

THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
SURRENDER SOVERIEGNTY OR FIGHT TO THE DEATH

BY

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


APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.



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ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a long-term, multi-disciplinary view of international relations that incorporates realism, liberalism, and constructivism into a distinct new theory. It focuses on the proposal that the international environment is a social system, driven by self-interest characterized by the larger evolutionary process. The analysis argues that human social evolution employs cooperation to fulfill self-interest. As cooperation increases, human social groups self-organize and amalgamate into larger groups and higher-order social constructs, creating the international system. Societies evolve and develop culture specifically to encourage and enforce cooperation. As evidenced by the spread of democracy, societies mimic and copy cultural aspects of more successful societies to reap the benefits of cooperation. Just as social constructs cooperate to meet the needs of the individual, states also cooperate to meet the needs of their own populations. Since the Seventeenth Century, the international environment has evolved from a continental grouping of states into an international society, reflecting ever-increasing cooperation among states. The rapid spread of globalization, international regimes, and institutions illustrates the growth of international cooperation and presages the coming amalgamation of states into a system dominated by supra-state social structures. Three case studies set in the Twentieth Century highlight this evolutionary process with an analysis of the outcomes of WWI, WWII, and the Cold War. The conclusion of each war represented steps toward increasing international cooperation that is likely to culminate in an international environment centered on supra-state structures. Just as Europe led in the amalgamation of societies to create the state structure in the Seventeenth Century after the close of the Thirty Years War, so too the close of the Twentieth Century's wars set the stage for Europe to once again lead in the evolution of a new social structure. The European Union is potentially the first example of the amalgamation of states into the next-level international organization. Just as the state system spread to the rest of the world, the regional structure is likely to overtake the state system in the evolutionary process. This thesis analyzes society's likely evolutionary processes into the Twenty-first Century.

CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
DISCLAIMER	ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
INTRODUCTION	1
1 SELF-INTERESTED COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION	8
2 EVOLUTION AND THE STATE	27
3 EVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY	54
4 INTERNATIONAL EVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. .	85
CONCLUSION	117
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125

Illustrations

Table

1	Primary Themes of the World's Religions	19
2	Major Integrative Levels	24
3	Hierarchy of Needs	34

Introduction

Whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resemble those of preceding times.

– Niccolo Machiavelli

Strategists operate in an international arena defined primarily in the realm of theory and ideology. Lacking the mathematical foundations of the “hard” sciences such as chemistry and physics on which to base predictions, international relations (IR) practitioners turn to various ideas and theories to explain the world as it is and to predict the world as it may be. Their conceptions of the world form the foundation of their decision making. The three competing ideas of realism, liberalism, and constructivism currently dominate the field of international relations. Professors describe them as “lenses” through which strategists peer to gain understanding of various aspects of world events. To evaluate international phenomena, students learn that each lens illuminates certain factors while clouding others. Practitioners on the other hand, often identify with one particular school and make decisions based on the perceived precision of one ideology over the others.

This thesis will present a view of international relations that incorporates portions of each of the three dominant theories into a fourth theory centered on the proposal that the international environment is a social system that is evolving as a subset of the greater evolutionary process. To support this claim, it will be necessary to illuminate the mechanisms by which it evolves. Most IR theories begin and end at the state level, but this discussion of the evolutionary mechanism necessarily begins at a level far below the state.

The basic mechanism of evolution is individual self-interest. That is to say, humans, as with all other living things, seek to prolong and improve their life, and to spread their genes. The more intelligent life

forms are assisted in the pursuit of self-interest by complex learning. Thanks to the ability to learn from prior actions and the prior actions of others, humans discovered that cooperation can meet more interests than any solitary person can ever hope to fulfill. In pursuit of these increased benefits, humans created societies to promote and encourage cooperation. Societies then evolved as ever more effective strategies were employed. As societies evolved, they gradually learned to cooperate not only within societies, but also between and among one other. The international arena simply represents the highest level of human society.

This proposal of an evolutionary view of international relations will follow the process first through a discussion of the role self-interest and cooperation play in evolution and human societies, then transfer these ideas to the role they play in the formation and maintenance of the state. It will then demonstrate how these concepts relate at the international level. Finally, three case studies will explore how this evolution occurred in the previous century. Before initiating the theoretical investigation, however, a brief exploration of perspective will help frame the discussion.

This thesis will not only begin below the state level, it will also look beyond this single structure to consider the nation-state centric international structure as merely one version of human social construction. Each of the theoretical schools reflects certain realities, but because they each take a historically short view of human existence, they reflect only segments of reality. This thesis purports that their observations may not be mutually exclusive and their primary tenants may coexist. Perhaps the realists are correct and self-interest really does drive all state behavior. Perhaps the liberals are right and the future of the world does rest on the power of cooperative institutions. Perhaps the constructivists are correct and ideas really are more important than relative power in the behavior of states. It could be that the contradictions among the schools do not really exist at all, but rather describe different aspects of the same phenomena. Perhaps their

incongruence is merely ephemeral because their explanations and predictions are based on a comparatively short historical record.

This thesis asks the reader to consider international relations by taking a very long view of history. The current state-centric system that realists, liberals, and constructivists primarily focus on emerged in the Seventeenth Century. This was the only system that the theorists who founded the schools of thought had personally observed. This is also the only system in which their subsequent adherents have operated. As understandable as this approach appears, it too often ignores preceding international systems that do not appear to mirror the current one.

John Ruggie similarly critiqued Kenneth Waltz' presentation of neorealism because it denied the significance of political structure in the international environment and thereby essentially ignored the transition from the feudal system.¹ Waltz was intent on not "blurring the lines of distinction between the different levels of a system."² However, to deny that the current system is but a snapshot of a larger process is to describe a dynamic process in static terms. This thesis contends that the current state-centric international system is a temporary configuration in a much larger process of social evolution. Similarly, the process of social evolution presents just one subset of the larger evolutionary process.

This thesis claims that the international system is evolving and that it is evolving as part of human evolution, which is evolving as part of universal evolution. Therefore, what we know about the evolutionary process can provide insight to trends in the international environment. Based on this framework, and relying on insights from the theorists of all three schools, this thesis will further show that a cooperative approach

¹ Christian Reuse-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 89.

² Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 78.

to international affairs is compatible with the realist, liberal, and constructivist views and that this approach furthermore provides the most effective means of fulfilling state and individual interests. This thesis will support these claims in four chapters. The first three chapters will lay out the theory of international relations to show that the international system is evolving in the direction of a single world entity and will further highlight the mechanisms of this evolution. The fourth chapter will provide a hundred-year case study to show how the international system evolved in the Twentieth Century according to the theory described in the first three chapters. Throughout this entire thesis, the importance of taking an extremely long view of history cannot be overemphasized.

The following analysis largely takes the approach of the French *Annales* school of thought. This school rejects the compartmentalization of history and asserts that history should be studied from a very long perspective and not in isolation of other disciplines.³ In harmony with this line of thinking, this thesis focuses on the long view and integrates biology, sociology, psychology, political science, and history into its alternative IR theory.

In providing an alternative to the three primary and extremely robust theories, about which thousands of insightful tomes have been written, this modest attempt will undoubtedly provide the reader with more holes to fill than words to suffice. The best the author can hope to provide is the goal of Robert Gilpin in his book *War and Change in World Politics*. It will propose “a plausible account of how international change occurs.”⁴ As Kenneth Waltz required in his seminal work *Theory of International Politics*, it will lay out a proposition and seek to show it as

³ Bernard A. Knapp, “Archaeology and Annales: Time, Space, and Change,” in *Archaeology, Annales and Ethohistory: New Directions in Archaeology*. Ed. Bernard A. Knapp, (Cambridge, England: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992), 5.

⁴ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 2.

“logical, coherent and plausible.”⁵ With this goal in mind, the first three chapters will assess the literature regarding evolution, self-interest, and self-organization to determine their roles in the evolution and amalgamation of societies.

Chapter 4 will use the major changes in the Twentieth Century international landscape as a three-part case study to illustrate the evolutionary nature of the international system. It will examine the outcomes World War I, World War II, and the Cold War as touchstone events in the evolution of the international environment and further show how these outcomes reflect elements of the proposed theory. Given that this study will require the reader to consider the most top-level and long-range views of history, a case study of all of human history would be ideal. However, in order to examine the historical record in sufficient detail, the scope was narrowed to a single century. The Twentieth Century was chosen because it will be familiar to most readers and it provides ample examples of international change. Despite this narrowing of scope, many subjects, covered here in a few scant paragraphs, could require years of research and analysis, and still provide insufficient evidence to convince the most skeptical reader. Given the limitations imposed by the need to select a specific period of study, the overarching ideas presented are expected to apply to the whole of history and therefore begins with recognition of certain long-term trends.

When viewed in its entirety, human history displays certain unmistakable changes. Humans today are more socially organized than their ancestors. Human social organizations have expanded horizontally to ever-larger structures. Skills have become more specialized and distinct. Ever-larger entities constitute international actors as they have

⁵ Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, 16.

evolved from families, to clans, to tribes, to nations, to nation-states. As George Modelski explained,

We cannot fail to have noticed that in the past millennium, global organization has changed extensively, from a condition of low connectivity and minimal structure to one of considerable connectivity and substantial structure today. Moreover, that development has been not merely one of change but has also shown directionality (rather than randomness) in that... the change might be said to have embodied a search for improved forms of organization appropriate to an expanding population. It has also traced an orderly path in space, and exhibited a temporal structure. Furthermore, it has been evolutionary in the sense of being a 'natural' process of trial and error, one that could be seen as if the unfolding of the course of evolution which does not require the postulation of a grand design or purposeful intention.⁶

This development has not followed a straight path from the Stone Age to the Information Age. Rather, like the stock market, humankind progresses in fits and starts. If the Dow Jones Industrial Average were imagined on a graph for any given day, absent any other information, it would be impossible to determine the course that average stock prices have taken since the stock market's inception. The further one zooms out from that graph, the longer the time period viewed and the more the actual direction of average stock prices becomes evident. The broader the view, the more accurate long-term projections are likely to be. So it is with the progress of humankind. Winston Churchill recognized this fact when he noted, "The further backward you look, the further forward you can see."⁷ To appreciate a trend you must study more than one year or even one hundred years. Just as myriad factors affect the course of

⁶ George Modelski, "From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics," In *The Future of Global Conflict*, ed. Volker Bornschier and Christopher Chase-Dunn (London, UK: Sage Studies in International Sociology, 1999, 2008 rev.) <https://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/ORGANIZATIONrev08c.htm>

⁷ Robert B. Seidensticker, *Futurehype: The Myths of Technology Change*. (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc., 2006), 1.

all evolution, so the fits and starts of human progress are driven by a multitude of factors that countervail the overarching process moving the trend in what can only be called an upward direction. Among these counteracting factors are incompetence, misjudgment, and pessimism. There are of course many others, but the following emphasis on cooperation has special implications for the self-fulfilling prophecies of the pessimists in particular. This thesis focuses on the process that drives change in human interaction and specifically at the international level. It will examine the progress of evolution, draw some conclusions about that progress to date, and surmise the value of those conclusions to the strategist. Its methodology necessarily looks for patterns of the past and projects them into the future.



Chapter 1

Self-interested Cooperation in Evolution

When most people think of the evolutionary process they conjure up ideas about survival of the fittest and imagine a violent struggle among species to live and reproduce. This view fits well with the Hobbesian realist perspective of international relations. In this world view, states vie for power and seek to overcome one another so that the winner and its genetic make-up might carry on to the next generation. This view highlights the selfish nature of living beings and recognizes self-interest as the overriding factor in international interaction. This chapter will propose that self-interest not only drives international interaction, but that it is the engine that drives evolution at all levels to include the international. Richard Dawkins examined the effect of selfish behavior on the long-term prospects of an organism's survival. His work showed that evolution occurs because "we are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes." Dawkins' other related, yet all important insight was that evolution works in favor of the individual (the gene) rather than in favor of the species (the group).¹ It is beneficial to be self-interested and evolution ensures the passing on of genes of organisms that best maximize benefit. This thesis likewise recognizes the dominant role of self-interest in human interaction, but it will go one step further to examine an aspect of the idea that is far too often neglected in discussions of self-interest.

The most effective strategies employed to fulfill self-interest may not at first appear selfish at all. What the dog-eat-dog view of evolution confuses is the fundamental nature of the process. That is that the most

¹ Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 2d Ed. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1989), v-2.

successful *traits* survive. In Darwin's *Origin of Species* he tried to head off some of this confusion when he said, "I should premise that I use the term Struggle for Existence [sic] in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being upon another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny."² Alexander Wendt addressed the persisting misconception by noting, "Natural selection occurs when organisms that are relatively poorly adapted to the competition for scarce resources in an environment fail to reproduce and are replaced by the better adapted. The metaphor of a 'survival of the fittest' is often used to describe this process, but it can be misleading insofar as it suggests that the strong kill off the weak."³ A major problem of this misconception emerges because it neglects to account for the high level of cooperation that takes place in the living world. If direct competition among organisms provided the best means of fulfilling interests then how could we explain the fairly universal taboo against selfish behavior among the human race?

Societies around the world are unanimous in their rejection of the most selfish behaviors. Similarly, they all share in the valuation of group-centered behaviors at the expense of immediate individual reward. As Matt Ridley expressed the depth of the taboo, "selfishness is almost the definition of vice."⁴ Theft, murder, and rape present the extreme in selfish behaviors, while sacrifice, giving, and empathy present the ideal. This could seem at odds with the aforementioned role of selfishness in evolution. If self-interest drives evolution then why do we humans so eschew it? The answer lies in the balance of long-term and short-term interests. It is the exchange of long-term, more-beneficial individual gain

² Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (London, England: CRW Publishing Limited, 2004), 62.

³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 321.

⁴ Matt Ridley, *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation* (London, England: Penguin Books, 1996), 38.

that pushes the benefit of the group to the forefront of our moral calculations. The potential short-term gains of individual selfish behaviors pale in comparison to the potential profit of a group working as a whole to benefit its members.

Self-Interest in the Division of Labor

Among many uniquely human qualities, it is perhaps our ability to specialize and divide labor that provides our species the largest advantage and drives us to pursue the good of the group. Adam Smith described the process with an example from his day. He used the process of pin making to illustrate the benefits that the division of labor brings to society. He related how one man would be unable to produce even 20 pins per day if working alone, but with the process divided into 18 steps accomplished by 10 men, the team could produce 48,000 pins in a day.⁵ The addition of nine workers laboring in cooperation yielded 2,400 times the output. In modern societies, the idea of a self-sufficient person is almost unthinkable. From the grocery store, to the bank, to the electrical grid that enables our modern society, we humans are deeply intertwined and far more productive than we could ever be as individuals. However, it is not any selfless contribution of the individual to the group that drives the cooperation that yields such phenomenal productive increases. Rather, the tendency to divide efforts is most characterized by the greater benefits afforded to each individual in the group. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts and collective action is enabled not by the reward to the anonymous whole, but by the benefit to its individual contributors. Adam Smith summed up the phenomenon:

In civilized society [man] stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes... man has

⁵ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, <http://markbarnes.us/The%20Wealth%20of%20Nations.pdf>, 7-8.

almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me what I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer, and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own advantages.⁶

Smith shows that not only do self-centered behaviors benefit the group, but that the world does not function solely along zero-sum lines as some international relations theories presume. The zero-sum dynamic makes games like chess and football more entertaining, but it does not reflect the nature of most human interactions. Buyers and sellers both benefit from trade, husbands and wives both benefit from marriage, and both states in a coalition benefit from their agreement. There are situations such as land disputes, where the only way for one to benefit is for another to equally lose, but as Michael Intriligator pointed out “more generally, however, international relations involves a much more complicated set of relationships that are, by their nature, non-zero-sum, where there is a possibility of mutual gains or losses.”⁷ Even in a land dispute, other incentives and costs may offset land value. Robert Wright investigated this idea of non-zero-sums and agreed with Intriligator that mutual benefit indeed abounds in the world and that most other situations can be made mutually profitable.

⁶ Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 13-14.

⁷ Michael, D. Intriligator, “From Conflict to Cooperation in the Study of International Security,” in *Cooperative Models in International Relations Research*, ed. Michael Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher, (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 48.

This isn't to say that non-zero-sum games always have win-win outcomes rather than lose-lose outcomes. Nor is it to say that the powerful and the treacherous never exploit the weak and the naive; parasitic behavior is often possible in non-zero-sum games, and history offers no shortage of examples. Still, on balance, over the long run, non-zero-sum situations produce more positive sums than negative sums, more mutual benefit than parasitism. As a result, people become embedded in larger and richer webs of interdependence... The conversion of non-zero-sum situations into mostly positive sums—had started happening at least as early as 15,000 years ago. Then it happened again. And again. And again. Until—voila!—here we are, riding in airplanes, sending e-mail, living in a global village.⁸

Wright recognized that evolution, like the stock market has its ups and downs, but on the whole it moves in a general direction. It is at least possible if not likely that a given human interaction can result in two winners; if only the players are able to focus on the long-term, accept these win-win opportunities, and find mechanisms to develop the trust to cooperate and realize mutual benefits.

Game Theory Informs Interaction

Theorists use multiple models to describe and evaluate the nature of human interactions in non-zero sum situations, but perhaps the most prevalent model is the one often presented by realists to illustrate why cooperation among self-centered actors without a central authority is logically impossible. Prominent neo-realist Kenneth Waltz cited the model known as the prisoner's dilemma when he described how states can logically satisfy their own interests only at the expense of the common good.⁹ Many have described the model, but few as succinctly as Matt Ridley when he explained, "The game is called the prisoner's dilemma because the commonest anecdote to illustrate it describes two

⁸ Robert Wright, *Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny* (New York, NY: First Vintage Books, 2001), 6-7.

⁹ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 109.

prisoners each faced with the choice of giving evidence against the other and so reducing his own sentence. The dilemma arises because if neither defects on the other, the police can convict them both only on a lesser charge, so both would be better off if they stayed silent, but each is individually better off if he defects.”¹⁰ The model applies any time two actors face an opportunity to cooperate for potential benefit or to defect for a definite, but smaller benefit. The unknown decision of the other actor determines the payoff, so without knowing the other actor’s choice, it is only rational to defect and assume the cohort will do the same. This logical solution presumably precludes cooperation in the absence of a central authority to require it. On the surface, this model presents a bleak outlook for human relations, but is this really how humans interact?

Robert Axelrod recognized that people and groups more often enter into iterated, rather than single-encounter dilemmas. That is to say, humans normally interact with one another on a repetitive basis. We have to live with our neighbors and every encounter with them is affected by our prior encounters. Axelrod showed that when actors interact repeatedly, cooperation emerges as the most beneficial strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma. He used computer simulations to demonstrate further that some strategies for addressing the dilemma fare much better than others. Axelrod ran the prisoner’s dilemma through various types of iterated games, testing a multitude of strategies. Some of the most telling results appeared when he allowed the most successful strategies to replace less effective ones in generational games. In these games, the model more closely imitated the real world where players are able to adapt their behavior based on results of prior games. Learning, imitation, and selection made unsuccessful strategies less likely to appear in the game just as humans learn and adjust behavior in reality.

¹⁰ Ridley, *Origins of Virtue*, 54.

These games included what Alexander Wendt called “cultural selection” where strategies that are more beneficial actually edge out others.¹¹ Axelrod’s generational simulations showed how “learning, imitation, and selection can operate in human affairs to produce a process which makes relatively unsuccessful strategies less likely to appear later.”¹² The model reflected the process of natural selection. Through all of his simulations, cooperative strategies dominated, but one strategy continually rose to the top as the leading scorer in iterated dilemmas.

Axelrod identified four basic traits that made the strategy known as TIT FOR TAT the most successful: initial cooperation, provocability, forgiveness, and clarity.¹³ These four qualities proved to be the keys to the maximized benefit that caused the strategy to take over its environment. TIT FOR TAT clearly dominated the field, but it was one of the simplest entrants. When TIT FOR TAT encountered any strategy for the first time, it always cooperated. This initial cooperation set the stage for future dealings between the two strategies and created the opportunity for both to maximize gains. After the first encounter with a strategy, TIT FOR TAT would simply reciprocate with the action taken by its counterpart in their previous encounter. Thus, it was provoked to punish any and all defections. This same reciprocating behavior also demonstrated its forgiveness trait in that any defecting partner who chose to revert back to cooperation would be ‘forgiven’ and TIT FOR TAT would respond in kind. This reciprocating behavior did, however, have a down side.

Reciprocation also meant that partner defections could develop quickly into mutual defection loops in which neither participant reaped the benefits of cooperation. Both prisoners would continually punish

¹¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 324.

¹² Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* Rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 50.

¹³ Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*, 20.

one another. The famous feuds of the Montagues and Capulets or the Hatfields and McCoys illustrate this phenomenon where TIT FOR TAT never gets a shot at forgiveness.¹⁴ Despite this ugly side, the overall simplicity and predictability of this strategy ensured its fourth trait, clarity. Other strategies quickly identified the pattern and responded in a cooperative way that maximized benefit to both. Certain strategies were able to outscore TIT FOR TAT in the short term, but these were eventually eliminated by still other strategies that TIT FOR TAT could then eradicate.¹⁵ This phenomenon highlights the fact that cooperation does not pay in every situation, but in the long run, across multiple circumstances; the cooperative strategy that reciprocates in a clear way is most successful. On the basis of its four defining traits, TIT FOR TAT spread through generational games while less successful, uncooperative strategies gradually died out.

In dilemmas where players interact anonymously or are unable to recognize fellow players or recall the actions of their cohorts, cooperative schemes are annihilated by uncooperative strategies such as one aptly named ALWAYS DEFECT. However, the more frequent the interactions and the more stable the relationship of the participants, the more beneficial the cooperative strategy. Though previously ignored by international relations theory, cooperative approaches to real-world prisoner's dilemmas were recognized long before Axelrod's computer simulations re-introduced them. In 1740 David Hume pointed out the benefits of cooperation in recurring interactions:

I learn to do service to another, without bearing him any real kindness: because I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or others. And accordingly, after I have serv'd him and he in possession of the advantage arising from my action, he is

¹⁴ Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*, 138.

