

COLOMBIA TO NIGERIA: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SECURITY  
COOPERATION STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA BASED ON THE SUCCESSES  
REALIZED THROUGH PLAN COLOMBIA

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by

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## ABSTRACT

COLOMBIA TO NIGERIA: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SECURITY COOPERATION STRATEGY FOR NIGERIA BASED ON THE SUCCESSES REALIZED THROUGH PLAN COLOMBIA by Major Elliott B. Burns, 153 pages.

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## ACRONYMS

|        |                                                                        |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ACI    | Andean Counternarcotic Initiative                                      |
| CIA    | Central Intelligence Agency                                            |
| DOD    | Department of Defense                                                  |
| ELN    | National Liberation Army                                               |
| ESF    | Economic Support Fund                                                  |
| FARC   | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia                                 |
| FFP    | Food for Peace Title II                                                |
| FMF    | Foreign Military Financing                                             |
| IMET   | International Military Education & Training                            |
| INCLE  | International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement                    |
| IS     | Islamic State                                                          |
| LOE    | Line of Effort                                                         |
| M-19   | 19 <sup>th</sup> of April Movement                                     |
| NADR   | Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs         |
| NSS    | National Security Strategy                                             |
| PMESII | Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure |
| US     | United States                                                          |
| WB     | World Bank                                                             |
| WBDI   | World Bank Development Indicators                                      |
| WBGI   | World Bank Governance Indicators                                       |

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION



Figure 1. Map of Africa, Nigeria Highlighted in Red

*Source:* BING Maps 2016.

### Background

The Chad Lake Basin Region is a vital region of West Africa that includes Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and the US strategic priority state and regional hegemonic power Nigeria. This region's security and stability directly affect the security situation on all sides of the junction of West, Central, and North Africa. The Lake Chad Basin Region is currently a place defined by corruption, tribal/ethnic/political upheaval, uncontrolled disease, organized crime, illicit markets, and violence. However, it is also the scene of budding democracies, international/regional security cooperation, foreign aid/education/medical initiatives, economic development assistance, and increasing

urbanization. Today, this region teeters on the edge as challenges and opportunities present themselves, and push the region into the future for better or worst.

Due to the strategic importance of this region and foreseeable budgetary constraints, it is especially important that the United States (US) maximize its security return on investment within the region. As the US looks at strategies for stabilizing the region and protecting US interests there, historical examples of successful security cooperation models become ever more relevant. One of those models was a strategy developed and refined by US and Colombian administrations from 2000 to the present known as Plan Colombia.

Often acknowledged as one of the most successful US security cooperation efforts in history, Plan Colombia produced marked security gains while utilizing far fewer resources than traditional military intervention. Executed jointly among the Colombian Government, Department of Defense (DOD), and in cooperation with Department of State and other agencies, Plan Colombia demonstrated the potential to magnify effects utilizing multiple lines of effort executed concurrently and in coordination with other governmental agencies. The successes of Plan Colombia in turn influenced security cooperation in other US priority and partner states such as the Philippines and United Arab Emirates. In many respects, Plan Colombia became “the” model for security force assistance and cooperation (Thomas and Dougherty 2013, 84).

## Colombian Situation 2000-2015



Figure 2. Map of South America, Colombia Highlighted in Red

*Source:* BING Maps 2016.

Nigeria anchors the Chad Lake Basin region in strategic importance today in much the same way that Columbia has anchored the Andean region over the last 30 years of American foreign policy. Columbia, whose drug cartels controlled the countryside and whose reach extended to every branch of government, epitomized the image of a state on the verge of collapse in the mid to late 1990s.

Columbia in the late 1990s was desperate for change. The government had been fighting a 40-year war against a number of armed groups for control of vast expanses of territory. These armed groups had expanded into the lucrative drug trade allowing them to acquire large amounts of modern military equipment. In addition, cartel financed leftist

guerillas waged an almost constant war with Columbia's Government. Bogotá and Medellin had among the highest murder rates in the world, while cartel bosses exploited the failures of the Colombian Government and the seamlessly endless supply of money the narcotics trade provided. In fact, this problem had spread beyond Columbia's borders and spilled across the entire Andean region of Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and the far western remote areas of Brazil.

Many in rural areas felt that the government was failing to protect them from criminals and that they had no choice but to cooperate with the cartels and guerilla forces or risk being harmed or killed. There was a strong and justifiable feeling that the government was not helping to develop the rural areas and instead only focused on urban areas. Those in the countryside viewed these urban areas as societies of corruption, keeping the nation's wealth in the hands of urban elites. Armed groups capitalized on this discontent and portrayed themselves and their business as a way of leveling the monetary fields between rural and urban populations.

In addition to monetary incentives to cooperate with armed groups within Colombia, there existed a deep political divide as well. This divide served the two largest armed groups in Colombia well, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both leftist organizations (Tompkins 2014, 6). Their socialist views played well among the disenfranchised rural poor. This sometimes led to government harassment and targeting of rural peoples as supporters of these groups, further disenfranchising them. As a result of these factors, many in the rural population viewed the Government of Colombia as no more legitimate than many of the armed groups it was fighting against.

Making matters worse was the fact that there were few legitimate business ventures for the average Colombian farmer or urbanite to participate in that had any real possibility of raising them or their communities out of poverty. The few legitimate forms of income that did allow a person to provide for themselves and their family, paled in comparison to income provided by illicit trade and criminal activity. Poverty and corruption were rampant with an average of 43 percent of the population in these states living below the poverty line (CIA 2000). This economic situation helped to grow and maintain the ranks of the cartels and armed groups operating in the uncontrolled countryside of Columbia and the border regions of Colombia's neighbors.

By 1999 these factors: economic disparity, illicit markets, undersized and under-funded military and police apparatus, well-funded armed groups, and difficult terrain came together to create a security situation that had stagnated at best and was headed out of control at worst.

However, in the late 1990s, during the Pastrana and Clinton Administrations, a combined US/Columbian strategy for reforming Columbia was developed that would come to be known as Plan Columbia. Initially implemented in 2000, Plan Columbia would further expand under the Uribe, Bush, and Obama administrations. The US Department of State explained the goals of Plan Colombia as follows:

Under Plan Columbia, the US provided substantial assistance designed to increase Colombia's counternarcotic capabilities, military and police capacity, expand and consolidate government presence, and improve the livelihoods of the most vulnerable Colombians by providing sustainable social and economic opportunities, protecting human rights, strengthening rule of law, and making governance more transparent, participatory and accountable. (US Embassy Bogotá 2015)

The results were dramatic, by 2004, the Colombian Government established, for the first time in recent Colombian history, a government presence in all of the country's 1,099 municipalities (county seats). Attacks conducted by illegally armed groups against rural towns decreased by 91 percent from 2002 to 2005. Between 2002 and 2008, Colombia saw a decrease in homicides by 44 percent, kidnappings by 88 percent, terrorist attacks by 79 percent, and attacks on the country's infrastructure by 60 percent (US Embassy Bogotá 2015).

However, success in Colombia did not equal success throughout the region. In fact, it started to destabilize it. Armed groups and cartels feeling pressure in Colombia began migrating into less secure areas of Colombia's neighbors. While initially downplayed by the US and Colombian Governments, by 2004 the facts became hard to discount. While coca production in Colombia crashed, coca production in Peru and Bolivia was on the rise as the so called "balloon effect" pushed production outside of Colombia's borders. Realizing this the US Government increased funding to Plan Colombia in order to expand many of these programs to Colombia's neighbors. Plan Colombia had now morphed into a regional initiative with goals of replicating successes achieved in Colombia throughout the region.

Largely due to the success of Plan Columbia and the US desire to disrupt the illicit overland narcotics trade routes flowing out of South America through Mexico into US markets, the US and Mexico, in 2007 developed and implemented the Merida Initiative. This initiative was model around programs developed and refined as part of Plan Columbia. As of January 2015, the US had apportioned 2.3 billion dollars towards the initiative with mixed success (US Department of State 2015).

Mirroring Mexico, a large percentage of narcotics exported from South America travel along illicit networks weaving their way through West Africa, especially the Lake Chad Basin region, in route to more lucrative European markets. This fact must not be overlooked in regards to US security cooperation and counter narcotics efforts in South and Central America, nor can it be overlooked when developing a security cooperation strategy for Nigeria. This region is currently facing many of the same challenges the Andean region faced, and at least one of which, cocaine smuggling, emanates from the same source.

#### Current Nigerian Situation

Much like Columbia, Nigeria is a US foreign policy priority state that sits at the center of a strategically important area, is rich in natural resources, and is seen as the center of security in its region. Nigeria and its neighbors also face significant security concerns from internal and external factions such as Boko Haram and Islamic State that greatly threaten regional security and vital US interests in the region in much the same way armed groups within Colombia threatened the Andean region over a decade ago.

Like the Andean region, the Chad Lake Basin states are additionally plagued with vast levels of corruption, poverty, and disenfranchisement of both rural populations and the urban poor, while religious and ethnic differences contribute to conflict at a greater level than seen in the Andean region. The result is a region of US national interest that is unstable and teetering on the edge of spiraling out of control, and at the center of this region sits Nigeria.

### Nigeria's Strategic Importance

Nigeria is the most populated country and market in Africa and is situated at the center of the resource-rich Gulf of Guinea. Its position on the Gulf of Guinea gives it the potential to become the regional naval power, while its massive population allows it to field the largest land force in the region. While already a regional power and US priority state, Nigeria has the potential to greatly increase its regional weight (Think Security Africa 2011, 8). Nigeria has the largest proven reserves of oil on the African Continent, yet its energy infrastructure remains underdeveloped, in fact, production has been in recent decline (Think Security Africa 2011, 9).

However, while there is great potential in Nigeria for forward progress, there also exists the potential for greater conflict. General (GEN) David M. Rodriguez, the current US Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander, summed up much of these recent threats and concerns in his 2015 posture statement to congress when he said that:

In recent months, Nigeria has faced a confluence of stresses: an escalation in terrorist attacks, economic stresses exacerbated by falling oil revenues, and political –tension associated with highly contested national elections. Boko Haram has launched attacks across Nigeria's borders into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. (Rodriguez 2015)

General Rodriguez's statement makes clear that the future of the security situation within Nigeria is fraught with perils and should in no way be taken for granted, while also making clear that there is real concern about this issue from our most senior officials.

### Nigeria's Security Situation and Its Effect on Regional Security in the Chad Lake Basin

The rise of Boko Haram, its alliance to Islamic State, and its expansion into neighboring states is the primary regional threat to the Chad Lake Basin states, especially

Nigeria. The growing threat of Boko Haram has caused the Lake Chad Basin states to begin the process of regional security coordination as mentioned by GEN Rodriguez in 2015. “Lake Chad Basin States are now expanding their cooperation in efforts to counter Boko Haram, including beginning to develop a Multinational Joint Task Force” (Rodriguez 2015).

Nigeria, from whose northern territory Boko Haram emerged, will be expected to play the lead role in any military operations against Boko Haram with supporting operations coming from neighboring Lake Chad Basin states. However, Nigeria like most Chad Lake Basin states, is dealing with more than one security concern.

Currently, Nigeria only has uncontested control of its airspace. On the seas pirates and smugglers operate with general impunity within the Gulf of Guinea. Illicit goods and personnel are smuggled out, while cocaine from the Andean region and other contraband are smuggled into Nigeria on their long trip to southern Europe. International military aid in the form of sea patrols are ongoing to attempt to stem the two-way flow, but to limited effect (Think Security Africa 2011, 8).

In the southern delta states, Nigeria is dealing with political violence tied to control of vast fossil fuel deposits that are exported through the Bay of Guinea to the rest of the world. To illustrate this, in 2015 River State (a southern delta state) outpaced all other states in Nigeria in violence tied to the 2015 national elections; dwarfing even those in the north that were a result of Boko Haram (Haken et al. 2015, 5). This political violence has kept much of the Nigerian internal security apparatus focused in the delta region and therefore helped to contribute to the growth of Boko Haram by creating a security force vacuum in the north.

In addition, it should not be lost on the observer that the security situation in the south takes place in the most densely populated and oil rich region of Nigeria, and more directly affects the Christian population and the much more lucrative legitimate and illicit economic markets there. These factors, combined with Boko Haram's tendency to operate mostly in the Islamic north and central transition belt further contribute to a traditional lack of government will to take serious and sustained action in the north to defeat Boko Haram. However, recent attacks, international and regional pressure, the emergence of Islamic State (IS) in Africa, and Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance to IS have led to renewed interest within the government of Nigeria to give at least the appearance of action.

#### Problem Statement

The purpose of this thesis is to determine if prior US security strategies utilized in the Andean region of South America during the 2000s as part of Plan Colombia can be used to stabilize the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa by developing a similar plan for Nigeria. Given a more robust examination and comparison of what appears on the surface to be similar security environments.

#### Primary Research Question

Should Plan Colombia serve as a model for a security cooperation strategy designed to stabilize Nigeria?

### Assumptions

The author assumes that the reports and works cited in this thesis were derived from accurate data and that their authors conveyed that data in a factual manner to the best of their ability and understanding.

### Limitations

The author worked with some limitations during this study; one limitation was the inability to travel to any of the locations mentioned in this work to conduct research and was thereby limited to writings and reports on the varying topics for sources of data and information. Subsequently, this work does not contain any first hand interviews of individuals from the regions discussed or participants in the implementation of Plan Colombia. Time was also a limiting factor as the author was limited to nine months of work on this thesis.

### Delimitations

This paper is intended to be an analysis of the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of using a strategy based on Plan Colombia for stabilizing Nigeria. This paper uses both quantitative and qualitative comparisons as part of a stepwise analysis and comparison. The author picked these states because in both cases they are US priority states and regional hegemonic powers that anchor the security situation in their region. In addition, at least on the surface, they appear to suffer from very similar security issues. The scope of this study is limited from 2000-2015 except in a few by case exceptions used to establish background and context.

## Chapter Summary

On the surface, there appears to be significant similarities in the security situations within the Andean region and Colombia in the late 1990s and the current state within the Chad Lake Basin region and Nigeria. Each region is anchored by a US priority state and are considered important to US national interests. The US and Colombia developed a security cooperation strategy known as Plan Colombia that led to significant security improvements within Colombia and the region, and this study looks to determine if conditions are uniform enough that a like strategy could prove successful in the greater Lake Chad Basin regional hegemony state of Nigeria.

In addition, this study helps contribute to the Army's understanding of the following Warfighting Challenges:

1. How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.
2. How to shape and influence security environments, engage key actors, and consolidate gains to achieve sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands and Joint requirements.
3. How to provide security force assistance to support policy goals and increase local, regional, and host nation security force capability, capacity, and effectiveness.

However, in order to better understand the context of the security environments within these two regions it is vital to first understand their history and their relations to US national security interests.

