the credibility from the other global nuclear power, one who shared a common border with North Korea. Finally, involving China offered leverage on North Korea from its largest ally at critical times during the process.

The Six-Party Talks follow three themes. There was no other international organization uniquely positioned to address the crisis in line with American interests. While the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played a part, they could not provide the narrow focus and leverage on the nuclear weapons program of the Six-Party group. Each time the IAEA pressured the North Koreans, they simply threatened to withdraw from the IAEA. According to an op-ed written by Henry Kissinger in the *Washington Post*, the multilateral approach of the six-party talks provided legitimacy to the negotiations and the need to find a resolution among all the regional actors that was not possible in bilateral negotiations. Multilateral engagement also provided transparency and buy-in from American allies throughout the process, and, with it, the responsibility of the outcome, rather than an agreement negotiated by the United States and North Korea that others had to fulfill.⁴¹ Finally, the Six-Party Talks provided an opportunity to focus on a narrow subject without the additional constraints of any existing organization's membership, mandate or ideals. Something particularly useful as the United States sought to constrain the discussions to nuclear issues without

³⁹ Jayshree Bajoria, "The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593> (accessed March 25, 2011).

⁴⁰ Francis Fukuyama, "Re-envisioning Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 84 no. 1 (2005).

⁴¹ Henry Kissinger, "A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy," *Washington Post*, May 16, 2006.

bringing in other contentious issues, particularly between the members of the Six-Party group.

The history behind the Six-Party negotiations goes back to a bilateral agreement signed in 1994 between the United States and North Korea, the Agreed Framework. Following years of secrecy regarding the North Korean nuclear program and North Korean threats to withdraw from the international non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the United States and North Korea signed a bilateral agreement, the October 1994 Agreed Framework. In return for freezing development of its nuclear program, the United States assured North Korea “nuclear energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits” from the United States.⁴² In particular, the United States would coordinate providing a light-water reactor (LWR) to replace North Korea’s current nuclear power generation capability. In the interim period between closing the current nuclear power plants and completing the LWR facilities, North Korea would receive heavy fuel oil to generate electricity.⁴³

Throughout the rest of the 1990s, the United States and North Korea engaged bilaterally, including both negotiations and sanctions from the United States in 1996 and 1998 regarding nuclear technology transfer from Iran and Pakistan. In 1998, North Korea launched a 3-stage missile, claiming to place a small satellite in orbit. Believed to be a variant of a military weapons missile, however, the missile’s launch path took it over Japan. In response, Japan suspended its cost-sharing of LWR facilities. Over the next year and a half, the United States tried to include other allies in policies with North Korea. In April 1999, this included the United States, Japan and South Korea establishing the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group.

Despite the sanctions imposed in 1996 and 1998, relations between the United States and North Korea during the Clinton administration existed at a cooperative enough level that, in October 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright conducted an official

⁴² Larry A. Niksch, *North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program*, CRS Report RL33590 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 15.

⁴³ According to the Arms Control Association, LWRs are “proliferation-resistant,” in contrast to North Korea’s existing graphite-moderated reactors. Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron> (accessed May 2, 2011); “Agreed Framework Between The United States of America And The Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” October 21, 1994, <http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/af> (accessed May 2, 2011).

visit to North Korea.⁴⁴ Initial indications at the start of the Bush administration indicated a change in approach to North Korea. In his Senate confirmation hearing, Colin Powell referred to the North Korean President as a “dictator.”⁴⁵ Then in March, during a visit to Washington by the President of South Korea, Powell and President Bush expressed concerns about threats from North Korea regarding weapons of mass destruction. Although Powell expressed willingness to continue negotiations where the Clinton administration had left off, the next day he also clarified a willingness to move at a slower pace with no imminent negotiations.⁴⁶

By 2002 the Bush administration left no doubt regarding its views on North Korea. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush included North Korea in his famous “axis of evil,” describing North Korea as “a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens.”⁴⁷ By the fall of 2002, relations between the two countries plummeted. In October 2002, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, held meetings with North Korean officials in Pyongyang.⁴⁸ During the meetings, Kelly accused the North Koreans of “secretly developing a program to enrich uranium to weapons grade.”⁴⁹ Later that month, the Bush administration claimed the North Koreans had acknowledged a uranium-based nuclear program to Kelly.⁵⁰ Following the admission of the nuclear program, the United States announced in November it was suspending the delivery of heavy oil for North Korea’s breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In response, North Korea requested the IAEA remove its seals and monitoring equipment so North Korea could restart its

⁴⁴ Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron> (accessed May 2, 2011).

⁴⁵ Ben Macintyre, “Bush Policies Threaten to Restart Cold War Rivalries,” *Times*, March 7, 2011.

⁴⁶ Brian Knowlton, “Bush Tells Korean He Distrusts North,” *International Herald Tribune*, March 8, 2001; “2 Faces of Bush on Sunshine Policy,” *Korea Times*, March 8, 2011; David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won’t Resume Now,” *New York Times*, March 8, 2001; Steven Mufson, “Bush Casts a Shadow on Korea Missile Talks,” *Washington Post*, March 8, 2001.

⁴⁷ Presidential Address, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (accessed March 2, 2011).

⁴⁸ Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Six-Party Nuclear Talks: An Evaluation and Policy Recommendations,” *Pacific Focus* 19 no. 2 (2004), 8.

⁴⁹ Selig S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” *Foreign Affairs* 84 no. 1 (2005), 99.

⁵⁰ Larry A. Niksch, *North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program*, CRS Report RL33590 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 5.

reactors to generate electricity. By the end of the year, North Korea had ordered all American and IAEA inspectors out of the country.⁵¹

In January 2003, with American and global focus on a potential war in Iraq, North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT.⁵² The American Government responded they were unwilling to negotiate in return for the negative act. Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted the North Korean Government understood “it is only through compliance and not through defiance that they will be able to move forward with their needs, security and otherwise.”⁵³ Meanwhile, the White House Press Secretary said “United States was not going to follow a pattern of ‘the worse they act, the more they get.’”⁵⁴ Attempting to restart discussions with North Korea, but on a new basis, the United States Government pursued efforts toward a multilateral approach over North Korea in 2003. In addition to the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group signed with South Korea and Japan in 1999, the United States, China, and North Korea held trilateral talks hosted by China in Beijing, the first formal talks between the United States and North Korea in six months.⁵⁵ The United States entered the meetings advocating a larger multilateral approach, with US Ambassador to Korea, Thomas Hubbard, stating “I see no possibility that there will be productive talks without the participation of South Korea and Japan in the future multilateral dialogue.”⁵⁶ North Korea chose the occasion to claim it had furthered its weapons program and vowed to “prove it soon.”⁵⁷ President Bush responded simply that North Korea was “back to the old blackmail game.”⁵⁸ China, the new third party, played the role of peace-maker. A long-time ally of North Korea and able to influence North

⁵¹ Arms Control Association, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron> (accessed May 2, 2011); Larry A. Niksch, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program*, CRS Report RL33590 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 6.

⁵² Richard Spencer and David Rennie, “N Korea Renounces Nuclear Pact But Begins Talks with US Governor,” *Telegraph*, January 11, 2003; “US Declares Withdrawal from NPT,” *Korea Times*, January 11, 2003.

⁵³ Glenn Kessler, “US Plays Down North Korea Move,” *Washington Post*, January 11, 2003.

⁵⁴ Roland Watson and Richard Lloyd Parry, “Pyongyang Quits Treaty on Nuclear Weapons,” *Times*, January 11, 2003.

⁵⁵ Joseph Kahn, “Trilateral Talks to Start on Arms in North Korea,” *International Herald Tribune*, April 23, 2003; “US, North Korea Start Nuclear Weapons Talks,” *Globe and Mail*, April 23, 2003.

⁵⁶ “US to Hold ‘Serious Talks’ with NK,” *Korea Times*, April 23, 2003.

⁵⁷ David Rennie and Richard Spencer, “N Korea Vows to ‘Prove’ Nuclear Strength,” *Daily Telegraph*, April 25, 2003.

⁵⁸ Richard Spence and David Rennie, “Bush Dismisses Kim’s Nuclear ‘Blackmail,’” *Daily Telegraph*, April 26, 2003.

Korean officials back to negotiating table both diplomatically and tied to Chinese aid to North Korea, this was a positive shift by the Chinese away from their policy of non-involvement between the two sides in order to reestablish talks.⁵⁹ A Christian Science Monitor article best summed up the desires of the three parties: “The US wants North Korea to dismantle its nuclear programs. North Korea wants a guarantee from the US that it won't attack. China doesn't want a war on its border.”⁶⁰

In August 2003 the first round of Six-Party Talks officially began. For the United States, this was an opportunity to broaden the legitimacy of its negotiations at a time when American prestige was suffering from the recent invasion of Iraq. While the UN served as an organization able to leverage North Korea's nuclear posture, the United States was unable, particularly in 2003, to rely on support within the Security Council. In selecting an *ad hoc* group, the United States also avoided many issues existing between the various six countries but not directly linked to the nuclear negotiations. In 2003 China aligned with France and Russia opposing the American-led invasion Iraq.⁶¹ The United States and China also continued a contentious relationship over the future of Taiwan.⁶² Japan continued trying to determine the status of Japanese citizens seized by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s and the two states still maintained territorial disagreements.⁶³ South Korea and North Korea are still, technically, at war under an agreed armistice from 1953. Despite all of these distracters, however, the focus of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear issues allowed handling the other concerns in separate venues, not bogging down the critical nature of the nuclear discussions. In choosing regional partners to engage North Korea the United States brought together states who, while each maintaining their own agendas, exerted a unified pressure on North Korea, something the United States acting bilaterally could not accomplish. According to Lawrence Grinter, Professor of Asian Studies at the US Air Force's Air

⁵⁹ Oliver August, “China Plays Peace Role Between US and North Korea,” *Times*, April 24, 2003; John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks,” *The Washington Quarterly* 28 no. 4 (2005), 81.

⁶⁰ Robert Marquand, “Despite Talks, Solution on N. Korea Far Off,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 23, 2003.

⁶¹ Peter Van Ness, “Why the Six-Party Talks Should Succeed,” *Asian Perspective* 29 no. 2 (2005), 238.

⁶² Shale Horowitz and Min Ye, “China's Grand Strategy, the Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Six-Party Talks,” *Pacific Focus* 21 no. 2 (2006), 57.

⁶³ John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks,” *The Washington Quarterly* 28 no. 4 (2005), 85; Peter Van Ness, “Why the Six-Party Talks Should Succeed,” *Asian Perspective* 29 no. 2 (2005), 243.

War College, two main goals framed the Six-Party Talks: “(1) ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities, and (2) drawing that eroding totalitarian state into normalized relations with the rest of Northeast Asia.”⁶⁴

It is worth addressing how the United States found ways to focus the differing objectives of four other states on Grinter’s common goals and what North Korea wanted from the negotiations. First, there is a common consensus the number one goal for the North Korean government is regime survival. As Grinter claims: “Pyongyang employs tactical measures to leverage or impact the other governments for its single overriding purpose: Keeping the aid flowing to the regime first and to the country second.”⁶⁵ Victor Cha, the Deputy Chief of the US Delegation to the Six-Party Talks during the Bush Administration, goes further, claiming that North Korea “wants to be accorded the status and prestige of a nuclear power.” Grinter goes on to clarify that North Korea also wants energy and economic assistance, along with normalized relations with the United States, but the major focus is “the global rules rewritten for them, much as they were for India.”⁶⁶ The common theme for all these desires, however, is the continued rule of the Kim regime.

Throughout four presidential administrations, the United States has maintained the goal of a nuclear-disarmed North Korea, reinstated and reintegrated into the international community once this is accomplished. It has, according to Grinter, “tried practically every conceivable combination of ‘carrots and sticks’ to get Pyongyang to cooperate and come clean, mixing incentives and disincentives, bilateral and multilateral approaches, using intermediaries etc.”⁶⁷ The Bush Government used Libya as a model of sanctions and isolation to bring about nuclear-disarmament, with removal of the sanctions only after that government demonstrated its willingness to disarm. Following September 11, 2001, the American Government focused on counterterrorism, with North Korea

⁶⁴ Lawrence E. Grinter, “Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea,” *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 294-295.

