Red Cloud's War: A Failure to Effectively Coordinate the Instruments of National Power
Abstract
The instruments of national power, as defined within the DIME model, are Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic. This thesis examines the United States' use of its instruments of national power with regards to Red Cloud's War of 1866-1868. It addresses the period following the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie and analyzes the war years in particular. It aims to understand both how and why the US failed to effectively coordinate its national instruments against an alliance of Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Northern Arapaho bands, leading to an operational defeat for the United States. The first chapter provides an introduction and general overview of the thesis, establishing a broad chronology. The second and third chapters detail the period from 1851 through to the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. The fourth chapter concludes the thesis, with a bibliographical essay forming the fifth and final chapter.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 10, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1019908
Entities
People
- Grant A. Brown
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College