## CHAPTER 2

### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

#### Introduction

In order to determine if security situations within 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria are similar enough that Plan Colombia could serve as a successful model for security cooperation to stabilize Nigeria and thereby contribute to the overall stability of the Chad Lake Basin region of West Africa, an initial understanding of historical and strategic context is required. This context is required to first determine if it is even in US national interests to concern ourselves in the task of stabilizing this region. In addition, it is also relevant in identifying the level of commitment that would likely be acceptable to US policy makers should it be determined that stabilizing this region is in line with US national interest.

This chapter develops this context by first providing a brief overview of international relations, national interests, and national strategy formation theory. Then it identifies US national interests and a model for establishing their importance relevant to an effort likely acceptable for their maintenance and advancement.

This chapter then provides an overview of Colombian history in relationship to US national interests leading up to the formation and implementation of Plan Columbia. This chapter then lays out an overview of Nigerian history in relationship to US national interests and current US strategic concerns towards Nigeria in order to prove that stabilizing this region supports US national interests.

## National Interests and Strategy

### What is Strategy?

This paper adopts a realist view of international relations which, when roughly defined, holds that countries engage one another and the larger international community in support of their own national interests in regards to their maintaining or increasing of power. That, in order to coordinate their actions, nations develop national strategies that look to maintain or advance their own national interests above or in mutual benefit of others, while never elevating interests of other countries above that of their own (Morgenthau 1951, 36). So then, how do nations identify interests and then develop strategies to maintain or further them?

There are a variety of definitions for national interests within the political sphere, for the purpose of this paper national interests will be defined through a paraphrasing of Hans Morgenthau's definition as those things required to protect a country's physical, political, economic, and cultural identities against encroachment (Morgenthau 1951, 6). These "vital" interests can be described as the ends or objectives in regards to national strategy and are, generally, enduring principles that shape national strategy. Therefore, if it is national interests that shape national strategy, how do countries use these interests to develop strategy and how do they judge if a strategy is sound and in balance with the importance of maintaining or furthering an interest?

Harry R. Yarger defines strategy at the national level as:

the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It is a process that

seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means. (Yarger 2006, 2)

In other words, national strategies seek to identify the current international system and the desired future system in which a nation's interests are furthered or maintained. Nations then determine the best ways to influence or manipulate the current system into becoming the desired system utilizing national resources and capabilities available. Materializing out of the congregation of these various national interests on the international stage is a system of ever competing national strategies that shape the international landscape of conflicts, alliances, and adversarial relationships that defines the international system of the day.

In order to maintain and advance their interests, governments, must identify ways that generate effects supportive of a national interest's advancement. These ways are usually expressed as policies or strategic concepts focused on creating a system that leads to the realization, or continued realization, of a national interest(s) (ends) (Yarger 2006, 2). This idea of policies and concepts as ways is not new and is explained in detail by Yarger in his *Little Book on Big Strategy* (Yarger 2006, 3).

In it, Yarger, details how ends (national interests), ways (policies and strategic concepts), means (resources expended), combined with risk interact to form strategies. Yarger holds that in order for a strategy to be complete it must identify the end states to be achieved (interests), ways in which to achieve them (policies or strategic concepts that create effects), and include sufficient means (resources and capabilities) to implement the ways. In addition, the strategy must balance against risk to ensure that the potential gains realized are worth risking the potential losses should it fail.

Furthermore, Yarger explains that strategies, in order to be sound, must be suitable in that the successful accomplishment of the ways will create an effect that is reasonably expected to result in the desired ends. Feasible in that accomplishment of the ways with the means provided is possible. Finally, that it is acceptable in that the means expended to accomplish the ways do not exceed the potential benefits gained. In doing so, Yarger argues, the strategist can be as confident as possible that a strategy developed in respect to these principals will succeed.

Now that national interests and strategy are defined, it is important to understand how the America generally views itself in regards to national interests. This understanding is critical when analyzing US policies and involvement in the world, and equally important when developing recommendations for future US strategies. Understanding US national interests and their hierarchy of importance greatly increase one's ability to determine if a developed strategy would be feasible, suitable, and acceptable to US policy makers.

### US National Interests

Not all interests are created equal, which is evident by the vastly different efforts exerted in support of some interests, but not others. How then does the US Government (USG) decide what is a national interest and its level of importance in regards to its willingness to expend effort in its pursuit?

Within the USG system, the Executive Branch bears the majority of responsibility for developing and implementing national strategy. Defining how that is done varies from administration to administration, but in general policies and concepts are weighed with cost (means) and risk on one side of the scale and importance of interest on the other. In

the realist's view of strategy, this interest must outweigh the cost and risk associated with maintaining or advancing it. Hans Morgenthau explained this idea in his book *Politics among Nations* in which he establishes the idea that in order for something to remain a national interest, its maintenance must not outweigh the benefit derived from its existence. This realist's model is generally the model the US has followed throughout its history; or at least in its development of successful strategies and policies.

During the Clinton Administration Morgenthau's principals were clearly defined in regards to US interests and the commitment of military forces for maintaining them it what came to be known as the Clinton Doctrine. This doctrine is highlighted in an excerpt from President Clinton's 1999 National Security Strategy (NSS) in which he paraphrases (though does not cite) Morgenthau's categories of interests and places limits on the ways and means considered acceptable for their maintenance.

Since there are always many demands for U.S. action, our national interests must be clear. These interests fall into three categories. The first includes **vital interests**—those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens, the economic well-being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures—including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems and emergency services—from paralyzing attack. We will do what we must to defend these interests, including, when necessary and appropriate, using our military might unilaterally and decisively. . . .

The second category is **important national interests**. These interests do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live. Important national interests include, for example, regions in which we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, protecting the global environment from severe harm, and crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows. . . .

The third category is **humanitarian and other interests**. In some circumstances, our nation may act because our values demand it. (Clinton 1999, 2)

In this document, President Clinton made clear that there are three categories of national interests: vital, important, and humanitarian/other, each allocated varying levels of response. This research will use these categories when describing US national interests and the levels of response associated with each as described in the following table.

Table 1. Categories of US National Interests

| <u>Category of US National Interest Importance</u> | <u>Level of Response</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Vital                                              | US will utilize the full range of national power. Militarily and unilaterally if necessary. No doubt, the US will go to war for these. Risks the security of the US or the erosion of core values at home if not maintained. Lesser categories of interest are generally nested in support of these interests. Enduring.                                                                  |
| Important                                          | US may use the full range of national power but will assuredly use significant elements of that range. Response not necessarily militant. US may go to war for these. Usually pertaining to the expansion of core values and their export within the international system. Change with the current and evolving international system in support of vital interests.                       |
| Humanitarian/Other                                 | The US will likely not use the full range of national power. Kinetic Military response is unlikely, though utilizing the military to provide humanitarian aid and assistance is. The US will not go to war for these unless the people demand it or it nests within an interest of a higher category and their combination of importance requires the elevation of response. Situational. |

*Source:* Developed by author using 1999 NSS (Clinton 1999).

Having established categories of US interests, focus now shifts to identifying those vital US interests from which the others flow. In order to identify vital US interests, provided below are excerpts from the last three Presidents' National Security Strategies' in which these administrations highlight their view of US national interests:

Our national security strategy is designed to meet the fundamental purposes set out in the preamble to the Constitution:

*. . . provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, . . .*

Since the founding of the nation, certain requirements have remained constant. We must protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad. We must maintain the sovereignty, political freedom and independence of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory intact. And, we must promote the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people. (Clinton 1999, 1)

The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. (Bush 2002, 1)

American leadership is a global force for good, but it is grounded in our enduring national interests as outlined: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners. A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity. Respect for universal values at home and around the world. A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. (Obama 2015a, 2)

Each statement builds on one another to highlight what this author considers the vital national interests of the United States: security of US sovereignty, increasing US economic prosperity, expansion of free and open markets, and the advancement of liberty, basic human rights, and the rule of law expressed in its founding documents. While initially narrowly defined in regards to the benefactors of liberty and these basic human rights, over the course of US history they have expanded to include generally every American citizen. These vital interests form the foundation of US policies, both foreign and domestic. Ideally, every USG policy and strategic concept can be argued in some fashion or another as supporting these vital US interests.

Important and humanitarian/other interests are generally subsets of these vital interests in that they support vital interests at home by expanding them abroad. This expansion and enlargement of US vital interests into the international system helps to codify US interests and values within the system serving as a sort of advance guard for US vital interests. It is within these important and humanitarian/other categories of interests that the post-Cold War era America realizes most of its national strategy as the fall of the Soviet Union has resulted in a void of truly existential threats to US sovereignty.

These principles governing the priority of US interests and commitment of US efforts are still regarded as relevant today and serve as guiding principles when determining if a policy or strategic concept is in line with US national interests and the levels of support it is likely to draw in regards to ways, means, and risk.

#### Colombia and Its Historic Strategic Importance to the US Leading Up to Plan Colombia

##### Colony to Republic: Monroe Doctrine

Colombia was until 1819, a colony of the Spanish Empire. However, Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 led to the rapid secession of Spanish colonies in the New World. This era of Spanish American wars of independence from 1808 until the mid-1830s would see Spain's loss of almost all of its New World colonies.

These events coincided with the formation of a new US national security policy laid out by then President James Monroe on December 2, 1823 during his annual address to Congress that would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine consisted of four overarching policies regarding US involvement in European affairs and

what the US was willing to tolerate in regards to Europe's involvement in the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine was shaped in large part as a response to the crumbling Spanish Empire and the freeing of its Western Hemisphere colonies. President Monroe declared:

In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do...to declare that we should consider any attempt on their (European powers) part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere . . . but with the Governments (American Colonies) who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States . . . in the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. (Monroe 1823, 22)

This declaration established four primary US international relations policies:

1. The US would not become involved in European wars in Europe.
2. The US would not interfere with current European colonies in the Western Hemisphere.
3. All future European colonization of the Western Hemisphere was closed and any attempt at further colonization would be seen as a threat to vital US national interests.
4. In the event of a European colonial rebellion within the Western Hemisphere, the US would remain neutral up until a colony gains independence at which

time the US would consider any attempt to reclaim that colony as a threat to vital US national interests.

According to Hans Morgenthau in his book, *In Defense of the National Interest*, “This doctrine manifested out of a US endeavor to preserve its unique position as the unrivaled predominate power within the Western Hemisphere. Interference of non-American nations into the affairs of the Western Hemisphere through the acquisition of territory, was the only way in which the predominance of the United States could have been challenged from within the hemisphere itself”(Morgenthau 1951, 5). The Monroe Doctrine was designed to ensure that US vital national interests of internal security and sovereignty were protected through the prevention of the expansion of foreign powers into what the US considered the only areas from which a foreign power could expect to project effective military operations against the US mainland, the Western Hemisphere.

Later, Henry Kissinger argued in his book *Diplomacy*, that the Monroe Doctrine was used to justify US expansion west and, by the 20th century, used to justify American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Further he claimed, that this policy allowed the US to free its hands of Europe and turn attention to the Western Hemisphere while at the same time claiming to be above the power politics that had come to define Europe (Kissinger 1994, 37).

It was during this period that Colombian rebels under the leadership of Simón Bolívar, a Caracas-born soldier, defeated Spanish Royal forces at the Battle of Boyacá effectively winning Colombian independence (Tompkins 2014, 6). Though the complete political separation would not occur until 1825, Bolivar united the former colonies that today generally form Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, and Venezuela into one Gran

Colombia that would last until 1830. The fact that this coincided with the US adoption of the Monroe Doctrine ensured that Spain would be unable to reclaim these former colonies, as it was now considered by the US an American nation, meaning any move to regain control would be seen as a hostile act against the US.

During the infancy stage of Gran Colombia self-rule, two political parties emerged along competing political ideologies of the time. Bolivar would form the Bolivarian party, a precursor to the current day Colombian Conservative Party. This party was heavily influenced by the ideology of centralized government with a powerful executive at its center in line with ideology expressed by Machiavelli's in his work *The Prince* (Tompkins 2014, 38). His party also sought to retain close ties to the Catholic Church and secure "The Church" an official place within the government. Led primarily by military officers, this party pushed for a centralized and powerful government focused around a strong man and closely intertwined with the church.

This was in direct opposition to the party founded by Bolivar's main rival and Vice President Francisco de Paula Santander who felt this model too closely resembled the monarchical structures of the old world (Tompkins 2014, 33). The Santanderistas, precursors to the modern day Colombian Liberal Party, led primarily by lawyers, wanted a new government based on political teachings that had come out of the European Enlightenment and strict devotion to the rule of law (Tompkins 2014, 33). In their mind, this new government would center on federalism and a greater separation of church and state.

Bolivar during his life was able to realize much of what he wanted for the government of Colombia including installing himself as what essentially amounted to the

dictator of Gran Colombia. However, Bolivar's power was not absolute and his failing health and Bogota's geographic isolation from Venezuela and Ecuador made it increasingly difficult for the centralized government to control and regulate Gran Colombia. Following Bolivar's death in 1830, Ecuador and Venezuela failed to recognize a new constitution drafted by representatives of the Gran Colombian Government, effectively dissolving Gran Columbia (Tompkins 2014, 38). Colombia and Panama would however remained together to form the Republic of Colombia.

Under this new nation, the Liberal Party would dominate Columbian politics through a period of general infighting punctuated from time to time with armed rebellion up until 1876 when a portion of the Liberal Party broke away and joined the Conservative Party. This led to the election of the Conservative Party candidate Rafael Nunez to the presidency. He oversaw the adoption of a new constitution in 1886 that would remain in effect until 1991. This constitution would galvanize much of the Conservative Party's view into law including a resurgence of the Church's role in the government, especially where education was concerned. The conflict it would help to create would also see the US' first intervention into the internal affairs of Colombia in order to further US economic power and strategic control of what would become the world's busiest maritime route.

Under the new constitution, the executive branch gained significant power. Now once elected, the President was able to appoint State and Local governors without elections. The legislative branch at all levels were still elected, but the President's ability to replace every Mayor, Local, and State Governor upon election greatly tilted the balance of power in favor of the executive branch.

This “winner take all” form of governing that evolved within Colombia often resulted in the disenfranchisement of large portions of its citizenry. This set the stage for the outbreak of a bloody civil war known as the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902). A variety of factors converged leading to the onset of war from political disenfranchisement to economic woes. Falling coffee prices had greatly affected Colombia’s economy leading to a widespread decrease in the quality of life of the average Colombian, significantly worst among the working poor. This, coupled with the suppression and manipulation of national elections by the Conservative Party in a bid to retain power, led to the outbreak of war between rival Conservative and Liberal factions.

Ultimately, US President Theodore Roosevelt would use this conflict as an opportunity to secure future US interests in the Panama Canal Project (Tompkins 2014, 28). The canal was seen as an opportunity for the US to increase its strategic importance by creating and controlling what would become the most important choke point for international commerce and naval navigation while simultaneously expanding US economic prosperity. US involvement would hasten the conclusion of the war and see the Liberal Party’s defeat and fracturing. The signing of a peace treaty aboard a US naval ship would end hostilities and see the creation of an independent Panama, more welcoming to US construction and control of a Panama Canal.