⁶⁵ Lawrence E. Grinter, “Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea,” *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 296.

⁶⁶ Victor Cha, “Up Close and Personal, Here’s What I Learned,” *Washington Post*, June 14, 2009.

⁶⁷ Lawrence E. Grinter, “Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea,” *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 300.

framed under the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies to terrorist organizations.⁶⁸ When it was unable to accomplish this bilaterally, the United States reached out to regional partners to assist.

South Korea's interest in the Six-Party Talks is inherently obvious. As the southern neighbor perpetually threatened by North Korea, conventionally as well as with nuclear weapons, it is in South Korea's interest to reduce the North's capabilities. As Grinter points out, "Twelve million South Koreans and possibly 40% of the ROK's GDP are concentrated in the Seoul metropolitan area," the primary target of any North Korean aggression.⁶⁹ Commonly recognized is that one of North Korea's tactics during the bilateral negotiations with the United States was to divide the American and South Korean alliance.⁷⁰ By involving the South Korean government in the negotiations this divide becomes less viable.

Japan, an American ally since the end of World War II, sees North Korea as a threat to regional stability and a direct threat to Japan. Having demonstrated the ability to launch missiles over Japan, North Korea also demonstrated the ability to target Japan.⁷¹ With this focus on security, Japan targets changing the nature of North Korea's political and economic systems rather than effecting a regime change in Pyongyang.⁷² Although, as previously discussed, Japan is still seeking proof of any abductees from the 1970s and 1980s still living, this concern was kept out of the main discussions by the other parties for fear of distraction.

Russia's role in the talks is historically poignant. It was Moscow that originally trained North Korea's nuclear scientists and supplied the reactor at Yongbyon that has gained so much attention.⁷³ More recently, however, Russia sees the opportunity to enhance Russian prestige through involvement, ensure the security of a bordering state,

⁶⁸ John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," *The Washington Quarterly* 28 no. 4 (2005), 78-79.

⁶⁹ Lawrence E. Grinter, "Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea," *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 302.

⁷⁰ Francis Fukuyama, "Re-envisioning Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 84 no. 1 (2005).

⁷¹ Lawrence E. Grinter, "Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea," *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 303.

⁷² John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," *The Washington Quarterly* 28 no. 4 (2005), 85.

⁷³ Lawrence E. Grinter, "Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea," *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 300.

and expand any economic interests, particularly in the area of energy. Finally, through engagement with other states in the region, Russia seeks a balancing role to the region's rising power, China.⁷⁴

The last member of the Six-Party Talks, China, holds a unique position as North Korea's largest ally and supporter. Through this role, China convinced North Korea to engage in the multilateral talks rather than the bilateral negotiations with the United States it preferred.⁷⁵ Beyond its role leveraging North Korea, China sees its role in the negotiations under two themes. The first is as a validation of the peaceful rise of China as the regional great power. It therefore aligned its geopolitical focus to achieve this message throughout the Asia-Pacific region. By encouraging the diplomatic resolution of the North Korean crisis, even when the United States and North Korea were discussing military force in 2003, China promoted "a profile of responsible great power."⁷⁶ The second theme for China is a secure neighbor on its border. Beijing does not want American forces on its border or the resultant refugee crisis. Beyond that, China sees a collapsed North Korean regime as a greater threat than any current North Korean nuclear capability. In order to maintain the regime stability China provides 40 percent of North Korea's food supply and almost 90 percent of its oil. This has created what Grinter calls "an asymmetrical dependency on each other: North Korea depends on China for oil and food, and China is obligated to the DPRK for 'good behavior.'"⁷⁷ By engaging in the Six-Party Talks, China is seeking to balance regime stability in North Korea with regional stability threatened by North Korea's nuclear program.

In coordinating the efforts of four other states the United States continued to steer the North Korean debate. Although South Korea, Russia, China, and even North Korea support a different model of disarmament than the US-advocated Libyan model, closer to that of the Ukraine in the 1990s involving economic rewards and a multilateral security

⁷⁴ John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," *The Washington Quarterly* 28 no. 4 (2005), 86-87; Lawrence E. Grinter, "Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea," *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 299-300.

⁷⁵ Francis Fukuyama, "Re-envisioning Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 84 no. 1 (2005).

⁷⁶ Shale Horowitz and Min Ye, "China's Grand Strategy, the Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Six-Party Talks," *Pacific Focus* 21 no. 2 (2006), 52.

⁷⁷ Lawrence E. Grinter, "Six-Party Talks and the Future Denuclearization and Rehabilitation of North Korea," *Pacific Focus* 23 no. 3 (2008), 298; Shale Horowitz and Min Ye, "China's Grand Strategy, the Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Six-Party Talks," *Pacific Focus* 21 no. 2 (2006), 60; John S. Park, "Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," *The Washington Quarterly* 28 no. 4 (2005), 82.

guarantee, the groups have largely maintained a dialogue rather than a military standoff, over the past eight years.⁷⁸ The talks have not always gone smoothly. Twice since the start of the Six-Party process, North Korea has performed underground nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Each time, however, the result was unified disapproval from all the other parties rather than disparate national policies. Following the first test in October 2006, President Bush highlighted the administration's multilateral approach stating "In response to North Korea's actions, we're working with our partners in the region and the United Nations Security Council to ensure there are serious repercussions for the regime in Pyongyang."⁷⁹ Similarly, following the May 2009 test, President Obama said "the United States and the international community must take action in response." He went on to say the United States "will work with our friends and allies to stand up to this behavior."⁸⁰ As stated by each president, the United States rallied UN Security Council support, achieving Resolutions 1718 and 1874. Each resolution called on North Korea to return to the NPT, IAEA, and the Six-Party Talks. In addition they both repeated sanctions and arms embargoes on technology and equipment, and individuals supporting North Korea's nuclear program.⁸¹ Similarly, the Security Council passed Resolution 1695 in July 2006 condemning North Korea's missile launch over Japan.⁸²

At a time when the United States suffered from reduced international prestige, and was focused on its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Six-Party Talks represented American ability to establish a narrowly focused, but internationally legitimate, *ad hoc*

⁷⁸ There are examples of North Korea using its military during this period to further its negotiating position such as the March, 2010 sinking of a South Korean Navy ship and the November, 2010 attacks on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, however the eight years of Six-Party Talks have avoided large-scale military conflict. Richard Lloyd, "South Korean Ship 'Sunk by Torpedo from North Korea,'" *Times*, March 27, 2010; Mark McDonald, "'Crisis Status' in South Korea After North Shells Island," *New York Times*, November 24, 2010.

⁷⁹ Presidential Statement, October 11, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061011-5.html> (accessed May 3, 2011).

⁸⁰ Presidential Statement, "Remarks by the President on North Korea," May 25, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-North-Korea (accessed March 4, 2011).

⁸¹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1718, "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea," October 14, 2006, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement>; United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1874, "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea," June 12, 2009, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁸² United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1695, "Non-proliferation," July 15, 2006, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement>.

organization intent on managing a specific problem. By using such a narrow focus the United States avoided the tensions already existing between states within the group. Additionally, by establishing the *ad hoc* group the United States limited its use of the UN Security Council to the times when North Korea's negative actions generated a global outcry. With the United States prestige in question over Iraq, the limited use of the Security Council avoided debates the United States could not be sure of winning there. Instead, the United States worked with many of the same powerful states toward specific goals with regard to North Korea: denuclearization and bringing North Korea back into international community norms. Finally, by engaging regional states with direct interest in the North Korean situation, the United States balanced local alliances with the ongoing negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program.

Summary

The United States maintains membership in many international organizations. Despite this, there are occasions when it chose to pursue its interests outside existing organizations, but still enjoy the legitimacy inferred by a multilateral approach. On these occasions the United States established *ad hoc* coalitions or groups specifically designed to address one issue area. In creating a group specific to one problem, the United States was not constrained by the mandate or values of an already existing organization. At the same time, the United States narrowed the group's focus so that tensions between members over other issues did not preclude effective negotiations on the target subject.

There are two ways the United States arrived at the need for *ad hoc* organizations: seeking capabilities or seeking legitimacy. In the case of Afghanistan, international legitimacy for the use of force already existed following the September 11 attacks. The United States therefore focused its attention on a needs-based selection of members. In contrast to the needs-based approach taken for Afghanistan, the United States built its coalition for Iraq specifically to establish legitimacy for its operation. The size of the coalition became more important in the American message than the capabilities made available. The final case, the Six-Party Talks over North Korea, again sought legitimacy from the expanded group of participants, but balanced an open-to-anyone approach with one seeking to maintain regional alliances and stability and pressure on North Korea. In

each of the three cases, there was not an international organization ready to pursue America's policy interests, in the timeline desired. As a result, the United States resolved to create a group that fit the needs of the moment.

Chapter 4

Non-engagement or Engagement Through a Third Party

This chapter analyzes three cases of American foreign policy where the United States either chose to not fully engage or ceded leadership to another willing actor. The three cases are: the Rwandan genocide in 1994; the East Timor crisis in 1999; and the war in Darfur, Sudan, in the early twenty-first century. While it is inaccurate to say the United States was uninvolved in these cases, American policy across all three maintained the United States absent as the lead nation, with no American combat troops, and, instead, a limited diplomatic, logistical, and humanitarian assistance posture. In each case, American interests were either absent or did not rise to a level prioritizing the case above others in which the United States was already involved. Three themes exist across the cases: in each case the state involved promoted the situation as an internal affair; each crisis occurred when the United States was already involved in a different foreign policy conflict, and each case received United Nations (UN) Security Council attention in determining the level of crisis and necessary response. Each case resulted in the United States focusing its attention elsewhere, deferring the issue either to a different willing actor or to the international community at large.

Rwanda 1994

On April 6, 1994, surface to air missiles shot down a plane carrying the President of Rwanda and the President of Burundi as it approached Kigali Airport, Rwanda, killing both presidents.¹ Although a French judge blamed forces supporting the current Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, Kagame denies this and instead claims Hutu extremists planned the downing of the plane to signal the start of their operation to eradicate Rwanda's Tutsi minority.² In the next 100 days, Hutus inspired by the Rwandan Interhamwe militia killed over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu Rwandans,

¹ Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 97.

² BBC News, "Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened," BBC News, December 18, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/1288230.stm> (accessed May 16, 2011).

mostly by machete or knife.³ In the intervening 17 years, the Rwandan genocide has represented the seminal case of the international community failing to act in the face of genocide.⁴ What caused the United States, the international community at large, and the UN to all stand by as Rwanda imploded into a cauldron of mass-murder? Three points provide the overarching context around which the United States determined its policy choice. First, only six months earlier, 18 American servicemen died supporting a UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mogadishu, Somalia.⁵ The last American forces only left Somalia on March 25, 1994, twelve days before the presidential plane was shot down in Rwanda. Jared Cohen sums up the impact of Somalia on American involvement in Rwanda: “Rwanda, six months after Somalia, was a political non-starter.”⁶

Secondly, concurrent to the events in Rwanda, the United States was also focusing on more proximate concerns in Haiti and coordinating its response to the Bosnian crisis. The United States government prioritized these issues above the Rwandan crisis occurring in a region with no vital American interest. While American prestige offered an option to engage in the issue, other American interests took priority. Moreover, the UN already had a force in Rwanda. The United States joined the UN

³ The exact death toll from the Rwandan genocide is undetermined. Typical figures range from 800,000, the official UN figure and the same one quoted by Romeo Dellelaire and Michael Barnett, to over 1 million according to Linda Melvern. United Nations, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Rwanda Genocide,” December 15, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed April 20, 2011); Romeo A. Dellelaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto, Canada: Random House, 2003), 5; Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1; Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: the Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 4.

