The Mediterranean Crucible, 1942-1943: Did Technology or Tenets Achieve Air Superiority
Abstract
In Richard J. Overy's air power history The Air War, 1939-1945, he makes an unexpected claim for the way in which the Allies won air superiority over the Axis powers in the Mediterranean in the Second World War. Unlike the traditional analyses, which often stress the quality and quantity of aircraft and airmen as the determining arbiters of air superiority, Overy claims that air superiority was achieved through the employment of radar and intelligence. By means of a historical analysis of the first two major US operations in the Mediterranean theater, Operation TORCH (November 1942-May 1943) and Operation HUSKY (July 1943- September 1943), the author examines the role of air superiority and how it was obtained by the British Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Forces in a coalition of Allied air powers. More specifically, the author investigates how the Allied forces employed the technology of radar, and the collection and application of intelligence, to defeat the Axis air forces and gain air superiority in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations between 1942 and 1943. The author concludes that technology and intelligence served as enablers to the centralized control of air power that informed Allied strategy and operational plans. Aided by technology, air planners and senior air leaders were able to make informed decisions regarding the allocation for the limited resources of the Allied air forces and thereby achieve and maintain air superiority in the Mediterranean.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- AD1019701
Entities
People
- Francois Ii H. Roy
Organizations
- Air University