It would also see the more conservative half of the Liberal Party joining with the Conservatives in a coalition government while an extreme left element would persist throughout the countryside eventually giving rise to leftist revolutionary forces in the mid-1900s.

The War of A Thousand Days lasted from 1899-1902 resulted in the deaths of 100,000 people and cost Colombia the Panama isthmus. However, it would create the conditions for a political reconciliation between the Liberal and Conservative Parties within the country that would see a 27-year long era of economic growth and bipartisan Conservative rule. Reforms instituted during this period would also ensure constitutional transfers of power all the way up until 1950, an impressive stretch for Latin America at this time.

### La Violencia: Rise of the Leftist Guerilla and US Containment Policy

In 1930, a rift within the Colombian Conservative Party resulted in the Liberal Party's winning of the presidential election. As predicted based on the high stakes political system created by the 1886 constitution, this led to the Liberal Party's domination of the national government. Initially, the Liberals implemented sweeping social reforms that saw an increased roll in governing and access to political power for the average Colombian. This however also saw the rise of communist leaders within departments of the Colombian Government.

This newfound inclusion of communists into the national government panicked politicians on both sides of the Conservative/ Liberal divide. This panic led to a "Red Scare" within Colombian politics as both sides viewed communism as a threat to their entrenched political establishment's power (Tompkins 2014, 72). The result was that the Liberal Party ran a more center candidate in the next election who won and began to roll back many of the social reforms emplaced by his predecessor.

This rolling back of social reforms led many within the Liberal Party to feel as though their party had abandoned them in favor of retaining political power. The result of this was a split within the Liberal Party that resulted in their loss of the 1946 presidential elections. This loss resulted in widespread violence by Liberal Party supporters and would come to represent the beginning of a time in Colombian history known as La Violencia that would see the deaths of 100,000-200,000 Colombians from 1946-1966 (Tompkins 2014, 85). Further enflaming the violence would be the assassination of a populist Liberal Party politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala in 1948.

After their victory in 1946 the Conservatives, as expected, continued to roll back social reforms, further disenfranchising the Liberal Party members and voters. A series of political events resulted in an off cycle presidential election being ordered by the Colombian Supreme Court in 1949 in which the Liberal Party for all intents and purposes boycotted. This led to their essential collapse and exclusion from the government. The effect of this exclusion of the Liberal Party resulted in nearly six million Colombians losing their representation within the national government (Tompkins 2014, 73). The resulting widespread disenfranchisement of Liberal Party supporters saw a drastic increase in political violence as Liberal politicians called for rebellion in the countryside.

These calls to arms resulted in the formation of numerous leftist armed groups across the Colombian countryside. In response to leftist violence rural landowners formed conservative protection forces to counter leftist attacks. Elements of these armed movements would combine along ideological lines to eventually form the four major non-governmental armed groups that would terrorize the Colombian countryside for over 40 years.

Elsewhere in the world at this time, the US was emerging victorious from World War II. However, the defeat of the Axis Powers saw the rise of the Soviet Union within the new age of nuclear warfare. The US now saw in the Soviet Union, the greatest existential threat it had ever faced. As the Soviet Union swallowed up Eastern Europe and turned its gaze towards the West the US doubled down on a policy of containment committing itself to the prevention of Soviet expansion.

This policy of international containment in many ways applied portions of the Monroe Doctrine to the rest of the world, in that the US viewed any expansion of Soviet power into Western allied nations as a hostile act against the United States. Within the Western Hemisphere America's new policy of Soviet containment fit into policies already in place under the Monroe Doctrine. Moving forward, the US would view the assurance of vital national interests within the Western Hemisphere through the lens of excluding and countering Soviet intervention and communist movements within the hemisphere, especially in Latin America.

So, in 1953 when, in response to the growing violence within Colombia, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Colombia's military commander in chief, seized power in a Conservative military coup d'état the US had no objections. Rojas would install himself as dictator under the pretense of establishing governmental control of the countryside and ending the violence by suppressing the armed groups and reintegrating them back into society. Rojas would institute economic development initiatives and reintegration programs along with increasing representation within the Colombian Government. These programs and initiatives would begin the reduction in violence that would see an end to

La Violencia by 1966. Rojas would rule until 1957 when widespread protests led to his peaceful ouster.

Rojas' ouster would see the formation of the National Front, a government formed by a power sharing agreement between the two primary political parties. This government would last until 1976, but elements of it would remain in place until the ratification of a new constitution in 1991. Among key provisions outlined as part of the National Front was a power sharing agreement that saw the Conservative and Liberal Parties allotted set levels of representation within the government.

While this resulted in a reduction of violence, it also resulted in political disenfranchisement among ordinary Colombians as they saw a significant drop in the power of the ballot box due to these set levels of representation. For its part, America was happy to see the National Front in control as it excluded communist elements from governing Colombia. It was during the timeframe of La Violencia that the US began training and equipping Government forces with the aim of defeating leftist groups funded by the Soviet Union and the drug trade operating within Colombia.

Armed leftist groups exploited the disenfranchisement caused by set levels of representation by championing the view that the National Front represented a return to a two party system dominated by elites in which the average Colombian was to have no part. In many ways, this was exactly what was happening and it resulted in a renewed resiliency among armed leftist groups that, coupled with funding from the drug trade, would see them outlast the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent drying up of funding for leftist revolutionaries within the Western Hemisphere.

By the late 1960s, Colombia had become a regional hegemony whose security situation affected the entire region. This further raised the stakes as Soviet control of Colombia would not only have violated both the Monroe Doctrine and the US policy of containment, but also threatened US control of the Panama Canal and influence throughout the region. Furthermore, control of any South American country would have given the Soviets a foothold directly threatening US national security. None of this could be tolerated by the US as it threatened a number of US vital and important national interests. This led to a multi-decade security cooperation alliance between America and Colombia to counter these groups and communist influences within Colombia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked arguably the greatest achievement of foreign policy in US history. The US had defeated the most powerful existential threat it had face without sparking a worldwide nuclear war. Within the Western Hemisphere, the US had achieved almost total victory, with Cuba being the sole exception to an otherwise complete exclusion of communist governments from the hemisphere.

Colombia, with the threat of Soviet interference gone, would now move rapidly towards reconciliation with armed groups through the adoption of a more inclusive constitution. This newly inclusive government, combined with a capable military honed over decades of experience fighting guerrillas and benefiting from decades of US training and equipping, now stood as the established regional power within the Andean region.

For its part, the US (along with the Colombians) predicted the 1990s would see a collapse and reintegration into society of Soviet backed revolutionaries in the hemisphere as most of them had depended on Soviet funding, training, and equipping for their

existence. In almost all cases, this was true as Latin American governments, backed occasionally by US support, exploited their advantages quickly bringing most of these groups to heel. The major exception to this domino effect was Colombia.

### The F.A.R.C., Cocaine, Oil, and 9/11: Why Plan Colombia

#### The FARC

From the late 1960s on, Colombia had become the coca and thereby cocaine capital of the world. This had resulted in the formation of powerful cartels within the country with access to levels of capital equal to many of the countries in the region. Integration of Colombia's armed groups into the drug trade by the 1980s and their subsequent access to capital outside of state sponsorship allowed these groups within Colombia to persist in force beyond the cessation of Soviet support.

The most influential, powerful, and threatening armed group within Colombia was the "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia" (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) more commonly referred to as the FARC. The FARC formed in 1964 through the organizing of independent leftist militias that had come into existence during the timeframe of La Violencia. Once it was clear that communist leadership was to be excluded from the coming National Front government, the Colombian Communist Party with help from its Soviet backers organized the FARC to serve as the militant wing of the party.

The FARC would officially adopted a Marxist-Leninist political worldview and pledge itself to the installment of a communist Colombian government. Two additional leftist revolutionary organizations operated within Colombia up until the late 1990's, the National Liberation Army and the 19<sup>th</sup> of April Movement (M-19). However, the FARC

was by far the largest and most effective, boasting a force six times larger than the other two groups combined.

US, Colombian, and Soviet Union governments considered the FARC the only real threat to Colombian government control and adopted policies that reflected that view. The majority of US support to Colombian forces would go to countering the FARC and their aligned narco-organizations. While Soviet support would focus primarily on improving, expanding, and legitimizing the FARC.

As mentioned earlier, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 created the expectation that leftist militias operating in Colombia would quickly negotiate for peace, reintegrate, and continue their struggle for political reform utilizing the newfound political freedoms and inclusions allowed for by the 1991 Colombian constitution. In fact, M-19 did follow this path, and disarmed and reintegrated as a political movement within Colombian society. They did this as part of the conditions agreed upon to allow them to participate in the drafting of the new constitution. Elements of the ELN would also take this option, however the FARC would not.

The FARC's ability to persist beyond the fall of the Soviet Union relied predominantly on their ability to control eastern portions of Colombia and benefit from the subsequent funding generated by the cultivation of coca and the exportation of cocaine. While initially opposed to the drug trade the FARC would come to rely on it as their primary source of income by the 1990s. "In order to finance a huge expansion of its forces, the FARC leadership finally switched tacks in 1982 and started taxing drug producers and smugglers"(Otis 2014, 2).

The FARC's monetary woes not only led to their involvement in the drug trade, but also in organized crime such as kidnapping and extortion. "The downside for the FARC (was) that Colombians (would) not soon forget its practice of targeting the civilian population through kidnappings, extortion, assassinations, and massacres, or its role in the drug trade that has brought so much violence to Colombia."

This almost sole reliance on the drug trade represented a critical vulnerability to the long term viability of the FARC. Its reliance on these tactics to produce capital alienated it from popular support as it began to be characterized as an organized criminal enterprise rather than a somewhat legitimate armed group fighting for representation. This allowed the Colombian Government to argue that the FARC was in fact a terrorist organization unworthy of international sympathy or support. This distinction would prove of even greater importance following the events of September 11, 2001 and will be discussed later on in this chapter in regards to that date and the international policy shifts that occurred as a result.

The FARC's persistence within Colombia meant that there still existed within Colombia the threat of degradation of vital and important US national interests in regards to security and economic opportunity within the Western Hemisphere. This threat coupled with the following threats discussed in this chapter would serve as the primary justification for the formation of the security cooperation strategy that would come to be known as Plan Colombia.

### The Drug Trade

A growing international demand for cocaine, that began in the mid-1960 and continued to increase to a peak in the late 1990s, would drive an ever increasing cultivation and manufacturing base. This expansion of production occurred almost

exclusively in Latin America, leading the way in this expansion was Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. By 1990 Peru stood as the world's largest producer of cocaine, however the collapse of the Soviet Union and its funding to the FARC would lead to a renewed vigor by the FARC leadership to make up the lost revenue in cocaine production. This, coupled with a decrease of US involvement in Colombia helped lead to a surge in Colombian production that would see it overtake Peru as the world's number one supplier of Cocaine. The following table shows the drastic increase in Colombian production before finally peaking in 2000, the year prior to the implementation of Plan Colombia.




Figure 3. Historic Cocaine Production within Bolivia, Colombia, Peru 1990-2010

Source: Hidalgo 2012.

While this increase cannot solely be attributed to the FARC's increased demand for funding in light of the evaporation of Soviet support there is no doubt that it was in

part responsible. The result was a FARC that proved much more resilient than either the Colombian or US Governments had anticipated.

The primary market for all of this cocaine was the United States. Cocaine, while present in the US for over a hundred years by this time, exploded in popularity by the late 1970s and became the party drug of choice by the 1980. The 1980s also saw the invention of crack cocaine, which helped to fuel an explosion of urban crime within North America that became one of the defining occurrences of that decade.

This explosion of cocaine use in the US began to be regarded as a real threat to US security by the public and policy makers alike. The cocaine trade was helping to spur a national crime wave and Americans were alarmed by the international criminal organizations it was creating who seemed to have reach all the way into US domestic affairs. In addition, the consumption of cocaine was creating an ever-increasing burden on US medical and penal institutions trying to cope with the wave of new drug addicts and offenders it was creating. This trade also represented significant economic concerns to the US, as not only did it represent a large transfer of wealth outside of US markets, but also was helping to fund one of the last pro-communist revolutionary forces operating in the hemisphere.

## Oil

This timeframe coincided with additional factors involving energy markets that increased Colombia's strategic importance to the US, while amplifying the threat of the FARC and allied leftist militants. The first was US diversification of energy suppliers in response to disruptions in energy markets caused by turbulence in the Persian Gulf area that threatened US crude supplies. The second was the discovery of vast petroleum

deposits within Colombia, and the third was FARC's escalation of attacks on oil infrastructure within Colombia.

Due to the regular occurrence of potentially destabilizing conflicts within the Persian Gulf region and the Iranian Revolution, the US began a considerable diversification in energy suppliers by the mid-1980s. By 1992 Latin America would supplant the Persian Gulf as the region supplying the largest share of petroleum imports to US markets. In addition, the Andean region alone would surpass all Persian Gulf imports in three of the five years leading up to the implementation of Plan Colombia. The following graphs demonstrate the ever increasing importance of the Latin American energy market and its clear relevance to US energy and economic interests while additionally showing the increased contribution of Colombia to this market.




Figure 4. U.S. Crude Oil Imports

Source: Dunning and Wirpsa 2004, 106.

Much of Colombia's increase in production was due to the discovery of vast oil deposits and the subsequent development of those fields. This discovery and subsequent development resulted in a more than fourfold increase in Colombian oil production between 1984 and 1999, much of which ended up in US markets. The following graph demonstrates the significant increase in Colombian oil production that took place following these discoveries.




Figure 5. Colombia Total Oil Production

Source: Cunningham 2013.

However, with this increased development came increased interest by the FARC and other leftist militias in the extortion of profits realized by this increase of oil infrastructure. The FARC, utilizing extortion tactics it had honed on Colombian civilians

over the years, turned its attention to these newly developed oil field. Their strategy was to extort foreign oil companies into making protection payments to ensure FARC elements would not attack their infrastructure or personnel. If companies failed to pay, or did not pay enough the FARC would conduct attacks and targeted kidnappings against the offending company. These attacks increased throughout the 1990s, peaking the year prior to and the year of the implementation of Plan Colombia, the following graph shows this increase. It is also worth noting that the number of attacks on oil infrastructure within Colombia in 2001 exceeded the number of attacks on oil infrastructure within Iraq in 2004.




Figure 6. Attacks on Oil Infrastructure

Source: Giroux et al. 2013.

These attacks represented a clear threat to US economic and energy interests in the region, further increasing the likelihood of US increasing involvement. The fact that this threat emanated from the last pro-communist revolutionary force operating in the region was not lost on the USG.

### 9/11 and the FARC

Finally, the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001 represented a turning point in US foreign policy. The traumatic events of that day galvanized US policy makers resolve to confront emerging and established terrorist threats that threatened US interest no matter where they were in the world. While the US had at this point already committed to the implementation of Plan Colombia, the resolve instilled on that day would ensure increased funding while also contributing to what would be a more than 15-year enduring commitment to the strategy.