⁴ United Nations Secretary-General, “Statement on receiving the report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” December 16, 1999, http://www.un.org/News/press/docs/1999/sgsm_rwanda.htm (accessed May 22, 2011); Kofi Annan, Speech to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, April 7, 2004, http://www.un.org/News/press/docs/2004/sgsm_5782.stm (accessed May 1, 2011); Ernest Harsch, “UN Seeking to Avert a ‘New Rwanda,’” *Africa Renewal* 18, no. 2 (July 2004), 14; Cong. Rec., 108th Cong., 2d sess., 150, pt. 106: H6935; Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), 33; Presidential Remarks, “Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and US and Rwanda Government Officials,” March 25, 1998, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/03/1998-03-25-remarks-by-the-president-to-genocide-survivors.html> (accessed May 16, 2011).

⁵ Jared Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 48.

⁶ Jared Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 50.

Security Council in advocating for its withdrawal rather than increasing its mandate and troop deployments.⁷

Finally, before April 1994, the United States was part of a diplomatic effort to negotiate peace in Rwanda, resulting in the August 1993 Arusha Accords between the Rwandan government and Rwandan Patriotic Front rebel forces.⁸ Shooting down the presidential plane shattered this fragile peace. By the end of April 1994, President Clinton called for an end to the violence and “reaffirm[ed] the American commitment to participate in renewed negotiations under the Arusha framework.”⁹ With other foreign policy commitments, the United States’ first policy choice was the diplomatic solution that had succeeded less than a year earlier. American interests in Rwanda were limited to evacuating Americans before senior state department officials “returned to issues that they deemed of greater importance to US foreign policy.”¹⁰

The same day the plane carrying the Rwandan and Burundi presidents crashed, a US State Department memo from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs to the Secretary of State warned public confirmation of the president’s death presented “a strong likelihood” of violence.¹¹ Since December 1993, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), primarily with troops from Belgium and Bangladesh, had operated in Rwanda to help implement the Arusha accords. The day after the presidential plane crash, the Canadian UNAMIR Commander, Lt Gen Romeo Dallaire, reported to UN headquarters that his forces were protecting the Rwandan Prime Minister from violent attack. The following day, members of the Rwandan Presidential Guard and Army killed the Prime Minister and her husband, along with the ten Belgian UN soldiers

⁷ Jared Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 6.

⁸ The Arusha Accords were named after the location where they were signed, Arusha, Tanzania. Council on Foreign Relations, “Arusha Accords,” <http://www.cfr.org/rwanda/arusha-accords/p23750> (accessed April 20, 2011).

⁹ Presidential Radio Address, April 30, 1994, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/04/1994-04-30-presidents-radio-message-on-situation-in-rwanda.html> (accessed April 13, 2011).

¹⁰ Jared Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 5.

¹¹ US State Department. Principal Deputy Assist Secretary of African Affairs Memo to the Secretary of State, “Death of Rwandan and Burundi Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali,” April 6, 1994, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw040694.pdf> (accessed April 13, 2011).

tasked to protect her.¹² Gen Dellaire subsequently testified he felt his force was “not equipped, trained or staffed to conduct intervention operations” to save the Belgian troops who were initially believed to be abducted rather than killed.¹³ The death of 10 UN peacekeepers, following the death of 18 American servicemen in Somalia six months earlier, further pressured the United States to keep American forces out of Rwanda.¹⁴ The Rwandan Prime Minister’s death certainly validated fears expressed by the US State Department.

On April 21, amid growing violence in Rwanda, the UN Security Council declared UNAMIR unable to sustain its peacekeeping mission. UN Security Council Resolution 912 reduced the UNAMIR force to a leadership, staff, and protection element, keeping only 270 personnel from the previous complement of 2,500.¹⁵ The UN Secretariat made this choice by framing the violence in terms of a re-emerging civil war, something previously calmed by the Arusha Accords. The new UNAMIR mandate, therefore, aligned to a desire for a diplomatic return to peace.¹⁶ With the peacekeeping force removed, UNAMIR now simply acted as an intermediary between the fighting factions, attempting to return them to the negotiating table. Despite media reports of mass violence and up to 20,000 already dead in Rwanda, the Belgian government’s withdrawal of its forces following the death of its soldiers further paved the way for the UN Security Council decision.¹⁷

¹² Romeo A. Dellaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto, Canada: Random House, 2003), 245 and 258.

¹³ United Nations, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Rwanda Genocide,” December 15, 1999, 17. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed April 20, 2011).

¹⁴ Jared Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 71.

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 912, “Adjustment of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda due to the current situation in Rwanda and settlement of the Rwandan conflict,” April 21, 1994, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/190/85/PDF/N9419085.pdf?OpenElement>; Donatella Lorch, “Rwanda Forces Shell Stadium Full of Refugees,” *New York Times*, April 20, 1994.

¹⁶ Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 112-115.

¹⁷ Jennifer Parmelee, “U.N. Nudges Rwandan Opponents Into Talks, Flies In Food Aid,” *Washington Post*, April 17, 1994; Catherine Bond, “Bloodshed Mounts in Rwanda,” *The Times*, April 18, 1994; William E. Schmidt, Once Chosen, Tribal Elites Now Suffer Consequences,” *New York Times*, April 17, 1994; “Battle Rages for Rwandan Capital,” *Montreal Gazette*, April 17, 1994; Sara Calle, “Nuns Tell of Machete Horror,” *Independent*, April 17, 1994.

Internally, the American government saw the bloodshed coming. A Department of Defense memo to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy on April 11 asserted, “Unless both sides can be convinced to return to the peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands dead) bloodbath will ensue that would likely spill over into Burundi.”¹⁸ Barely six months after the American deaths in Mogadishu, no national interest in Rwanda defined a need to commit American forces to Africa. A memo from the Secretary of State to its Mission in the UN concluded: “In the current environment in Rwanda, there is no role for a United Nations peacekeeping force.”¹⁹ The United States found no policy alternative at this time and supported the proposal to withdraw UNAMIR’s ill-equipped peacekeeping forces.

By the beginning of May, the American government had formed an interagency working group to assess the Rwandan issue. A discussion paper, now declassified, released by the group revealed a clear intent to press for a diplomatic effort to resolve the violence, but with an equally clear concern to avoid deeper American involvement, especially any sort of military action on the ground. The paper suggested the statement “to support the UN and others in attempts to achieve a cease fire,” “Need[s] to change ‘attempts’ to ‘political efforts’ – without ‘political’ there is a danger of signing up to troop contributions.” The paper also recommended adding a requirement to specify humanitarian assistance to include “in neighboring areas” and only “expanded throughout Rwanda when conditions permit.” Most telling, the group warned against using the term genocide: “Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday – Genocide finding could commit USG to actually ‘do something.’”²⁰

White House Press Secretary, Dee Dee Myers, stressed similar diplomatic efforts in a May 2 press briefing when asked about the “slaughter” in Rwanda. She highlighted an upcoming trip by the Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs and

¹⁸ Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Africa Memo to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Talking Points on Rwanda/Burundi,” April 11, 1994, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041194.pdf> (accessed April, 13 2011).

¹⁹ Department of State, Secretary of State Memo to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, “Talking Points on UNAMIR Withdrawal,” April 15, 1994, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041594.pdf> (accessed April, 13 2011).

²⁰ United States Government Interagency Working Group, “Discussion Paper: Rwanda” May 1, 1994. Document now declassified, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050194.pdf> (accessed April, 13 2011).

Ambassador Rawson to the region to meet with regional leaders and the head of the Organization of African Unity, a radio address by President Clinton aired in Rwanda calling for peace and cooperation with UN humanitarian assistance.²¹ The very next day, President Clinton prioritized the level of American involvement, stating Rwanda less directly affected American security interests than similar crises, such as Bosnia.²²

Coincident to the events in Rwanda was the reshaping of American peacekeeping policy following Somalia. On May 3, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) titled “US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.” A White House press statement announcing the PDD then asserted: “Peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy.”²³ National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, subsequently praised the work of UN peacekeepers, but also quickly noted the “limits to peacekeeping” in cases such as Rwanda.²⁴

Clearly, a horrific genocide occurred in Rwanda. At the time, however, the diplomatic response focused on a re-emerging civil war not genocide. A classified defense intelligence report (since declassified) issued May 9 reported: “It appears that, in addition to the massacres of Tutsi and Hutu by militias and individuals, there is an organized, parallel effort of genocide being implemented by the army to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi community.”²⁵ Although the report mentioned genocide, the theme throughout the report implied the violence was a civil war, with the government forces fighting the rebel forces just as they had prior to the Arusha Accords. It is this civil war theme, both within the UN and the United States government, which facilitated the renewed diplomatic push that had worked previously to stop the violence.

Beyond its diplomatic effort, the United States provided economic and logistical aid to countries surrounding Rwanda to help with the refugee crisis but American leaders

²¹ White House Press Briefing, May 2, 1994, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/05/1994-05-02-dee-dee-myers-press-briefing.html> (April, 13 2011).

²² William J. Clinton, President, “Remarks by the President in CNN Telecast of ‘A Global Forum with President Clinton,’” May 3, 1994, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/05/1994-05-03-cnn-telecast-of-a-global-forum-with-president-clinton.html> (accessed April, 13 2011).

²³ White House Press Statement, May 5, 1994, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/05/1994-05-05-statement-on-signing-of-peacekeeping-policy-directive.html> (accessed 13 Apr 11).

²⁴ Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, White House Press Briefing, May 5, 1994, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/05/1994-05-05-lake-and-clark-briefing-on-peacekeeping-policy.html> (accessed April 13, 2011).

²⁵ US Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Report, J2-210-94, May 9, 1994, 4, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050994.pdf> (accessed April 13, 2011).

were unwilling to provide aid into Rwanda itself. Contributions included airlifting 100,000 blankets and 10,000 rolls of plastic sheeting to Tanzania and over \$320 million in aid to UN programs in neighboring countries.²⁶ Even though American Secretary of State Warren Christopher finally used the word “genocide” publically in June 1994 in reference to Rwanda, the United States nevertheless restricted its involvement to diplomacy and indirect aid support. The recent legacy of Somalia, doctrinally asserted by the PDD in May, left the United States unwilling to commit troops to peacekeeping operations, particularly on the African Continent. With military focus on Bosnia, and diplomatic focus turning to Haiti, the American administration was willing to allow an image of Rwanda returning to an internal civil war, one already resolved diplomatically once, as a way to frame its policies without confronting a troop commitment debate.

East Timor 1999

While Rwanda stands as an example of international non-intervention in a sovereign state, East Timor by contrast represents a case where the United States willingly allowed regional leadership in handling a crisis. The three themes of an internal situation, UN handling, and higher priority commitments for American foreign policy still exist though. In East Timor a regional power, Australia, took the lead in military operations to quell the violence in an internal dispute between Indonesia and the independence-seeking East Timor population.

Similar to the events in Rwanda, East Timor failed to compete for American attention with other crises in the world. As East Timor reached crisis in 1999, American foreign policy focused on Kosovo.²⁷ Also, like Rwanda, there was a UN mission involved. This time, however, the UN mission ultimately expanded rather than withdrawing, with the United States military providing only logistical & humanitarian support.

²⁶ White House Press Briefing, May 10, 1994, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/05/1994-05-10-press-briefing-by-dee-dee-myers.html> (accessed April 13, 2011); Presidential Statement, “Presidential Statement on Rwandan Relief Efforts,” July 29, 1994, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1994/07/1994-07-29-president-statement-on-rwandan-relief-efforts.html> (accessed April 13, 2011).

²⁷ Gay Alcorn, “US Ponders Over Which Trouble Spot to Focus its ‘Super Powers’ on This Week,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 9, 1999.