¹⁵ Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*, 50-53.

induc'd to perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal.¹⁶

The prisoners' cooperative solutions illustrate not only beneficial human interaction, but the role of cooperation in the evolution of all life. Martin Nowak highlighted the pervasive nature of the prisoner's dilemma and the far reaching effects of its cooperative solutions:

In fact, for biology the problem is as old as evolution itself. Evolutionary progress, the construction of new features, often requires the cooperation of simpler parts that are already available. For example, replicating molecules had to cooperate to form the first cells. Single cells had to cooperate to form the first multicellular organisms... Animals cooperate to form social structures, groups, and societies... Humans cooperate on a large scale, giving rise to cities, states, and countries. Cooperation allows specialization. Nobody needs to know everything. But cooperation is always vulnerable to exploitation by defectors.¹⁷

This vulnerability to defectors is essentially what Mancur Olson referred to when he noted that in large groups, it is very difficult if not impossible for cooperation to emerge without coercion. He did, however, concede that "separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest"¹⁸ could give rise to cooperation and prevent free riders from taking advantage of the benefits provided by the group. We will further address Olson's claim in Chapter 2 when we consider its ramifications for state cohesion, but the current discussion will focus on the "separate incentives" that do enable cooperation to arise within any large group of individuals.

¹⁶ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc. 2003. Original published in London 1739-1740), 371.

¹⁷ Martin A. Nowak, *Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 72.

¹⁸ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Harvard Economic Studies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 2.

Social Incentives Promote Cooperation

Humans have developed complex social motivators precisely to solve Olson's large group cooperation problem. Olson recognized the massive effect of such social constructs as patriotism, language, religion, and political ideology in building cooperation as well as the role of government to enforce it.¹⁹ The contributions of these social structures incidentally contribute to the same criteria required for success in Axelrod's prisoner's dilemma tournaments. Axelrod even provided some recommendations for a society to reap the benefits of cooperation. He suggested, "making the interactions between players more durable and frequent, teaching participants to care about each other, and teaching them to understand the value of reciprocity."²⁰ Recall the four traits that made a strategy successful: initial cooperation, provocability, forgiveness, and clarity. Social constructs that provide these and further incentivize individual cooperation help fulfill group interests and will therefore spread throughout the society. Waldrop agreed that "when you peel it all back, religion, and ethical rules provide a way of structuring human behavior in a way that allows a functioning society... societies constantly perform experiments, and whether or not those experiments succeed determines which cultural ideas and moral precepts propagate into the future."²¹ To illustrate the role of social incentives, imagine a prisoner's dilemma where the two prisoners in custody are members of a social group with very rigid expectations for its members; a group such as the Mafia.²² Would the likelihood of cooperation increase? Most

¹⁹ Olson, *Logic of Collective Action*, 13.

²⁰ Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, 23.

²¹ Mitchell M. , *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 319.

²² Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. 1st Princeton classic ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 73.

social incentives focus, like the mafia, on inclusion, but the simplest social incentive is exclusion.

One of the most effective and easiest ways to prevent free-riding is to ostracize members of the group who defect. Societies can deny any payoff to known defectors by simply refusing to interact with them. Axelrod's original tournaments required interaction among the players, but subsequent prisoner's dilemma models that include the option to participate showed that ostracism is quite effective in eliminating defectors, but it also highlighted the need to determine, prior to interaction, whether a fellow player is a defector or cooperator.²³ The need to recall prior exchanges introduces reciprocity as one of the most crucial aspects of interaction.

It is no exaggeration to say that reciprocity completely permeates our lives. We work for pay, we give gifts with strings attached, we expect to be repaid for kindness. "Obligation; debt; favor; bargain; contract; exchange; deal..." all reflect the language of reciprocity.²⁴ The fundamental building block of human society is indeed the expectation that what comes around will in fact go around. The prisoner's dilemma highlights this fact, given that the highest payoffs occur when everyone reciprocates. The reciprocation of benefit nearly defines the word cooperation in its everyday usage. The notion even provides the basis for our sense of justice. The obvious value and ubiquity of reciprocity make clear why the idea is so important to most major religions of the world.

The forefathers of the world's great religions acted individually but concurrently, to regulate the brutal extremes of short-term selfish behavior that defined their times.²⁵ The most prolific religions of today can all trace their roots back to the Axial Age (900-200 BCE). During

²³ Ridley, *Origins of Virtue*, 80.

²⁴ Ridley, *Origins of Virtue* 84.

²⁵ Karen Armstrong, *The Great Transformation: The Beginning of our Religious Traditions* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), xiv.

this period, mankind had evolved to a point where the societal regulators could not keep pace with the conquest and destruction enabled by the technology and mobility of the time.²⁶ In their own regions, the sages of the period sought to develop, in their people, a deeply ingrained individual motivation to cooperate. They enjoined morality and religion to build societies on a foundation of reciprocity. As Karen Armstrong put it, “The fact that they all came up with such profoundly similar solutions by so many different routes suggests that they had indeed discovered something important about the way human beings worked... The consistency with which the Axial sages - quite independently – returned to the Golden Rule may tell us something important about the structure of our nature.”²⁷ In a greater sense, it may us something important about the structure of nature itself. Table 1 illustrates the way that seven major religions express the idea we commonly refer to as the Golden Rule.

TABLE 1: PRIMARY THEMES OF THE WORLD’S GREAT RELIGIONS

1.	Confucianism: Do not do to others what you do not like yourself. Then there will be no resentment against you, either in the family or in the state. Analects 12:2
2.	Buddhism: Hurt not others in way that you yourself would find hurtful. Udanda-Varga 5:1.
3.	Christianity: All thing whatsoever you would that men should do to you – do you so unto them – for this is the law of the prophets. Matthew 7:1
4.	Hinduism: This is the sum of duty; do naught onto others what you would not have them do unto you. Mahabharata 5, 1517
5.	Islam: No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother which he desires for himself. Sunnah
6.	Judaism: What is hateful to you, do not do unto your fellowman. This is the entire law – all the rest is commentary. Talmud, Shabbat 3id
7.	Taoism: Regard your neighbor’s gain as your gain, and your neighbor’s lass as your own loss. Tai Chang Kan Yin Pien

Source: Terrence E. Paupp, *Exodus from Empire: The Fall of America’s Empire and the Rise of the Global Community* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007), 171.

²⁶ Armstrong, *Great Transformation*, 6, 7, 367.

²⁷ Armstrong, *Great Transformation*, 391.

The other side of the reciprocity coin also presents the provocability that helped TIT FOR TAT lead in the computer models. The familiar idea of Karma presents not only reward, but also negative repercussions similar to the Christian and Judaism prescription for an “eye for an eye.” Doing unto others as we would want done unto us, implies that we should expect our defections as well as our “good” deeds to be repaid. Reciprocity goes both ways in most religions. It punishes and rewards to help ensure the benefits of cooperation by preventing defection. It is also difficult to miss the fact that just as many religions stress forgiveness as reciprocity. Likewise, Axelrod pointed out forgiveness as one of the four key traits that helped make cooperative strategies so successful. Religions also offer the most tantalizing of rewards, derived from the previously noted, evolutionary drive for survival. The short-term benefit of defection is a small price to pay in exchange for life eternal or reincarnation to a better state of being. Indeed, religion may be one of the most influential social motivators. Many societies and individuals closely link religion to morality, but even the non-believer who may deny religion, will recognize the value that a shared sense of morality brings to a society.

The overlap of morality and religion is not incidental. The fact that societies so frequently define morality as that which is best for the whole, echoes Ridley’s assertion that, “selfishness is almost the definition of vice.”²⁸ Morality is not standardized among societies, rather it is tailored to meet the collective needs specific to each. Each originated separately in a world of relatively isolated societies. Moral disagreements among societies stem primarily from differences in what each value and see as beneficial to the whole. While morality may vary, it generally works in concert with the other social incentives to help bind societies into productive structures. The collection of all these social incentives

²⁸ Ridley, *Origins of Virtue*, 38.

constitutes culture. Culture differs among societies precisely because each society developed its own social incentives independently, finding different but similarly effective solutions to the problem of collective benefit.

Alexander Wendt expressed frustration with fellow international relations theorists' handling of culture because they ignore this discussion of culture altogether. Wendt complained that, "Somehow it is thought to be enough to point to the existence of cultural norms and corresponding behavior, without showing how norms get inside actor's heads to motivate actions."²⁹ This discussion reveals that culture does not merely exist. It is socially constructed for good reasons. It is operative in encouraging and setting the conditions for cooperation. Culture has proved critical to societal success precisely because it translates the benefit of the group directly to the individual. Just as Adam Smith described the way individuals work together not for the benefit of the group as a whole, but for the benefit of the individual members of the group. Social incentives provide some of those individual benefits and help individuals forego short-term, smaller payoffs for the long-term, higher rewards of working together. In discussing the factors required for group action, Olson pointed out, "The possibility that, in a case where there was no economic incentive for an individual to contribute to the achievement of a group interest, there might nonetheless be a social incentive for him to make such a contribution, must therefore be considered... social loss might outweigh the economic gain."³⁰

The informal social incentives discussed to this point, also interact with government, the most formal incentive of all. The role of government in establishing and maintaining cooperation is obviously a primary social factor. In fact, subsequent chapters will focus largely on

²⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 134.

³⁰ Olson, *Logic of Collective Action*, 60.

the roles and interactions of governments. However, before governments can focus on international interactions, they must meet the needs of their society. Indeed societies establish and maintain governments for this very reason. Axelrod pointed to central authority as a solution to the mutual defection problem associated with provocability.³¹ Alexander Wendt described this role when he said, “State structures are usually institutionalized in law and official regulations. This stabilizes expectations among the governed about each other’s behavior, and since shared expectations are necessary for all but the most elementary forms of social interaction, state structures help make modern society possible.”³² Hedley Bull pointed out the importance of order in society and the role of government in ensuring it. Order is a basic expression of cooperation. The thief, murderer, and rapist are all defectors. They select the short-term temptation payoff over the long-term reward of mutual cooperation. According to Bull:

Order in any society is maintained not merely by a sense of common interests in creating order or avoiding disorder, but by rules which spell out the kind of behavior that is orderly. Thus the goal of security against violence; the goal of the stability of agreements by the rule that they should be kept; and the goal of stability of possession by the rule that rights of property, public or private, should be respected. These rules may have the status of, of morality, of custom or etiquette, or simply of operating procedures or ‘rules of the game.’³³

With regard to rule enforcement, Bull also pointed out that the state differs from other social incentives in its ability to utilize physical force. The state’s monopoly on legitimate violence makes it a powerful

³¹ Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*, 186.

³² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 203.

³³ Hedley Bull. *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*. 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 52.

incentive indeed.³⁴ With government as the ultimate enforcer of cooperation within a society, it becomes clear why human evolution would give rise to such an entity. Governments work in concert with other social incentives to help its individual members fulfill self-interest.

Self-interest Drives Self-organization

Self-interest drives cooperation and social incentives help to secure cooperation in societies, but the very process of societal formation will also inform any predictions about societal behavior. A primary assertion of this thesis is that social entities are living beings subject to the same evolutionary forces as other living beings. The world is evolving at multiple levels. While the proteins that comprise individual cells evolve, so too evolve the cells, the organisms comprised of those cells, the societies comprised of those organisms, and the ecosystems comprised of those societies. There are many ways to express this idea in biological terms, but Francois Jacob provided an excellent description and supplied a term that will be useful for later application. In his book, *The Logic of Life*, Jacob explained the nature of what may be called amalgamation. He summarized the phenomenon when he said:

It is thus by combining more and more elaborate elements, by fitting subordinate structures into one another that complexity is born in living systems. These systems can be reproduced from their elements at each generation, because at each level the intermediate structures are thermodynamically stable. Living things thus construct themselves in series of successive 'parcels'. They are arranged according to a hierarchy of discontinuous units. At each level, units of relatively well defined size and almost identical structure associate to form a unit of the level above. Each of these units formed by the integration of sub-units may be given the general name 'integron'. An integron is formed by assembling integrons of the level below it; it takes part in the construction of the integron of the level above.³⁵

³⁴ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 55.

³⁵ Francois Jacob, *The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1973), 302.

When viewed from sufficient distance, this Russian-doll view of the universe is difficult to deny. Max Pettersson also explored this idea and borrowing terminology from Joseph Needham, he referred to “integrative levels” as Jacob’s integrons. Petterson also took his model below the level of life to include atoms and smaller particles. His conceptualization otherwise varied little from Jacob, but a table he provided is particularly useful to illustrate this idea. Table 2 below reflects Petterson’s ideas.

TABLE 2: Major Integrative Levels

Major integrative level	Members of levels	Range of discipline
9	Societies of sovereign states	Social range
8	Multifamily societies	
7	One-mother family societies	
6	Multicellular organisms	Biological range
5	Ordinary cells, with nuclei	
4	Intermediate entities, each centered upon one chromosome	
3	Molecules	Physical range
2	Atoms	
1	Fundamental particles including (or together with) photons	

Source: Max Pettersson, *Complexity and Evolution*. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11.

Recognizing and expounding upon this phenomenon John Holland described it through his assessment of what he called complex adaptive systems. These systems exist at the human level as well as in the rest of the natural world. They “include brains, immune systems, ecologies, cells, developing embryos, and ant colonies” as well as any socially constructed human group.³⁶ Each system is made up of agents who serve as Jacob’s integrons, forming ever-higher levels of complex adaptive systems that Holland called meta-agents. These systems are constantly

³⁶ Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science*, 145.

rearranging, reorganizing, evolving, learning, and adapting to best fulfill their interests in an environment that is likewise evolving.³⁷

Holland showed how the same traits apply to complex adaptive systems at multiple levels. To describe the process of adaptation he showed how timeframes can vary among levels. “Adaptive changes in individual neurons in the nervous system take place over an interval that ranges from seconds to hours; adaptive changes in the immune system require hours to days; adaptive changes in a business firm take months to years; adaptive changes in an ecosystem take years to millennia or more.”³⁸ Adaptive changes to the international system similarly take decades to centuries. This coherence among levels of organization reflect Jacob’s recognition that:

There is a coherence in the descriptions of science, a unity in its explanations, that reflects an underlying unity in the entities and principles involved. Whatever their level, the objects of analysis are always organizations, systems. Each of them used as an ingredient by the one above. Even that old irreducible protagonist, the atom, has become a system. And physicists still cannot say whether the smallest entity known today is a system or not. The word ‘evolution’ describes the changes that occur between systems. For what evolves is not matter blended with energy into one permanent whole. It is organization, the unit of emergence, that can always associate with its like to integrate into a system by which it is dominated.³⁹

A skeptic of self-organization may ask some relevant questions: How can like entities continually form up to create ever higher levels of complexity and order in a universe of entropy? How can evolution and the second law of thermodynamics co-exist? The answer to these questions was provided by Norbert Wiener who said that, “...life is defined by the ability to challenge entropy. No system can defeat it

³⁷ Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science*, 146.

³⁸ John H. Holland, *Emergence: Chaos to Order* (New York: NY: Basic Books, 1998), 10.

³⁹ Jacob, *Logic of Life*, 323.

forever and everywhere, but some systems can defeat it locally for awhile... Humans have the greatest capacity for creating ordered systems, having developed the ability to think, plan, and communicate with each other. Our ability to think is in service to the local, temporary defeat of chaos and disorder.”⁴⁰ The very nature of life itself is its ability to work against the natural force of disorder. When the sun burns out, the short reign of life on earth will end as entropy marches on. However, for the time being, as long as life exists on earth it will continue evolving into higher and higher levels of order and structure. As Matt Ridley began, “genes team up to form chromosomes; chromosomes team up to form genomes; genomes team up to form cells; cells team up to form complex cells; complex cells team up to form bodies; bodies team up to form colonies.”⁴¹ This thesis takes Ridley’s description only a few steps further to say colonies, team up to form nations; and the process continues: each integron, a grouping of the next lower-level integrons.

It is no revelation that self-interest drives evolution. However, that cooperation proves to be the most effective approach to realizing self-interest has been less self-evident, particularly to international relations theorists. Over the course of the planet’s history, life has utilized self-interested cooperation to yield complex societies driven to interact with one another. Given the dominant role of cooperation in the formation of societies, the prospect of its applicability to relations among societies becomes important to examine.

⁴⁰ Adam Brate, *Technomanifestos* (London, England: Texere Publishing, 2002), 16.

⁴¹ Ridley, *Origins of Virtue*, 17.

Chapter 2

Evolution and the State

Realists are correct when they assert that self-interest is the primary driver in interstate relations. In fact, as we have seen, self-interest is the driver of human relations and evolution writ large. However, organisms striving to survive, improve their lot, and pass on their genetic code generally discover in time that their chances improve when they team up with like entities. Just as societies eventually learned like Adam Smith's pin makers that they could realize a phenomenal increase in output by pooling individual resources into a group, so do states increase the benefit to each individual by combining effort. Natural selection will eventually eliminate those who fail to consolidate. Because most interactions are not inherently zero sum, mutual cooperators in the long run will prosper and overtake the population. In the words of Ridley: "cooperative groups thrive and selfish ones do not, so cooperative societies have survived at the expense of others."¹ This does not mean cooperative societies necessarily destroy or take over the others. Rather, the others learn or choose to be more cooperative for their own benefit. Alexander Wendt called the phenomenon cultural selection. He described how societies learn and implement the most effective strategies through imitation and social learning.² This chapter examines some key factors at work in the most successful states. As Wendt said, "Groups exist to meet their members' needs."³ Thus, the most successful states will most effectively align individual needs with state interests. They will align the state's perceived

¹ Ridley, Matt. *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation*. London, England: Penguin Books, 1996, 175.

² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 324-336.

³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 355.

interests with actual interests, and they will align their short-term interests with long-term interests. Just as in Axelrod's iterated prisoner's dilemmas, the most successful strategies eventually dominate a population and cooperative strategies prove most beneficial in the long run.

Realism does not recognize this role of cooperation in the overall fulfillment of interests; in contrast, it generally explains cooperation only in terms of power balancing. As Milner pointed out, "[To Realists] balancing is likely to be short-lived and not very well institutionalized since one's allies always remain potential enemies. Moreover, in the absence of an external threat requiring collaboration for defense, cooperation seems inexplicable for Realists... Long term, institutionalized cooperation among states seems particularly anomalous."⁴ This chapter largely constitutes an argument against the realist line of thought and the view of those such as John Mearsheimer who pronounce that international politics is a "brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other."⁵ The assertion here is rather that states look for opportunities to fulfill their interests and meet the needs of their members. They are happy to cooperate if it suits their ends, but will also take advantage of each other if they perceive it as the most beneficial with respect to their interests. The assertion here is also that cooperation, in the long run, yields more benefit than victimization. A thief may benefit in the short term. However, more people do not choose this line of work, because in the long run its payoff, at least in successful societies, is likely to diminish in comparison to its costs. Societies have established social incentives in the form of religion, morality, ethics, and

⁴ Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 6.

⁵ John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1995/95), 9.

laws, to discourage behaviors such as thievery because they are harmful to the group. The more a group is able to leverage social incentives to discourage harmful, short-term payoffs such as robbery, the more likely it is to meet the needs of its members and succeed as a group.

Realism gets specific treatment here because as Milner noted, “in the United States at least, Realism has attained a preeminent place in theories of international relations,” and also because realist policies can become dangerous self-fulfilling prophecies. Before we expound on this danger, however, some preliminary discussions are required.

Cooperation

Throughout the first chapter we discussed cooperation in a general sense where there was little need to define the meaning of the word. As we begin the more specific discussion of cooperation inside, and among states, it becomes possible and more important to define cooperation. For our purposes, cooperation is “goal directed behavior that seeks to create mutual gains through policy adjustment.”⁶ Helen Milner derived this simplified definition from recent literature in the international relations field. Based on this definition, we can say that cooperation has occurred when a group or state changes its policy in an effort to fulfill its own self-interest concomitant with those of another group or state. Cooperation can be tacit or negotiated. A state electing to lower a tariff is an example of tacit cooperation. Based on no discussion or exchange with the other affected states, but in pursuit of a goal, it adjusted a policy that created mutual gain. On the other hand, negotiated cooperation may also occur. For example, when states establish the responsibilities of a cooperative security agreement they maneuver and compromise to get the best deal. Both seek the benefit of the arrangement, but they balance contribution and benefit through negotiation. This common definitional starting point allows us to classify

⁶ Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 8.

behavior appropriately, as we make claims of cooperation. Another point of clarification is also required as we discuss states as constituted groups of individuals viewed as unitary actors.

Anthropomorphism

In the international relations literature, debate abounds as to whether states can or should be treated as unitary actors as opposed to groups and individuals vying internally to meet competing domestic needs. Milner posited that it is useless to consider either domestic or international politics in isolation because in any given case, domestic politics can dominate state decisions and vice versa.⁷ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow also pointed out that to analyze a state action, “it is necessary to open the black box and look within the state actor to its disaggregated moving parts.”⁸ The internal workings of a state are particularly important and possible to examine in certain contexts, but as discussions move to interaction among states it becomes increasingly difficult and less valuable to calculate and assess each of these internal dynamics.

This thesis concedes that in any given situation, varied domestic politics may indeed dictate international considerations, and that ideally every evaluation would consider both perspectives. In fact, ideal analysis would consider every state action down to the level of each and every constituent member to assess how each individual may react to or encourage a given action of their government. In the case of a democracy, are the voters likely to reject the action with their votes? In a dictatorship, is the population likely to take to the streets or attempt a coup? However, because internal politics exist as an avenue to distribute benefits to the individual, it remains appropriate to view decisions made

⁷ Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 4.