Additionally, in light of 9/11, the declaration of the FARC as a terrorist organization by the US meant that any tacit support the FARC had received from places like Cuba were over. No nation was willing to incur the wrath of the recently wounded US over what had now become increasingly viewed as little more than a well organized criminal network of communist guerrillas, criminals, and drug smugglers.

However, by 1999 and beyond, the FARC and its complementary spattering of leftist militant consortiums throughout Colombia represented a threat to US security, economic prosperity, energy markets, an allied nation, and core American beliefs about republican institutions and free market economics within the Western Hemisphere. Plan Colombia would be the US answer to this threat.

## Nigeria and Its Strategic Importance to the US

### Colonial Nigeria

In 1807 the British Government outlawed the slave trade and adopted a policy of combating the Atlantic slave trade. After the Napoleonic Wars, Britain began working to eliminate the slave trade focusing on West Africa. In 1851 British forces ousted the ruler of Lagos, Oba Kosoko, and installed Oba Akitoye, a man more amicable to British interests and willing to enforce their ban on the slave trade. British forces also compelled this new leader to sign a treaty establishing the ban on slaving in Nigeria while also expanding the reach of Christian missionaries and setting favorable trade conditions for Britain (Metz 1991, 29).

The British Government would have likely remained content with this arrangement, had the French and Germans not begun colonizing West Africa at an alarming rate. This encroachment by other European powers caused the British Government to take a step they would have preferred not to of and declare Lagos a colony in 1861(Metz 1991, 30). By this point colonies, especially in Africa were becoming expensive liabilities, but control of the Niger River basin was too important to the British to lose to the French or Germans. Then in 1885, British claims in West Africa were acknowledged during the Berlin Conference and almost all of what is now modern day Nigeria fell under British control (Metz 1991, 29).

This new recognition set conditions for the establishment of a British Government backed trade company along the lines of the British East Indies Company named the Royal Niger Company (Metz 1991, 27). This company, often through the use of force,

secured exclusive trading rights along the Niger River basin while British missionaries moved further and further inland converting Sothern Nigerians to Christianity.

Britain administered colonial rule in Nigeria along ethnic and religious boundaries; this saw the creation of a northern and southern protectorate. The northern Islamic protectorate was allowed to maintain Islamic law and social structure as long as local leaders acknowledged British rule and administered British tax and tariff requirements. In the south, the British pushed conversion to Christianity and administered it more in line with British common law (Metz 1991, 31). This resulted in European style education systems and universities open in the south and the adoption of many European customs and forms of dress among elites and the middle class. This would later become a subject for concern among some in the Islamic north. Boko Haram would use these facts to paint these differences as a threat to traditional Islamic values.

By 1912 however, the British governor of Nigeria set to begin the unification process of Nigeria under one central government. In 1914, near the eve of World War I Nigeria was unified, however the principal of indirect rule was left in place and British colonial officers were instructed to interfere as little as possible (Metz 1991, 34). In 1916 the colonial governor began conducting a yearly meeting with the six main regional rulers of Nigeria as a way to inform them of the British policies they were to enforce over the next year. This loose affiliation overseen by British administrators was as about as far as unification went until after World War II.

### Nigerian Independence

Throughout the early and mid-1900's, Nigerian nationalism began to take root (Metz 1991, 38). While there were sharp and significant political differences between

north and south, east and west, Nigerians by the 1940 began to see themselves as one country. After World War II political movements within Nigeria's north and south began to call for independence. Both conservative parties and liberal parties began to unite on at least this one issue (Metz 1991, 48).

By the 1950s it was becoming clear to the European powers that the colonial systems they had established had now, during the Cold War, become a liability. Britain, realizing that it would be unable to continue direct rule of its African colonies, began to relinquish control, creating sovereign states. So on October 1, 1960 by an act of the British Parliament, Nigeria became an independent country within the Commonwealth (Metz 1991, 47).

This set off a dizzying array of political action as territorial lines were adjusted and political parties jockeyed for positions of power within the country. Nigeria became a political piece in the new "Great Game" between the Soviet Union and the West brought on after the end of the Korean War. Each side attempted to secure a politically favorable Nigerian Government as Nigeria was key to the control of the Bay of Guinea and an ideological victory there could unlock a large portion of the continent to the victor.

By 1963 a coalition government established a federal republic known as the New Republic through a number of political and territorial moves so numerous their explanation goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, the result was a Nigerian Government with three major political parties comprised of one conservative Muslim party, the Nigerian People's Congress, a conservative Christian party, the National Counsel of Nigeria, the Cameroons, and a liberal opposition group the Action Group (Metz 1991, 54).

The first nationwide elections were held in 1965, resulting in a victory for the Christian coalition. However, widespread disenfranchisement due to the corrupt way in which the elections were conducted led to back to back military coups. First by Christians from the south then the counter coup by military officers in the north. The resulting northern and western dominated military dictatorship created panic in the south (Metz 1991, 58).

This sparked the Eastern Region to declare independence, calling itself the Republic of Biafra. This caused the Nigerian Government, utilizing units loyal to the dictatorial government, to attack to reclaim the breakaway region (Metz 1991, 60). The resulting conflict became the Nigerian Civil War and lasted from 1966 until 1970 and was responsible for the direct or indirect death of between 1-3 million Nigerians. From this point on Nigeria never really experienced democratic rule as a series of military dictators assumed control through both bloody and bloodless military coups.

Nigeria entered the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) during the 1970s receiving a flood of capital through the oil trade (Metz 1991, 65). This flow of money buoyed Nigerian dictators even in light of their gross mismanagement of the government. This capital also led to some of the most extreme examples of government corruption imaginable. And so it was that from 1966 until 1999 Nigeria experienced a progression of military dictators, each coming to power on the promise of stamping out corruption and bring back democracy while in practice doing the very opposite.

## The Developing Democracy

One of the only positive effects of the revolving door of leaders the coups created was a country accustomed to power sharing among the country's largest groups. Several heads of state lost power then regained it as an ebb and flow of political backers shifted. This constant shifting of power likely prevented another civil war, in the author's opinion.

In 1999 General Abdulsalami Abubakar, the leader of Nigeria, adopted a new constitution and held a new round of elections. Olusegun Obasanjo, a prior military dictator of Nigeria, won election having recently retired from military service. However, the elections, both in 1999 and 2003, that saw him elected were widely criticized as unfair and illegitimate.

In 2007, Umaru Yar'Adua won the Presidential election and served until he died in office in May of 2010. His replacement, Goodluck Jonathan, was sworn in and served the remainder of Yar'Adua's term. In 2011 Goodluck Jonathan won re-election. In 2015, he oversaw what is considered to be Nigeria's most successful election, garnishing wide praise for the fair and inclusive way in which it was conducted. Goodluck Jonathan however lost the election to the leader of the opposition party and former military dictator of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari. This was the first time an incumbent Nigerian President lost an election and also marks the most peaceful transition of power in Nigeria's modern political history.

Nigeria has made large strides recently to increase development and improve government function while reducing corruption. Its continued reliance on military

strongmen to maintain order has retarded the growth of democratic governance but seems poised to make significant progress towards that end of late.

### Current US Interests

Nigeria currently faces a number of challenges and opportunities that have led to its labeling as a US foreign policy priority state. Its size, population, location, and contributions to international energy markets and regional security means that its security environment has the potential not only to effect the region but the international system as well. As is, Nigeria sits as the regional hegemony power with the potential to either stabilize the region if properly developed or further destabilize if not.

Nigeria is a key power on the African continent, not only because of its size, but also because of its political and economic role in the region. Nigeria has overtaken South Africa as Sub-Saharan Africa's largest economy, and it is one of the world's major sources of high-quality crude oil. Nigeria has the largest population of any African country at 181 million making it one of the largest democracies in the world. One in five people in Sub-Saharan Africa live in Nigeria and Lagos, the country's commercial center, is among the world's largest cities (Blanchard and Husted 2016, 3).

This former British Colony emerged as a democracy from military dictatorship in 1999 and has held elections as recently as 2015. This also makes it one of the world's newest and most fragile democracies. Its population also allows it to field one of the largest security forces in Africa and gives it the potential to be a stabilizing force in the region, if stabilized and converted into a net exporter of security. Currently, Nigeria plays an important role in peace and stability operations within Africa and is routinely in the top ten contributors of troops to UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions

(Blanchard and Husted 2016, 3). Few countries in Africa have the capacity to make a more decisive impact on the region's security.

Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa and 11th overall in the world and considered a source of high quality crude (Blanchard and Husted 2016, 3). Vast deposits of oil in the Gulf of Guinea and in its delta states give Nigeria the potential to fund both economic and military expansion. However, current levels of corruption mean that the majority of fund generated by these reserves are skimmed away by corrupt officials. In addition to oil reserves, Nigeria boasts the largest economic market in Africa, though underdeveloped for its size (Think Security Africa 2011, 12). This political and economic turmoil has contributed to the formation of security gaps within the country, especially in the north, that have contributed to the rise of armed groups exercising territorial control over large portions of Nigeria, the largest of which is Boko Haram.

Nigeria is home to Boko Haram, an Islamic terrorist group aligned with Islamic State that controls significant territory in Northern Nigeria. This group regularly targets civilians, government officials, and security force personnel with terrorist attacks. They are responsible for numerous atrocities against civilians and are now operating in at least four counties, representing a regional spillover that threatens the stability and security of the entire region.

In addition, criminal groups maintain direct ties to Latin American and Colombian drug cartels. These ties are to such an extent that Colombia has sent advisors to Nigeria to help confront smuggling operations that move cocaine on its way from Latin America to Southern Europe through Nigeria and up through North Africa. In addition, heroin from the golden crescent and triangle also make their way through Nigeria, tying it

to another US priority state, Afghanistan. It is highly unlikely that Boko Haram is not benefiting from this trade as much of it moves along routes that cross through Boko Haram controlled territory. This trade parallels the already well established arms smuggling routes that supply markets in northern Nigeria from which Boko Haram benefits and depends on for most of its arms.



Figure 7. Major International Drug Trafficking Routes

Source: International Networks Archives 2016.

This expansion of the drug trade into Nigeria has only worsened the state of corruption within the region and signs point to an increased worsening. In fact in the spring of 2016 the first industrial scale methamphetamine factory was raided in Nigeria, captured among the workers were four Mexican nationals that had been sent over as advisors by a cartel operating in Mexico (Hernandez 2016).

The above factors alone represent three of the eight primary threats to US interest identified in the 2015 US National Security Strategy:

- Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies
- Major energy market disruptions
- Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime)

### Chapter Summary

Plan Colombia led to the stabilizing of Colombia and the defeat of the FARC over essentially the same period as the war in Iraq for just a little over the cost of one month of the Iraq War. The return on investment Plan Colombia provided marks it as one of the most successful security cooperation strategies ever executed by the United States. Due to this, when appropriate, Plan Colombia should be used as a model for stabilizing other states dealing with internal insurgencies that pose a threat to US national interests.

Especially if those states are US priority states, regional hegemonies, large scale oil producers, emerging democracies, or dealing with insurgencies opposed to the most basic principles America looks to further in the world while also maintaining ties to Latin American drug cartels and committing atrocities against civilians that threaten to spill over into the surrounding region.

Currently Nigeria represents a US national security concern that has the real potential of turning into an international security emergency. Due to Nigeria's location, importance to energy markets, the threat posed by Boko Haram, potential for atrocities, status as a weak state, and ties to Latin American drug cartels the US must consider strategies for the long-term stabilization of Nigeria.

Strengthening this point even more is the comparison of President Bill Clinton's words in a speech given in Colombia to mark the beginning of Plan Colombia in which he stated: "The United States has a strong interest in Colombia, in your economic

recovery of the country, in the conservation of your democracy, in the protection of human rights for the people of Colombia, and in your pursuit of peace, security, stability, not only for Colombia but for the whole region” (Clinton, 2000).

This was further strengthened by the words of President Barak Obama given in a televised address to the people of Nigeria on the eve of their successful national elections in 2015: “And in this task of advancing the security, prosperity, and human rights of all Nigerians, you will continue to have a friend and partner in the United States of America” (Obama, 2015b).

Based on initial similarities, and the concluded strategic importance of a stable Nigeria this paper considers developing a strategy to stabilize Nigeria to be in line with US national interests. Furthermore, this paper looks to examine in the following chapters the potential of using Plan Colombia as a model for that strategy. This paper will provide an additional outline of that strategy and potential risks and costs associated with it. The following chapter will detail how this paper will compare situations in these states and determine if they are similar enough that Plan Colombia could serve as the US strategic model for stabilizing Nigeria.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research first examines Plan Colombia's operational approach and results to determine if a similar strategy executed in Nigeria would be suitable to address the current security problems within Nigeria that pose a threat to US interests. The research then utilizes a stepwise comparative analysis of the operational environments within Colombia in 2000 and current day Nigeria using the operational variables of PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure) to determine the feasibility of implementing a similar strategy in Nigeria. Finally, this research develops and compares estimated costs of implementing such a strategy in comparison to risks identified in the preceding comparison to make a determination on the likely acceptability of implementing a similar strategy to Plan Colombia in Nigeria.

#### Methodology

##### Methodology for Analysis of Operational Approach Suitability

This research first conducts a qualitative analysis of the operational environmental framework present within Colombia in 2000 and the desired environment US strategy hoped to achieve. Using stated ends, ways, and means, this research illustrates the US operational approach in regards to Plan Colombia and how elements of that approach interacted with each other. This research then evaluates the results of Plan Colombia and makes a determination on its effectiveness. Relying on this analysis of Plan Colombia and problem framing developed in chapter 2 in regards to 2000 Colombia and current day

Nigeria this research paper then makes a determination in regards to the suitability of a strategy based on Plan Colombia for current state Nigeria.

#### Methodology for Analysis of Feasibility Based on Operational Environment Similarities

Utilizing a stepwise approach, this research will compare the following operational environment systems that existed within Colombia in 2000 and the current systems in Nigeria to determine the feasibility of implementing a strategy similar to Plan Colombia in Nigeria. This paper selected the following systems for comparison from US Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (21 May 2014). They are: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII). These systems were chosen because they are used in Joint doctrine as well as Army doctrine for analyzing the strategic and operational environment. In addition, these systems align very closely with the systems that Plan Colombia targeted with effects as part of that strategy.

These six primary categories will consist of a combined 20 subcategories for which they will be assessed. The author chose these subcategories because he believed them to be the best indicators for comparison at such a macro-level. These subcategories are as follows:

Political: Regulatory Quality, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.

Military: Insurgency to Population Ratio, Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Ratio, Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Territorial Control Ratio.

Economic: GDP per Person in Current US Dollars, percent of Population Below Poverty Line, Exports of Goods and Services as percent of GDP.

Social: Religion, Ethnicities, Language.

Information: Cell Phone Subscribers as a Percent of Population, Internet Subscribers as a Percent of Population, Social Globalization

Infrastructure: Access to Drinking Water, Access to Electricity, Population to Airport Ratio.