In 1975 East Timor declared independence from Portuguese colonial rule. Nine days later Indonesian forces invaded, then in 1976 Indonesia declared East Timor a province.²⁸ In both 1975 and 1976 the UN Security Council issued resolutions calling for withdrawal of Indonesian troops and all states to recognize the territorial integrity of East Timor, but with no action beyond that.²⁹ The UN never recognized the annexation of East Timor. Over the following two decades, the UN facilitated multiple negotiations with Indonesia and Portugal to resolve East Timor's status and the ongoing violence between pro-independence and pro-Indonesian groups. In 1999 the meetings finally reached a breakthrough when Indonesia proposed limited autonomy for East Timor. Following Indonesia's proposal, Indonesia and Portugal formally signed an agreement on May 5, 1999.

The May agreement called for a UN-conducted "special consultation" election to determine the future of East Timor.³⁰ In accordance with the agreement, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1236 on May 7, approving the Secretary General's plans to establish a mission to conduct the special consultation on August 8.³¹ On June 11, the Security Council passed Resolution 1246 approving the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). Resolution 1246 strictly defined UNAMET to provide election support. UNAMET's personnel allocation reflected the tightly defined mission. The only security forces within UNAMET consisted of 280 civilian police advising the Indonesian police in East Timor and 50 international military liaison officers designated to work with the Indonesian Armed Forces.³² Despite 34 deaths occurring in just the month between May agreement signing and the UN Security Council's June resolution, as well reports submitted by the Secretary-General describing "political violence, including intimidation and killings, by armed militias against unarmed pro-independence

²⁸ CIA World Factbook, Timor-Leste, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html> (accessed April 26, 2011).

²⁹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 384, "East Timor," December 22, 1975, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/782/32/IMG/NR078232.pdf?OpenElement>; United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 389, "East Timor," April 22, 1976, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/294/77/IMG/NR029477.pdf?OpenElement>.

³⁰ United Nations, "East Timor – UNTAET – Background," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm> (accessed April 26, 2011).

³¹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1236, "The Situation in Timor," May 7, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/133/97/PDF/N9913397.pdf?OpenElement>.

³² United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1246, "The Situation in Timor," June 11, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/174/13/PDF/N9917413.pdf?OpenElement>.

civilians,”³³ the resolution creating UNAMET contained no discussion of peacekeeping forces.³⁴

Throughout the summer of 1999, UNAMET balanced voter registration with recurring violence in East Timor. As violence caused registration offices to temporarily close, the Secretary-General reported delays in voter registration and a three week delay to the election date.³⁵ He also expressed concern the elections could not take place with the currently experienced levels of violence.³⁶ Three days before the election, the UN Secretary-General again called on Indonesian authorities to “provide a secure environment for the elections.”³⁷ On August 29, the day before the election, groups on all sides agreed to an arms-free day for the election, assuring the arrest of anyone found with weapons.³⁸ This truce allowed for elections conducted in relatively calm conditions with little violence according to most newspapers.³⁹ The results of the elections were 78.5 percent in favor of independence with only 21.5 percent voting to remain part of Indonesia.⁴⁰

³³ Lindsay Murdoch, “Amnesty Confirms Worst Fears of Voter Intimidation,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 22, 1999; United Nations Secretary-General, “Question of East Timor. Report of the Secretary-General,” May 22, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/151/14/PDF/N9915114.pdf?OpenElement>.

³⁴ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1246, “The Situation in Timor,” June 11, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/174/13/PDF/N9917413.pdf?OpenElement>.

³⁵ Craig Skehan, “Angry Crowd Attacks UN Staff in Timor,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 30, 1999; Keith Richburg, “Militias Hit UN Office in East Timor: Anti-Independence Violence Continues,” *Washington Post*, June 30, 1999; United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” July 26, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/218/39/PDF/N9921839.pdf?OpenElement>; Don Greenless and Peter Alford, “Jakarta Defiant as UN Postpones Timor Vote,” *The Australian*, June 24, 1999; United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” July 28, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/221/16/PDF/N9922116.pdf?OpenElement>.

³⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” July 14, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/207/80/PDF/N9920780.pdf?OpenElement>; United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” July 26, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/218/39/PDF/N9921839.pdf?OpenElement>.

³⁷ Stephen Romei, “Annan Pledges Follow-Up Support,” *Australian*, August 30, 1999.

³⁸ Richard Lloyd Parry, “East Timor Votes in a Climate of Fear,” *Independent*, August 30, 1999.

³⁹ The major exception to this lack of violence was the death of one UN worker stabbed to death near a polling station. Lindsay Murdoch, “Mass Turnout ‘A Triumph for the People,’” *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 30, 1999; Keith Richburg, “Voters in E. Timor Flock to the Polls; Killing of U.N. Worker, Militia Terror Fail to Stop Balloting on Independence,” *Washington Post*, August 31, 1999; John Aglionby, “Timor Heads for Freedom as Voters Defy Gunmen,” *Guardian*, August 31, 1999; Seth Mydans, “In Huge, Model Vote, East Timorese Choose Their Future,” *New York Times*, August 31, 1999;

⁴⁰ United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” September 3, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/255/00/PDF/N9925500.pdf?OpenElement>.

Despite the peace during the elections, violence returned even before the UN officially declared the results. Newspapers reported armed militia returning to the streets of Dilli, trapping UN workers, setting up road blocks, and harassing port and airport travelers.⁴¹ On September 6, the UN Security Council expressed concern over the violence that caused all but four UN regional offices in East Timor to close.⁴² One Australian newspaper reported over 100 people already dead, while the *Washington Post* put the number of dead at over 200.⁴³ Nearly one quarter of East Timor's population, 200,000 people, fled their homes according to a UN report issued only two days later.⁴⁴ Despite rising international pressure for a UN peacekeeping force in East Timor, the Indonesian government continued to reject any such plan.⁴⁵ Without Indonesian approval, the UN was unwilling to insert such a force.⁴⁶

By September 9, the UN mission considered complete evacuation of the island. Militia groups shot into UN convoys killing those seeking UN protection.⁴⁷ Facing significant criticism for organizing and encouraging the election then fleeing when the violence broke out, the UN recognized the essential nature of keeping some presence in

⁴¹ Keith Richburg, "East Timor Spirals Towards Anarchy," *Washington Post*, September 5, 1999; Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 44; Richard Lloyd Parry, "East Timor Vote: Militias Block Roads in Fresh Violence," *Independent*, September 1, 1999; Seth Mydans, "Militias Raise Tensions After Timor Votes," *New York Times*, September 1, 1999; Lindsay Murdoch, "'We Are Terrified Here,'" *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 1, 1999; Keith B. Richburg, "E. Timor Militias Return to Streets; Violent Incidents Reported Day After Vote," *Washington Post*, September 1, 1999.

⁴² United Nations, Letter from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General, September 6, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/263/55/PDF/N9926355.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴³ Don Greenless, "The Desertion of Dili: East Timor in Flames," *Australian*, September 6, 1999; David Watts, "Forty Timorese Massacred in Church Refuge," *Times*, September 8, 1999; Keith B. Richburg, "Thousands Flee Chaos Engulfing E. Timor; Military, Police May Be Involved In New Violence," *Washington Post*, September 6, 1999.

⁴⁴ Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Says a Quarter of East Timorese Have Fled," *New York Times*, September 8, 1999.

⁴⁵ Barbara Crossette, "As Support for Intervention Grows, Indonesia Persuades UN to Delay Evacuation of Mission," *New York Times*, September 9, 1999; Roger Maynard, "Australia Urged to Intervene," *Times*, September 8, 1999; Simon Mann, "Church Anger At Attack on its Flock: Vatican Call – East Timor A People Betrayed," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 11, 1999; Richard Owen, "Targeting of Clergy Denounced by Pope," *Times*, September 11, 1999; Seth Mydans, "Indonesia Says No to Timor Peacekeepers," *New York Times*, September 9, 1999.

⁴⁶ James Bone, "Australia Presses for UN to Send in Troops," *Times*, September 6, 1999.

⁴⁷ Lindsay Murdoch, "Gangs Lash Out at Convoy on Eve of UN Evacuation," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 10, 1999; Max Stahl, "Soldiers Shoot Refugees as the Flee Safety of UN Base," *Times*, September 10, 1999.

East Timor, if only a symbolic one.⁴⁸ Following evacuation of a first wave of UN staff to Australia on September 7, the UN Secretary-General delayed the full evacuation, receiving guidance that many of the UN staff would volunteer to stay on despite the danger.⁴⁹

On September 8, Australia, in concert with “many other nations,” issued a 48-hour deadline for Indonesian government to establish security in East Timor.⁵⁰ When this produced no change in the situation two days later, the Asian Pacific Economic Conference of states (APEC) announced its support for peacekeepers in East Timor, but only under a UN mandate.⁵¹ A cycle of diplomatic dilemma rapidly emerged. The Indonesian government forces officially responsible for the security in East Timor were actually helping the violent militia groups; the UN mission in East Timor was unable to maintain even its own security; world pressure was growing for a peacekeeping mission; Australia was standing by with forces ready to support a UN mission in East Timor, but only with the approval of the Indonesian government; and the Indonesian Government was unwilling to invite an international force into East Timor.⁵²

Comparisons rapidly emerged in the media between East Timor and Kosovo.⁵³ Although the ultimate death toll of Kosovo far exceeded those of East Timor, in the fall

⁴⁸ Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 44-45.

⁴⁹ Bernard Lagan, “‘A Humanitarian Catastrophe is Building:’ Harrowing Tales,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 7, 1999; Mark Riley, “A Night of Torment for Kofi Anan,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 10, 1999.

⁵⁰ Peter Cole-Adams, “48-hour Deadline to Stop the Killing,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 8, 1999.

⁵¹ Michael Grattan and Tom Allard, “Softly, Softly and No Deadline,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 10, 1999.

⁵² David Watts, “Calls Grow for Timor Intervention,” *Times*, September 7, 1999; Barbara Crossette, “As Support for Intervention Grows, Indonesia Persuades UN to Delay Evacuation of Mission,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1999; Roger Maynard, “Australia Urged to Intervene,” *Times*, September 8, 1999; “Reporters Flee, UN on Run,” *Weekend Australian*, September 4, 1999; Simon Mann, “Church Anger At Attack on its Flock: Vatican Call – East Timor A People Betrayed,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 11, 1999; Richard Owen, “Targeting of Clergy Denounced by Pope,” *Times*, September 11, 1999; Peter Cole-Adams, David Jenkins, Craig Skehan, and Lindsay Murdoch, “Day of Reckoning: Australia May Join Peace Force: Timor Braces for Poll Result,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 4, 1999; Barbara Crossette, “Annan Warns Indonesians That Inaction May Lead to Criminal Charges,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 11, 1999; Seth Mydans, “Indonesia Says No to Timor Peacekeepers,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1999.

⁵³ Liam Phelan, “Dili’s Kosovo-Like Genocide,” *Australian*, September 7, 1999; “How East Timor is Like Kosovo,” *New York Times*, September 11, 1999.

of 1999 the perceived scenarios certainly appeared far closer.⁵⁴ Both consisted of a state looking to maintain control of a region, and both used the state's security forces to support and assist violence and murder of opposition groups. The largest difference was the level of international response. Kosovo received international military support to protect its citizens; East Timor, on the other side of the world, saw no such action.

The United States presented the East Timor crisis as an Indonesian internal state affair. Beyond that, the United States expected other actors to lead any international efforts. On September 9, with American focus on Kosovo, President Clinton specifically challenged Indonesia's government to support "overwhelming international opinion" and reestablish security in East Timor. At the same time he stressed the Australian lead for any international effort.⁵⁵ By the next day, following the attacks on the UN convoy in East Timor, the President repeated his calls for a cessation of violence but now specifically followed by an international force entering East Timor.⁵⁶ The same day, he explicitly asserted the Indonesian military were now behind the violence in East Timor.⁵⁷ Prior to departing for the APEC meetings in New Zealand on September 11, President Clinton announced the suspension of all American military sales to Indonesia and, again, called on the Indonesian Government to allow an international force into East Timor.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ While the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) now estimates over 10,000 ethnic Albanians were killed in Kosovo between March 24 and June 22 1999, in the fall of 1999 the ICTY was only just starting the job of tracking deaths in Kosovo, reporting by November only 2,108 bodies discovered. In comparison, Dunn's unpublished UN report suggests that the East Timor death toll following the election "may never be known." He estimates, however, that "it may well be greatly in excess of 1,000 persons." United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "Kosovo: Death Toll and Pattern of Refugee Flow," United Nations ICTY, <http://www.icty.org/sid/10592> (accessed April 30, 2011); *7th Annual Report of the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 S/2000/777* (New York: United Nations, 2000), 28, http://www.icty.org/x/file/about/reports%20and%20publications/annualreports/annual_report_2000_en.pdf (accessed April 30, 2011). James Dunn, "Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their Nature and Causes" (unpublished UN report, 2001), 26, <http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdf1/dunn.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2011).

