Learning to Win When Fighting Outnumbered: Operational Risk in the U.S. Army, 1973-1982, and the influence of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Abstract
In October 1973, Israel fought and won a ferocious three-week war against a large, capable, highly motivated, and well-equipped Arab coalition, illuminating key lessons about the evolving nature of modern, mid-intensity combat. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) overcame the seemingly unprecedented lethality, intensity, and density of the modern battlefield through bold operational maneuver and risk-taking on both fronts. This thesis seeks to explore how Israel's performance in the war influenced an evolved conceptualization of, preparation for, and response to operational risk within the U.S. Army between 1973 and 1982. It defines and applies a more neutral definition of risk: the effects of uncertainty upon one's objectives. It argues that the U.S. Army learned a great deal about operational risk from the IDF. Although it largely succeeded in integrating those insights into its capstone doctrine and concepts, it failed to operationalize them fully within its warfighting elements because of a number of cultural and institutional differences between the two armies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 10, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1019845
Entities
People
- R. Z. Alessi-friedlander
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College