⁸ Graham Allison, and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2d ed. (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 404.

on the international stage in light of assumed unitary interests of anthropomorphized states.

Available space also prevents consideration of each state decision in light of all domestic actors. This work makes a conscious trade off of depth in favor of breadth by taking a broad, overarching perspective of the international system. The complexity of analysis in an already intricate environment grows dramatically when the intervention of internal political variables is included. This thesis therefore assumes that in the broad view, states will attempt to fulfill the needs of its constituent individuals and its actions will generally be directed toward this goal. This perspective is in line with other theorists such as Wendt who asserted that, "When states interact they do so with their societies conceptually 'in tow'... From this standpoint... the referent object of 'the state' should be conceptualized as an organizational actor that is internally related to the society it governs by structure of political authority..."⁹ With this caveat in place, it is possible further narrow the scope of consideration.

Great Powers

The remaining analysis will focus primarily on the great powers; they define the international system. Some may view this as an omission that neglects forces at work in the developing world, but similar to the question of anthropomorphism, any given analysis must select a cutoff point to maximize utility within achievable boundaries. Furthermore, smaller powers in the long run generally fall in line with the structure established or imposed by the great powers. This approach is also well established in the international relations literature. Kenneth Waltz took this position in his *Theory of International Politics*. According to his view, "Concern with international politics as a system requires concentration on the states that make the most difference. A general theory of

⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 201.

international politics is necessarily based on the great powers. The theory once written also applies to lesser states that interact insofar as their interactions are insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system..."¹⁰ Different states and regions may be in different phases of evolution, but the same forces that drive evolution of the great powers are also at work with the lesser powers. Furthermore, the conditions and actions of the great powers largely determine the evolution of the system as a whole and therefore provide the most predictive potential. The state system came about as a result of interactions among the great powers and the lesser powers followed suit. It is reasonable to assume, for our purposes, that the preceding pattern of great power determinacy will proceed through future developments in the international system. Having established some preliminary definitions and considerations it is possible to explore the structure of the self-interested behavior that drives human social evolution.

Hierarchy of Needs

Albert Maslow developed his famous hierarchy of needs to explain human motivation. A similar framework is necessary here because this thesis claims that the selfish drive to fulfill needs is the motivating force of evolution writ large, to include societal and international change. This thesis will make assertions about motivations, discuss the notion of progress, and explore situations where needs conflict. To set a basis for these discussions, it is important to delineate and define the idea of needs. Maslow provided a point of departure with his delineation of five basic needs: physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization.¹¹ Maslow also made a few other observations that are relevant here. First, he tried to clarify a lasting misperception about the hierarchy pointing

¹⁰ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 73.

¹¹ Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50(4), 370-396, (1943), 372-382.

out that the hierarchy itself is not entirely fixed or rigid. That while people generally prioritize the most basic needs first, this is not the case in all situations, and in fact, most people are partially satisfied at all levels simultaneously.¹² Second, Maslow asserted the existence of “preconditions for the basic need satisfactions.”¹³ These preconditions are not needs themselves, but they do elicit similar efforts as needs to secure them. These are summarized here as freedoms: freedom to speak, act independently, and learn, as well as “justice, fairness, honesty, and orderliness in the group.”¹⁴ This point will be particularly relevant when we discuss likely reasons for liberal democracy’s success in the international system.

This thesis applies a more simplified hierarchy of needs than Maslow’s. This version removes a level of detail, but allows commonality between the individual and the state. Alexander Wendt slightly modified Maslow’s conceptions and applied them to individuals and states as well. However, he used a different hierarchy for individuals than states. Wendt’s needs provide a starting point for our discussion, but we will modify them slightly further for our purposes. On the level of the individual, Wendt consolidated elements from various authors to establish a five-tiered hierarchy of needs that closely resembled Maslow’s.¹⁵ Wendt’s list started with “physical security,” which includes life sustaining functions and survival. This thesis will use this definition, but rename the need, survival. Second, Wendt used “ontological security,” which included a need for “stable expectations about the natural and especially social world around them.” To this definition, this thesis adds insurance of future survival and rename it security. Wendt’s third need was “sociation,” where he included the social needs of “love

¹² Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 386, 388.

¹³ Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 383.

¹⁴ Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 383.

¹⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 131-132.

and group membership.” His fourth need was “self-esteem,” including the need to feel good about one’s self, and his fifth and final need was “transcendence,” as the need to “grow, develop, and improve their life condition.” For the purposes of this thesis, Wendt’s final three needs are rolled into one, which will collectively be called esteem. There may be valid reasons to apply Wendt’s divisions in other contexts, but this simplified three-tiered hierarchy concentrates our discussion and remains sophisticated enough for our purpose. Table 2 summarizes the derivative hierarchy of needs that will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis.

Table 3: Hierarchy of Needs

Survival	Food, water, sleep, protection from physical threats, life itself...
Security	Insurance of future survival, stable expectations about surroundings...
Esteem	Love, human contact, social belonging, feeling good about self, transcendence, growth, development, improved life condition...

Source: Author’s Original Work, adapted from Abraham H. A Maslow, “Theory of Human Motivation”, Psychological Review 50(4) 370-96, 1943. and Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

To avoid confusion, it is important to point out that financial benefit is not a distinct interest in any way. That is to say, financial gain is a means to an end that can meet needs at all three levels. Money can buy food - survival. It can also stockpile food - security, and it can make one feel good about having excess food... or a three car garage, a picket fence, and a boat – esteem. The extreme focus that we see on money as a primary motivator is attributable to what Maslow called “multi-motivated behavior.” That is as he said, “any behavior tends to be determined by several or all of the basic needs simultaneously rather

than by only one of them.”¹⁶ Financial gain is the simplest manifestation of this notion.

We return now to Adam Smith’s view on the human motivation to save money, and particularly how it can fulfill esteem needs: “The principle which prompts us to save, is the desire of bettering our condition; a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce, perhaps a single instance, in which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation, as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their condition.”¹⁷ As Smith recognized, despite the basic human drive for survival, we expend most of our effort in pursuit of the “higher-level” needs for security or even more so... esteem because we are driven by a need to improve our lives.

It is necessary to make a distinction here between need and interest. Needs, as described above, are largely fixed from person to person and from state to state. Interests, on the other hand, are conditions, actions, or ends sought to fulfill those needs. With this distinction in mind, Wendt asserted that humans expend effort in order to meet needs and adjust their interests, according to their physical and cultural situation, in ways that they determine are best suited to meet those needs.¹⁸ He went on to say, “When needs are met people experience the emotion of satisfaction. When needs are not met we experience anxiety and fear, or frustration, which depending on circumstances will motivate us to redouble our efforts, to change our

¹⁶ Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 390.

¹⁷ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, <http://markbarnes.us/The%20Wealth%20of%20Nations.pdf>, 203.

¹⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 132.

interests, or to engage in aggression. Thus in contrast to Classical Realists who would posit fear, insecurity, or aggression as essential parts of human nature, I am suggesting these feelings are effects of unmet needs and therefore contingent.”¹⁹ Thus, fear and frustration are not basic motivators. They derive from basic needs and therefore the interests that get most of our attention are socially constructed. Our simplified hierarchy of individual needs allows us to move on to apply the same tiers at the state level.

Wendt differentiated between the individual and state hierarchy of needs, but his state hierarchy more closely matches our simplified, three-level one with a minor exception. Wendt defined “the national interest as the objective interests of state-society complexes, consisting of four needs: physical, survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem.”²⁰ This thesis proposes that we consider state needs to be in line with the individual needs described above. After all, the state, as any group, exists for the purpose of transmission of benefit to its constituent individuals. Using this three-tiered construct of needs, Wendt’s international “physical security” becomes survival, his “survival” becomes security – again, the insurance of future survival – and Wendt’s state-need of “collective self-esteem” becomes simply, esteem. His fourth state-need, “autonomy,” is discarded as embedded within the other three. That is to say, autonomy, like financial gain, is a means to secure the other three needs. While it may be primarily contingent to esteem, it is not a need in and of itself. States pursue autonomy to the extent it allows them to fulfill needs, but as will be shown in Chapter 4, they can, and do, sacrifice autonomy in situations where the sacrifice is more conducive to meeting their needs.

This construct is presented as a hierarchy to say that actors generally prioritize lower level, survival, and security needs ahead of

¹⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 132.

²⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 198.

esteem needs. The key word to emphasize here is “generally.” Recall that Maslow would concur.²¹ The esteem needs can be manipulated and intertwined with the lower two needs to the point that they dominate action. In fact, this is a primary effect of social incentives. Take the case of the suicide bomber, or the patriot who marches into a hail of gunfire ‘for God and country.’ Motivated by needs at the esteem level, both pursue coherence of their group, respect, or at least fear of disrespect, and even perhaps the blessings of the afterlife. In these cases and others, esteem needs can “over-power” the survival and security needs. As Wendt summarized the value of the esteem need, “only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material.”²² Groups can function in a similar manner.

While the preceding discussion is very important, this emphasis on esteem does not completely diminish the drive for material needs. As Wendt pointed out, “There are strictly material elements in the structure of social systems. The actors who make up social systems are animals with biologically constituted capacities, needs, and dispositions not unlike their cousins lower down the food chain. These animals have various tools (‘capabilities’) at their disposal, material objects with intrinsic powers, which enable them to do certain things. In emphasizing the ideational aspect of international structure, therefore, we should not forget that it supervenes on this material base, the analysis of which is a key contribution of Realism.”²³ We cannot discount material interests, those means that enable survival and security, and nothing here advocates their abandonment. Rather, this thesis asserts that we cannot simply view material interests as the sole motivators of man or groups of men.

²¹ Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 386, 388.

²² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 114-115.

²³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 189.

To say that the needs of the individual mirror those of the state is not to say that there is no difference in the complexity of those needs at each level. Recall our discussion of state anthropomorphism. Each level of complexity adds more competing interests and complicates analysis. Groups form to meet needs of its members, but domestic or constituent groups may see very different means as best suited to meet needs. Similarly, in all we do, humans seek to meet our needs at all levels, but we do not always accurately calculate the best course of action to do so. The gap between chosen actions that meet needs and those that do not is the gap between perceived interests and actual interests.

Perceived vs. Actual Interests

Wendt called perceived interests “self-interest” and actual interests, “interests,” but he did make a distinction and provided a useful description of how they impact state behavior. He acknowledged that “a major source of confusion is that [self-interest] is often used as though it were equivalent to saying that an actor did X because X was ‘in his interest.’ This implies that self-interest is whatever the ‘Self’ [sic] is interested in, which strips the concept of any explanatory power.”²⁴ He conceptualizes self-interest as a “contingent belief about how to meet needs that gets activated in relation to specific situations and Others [sic], and as such it is culturally constituted.”²⁵ This idea of perceived interests as being culturally constituted is important because it explains how individuals and states can get it wrong about what action is most beneficial to them. If their culture, developed to encourage internal cooperation, tells them that outsiders only want to take advantage of them, they will be unlikely to embrace external cooperation which may actually better fulfill their needs. Wendt went on to describe the attempt states make to align perceived interests with actual interests noting that “states have intrinsic, objective interests which they are disposed to try

²⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 239.

²⁵ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 240.

to understand and meet. This will at least 'bias' them toward egoistic interpretations of their interests, since they cannot be sure Others [sic] will look out for their interests, and in a world of scarce resources meeting the needs of the Self [sic] will often conflict with those of the Other. Human beings probably never would have survived evolution without such self-interested bias, and the same is probably true of states."²⁶ States and individuals act upon perceived self-interest and may misjudge objective interests or those means which actually would fulfill their needs.

Noting that states act on perceived interests that could be detrimental to their objective needs, the formation process for these interests becomes important. Variations in culture create variations in perceived interests. Wendt's previously-noted assertion that "interests are socially constructed" provides a valuable insight for perceived interests.²⁷ Wendt also noted that, "To assume a priori that interests are never socially constructed is to assume that people are *born* with or make up entirely on their own all their interests, whether in getting tenure, making war, or marrying their high school sweetheart. Clearly this is not the case."²⁸ Clearly, people are not born with these perceived interests, but the survival, security, and esteem needs these interests may or may not fulfill are universal. Whether tenure, war, or marriage actually meet those needs differentiates perceived from actual interests.

Wendt further recognized that, "No one denies that states act on the basis of perceived interests... but interests should not be seen as an exclusively 'Realist' variable. What matters is how interests are thought to be constituted."²⁹ Because perceived interests are culturally defined, they can and often do diverge from actual interests. States and

²⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 241.

²⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 169.

²⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 169-170 [emphasis in original].

²⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 113.

individuals act on perceived interests while evolution only rewards actual interests.

The assertion that interests can be misjudged may seem obvious, but some, such as Hedley Bull, have rejected “the idea that states or nations have ‘true’ or objective interests, as distinct from perceived interests, and that men are endowed with a faculty of reason that enables them to see what these objective interests are.”³⁰ Bull made this claim because he viewed interests as a means to any end, rather than as a means to objective needs. He asserted that, “to say that x is in someone’s interest is merely to say that it serves as a means to some end that he is pursuing.”³¹ His logic seems an attempt to avoid the previously-noted circular argument that says ‘an interest is anything one wants to do,’ but ignores the reality that certain choices or occurrences really do meet one’s needs more completely than others and that some perceived interests may actually inhibit fulfillment of needs.

Waltz used a market analogy to describe how so many states can make decisions that do not, in the end, serve their objective interests. He described how firms on the open market may make decisions based on short term profit even with the realization that if every competitor did the same it would harm them all.³² This situation exists when manufacturers increase production in response to falling prices and thereby drive the price down even lower. On the state level, policy makers sometimes make short-term, detrimental decisions based on a restricted view of that decision’s impact. Given the impact of others’ unknown decisions, it may be impossible to see the long term effect of any given action. Just as in the prisoners’ dilemma, states are bound to find themselves in defect loops with one another if they are collectively unable to focus on or surmise their own long-term benefit. That is,

³⁰ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*. 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 163.

³¹ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 63.

³² Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, 108.

unless they can somehow assure themselves that others will make a mutual decision to cooperate and avoid the negative long-term consequences. This is what Axelrod called the shadow of the future. Waltz claimed that, “With each country taking care of itself, no one can take care of the system.”³³ On the contrary, the system will take care of itself if the actors know they are likely to interact in the future. This brings us back to Axelrod’s iterated tournaments.

Game Theory on a New Level

Milner referred to “international cooperation as the continuation of domestic politics by other means.”³⁴ With an interesting twist on Carl von Clausewitz’ famous phrase, she expressed how the interaction among states cannot be viewed as separate from the state’s internal interests.³⁵ Cooperation among states occurs because it meets the needs of the domestic individual and if cooperation proves the most effective means to this end, it will continue and thrive. Structures that best meet needs will survive while others will die out, just as TIT FOR TAT edged out other strategies that paid off less in the long run. As Wendt explained, “Natural selection is not about war of all against all, but about differential reproductive success. This can be used to explain the evolution of species (state vs. city-states) or of traits (identities and interests) within a species, but the mechanism is the same, the reproductive success of organisms. Traits are selected by the fates of the organisms who carry them, not through the selection of traits as such.”³⁶ When Wendt wrote of this type of selection, he essentially described how successful strategies come to dominate a system through self-organization. How TIT FOR TAT yields Jacob’s integrons, forming ever-higher levels of complex adaptive systems that Holland called meta-

³³ Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, 109.

³⁴ Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 246.

³⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Eliot Howard, Peter Paret, and Beatrice Heuser (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 81, 87.

³⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 321.

agents.³⁷ Waltz noted the phenomenon as well when he said, “Where selection according to consequences rules, patterns emerge and endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns or striving to maintain them... Order may prevail without an orderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without an allocator.”³⁸

As states interact in iterated prisoners’ dilemmas, culturally formed interests come into play. The outlook of the players greatly affects the outcome of their interactions. Wendt said that, “Culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Actors act on the basis of beliefs they have about their environment and others, which tends to reproduce those beliefs. The self-fulfilling prophecy idea can explain a great deal about the production and reproduction of social life.”³⁹ Axelrod’s tournaments demonstrated this characteristic when he divided players, by labels, into two groups and set a rule that each player cooperated only with like-labeled players while defecting on the others. This simulated an environment where State A expects State B to defect and therefore never tries initial cooperation with them. Predictably, in this situation, “everyone does worse than necessary because cooperation between groups could have raised everyone’s scores.”⁴⁰ Each interaction between groups also confirmed otherness, isolated the two groups, and reduced the potential benefit to both. To the extent that notions such as realism and a coming ‘clash of civilizations’ become dominant in the culture of a given society, they increase the risk of a damaging self-fulfilling policy. If a society assumes that their fellow prisoner will defect, the traits of initial

³⁷ Francois Jacob, *The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1973), 302. And Mitchell M. Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 146.

³⁸ Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, 77.

³⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 108.

⁴⁰ Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* Rev. ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006), 147-148.

cooperation and forgiveness that made TIT FOR TAT so successful will never have an opportunity to take hold.

Herein lays the danger of world views that lack TIT FOR TAT's characteristics of initial cooperation, provocability, and clarity. The problem with a realist strategy is that by assuming the worst in everyone else, it elicits the worst and deprives itself of the maximized benefits that cooperation would bring. Fortunately, however, most states do not, in practice, make decisions solely from the perspective of a single international relations theory. This varied approach has produced similarly varied forms of government that meet with equally varying degrees of success. This is a good point to clarify the concept of the success in this context.

An evolutionary definition of success is relevant to this discussion. Through the process of evolution, traits that are poorly adapted to the environment fail to survive through subsequent generations, just as poorly adapted strategies failed to survive in Axelrod's iterated tournaments. In both contexts, the more productive traits are passed on, while less productive traits die out. Similar to the way strategies adjusted in Axelrod's iterated model, forms of governments also adjust, through cultural selection, continually seeking higher rewards. Success here simply implies the degree to which a form of government numerically dominates the international environment. The more numerous forms of government are considered more successful. The current international environment is dominated by liberal democracy.

A universal standardized definition of liberal democracy does not exist and not all democracies are equally democratic. By today's standards, we would not consider the United States very democratic before women and African-Americans were allowed to vote. Regardless of these difficulties, broadly-accepted lines do exist and democracies now account for about 62% of the world's governments, governing about 58% of the world's population. It also must be noted that while democracy is

spreading, just as in the US example, so too are democratic principles within societies.⁴¹

Throughout history, various forms of government have emerged. Through social learning and mimicking, some came to dominate the environment. They caught on and spread on the basis of their suitability to the environment. Democracy's recent rapid spread and dominance appears to have been enabled by the rise of modernization. Wealthy states are more likely to be democracies. However, recent evidence indicates that affluence does not cause democracy, nor does democracy cause affluence. Rather wealth enables democracy. That is, development has allowed individuals to move beyond basic survival to focus on higher-level needs that democracy is uniquely suited to fulfill. For example, during times when the highest-level need a government could hope to fulfill was individual survival, monarchy proved the best suited form of government and dominated the international environment. Today, in a modernized world, characterized by "occupational specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic growth" liberal democracies dominate the environment.⁴² Could we define its widespread adoption in terms of its similarity to TIT FOR TAT?

Emergence of Liberal Democracy as the World's TIT FOR TAT?

In order for cooperative strategies to succeed they need not be sought out or specifically selected. While culture and governments develop precisely to encourage, assist, and enforce cooperation, they are not required for cooperative strategies to take hold. As Axelrod saw in his experiments,

The individuals do not have to be rational: the evolutionary process allows the successful strategies to thrive, even if the players do not know how or why. Nor do the players have to

⁴¹ World Forum on Democracy, <http://www.fordemocracy.net/electoral.shtml>.

⁴² Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Development and Democracy: What We Know about Modernization Today," *Foreign Affairs* pp. 33-41 (March/April, 2009), 1-9.

exchange messages or commitments: they do not need words, because their deeds speak for them. Likewise, there is no need to assume trust between players: the use of reciprocity can be enough to make defection unproductive. Altruism is not needed: successful strategies can elicit cooperation from an egoist. Finally, no central authority is needed: cooperation based on reciprocity can be self-policing.⁴³

With the exception of the American Republic, it is unlikely that the founders of liberal democracy sought enforcement or even encouragement of cooperation among states. They primarily sought to develop a formal social incentive to meet the needs of its individual members. Liberal democracy has proved able to meet the needs of survival and security while its distinctive focus on the individual has proved uniquely suited to meet esteem needs as well. Liberal democracy as a form of government has excelled not only in meeting the needs of its constituencies, but also, as previously discussed, also in spreading its benefits throughout the international society via social learning. Again, self-interested behavior benefits the group.

Liberal democracy has developed as a cooperative strategy that performs exceptionally well in the international order and has spread voraciously through cultural selection from three in the 18th Century to about 90 by 2000.⁴⁴ No claim is made here that liberal democracy exactly mirrors TIT FOR TAT or even that it will ever be as robust. Rather, this thesis proposes that liberal democracy's similarity to TIT FOR TAT may explain its current success in the international system, thereby solidifying the viability of TIT FOR TAT as a successful strategy outside of computer simulations in the international arena. There are at least four traits that liberal democracy shares with TIT FOR TAT that

⁴³ Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*, 173-174.

⁴⁴ Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 1997), 264.

indicate its propensity to spread and dominate in the international system.

First, liberal democracy embraces the most cooperative of interactions: the mutual benefit of trade.⁴⁵ Based on Adam Smith's theory of free trade in benefiting participants on both sides of the exchange, liberal strategies constantly seek new opportunities to maximize mutual financial benefit.⁴⁶ The states who engage least in trade are the least financially viable while export-centric states see the highest and most sustained economic growth.⁴⁷ Recall the previously noted value of financial gain as its ability to fulfill needs at all three levels. Few forms of government have made the development of free trade as central as liberal democracies. Other strategies centered on self-help or constant defection are less likely to embrace free trade because of their inherent concern for relative gains. Their dominant view of each interaction as a single, zero-sum event rather than a series of mutually-beneficial interactions, causes them to miss out on many benefits of free trade that liberal actors enjoy. Liberal democracies not only share TIT FOR TAT's initial cooperation but also its provocability.

