The Best Defense: Making Maximum Sense of Minimum Deterrence
Abstract
This paper argues that minimum deterrence is a viable policy option for the United States. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review has laid the groundwork for a reduction in size of the US nuclear arsenal while at the same time, constrained economic resources promise to force the Department of Defense look for responsible ways to reduce its budget. Given this situation, the question must be asked as to whether the United States can achieve effective nuclear deterrence with a limited number of weapons. This paper argues that it can. A careful study of the nuclear weapons programs of China, India and Pakistan-three countries that espouse minimum deterrence policies-supports the theory that statesmen are not sensitive to the number of nuclear weapons a rival state possesses, they are sensitive to the fact that they have them at all. So long as a state possesses an overt nuclear weapons program and the capability to deliver an assured second-strike, deterrence is successfully achieved with a limited number of weapons. Minimum deterrence is, therefore, not only a viable policy for the United States to pursue, given future economic constraints it is also the most prudent.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- AD1019688
Entities
People
- Jeremy E. Olson
Organizations
- Air University