Each subcategory will receive a score of 1-5 based on level of similarity present between the two situations. Each score corresponds with a level of similarity as explained below:

1. Very Dissimilar-Situations bear little to no resemblance to each other.  
Inappropriate to believe similar strategies would succeed in compared situations.
2. Dissimilar-Situations have some similarities but are more different than similar.  
Differences create significant obstacles to implementation. Extremely high risk in assuming strategy effects would be similar.
3. Somewhat Similar-Situations have some similarities and differences but are more similar than different. Obstacles created by differences are outweighed by opportunities created by similarities. High Risk in assuming strategy effects would be similar.
4. Similar-Situations have few differences and are significantly more similar than different. Opportunities created by similarities significantly outweigh obstacles

created by differences. Medium Risk in assuming strategy effects would be similar.

5. Very Similar - Situations bear clear and striking resemblance to one another.

Low risk in assuming strategy effects would be similar.

The scores from each subcategory are then averaged and that average becomes the overall score for the category, giving the overall category a level of similarity between situations. The category scores are then averaged together to determine the overall similarity score between Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014.

The author relied on open source information from government reports, think tank products, international organization's reports, data analysis sites, research papers, articles, and journals to collect data on each of the categories and subcategories. The following details origins of the data sets for each subcategory researched and how that data is compared.

### Political

For this category, the researcher utilized five subcategories taken from The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WBGI). These indicators and their descriptions are taken directly from the World Bank's (WB) descriptions and are as follows:

Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.

Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

These subcategories utilized WBI scores for each of these categories to compare the political situation in Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014 (most current data available).

The WB score distribution is as follows: “The composite measures of governance generated . . . are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard deviation of one, and running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.”

These scores were generated using WB methodology that can be found on The World Bank website: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbi/index.aspx#doc>.

Utilizing the WB range of scores from -2.5–2.5 (rounded to the nearest .0) there were 51 possible scores in this range a country could receive in regards to each of these subcategories. Using this data, it was possible for the researcher to determine the percent variance in situations between Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014 by first determining their

score's placement among these 51 positions and then multiplying that number by 1.96 (the number required to create a 100 point scale). See below table.

Table 2. World Bank Country Scores Value Within Range and Parity on a 100 Point Scale

| World Bank Country Score | WB Country Score Position Value within Range | Score Parity to 100 Point Scale Across Range | World Bank Country Score | WB Country Score Position Value within Range | Score Parity to 100 Point Scale Across Range | World Bank Country Score | WB Country Score Position Value within Range | Score Parity to 100 Point Scale Across Range | World Bank Country Score | WB Country Score Position Value within Range | Score Parity to 100 Point Scale Across Range |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| -2.5                     | 1                                            | 2                                            | -1.2                     | 14                                           | 27                                           | 0.1                      | 27                                           | 53                                           | 1.4                      | 40                                           | 78                                           |
| -2.4                     | 2                                            | 4                                            | -1.1                     | 15                                           | 29                                           | 0.2                      | 28                                           | 55                                           | 1.5                      | 41                                           | 80                                           |
| -2.3                     | 3                                            | 6                                            | -1                       | 16                                           | 31                                           | 0.3                      | 29                                           | 57                                           | 1.6                      | 42                                           | 82                                           |
| -2.2                     | 4                                            | 8                                            | -0.9                     | 17                                           | 33                                           | 0.4                      | 30                                           | 59                                           | 1.7                      | 43                                           | 84                                           |
| -2.1                     | 5                                            | 10                                           | -0.8                     | 18                                           | 35                                           | 0.5                      | 31                                           | 61                                           | 1.8                      | 44                                           | 86                                           |
| -2                       | 6                                            | 12                                           | -0.7                     | 19                                           | 37                                           | 0.6                      | 32                                           | 63                                           | 1.9                      | 45                                           | 88                                           |
| -1.9                     | 7                                            | 14                                           | -0.6                     | 20                                           | 39                                           | 0.7                      | 33                                           | 65                                           | 2                        | 46                                           | 90                                           |
| -1.8                     | 8                                            | 16                                           | -0.5                     | 21                                           | 41                                           | 0.8                      | 34                                           | 67                                           | 2.1                      | 47                                           | 92                                           |
| -1.7                     | 9                                            | 18                                           | -0.4                     | 22                                           | 43                                           | 0.9                      | 35                                           | 69                                           | 2.2                      | 48                                           | 94                                           |
| -1.6                     | 10                                           | 20                                           | -0.3                     | 23                                           | 45                                           | 1                        | 36                                           | 71                                           | 2.3                      | 49                                           | 96                                           |
| -1.5                     | 11                                           | 22                                           | -0.2                     | 24                                           | 47                                           | 1.1                      | 37                                           | 73                                           | 2.4                      | 50                                           | 98                                           |
| -1.4                     | 12                                           | 24                                           | -0.1                     | 25                                           | 49                                           | 1.2                      | 38                                           | 74                                           | 2.5                      | 51                                           | 100                                          |
| -1.3                     | 13                                           | 25                                           | 0                        | 26                                           | 51                                           | 1.3                      | 39                                           | 76                                           |                          |                                              |                                              |

Source: Developed by Author using World Bank 2016b.

Comparison of the resulting numbers allowed the researcher to determine each situations' position along the range and the percentage variance between scores. The following is an example comparing WB scores of -0.8 and 0.1.




Figure 8. World Bank Standard Deviation

Source: Developed by Author using World Bank 2016b.

In this example, the difference between scores calculates to 18 percent because there is a difference representing 18 percent of the range between the two data points. This represents a variance between situations of 18 percent. The standard deviation for the WB data sets are 1, which when overlaid on this range equates to approximately 20 percent of the range (the range of -3 - -2.5 and 2.5-3 was left off because no data points fell in those ranges).

Being able to determine this variance between situations allows the researcher to assign situation similarity scores of 1-5 based on the aforementioned similarity scale. For the purpose of these political subcategories any two scores with a variance equal to or greater than 1 standard deviation or 20 percent of the range apart were considered 'Very Dissimilar' and received a score of 1. Situations with a variance between 15-19 percent of one another was considered 'Dissimilar' and receive a score of 2. Situations with a variance between 10-14 percent of one another were considered 'Somewhat Similar' and received a score of 3. Situations with a variance between 5-9 percent were considered

‘Similar’ and received a score of 4. Finally, situations with a variance between 0-4 percent were considered ‘Very Similar’ and received a score of 5.

- 1= 20 percent or greater variance=Very Dissimilar
- 2=15-19 percent=Dissimilar
- 3= 10-14 percent=Somewhat Similar
- 4= 5-9 percent=Similar
- 5= 0-4 percent=Very Similar

These results are displayed in the following table and an overall value between 1-5 was determined for the entire category by averaging the subcategories’ similarity scores.

Table 3. World Bank Political Scores

| POLITICAL                                             |                                    |                                   |                                                       |                       |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                       | Raw World Bank Score Colombia 2000 | Raw World Bank Score Nigeria 2014 | % Difference in Score in Proportion to the Data Range | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| Regulatory Quality                                    |                                    |                                   |                                                       |                       |
| Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism |                                    |                                   |                                                       |                       |
| Government Effectiveness                              |                                    |                                   |                                                       |                       |
| Rule of Law                                           |                                    |                                   |                                                       |                       |
| Control of Corruption                                 |                                    |                                   |                                                       |                       |
| 0-4% = 5                                              | 5-9% = 4                           | 10-14%=3                          | Total Score                                           |                       |
| 15-19% = 2                                            | 20 and greater = 5                 |                                   |                                                       |                       |

\*\*\*Outside of political subcategories standard deviation does not play a role in data analysis.\*\*\*

Source: Developed by Author.

### Military

Data collected on the military situations focused on the size of the insurgencies in relationship to other populations within the country to determine environmental similarities. The data was derived from the BBC, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, RAND,

Stanford University, Wilson Center, and CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016. This category compared those situations to one another to determine a percent variance between the two. These variance were then scored using the below values.

- 1= 20 percent or greater variance=Very Dissimilar
- 2=15-19 percent=Dissimilar
- 3= 10-14 percent=Somewhat Similar
- 4= 5-9 percent=Similar
- 5= 0-4 percent=Very Similar

These results are displayed in the following table and an overall score between 1-5 was determined for the entire category by averaging the subcategories' similarity scores and comparing the results to the scoring scale covered above.

Table 4. Military Scores

| <b>MILITARY</b>                                                  |                                |              |             |                       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                                                  | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2014 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| Insurgency to Population Ratio                                   |                                |              |             |                       |
| Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Ratio                     |                                |              |             |                       |
| Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Territorial Control Ratio |                                |              |             |                       |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2                                           | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score |                       |

Source: Developed by Author.

The subcategories and the formulas used to determine their situational variance are as follows:

Insurgency to Population Ratio identifies the number of citizens per insurgent member in Nigeria 2014 and Colombia 2000 and then determined the percent variance between the two values. The two formulas used are as follows:

$$\text{Total country population/ \# of insurgents} = \text{ratio}$$

$$100[1 - (\text{Smaller Ratio Value}/\text{Larger Ratio Value})] = \text{Situation Variance}$$

Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Ratio identifies government military personnel per insurgent member in Nigeria 2014 and Colombia 2000 and then determined the percent variance between the two values. The two formulas used are as follows:

$$\text{Total \# government security forces/ \# of insurgents} = \text{ratio}$$

$$[1 - (\text{Smaller Ratio Value}/\text{Larger Ratio Value})] \times 100 = \text{Situation Variance}$$

Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Territorial Control Ratio identified territory in kilometers (km) controlled by the government for every one km controlled by insurgent groups in Nigeria 2014 and Colombia 2000 and then determined the percent variance between the two values. The two formulas used are as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Total area in km}^2 \text{ under government control}}{\text{Total area in km}^2 \text{ under insurgent control}} = \text{ratio}$$

$$100[1 - (\text{Smaller Ratio Value}/\text{Larger Ratio Value})] = \text{Situation Variance}$$

### Economic

Data collected on the economic situations were derived primarily from CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016, Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), and World Bank Development Indicators. These figures were used to determine the variances between the below listed economic variables in Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014. These variance were then scored using the below values.

1= 20 percent or greater variance=Very Dissimilar  
 2=15-19 percent=Dissimilar  
 3= 10-14 percent=Somewhat Similar  
 4= 5-9 percent=Similar  
 5= 0-4 percent=Very Similar

These results are displayed in the following table and an overall score between 1-5 was determined for the entire category by averaging the subcategories' similarity score and comparing the results to the scoring scale covered above.

Table 5. Economic Scores

| ECONOMICS                                 |                                |              |             |                       |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                           | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2014 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| GDP per Capita in Current US Dollars      |                                |              |             |                       |
| % of Population Below Poverty Line        |                                |              |             |                       |
| Exports of Goods and Services as % of GDP |                                |              |             |                       |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2                    | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score |                       |

Source: Developed by Author.

The following are the economic variables used and how each variance between situations are calculated.

GDP per Capita in Current US Dollars uses WB data from 2000 and 2014 to determine each country's GDP per capita in current US dollars and where each country fell in relationship to the world range the year of evaluation. The research then determined the percent variation in situations utilizing the below formulas.




Figure 9. GDP Variation

Source: Developed by author using World Bank Data

Percent of Population below Poverty Line was determined by a simple comparison of the percent of people below the poverty line derived from WB figures for Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014 and then subtracting the lower value from the higher one to determine the percent variation between situations.




Figure 10. Poverty Line Variation

Source: Developed by Author.

Exports of Goods and Services as percent of GDP was determined by a simple comparison of the two values derived from WB figures for Colombia 2000 and Nigeria

2014 and then subtracting the lower value from the higher one to determine the percent variation between situations.

$$\frac{\text{Higher Value} - \text{Lower Value}}{\text{Higher Value}} \times 100 = \% \text{ Variation between Situations}$$

Figure 11. Export of Goods and Services Variation

*Source:* Developed by Author.

### Social

Data collected on the social situation was derived primarily from CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016 figures. These figures were used to determine the variances between the below listed social variables in Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014. These variance were then scored using the below values.

- 1= 20 percent or greater variance=Very Dissimilar
- 2=15-19 percent=Dissimilar
- 3= 10-14 percent=Somewhat Similar
- 4= 5-9 percent=Similar
- 5= 0-4 percent=Very Similar

These results are displayed in the following table and an overall scores between 1-5 was determined for the entire category by averaging the subcategories' similarity scores and comparing the results to the scoring scale covered above.

Table 6. Social Scores

| <b>SOCIAL</b>                  |                                |              |             |                       |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2014 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| # of primary/major religions   |                                |              |             |                       |
| # of primary/major ethnicities |                                |              |             |                       |
| # of primary/major languages   |                                |              |             |                       |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2         | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score |                       |

Source: Developed by Author.

The following are the social variables used and how each variance between social situations were calculated.

Religion identifies the # of primary/major religions in a country as determined by the CIA Factbook from the corresponding year, Nigeria 2014 and Colombia 2000. The research then determined the percent variance between the two values. The formula used was as follows:

$$100[1 - (\text{Smaller Value} / \text{Larger Value})] = \text{Situation Variance}$$

Ethnicities identifies the primary/major ethnicities in a country as determined by the CIA Factbook from the corresponding year, Nigeria 2014 and Colombia 2000. The research then determined the percent variance between the two values. The formula used was as follows:

$$100[1 - (\text{Smaller Value} / \text{Larger Value})] = \text{Situation Variance}$$

Language identifies the# of primary/major languages spoken in a country as determined by the CIA Factbook from the corresponding year, Nigeria 2014 and

Colombia 2000. The research then determined the percent variance between the two values. The formula used was as follows:

$$100[1 - (\text{Smaller Value} / \text{Larger Value})] = \text{Situation Variance}$$

#### Information

Data collected on the information situations were derived from The Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich's (SIT) Social Globalization Index (SGI) and World Bank Development Indicator figures from the corresponding years. These figures were used to determine the variances between the below listed information variables in Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014. These variance were then scored using the below values.

- 1= 20 percent or greater variance=Very Dissimilar
- 2=15-19 percent=Dissimilar
- 3= 10-14 percent=Somewhat Similar
- 4= 5-9 percent=Similar
- 5= 0-4 percent=Very Similar

These results are displayed in the following table and an overall score between 1-5 was determined for the entire category by averaging the subcategories' similarity score and comparing the results to the scoring scale covered above.

Table 7. Information Scores

| INFORMATIONAL                               |                                |              |             |                       |
|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                             | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2014 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| Cell Phone Subscribers as a % of Population |                                |              |             |                       |
| Internet Subscribers as a % of Population   |                                |              |             |                       |
| Social Globalization                        |                                |              |             |                       |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2                      | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score |                       |

Source: Developed by Author.

The following were the social variables used and how each variance between information situations are calculated.