Liberal democracies go to war at least as often as other state types.⁴⁸ On the surface, this propensity may appear incongruent with cooperation. However, this tendency is consistent with TIT FOR TAT's reciprocity trait and therefore may help explain liberal democracy's overall success in the international system. Democracies have certainly initiated wars that Michael Doyle described as "imprudent aggression." However, the fact that they generally fight their wars against non-liberal, non-democratic states indicates that many of their wars could be explained as punishment for the defection of states utilizing non-

⁴⁵ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, 19, 283.

⁴⁶ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, 230.

⁴⁷ Ingelhart and Welzel, "Development and Democracy," 3.

⁴⁸ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, 268.

cooperative strategies.⁴⁹ Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder provided another, largely internal, explanation to account for many of the wars fought by burgeoning democracies. They concluded that weak institutions in democratizing states cause them to be more war-prone.⁵⁰ These two factors may have made the democratic peace appear illusive. However, as the number of mature liberal democratic states grows, there will be less need for force to punish defectors and there will be fewer war-prone democratizing states left. The fact that cooperative strategies like TIT FOR TAT must punish defectors in order to flourish correlates to the role force plays today in the international order, but there are still other similarities between liberal democracies and TIT FOR TAT.

In the generational prisoner's dilemma models, TIT FOR TAT continually edged out competitors and flourished in eventual environments of near exclusively like-minded strategies. The accelerating spread of liberal democracy closely resembles the spread of TIT FOR TAT in Axelrod's models. The related fact that both strategies perform best when surrounded by similar strategies presents yet another similarity between liberal democracy and TIT FOR TAT. Like TIT FOR TAT, liberal democracy will continue to spread because it is in the interest of each state to adopt it as a strategy in interactions with fellow states. The high level of trade among liberal democracies coupled with the fact that they historically have tended to not fight wars with one another highlight this similarity.⁵¹ There are, however, also traits of the two strategies that do not align so neatly.

Compared to TIT FOR TAT, liberal democracy does show some apparent shortfalls. For instance, it may not be forgiving enough, and it may lack ideal clarity. It is possible that the lack of apparent forgiveness

⁴⁹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, 268.

⁵⁰ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 37.

⁵¹ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, 265.

and clarity may be attributable to the complexity of the real world compared to the simple nature of the prisoner's dilemma model. For example, clarity and forgiveness would be difficult to communicate to fellow international actors if domestic realists publically advocate defection. When contingents within a liberal democracy call for non-cooperative action, it can be far more difficult for a liberal state to convince other actors of its desire for initial cooperation or forgiveness. These shortfalls may also stem from competing domestic concerns that the prisoner's dilemma does not address. It is likely, however, that liberal democracy still has a ways to go; that an ideal international strategy simply does not yet exist. Its similarity to TIT FOR TAT may just make liberal democracy the best strategy yet attempted.

To conclude this discussion of liberal democracy, a final point requires redress that does not concern TIT FOR TAT, but rather its ability to meet the needs of its individual members. Recall Maslow's preconditions. He asserted that these conditions of freedom, "justice, fairness honesty, orderliness in the group..." were "immediate prerequisites for the basic need satisfactions."⁵² Liberal democracy, by definition, emphasizes the idea of individual rights and freedoms as its most basic feature.⁵³ As we continue to emphasize the success of a state as contingent upon its ability to meet the needs of its constituents, the fundamental advantage of liberal democracy in this regard cannot be ignored. If liberal democracy is indeed the type of government best able to provide the prerequisite for all other needs, it should be no surprise that it has been so successful in meeting those needs and thereby spreading across the international landscape. However, even liberal democracies at times turn to new state-centric social incentives to overcome older, more established, and potentially counterproductive ones.

⁵² Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 383.

⁵³ Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, 19.

Value of Social Incentives to States

In Chapter 1, we discussed the role of social incentives in the establishment of societies and the role they serve in promoting cooperation within generic groups. This section will extend this discussion to the role social incentives play in the amalgamation of individuals and groups in modern states. As Olson pointed out, the larger the group, the more it will require individual incentive and coercion to secure the collective benefits for the group.⁵⁴ States rely on both to build unity to secure those benefits and meet their needs.⁵⁵ A brief discussion of the modern nation-state will frame the discussion.

Elizabeth Hanson provided an excellent summary of the current concept of the nation-state as a combination of two ideas. First is the state as a particular designated group of individuals occupying specified physical territory under a common government with the power to make and enforce laws inside said territory. The state maintains “a monopoly on the legitimate use of force,” and remains free from the expectation of external interference.⁵⁶ Second is the idea of the nation, which is more ethereal and “generally defined as a group of people with a common sense of identity, based on one or more of the following: language, religion, race, culture, and history.”⁵⁷ Inside the nation-state, the individuals’ identification with the nation is older and generally more strongly held than the more recent and often more frangible idea of the state.

Wendt discussed how these nations formed before conjoining to form the state: “Group identities (from tribe to clan to nation, among others) are based first and foremost on things like language, culture,

⁵⁴ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Harvard Economic Studies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 48.

⁵⁵ Olson, *Logic of Collective Action*, 13.

⁵⁶ Elizabeth C. Hanson, *The Information Revolution and World Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008), 180.

⁵⁷ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 180.

religion, and ethnicity. These things sometimes are effects of state policy, but some groups existed long before there were states, and some have endured despite states. To that extent these groups can be thought of as self-organizing social facts welling up from the 'bottom' of the human experience."⁵⁸ Of course, this "welling up" started with individuals pursuing their own interests and eventually recognizing that they would have more success together than divided. Similarly, for the state to maximize collective gains, it must unify its members to cooperate despite these pre-existing group identities designed to unify and maximize cooperation at their level.

Robert Gilpin brought home the way states condition populations to serve the good of the state when he pointed out that, the United States also seeks to establish a state culture to unite disparate internal groups. He noted that, "Americans pay homage to the same notion in our reverence for the Founding Fathers and the ways in which the American Constitution was framed to facilitate conquest of the continent... Important aspects in such lawgiving are found in the long-term effects of internal social, economic, and political arrangements on individual incentives... The problem of the lawgiver in the words of Gordon Tullock, is to so arrange the structure that the [citizen] is led by self-interest into doing those things that he 'ought' to do"⁵⁹ Robert Gilpin further brought in again the benefit of social incentives to bring about cooperation in a nation.

The central idea in Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*: In a competitive market economy the individual pursuing self-interest is led by an invisible hand to contribute to the economic growth and well-being of society. Motives other than those associated with economic gain have also been used by societies to encourage individuals to identify with and contribute to the common good. Religion and political

⁵⁸ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 210.

⁵⁹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101.

ideologies promise rewards to the faithful. The religious fanaticism of the Arabian tribes converted to Islam and the fanaticism of the Bolshevik revolutionaries in czarist Russia illustrate the point. The power of modern nationalism lies in the fact that individual identity and state interest become fused; the nationalist becomes the patriot willing to sacrifice his own life for the good of the state.⁶⁰

Wendt highlighted some specific ways states strengthen social incentives to build coherence and greater individual identification with the state. He described how states use education, language, and internal policy to solidify its members, eliminate communal differences, and build the idea of citizenship. Foreign policies help unite by emphasizing or creating threats from outsiders. The state can even utilize organized violence to support and enforce these unifying policies. He said, "Given the power at states' disposal, however, one cannot help but be impressed with the extent to which their efforts to construct societies (let alone nations) can founder on the rocks of preexisting group identities. A potential key factor in constructing societies, therefore, is the extent to which the boundaries and policies of the state coincide with the boundaries and needs of the preexisting groups subject to its rule."⁶¹

This explains how an empire may take over a territory and even form a state from conquered land, but if it cannot either remove or destroy the conquered groups, it must fulfill the needs of the conquered to have any chance at infiltrating the social incentives that helped form the conquered group in the first place. Robert Gilpin made this point as well when he pointed out that, "Although empires were militarily strong, they were able to enlist and secure the loyalty of only a small fraction of their inhabitants. This lack of identification between the public good and the private objectives of most citizens was a source of serious weakness;

⁶⁰ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 98.

⁶¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 210-211.

it accounts for the ultimate fragility of empires in the face of internal revolts and external pressures.”⁶²

This chapter closes with a return to the evolutionary process and two quotes from Charles Darwin, as he recognized both sides of the social-incentives coin. In this first passage, he saw the advantage social incentives parlay to one group over another with weaker or less appropriate social motivators and the way that esteem needs can trump survival and security. In *Descent of Man*, he highlighted the first side of the coin:

It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an increase in the number of well-endowed men and an advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. A tribe including members who, from possessing in high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection.⁶³

Darwin also recognized the other side of the coin; that each group is simply comprised of smaller, older groups, and that the incentives that help one group to dominate another also makes amalgamation of groups exceedingly difficult yet inevitable.

As man advances in civilisation [sic], and small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies from extending to the men of all nations and races. If, indeed, such men are separated from him by great differences in appearance or habits, experience

⁶² Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 117.

⁶³ Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, Vol. 2 (Appleton, NY: 1871), 203-204.

unfortunately shews [sic] us how long it is, before we look at them as our fellow-creatures.⁶⁴

The incentives used to create and strengthen a group also make it more difficult for that group to cooperate and eventually unite with other groups. However, history shows that groups eventually do cooperate and they eventually do coalesce in order to meet the needs of constituent groups and individuals.



⁶⁴ Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 187-188.

Chapter 3

Evolution and the International Society

Through the slow march of evolution individuals learned to cooperate, pool resources, and reap the rewards of societies. Eventually societies learned to cooperate and form modern nation-states. Over time, the processes of nature formed human social structures in a clearly discernable pattern. States in the international environment remain divided from one another by the same social incentives that each state previously used to break down their own internal divides. Societal glues at one level necessarily become barriers to coalescence of the next integron, to again use Jacob's terminology.¹ Self-interested cooperation was able to break down barriers at the state level. Recalling the "artificial barriers" that Darwin referred to at the end of Chapter 2, this thesis asserts that self-interest is again breaking down these barriers at the international level.²

Continued pursuit of individual interests drives growth in international cooperation. This cooperation has grown to the point that an international society has formed. While this society still faces barriers, the same evolutionary processes that created states are likely to lead them to again break down barriers in favor of social incentives that better translate rewards of cooperation to the individual.

Barriers to International Cooperation

Social incentives prove invaluable in the formation of social structure and have had a definite hand in the emergence of states themselves. However, they also become barriers to cooperation in the formation of multicultural states or the amalgamation of states. These

¹ Francois Jacob, *The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1973), 302.

² Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, Vol. 2 (Appleton, NY: 1871), 187-188.

barriers can and do soften and evolve over time when it becomes sufficiently clear that an alternative will better meet the needs of individuals.

Wendt talked about the difficulty of overcoming previously beneficial social constructs when he cited the Bosnian Civil War and the way “Serbian leadership was able to mobilize its people to respond so aggressively to Croatian and Muslim actions at the start of the conflict, as well as the larger, aggregate tendency for such seemingly irrational conflict to recur over time. This sounds an important cautionary note about the possibilities for social change: once collective memories have been created it may be hard to shake their long term effects, even if a majority of individuals have ‘forgotten’ them at any given moment.”³ Thus, a social incentive can become so ingrained that the group may not even recall or acknowledge the original reasons for its creation. It just becomes part of the collective psyche of the society, making its breakdown exceedingly difficult. This example also helps explain theses such as Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* which seem to raise such cultural differences to the level of near permanency.⁴ Social incentives on one level can become powerful artificial barriers on the next. The stronger the integron bond, the more difficult it will be to overcome in the formation of the next-level integron.

The role of religion is illustrative. As useful as the cooperative teachings of religion were in the establishment and strengthening of separate societies, this powerful social incentive can also serve as a barrier when disparate societies might otherwise benefit from inter-faith cooperation. The marriage of religion and morality helped inculcate the beliefs that made religion so effective at encouraging intergroup

³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 163.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3 (Summer 1993), 25.

cooperation, but it also created a downside. Religious exclusivity has frequently been appropriated to justify violence against outsiders and in steeling groups against one another.⁵

As potent as religion can be as barrier, even it can soften and evolve in time. Bull spoke of the “fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the universal political organization of Western Christendom was still in the process of disintegration, and modern states in process of articulation...”⁶ He pointed out that, “the search for principles on which Catholic and Protestant states might find a basis for coexistence led necessarily in the direction of secular principles.”⁷ In the early throes of the Thirty Years War, which eventually yielded the current state system, it would have been difficult even to imagine the peaceful coexistence of Catholics and Protestants on the European continent. Much less imaginable would have been the cooperation that gradually developed over the next 400 years to eventually yield the European Union. Today, in the throes of a far less destructive conflict, the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians seems equally difficult for many to imagine.

Referring to language as a cultural artifact, Dawkins pointed out that “Geoffrey Chaucer could not hold a conversation with a modern Englishman,” despite the fact that the Chaucers’ language was passed generationally directly through some 20 generations of English speakers.⁸ The assertion here is simply that culture evolves and Wendt’s process of cultural selection ensures that in the long run, groups of humans tend eventually to adopt new cultural traits in attempts to better meet individual needs.

⁵ Karen Armstrong, *The Great Transformation: The Beginning of our Religious Traditions* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 394.

⁶ Hedley Bull. *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*. 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 26.

⁷ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 27.

⁸ Dawkins, *Selfish Gene*, 189.

Chapters 1 and 2 discussed another barrier to cooperation that is also relevant at the international level. Olson highlighted the difficulty of large group collective action without outside incentives and coercion. He pointed out that a large group is unlikely to cooperate for the benefit of the collective good alone, but if members recognize the recurring need to cooperate, they will establish social incentives that allow cooperation to take hold. At the international level, these same dynamics are at play in the large group of states. Just as societies and states rely on social incentives such as language, religion, and political ideology to build cooperation and government to enforce it, so too does the international society employ similar social incentives to reap the benefits of cooperation.⁹

Culture has developed at the international level for the same reasons it developed in the societies that make up what Hedley Bull called the international society. Wendt addressed the development of society at this level. He said, "I suspect few scholars, even the most hardened Neorealists, would deny that contemporary states share a great many beliefs about the rules of the international game, who its players are, what their interests are, what rational behavior is, and so on. Few would deny, in other words, that the structure of the contemporary international system contains a lot of culture. This culture is deeply embedded in how both statesmen and scholars understand the nature of international politics today, literally making those politics possible in their modern form..."¹⁰ Culture is at play in the international arena and as such, it is susceptible to the same evolutionary forces that cause it to evolve at the intra-state level and below.

⁹ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Harvard Economic Studies, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 13.

¹⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 190.

This evolution has continued as long as human groups have existed, but Hedley Bull provided fair point of departure for an international discussion when he asserted that the international environment has evolved beyond an international system and into an international *society* of states. An international system exists “when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole.”¹¹ On the other hand, an international society “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”¹² Bull further asserted “that modern states have formed and continue to form not only a system of states but also an international society.”¹³ The transition of the international world from a system to a society represents an increased level of cooperation and an early step in the direction of amalgamation.

Given the existence of an international society, it becomes clear that Wendt’s discussion of the overarching role of culture certainly applies among states in much the same way it does within states. He averred that culture provides for basic needs and works to stabilize expectations. “By reducing transaction costs [culture] helps solve the otherwise enormous practical problems of getting anything done. Most of the time we take the performance of these functions for granted, and in part that is the point, since it is the ability to treat culture as a given that enables us to go about our business. Often it is only when someone violates our shared expectations, ‘breaching’ the social order, that we realize how important they are in constituting who we are and what we

¹¹ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 9.

¹² Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 13.

¹³ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 22-23.

do.”¹⁴ Culture creates certain expectations for how states in the international world are to behave and these expectations in turn make international interaction possible. It improves the predictive power of states in prisoners’ dilemmas regarding the likely decisions of fellow states.

Having established the existence of the society of states, Bull went on to answer the question of how order is maintained in world politics. His answer reflects the hierarchy of needs discussed in Chapter 2 and further reveals the requirement for cooperation on the basis of self-interest. Bull said,

The maintenance of order in any society presupposes that among its members... there should be a sense of *common interests* [emphasis in original] in the elementary goals of social life. Thus the facts of human vulnerability to violence and proneness to resort to it lead men to the sense of common interests in restricting violence. The fact of human interdependence for material needs leads them to perceive a common interest ensuring respect for agreements. The facts of limited abundance and limited human altruism lead them to recognise [sic] common interests in stabilizing possession. This sense of common interests may be the consequence of fear. It may derive from a rational calculation that the limitations necessary to sustain elementary goals of social life must be reciprocal... it may express a sense of common values rather than a sense of common interests.¹⁵

The functioning of self-interested cooperation in international politics brings us to the question of specific mechanisms by which the culture, the social incentives, and coercive functions take hold at the international level.

Social Incentives Among States

The rise of the international society from the international system represents evolution in the international environment and shows how peaceful international change can occur. Gilpin recognized the driving

¹⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 187.

¹⁵ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 51-52.

factor in such change when he pointed out that “in the absence of shared values and interests, the mechanism of peaceful change has little chance of success.”¹⁶ It is exactly the growth of shared values and interests that enable peaceful change to occur and one explicit mechanism to build and capitalize on such commonality is international regimes.

Regimes can be thought of as social incentives at the international level that encourage cooperation by reducing transaction costs, providing Olson’s outside incentives and coercion, and building common international culture. Robert Keohane wrote extensively on the role of regimes based on a generally accepted definition as, “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations...”¹⁷ International regimes are normally manifest in the form of international institutions, treaties, and agreements. The real value of regimes is that they have the same effect as other social incentives and according to Helen Milner, “facilitate cooperation through the functions they perform for states: they allow the decentralized enforcement of agreements, improve each other’s information about the behavior of others, and lower transaction costs. Regimes thus reduce states’ uncertainty and mitigate their fears that others will defect, thus inducing cooperation.”¹⁸ Regimes thus arise for the purpose of securing the mutual benefits of cooperation, but just as we saw with social incentives below the international level, they do not arise for the good of the group. Rather they exist and are abided by for the good of individual adherents.

Keohane recognized this dynamic in his claim that, “states do not typically cooperate out of altruism or empathy with the plight of others,

¹⁶ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 209.

¹⁷ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. 1st Princeton classic ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 57.

¹⁸ Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 25.

nor for the sake of what they conceive as ‘international interests.’ They seek wealth and security for their own people, and search for power as a means to these ends... States build international regimes in order to promote mutually beneficial cooperation... International regimes... do not override self-interest but rather affect calculations of self-interest.”¹⁹ Thus, just as Adam Smith’s pin-makers collaborated only for the benefit of each individual, states create and adhere to regimes for the specific benefit the regime yields to their members.

A primary benefit of regimes in this regard is an increased commonality of information. As we saw in the prisoners’ dilemma, a decision to cooperate is based in large part on the level of confidence in the intentions of the other player. Recognizing this situation among states, Keohane pointed out the overarching value of the shared information that regimes enable. On this idea, he said that, “As the principles and rules of a regime reduce the range of expected behavior, uncertainty declines, and as information becomes more widely available, the asymmetry of its distribution is likely to lessen... In general, regimes make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being double-crossed.”²⁰ Again, if the two players in a prisoners’ dilemma are members of an organized-crime family, it is less likely that either will defect.

While international regimes of all types increase the level of shared expectations, they do not enforce them in the strict sense of the word. According to Keohane, “Regimes contribute to cooperation not by implementing rules that states must follow, but by changing the context within which states make decisions based on self-interests. International regimes are valuable to governments not because they enforce binding rules on others (they do not), but because they render it possible for governments to enter into mutually beneficial agreements

¹⁹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, x-xi.

²⁰ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 97.

with one another.”²¹ A realist might point out that governments can always withdraw or refuse to abide by a regimes norms or rules. This is true, but in doing so, a government would pay a price in legitimacy. Keohane provided just such an example when he pointed out that under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade states are forbidden to target tariffs at another specific state. While no world government exists to enforce the rule, the likelihood of mass retaliation prevents states from taking such illegitimate actions.²² Similarly, he pointed out that “Governments worry about establishing bad precedents because they fear their own rule-violations will promote rule violations by others, even if no specific penalty is imposed on themselves.”²³ For this reason, states rarely seek to establish a reputation as a defector.

Furthermore, regimes can build to the point that a sense of morality itself can intercede on state behavior. “Some regimes may contain norms and principles justified on the basis of values extending beyond self-interest, and regarded as obligatory on moral grounds by governments.”²⁴ To violate morality as defined by the international society can have powerful repercussions and as such serve as another informal enforcement mechanism.

Another benefit of regimes stems from the costs associated with the initiation of interactions between and among states. By establishing avenues of interaction and expectations of continued cooperation, regimes reduce the transaction costs of subsequent cooperative international endeavors. When a relationship and avenues of coordination have already been established, the likelihood of cooperation in new areas grows. Milner discussed this phenomenon and provided an example when she pointed out that the existence of the European

²¹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 13.

²² Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 89.

²³ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 105.

²⁴ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 58.

Community as an organization made European monetary cooperation easier to initiate. The European Community provided a framework and method of bargain across multiple issues. Countries already cooperating on one issue are more likely to cooperate on new issues.²⁵ In this way, regimes spread the benefits of cooperation beyond the goals that initially created them. States join and build regimes that limit their freedom in exchange for predictability and stability in the international society. These are the same reasons that individuals establish states and support laws and other social incentives that improve stability and predictability. States submit to the protocols of the regimes they join for similar reasons that individuals obey laws. A limitation of freedom is worthwhile to the extent that the same limits are imposed upon others in the society. As states modify their policies and decisions in deference to regimes that limit freedom of action, states gradually sacrifice sovereignty for the greater benefits that regime participation yields.