⁵⁵ President, Statement, "East Timor," September 9, 1999, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/09/1999-09-09-statement-by-the-president-on-east-timor.html> (accessed April 30, 1999).

⁵⁶ President, Statement, "East Timor," September 9, 1999, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/09/1999-09-10-statement-on-deteriorating-situation-in-east-timor.html> (accessed April 30, 2011).

⁵⁷ Philip Shenon and David E. Sanger, "Indonesia Assisting Militias, US Says," *New York Times*, September 11, 1999.

⁵⁸ Robert Milliken, "Howard Winning World Support," *Sun Herald*, September 12, 1999.

On September 12, Indonesia finally eased its stance on international security forces and invited a UN peacekeeping force into East Timor.⁵⁹ The same day, the President and his National Security Advisor separately reiterated Australia's lead for this operation, with America providing only limited support.⁶⁰ The UN Security Council moved swiftly to authorize the international force, passing Resolution 1264 on September 15, officially establishing the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET).⁶¹

By September 20, the Australian members of INTERFET began arriving in Dili. By the end of September over 4,000 troops had arrived and by November 1, 8,200 troops deployed throughout East Timor. Initially, the combat troops on the ground came from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Brunei (a company of British Gurkhas). Soon after, France, Italy, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines all added forces.⁶² While expressing great political support for INTERFET, the US considered its role strictly limited to support activities, with no forces committed to the INTERFET security operation on the ground. The day after the Security Council passed Resolution 1264, President Clinton authorized limited American participation: "I have decided to contribute to the force in a limited, but essential, way—including communications and logistical aid, intelligence, airlifts of personnel and material and coordination of the humanitarian response to the tragedy."⁶³

In October 1999, the Indonesian government officially recognized the results of the August 30 election in East Timor, allowing the UN to establish the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), essentially governing East Timor in an interim status as it transitioned to an independent state. By the time the INTERFET mission was officially completed and handed off to UNTAET in February 2000, the

⁵⁹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1264, "The Situation in East Timor," September 15, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁶⁰ David Sanger, "Clinton Sees US Playing Support Role in East Timor," *New York Times*, September 13, 1999; Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor, White House Press Briefing, September 13, 1999, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/09/1999-09-13-press-briefing-by-sandy-berger-concerning-east-timor.html> (accessed April 30, 2011).

⁶¹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1264, "the situation in East Timor," September 15, 1999, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁶² Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 45.

⁶³ President, Statement, "East Timor and Texas Murders," September 16, 1999, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1999/09/1999-09-16-statement-by-the-president-on-east-timor-and-texas-murders.html> (accessed April 30, 2011).

United States had contributed over \$2.5 million directly to East Timor, with almost \$20 million listed in indirect support, but all without any troop contributions to the INTERFET security mission.⁶⁴

The United States was far from absent in the East Timor situation in 1999. It was, however, willing to cede leadership, both of the election to determine East Timor's future and in securing the population from violence following the election. Although comparisons to Kosovo emerged, the American government was unwilling to commit combat troops to ground operations in East Timor, similar to its stance on Kosovo. East Timor, however, was not a place where an air campaign would suffice. With its proximity to Australia, the United States was happy defer to Australia as it led the effort to stabilize a crisis in its region, accepting its status as the regional power responsible for situations within its sphere of influence.

Twenty-first Century Darfur

The case in the Darfur region of Sudan represents one of limited American involvement. Two differences exist, however, to the previous cases of Rwanda and East Timor: first, Darfur represents a multiple-year duration rather than a crisis lasting only a few months; and second, this case recognizes the significance of American leadership, particularly in this case the inability to influence the international community demonstrates the importance of American prestige and its frailty within the international community as it exerts its global leadership role. Following the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States lacked the prestige necessary both with the United Nations Security Council and the international community at large to influence decisions on handling Darfur.⁶⁵ This lack of prestige, combined with America's military focus in Iraq and Afghanistan, provides one of three themes for America's role in the Darfur Crisis. The next theme exists across all three cases in this chapter: the tension between international intervention and internal domestic state issues. Sudan received significant

⁶⁴ United Nations, "East Timor – UNTAET – Background," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm> (accessed April 30, 2011); Government Accounting Office, *UN Peacekeeping: Estimated US Contributions, Fiscal Years 1996-2001*. GAO-02-294 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, February 2002), 24-25.

⁶⁵ Alex J. Bellamy, "Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq," *Ethics and International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), 48 and 51.

support from various powerful states, including China and Russia, claiming Darfur was an internal affair and not within the purview of the international community.⁶⁶ Tied to the issue of sovereignty was, once again, the requirement for Sudan to accept international troops before any multinational force could deploy.⁶⁷ The final variable in this case is the divided nature of the UN Security Council. As hard as the United States pushed for more action through the Security Council, China, Russia and others either weakened or held back resolutions.

In February 2003, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) began an insurgency against the government of Sudan and its purported policy of *Arabization* of Sudan and the Darfur region in particular. In response to the insurgency, the government of Sudan used its military forces to assist the *Janjaweed* militia group in a campaign to “drain the swamp” by driving citizens from their villages, “thereby denying the rebels sanctuary in much of Darfur.”⁶⁸ The ethnic cleansing executed by the *Janjaweed* has also left land available for further Arab colonization.⁶⁹ As mass murder, rape and violence increased, the international community became more and more aware of the problems. With this came calls from the international community for intervention, often tied with analogies to the 1994 Rwanda genocide.⁷⁰

The UN Secretary-General discussed Darfur’s problem as early as April 2004. In a speech to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva he expressed “grave concern” over the “human rights abuses and at the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Darfur,

⁶⁶ Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), 41; Nick Grono, “Briefing – Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect,” *African Affairs* 105 no. 421 (2006), 628.

⁶⁷ Nick Grono, “Briefing – Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect,” *African Affairs* 105 no. 421 (2006), 626.

⁶⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), 31; Robert O. Collins, “Disaster in Darfur: Historical Overview,” in *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan*, ed. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 9-12; Nick Grono, “Briefing – Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect,” *African Affairs* 105 no. 421 (2006), 624.

⁶⁹ Robert O. Collins, “Disaster in Darfur: Historical Overview,” in *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan*, ed. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 12.

⁷⁰ Alex De Waal, “Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect,” *International Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2007), 1043.

Sudan.”⁷¹ That same month, the Sudanese government and members of rebel groups signed a ceasefire agreement in N’Djamena, Chad, brokered by the African Union (AU). Though the ceasefire agreement quickly broke down, it successfully established an AU presence within Darfur attempting to establish a ceasefire commission.⁷² Over the next three months the UN Security Council passed two resolutions, each calling for little more than the cessation of violence.⁷³ With each of these resolutions, the United States called for tougher measures but each time accepted a diluted resolution as China, Russia, and others questioned the invasion of Sudan’s sovereignty and opposed stronger words or actions within the resolutions.⁷⁴

The United States also tried other methods to influence decision making within the international community. In June, President Bush sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to Sudan to “urge the Sudanese Government to heed the concerns of the international community,” demonstrating American leadership to resolve the situation.⁷⁵ Also in June, the US led both US-EU and G-8 statements calling on the UN to “lead the international effort to avert a major disaster.”⁷⁶ Newspaper reports supported American pressure, becoming more descriptive of the violence in Darfur. Articles such as one in the *New York Times* on July 15 described “wanton burning and bombing of villages, the raping of women and girls, and the denial of humanitarian aid, all of which have so far claimed tens of thousands of lives.” The article also went on to call for a greater UN role,

⁷¹ Kofi Annan, Address to the Commission of Human Rights, United Nations, April 7, 2004, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_search_full.asp?statID=13 (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁷² African Union, “Agreement With the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur,” May 28, 2004, <http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/sudan/darfur/cfc/agreement.pdf> (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁷³ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1547, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” June 11, 2004, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/386/26/PDF/N0438626.pdf?OpenElement>;

United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1556, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” July 30, 2004, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/446/02/PDF/N0444602.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁷⁴ Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), 41.

⁷⁵ White House Press Statement, June 29, 2004, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040629-6.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁷⁶ United States-European Union Declaration on Sudan, White House Press Release, June 26, 2004, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040626-3.html> (accessed May 1, 2011); G-8 Statement on Sudan, White House Press Release, June 10, 2004, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040610-7.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

including a scaled-up security presence beyond the 300 AU troops.⁷⁷ Despite the calls for greater involvement, however, the United States focused its calls on others than the West providing the force.⁷⁸

Although the AU increased troop levels in Darfur in August 2004, the two major troop-providing states, Nigeria and Rwanda, interpreted the mandate for the troops differently. Nigeria maintained its troops were strictly to protect AU observers, all the while operating at the consent of the Sudanese government. In contrast, Rwanda's President "insisted that they would use force to protect civilians if necessary."⁷⁹ American contributions to the AU mission at this time consisted primarily of financial and logistics support, including US Air Force C-130s airlifting the Rwandan troops into Darfur.

September 2004 saw a breakthrough in the language used by the United States government. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of State said "we concluded—I concluded—that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* bear responsibility, and that genocide may still be occurring."⁸⁰ This declaration, reiterated by the President later that day, aimed to increase pressure on the UN Security Council.⁸¹ As the *Times* reported, the use of the word genocide opened requirements for the UN to respond.⁸² The United States, however, still sought a path that would allow others to stop the genocide. As the International Crisis Group Vice President for Advocacy and Operations, Nick Grono, asserts, using the word did not correlate to any direct American obligation to intervene.⁸³ On September 18, the Security Council issued another resolution on Darfur. Again, it hedged against breaching Sudanese sovereignty while declaring the Sudanese

⁷⁷ John Prendergast, "Sudan's Ravines of Death," *New York Times*, July 15, 2004. Similar articles appeared elsewhere with the Daily Telegraph in London reporting similar stories. David Blair, "Villagers Burned Alive in Sudan Atrocity," *Telegraph*, July 28, 2004.

⁷⁸ David Blair, "Villagers Burned Alive in Sudan Atrocity," *Telegraph*, July 28, 2004.

⁷⁹ Alex J. Bellamy, "Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq," *Ethics and International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), 44-45.

⁸⁰ Steven R. Weisman, "Powell Says Rapes and Killings in Sudan are Genocide," *New York Times*, September 10, 2004; Anton La Guardia, "Darfur Killings 'are Genocide,'" *Telegraph*, September 10, 2004.

⁸¹ Presidential Statement, September 9, 2004, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040909-10.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁸² Jame Bone, "Powell Accuses Sudan of Genocide in Darfur," *Times*, September 10, 2004.