Cell Phone Subscribers as a percent of Population was determined based on data from World Bank data for Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014. This first required a determination of the percentage of the populations in each country that are cell phone subscribers and then subtracting the lower value from the higher one to determine the percent variation between situations. The following formulas were used:

$$100 \left( \frac{\text{Total Cell Phone Subscribers}}{\text{Total Population}} \right) = \text{\% of Population Subscribing To Cell Phones}$$

Figure 12. Cell Phone Subscription

Source: Developed by Author.

$$\frac{\text{Higher Value} - \text{Lower Value}}{\text{Higher Value} + \text{Lower Value}} \times 100 = \% \text{ Variation between Situations}$$

Figure 13. Cell Phone Variance

*Source:* Developed by Author.

Internet Subscribers as a percent of Population was determined based on data from World Bank data for Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014. This first required a determination of the percentage of the populations in each country that are internet subscribers and then subtracting the lower value from the higher one to determine the percent variation between situations. The following formulas were used:

$$100 \left( \frac{\text{Total Internet Subscribers}}{\text{Total Population}} \right) = \% \text{ of Population Subscribing To Internet}$$

Figure 14. Internet Subscription

*Source:* Developed by Author.

$$\frac{\text{Higher Value} - \text{Lower Value}}{\text{Higher Value} + \text{Lower Value}} \times 100 = \% \text{ Variation between Situations}$$

Figure 15. Internet Variance

*Source:* Developed by Author.

Social Globalization was rated according to The Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich's (SIT) Social Globalization Index (SGI). SIT establishes the following dimensions for determining their index:

Social globalization has three dimensions: personal contacts, information flows, and cultural proximity. The sub-index on personal contacts includes international telecom traffic, degree of tourism, transfers, foreign population, and number of international letters. The sub-index on information flows includes number of internet users, share of households with a television set, and trade in newspapers. The sub-index on cultural proximity includes trade in books and number of McDonald's restaurants and Ikea located in a country. (Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich 2016)

SIT determines a score based on the above factors between 0-100. In this research Social Globalization variance was determined by a simple comparison of the of SGI scores for Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014 and then subtracting the lower value from the higher one to determine the percent variation between situations using the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Higher Value} - \text{Lower Value}}{\text{Higher Value}} \times 100 = \% \text{ Variation between Situations}$$

Figure 16. Social Globalization Variance

Source: Developed by Author.

### Infrastructure

Data collected on the infrastructure situations were derived from CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016 and World Bank Development Indicators for the corresponding years. These figures were used to determine the variances between the below listed

infrastructure variables in Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014. These variance were then scored using the below values.

- 1= 20 percent or greater variance=Very Dissimilar
- 2=15-19 percent=Dissimilar
- 3= 10-14 percent=Somewhat Similar
- 4= 5-9 percent=Similar
- 5= 0-4 percent=Very Similar

These results are displayed in the following table and an overall score between 1-5 was determined for the entire category by averaging the subcategories' similarity score and comparing the results to the scoring scale covered above.

Table 8. Infrastructure Scores

| <b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>       |                                |              |             |                       |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                             | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2014 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| Access to Drinking Water    |                                |              |             |                       |
| Access to Electricity       |                                |              |             |                       |
| Population to Airport Ratio |                                |              |             |                       |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2      | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score |                       |

Source: Developed by Author.

The following are the social variables used and how each variance between infrastructure situations were calculated.

Access to Drinking Water was determined by a simple comparison of the percent of people with access to drinking water based on WB data in Colombia 2000 and Nigeria

2014 and then subtracting the lower value from the higher one to determine the percent variation between situations.

$$\frac{\text{Higher Value} - \text{Lower Value}}{\% \text{ Variation between Situations}}$$

Figure 17. Drinking Water Variance

*Source:* Developed by Author.

Access to Electricity was determined by a simple comparison of the percent of people with access to electricity based on WB data in Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014 and then subtracting the lower value from the higher one to determine the percent variation between situations.

$$\frac{\text{Higher Value} - \text{Lower Value}}{\% \text{ Variation between Situations}}$$

Figure 18. Access to Electricity Variance

*Source:* Developed by Author.

Population to Airport Ratio identifies the number of people per airport for Colombia 2000 and Nigeria 2014 and then determines the percent variance between the two values. The two formulas used were as follows:

Total population/ # of airports = ratio

$[1 - (\text{Smaller Ratio Value} / \text{Larger Ratio Value})] \times 100 = \text{Situation Variance}$

This research then takes the overall scores from each category and averages them together to determine the overall similarity between situations in 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria. This overall similarity score is then used to determine the overall feasibility of using Plan Colombia as a model for stabilizing current day Nigeria.

#### Methodology for Analysis of Acceptability Based on Cost

Finally, this research develops an estimate for cost in the implementation of a 15-year strategy for Nigeria based on Plan Colombia. This research determines this estimate taking into account historic timelines and funding for Plan Colombia, current funding for Nigeria, variations in population size, military size, and situational differences in internal drug cultivation. These estimates coupled with determinations made by the preceding analysis allows this research to determine the likely acceptability of Plan Colombia as a model for stabilizing Nigeria in relation to cost on return.

#### Role of the Researcher

The researcher identified a likely point of bias as a lack of experience in the two regions discussed. While the researcher has real world experience as an advisor/trainer in the Middle East, he lacks those same experiences in Africa or Latin America. In an attempt to eliminate possible biases from this research, the researcher selected his committee to include a Latin America and an Africa security cooperation specialist. Drawing upon their experience, guidance, and relying on quality sources of data the researcher attempted to eliminate any personal bias from this study.

### Threats to Validity

The validity of this study could be threatened by its reliance on data collected by its sources. Someone other than the author collected all of the raw data assembled and compared within this study originally. Therefore, the author must assume that its collection was done to a high standard. The author has attempted to mitigate this threat by relying on quality, widely accepted, academic and professional organizations for data. However, the researcher still acknowledges that there could be flaws in the original methods and collection of data by these source organizations and authors.

### Chapter Summary

By determining the suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and risk of implementing a strategy for stabilizing Nigeria based on Plan Colombia this research paper will determine whether the situations within 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria are similar enough that Plan Colombia could serve as a successful model for security cooperation to stabilize Nigeria. The following chapter conducts this analysis and makes that determination.

## CHAPTER 4

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

This chapter conducts data collection and analysis in accordance with the methodology detailed in chapter 3 in order to determine if Plan Colombia should serve as a model for security cooperation when designing a strategy for stabilizing current state Nigeria.

First, this chapter examines Plan Colombia as a strategy and its results in stabilizing Colombia. Based on these results, and an examination of the drivers of instability present in each country state, this chapter determines if Plan Colombia would be suitable for Nigeria in that successful achievement of Plan Colombia's effects in Nigeria would result in a stabilizing effect.

This chapter then examines the operational environments present in current state Nigeria and 2000 Colombia using the PMESII model in order to determine if the operational environments present are close enough that it would be feasible to implement a strategy modeled on Plan Colombia in Nigeria. This section expresses these similarities in accordance with methodology found in chapter 3, and uses the situational and environmental similarities to determine risk of implementation.

Third, this chapter develops an estimate of the likely cost of implementing a strategy modeled on Plan Colombia in Nigeria using current funding level for Nigeria and historic funding levels for Plan Colombia. This cost represents means and is then balanced against likely ends secured to determine if a strategy modeled on Plan Colombia would likely be acceptable to policy makers.

Finally, based on the determinations of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability when accounting for risk, this chapter makes a final determination if Plan Colombia should serve as a model for security cooperation when designing a strategy for stabilizing current state Nigeria.

### Plan Colombia: Operational Approach

This section conducts analysis to determine what strategy Plan Colombia represented, if it was successful, and if the drivers of instability are similar enough that Plan Colombia would be suitable for Nigeria. In order to do this it begins with an overview of what this research considers the Plan Colombia operational approach.

In response to the persistence of the FARC and other leftist militias' threat to constitutional republican government in Colombia, their threat to US energy interests in Colombia, and their connection to drug cartels that supplied the US cocaine market, American President Bill Clinton and Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango announced in 1999 a plan to address these threats. As described in chapter II, this strategy would come to be known as Plan Colombia.

Plan Colombia looked to solve the problem of a destabilizing Colombia which was the largest cocaine contributor to US markets, plagued by the largest communist revolutionary force in the western hemisphere, and unable to secure internal infrastructure vital to energy production. This plan was conducted in a highly restrictive mountainous and jungle terrain frequented by bad weather, security forces incapable of conducting sustained campaigns, and a government whose reach was generally confined to urban areas and isolated from the rural areas in which illegally armed groups operated.

The following is a graphical representation of what this research considers to be the Plan Colombia operational approach and is intended to serve as a visual representation of the strategy laid out from beginning to end, bridging the two states utilizing lines of effort, objectives, key tasks, and effects.

The author developed this model utilizing a synthesis of information obtained through numerous and thorough reading of US Congressional research reports, State Department reports and statements, as well as a number of scholarly articles and papers focused on Plan Colombia and its impact.




Figure 19. Plan Colombia Operational Approach

Source: Developed by Author.

### End State and Effects

The end state for the US in regards to Plan Colombia was to secure five national interests represented within Colombia. These interests and their categories are as follows:

#### Vital Interests:

1. Security of US citizens home/abroad and that of its institutions. All threatened by the increasing violence and capabilities of the drug trade both within and outside US borders.
2. Defeat of the last substantial remaining attempts at communist expansion into the Western Hemisphere outside of Cuba, represented by the FARC and its affiliates.

#### Important Interests:

1. Protect US energy concerns within Colombia, threatened by extortion and attack from leftist revolutionaries and affiliated drug cartels.
2. Increase stability within the Western Hemisphere, threatened by an unstable regional hegemony, Colombia.

Humanitarian/Other Interests: Worsening humanitarian situation within Colombia predicated by the expansion of violence against civilians caught in the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian Government.

In order to secure these interests, it became clear to the US and Colombia, that the FARC was the center of gravity keeping them from obtaining their desired end state. This point is highlighted in a Wilson Center's Latin American Program report that credits the ineffectiveness of peace talks with the FARC from 1999-2002 as a primary driver of the implementation of Plan Colombia:

During the last round of peace talks with the government that lasted from 1999 to 2002, the FARC was at the peak of its military power thanks, in part, to a surge in drug income and made almost no effort to seriously negotiate a peace treaty. Since then, the U.S. government has provided Colombia with \$9.3 billion in aid, much of which has been spent on counterinsurgency and counterdrug programs targeting the FARC. The Colombian military's successful efforts to weaken the FARC and reduce its drug income through targeting coca fields, drug laboratories, and smugglers have helped convince FARC leaders to return to the bargaining table for negotiations that hold much promise for a final peace accord. (Otis 2014, 2)

The FARC's capability to conduct operations while funding, equipping, and staffing its organization, allowed it to prevent the US and Colombian end state from being realized. These capabilities however consisted of critical requirements that the FARC had to possess in order to continue to prevent the desired end state. A number of critical requirements representing critical vulnerabilities were identified that could be either directly or indirectly targeted as part of Plan Colombia.

Funding and popular support were identified as the FARC's most critical requirement, as it was these that enabled the FARC to retain operational readiness by facilitating the recruitment of fighters, equipping, sustainment of operations, and protection of lines of communication. Furthermore, it was identified that the cartels required territory in order to produce cocaine, and that the FARC's ability to control that territory allowed for the continued production of cocaine on which the FARC derived the majority of its funding. The FARC also required popular support in order to recruit and protect information about its movements and elements whereabouts, much of which was provided on conditions of the FARC's economic support to an area or its ability to instill fear and coopt the population because of a lack of government protection.

Therefore, defeating the FARC's military capabilities and preventing them from controlling territory would directly target their critical vulnerability of funding while

indirectly targeting their popular support. Expanding government control and protection would target the FARC's critical vulnerability of popular support directly by preventing the FARC from intimidating and coopting civilians. These vulnerabilities, FARC military capabilities, territorial control, and popular support, would drive the identification of the effects to be achieved as part of Plan Colombia in order to eliminate their funding and force their culmination and ultimate defeat.

The following are graphical representations of the environmental framework in regards to the current state in Colombia in 1999 and the desired end state post Plan Colombia:




Figure 20. Colombia Current State 1999

Source: Developed by Author.




Figure 21. Colombia Desired State Post Plan Colombia

Source: Developed by Author.

Plan Colombia aspired to achieve the following four effects whose combined weight would result in the removal of FARC critical vulnerabilities and see a transition of the current unacceptable state within Colombia to that of the desired state:

1. The FARC's military defeat forcing peace negotiations, which result in their disbandment and reintegration into Colombian Society thereby eliminating cartel safe havens and greatly reducing the flow of cocaine out of Colombia.
2. Government control over the whole of Colombia established. Critical Infrastructure Protected and Maintained. Loss of cartel safe havens exploited.
3. Provide the most vulnerable Colombians options other than illicit activities as a way to provide for themselves and their families, reducing the numbers

participating in illicit activities that support illegally armed groups while increasing popular support for Colombian Government.

4. Provide Colombians with a legitimate ways to settle differences within a political and legal system adhering to the rule of law and international standards for human rights; greatly reducing the legitimacy of illegally armed groups as a means to solve political and legal disputes.

The end state the US and Colombia hoped to achieve through these effects was a secure and stable Colombia capable of exporting security to the surrounding region, maintaining or increasing its contribution to energy markets, drastically reducing its cocaine production, and ensuring basic human rights for its citizens, all of which nested within US national interests.

### Ways

This paper identifies four lines of effort and 20 objectives established by the US in order to achieve the aforementioned end state and effects in Colombia. The objectives each nested within a LOE with multiple objectives per LOE achieving magnified effects. Furthermore, several of the objectives positively affected effects achieved along adjacent lines of effort. By understanding this and coordinating these objectives' effects the US was able to achieve magnified results both within and across lines of effort, as previously demonstrated in the operational approach diagram (Figure 19), greatly increasing the effectiveness of the overall strategy.

Plan Colombia had four lines of effort: Security, Government Legitimacy, Economic Stimulation/Reform, and the expansion of the Rule of Law/Human rights (US Embassy, Bogotá). The primary objective for Plan Colombia was a secure Colombia;

because of this security was the main line of effort. Government legitimacy supported this LOE by expanding and positioning Colombia's Government so that it could eventually assure security throughout the entirety of its territory. Economic stimulation/reform and rule of law/human rights lines of effort were supporting lines for the first two in that they were targeted at decreasing support for illegally armed groups while simultaneously strengthening popular support for the Colombian Government. The cumulative effects of achieving objectives along these lines of effort were expected to result in the previously mentioned four effects.

#### Line of Effort 1: Security

LOE 1 was Security and focused on achieving the effect of defeating the FARC and its associated groups. Their defeat would result in the loss of territory and therefore the safe havens they provided cartels within their areas of control. From within these safe havens cartels were producing the vast majority of cocaine in Colombia. The loss of protection to these safe havens would allow the Colombian Government to expand their control to these areas and eliminate this production, greatly reducing the amount of cocaine produced and exported from Colombia.