Surrendering Sovereignty

Recognizing that policy adjustment defines cooperation as discussed in Chapter 2, Milner pointed out its effect with regard to sovereignty and noted that “once committed to international cooperation, political actors are prevented from manipulating some policy variable that they otherwise could.”²⁶ Acts of cooperation represent small sacrifices of sovereignty in exchange for the benefit garnered through cooperation. As Arnold Wolfers put it, “Cooperation means sacrificing some degree of national independence with a view toward coordinating, synchronizing, and rendering mutually profitable some political, military, or economic policies that cooperating nations intend to pursue.”²⁷

²⁵ Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 25.

²⁶ Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 46.

²⁷ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 27.

The assertion made in Chapter 2 that state autonomy is a means to an end rather than an inherent state interest becomes very important at this stage. It is the assumption of autonomy as an inherent state interest that presents a massive barrier to any consideration of amalgamation of states. However, it is the assertion of this thesis that, despite even some self-imposed barriers, states will, in the long run, choose the course that best translates fulfillment of survival, security, and esteem to its constituent individuals – even if this means sacrificing autonomy at the state level. As important as regimes are in preventing defection, Milner noted the primacy of domestic needs when she asserted that, “cooperation among nations is affected less by fears of other countries’ relative gains or cheating as by its *domestic distributional consequences* of cooperative endeavors.”²⁸ As with any group, what matters most to a state is the needs of its members. Autonomy is not an interest in and of itself. It provides a means to beneficial ends and in instances where other means prove more beneficial the trade off is worthwhile.

A realist may claim that the power of the state is not eroded by regimes and international agreements because states retain the ability to opt out of such arrangements or they may unilaterally disallow transnational interactions. However, the fact that they increasingly do not illustrates that the benefits of this sort of cooperation outweighs any loss in sovereignty or control. Keohane noted how likely states are to restrict their own options for greater benefit. He said that, “It can... make sense to accept obligations that restrain one’s own freedom of action in unknown future situations if others also accept responsibilities, since the effect of these reciprocal actions is to reduce uncertainty.”²⁹ Reciprocity is again critical to cooperation. States do not relinquish freedom kicking and screaming. They gradually hand over control to

²⁸ Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 9 [emphasis in original].

²⁹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 17.

reap the mutual rewards these transnational and international arrangements bring.

Another potential counter argument points out that states do still defect and they do still take advantage of one another. Gilpin took this tack and noted that, “In the modern era, nations have frequently had more to gain through economic efficiency, cooperation, and international division of labor than through war, imperialism, and exclusive economic spheres. Yet economic interdependence and the promise of mutual gain have not eliminated the efforts of nations to advance their own interests at the expense of others and at the expense of the overall economic efficiency of the global economy.”³⁰ Gilpin’s point is well taken.

Defections do still occur, but their existence does not show that they continue unabated by mutual benefit. The fact that states at times still pursue interests at the expense of others may simply mean that they inappropriately aligned their perceived interests. In other words, the fact that defection was the selected course does not show it was the most profitable course. Defectors still exist, but the overall direction of the system is making it harder for them to flourish. Those who choose to cooperate rather than defect generally reap greater rewards in the long run.

International regimes and the growing realization that cooperation pays have combined with communication advances to change the ways individuals and states interact. Hanson pointed out that “new forms of organizing and networking across national boundaries have evolved, expanding the arena of political action beyond the nation-state and thus changing the nature of world politics.”³¹ How difficult is it to imagine the formalization of the web of international agreements becoming increasingly solidifying and binding as they begin serving the needs of

³⁰ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 220.

³¹ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 213.

individuals in the same ways that states currently meet the needs of its constituent individuals?

The role of regimes, as they solidify and expand, begins to look increasing like the role currently played by the state. Commenting on the role of the state, Wendt pointed out that “state structures are usually institutionalized in law and official regulations. This stabilizes expectations among the governed about each other’s behavior, and since shared expectations are necessary for all but the most elementary forms of social interaction, state structures help make modern society possible. Institutionalization also stabilizes expectations about the use of force within the society by state actors, who are empowered by law to use violence to enforce rules.”³² While regimes are not yet institutionalized by governmentally-enforced laws and regulations, they remain at least informally enforceable and they do stabilize the expectations that allow the cooperation that defines society. The rapid and continued growth of regimes demonstrates the major role that they play and indicates their utility in building international cooperation.

The growth of the number international regimes has accelerated since the creation of the state system. The authors of “The International Regimes Database as a Tool for the Study of International Cooperation” highlighted the value of multiple data points to explain and examine the “remarkable growth in the number and variety of international regimes.”³³ International treaties, agreements, institutions, and organizations all reflect the strength and viability of international regimes. As measurable reflections of regimes, growth in the number of international organizations, treaties, and institutions reflect a growth in international cooperation. At the turn of the Twentieth Century, there

³² Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 203.

³³ Helmut Breitmeier, Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zürn, “The International Regimes Database as a Tool for the Study of International Cooperation”, December 1996, online: <http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/WP-96-160.pdf>, accessed: 14 May 2011.

were 36 international government organizations, but by 2000, there were 7,350.³⁴ “In the period of 1648 to 1750 there were 86 multilateral treaties, whereas in the years 1976 to 1995 there were over 1,600 treaties of which 100 created international organizations.” Also of note has been the expansion of regional institutions alongside the global ones. The most dramatic growth has been in Europe and Asia, but other regions are also forming regional regimes and institutions.³⁵ Regimes are perhaps the most visible example of international cooperation, but they represent only a portion of the forces at work that are bringing the world ever closer to the next amalgamation.

Evolution of the International Society

The international society is evolving in the same way lower forms of life are evolving. Actors change the system according to their perceived interests. Gilpin showed the similarity of the international society to other societies when he noted that, “An international system is established for the same reason that any social or political system is created; actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic, or other types of interests.”³⁶ Wendt reminded us of how particular interests form societies and how this formation mirrors biological self-organization. He pointed out that both the state and the human body “are constituted by self-organizing internal structures, the one social, the other biological.”³⁷ Self-interested cooperation drives self-organization.

Also on the emergence of organization, Waltz similarly linked the pin makers from Chapter 1 to the international system noting that, “Adam Smith’s great achievement was to show how self-interested, greed

³⁴ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, eds., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 22.

³⁵ Held et. al, *Global Transformations*, 23.

³⁶ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 9.

³⁷ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 198.

driven actions may produce good social outcomes... Each man seeks his own end, and, in doing so, produces a result that was no part of his intention. Out of the mean ambition of its members, the greater good of society is produced... International-political systems, like markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units... No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained. International-political systems, like markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended.”³⁸ While the organization of international order emerges from the biological engine of self-interest, human intelligence provides a major advantage over nature acting alone.

Intelligence provides humans the ability to take a short cut to natural selection by selecting strategies that provide the most benefits rather than having to wait for natural selection to eliminate unsuccessful strategies and traits. Joel Garreau highlighted this distinction and said that, “by learning to do what-ifs in our head, we rapidly surpassed natural evolution. We discovered we could solve problems thousands of times faster than nature could.”³⁹ This makes societal change analogous to breeding animals. Natural selection will find solutions that are ever more effective. However, as Axelrod pointed out, “Foresight is not necessary... but without foresight, evolution can take a very long time.”⁴⁰ Humans can choose to eliminate harmful or unproductive societal traits just as we can breed undesirable traits out of race horses. According to Wendt, “In nature variation comes from genetic mutation; here [in the international system] it comes from unit-level changes in the structure of state-society relations and from strategic choices of foreign policy

³⁸ Kenneth Neal, *Realism and International Politics*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 90-91.

³⁹ Joel Garreau, *Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies – and What it Means to be Human* (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2005), 72.

⁴⁰ Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* Rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 188.

decision-makers.”⁴¹ These decisions make up what Boyd and Richerson also called cultural selection or “the transmission of determinants of behavior from individual to individual, and thus from generation to generation, by social learning, imitation or some other similar process.”⁴² To Wendt, “cultural selection works directly through [actors] capacities for cognition, rationality, and intentionality.”⁴³ Cultural selection operates at the international level in the same way that it operates at the national level and below. States in the international society continually make adjustments to the society according to their perceived interests. As in the prisoners’ dilemma, they cooperate to the extent that cooperation meets their needs and cooperation begets more cooperation as Axelrod’s shadow of the future grows.

This brings us once again to the ramifications of the realist’s view of the world. As Wendt opined, “The uniquely Realist hypothesis about national interests is that they have a material rather than social basis, being rooted in some combination of human nature, anarchy, and/or brute material capabilities.”⁴⁴ Francis Fukuyama pointed out that for the realist, “underneath the skin of ideology is a hard core of great power national interest that guarantees a fairly high level of competition and conflict between nations... Conflict inheres in the international system as such, and that to understand the prospects for conflict one must look at the shape of the system -- for example, whether it is bipolar or multipolar -- rather than at the specific character of the nations and regimes that constitute it. This school... assumes that aggression and expansionism are universal characteristics of human societies rather

⁴¹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 319.

⁴² Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, “Culture and Cooperation” in *Beyond Self Interest* ed. Jane J. Mansbridge. (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1990), 102.

⁴³ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 324.

⁴⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 113-114.

than the product of specific historical circumstances.”⁴⁵ Giving no credence to the value of social incentives to predict the other’s actor’s behavior, this view would tend to prescribe defection as a default position.

Wendt addressed the wisdom of this position. He said, “The question is whether states’ knowledge about each other’s intentions is sufficiently uncertain to warrant worst-case assumptions, and in most cases today the answer is no... One could argue that policy-makers’ complacency is irrational, that because of anarchy they *should* treat each other as enemies, but that actually seems far more irrational than acting on the basis of the vast experience which suggests otherwise.”⁴⁶ Past experience shapes predictions of the future. States trust one another and do not default to the enemy stance, again because of Axelrod’s shadow of the future and the social incentives that the international society has developed to extend that shadow.

Growing Similarity

As Gilpin pointed out, the more similarity that exists between groups, the more likely they are to increase cooperation.⁴⁷ Axelrod also noted that stereotypes affect expectations of cooperation and therefore similarity helps ensure the benefits of cooperation.⁴⁸ The obvious diversity in the world therefore portends great difficulty in breeding cooperation. The barriers discussed at the opening of this chapter often create and reinforce the perception of differences. However, we do see evolution at work enabling the emergence of cooperation despite diversity in the world.

The argument that cultural differences can or necessarily do lead to conflict, admits that a growing similarity in culture would alternatively

⁴⁵ Francis Fukuyama, “Have We Reached the End of History?” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), 18-19.

⁴⁶ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 281.

⁴⁷ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 209.

⁴⁸ Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation*, 146-50.

lead to a reduction in conflict. This is the basis of the Samuel Huntington's influential argument regarding the impending or some would say, ongoing, 'clash of civilizations.' Globalization, while at times highlighting cultural differences, is in other areas homogenizing culture to a degree.

Wendt asserted that shared culture already exists somewhat at the international level, evidenced by the fact that states are able to trust one another to not attack, but he also pointed out that,

This [restraint] does not by itself generate collective identity, since without positive incentives to identify self-restraint may simply lead to indifference... The key problem with this logic, as emphasized by Realists, is our inability to read each others' minds and thus uncertainty about whether they will in fact restrain themselves in the absence of third party constraints. This problem is especially serious in a self-help system where the costs of mistaken inference can be fatal. Yet despite limited telepathic abilities, in point of fact human beings do manage to make correct inferences about each other's – even strangers' – intentions, much, even most, of the time. Society would be impossible if this were not the case. Helping us make such inferences is one of the main things that culture, shared knowledge, is for.⁴⁹

The broadening of a shared culture can help break down some of the social barriers to amalgamation. Cultural globalization is gradually giving larger and larger portions of the world more common cultural ground. Entertainment provides an obvious example of cultural globalization. Hanson pointed out the absolute domination of the US entertainment industry around the world.⁵⁰ While US hegemony is in many ways creating some cultural commonality, the phenomenon of globalization is reaching into nearly every aspect of life to tie individuals around the world together.

⁴⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 359-60.

⁵⁰ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 208.

Globalization

Since the establishment of the state system, there has been an overall shift in the distribution of power in the system. While the state remains by far the predominant feature of the international landscape, other structures and forces are contravening its monopoly on power. Pointing out the revolutionary role that communication technology is having on the world, Hanson claimed that, “Enhanced information and communication capabilities increase productivity, facilitate international commerce, and foster growth in a global economy. Increased transparency from multiple, globalized media makes authoritarian governments more difficult to maintain and all governments are more accountable to their citizens. Electronic networks facilitate the organization and efforts of transnational coalitions to influence the policy agendas of governments and international organizations.”⁵¹ In many ways, modern communication and transportation technologies are bringing the citizens of varied states into increasing contact and allowing them gradually to tear down Darwin’s artificial barriers that “prevent... sympathies from extending to the men of all nations and races.”⁵² Hanson also highlighted that, “More people today have access to more diverse sources of information (and entertainment) than ever before, as well as a greater capacity to influence national and international agendas. Common interests and concerns are more easily shared across national boundaries, and the organization of collective action, even across great distances is more feasible. The conduct of international relations is a more public affair, and leaders are under greater scrutiny from more sources.”⁵³

The effect of these technologies is indeed impressive, but this is not the first period in history that communication technology contributed to

⁵¹ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 5.

⁵² Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 188.

⁵³ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 221.

a dizzying pace of change in the international system. Catalysts are often required for societal amalgamation. Gilpin highlighted the fact that, “In many instances the great social and political upheavals throughout history have been preceded by major advances in the technology of transportation and communication.”⁵⁴ More specifically, Hanson pointed out that, the printing press was a catalyst to the establishment of the nation-state system. It undermined the Catholic Church’s monopoly on the written word and therefore its grip on power. Further, by giving rise to vernacular languages over Latin, the new technology helped produce a “sense of group identity [that] gradually evolved into the ideology of nationalism.”⁵⁵

The aforementioned growth of liberal democracy also represents a homogenization of the world’s citizenry. A more standardized view of expected state behavior is emerging as more citizens of the world come to value and realize individual rights and the freedoms of representative government. States that are more similar are more likely to cooperate. Democratic Peace Theory indeed holds that the historical separate peace among liberal democracies means that “as the number of Liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest.”⁵⁶ This hopeful ideal is appealing, but it does seem unlikely that even democratic states will altogether cease to misaligning perceived and actual interests. It is quite conceivable, however, that growing similarity of governance will decrease defections among states.

Another indicator of globalization’s impact is expressed in the virtual explosion in the number of international non-government organizations (INGO). From 1900-2000, the number of INGOs grew from

⁵⁴ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 56.

⁵⁵ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 16.

⁵⁶ Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 1997), 256.

176 to 51,500.⁵⁷ This rapid growth illustrates the ability and willingness of individual citizens to look beyond the state to meet needs and a move toward greater cooperation among the members of different states. There is also indication that INGOs are not only multiplying, but also becoming more influential in government policies. Elisabeth Freidman, Kathryn Hochstetler, and Ann Marie Clark studied the role of INGOs in United Nations conferences and found evidence of “NGOs as regular and consistent influences on states in world politics... Whereas earlier conferences in the 1970s governments could ignore NGOs, they became increasingly visible, vocal, and effective with each passing conference...” These results led them to note that, “these conferences have offered a platform for sustained, peaceful challenge to the monopolization of global affairs by states.”⁵⁸ Individuals around the world are increasingly less reliant upon state structures for interaction and political action. As the individual’s options for receiving and transmitting ideas and information continue to evolve and grow, and as self-interested cooperation and amalgamation continue, could these dynamics represent a process of overall improvement of human life on earth?

Progress

Through all of the evolution and change highlighted by this thesis to this point, the notion of progress has been implicit. This thesis fundamentally disagrees with the realists who claim that “progress in international politics is impossible” and rather sides with Wendt that the international system has progressed in the last 1,500 years or so.⁵⁹ In light of this view, the question that begs an answer becomes: What is progress? Wendt vaguely described progress in terms of more peaceful

⁵⁷ Held et. al, *Global Transformations*, 22.

⁵⁸ Elisabeth Friedman, Ann Marie J. Clark, and Kathryn Hochstetler, “The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women,” *World Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Oct. 1998), 1-35.

⁵⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 311.

interaction among states, and more rights for the individual.⁶⁰ This thesis builds on Wendt's definition, and modifies it to encompass an international system that may not be state centric and to include individual needs beyond rights. Individual needs of survival, security, and esteem, as defined in Chapter 2, provide the measure of progress. Progress here means a greater meeting of needs for a greater number of individuals. A change that meets the same level of needs for a larger number of people is considered progress. A change that increases the number of needs met for static number of people also represents progress. Wendt's concern for peaceful interaction and individual rights is captured by this broader definition, because more peaceful interaction meets more survival needs and individual rights are included as precondition to need satisfaction. Therefore, greater freedom allows greater need fulfillment.

The claim that improvement has occurred may seem obvious, but it remains disputed. A more thorough and concrete exploration of progress will shed light on some specific examples and show that the international system is indeed progressing. If the role of social structure, to include the international society, is to meet the needs of individuals, then the climb up the hierarchy of needs will show progress in that structure.

The first and most basic need to address is survival. A decrease in violence yields an improvement in meeting the survival need. Harvard professor, Steven Pinker started in Biblical times and tracked the steady drop in overall violence since. He pointed out the commonality in early times of such now-repugnant practices as cruelty used for entertainment, the death penalty for minor crime, burnings at the stake, human sacrifice, and myriad acts of violence that were, at earlier times in history, common place and completely socially acceptable. In contrast

⁶⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 312.

to modern times where such behavior is extremely rare or non-existent in the West, far less common elsewhere and normally hidden from view when they do occur, and condemned when discovered. Violence is far less acceptable today than at any other point in history and continues to grow less so.⁶¹

War represents an obvious failure to meet individual survival needs. Yet across the history of humankind, the percentage of deaths due to war has fallen along with the acceptability of violence, despite recent intervening factors. High technology combined with state cohesion manifest in an increasing ability of states mobilizes entire societies for war. The resulting high casualty counts during Twentieth Century wars would seem to belie any claim of progress in terms of survival needs met. However, the Twentieth Century's war death rate of 1% was small compared to the 13-15% rates when small hunter-gather tribes were the largest social integron.⁶² The cost of defection in the last century was extremely high in terms of casualties, but at an individual level, the Twentieth Century still resulted in overall improvement from earlier times in terms of stable environment, individual freedoms, and self-determination.

Governments have also improved their ability to meet the survival needs internally. Homicide rates have fallen as well as war death rates. Manuel Eisner studied historical homicide rates in Europe and reported sharp declines across the continent. European homicides fell from 32 per 100,000 citizens in the Thirteenth Century to 1.4 per 100,000 by end of the Twentieth.⁶³ Not only are individuals safer in their societies, they are also generally more affluent.

⁶¹ S. Pinker, "A History of Violence," *The New Republic*, 236, 19 (March 2007), 18-21.

⁶² Samuel Bowles, "Group Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism," *Science*, 314, 1569, (2006), 1572.

⁶³ Manuel Eisner, "Long-term Historical Trends in Violent Crime," *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 30 pp. 83-142 (2000), 99.

Chapter 2 described how money is able to meet needs at multiple levels. As such, it gives an overall indication of improvement. “Annual per capita income in Western Europe at the time of Christ was \$450 in today’s dollars.” By 1820 it was \$1,269 and by 2005 it was \$17,456. “Just in the last half of the 20th Century, the world’s gross domestic product doubled almost three times in constant dollars. The world’s exports doubled six and a half times in constant dollars during that period.”⁶⁴ “At the global level the percentage of people living on less than one dollar a day has declined from 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2001.”⁶⁵ While this decline was not evenly distributed around the world and some regions have seen slight inclines, it is impossible to say that more people have not met more needs.

Garreau gave a snapshot of how societal progress has improved the lives of humankind in recent centuries. “Even 200 years ago, 98 or 99 percent of human beings lived lives of utter desperation. Extreme poverty. Extreme labor. Spending all their time to prepare an evening meal. Extremely disaster prone. No social safety nets. Now at least an increasing portion of human civilization is free of that level of desperation. So our ability to appreciate arts and music and to have stable relationships is increasing. That was relatively difficult even 200 years ago, let alone thousands of years ago.”⁶⁶ As human societies have increased cooperation through division of labor and amalgamation, so have they increased their overall stability, security, and standard of living that stretches across all three levels of the hierarchy of needs. Financial changes provide a satisfyingly quantifiable measure of change, but the needs of esteem and Maslow’s prerequisite conditions of freedom can shed further light on the direction of human evolution.

⁶⁴ Garreau, *Radical Evolution*, 57.

⁶⁵ United Nations Human Development Report, 2005 http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR05_chapter_1.pdf, 34.

⁶⁶ Garreau, *Radical Evolution*, 93.

Garreau quoted Jaron Lanier as he detailed what he called a “moral progress,” showing how social incentives are providing for the meeting of more and more needs. He suggests imagining this progress on a graph to determine its direction. “Should you start with the revolutionary proposition that ‘all men are created equal’ in 1776... you can then plot the graph of increasing dignity and autonomy through the abolition of slavery... women gaining the right to vote, the abolition of legal racial discrimination... American sympathy for those we were supposed to be at war with in Vietnam, then widespread acceptance of both sexes being treated equally, the breaking down of legal barriers against gays...”⁶⁷ The graph that Lanier proposed would likely resemble the stock market graph from our introduction. There would be certain dips, fits, and starts – the Inquisition, imperialism, and the Holocaust among others. However, taken in the long view, it is possible to imagine that our descendants may one day view a football game or rugby match in the same way we now judge Roman gladiatorial games. Our sense of morality on the whole is adjusting to meet more needs for more individuals.