⁸³ Nick Grono, "Briefing – Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect," *African Affairs* 105 no. 421 (2006), 628.

government “has not fully met its obligations noted in Resolution 1556 (2004).” Once more, the resolution also called on the AU to “enhance and augment its monitoring mission” without any commitment from Western powers. The one success for the United States in Resolution 1564 was establishing an international commission to investigate humanitarian violations and “whether or not acts of genocide have occurred.”⁸⁴

The UN issued only one more Security Council resolution mentioning Darfur in 2004. Resolution 1574 primarily addressed Southern Sudan and a peace treaty signed in its civil war, but it also called for peace in Darfur.⁸⁵ Beyond this, however, the UN and the United States left the AU to manage Darfur. January 2005 saw the clearest disparity between the UN and the United States. The commission established by Resolution 1564 returned its report on violence in Darfur, stating: “The Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.”⁸⁶ The report left the United States unable to continue pushing for a UN response to genocide. The report, however, still found the potential for criminal activity, referring it to the International Criminal Court (ICC) through Resolution 1593 in March 2005.⁸⁷ The significance of the resolution was not only the potential for criminal prosecution, but also American willingness to forgo its dislike of the ICC. By abstaining on Resolution 1593 the United States balanced its negative view of the ICC with assuring action against the Sudanese Government.⁸⁸ What is equally evident, however, is the fall in prestige the United States had suffered from its Iraq invasion. No longer able to steer its choice of an independent investigative body, the United States instead followed the desires of others on the Security Council. Two other UN resolutions in March 2005 called on the government of

⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1564, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” September 18, 2004, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/515/47/PDF/N0451547.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁸⁵ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1574, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” November 19, 2004, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/616/89/PDF/N0461689.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁸⁶ United Nations, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General,” (New York: United Nations, 2005), 4, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2005/60 (accessed May 2, 2011).

⁸⁷ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1593, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” March 31, 2005, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁸⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2005), 49; Nick Grono, “Briefing – Darfur: The International Community’s Failure to Protect,” *African Affairs* 105 no. 421 (2006), 627.

Sudan to abide by the agreements signed the previous year in N'Djamena, and, in Resolution 1591 established a committee to identify individuals to receive economic and travel sanctions by the UN, but both resolutions also reiterated the sovereignty of Sudan.⁸⁹

Little mention of Darfur occurred during the summer as focus on Sudan aimed at the peace process in South Sudan and the United States wrestled with the devastation left by Hurricane Katrina. In September 2005, President Bush and the UN Security Council again took up the issue as the UN opened its annual World Summit. The President chose to highlight Darfur's ongoing violence as he congratulated the new National Assembly of Sudan created out of the South Sudan peace agreement.⁹⁰ Two days later, another Security Council Resolution focused on the peace agreement in South Sudan briefly mentioned the violence in Darfur.⁹¹ Save for a resolution issued in December extending the panel of experts tasked to oversee individual sanctions associated with Darfur that once more called upon the Sudanese Government to cease violence in Darfur, there was no more action taken throughout the rest of 2005 or the start of 2006 by the UN or United States.⁹²

In March, 2006 the Security Council finally directed the Secretary-General to submit a report proposing "a range of options for a United Nations operation in Darfur."⁹³ The next month, President Bush announced an executive order imposing sanctions

⁸⁹ United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1590, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," March 24, 2005, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement>. United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1591, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," March 29, 2005, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/287/89/PDF/N0528789.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹⁰ White House Press Statement, "Statement on President Congratulating Sudan on Opening New National Assembly and Appointing the Government of National Unity's Cabinet Members," September 21, 2005, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050921-5.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁹¹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1627, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," September 23, 2005, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/521/57/PDF/N0552157.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹² United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1651, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," December 21, 2005, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/658/72/PDF/N0565872.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹³ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1663, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," March 24, 2006, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/283/61/PDF/N0628361.pdf?OpenElement>.

“aimed at those responsible for heinous actions being committed in Darfur.”⁹⁴ Two days later, Resolution 1672 followed the President’s Executive Order, adding four individuals to its list of sanctioned individuals.⁹⁵ Following the Security Council Resolution, President Bush continued his pressure on the UN, calling for the AU ground force “to be augmented and increased through strong United Nations action,” going on to again stress the need for indirect American support.⁹⁶

In May the Sudanese government and the main rebel factions signed a peace agreement over Darfur.⁹⁷ Although smaller groups failed to sign the agreement and violence continued, the peace accord entered the UN directly into the Darfur situation. The President announced two critical components to his plan to assist Darfur: “The United States has met its commitment – but other major donors have not come through,” and “America and other nations must work quickly to increase the security on the ground in Darfur.” Once again, however, President Bush focused on others providing forces to the UN. Reinforcing the President’s message, a White House Press statement said “we are working with the UN to identify countries that can contribute troops to this peacekeeping effort.”⁹⁸ On May 16, the Security Council issued Resolution 1679, recognizing the peace agreement, commending the AU mission in Darfur, and calling for a process to begin establishing requirements for a follow-on UN mission replacing the AU mission.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ White House Press Statement, “US-Targeted Sanctions on Persons in Connection With the Conflict in Sudan’s Darfur Region,” April 27, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060427-5.html> (accessed May 1, 2011); Executive Order, Blocking Property of Persons in Connection with the Conflict in Sudan’s Darfur Region, April 27, 2006, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/sudan_eo.pdf (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁹⁵ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1672, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” April 25, 2006, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/326/77/PDF/N0632677.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹⁶ Presidential Statement, April 28, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060428-5.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁹⁷ BBC News. “Timeline Sudan: A Chronology of Key Events,” http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/827424.stm (accessed April 30, 2011).

⁹⁸ White House Press Statement, “White House Fact Sheet on Darfur Peace Agreement,” May 8, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060508-3.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

⁹⁹ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1679, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” May 16, 2006, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/350/24/PDF/N0635024.pdf?OpenElement>.

Ultimately, the Security Council passed Resolution 1706 on August 31, 2006, formally establishing a UN mission to exist in conjunction with, rather than replacing, the AU mission in Darfur. Initially kept under the umbrella of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), it took over a year to organize the entry of UN “blue helmets” and finally declare the United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in effect with Resolution 1769 in July 2007.¹⁰⁰ The mandate did little to change the situation, with AU troops still providing the bulk of the force and violence still ongoing in periods of surge and calm. Throughout the year between Resolutions 1706 and 1769, President Bush continued his pressure on the United Nations and the Government of Sudan to expedite the deployment of UN forces but to no rapid avail, with the Sudanese Government only accepting a limited expansion of UN forces above the AU numbers in April, 2007.¹⁰¹

The case of United States involvement follows the same themes as those in Rwanda and East Timor. In each case the United States was already engaged in other, more pressing, foreign policy commitments. Again, the United States advocated other organizations to avoid any requirement for direct American involvement. An unwillingness to commit troops to any effort within the area of violence, instead restricting American assistance to logistics and financing humanitarian aid also resembled the previous two cases. Finally, the United States, though showing greater desire to lead diplomatic engagement this time, battled the question of national

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1769, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,” July 31, 2007, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁰¹ Presidential Speech, “Speech by the President of the United States to the United Nations General Assembly,” September 19, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060919-4.html> (accessed May 1, 2011); Presidential Remarks, “President Meets with Andrew Natsios, Special Envoy for Sudan,” October 2, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061002.html> (accessed May 1, 2011); Presidential Speech, “President Bush Visits the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,” April 18, 2007, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070418.html> (accessed May 1, 2011); Presidential Statement, “President Bush Discusses Genocide in Darfur, Implements Sanctions,” May 29, 2007, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070529.html> (accessed May 1, 2011); BBC News, “Timeline Sudan: A Chronology of Key Events,” http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/827424.stm (accessed April 30, 2011); Presidential Speech, “President Bush Visits the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,” April 18, 2007, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070418.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

sovereignty and a declared internal issue. The absence of American interests significant enough to commit its own troops to the problem conflicted with low American prestige within the international community. The United States suffered loss of prestige internationally following its invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the downward spiral of violence that ensued there at the same time the United States called for other states to step forward in quelling the violence in Darfur. As a result, it found its desired lead actor, the UN, unwilling to take on the problem and instead had to defer handling of the situation to the AU.

Summary

The three cases analyzed in this chapter represent occasions when the United States deferred resolution to a different source. In Rwanda, a lack of American interests following its withdrawal from Somalia meant Bosnia was the priority for American foreign policy. As such, the United States deferred the situation in Rwanda to the UN, avoiding any commitment of American troops to an African peacekeeping mission. East Timor's proximity to Australia presented a perfect situation for the United States to diplomatically, logistically, and economically aid UN efforts but support a willing Australia to take the lead and command operations, allowing American focus to remain on Kosovo. Finally, in the Darfur region of Sudan, limited American interests meant American leadership pushed for intervention, but under the leadership of the UN and AU rather than by the United States. Again, offering logistics and economic assistance to the AU provided the United States a measure of inclusion without the need to commit troops already stretched thinly between Iraq and Afghanistan.

All three cases also demonstrate the problems of overcoming the perception of an internal domestic issue containing limited American interests when discussing international intervention. In Rwanda, the recent memories of a civil war recently ended by diplomatic negotiations allowed American leaders to promote the same solution again. In East Timor, the Indonesian government held up response as it refused to allow an international force into a situation it deemed internal to its state. Finally, the Sudanese government benefited from power players in the Security Council identifying Darfur as

an internal situation as they saw similar situations of rebel movements within their own borders.

Chapter 5

Building a Framework for American Foreign Policy Decisions

What role should the world's lone superpower play? The United States has pursued various policy choices in different international situations since the end of the Cold War. When did the United States engage and when did it choose to stay out? One choice was non-engagement or engagement through a third party. Alternatively, the United States chose to engage in the given situation. By selecting engagement, one of three paths was available: unilateral action by the United States; multilateral action within an existing organization; or multilateral action within an *ad hoc* group created specifically for the situation.

From the twelve cases analyzed in the preceding four chapters, six variables emerged demonstrating choices within the American Government to generate its policy and establish the framework mapped in figure 1. The variables for American foreign policy decision making are: American interest; leadership; legitimacy; required capabilities; available multilateral organizations; and alternate willing lead actors. Each variable produces a decision moving towards one of the four expected outcomes analyzed in Chapters 2 through 5: unilateral engagement; multilateral engagement through an existing organization; multilateral engagement through an *ad hoc* coalition; or non-engagement or engagement through a third party. While few real-world scenarios perfectly fit into one of the prescribed theoretical outcomes, they frame an overarching concept for what type of policy engagement is expected. This concept can provide insight to both American strategists and foreign actors seeking predictability in American foreign policy. The predictive capability enhances stability for American interaction in an increasingly complex world of traditional symmetrical and unpredictable asymmetrical challenges.

Following a description of how the themes fit within figure 1, this chapter applies the twelve analyzed cases to the framework, aligning each case with the decisions represented. Next, the case of Somalia is applied, demonstrating the real-world limitations that such a theoretical framework experiences. Following the Somalia case,

the chapter applies two recent American foreign policy cases not yet mature enough to allow comprehensive analysis to the framework, testing the framework by demonstrating potential outcomes from known, but less analyzed, cases. Finally, the chapter offers recommendations for future study and impacts from the framework for application beyond this paper.

The Framework

Figure 1 represents the theoretical framework established from the twelve historical case studies analyzed in Chapters 2-5. Working through the six variables within the framework allows the analyst to gain insight into decisions on American foreign policy. Each variable either produces one of the four possible policy outcomes or moves on to another variable to further refine the policy decision.




Figure 1. Foreign Policy Decision Framework

Source: Author's Original Work

Determining if American interest exists must be at the very core of any foreign policy decision. Two categories typically couch interests, either national security interests or prestige interests. National Security Strategies of all four presidential administrations since the end of the Cold War contained American leadership and international involvement as security interests, recognizing international engagement as a national security interest regardless of the political party in power.¹ While the framework does not uniquely parse out security interests from prestige interests, prestige interests lead directly to the second part of determining American national interest, priority. The United States cannot effectively support all its interests, in all places, at all times, with maximum effect. Therefore the priority attached to a situation relative to other interests is essential to determine how American foreign policy proceeds.

If there is no interest or insufficient priority identified, the next choice determines whether another actor demonstrates willing interest to take the lead. If this is the case, then the United States defers the situation to that actor. Examples of this include East Timor, which the United States handed off to Australia, and Darfur, Sudan, deferred to the African Union (AU). In such cases, the United States appears to support the lead actor with limited logistical support and humanitarian assistance. In East Timor, American support consisted of naval exercises providing communication and other logistical assistance, as well as over \$70 million in humanitarian assistance the following year.² In Darfur, American assistance consisted of Air Force C-130s transporting Rwandan troops to the AU force in Darfur and financing humanitarian assistance inside Darfur and in refugee camps in neighboring Chad.