Initially, the US Congress only authorized funding for counter narcotics assistance out of a fear that the US would become involved in a protracted counter insurgency fight against communist guerrillas in limited jungle warfare to akin to Vietnam (Otis 2014, 6). However, a combination of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and the realization that the FARC and the drug trade were inseparable issues resulted in the US congress expanding appropriated funds to include counter insurgency operations targeting the FARC and ELN (Otis 2014, 6).

The US and Colombian Governments developed what the author considers to be nine key tasks along the security line of effort.

1. Increase Police Numbers and Capabilities.
2. Increase Military Numbers and Capabilities.
3. Train/Conduct Counter Narcotics Operations.
4. Train/Conduct Counter Insurgency Operations.
5. Employ US Advisors to Advise/Assist/Train.
6. Provide Intelligence Support.
7. Disrupt/ Degrade FARC and Cartels.
8. Reintegrate Militia Members into Society.
9. Expand Police Presence.

Increasing the size and capabilities of Colombian security forces would allow them to conduct counter narcotics and counter insurgency operations that were larger, more effective, and in greater number than before. These new capabilities coupled with the complementary effects they would have on disrupting and degrading the FARC and associated cartels, would lead to a drastic reduction in the FARC's ability to conduct operations and control territory. Expansion of police forces into these areas following operations would help insure that FARC element could not move back in once military forces had left. This expansion would also allow the government to expand its presence into these new areas.

The US would assist in this by employing American advisors to advise, train, and assist Colombian security forces in these operations. The US would additionally provide intelligence assistance to these advisors in order to increase mission effectiveness.

Finally, reintegration programs would focus on bringing reconcilable FARC members back into legitimate Colombian society. This was critical because increasingly the FARC utilized child soldiers they would abduct and force into service as their volunteer forces where neutralized or deserted. The following diagram illustrates how these objectives were to interact and mutually support each another in the realizing of the associated effect of defeating the FARC and reducing cocaine production.




Figure 22. Security Line of Effort Interaction Model

Source: Developed by Author.

### Line of Effort 2: Government Legitimacy

The second LOE was Government Legitimacy. This line of effort looked to complement the security line of effort by capitalizing on security gains made by the

Colombian security forces while also improving their capability to support those security force operations. This paper identifies five key tasks established along this line of effort:

1. Consolidate Government Presence.
2. Expand Government Presence.
3. Make Government More Transparent.
4. Increase Participation/ Representation in Government.
5. Increase Government Accountability.

Consolidating government presence looked to establish clear chains of command between already established government areas of control, build and strengthen control in those areas, and increase intergovernmental cooperation. Doing this would allow the Colombian Government to hold and improve their control and security in areas already under control while also being able to expand into areas cleared by security force operations.

Establishment of clear chains of command would allow for the development of a common operating picture focused on the accomplishment of a unifying vision, while increasing intergovernmental cooperation. This would increase the efficiency at which a vision was realized. The following diagram illustrates how these objectives were to interact and mutually support each another in the realizing of the associated effect of establishing government control throughout the whole of Colombia.




Figure 23. Government Legitimacy Line of Effort Interactions Model

Source: Developed by Author.

### Line of Effort 3: Economic Stimulation/Reform

The third LOE was Economic Stimulation/Development. This line of effort looked to complement the above lines of effort by reducing popular support to the FARC and cartels by reducing Colombians economic dependency on the funds generated by the drug trade they controlled. This author identifies three key tasks associated with this line of effort:

1. Increase economic opportunities beyond illicit activities for the most vulnerable Colombians.
2. Decrease illicit economic opportunities.
3. Provide agricultural alternatives to coca.

Increasing economic opportunities outside of illicit markets aimed to draw personnel and support away from the FARC by giving members and potential members legitimate means by which to make a living. As mentioned before, the FARC had lost considerable prestige and legitimacy when it entered into the drug trade. This not only

hurt the FARC's public image, but also damaged member's standings within their communities. By making available other means of employment, the Colombians offered disenfranchised FARC members, upset by their loss of standing and fearful of arrest or death during counter narcotic/insurgency operations, a legitimate way out.

Funding was established to develop these legitimate sectors of the economy and stimulate their growth. This included initial investments in infrastructure, urban, and rural development projects, and the expansion of already existent facilities. In addition, the growth of the energy sector within Colombia also contributed to the expanding of a legitimate economic base.

Complementing this objective was the targeted reduction in illicit economic opportunities by decreasing profitability of illicit markets. This was accomplished through a number of interdiction methods both kinetic and financial coupled with the closing of the US/Colombian drug air bridge that had been established by cartels moving shipments via private plane (Wilhelm, 1998, 8). This forced the utilization of long overland or sea routes which took much longer and required significantly more resources in the forms of manning, equipment, and capital thereby reducing the overall profitability of the cartels and subsequently that of the FARC.

Finally, helping farmers that had been operating in FARC/Cartel controlled areas transition the use of their land away from coca production was key to ensuring that agricultural regions did not return to coca cultivation because of a lack of alternative revenue. Grants and projects were awarded to assist in land transition while organizations and groups were brought in to advice on ways to maximize output and quality of

legitimate crops. When coupled with a secure environment, these projects proved highly effective at reducing coca production and then maintaining that reduction.

These objectives taken together were successful in increasing participation in legitimate economies while decreasing participation in illicit ones. This led to the further isolation of the FARC from its base of popular support thereby contributing to their degradation. Illustrated in the following diagram is the interactions of these objectives:




Figure 24. Economic Stimulation/Reform Line of Effort Interaction Model

Source: Developed by Author.

#### Line of Effort 4: Rule of Law/Human Rights

The fourth LOE was Rule of Law/ Human Rights. This line of effort looked to complement the above lines of effort by increasing popular support to the Colombian

Government by helping further develop key governmental institutions. The author identified three key tasks along this line of effort:

1. Expand Rule of Law.
2. Decrease Corruption.
3. Protect and Expand Human Rights.

In general, these objectives were designed to support the legitimacy of the Colombian Government in the eyes of its own people, as well as the international community. It was important that those transitioning from under FARC control to government control saw that the new systems and institutions the government provided did not discriminate against them and were capable of providing equitable results for its citizens.

Minimizing abuses of power were key in ensuring integration of new populations into the national system so programs were established to begin countering corruption. These programs saw the strengthening of watchdog agencies and creation of better reporting procedures. To reinforce this anti-corruption effort, training was conducted within agencies aimed at reducing graft.

In addition, key was the expansion of the rule of law in regards to evidence based policing and prosecution. Training and equipping were provided to help police units better conduct investigations, and gather and catalog evidence while courts and staff were trained on streamlining processes to ensure justice was handled in a timely manner.




Figure 25. Rule of Law/Human Rights Line of Effort Interaction Model

Source: Developed by Author.

These four LOEs developed a cyclical relationship that served to amplify effects across the entirety of the operational approach. The interaction of these LOE and the cyclical synergy that developed as a result hastened the realization of objectives while creating a systems approach that became more than just the sum of its parts. These interactions are illustrated in the following model that details the systems relationship to effects and the overall end state of Plan Colombia.




Figure 26. Plan Colombia Four Lines of Effort Interaction Model

Source: Developed by Author.

## Ways of the Ways and Means: What it Required

### Ways of the Ways

Plan Colombia was conducted primarily by the US Department of State with the US military in support and in conjunction with the Government of Colombia using a number of programs that constituted ways in which the objectives along lines of efforts where accomplished. These programs contain a mix of ways and means, and could be argued to represent means at the strategic level or ways at the operational level. However, for this reason, this paper will classify them as “ways of the ways” with means classified as the money associated with the funding of these “ways of the ways” within Colombia.

The programs utilized were the Economic Support Fund (ESF), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation Antiterrorism Demining and Related Programs (NADR), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), The Andean Counternarcotic Initiative (ACI), and Food for Peace Title II Food Aid (FFP). Each of these programs operated across multiple lines of effort, supported multiple objectives, and are detailed in Appendix 1 using descriptions found in the US Department of State's US Foreign Assistance Guide 2005.

These programs provided both ways and means in support of the Plan Colombia operational approach. While the US military provided trainers and advisors, the extent of which in many cases is still classified and therefore is not used in this paper. The author assumes that the US military possesses and could make available the number of advisors and trainers required to implement a similar strategy to Plan Colombia in Nigeria should it be required.

#### Means: Funding the Ways of the Ways

Plan Colombia cost US taxpayers roughly 7.35 billion dollars between 2000 and 2014. That is about equal to the cost of an average month fighting the Iraq War. The US spent 1.3 billion dollars during this time on economic development and food aid, and 6 billion dollars on security related programs. The following is a table that outlines US dollars spent per program by year and the totals. Note: Numbers in thousands of dollars.

Table 9. US \$ Spent on Plan Colombia

| FY                                     | 2000   | 2001  | 2002   | 2003   | 2004   | 2005   | 2006   | 2007   | 2008   | 2009   | 2010   | 2011   | 2012   | 2013   | 2014   | Program Totals |
|----------------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------|
| ESF                                    | 4000   | 0     | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 194412 | 196500 | 201790 | 184426 | 172000 | 165883 | 141500 | 1260511        |
| INCLE                                  | 0      | 0     | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 289005 | 275128 | 243900 | 204000 | 160600 | 152322 | 149000 | 1473955        |
| ACI                                    | 894429 | 48000 | 379900 | 580200 | 473900 | 462767 | 464781 | 465000 | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 3768977        |
| NADR                                   | 0      | 0     | 25000  | 3279   | 1676   | 5118   | 5476   | 4086   | 3288   | 3150   | 4750   | 4750   | 4750   | 5050   | 4300   | 74673          |
| IMET                                   | 900    | 1040  | 1180   | 1165   | 98450  | 1700   | 1673   | 1646   | 1421   | 1400   | 1695   | 1695   | 1656   | 1485   | 1534   | 118640         |
| FMF                                    | 0      | 0     | 0      | 17100  | 0      | 99200  | 89100  | 85500  | 52570  | 53000  | 55000  | 47904  | 40000  | 28862  | 28500  | 596736         |
| FFP                                    | 0      | 0     | 0      | 0      | 0      | 3419   | 2973   | 4858   | 7165   | 11046  | 0      | 10443  | 5282   | 6152   | 5767   | 57105          |
| FY Totals                              | 899329 | 49040 | 406080 | 601744 | 574026 | 572204 | 564003 | 561090 | 547861 | 540224 | 507135 | 453218 | 384288 | 359754 | 330601 |                |
| Total Cost of Plan Colombia 2000-2014: |        |       |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        | 7350597        |

Source: Developed by Author using data from US Department of State, 2000-2016.

### Results of Plan Colombia

The secure phase of Plan Colombia would officially end in 2007 with expiration of the Andean Counternarcotic Initiative. By 2004 “for the first time in recent Colombian history, a government presence in all of the country's 1,099 municipalities (county seats) had been established. Attacks conducted by illegally armed groups against rural towns decreased by 91 percent from 2002 to 2005. Between 2002 and 2008, Colombia saw a decrease in homicides by 44 percent, kidnappings by 88 percent, terrorist attacks by 79 percent, and attacks on the country's infrastructure by 60 percent” (US Embassy Bogotá 2015). Figures similar to this are illustrated in the following graphs compiled by the Colombian Ministry of Defense.




Figure 27. Improvement in Colombia's Security

Source: US Department of State, 2008.

Following the ending of this secure phase, rates of violence have remained consistently lower and on average continued decreasing from 2007 levels every year after.

The expiration of ACI eliminated funding from the US Congressional budget cycle in 2007. However, much of the funding lost with the expiration of ACI, would simply shift to INCLE and ESF funding to Colombia representing a hold and build strategy designed to complete the transition of the Colombian economy, assist the government in consolidating gains and continued development, while ensuring the continued development of Colombian security forces. This second “build” phase to Plan

Colombia would see marked growth in GDP while also significantly lowering poverty rates across all of Colombia's States as depicted in the following graphs.




Figure 28. Colombia GDP Per Capita Current US \$

Source: World Bank 2016a.




Figure 29. Poverty Levels in Colombia

Source: Silva, 2015.

In addition to the reduction in violence and economic growth, Colombia saw a vast decrease in the power of the FARC. By 2014, some estimates showed the FARC having lost between 50-75 percent of its late 1990s membership and virtually all of its territory. At the time of this research, the FARC is in peace negotiations with the Colombian Government in Havana, Cuba with a final treaty expected sometime in 2016. If expectations are correct, 2016 is likely to see the end to a five-decade civil war in Colombia and the final defeat of the last major communist revolutionary force outside of Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

Plan Colombia by all accounts has been a security cooperation success story that has resulted in the stabilization of Colombia, improvement of its economy, and defeat of the largest insurgency group operating in the Western Hemisphere while also likely to prove a model for the reintegration of illegally armed group members back into society.

#### Suitability Assessment

Based on problem framing developed in chapter 2 and 4 it is clear that 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria suffer from many of the same problems, and that these problems emanate from very similar sources. Based on these similarities the following table illustrates just how similar these issues are.

Table 10. Similarities between Situations as they Apply to US Interests in 2000 Colombia and 2014 Nigeria

| Similarities between Situations as They Apply to US Interests in 2000 Colombia and 2014 Nigeria |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Active Insurgency                                                                               | Opposed to traditional American values and interests. Threatening to spill over into surrounding region. Responsible for continued and egregious human rights violations.                                                                           |
| Energy Markets                                                                                  | Significant energy market threatened by instability.                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Government                                                                                      | Regional hegemony. Generally supportive of US interests but lacking legitimacy due to corruption and inability to control entirety of borders. Struggles with rule of law.                                                                          |
| Economic                                                                                        | Underdeveloped economy leading to growth of illicit markets to sustain population. These illicit markets in turn contribute to funding insurgencies, criminal group, drive corruption and prevent legitimate economic and governmental development. |

Source: Developed by Author.

As discribed earlier, in order to address these issues in Colombia the US developed Plan Colombia and this research has analysed that operational approach, its results, and deemed it to have been effective in achieving its objective. Using that same operational approach design and enviromental framework, but simply replacing key words with Nigeria, Boko Haram, and smuggling we get the following operational approch and current/desired enstate enviromental framework for Nigeria.




Figure 30. Hypothetical Operational Approach for Nigeria based on Plan Colombia

Source: Developed by Author.




Figure 31. Current Nigerian Operational Environment Framework

Source: Developed by Author.




Figure 32. Hypothetical Desired Nigerian Operational Environment Framework

Source: Developed by Author.

These diagrams illustrate that the negative issues that exist in each state so similarly resemble one another that an almost direct copy of strategy appears to address the primary drivers of instability within current state Nigeria required to shift that state to the desired state. Based on these facts, the author determines that a strategy similar to Plan Colombia would be suitable for moving current state Nigeria to a desired end state more in line with US national interests, in that if able to be successfully implemented it would address the correct problem sets required to alter the current state to the desired one. Having made this determination the author now will evaluate the operational environments in greater detail to determine if implementation of a similar strategy to that of Plan Colombia in Nigeria would be feasible.