It is important to keep in mind that the path of human progress is merely an inextricable subset of universal evolution and highlighted the role that cultural selection has played throughout human history. Garreau gave a reminder of evolution’s long march and described how human intelligence and cultural selection are accelerating the process. “To get from the formation of the Earth to the first multicellular organism took perhaps 4 billion years... Getting from walking erect to humans painting on cave walls ... took 4 million years. Getting from cave paintings to the first permanent settlements took some 10,000 years. Getting from settlements to the invention of writing... took about 4,000 years. At that point, biological evolution was trumped by cultural

⁶⁷ Gareau, *Radical Evolution*, 213.

evolution... As humans increasingly became capable of acting collectively, they could make advances in the arts, sciences and economics far beyond the capabilities of the individual.”⁶⁸ These advances in arts, sciences and economics represent higher level needs. They occurred as a result as Adam Smith said, a “desire of bettering our condition,” highlighted in Chapter 2.

The spread of liberal democracy also represents progress on two levels: one as a trailing indicator and the second as a cause itself. First, as noted in Chapter 1, a certain level of development is necessary for a democracy to flourish. The spread of democracy therefore represents a trailing indication of affluence whose benefits were previously noted. Second, as a causal mechanism for progress, liberal democracy provides the precondition of freedom and fulfills esteem needs of the population through self-determination. Autocracy and imperialism rely on subjugation and control of the population or subjects. Liberal democracy, by definition, puts the population in control of government as opposed to the reversed domination and suppression more common among other forms of government. Prior to the American and French revolutions, nearly the entire world population was subjugated to a government. Today nearly 60 percent of the world population selects its own leadership and more directly control their own fate, fulfilling security and esteem needs while building upon the precondition of freedom.

With learning considered an esteem need, Hanson described how its spread has progressed through time. “A quick backward glance suggests that there is a progressive trend toward the expansion of human knowledge, the conquest of time and space, and the democratization of communication... Only 4 to 5 percent of the European population could read when the first books circulated in the fifteenth century; 82 percent of the world’s population above the age of

⁶⁸ Garreau, *Radical Evolution*, 57.

fifteen was literate in 2007, according to the World Bank.”⁶⁹ The expansion of knowledge meets esteem needs, enables further meeting of lower level needs, and contributes immeasurably to the overall human condition.

Human life improves when more of its needs are met. To claim that fewer or no more needs are met today than in earlier ages would be to ignore reality or to confound the definition of progress. The quality of life for the individual human on average has clearly improved since the emergence of the species. If humans did not generally agree that their lives were indeed improving or improvable, they would not be trying so hard to improve it.

The international system is part and parcel to evolution. As humankind improves its condition, it finds improved means to further progress. Cooperation emerged from this search as did governments and the international system. Each continues to evolve to this end. Ideally, we could put progress objectively on a graph with numbers that show data like life expectancy, per capita income, hours of leisure per hour of labor, or average height etc. Such a graph would likely show a stuttered rise resembling the stock market chart discussed in the Introduction. This simple directionality makes anticipation of the future a feasible proposition.

Next Steps

The overall objective of this thesis has not been to predict specific outcomes, but rather to highlight the fact that human society is ever evolving and doing so in a broadly predictable way. However, to assert any predictability at all invites speculation regarding the implications for the future. The only surety in international relations is captured in the old idiom that the only constant is change, except that in this case we have shown the change, at least to date, has been directional. That is,

⁶⁹ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 13.

change has proceeded on a path of increasing cooperation and repeated amalgamation that has yielded progress for the human race.

The current status of human societal evolution is dominated by a society of states that are becoming increasingly intertwined through regimes, commerce, INGOs, culture, and technology. The evolution of the society seems unlikely to stop and a logical extrapolation leads to a single world government and beyond. However, as certain as change is, the amalgamation of states is unlikely to leap from the current system directly to a one world government. It will likely change in stages to ever-larger structures. Wendt described the evolution to a world state as inevitable and proposed “five stages, each responding to the instabilities of the one before: a system of states, a society of states, world society, collective security, and the world state.”⁷⁰

In contrast to Wendt’s thesis of proposed stages, Bull considered a wider array of possibilities that included de-evolution. Bull suggested that the international society may devolve back into a system of states and even that the system may disintegrate.⁷¹ However, Bull also considered the possibility of a world government and a new medievalism of “overlapping or segmented authority.”⁷² In this situation, state sovereignty would coexist with other lines of loyalty, control, and authority. Bull ultimately rejected any impending breakdown of the state system in favor of neo-medievalism, but went on to provide “five features of contemporary world politics that provide prima facie evidence of such a trend.”⁷³ Bull pointed out the regional integration of states, the disintegration of some states in favor of national identities, the rise of non-state actor violence, the growth of transnational organizations, and

⁷⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy,” (University of Chicago, January 2003), ii.

⁷¹ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 248-252.

⁷² Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 254.

⁷³ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 255.

“technological unification of the world.”⁷⁴ When viewed in the larger context of human evolution, Bull’s observations begin to take on a more de facto than prima facia character. Hanson also recognized that, “What seems to be emerging is a world of more complex loyalties and multilayered identities, posing new challenges for the nation-state.”⁷⁵ While Wendt went on a limb to guess “that a world state will emerge within 100 Years,” this thesis ventures no such guess, nor does it posit whether a neo-medieval system will dominate a more regional system in the relatively near term. As Chapter 4 will discuss, a regionally based system may already be on the rise. Regardless of which characteristic dominates, the basic assertion of this thesis is that the international environment has evolved, is still evolving, and will continue to evolve. However, unlike other progressive theories, this claim specifically denies an end state.

Ontogeny

A distinction must be made here between this thesis and that of several theorists who may be thought to share the idea of directional change in the international arena. This thesis departs abruptly from the theories of Marx, Fukuyama, Kant, and Wendt in that they all either prescribe or describe a world evolving toward some end state.⁷⁶ They claim that the greater human society is on some ontogenetic course toward adulthood. It seems clear that life on Earth has evolved since it came into existence 2,000 million years ago. What cataclysmic event,

⁷⁴ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 255-266.

⁷⁵ Hanson, *Information Revolution and World Politics*, 231. Referring to Held, David. McGrew, Anthony. Goldblatt, David. And Perraton, Jonathan eds., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

⁷⁶ Marx, in Michael L Morgan, ed., *Classics of Moral and Political Theory 4th Ed.*, Marx, Karl, *Critique of the Gotha Program* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2005), 1132. in Francis Fukuyama, “Have We Reached the End of History?” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), 24.

Kant in Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace : Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1997), 277.

Wendt in Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” ii, 51.

save the end of life on the planet, might cause this process to stop? What could drive some permanent stasis to suddenly arise? Each theorist provides their own answers to these questions, but to predict anything beyond continued evolution seems incredulous in the face of such a long track record of change. In this regard, this thesis merely seeks to point out the trends of the past and project them into the future. Since the emergence of humans on the planet, social structures have grown larger and more complex while quality of life has concurrently improved. The claim that this trend will continue should not seem as farfetched as an assertion that it has stopped or will do so at some point in the future.

Conflict and Common Enemies

The fact that this thesis has, so far, barely touched on the topic of conflict in the creation and maintenance of social structures is not intended to imply that conflict is not a major factor in such formation. Rather, this seeming omission is to suggest that conflict's role is but one catalyst of change and amalgamation with self-interest as the driving force. Indeed, since the time of Thucydides, when a common Persian enemy temporarily united the Hellenic city states, a common enemy has often helped smaller integrons bind together on the basis of their common interests.⁷⁷

It may be true that the next amalgamation will require such a catalyst before states will share sufficient interests to form up into larger integrons. Gilpin hinted to this idea when he noted that, "Global ecological problems, as well as resource constraints and limits to its growth, have placed on the world's agenda a set of pressing issues whose solutions are beyond the means of self-serving nation-states."⁷⁸ Another novel argument has presented that the "empire" of the United States

⁷⁷ Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. ed. Robert B. Strassler, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1996), 554.

⁷⁸ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 223.

hegemony will serve as a common enemy that will bring the rest of the world together to offset its power and exploitation of the world.⁷⁹ A common enemy may or not be required to support the next teaming up of integrations, but as we have seen, even if the fear of a common fate results in amalgamation, the new formation must continue to meet the needs of its individual members for it to remain viable.



⁷⁹ Terrence E. Paupp, *Exodus from Empire: The Fall of America's Empire and the Rise of the Global Community* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007), 5.

Chapter 4

International Evolution in the Twentieth Century

As frequent catalysts to international change, wars and their outcomes can provide a valuable overview of international change. The Twentieth Century presents a number of solid case studies to illustrate the assertions of the preceding three chapters. One century is admittedly a very short span of time to examine, given the insistence of this thesis that a long-term view of human history is required to evaluate international relations effectively. However, the focus on this one century provides several benefits. First, a review of all of human history in the span of this short thesis would neglect too much detail to be of use. One century represents a reasonable tradeoff between detail and inclusive span of time. Second, the Twentieth Century's outlines are familiar to most readers. Third, the use of a relatively short time span presents a hard case. That is, if the themes of this thesis are relevant over such a short timeframe, it is easier to imagine their application spanning multiple centuries. Finally, this particular century included major wars and corresponding changes to the international system that reveal the evolutionary aspects of the system.

Gilpin made a distinction among three types of international change. Systems change is the most dramatic and occurs when "change involves change in the character of the international system itself... the nature of the principle actors or diverse entities composing the system." A systems change occurs when the primary international actors change. "The rise and decline of the Greek city state system, the decline of the medieval European state system and the emergence of the modern European nation-state systems are examples of systems change."¹ A

¹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 41.

change in the international system that granted primacy to regional actors or a one world government over the nation-state would clearly constitute a systems change. However, less sweeping change would fall into another category.

Gilpin referred to systemic change as “a change within the system rather than a change of the system itself... It entails changes in the international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules and rights embodied in the system...”² This sort of change occurred in the Twentieth Century with the United States’ rise to world dominance, as well as with the emergence and subsequent fall of bipolarity. Because most changes in the international system fail to rise to this level, Gilpin defined a third type of change.

Interaction change refers to “modifications in the political, economic, and other interactions or processes among the actors in an international system... it usually does entail changes in the rights and rules embodied in the international system.”³ International regimes discussed in Chapter 3 primarily reflect interaction changes.

The international evolution described by this thesis occurs across each level of international change. Frequent interaction changes culminate in less frequent systemic changes which culminate in still less frequent systems changes. The last systems change occurred in the Seventeenth Century following the end of the Thirty Years War when the primary international actors changed to the nation-state. While other powerful actors existed at times since, they did not change the character of the system or the nature of the principle actors. The following examination of the Twentieth Century focuses primarily on interaction and systemic changes that occurred in conjunction with the outcome of the century’s primary conflicts and ends with the examination of a potential systems change tantamount to that of three centuries removed.

² Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 42.

³ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 43.

The outcomes of World War I (WWI), World War II (WWII), and the Cold War have been widely researched, studied, and critiqued in the literature. Rather than recount the details of each outcome, this thesis will focus on the primary factors of each as they relate to the assertions laid out in the preceding chapters with emphasis on the evolutionary process of change.

John Ikenberry claimed that a dominant power after major war faces three options: 1) dominate and control the environment as much as possible, 2) withdraw from the world and just go home, or 3) build a mutually beneficial system of acquiescence that helps extend their position.⁴ This thesis largely supports Ikenberry's claim that such states have generally sought to find ways to retain their dominant positions by setting limits on their application of power. They bound themselves through institutional constraints in order to reassure lesser powers of their benign intent and to gain acquiescence to a longer-term advantage. With the leading state thus bound, secondary states are more likely to consent to leadership rather than seek to overthrow or counter balance against the greater power. This exercise of power through self-restraint has thus contributed to the growth and influence of international institutions.⁵ Such institutional growth reflects primarily interaction and systemic changes, but the end of the Cold War, may have initiated a much more dramatic systems change.

These case studies will illustrate how increasingly cooperative systemic changes occurred at the end of each war and how these systemic changes culminated at the end of the Cold War with the first steps of a systems change. It highlights uneven stair steps of progress toward amalgamation. The end of WWI brought measured progress and

⁴ John G. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 50.

⁵ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, xi, 19.

the prospect for increased cooperation to the international system. However, the realist approach of the resolution slowed progress, hindered cooperation, and set the stage for WWII. The end of WWII brought further progress. Its cooperative resolution laid the ground work for unprecedented international cooperation and set the stage for the peaceful resolution of the Cold War, whose conclusion introduced the potential for the next international systems change. The cases further show how every step in the staircase was built without regard for any evolutionary goal or change to the system. Rather, at every stage, each actor behaved according to their perceived interests to meet the needs of their populations.

World War I

Given the events of two decades since, the outcome of WWI is widely considered as a military victory, but diplomatic defeat.⁶ The war presents an early milestone in the evolution of the international system and it is valuable to view the failures of its resolution as lessons learned for the future. While the settlement largely set the stage for WWII twenty years later, WWI also resulted in some positive steps that relate to progress in the terms discussed in Chapter 3.

Progress

For the many tragedies and failures of WWI, there were positive outcomes at the systemic level that weakened the role of empire and monarchy in the international order. The weakening of dynastic and imperial rule as legitimate forms of government sped rapidly at the end of WWI. Subjugation began to give way to self-determination and domination and control yielded ever so slightly to individual freedom. The demise of the Hohenzollern, Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman dynasties, as well as the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires presented significant steps away from imperialism and

⁶ Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1944), 322.

set the stage for the enlargement of the liberal democratic sphere.⁷ Chapter 3 showed how the spread of liberal democracy acts as an indicator of financial progress and a direct enabler of esteem needs and Maslow's precondition of freedom. The decline of monarchy, empire, and subjugation represented systemic change and progress in the international system. Colonialism did not die with the close of the war, as the British and French maintained their empires while taking over portions of the Ottoman Empire. However, President Wilson stridently ensured the idea of self-determination entered into the international debate and even though the ideal was largely ignored at the end of the settlement, the move toward total rejection of colonialism writ large had begun.⁸ The colonial scourge would eventually be expunged, but not until resolution of the next world war.

Additionally, the League of Nations formally introduced the idea of a global institution on the international stage.⁹ The league not only set a precedent for a sweeping cooperative ideal, its creation and even its failure presented a trove of lessons learned for future attempts at implementing such an ideal.¹⁰ The drafters of the world order that emerged following WWII certainly learned from their post-WWI predecessors. The Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, for all their failures, provided the groundwork that helped secure more lasting and productive instruments at the close of WWII.

Diverging Settlement Approaches

The outcome of WWI can be thought of in terms of an opposition between a self-interested cooperative approach and a self-interested

⁷ John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War* (London, England: St. Martin's, 1972), 6.

⁸ Andrew Williams, *Failed Imagination? New World Orders of the Twentieth Century* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2007), 256.

⁹ Bernadotte E. Schmidt and Harold C. Vedeler, *The World in the Crucible* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 1984), 474-475.

¹⁰ Edwin Tetlow, *The United Nations: The First 25 Years* (London, England: Peter Owen Limited, 1970), 22.

realist approach to international relations. Viewed through the lens of the theory proposed in the preceding three chapters, the resolution of the conflict reveals potential rationale for the failures. At the end of the war, the United States stood as the greatest world power in the dominant position to influence the post war system.¹¹ President Wilson sought to retain his nation's position in a more stable world embodied in a highly institutionalized international society. The League of Nations was to be the key to the maintenance of order, acting as arbiter and enforcer of new peaceful order.¹² The devastated allies, France and Britain, on the other hand, were fearful of US abandonment in the face of their recovery. They also feared US domination of the international order at their expense. They sought a solution to both concerns by attempting to bind the United States to Europe. Thus, the institutional approach was designed to meet the interests of each primary player.¹³

Preliminary to the discussion of the peace talks that ended WWI, it is important to point out that the League of Nations was not a separate instrument from the Peace of Paris 1919. The league's creation was part and parcel to the treaty and this was so primarily at the insistence of President Wilson. European allies viewed America's vast resources as crucial to European recovery and with an eye toward US assistance; British and French delegations viewed this inclusion as a price they would have to pay to secure the support of the United States in the post-war arrangements.¹⁴ Wilson envisioned the league's marquis component to be a collective security agreement that would disallow injustice and aggression.¹⁵ The U.S. Senate's failure to ratify the peace treaty on the basis of league so resolutely championed by the U.S. president requires closer examination.

¹¹ Schmidt and Vedeler, *World in the Crucible*, 463.

¹² Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919* (New York, NY: Random House, 2001), 13.

¹³ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 118.

¹⁴ Bailey, *Wilson and the Lost Peace*, 180.

¹⁵ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1994), 226-227.

Opposition in the U.S. Senate viewed the league as a surrender of US sovereignty. The Senate decried Article 10: a requirement for automatic response in the case of aggression against another member of the league. This collective security aspect precluded US membership in the league.¹⁶ This reluctance to surrender sovereignty represents just the sort of barrier to international cooperation discussed in Chapter 3.

In Paris, at the armistice discussions, each of the key players - France, Britain, and the United States - sought to end the war in a way that would best meet their perceived interests. While much discussion centered on lofty ideals of world peace and the benefit of mankind, in the end, each state sought to meet the needs of their populace. The United States sought to lock other states into an international order of institutions that the United States, as the most powerful actor, would oversee.¹⁷

Alternatively, as a seeming continuation of their long-term enmity in a century-long iterated prisoner's dilemma tournament, France sought to repay German defection with French defection. To pay back German defection, the French sought not only disarmament, but also dismemberment of Germany. President Wilson rejected such extremes as sowing too much German indemnity to allow extended peace.¹⁸ Wilson's underlying perception of interests was premised on "not a balance of power, but a community of power. Not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."¹⁹ He sought to break down the balance of power politics that he blamed for so many of Europe's woes.²⁰ Perceived interests diverged among the allies regarding the balance between the

¹⁶ MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 492.

¹⁷ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 160.

¹⁸ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 233.

¹⁹ Woodrow Wilson, *Selected Addresses and Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Albert Bushnell Hart (Boni and Liveright Inc., New York, NY: 1918), 175.

²⁰ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 226.

reintegration of Germany into the community of states, and the retribution and restitution primarily sought by France.²¹

Tension between two distinct camps emerged. The camps could be labeled idealist and realist. The idealists represented by President Wilson and largely supported by Britain, perceived it in their interest and that of the world community to reintegrate Germany into the international society. This camp saw the League of Nations as a means to enable integration and also as a hedge against future aggression. In this view, a thriving, mutually dependant Germany would have little reason to lash out in the future and a properly constructed League of Nations could encourage cooperation and act as an arbiter to forestall any German desire to strike back at a later date.

Opposing this view, the realist camp, represented by France, sought not only to avenge their staggering war losses, but also to assure a favorable balance of power through Germany's material weakness in the future. From this perspective, a weak Germany would be unable to lash out in the future and the League of Nations could serve as a military alliance against Germany or at least as an avenue to keep Germany locked out of the club of powerful international players and generally subordinate on the world stage.²²

In the end, the compromise between these two camps produced a treaty that leaned very heavily toward French position to punish Germany and keep her too weak to be a future threat.²³ The outcome of such a treaty might have been predictable. As Thomas Bailey pointed out, "There are two ways of dealing with a fallen foe. The one is to make a peace so generous that he may forgive and forget. Whether Germany

²¹ MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 463, 470.

²² Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 75-76. And Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 132.

²³ Schmidt and Vedeler, *World in the Crucible*, 471, 475. And MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 465.

would have responded favorably to such treatment is still a matter of speculation, but there was a possibility that it might have worked. The second method is to impose a victor's peace, with the purpose of keeping the conqueror's heel on the enemy's neck as long as physically possible. This method is sure to breed another war."²⁴

Herbert Hoover, the future U.S. President, , who participated in the Versailles Treaty negotiations, spoke of the effect that social incentives, as barriers to cooperation, played in the negotiating process. He referred to, "the pestilence of [European] emotions" that prevented Wilsonian cooperation. Europe was infected with the "genes of a thousand years of hate and distrust, bred of racial and religious persecution and domination by other races... As a historian, Mr. Wilson was no doubt familiar with their age old background, but he did not seem to realize their dynamism."²⁵ Hoover recognized the difficulty in overcoming incentives built to support age-old social structures. It took a second war of global proportions and a new approach to international cooperation before the "thousand years of hate and distrust" would be overcome.

WWI resulted in a systemic change that left the United States at the fore of a new international order. This new order can be seen as a tiny step in the staircase of cooperation and amalgamation. Imperialism and autocracy began to decline, the leading world power was a liberal democracy, and the world was experimenting with an institutional approach to resolving conflict. However, the power balancing approach to international relations still dominated the order and the failure to bind the defeated powers into a cooperative international society created an environment for catastrophe on a scale beyond Wilson's greatest fears.

²⁴ Bailey, *Wilson and the Lost Peace*, 312-313.

²⁵ Herbert Hoover, *The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson* (London, England: Museum Press, 1958), 75-76.

World War II

If the conclusion of WWI provided an example of what not to do at the close of a major conflict, then the conclusion of WWII revealed what is possible with a cooperative approach to rebuilding order. This discussion must recognize that total defeat of the Axis powers and Allied occupation had a definite impact on implementation of post-war plans. However, the overall focus here is on the outcome of the war and the overall approach of the victors to affecting international change. Of course, to say that one outcome was better than the other requires another quick glance at the idea of progress discussed in Chapter 3. The systemic changes following WWII helped build international cooperation and represented a much larger step in the direction of amalgamation. This thesis further asserts that the outcome of WWII represented progress over that of WWI based on the net gain the resulting systemic changes permitted in the fulfillment of individual needs.

Progress

The claim of progress or improvement over the WWI settlement is largely agreed upon in the relevant literature, but a quick overview of the major outcomes will support the assertion. The WWII resolutions avoided a subsequent global war that the WWI post-war planners were unable to avoid. WWII also largely laid colonialism to rest while liberal democracy defeated and replaced Nazism, fascism, and imperialism in the resultant Western order. These adjustments within the international society helped create an order that, on the whole, provided greater security to a greater portion of the world. That is to say that the emergent Cold War remained largely cold. It allowed more individuals greater esteem through self-determination, and finally, the resolution greatly enlarged the sense of individual freedom that Maslow insisted upon as a prerequisite individual need.