The other option for a policy with no American interest or priority is a corresponding absence of any willing lead actor. In these cases, the United States defers the situation to the international community at large. Although this choice does not assure resolution to the crisis, it recognizes the United States is not the sole provider in

¹ *United States National Security Strategy*, May 27, 2010 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 7; *United States National Security Strategy*, March 16, 2006 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 3; *United States National Security Strategy*, October 29, 1998 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 1; *United States National Security Strategy*, August 13, 1991 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 4.

² Presidential Statement, "Peacekeeping Efforts in East Timor," February 11, 2000, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/02/2000-02-11-statement-by-the-president-on-east-timor.html> (accessed April 10, 2011).

the post-Cold War world, and others have to accept responsibility for situations bearing insufficient American interest. Rwanda is a case in point for this policy outcome. Days after the last American forces withdrew from Somalia in March, 1994 the United States Government saw no national interest in the unfolding crisis in Rwanda. While it eventually recognized the genocide occurring, the United States found no immediate connection to a central African nation just emerging from civil war. As a result, the United States deferred to the United Nation's decisions and focused its policies elsewhere. Though deferring to the international community, the United States provided limited logistical and humanitarian support to Rwanda's neighboring states as they absorbed mass influxes of refugees.

Having recognized the available choices when not enough American interest exists, what happens when the United States determines it has sufficient interest? With this choice another question emerges, further clarifying the possible policy outcome. Who is leading the policy-making within the United States government: the Congress or the Executive Branch? While both Congress and the President are responsible to the voters, Congressional leaders typically focus their decision making on pursuing the best outcome for the United States in each specific situation. The President, as American Diplomat-in-Chief, targets a far broader spectrum of international policy-making, seeking to balance one situation within the international context of others. Because of the different focus provided by each branch, the likely outcome also differs.

If Congress leads the policy-making in a specific situation, it is likely to promote a unilateral action best suited to serve immediate American interests. Both the Nunn-Lugar act reducing the threat of the post-Soviet nuclear arsenal and the Kyoto Protocol represent such cases. The Nunn-Lugar act recognized a specific threat to the United States, and with Congressional lead, appropriated funds directing the Department of Defense to aid the former Soviet states struggling to manage their newly inherited nuclear arsenals. There was no consideration of using multilateral organizations to handle the nuclear security concern from an international perspective. The Congress acted to swiftly and securely resolve the matter using tools it controlled. Similarly, despite the Executive Branch attempting to find an international consensus to global climate control, the United States Congress was unwilling to commit the American economy to an incomplete, ill-

defined, and too open-ended system. By refusing to ratify the treaty, the Congress assured the United States took a unilateral path addressing climate control, separate from the collective choices of the international community of states.

In contrast to the inward focus of the Congress, the President tends toward international solutions, encompassing global approval. Because of this, policies led by the President adopt a different decision path. The first question posed when the President addresses a foreign policy interest is the need to establish legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the international community. If there is not yet a clearly defined case for the chosen policy, the President must establish the policy's legitimacy. The best way to accomplish this legitimacy is through multilateral action by including other members of the international community and their assertion that the policy is legitimate.

One way to accomplish multilateral legitimacy is through an already existing organization of states. In using a pre-existing system, the President simply acts within an already recognized international community of norms. This is the exact path chosen for the Gulf War in 1991. Operating through the United Nations (UN), the United States built international consensus for the American-led military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Through the UN, the United States received approval and support, both financial and military, for the operation to legitimately expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Similarly, in Kosovo the United States responded to foreign policy issues threatening the security of the Western world through a pre-existing multilateral organization, NATO. The already established multilateral organization facilitated the legitimacy of American policy choices channeled through the decision-making processes of the organization rather than the United States unilaterally executing them. In the case of Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States recognized the legitimacy generated by membership in the WTO. By encouraging the Chinese Government to pursue membership, the United States Government drew China into already legitimized international norms of business. Acting under the umbrella of the WTO rather than simply as a unitary actor, the United States successfully leveraged its economic power to achieve bilateral agreements with China that also addressed human rights concerns and normalizing China's policies towards those of the international community.

There are cases, however, when a multilateral organization does not present the opportunity to legitimize American foreign policy choices. This can be either because no organization exists or because existing organizations do not align with American policies. For Iraq in 2003, not all the permanent members of the UN Security Council agreed with the American policy. This forced the United States to find a different path to legitimacy, forming a coalition of states large enough to infer international legitimacy for the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein government. In the case of the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea's nuclear program, the United States did not have the prestige in the UN Security Council to ensure its policies. The decision to create an *ad hoc* group specifically focused on the problem of North Korea's nuclear program circumvented this concern. The United States included the relevant players from the UN Security Council but avoided other areas of tension that existed between those states. The multilateral solution provided legitimacy to the policy chosen across the region. Additionally, including China and Russia established international credibility to the talks, by engaging the two regional nuclear powers in the discussions.

There are times when the President determines American foreign policy already demonstrates legitimacy to the international community. As long as the President concludes the policy already meets an international acceptance of legitimacy, the next question is whether the United States needs the capabilities of other states to execute its policy choices. If the answer to this question is no, then the United States unilaterally executes its already legitimate policy decision. An example of this is the American engagement in Liberia in 2003. The international community already clamored for American involvement, so any engagement by the United States carried legitimacy from the international community. The United States' limited engagement did not require capabilities from other states; the operation fell within the capabilities of the Marine force located off the coast of Liberia. As such, the United States pursued its policy unilaterally, engaging its Marines in a limited set of security actions to assure the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia fulfilled its task transitioning Liberia to a long-term peace.

The other policy option the United States can choose determining the need for external state capabilities is that it does require assistance from other states. At this point, the United States must identify how to obtain those capabilities. Again, the question

arises over multinational organizations. If a multinational organization presents the assistance required, the United States can operate with that organization obtaining the capabilities required. Although this theoretical option exists, it bears no real-world example of use. The United States has not reached out to a multilateral organization solely to provide capabilities without that organization also legitimizing American policy decisions. What has occurred, however, is a situation where American policies already carried legitimacy within the international community but the United States sought capabilities not readily available through any pre-existing multilateral organization. In this case, the United States formed *ad hoc* groups strictly encompassing the capabilities required. The 2001 Afghanistan invasion is a perfect example. The attacks on New York and Washington, DC in September 2001 already legitimized American action. The United States, however, required precise capabilities from specific states in a condensed time. As such, there was no opportunity to identify an already existing multilateral organization able to aid the United States. Instead, the United States reached out to specific countries, for specific capabilities and tasks. Only the United Kingdom possessed combat forces that could integrate into the operation fast enough without reconfiguring the plan. Other states offered access and intelligence capabilities needed to position the American and British forces into the combat theater appropriately. This coalition of American and British forces, combined with other states providing access or intelligence to the combat forces created an *ad hoc* group of states all facilitating the American policy targeting the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Only after the initial combat operations did the United States evolve its coalition, including more states and foreign forces to provide a long-term legitimacy to its Global War on Terror.

Figure 2 shows the developed framework again, this time including policy outcomes for each of the twelve historical case studies.




Figure 2. Foreign Policy Decision Framework with Historical Cases Added

Source: Author's Original Work

A Theoretical Framework in the Real World

While historical case analyses construct the theoretical framework, there are also cases where the real world may not perfectly fit that of theory. In 1993, 18 American troops died in Mogadishu, Somalia. What foreign policy led to the presence of these soldiers on the northeast edge of Africa, far from America's traditional areas of interest and what policy outcome emerged from their deaths?

In September 1992, Pakistani peacekeepers arrived in Mogadishu to support the newly established United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), overseeing a March ceasefire agreement and securing UN humanitarian assistance. At its peak, UNOSOM was authorized 4,219 personnel.³ A UN Secretary-General report on November 24 reported hijacking of two different unarmed UNOSOM observer units and

³ United Nations, "Somalia – UNOSOM I Background: Full Text," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html> (accessed May 5, 2011).

attacks by heavy machine gun on UNOSOM troops guarding the Mogadishu Airport, each by different factions within Somalia. Additionally, local warring factions were holding humanitarian supplies arriving by ship at the port in Mogadishu, preventing the critical aid reaching those in need.⁴ Following its success in the Gulf War 18 months earlier, the United States recognized an opportunity to increase its role as the global leader, particularly within the UN. The Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, wrote to the UN Secretary-General saying the United States was willing to lead a UN-mandated mission “to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia.”⁵

By November 29, the UN Secretary-General informed the Security Council the UNOSOM force was inadequate to accomplish its peacekeeping mission and offered the option of the US-led force as a solution.⁶ The outcome of this report was Security Council Resolution 792, authorizing a transition from UNOSOM to a new American-led and UN-endorsed force, the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF). According to Gen Joseph Hoar, the Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), UNITAF benefited from a “well defined mission with attainable, measurable objectives prior to the operation commencing.”⁷ The mandate was “to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible.”⁸ In January, 1993 the United States reported approximately 21,000 American troops and 9,995 non-American troops in Somalia supporting Operation RESTORE HOPE and UNITAF.⁹ By March, 1993, with approximately 37,000 troops deployed in support of UNITAF, reports stated

⁴ United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” November 27, 1992, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/754/62/IMG/N9275462.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵ United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” November 29, 1992, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/759/55/IMG/N9275955.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁶ United Nations Secretary-General, “Letter to the President of the Security Council,” November 29, 1992, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/759/55/IMG/N9275955.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁷ Joseph P. Hoar, CINC CENTCOM, “A CINC’s Perspective,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1993, 58.

⁸ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 794, “Somalia,” December 3, 1992, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁹ Operation RESTORE HOPE was the US Department of Defense name for American operations in Somalia as part of UNITAF. United Nations Security Council, “Letter From the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council,” January 19, 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/033/73/IMG/N9303373.pdf?OpenElement>.

“all areas are stable or relatively stable.” Unfortunately, only 40 percent of Somalia was under UNITAF control, with no attempts made to expand beyond that.¹⁰

In March, 1993, UNITAF transitioned the operation back to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNOSOM II. Following UNITAF’s success, the Security Council defined a broad mandate for UNOSOM II entering the UN into peace-enforcement operations, well beyond securing humanitarian assistance. Security Council Resolution 814 included humanitarian assistance security, but then expanded to what is today is known as *nation-building or state-building*.¹¹ The United States played a significantly smaller role in UNOSOM II than in UNITAF, but still retained a combat capability providing security and reassuring other coalition member states, despite President Clinton’s assertion the mission had “no combat connotations.”¹² Hoar described “a US force of approximately 4,000 tailored to stay in Somalia to support projected UNOSOM II needs.” This force consisted of senior officers, logistics personnel and equipment, and a 1,200-man quick reaction force “to intervene in emergencies.”¹³ Significantly, the plan placed none of the American troops under UN control; instead they remained under the operational and tactical control of the CENTCOM Commander and the 2-star Commander, US Forces Somalia respectively.¹⁴

As UNOSOM II pressed forward with its broad rebuilding mission, it encountered violent resistance from clan groups within Somalia reluctant to cede control to the UN. The clashes culminated in a June 5, 1993 battle when forces loyal to General Mohammed Farah Aideed, one of Somalia’s several warlord clan leaders, killed 24 Pakistani UN troops. The next day the Security Council passed Resolution 837 reaffirming UNOSOM’s authority under Resolution 814 to “take all necessary measures against all

¹⁰ United Nations Secretary-General, “Report of the Secretary General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992),” March 3, 1993, 3-4, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/121/56/IMG/N9312156.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹¹ For a thorough discussion of nation-building and state-building see Francis Fukuyama, *State Building* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 814, “Somalia,” March 26, 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/226/18/IMG/N9322618.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹² Presidential Remarks, “Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,” February 23, 1993, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/02/1993-02-23-remarks-by-the-president-in-photo-op-w-sec-gen-of-un.html> (accessed May 5, 2011).