Recognizing the obvious benefit of fascism's defeat, Francis Fukuyama pointed out the mechanism of its defeat and the enormity of

this outcome. His observation might similarly apply to the eventual annihilation of colonialism that also sprang from the WWII resolution. Fascism had actually started to take root in other parts of the world, but by the end of the war it was completely discredited everywhere. Other fascist strands existed outside of Japan and Germany after the war, but they quickly withered away on their own.²⁶ The war was resolved in such a way that removed the legitimacy of various forms of coercive and dominating rule that had hitherto been acceptable or at least tolerable in the international society. The death of fascism is difficult to view as anything but progress similar to the demise of a much longer held form of governance through domination and control.

The international renouncement of colonialism, with roots in Versailles, finally became a formal reality in the post WWII era. The self-determination that Wilson unsuccessfully championed in 1919 had become so universally adopted in 1945 that the UN Charter endorsed the principle and the UN eventually became a vehicle for advocacy of decolonization.²⁷ As an outcome of the war, the world had begun down the road toward total decolonization.

While it took decades for the British and French empires to completely disintegrate, their differing approaches toward doing so reflected the value of cooperation over defection. According to Williams, the British made the transition with much less turmoil than the French. The British employed the mechanism of the Commonwealth to give at least the appearance of cooperation with its former colonies. France, on the other hand, consistently approached its empire from a position of dominance rather than cooperation.²⁸ While the benefits of mutual cooperation do generally pay off on their own in the long run, any state

²⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "Have We Reached the End of History?" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), 10.

²⁷ Karen A. Mingst and Margaret, P. Karns, *The United Nations in the 21st Century* (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2007), 3.

²⁸ Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 268-269.

that relies on legitimacy or world opinion also recognizes the legitimacy that the cooperative approach infers from third party states and populations. The more the rest of the world views a state as cooperating with others, the less likely the rest of the world is to defect on that state in the future. The earned reputation extends the shadow of the future. Conversely, a state known for defection will be expected to defect again and will therefore have greater difficulty garnering cooperation.

Soviet-Western Orders

While some post-WWII developments clearly represent progress, particular aspects of the settlement complicate the examination. As opposed to the multi-polar order that resulted from WWI, the end of WWII brought about essentially two distinct world orders. The Soviet Union dominated and largely controlled one order, while the United States led without directly controlling the second, which was characterized by a complex set of Western institutions.²⁹ The remaining discussion of the war's outcome is framed first by the interaction between the Western Allies and the defeated belligerents, and second by the interaction between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union as the Cold War took shape.

Just as the WWI settlement became bifurcated between the realists and the idealists, the resolution to WWII can be viewed in a similar framework. The Western Allies constructed an order along idealistic lines of self-interested cooperation to include the defeated belligerents. However, the relationship between the Western order and the Soviet Union took on a decidedly realist character built around a balance of power and an evolving mutual defection loop that lasted until the end of the Cold War.

Before a more in-depth discussion of the Western Allies' dealings with one another, Germany, Italy, and Japan, it is important to account

²⁹ Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 142. And Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 163.

briefly for the non-cooperative nature of the Soviet-Western aspect of the war's resolution that initiated the Cold War. Scholars may disagree on which side defected first, but this thesis concurs with the broader school of thought that generally concludes that Stalin's *Realpolitik* approach manifest itself as diametrically opposed to the cooperative, liberal approach of the Western Allies; that a Soviet expansionist policy set off a mutual defection cycle with the Western Allies.³⁰ Arthur Schlesinger pointed how fundamental differences regarding freedom, rights of the individual, and overall world view characterized the developing dichotomy.³¹ Soviet defection begat Western defection and as a later section of this thesis will discuss, it took decades of gradual détente for the resulting Cold War to yield the slightest benefits of cooperation. In contrast to this mutual defection, the Western Allies took immediate steps to build institutions and regimes able to secure self-interested cooperation.

The Western Allies' overall approach to the dual world orders focused on cooperation with the defeated belligerents while punishing the defection of their former Soviet ally. Cooperative economic and security arrangements characterized the dual track that the Western Allies took after the war. Wolfram Hanrieder called the approach "double containment: the containment of the Soviet Union at arm's length, and of West Germany with an embrace."³² Contrasting sharply with the approach toward post-WWI Germany, the allies this time sought to build up their former enemies rather than keep them weak. Through robust cooperative arrangements, the West presented an enlarged power to the Soviets, while at the same time offering an accommodating hand to West

³⁰ Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *Semblance of Peace*, 9, 556. And Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 398-422.

³¹ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "Some Lessons from the Cold War," in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 54.

³² Wolfram P. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 6.

Germany, Italy, and Japan, raising the reward of cooperation, and diminishing their temptation to defect.

Allied Western Order

As with the close of WWI, the victors again sought an order that would fulfill their specific individual interests. The United States sought to establish a system of robust institutions that would not only serve American interests, but also sufficiently benefit its allies to acquiesce to US leadership of the Western order. To this end, the United States sought out and created mutual interests.³³ Also, similar to the post WWI period, European allies once again found themselves more fearful of US abandonment than of US domination.³⁴ These incentives and fears, coupled with US willingness to limit its own power, and made it easier for the Europeans to accept the new reciprocal and institutionalized American-dominated order.³⁵ Given the underlying motivations of the Western Allies, there were also other intervening factors that helped to enable the cooperative nature of the resulting order.

Chapter 3 ended by pointing out the role a common enemy can play in cooperation and steps toward amalgamation. Western fear of Soviet defection certainly played a role in closing the gaps between states that had existed for hundreds of years as enemies. While the common enemy catalyst can be the primary driver of cooperation, Ikenberry pointed out that in this case, the aforementioned motivations took hold prior to Soviet defection claiming that Soviet fears served only to reinforce the pre-existing Western cooperation.³⁶ A common enemy helped solidify Western bonds, but individual interests in establishing a better peace was the initial driver of cooperation. Another factor in the

³³ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. 1st Princeton classic ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 137-138.

³⁴ Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 235. And Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 198.

³⁵ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 20.

³⁶ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 166.

post-war Western order relates again back to Axelrod and his shadow of the future.

In 1945, the United States successfully came to the aid of its liberal European allies for the second time in half a century. In a world otherwise defined by empire and conquest, the United States was known more for its isolationism and reluctance to fight than for any thirst for subjugation or control.³⁷ In other words, an international reputation for cooperation preceded the willingness of previously great powers to acquiesce to US leadership. “The open character of American hegemony, the extensive reciprocity between the United States and its partners, the absence of hegemonic coercion, and binding institutional relations all provided elements of reassurance and legitimacy despite huge asymmetries of power.”³⁸ The United States’ reputation for cooperation made it easier for the allies to trust that it would continue to cooperate rather than parlay its supreme power into coercive domination. Besides the positive reputation of the United States, the open character of liberal democracy also made trust easier to build.

Chapter 2 asserted that liberal democracies are ideally suited to capitalize on cooperative benefits and Chapter 3 discussed the effects that democracy’s spread is having on homogenization among societies. The willingness of the Western Allies to cooperate with the United States was affected not only by its prior international actions as noted above, but also by the liberal nature of its internal make up. “The decentralized and pluralistic character of the United States government – which rendered it relatively transparent and open to influence – also served to reassure European leaders that the exercise of American power would be less arbitrary and unpredictable than that of an authoritarian regime. This made it easier and less risky to establish institutional ties as well.”³⁹

³⁷ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 369-372.

³⁸ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 166.

³⁹ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 165.

Similarly, the Western Allies were further comforted by democratic commonalities among them.

The phenomenon highlighted in Chapter 3 that commonality among states increased the likelihood of cooperation is also supported by the willingness of the Western Allies to bind themselves together.

Western leaders were adamant at the time that their shared democratic ideals affected their willingness to be bound together in so many ways.⁴⁰ Similar states are more likely to trust one another. Liberal democracies appear historically able to form lasting bonds and even to yield sovereignty, if for no other reason than their shared democratic culture.

These various factors combined to create extremely strong commitments within Western Europe and across the Atlantic that served to limit individual state options while meeting needs of each of the states. Contrary the normally expected behavior of governments, states in the Western order bound themselves together into security, political, and economic agreements that were not easy to pull away from.⁴¹ This arrangement illustrates the willingness of states to indeed surrender sovereignty when doing so suits their greater interests. State sovereignty is not a need, it is a perceived interest. The post-war Western world was willing to trade some sovereignty for cooperative rewards.

Cooperative Political Agreement

Among the commitments intended to bind nations together, the great powers of WWII established the United Nations (UN) as a political institution to not only help ensure peace, but also to promote cooperation among states.⁴² Originally envisioned by President Roosevelt as a conduit for a Soviet-American alliance, as Soviet defections mounted, the UN was eventually formed on the basis of lessons learned from the failure of the League of Nations and soon divided along Cold

⁴⁰ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 164.

⁴¹ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 205-206.

⁴² Mingst and Karns, *United Nations in the 21st Century*, 2.

War lines.⁴³ One of the many lessons that the WWII victors learned from the troubled establishment of the League of Nations, was not to wait for the war to conclude before establishing an international body for peace.⁴⁴ The Declaration of the UN was signed in 1942 and the charter was completed and ratified in 1945.⁴⁵

Contrary to many of the new institutions in the West, the UN's foundational principle is the sovereignty of its members and its principal goal is to maintain international peace and security.⁴⁶ This basic framework, coupled with a wide membership, has made the UN far more relevant than the League of Nations that preceded it. However, the fundamental principle of member sovereignty presents a double edge. It is required to garner support and state membership, but it also limits the actions of the body overall. Based on its large membership and longevity, the UN can clearly be seen as a more successful version of the League of Nations. While it has failed to end war as means of dispute resolution, it has certainly provided options to the international society and maintains a clear effect on the calculations of states intending to go to war. The UN was perhaps the most well known institution to rise from the ashes of WWII, but others also had sweeping international impact.

Cooperative Financial Agreements

The balance of power policies that followed WWI not only sowed the seeds of political and military strife, but financial conflict as well. The new liberal economic approach that followed WWII was at least in part driven by American determination to preclude the antagonistic trade practices of the interwar years. The Western powers went to great lengths to reset the foundations of the international financial system to a

⁴³ Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, *Semblance of Peace*, 8. And Mingst and Karns, *United Nations in the 21st Century*, 2.

⁴⁴ Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, *Semblance of Peace*, 547.

⁴⁵ Tetlow, *United Nations*, 24, 37.

⁴⁶ Mingst and Karns, *United Nations in the 21st Century*, 23.

cooperative basis.⁴⁷ The International Monetary Fund and the predecessors to the World Bank (then the Bank for Reconstruction of the United and Associated Nations) and the World Trade Organization (WTO - then the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT) are the three primary international organizations that came to comprise the world's financial and trade foundations to this end.⁴⁸

The cooperative benefits of trade, referenced throughout this thesis, became a key to the new financial order. Trade exploded following the war, driven by the allied conviction that mutually beneficial trade would ensure the growth required for recovery. Created as forum to negotiate reduction of trade barriers, the GATT was instrumental in reducing average tariffs on manufactured goods to below five percent.⁴⁹ Trade is generally beneficial for both trading partners. The financial and trade institutions established after WWII, with an eye toward stability through interaction and interdependence, have proved far more effective than the system of economic nationalism that preceded them.

In addition to the need for increasing trade, the United States also recognized that the European economy was not ready to stand on its own. The massive European aid package embodied in the Marshall Plan met the interests of the United States and Europe. The United States sacrificed short term financial gains in order to invest in the future returns of a productive non-communist Europe. The Marshall plan not only helped strengthen Europe's economy, it also gave Europe an avenue to build cooperative European structures.⁵⁰ US officials viewed such arrangements as crucial to help strengthen European regional cooperation. With echoes of Wilson's desire to reform European

⁴⁷ Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York, NY: Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), 327.

⁴⁸ Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 231.

⁴⁹ Elizabeth C. Hanson, *The Information Revolution and World Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2008), 140.

⁵⁰ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 264.

Realpolitik, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations invested heavily in binding European powers to one another.⁵¹ This unique and expensive American effort resulted directly in the rise of European unity.

To help build European cooperation, the United States insisted that Europe allocate Marshall Plan funds themselves. This led to the formation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which eventually evolved into the European Community, one of the three main pillars of what is now the European Union (EU).⁵² However, the EU, as evolved from the OEEC, created as a separate government-like entity, with independent decision-making power, not reliant on unanimous agreement from member states. It had separate executive, parliamentary, and judicial arms to create, execute and enforce European policy.⁵³ The institution was set up to avoid the common problem of rule-by-committee where every voter has a veto. This dynamic added immense power to the institution and undoubtedly helped prevent its breakdown at times when individual states disagreed with particular decisions. The post war changes to the world economic and political structure were indeed vast, but the proliferation of post-war institutions in those realms was nearly matched by an elaborate web of cooperative security agreements that emerged at the same time.

Cooperative Security Agreements

President Roosevelt agreed with the basic assertion that the British and French balance-of-power approach to politics at Versailles was as much to blame for the Second World War as German aggression. This view led him toward a “new form of international politics... one that stressed the ‘harmony of interests,’ regional and global cooperation and a blurring of the barrier between nation and international society. But he

⁵¹ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 398.

⁵² Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 209.

⁵³ John Van Oudenaren, *Uniting Europe: An Introduction to the European Union*, Second Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 19.

also believed that any NWO [new world order] had to be backed up by force.”⁵⁴ He recognized the failure of a defection-centered approach, and championed the system of institutions discussed above. However, he also realized that not all states would recognize the same. The Western order still required an ability to punish defectors.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the keystone security agreement that bound the United States to Europe, but it was one of many alliances that contributed to the security portion of the “layer cake’ of institutions that eventually emerged.”⁵⁵ Among the cooperative security agreements were the ANZUS Treaty (among Australia, New Zealand and the United States), a United States – Philippine Republic Treaty, and in 1954 the South-east Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) which essentially combined ANZUS with the Philippine Treaty and added Britain, France, Pakistan, and Thailand to the alliance.⁵⁶ Cooperative security agreements serve many mutual functions. Ideally, they symbolically link states, they prevent duplication of expensive capabilities, and they deter aggression by enlarging the available combat power of any single member state. The uniting fear of the Soviet Union had a catalytic effect that went hand in hand with the other cooperative rewards of alliance. Each agreement provided these rewards, but NATO remained the dominant coalition. In fact, NATO remains quite relevant today despite the diminishment of the threat that helped form it.

The European experiment with Roosevelt’s “new form of international politics” appears to have paid off. Europe experienced its longest ever stretch of untarnished peace until the ethnic strife that occurred in the former Yugoslavia from 1991-1997. Considering its long history of balance-of-power politics, it appears to have solved its security

⁵⁴ Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 133-134.

⁵⁵ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 184.

⁵⁶ Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, *Semblance of Peace*, 520-521.

dilemma. Peaceful conflict resolution in Europe is finally a reality. The current character of the continent contrasts sharply with that of centuries prior. Europe is now characterized by interdependence, self-determination, and peaceful norms.⁵⁷ In the end, Roosevelt and Truman mixed idealistic Wilsonianism with cold, hard self-interest to lead the construction of a better peace centered on self-interested cooperation.

One final note about the regional nature of the cooperative structure is relevant to the assertions of this thesis. Recognizing the contributions of the UN and other international institutions, Williams pointed out the value of regional organizations. He pointed out that although the UN is able to arbitrate peaceful norms and policies, regional organizations who are better informed of local culture and predispositions may be better suited institutions for building cooperative ties and peaceful practices.⁵⁸ His point highlights earlier discussions regarding the potential for the international society eventually to evolve through a stage of regional supra-state structures. Evolution of the European order toward increasingly intertwined supra-nationalism indicates that regionalized entities may work together with global institutions to continue edging out state sovereignty elsewhere as well. From the establishment of the state system as an outcome of the Thirty Year's War, to the complex system of institutions that characterized the outcome of WWII, the European continent has historically led in systems and systemic changes to the international system. The evolving European system may once again portend changes ahead in the rest of the world.

The Cold War

The final major conflict that closed out the Twentieth Century is labeled a war despite the fact that it was largely waged peacefully. The Cold War requires examination because it dominated international affairs

⁵⁷ Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 204-205.

⁵⁸ Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 205.

for over four decades, and even more importantly, its outcomes were similar in scale to those of the previous two global hot wars. The end of the conflict surprised the world. Perhaps this was partially because a great many international relations thinkers and practitioners had come to accept and apply the predictions and prescriptions of realism's bleak ideology. The realist view of power that developed during the Cold War focused entirely on the material and political-military aspect of power and maintained that no state would peacefully give up such power. However, the Soviet Union did just that from 1989 to 1991.⁵⁹ In the years that followed, realists faced yet another surprise. As with the century's two previous global wars, as Cold War ended, the world again became a slightly better place to live.

Progress

As with the two world wars, major systemic evolutionary changes in the international system also occurred with the end of the conflict. John Mueller highlighted this fact. "Just as the ancient institution of monarchy met its effective demise in Europe in World War I and as the newer, but dangerous and seemingly virile ideologies of nazism and fascism were destroyed by World War II, so a major political philosophy, communism, over which a deal of ink and blood have been spilled, was discredited and apparently expunged in World War III."⁶⁰ No one should expect any sort of utopia to arise when any one form of subjugation or aggression goes away. Rather as the last century illustrates, bad ideologies often replace other bad ideologies, but the negative impact of each subsequent bad ideology shrank in the last century.

⁵⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 31.

⁶⁰ John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts on World War III," in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 39.

Mueller expressed a similar view discussing how in the absence of the massive global conflict the world witnessed in the first half of the Twentieth Century; smaller wars are often elevated to illustrate some lack of progress. When the world finally expunges a “big evil” we rapidly promote a smaller one to the same level.⁶¹ Can the current spate of terrorism and civil war really compare to the scale of death and destruction wrought by the ideologies of the previous century? No matter what may be said about the world remaining a dangerous place, the prospects for major interstate wars have clearly changed.

The overall unacceptability of interstate war reflects progressive international change concomitant with the end of the Cold War. For most of history, since the creation of the state-centric system, it was nearly accepted that repeated interaction between any two states could likely lead to war.⁶² As recently as a hundred years ago, war was commonly viewed as acceptable or even desirable; such notables as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Igor Stravinsky openly expressed this sentiment. War today is rarely if ever held up as a positive event, especially not in the developed world. In areas once engulfed in seemingly never-ending deflection loops of violence, peace seems to be replacing war as an ideal.⁶³ Michael Howard speculated where a projection of this trend may lead when he claimed, “It is quite possible that war in the sense of major, organized armed conflict between highly developed societies may not recur, and that a stable framework for international order will become firmly established.”⁶⁴ Besides the overall diminishing of the likelihood of major conventional war, the risk of global

⁶¹ Mueller, “Quiet Cataclysm,” 50-51.

⁶² Robert Jervis, “Usable Past for the Future,” in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 266-267.

⁶³ Mueller, “Quiet Cataclysm,” 49.

⁶⁴ Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (Binghamton, NY: Vali-Ballou Press, 1991), 176.

thermonuclear war has diminished even further. Most would agree that it has even fallen to a negligible level.

A major point of distinction regarding the end of this conflict as a representation of progress involves its cold nature. The so called war ended peacefully and it ended gradually rather than with the massive, bloody conflagrations that resolved the previous great-power rivalries of the century. At various points throughout the Cold War, nuclear holocaust seemed inevitable to many. At other points, preemptive victory would have been possible. However, both sides recognized the futility of defection and cooperative self-interest eventually triumphed over power-centric defection. A peaceful end was never a forgone outcome. Rather, decades of ideological confrontation took decades to overcome.

Cooperative Conclusion

Many Cold Warriors painted the conflict as a zero sum game. When a defection cycle starts, only forgiveness, as Axelrod called it, can break the cycle.⁶⁵ In the bipolar world of the Cold War, the common view was that any gain for one side constituted a loss for the other. This thought pattern made any negotiation illogical and every point of contention became an all-or-nothing proposition. The gradual, eventual rejection of this view was responsible for détente and the eventual peaceful end of the Cold War.⁶⁶ The Cold War did not suddenly end one day with any singular decision by either side. Rather, a long series of small turning points, and sometimes accidental overtures toward cooperation slowly brought the Cold War to a close.⁶⁷

Writing at the height of the Cold War in 1966 about the standoff between the superpowers Thomas Schelling asked, “How does one get

⁶⁵ Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* Rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 20.

⁶⁶ Schlesinger, “Some Lessons from the Cold War,” 61.

⁶⁷ Alexei Filitov, “Victory in the Postwar Era: Despite the Cold War or Because of It?” in *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 82.

out of playing chicken if he considers it dangerous, degrading, or unprofitable? How would the United States and the Soviet Union, if they both wished to, stop feeling obliged to react to every challenge as if their reputations were continually at stake? How can they stop competing to see who will back down first in a risky encounter?” He answered his question... “Confidence has to be developed. Some conventions or traditions must be allowed to grow. Confidence and tradition take time. Stable expectations have to be constructed out of successful experience, not all at once out of intentions.”⁶⁸ This is exactly what happened 23 years after Schelling’s wrote. The regimes and treaties built between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gave them an opportunity to interact with one another on small enough issues to build trust gradually through iterated prisoners’ dilemmas. Conventions and traditions, as Schelling called them, allowed for more stable expectations and the process of détente to benefit both. The stability provided by such a highly institutionalized Western order also played a role in building confidence and trust.

As Soviets contemplated various small steps toward cooperation to end the standoff, institutions initiated at the end of WWII helped reduce their fears of Western abuse. Ikenberry asserted that among the reasons the Soviet Union was willing to take some of the final unilateral risks that helped end the Cold War was the institutional character of the Western order. Gorbachev was able to make large military reductions and let Eastern Europe run its own course, because of the nature of the Western system. The Western states were so intertwined and open that it would have been extremely difficult for one or several of them to exploit Soviet weakness.⁶⁹ Ikenberry went on compare the post-Cold War period to that of post-WWII. The Soviets viewed the Western states similarly to the

⁶⁸ Thomas C. Shelling. *Arms and Influence*. (London, England: Yale University Press 1966), 123.

⁶⁹ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 219.

way Europe viewed US hegemony at the end of WWII. Cooperation in lieu of power balancing was possible despite the massive Western overmatch because Western power was adequately constrained by institutional bonds.⁷⁰ The cooperative institutions built to bind the Western order at the end of WWII helped bind the entire international society at the end of the Cold War. At the end of this conflict, the United States sought, once again, to strengthen and expand them.

Cooperative Institutions

Again, keen to demonstrate restraint to the world and to build upon a productive system based on its hegemony, the single remaining superpower set about strengthening institutions. While power balancing realists might highlight weakened US support of certain institutions to suggest that the end of the Soviet threat should mean the end of Western cooperation, it decidedly did not. In fact, the United States and other industrialized states continued to build and strengthen cooperative agreements and regimes. Allies did not balance power against the once again unprecedented power of the United States. They joined in with an enlarged NATO, the North American Free Trade Agreement, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the WTO.⁷¹

The United States needed once again to reassure the world of its trustworthiness and express its willingness to limit application of its now-immense relative power. Eastward NATO expansion was seen as a means to do so once again. It advanced three reasons for NATO expansion. The first advocated by U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright was to enlarge “the area in Europe where wars do not happen.” The second was to strengthen the alliance militarily. The third and most important goal was to provide an avenue to build democracy and to reform the markets of the newly independent Eastern European states.⁷²

⁷⁰ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 222.

⁷¹ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 217.

⁷² Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 236.

The United States wanted to be sure that as former Soviet bloc countries became independent that they could be integrated into the international society: the same society that it worked to build to its favor at the end of WWII. However, NATO was not the only of segment of this society to gain to these ends.

The WTO was created in 1995 when it essentially reformed the GATT's systems for dispute settlement. The WTO fulfilled American interests of strengthening its dispute resolution authorities to protect US businesses. It fulfilled European interests by guarding against unilateral American actions, and lesser powers saw it as leveling the field for their participation in the markets.⁷³ Everyone gained from the arrangement. Once again, international players built and strengthened institutions for the benefit of each. Their self-interested actions resulted in cooperation that indeed paid off while the UN continued to evolve.

The UN remained fairly strong and viable throughout the Cold War, but its relevance grew at its close. When many authoritarian states initiated the often-violent process of democratization and the number of intrastate wars rapidly increased, the UN was frequently called upon and proved instrumental in peace keeping operations, election assistance, and improving human rights. UN membership also continued to grow steadily. It started with 50 member states in 1950, grew to 151 by 1980, and 191 by 2005. States newly formed during Cold War decolonization accounted for most of the growth, but the number of members speaks to its acceptance and at least its perceived utility.⁷⁴

Faults and problems of the UN are easy enough to highlight, but failing perfection does not sentence an organization to failure. Mingst and Karns provided a reminder of many of the benefits that the UN does provide. The UN has not only survived for over six decades, it has changed the world in obvious ways. It has promoted the rule of law,

⁷³ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 244-245.

⁷⁴ Mingst and Karns, *United Nations in the 21st Century*, 3-6.

raised awareness and assistance to the world's poorest. It promotes human rights and development, and provides technical assistance to developing economies as well as burgeoning democracies. It also shapes global norms to encourage peaceful conflict resolution and multilateral diplomacy over violence.⁷⁵

The aforementioned delegitimizing of interstate war likely has something to do with the actions of the UN. This development has in turn increased the importance of the UN. Today, a UN mandate is nearly synonymous with legitimacy when it comes to interstate war. Even though the United States in 2003 did not let the lack of a UN mandate stop the invasion of Iraq, the fact that it sought a supporting resolution indicates the legitimacy conveyed by such a mandate. It seems certain that the recent military actions in Libya would not have initiated without the support of the UN. States can, of course, ignore any actions of the UN, but they do so at a price of legitimacy. As John Ruggie said, "Membership...almost by definition, constrains unilateral degrees of freedom to some extent and over some range of issues."⁷⁶

Regional Cooperation Evolves to Redefine Sovereignty

The EU is resolved to work within and through the UN system, though certainly not exclusively. Jose Magone deftly described the relationship between the two and how the EU perceives its role in the international society. The EU perceives itself as part of a new system of global governance that includes the United Nations and other international institutions. The establishment of the EU represented the next step in a pattern of international relations adjustments that began

⁷⁵ Mingst and Karns, *United Nations in the 21st Century*, 1.

⁷⁶ John Gerard Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order: America and Multilateralism after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 553-70, (1994), 559.

with the League of Nations in the 1920s, the United Nations in 1945 and the fall of the Soviet order in 1991.⁷⁷

It may be tempting to conceptualize the EU as a smaller version of the UN, but this faulty analogy breaks down very quickly. The key difference between the EU and the UN is the role of sovereignty in their makeup and impact on its membership. As noted in the previous chapter, the UN relies on member state sovereignty to exist while it remains constrained by the same sovereignty. The UN, on the other hand, supersedes state sovereignty. According to Jose Magone the idea of absolute sovereignty is evolving and the EU is a major part of the new conception of a postnational system. The fact that EU law supersedes the laws of member states is a primary example of the paradigm shift that replaces the state as the only or primary actor in the international society. The change that Magone described represents the early stages of what Gilpin called a systems change; the most sweeping form of evolution in the international system. The last time a systems change occurred, the principle international actors emerged as European nation-states following the Thirty Years War. This systems change initiated the Westphalian model. Amalgamation to the state did not occur all around the world all at once. The systems change started in Europe and through cultural learning, it gradually spread to the rest of the world. Magone also pointed out that other regions are already launching less sophisticated regional integration projects based on the model of the European Union.⁷⁸

The EU has its roots in post-WWII institutionalization and pan-Atlantic cooperation, but it strengthened during the Cold War and came into its own after that conflict's close. Since the end of the Cold War and the further strengthening of the EU, the international society has moved

⁷⁷ Jose M. Magone, *The New World Architecture: The Role of the European Union in the Making of Global Governance* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 2.

⁷⁸ Magone, *New World Architecture*, 14.

beyond the nation-state model and actually initiated a postnational model. The EU is the foundation of a European community that is evolving into an uneven, yet very real European society complete with a European identity. The new identity is no longer singular as was the old notion of nationality. Rather, it is fragmented and diverse based on multiple dimensions such as economic, social, political, national, and regional factors.⁷⁹ While the close of the previous wars of the century brought major change at the systemic and interaction levels, the end of the Cold War may be evolving the systemic changes of WWII into genuine international systems change manifest in a new amalgamation to the next larger integron.

In line with the assertion that the breakdown of social incentives is generally required for amalgamation of societies to occur, it is clear that dampened European nationalism is playing a role in unification. Diminished individual attachment to the state facilitates European amalgamation. This amalgamation, in turn, serves to further weaken individual attachment to the state. Just as all social incentives eventually give way to the fulfillment of needs, European nationalism is evolving into a more beneficial form. At the close of WWI, nationalism was discredited in some European states on the basis of its failure. Excess nationalism was recognized as a contributing factor in the destruction wrought by the war. The current adjustments are occurring with the shift of power and perhaps loyalty from the state toward institutions.⁸⁰ While Europeans clearly retain their national identities, those identities are now intertwined with their growing identification as Europeans. Just as Protestant and Catholic religious fervor had to abate to allow the state system to arise, so too is nationalism subsiding to allow the rise of a new international structure. Plenty of Europeans still identify themselves as Protestant or Catholic, but decidedly few are likely

⁷⁹ Magone, *New World Architecture*, 26.

⁸⁰ Jervis, "Usable Past for the Future," 261.

to kill members of the other faith on the sole basis of that membership, and nationalism counts for less as well.

Steeped in the idea of the unbending sovereignty of the state, consummate realist Kenneth Waltz wondered rhetorically why states had not joined together out of efficiency alone. “Nations could mutually enrich themselves by further dividing not just the labor that goes into the production of goods but also some of the other tasks they perform, such as political management and military defense. Why does their integration not take place?”⁸¹ Writing in 1979, Waltz can be forgiven for not foreseeing the convergence of shared workload among EU states or the 2010 mutual defense agreement between Great Britain and France. In the 32 years since his writing, the previously unthinkable has happened. The states of Europe are indeed integrating. Sovereignty is only as valuable as the needs it meets. Waltz at that time could not have imagined the current level of English, German, and French collaboration. How much more difficult would it have been for a theorist in 1647, year twenty-nine of the Thirty Year’s War, to believe the current cooperation in Europe could ever come to pass? The international system is evolving. To develop strategies on the assumption that it is not, would be pure folly.

Helen Milner described four levels of cooperation among states. “The exchange of information to facilitate tacit policy coordination, the negotiation of specific policy ‘deals’ on a one-time basis, the establishment of a set of rules guiding policy choice, and the surrender of national policy instruments often to form a larger policy community. Within this scheme, the last level - for example, a monetary union that entails a single market, or in the security area a pooling of national military units into a single international one – represents the most

⁸¹ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 105.

extreme form of international cooperation.”⁸² Many pairs and groups of states are at varying levels on Milner’s scale. The states of the EU appear to have traversed each of these levels. What might we imagine comes after “the most extreme form of cooperation?”

Since the end of the Cold War, the leading powers operate a strikingly cooperative and stable international environment.⁸³ A strict, power-balancing realist should be extremely perplexed by this state of affairs. Their outlook should predict that the rest of the world would not long stand for American dominance and that absent an enemy of similar power to balance it, the United States would capitalize on its position of power to dominate and control more of the world. This last assertion illuminates the peril of self-fulfilling prophecies. Realist practitioners in the United States have at times already defected on the international society who has invested much in the mutual trust that took a century to build. US unilateral action in Iraq, in particular, highlights the danger of realist prescriptions that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”⁸⁴ Despite some American defection into such unilateral action, the fact of the matter is that the cooperative Western order remains largely intact and growing stronger because it meets too many needs for too many states for any to sufficiently benefit from its retrenchment or disintegration. Gilpin noted that states will seek to change the system when they perceive another alternative to better suit their needs.⁸⁵ As we have seen, this has certainly been the case following the major wars of the last century. The realists are right to insist that self-interest come first, they only miscalculate the extent to which cooperation is able to meet actual interests.

⁸² Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 9.

⁸³ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 246.

⁸⁴ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 352.

⁸⁵ Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 42.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Assuring other nations that the United States will exercise its power responsibly, sparingly, virtuously, and in accordance with international norms is therefore not an optional luxury or a sign of moral flaccidity. Rather, it is a key strategic requirement to prevent...[a] 'balance of power' response to the unprecedented scale of American military might. American power must be matched by American virtue.

– David Kilcullen

It took more than opposable thumbs for the human organism to come to dominate the planet so completely. The ability to recognize the value of cooperation and employ it so robustly must certainly rank among the most valuable traits of the species. The degree to which cooperation dominates our everyday lives is striking to consider. We would be quite helpless without one another, fortunate to barely survive each day, just as our ancient ancestors were. Human social structures evolved over time to help us survive and meet the other human needs.

The fact that cooperation provides a better return on investment does not mean that the decision to choose cooperation is always easy. The near and certain defection payoff can appear much more inviting than the long-term, less certain, but larger reward of cooperation. We often select a bird in hand over two in the bush. Realizing the difficulty of this decision, humans developed various social incentives to provide short term motivation to hold out for long-term reward. Social incentives range from morality, religion, and governments to international norms, regimes, and institutions. They all serve the same basic purpose. As a species, we developed these mechanisms to build more confident expectations of one another's behavior.

The prisoners' dilemma was originally presented as a realist model to illustrate that defection is the only logical choice for a self-interested

actor. The problem with the model is that the world simply does not operate in that way. We interact with one another on a repeated basis. We modify our cost-benefit calculations based on the likelihood of future interactions. Long shadows of the future help us work together and cooperation dominates our lives because it pays off. Defection is the exception. Why would one expect this phenomenon to change from one level of human interaction to another?

Realists claim that anarchy is the difference, and that cooperation requires an enforcer that does not exist at the international level. However, the same realists fail to recognize that there was once no enforcer among individuals, among clans, among tribes, among city states, and among every subsequent integron. Humans learned over time that social incentives increase overall benefit, so we create, adapt, and employ them at each amalgamation.

The next amalgamation is likely upon us. Punctuated by three major world conflicts, the last century witnessed evolution of the international system that appears to have culminated in an amalgamation of states and a consequent systems change on the same level as the Peace of Westphalia. The emergence of the state system did not happen instantaneously at the end of the Thirty Years War. Rather, it first emerged then, and in many ways it is still emerging today in parts of the world where familial and tribal identities dominate populations. The state is unlikely to disappear any time soon as the EU and other regional actors evolve, but the role of the state is already changing and portions of that role are being replaced. The international environment continues to evolve. As it does, there are a few strategic implications of this IR theory that could inform American strategists.

Strategic Implications to the United States

This theory of international relations presents various implications to the grand strategist as well as the military strategist. In the terms of this theory, the job of the grand strategist is to develop and secure

interests that fulfill the needs of the constituent population. While grand strategists concern themselves with national policy, the decisions and actions of the whole of government, to develop and achieve those interests, military strategists are restricted to considerations for a single instrument of power. To build integrated, coherent, and effective strategy, individuals operating at each level should strive to understand the considerations of the other. Clausewitz emphasized the important interplay of these two levels when he discussed policy and strategy, and highlighted the need for harmony between the statesman and the general with military decisions necessarily bound to policy.¹ In a step toward operationalizing this theory of international relations, it is useful to explore a few specific implications and prescriptions that it holds for American strategists at the national and the military level.

Grand Strategist

A basic relevancy of this theory to the grand strategist is the idea that the international system is not static. Therefore, long-term strategy should be adaptive and based on the expectation that the international system of the future will differ from that of today, in terms of systemic changes as well as less frequent, but more sweeping systems changes. However, just knowing that the future system will be different is of little value without a reasonable expectation of what about it may differ.

To answer how the future international system is likely to change, a strategist need only take a long view of history and project its path into the future. In the past, the stutter-stepped process of increasing cooperation among horizontal integrations eventually gave way to amalgamation into higher-level integrations thereby broadening the scope of cooperation. Families discovered the benefits of cooperation with other families so they increased cooperation until a systems change occurred and multiple families formed clans, clans discovered the same and

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Eliot Howard, Peter Paret, and Beatrice Heuser (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 81, 87-88.

cooperated to eventually form tribes, and the process continued. To recognize where the international system is in this process, grand strategists can look to the EU to see that European states have increased cooperation to the point of amalgamation. Just as Europe led the way during the previous systems change to the state system, it appears that the international system may be ready to follow Europe's lead once again and gradually follow through with the next systems change. As the rest of the world recognizes the benefits of amalgamation in Europe, they are likely to adjust as they did to the state system. However, social incentives which become barriers to amalgamation do not die or moderate easily.

Grand strategists should recognize social incentives (aspects of culture) for what they are. They are means to an end. They encourage, build, and enforce cooperation among integrons in a society, to meet the needs of the society. When cultural artifacts become detrimental to the needs they were formulated to fulfill, they should be discarded or adjusted to allow further cooperation at new levels. Unfortunately, the more effective they are at one level, the more difficult they are to put aside to form the next-level integron. Clinging to social incentives that prevent cooperation at new levels diminishes the society's ability to meet the needs of its constituents.

This idea is relevant to the present struggle against violent Islamists. Fundamental Islamic extremism can be thought of as a current example of a group clinging to a social incentive that was useful in fostering cooperation at one integron level, but inhibits formation of the next. Fundamental Islam at its creation served to bond Arab tribesmen together and forestall frequent defection loops that prevented them from realizing the benefits of cooperation.² In recent times, many Muslims felt the Western order had defected so they turned predictably

² Karen Armstrong, *The Great Transformation: The Beginning of our Religious Traditions* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 386.

to defection and the familiar loop ensued. Disaffected Muslims once again turned to fundamental Islam, which was so effective 1,500 years ago, to bind members of the group in opposition to their fellow prisoner, the West. The strength of this religious bond makes it extremely difficult to break out of the ongoing defection cycle. American grand strategists should seek ways to affect the moderating of this social incentive and find ways to increase cooperation with the greater Muslim community, similar to the way Cold War strategists ended the US/Soviet defection loop through a gradual process increasing cooperation. When the defection cycle ends and fundamental interpretations of Islam mitigate, the Muslim world will more readily integrate with peer-level integrations.

In a similar, but peaceful manner, some forms of Christian fundamentalism also prevent the United States from reaping the benefits of greater cooperation. Some in the United States resist various forms of international cooperation on the grounds that they correctly recognize such cooperation as steps toward amalgamation. They resist amalgamation, because it may lead to a one world government that according to their faith would literally signal the end of the world. As with others, this social incentive will most certainly moderate with time as it becomes more difficult to deny the increasing benefits of cooperation and amalgamation, but the longer it is retained in its current form the more it inhibits American fulfillment of actual interests.

There are other examples of American barriers to amalgamation, whose surrender may appear to some as one sided compromise or as flaccidity, but strategists should keep in mind that it is self-interest that forms the basis of evolution and cooperation. To say that the United States should break down barriers to take advantage of the benefits of cooperation and avoid defection loops is not to advocate weakness or a compromise of needs. Rather, it is advocacy to compromise the *means* to an end – the end being fulfillment of needs. A sacrifice of a means alone is no loss. It is the *end* or *need* that counts.

To fulfill the end of meeting its constituents' needs, the United States should endeavor to convince the world, as Wilson attempted and Roosevelt largely succeeded, that the United States is a benign if not benevolent power. Unilateral actions tell the rest of the world that the United States is a defector, thus building a reputation that will only yield defection. If the job of grand strategists is to pursue interests that meet the nation's needs then the projection of history should inform them to seek opportunities to cooperate.

Given the fact of increasing cooperation among the leading powers and the potential for impending regional amalgamations, American grand strategists should recognize the actual interest in shaping the future system to best meet the needs of Americans. The best way to shape the system to maximize American benefit is to lead the way in cooperation and avoid defection loops. Because there are more non-zero sum situations than zero-sum and most situations can be converted from one to the other, mutual cooperation yields the most benefit in the long term. The United States should seek non-zero sum exchanges and use creative methods to convert the others. Unfortunately, however, the choices of cohorts in a prisoners' dilemma cannot be controlled.

Many states or regional actors will continue to mismatch perceived and actual interests. They will choose defection over cooperation and force will be required to respond with punishment. As long as humans remain imperfect, it is inevitable that some of them will fail at cultural learning, miscalculate their interests, and choose to defect. The United States must therefore maintain sufficient power to return the defection. At the same time, American grand strategists should be careful not to let the possession of overwhelming military force tempt them into starting defection loops themselves.

The real difficulty in this prescription to punish relates to TIT FOR TAT's trait of clarity. That is, ensuring that punishment predictably always follows a partner's defection and that it never follows a partner's

cooperation. The problem becomes defining when a fellow prisoner's action constitutes a defection. This is where the idea of legitimacy comes into play highlighting the danger of unilateral action. To maintain clarity of action, the United States should punish only when it has the legitimacy to do so. Without legitimacy, onlookers will perceive defection where the United States sees punishment. To maximize cooperative benefits and minimize defections the US objective should be to maintain a reputation as a reliable cooperator who also reliably punishes genuine defections. This need for legitimacy and determination of genuine defections highlights one of the values of institutions.

Among their benefits, international institutions help define legitimacy and thereby assist the United States in maintaining clarity of action. Acting under a UN mandate communicates punishment while unilateral action indicates defection. Institutions also help regulate the behavior of others. States will be less likely to defect knowing that an institution will label them as a defector clearing the rest of the world for punishment. Again, this clearly does not always work, but it does raise the stakes and influence the calculus of would-be defectors.

Additionally, institutions can assure others that the United States is not bent on coercion and control, and that its intentions are rather to share in cooperative benefits. The United States should continue to support the growth of international institutions founded on the values of liberal democracy. As discussed in Chapter 2, the liberal democracy model is certain to further evolve, and eventually become obsolete itself, but as a system, it is the most effective devised to date at meeting the individual needs.

Military Strategist

A theory of international relations is by definition, more applicable to the grand strategist than the military. However, it remains extremely relevant to the military strategist. A state's military strategy should be informed by not only the grand strategy of its own nation, but also by

that of its enemies and potential enemies. By viewing grand strategy through the lens of this theory and considering disciplines generally outside of their military craft, the military strategist can conceptualize the military role in a different light and may develop and consider a broader range of solutions that might otherwise lie outside their own proclivities.

It is this author's perception that the ranks of the American military officer corps generally leans toward the realist perspective. If this perception is accurate, then it would be understandable given that the military instrument is normally called upon after defection has ensued. Because they rarely participate in interactions of mutual benefit, it may be easiest for military officers to adopt a realist view. In the bipolar, mutual-defection world of the Cold War a tendency to defect fit nicely into the nation's grand strategy, but the world has changed and enemies have changed.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has a history of neglect by strategists, but it is now back on the front burner of strategy and could benefit from the preceding examination. Current US COIN strategy is focused on the population and the process of convincing the population that the government is better able to meet their needs than the insurgency. This thesis described how successful governments transmit benefit to the individuals in the population. This process is quite relevant today in Afghanistan. As an example, the United States and NATO focus massive attention, money, and effort on strengthening the central Afghani government and encouraging amalgamation of the disparate tribes into a higher-level, homogenous integron. Given this level of commitment and the fact that the military is charged with the bulk of this execution, American military strategists should carefully consider the concepts of Afghani interests and needs as well as the process of cooperation and amalgamation, along with the barriers to each.



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