¹³ Of note, the Commander, US Forces, Somalia was also the Deputy Commander for UNOSOM II. T. Frank Crigler, “The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1993, 66; Joseph P. Hoar, CINC CENTCOM, “A CINC’s Perspective,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1993, 62-3.

¹⁴ Joseph P. Hoar, CINC CENTCOM, “A CINC’s Perspective,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1993, 62.

those responsible for the armed attacks... including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment.”¹⁵ A humanitarian mission that expanded to security building, then institution building, grew into a mission to capture Gen Aideed. The combat forces within the American troop commitment quickly took the lead hunting down Aideed and others. In attempting to arrest key leaders of Aideed’s organization on October 3, 1993, eighteen American troops died in as the convoy attempted to fight its way out of the city and in Blackhawk helicopter crashes. In response to the Mogadishu killings, the United States reassessed its peacekeeping interests and terminated its troop commitment to UNOSOM II. On March 25, 1994 the last American military personnel left Somalia.¹⁶

Figure 3 presents the potential paths for American foreign policy decisions in the Somalia case. There was little American interest in Somalia, particularly with regard to national security. It is reasonable to consider, therefore, foreign policy should have proceeded down the no interest path, leaving Somalia in the hands of UN peacekeepers as the willing actor. This was clearly not the path taken. A struggling humanitarian assistance cause presented the United States an opportunity to further its international prestige, particularly within the UN, the year after it successfully led the UN-coalition against Iraq. As a result, the United States jumped at an opportunity to demonstrate leadership in the post-Cold War world order, elevating its prestige that could translate success in Somalia to legitimacy in future American policy actions. The United States pursued this interest of American prestige and chose the “yes” path.

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 837, “Somalia,” June 6, 1993, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/332/32/IMG/N9333232.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁶ Donatella Lorch, “Last of the U.S. Troops Leave Somalia,” *New York Times*, March 26, 1994.




Figure 3. Foreign Policy Decision Framework with Somalia Added

Source: Author's Original Work

Given a choice to follow the prestige interest, the President was the lead policy-maker throughout. For the initial UNITAF mission one of two paths are identifiable. One path considers the operation a US mission loosely associated with a UN mission. As such, Operation RESTORE HOPE could be considered a unilateral action operating in parallel to the UN forces in Somalia, executed by the United States where it required neither legitimacy (this was provided by the humanitarian situation) nor other capabilities. The other path defines the decisions made including American forces within UNITAF and therefore operating within a multilateral organization that was providing the legitimacy for the operation.

Once UNITAF transitioned control to UNOSOM II the American role again offered parallel policy interpretations. The 4,000 Americans in Somalia were there specifically because of and in support of UNOSOM II, without any separate operational mission or mandate. As such, logic describes them as part of a multinational force

operating under its legitimacy directed by American policy coming from the executive branch. What confuses this interpretation, however, is the specific requirement by the United States that its forces not be under UN control, instead remaining as part of CENTCOM's command. Now identifying this force – similar in construct to the Liberia case analyzed in Chapter 2 – as a unilateral operation, aligned with but not part of the multilateral organization, suggests a different set of policy choices. An interest was identified (increasing American prestige), the President led policy-making, and the United States did not need legitimacy for its forces there, they were there because the international community needed them. The American military needed no other capabilities to execute their particular mission. They were, in fact, providing capability to others. At this point, the policy option flows logically to a unilateral effort once again.

Resolution 837 expanded the mission even further, to include hunting and arresting Aideed and other clan leaders. The United States again operated under one of two interpretations. They were, technically, still part of the UNOSOM II mission and incorporated under the multilateral organization. In reality, however, they operated independent of UN command and control, executing the mandate of Resolution 837 but certainly not within the organizational structure it represented. This second interpretation leads us to a unilateral action with no other capabilities needed and no further legitimacy required. Following policies from the Executive branch the military unilaterally pursued American interests of prestige by searching for those responsible for the insecurity and death in Somalia.

The final part of American policy in Somalia is the least contentious. Following the death of 18 American personnel in the October 1993 Mogadishu battle, the United States rapidly reprioritized its peacekeeping interests to below the engagement level. As such, a choice following the no interest path on figure 1 emerged, deferring to the actor willing to take the lead (the UN) as American forces withdrew from Somalia.

While all the policy choices demonstrated in the Somalia case represent logical paths through the framework, the possibility of multiple interpretations leading to diverse policy outcomes highlight the balance required between a theoretical framework and real-world application. There is a predictive capability within the framework, but realizing that differing interpretations of a situation by actors involved can also cause varying

outcomes in policy choices is essential. It is critical that the expected interpretations receive analysis against the facts as they happen, ensuring the predictions accomplished do not unknowingly become invalidated as the situation unfolds.

Two Recent Test Cases

The variables drawn from historical cases analyzed in Chapters 2 through 5 combine to produce one of four American foreign policies. How do other cases fit this same framework though? Two recent cases with limited analysis test how the framework applies to contemporary decision-making within the American Government. The first example is the 2011 NATO air-strikes on Libya. The day military operations commenced, President Obama declared “we are acting in the interests of the United States and the world.”¹⁷ This immediately resolved the questions of sufficient interest and who was leading the policy-making. Although members of Congress previously voiced their opinions about American involvement in Libya, Congress had not established any policies. The Executive Branch, led by the President, determined the need for and type of action. The US Secretary of Defense identified the need to establish legitimacy when he reminded a press briefing on March 1, 2011: “I would note that the UN Security Council resolution provides no authorization for the use of armed force.”¹⁸ Journalist Tom Ricks made a similar connection when he identified “a no-fly zone is an act of war.”¹⁹ The March 17 Security Council Resolution provided this legitimacy: “Authorizes Member States..., acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements..., to take all necessary measures..., to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”²⁰ Under the umbrella of the UN resolution, and in conjunction with NATO and the Arab League, the

¹⁷ Presidential Remarks. “Remarks by the President on Libya,” March 19, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/19/remarks-president-libya> (accessed May 5, 2011).

¹⁸ Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm Mullen from the Pentagon,” March 1, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4777> (accessed May 5, 2011).

¹⁹ Tom Ricks, “Six Considerations For Discussing the Imposition of a Libyan No-Fly Zone,” *Foreign Policy*, March 4, 2011, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/03/six_considerations_for_discussing_the_imposition_of_a_libyan_no_fly_zone (accessed May 5, 2011).

²⁰ United Nations Security Council (SC) Resolution 1973, “The situation in Libya,” March 17, 2011, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement>.

United States led the military operations over Libya in what quickly transitioned to a NATO-led operation.

The second test case is the failed transfer of power following the 2010 elections in Cote D'Ivoire. Following years of civil war, Alassane Ouattara won an election in November over incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo. After the elections, however, President Gbagbo refused to step down.²¹ By March 2011 open fighting between forces supporting the President elect and those supporting Gbagbo reached the capital, Abidjan – Gbagbo's last stronghold. Since 2004, a UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Operation in Cote D'Ivoire (UNOCI) has operated in Cote D'Ivoire, taking over from an AU force. UNOCI received most of its manning and support from non-Western nations and France, the former Cote D'Ivoire colonial power.²² Following the election, UNOCI attempted to remain an impartial force, but, by March, its troops came under fire from Gbagbo's supporters.²³ On April 11, Outtara's forces, aided by UNOCI and French troops arrested Gbagbo, finally clearing the way for Alassane Ouattara to take his position as President.²⁴ The United States acknowledged the post-election problems in Cote D'Ivoire, including voting to support Security Council resolutions and a video message recorded by President Obama calling for Gbagbo to step down and the people of Cote D'Ivoire to enjoy their democratic rights.²⁵ Following the trend towards African peacekeeping since American troops left Somalia in 1994 (Liberia in 2003 stands as a lone exception), the United States has yet to define a national interest in Cote D'Ivoire, however. As a result, American foreign policy choices have followed the no interest path through figure 1. With insufficient national interest in Cote D'Ivoire, the United States identified the UN and France as willing leaders to defer to.²⁶

²¹ Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Press Briefing, "Situation in Cote D'Ivoire," March 31, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/spbr/2011/159489.htm> (accessed March 5, 2011).

²² United Nations Operations in Cote D'Ivoire, "UNOCI Facts and Figures," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/facts.shtml> (accessed May 5, 2011).

²³ "Ivory Coast: UN Threatens Air Attacks on Gbagbo Forces," *BBC News*, April 4, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12960308> (accessed April 4, 2011).

²⁴ United Nations Operations in Cote D'Ivoire, "Post-Election Crisis," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml> (accessed May 5, 2011).

²⁵ Presidential Video Message, "President Obama Speaks to the People of Cote D'Ivoire," March 25, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/03/25/president-obama-speaks-people-cote-divoire> (accessed May 5, 2011).

²⁶ Jendayi Frazer, "Ending Ivory Coast's Stand-Off," Council On Foreign Relations, April 1, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/ivory-coast/ending-ivory-coasts-stand-off/p24568> (accessed April 4, 2011).

Figure 4 shows the developed framework again, this time including the policy outcomes for the two test cases discussed.




Figure 4. Foreign Policy Decision Framework with Test Cases Added

Source: Author's Original Work

Conclusion

As the Soviet Union collapsed after the Cold War, the United States emerged as the remaining superpower. America's unipolar moment presented great opportunity, but also vast uncertainty. How would the United States pursue its foreign policy as the unmatched leader of the world? While many experts suggested roles for the post-Cold United States, few stopped to identify when a specific role should apply. In the past two decades American foreign policy adopted many different approaches, some more expected than others. With such a lack of clarity comes misperception both in why the United States is choosing a foreign policy, as well as what can be anticipated prior to the choice.

Ultimately, there are four ways the United States executes foreign policy:

1. Unilateral action
2. Multilateral action through existing organizations
3. Multilateral action through *ad hoc* coalitions
4. Non-engagement or engagement through a third party

Case study analysis of American foreign policy in each of these four categories identified unique variables determining when the United States chooses which option. Recognizing these variables allows the United States to better target how it builds partnerships aligned with exerting its superpower role. At the same time, the framework produced from the analysis also provides a predictive capacity useful to the international community as it interacts with the United States. In recognizing what the United States is likely to do, international actors – both states and international organizations – are less likely surprised by an American foreign policy decision.

Six variables that channel American foreign policy decisions establish the framework in figure 1. They are: American interest; leadership; legitimacy; required capabilities; available multilateral organizations; and alternate willing lead actors. Recognizing the context for each variable, and the likely decision to come from it, establishes the predictive nature of the framework. Equally, however, incorrectly contextualizing the situation threatens the analyst with falsely predicting a policy decision, particularly if he or she interprets the context to produce a preordained outcome justified by the framework. The astute strategist recognizes what influences and contexts exist in asserting answers throughout the framework, both within the specific situation and broadly across American and international policy. Only with this recognition can the framework provide a stable outlook, offering rational predictions of American foreign policy rather than becoming nothing more than a tool to justify a desired policy decision.

The framework produced offers analysts significant insight into the logic of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It relies, however, on the interpretation input to it. Future study needs to better refine how the United States defines its national interest, be it security or prestige, and how it prioritizes interests. A refined answer to this decision will certainly produce a more accurate entry into the rest of the framework, allowing the analyst a more contextualized picture from which to work

his or her way through the ensuing variables. Much the same discussion exists for refining the determination of legitimacy and availability of multilateral organizations. This framework provides a launching point to define when the United States chooses various foreign policy options. The clearer the understanding of the calculation within each variable, the more accurate and justifiable the output from the framework becomes. A better output allows the United States policy maker to distill how the United States makes partnerships and engages in multilateral organizations, as well as how the rest of the world expects the United States to do those things. With better understanding comes a more stable international system of states, interacting successfully in times of peace and conflict.

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