### 2000 Colombia vs 2014 Nigeria Operational Environment Systems Comparison

As discussed in chapter 3 the following section will compare operational environment systems utilizing a stepwise approach and will compare the following operational environment systems that existed within Colombia in 2000 and the current environmental systems in Nigeria to determine the feasibility of implementing a strategy similar to Plan Colombia in Nigeria. This paper selected the following systems for comparison from US Joint Publication 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (21 May 2014).

These subcategories are: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII). The author selected these because they are used in Joint doctrine, as well as Army doctrine for analyzing the strategic and operational environment. In addition, these systems align very closely with the systems that Plan Colombia targeted with effects as part of that strategy. Subcategories were selected based on recognized areas of importance and indicators widely accepted as significant data points when evaluating countries at the macro level. In fact, much of the raw data for this comparison was gathered from highly respected organizations whose primary mission often involve detailed macro level country comparisons.

#### Political

As discussed in chapter III analysis of the political environmental system similarities between 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria relies on the most recent World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator scores. Scores for each country period

subcategories, their variance, resulting subcategory scores, and overall category score are detailed in the following table.

Table 11. Political Situation Comparison

| <b>POLITICAL</b>                                            |                                      |                                     |                                                             |                          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
|                                                             | World Bank<br>Score Colombia<br>2000 | World Bank<br>Score Nigeria<br>2014 | % Difference in Score<br>in Proportion to the<br>Data Range | Similarity<br>Rating 1-5 |
| Regulatory Quality                                          | 0.1                                  | -0.8                                | 18%                                                         | 2                        |
| Political Stability and<br>Absence of<br>Violence/Terrorism | -1.6                                 | -2.1                                | 10%                                                         | 3                        |
| Government Effectiveness                                    | -0.3                                 | -1.2                                | 18%                                                         | 2                        |
| Rule of Law                                                 | -1                                   | -1.1                                | 2%                                                          | 5                        |
| Control of Corruption                                       | -0.4                                 | -1.3                                | 18%                                                         | 2                        |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2                                      | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5       | 10-14%=3                            | Total Score                                                 | 2.8                      |

Source: Created by author data from: World Bank 2016a; World Bank 2016b.

This table and the data it represents allows this research to draw several conclusions in regards to the comparison of political situations present during the timeframes evaluated.

First, in regards to regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and control of corruption, Nigeria is currently significantly worse off than Colombia was in 2000. Each of these subcategories receives a similarity score of 2 meaning that they are dissimilar and pose an extremely high risk in assuming portions of strategy designed to address these situations in Colombia would be effective in Nigeria.

Second, political stability and absence of violence and terrorism are also worse off in Nigeria than they were in Colombia in 2000. While they are closer in similarity

than the previously mentioned subcategories, its score of 3 somewhat similar, represents a high level of risk in assuming portions of strategy designed to address these situations in Colombia would be effective in Nigeria.

Third, rule of law situations in 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria are very similar, receiving the highest possible score of similarity at 5. This represents a low level of risk in assuming portions of strategy designed to address these situations in Colombia would be effective in Nigeria.

Based on the average of subcategory scores the overall political environment systems similarity received a score of 2.8. This places the risk of applying elements of Plan Colombia to current state Nigeria’s political situation without mitigation between extremely high and high, albeit closer to high as illustrated in the following figure.




Figure 33. Risk of Applying Plan Colombia to Nigerian Political Situation Without Mitigation

Source: Developed by Author.

### Military

As discussed in chapter III analysis of the military situation similarities between 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria relies on information gathered from Amnesty International, The BBC, IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, RAND, Stanford University, The

Telegraph, Wilson Center, and CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016. This information allowed the author to calculate ratios in regards to the size of the insurgency in comparison to population and military numbers, and also compare territorial control excersised by the insurgency in comparison to the government.

Current strength for Boko Haram is estimated anywhere between 6,000 and as high as 50,000, though most estimates place the number between 9,000 (Chothia 2015) and 20,000. This research will use the Amnesty International estimate of 15,000 because it is in the midle of the most common ranges given. A Nigerian military strength of 100,000 (Binnie 2016) and a Colombian military strength of 144,000 (Rabasa and Chalk 2000, 3) were used for this research. Country populations were taken from the CIA World Factbook of the corresponding years.

The size of territory controlled by Boko Haram is generally given between 30,000sq km (Chothia 2015) and 52,000sq km (Blair 2015). This research adopted an average of 41,000 sq km for Boko Haram territorial control. Territorial control for the FARC in 2000 is much clearer because a temporary truce agreed upon by both sides to allow for negotiation that year defined it as an area of 42,000 sq km (Otis 2014, 5). Governmental territory control was determined by subtracting insurgent groups area of control from that of the overall land area of a country based on CIA World Factbook numberes.

This data was calculated and scored in accordance with methods outlined in chapter III. Scores for each country and timeframe subcatagories, their variance, resulting subcatagory situational scores, and overall category situational score are detailed in the following table.

Table 12. Military Situation Comparison

| MILITARY                                                         |                                |              |             |                       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                                                  | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2016 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| Insurgency to Population Ratio                                   | 1:2480                         | 1:12104      | 80%         | 1                     |
| Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Ratio                     | 7:1                            | 7:1          | 0%          | 5                     |
| Government Forces to Insurgency Forces Territorial Control Ratio | 24:1                           | 21:1         | 13%         | 3                     |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2                                           | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score | 3.0                   |

Source: Developed by author using information from: Amnesty International 2015; Binnie 2016; Blair 2015; CIA 2000; CIA 2016; Chothia 2015; Otis 2014, 5; Rabasa and Chalk 2000, 3; Stanford 2016.

This table and the data it represents allows this research to draw several conclusions in regards to the comparison of military situations present during the timeframes evaluated.

First, as a percentage of the population the FARC had a much larger footprint within the human terrain present in 2000 Colombia than Boko Haram does currently in Nigeria, assuming that the highest outling estimates are not accurate. This would likely make some aspects of countering Boko Haram easier than what was needed for the FARC; however, that still represents two situations that are very dissimilar. This lack of similarity implies that when designing elements of a strategy that effect this subcategory the strategist would expect to have to start from scratch.

The opposite is true in respect to government forces to insurgency forces ratio. These two situations are nearly identical and represent a low level of risk for application of Plan Colombia to Nigeria in this regards. In fact, the relatively rudimentary

capabilities of Boko Haram in comparison to the FARC only strengthens the likely advantages a US trained Nigerian Army would have in fighting Boko Haram verses the experiences encountered by Colombian security forces when fighting the FARC.

In regards to territorial control ratios, this sub category received a score of 3. While they are more similar than different, a 13 percent increase in area controlled by an insurgency roughly the same size in a country about the same size makes locating and fixing them harder.

Based on the average of subcategory scores the overall military enviromental similarity received a score of 3. This places the risk of applying elements of Plan Colombia to current state Nigeria’s military situation without mitigation as high.




Figure 34. Risk of Applying Plan Colombia to Nigerian Military Situation Without Mitigation

*Source:* Developed by Author.

## Economic

As discussed in chapter 3 analysis of the economic situation similarities between 2000 Colombia and curent state Nigeria relies on information gathered from the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics, CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016, and the World Bank Worldwide Development Indicators. This information

allowed the author to calculate the differences between economic situations present in the two countries.

GDP per capita in current US dollars was chosen because it gives a better snapshot of how developed an economy is by expressing GDP as a ratio to population rather than just overall GDP which does not take population into account. This data was taken from World Bank figures for the corresponding years and the situational variance was calculated in accordance with the methodology described in chapter 3.

Percentage of population below the poverty line helps to understand how well GDP is distributed within an economy and is a good indicator of economic disparity. Data for this subcategory was derived from CIA World Factbook data and the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics and the situational variance was calculated in accordance with the methodology described in chapter 3.

Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP serves as an indicator of how open a country's market is and also how vulnerable it is from outside economic threats. Data for this subcategory was taken from World Bank figures for the corresponding years.

All of this data was calculated and scored in accordance with methods outlined in chapter 3. Scores for each country and timeframe subcategories, their variance, resulting subcategory situational scores, and overall category situational score are detailed in the following table.

Table 13. Economic Situation Comparison

| ECONOMICS                                 |                                |              |             |                       |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                           | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2014 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| GDP per Capita in Current US Dollars      | 2472.2                         | 3203.3       | 0.2%        | 5                     |
| % of Population Below Poverty Line        | 58*                            | 70**         | 12.0%       | 3                     |
| Exports of Goods and Services as % of GDP | 15.2                           | 18.4         | 3.2%        | 5                     |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2                    | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score | 4.3                   |

\*2000 Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics \*\*CIA Data 2011

Source: Developed by the author using data from: CIA 2000; CIA 2016; Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) 2016; World Bank 2016a.

This table and the data it represents allows this research to draw several conclusions in regards to the comparison of economic situations present during the timeframes evaluated.

First, the GDP per capita comparison resulted in a .2 percent variance within the range, as displayed in the following figure, and subsequently received a score of 5.




Figure 35. GDP Per Capita Situation Comparison

Source: Developed by author using data from World Bank 2016a.

Both countries during their respective timelines fall within the bottom 3 percent of the overall worldwide range. This represents two economies that are similarly developed in regards to economic resources available. Furthermore, these situations are nearly identical and represent a low level of risk to the application of Plan Colombia to Nigeria.

Second, the percentage of people living below the poverty line variance was calculated at 12 percent. This received a score of 3 and represents a somewhat similar environment. However, from the data it appears that the Colombian economy more equitably distributed GDP among its citizens than does the current Nigerian model. While GDP per person is very similar, the level at which GDP affects the lives of individuals varies much more between the two systems. This disparity in distribution resulted in a variance in situation that represent a high level of risk to the application of Plan Colombia in Nigeria.

Third, the variance in exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP was calculated at 3.2 percent. This received a score of 5 and represents very similar situations in regards to outside economic vulnerabilities. In addition, it is also important to point out that in both cases the vast majority of exports from both countries was and is petroleum products, making each economy highly vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices. These similarities in regards to exports represent a low level of risk to the application of Plan Colombia in Nigeria.

Based on the average of subcategory scores the overall economic situational similarity received a score of 4.3. This places the risk of applying elements of Plan Colombia to current state Nigeria's economic situation without mitigation between medium and low risk, though closer to medium than low.



Figure 36. Risk of Applying Plan Colombia to Nigerian Economic Situation Without Mitigation

Source: Developed by Author.

### Social

As discussed in chapter 3 analysis of the social situation similarities between 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria relies on information gathered from the CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016. The sub categories chosen for this category are: number of primary/major religions, number of primary/major languages, number of primary/major ethnicities.

These subcategories were chosen because they represent the most common subdivisions of populations within countries in respect to the social environment. These separations are often leading contributors to tension within conflict zones as well as obstacles for military advisors to overcome. Analysis of this information allowed the calculation of differences between social environmental systems present in the two countries.

In collecting this data the author chose to exclude some data in regards to Nigerian languages and ethnicities. While there are over 500 languages and dialects spoken in Nigeria (CIA 2016) there are five primary languages of which every citizen speaks at least one. For the purpose of this study the number used for languages spoken in Nigeria will be five.

Likewise in Nigeria, there are somewhere around 250 ethnic groups (CIA 2016) present, however over 88 percent belong to just seven. For the purpose of this study the number used for ethnicities present in Nigeria will be seven.

These variations and their corresponding scores are detailed in the following table.

Table 14. Social Situation Comparison

| <b>SOCIAL</b>                  |               |              |             |                       |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                | Colombia 2000 | Nigeria 2016 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| # of primary/major religions   | 1             | 3            | 67%         | 1                     |
| # of primary/major ethnicities | 6             | 7*           | 14%         | 3                     |
| # of primary/major languages   | 1             | 5**          | 80%         | 1                     |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2         | 5-9% = 4      | 10-14%=3     | Total Score | 1.7                   |

20 and greater = 5  
 \*Over 250 but 7 make up 88%  
 \*\*Over 500 one of seven primary spoken by all

Source: Developed by author using: CIA 2000; CIA 2016.

This table and the data it represents allows this research to draw several conclusions in regards to the comparison of social situations present during the timeframes evaluated.

First, in regards to religion this paper calculated a 67 percent variance in situation resulting in a score of 1. This is further underscored by the fact that conflict between religious groups in Colombia played no role in that conflict while in Nigeria the primary driver of the insurgency is centered around religious interpretation of societal norms.

Second, in regards to ethincities this paper calculates a 14 percent variation in situations resulting in a score of 3. The additional numbers of ethnicities in Nigeria would likely complicate counter insurgency operations in Nigeria more so than was seen in Colombia.

Third, in regards to language this paper calculates the situational variance at 80 percent resulting in a score of 1. This variance is the second most extreme in the study and identifies the language barrier as a major challenge to operations in Nigeria not present in Colombia.

Based on the average of subcategory scores the overall social environmental system similarity received a score of 1.7. This places the risk of applying elements of Plan Colombia to current state Nigeria's social environment without mitigation between extremely high and no reason to expect similar results, though closer to extremely high risk.




Figure 37. Risk of Applying Plan Colombia to Nigerian Social Situation Without Mitigation

Source: Developed by Author.

## Information

As discussed in chapter 3 analysis of information similarities between 2000 Colombia and curent state Nigeria relies on information gathered from the Swiss Institute

of Technology in Zurich and World Bank Development Indicators. The sub categories chosen for this category are: cell phone subscribers as a percentage of the population, internet subscribers as a percentage of the population, and social globalization.

Cell phone and internet subscription was chosen because both technologies have undergone significant technological advancement, development, and expansion throughout the world since 2000. Both represent significant reductions in the cost and effort required to transmit information both internally and externally. Each critical capabilities required for both governments and insurgencies to communicate their message in attempts to garner support internally and internationally. Determining the variance in regards to these helps give some idea of how much of an increased role these technologies could play in Nigeria over 2000 Colombia.

Social globalization was chosen because it gives an indication of how well the country interacts informationally with the rest of the world in both communication and in acceptance or willingness to integrate foreign institutions, such as McDonald's restaurants.

All of this data was calculated and scored in accordance with methods outlined in chapter 3 and recorded. Scores for each country and timeframe subcategories, their variance, resulting subcategory situational scores, and overall category situational score are detailed in the following table.

Table 15. Information Situation Comparison

| <b>INFORMATIONAL</b>                        |                                |              |             |                       |
|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                                             | Colombia 2000                  | Nigeria 2013 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| Cell Phone Subscribers as a % of Population | 6                              | 78           | 72%         | 1                     |
| Internet Subscribers as a % of Population   | 2.2                            | 42.7         | 41%         | 1                     |
| Social Globalization                        | 39.7                           | 34.2         | 5.5%        | 4                     |
| 0-4% = 5<br>15-19% = 2                      | 5-9% = 4<br>20 and greater = 5 | 10-14%=3     | Total Score | 2.0                   |

Source: Developed by author using data from: Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich 2016; World Bank 2016a.

As expected, there is a significant increase in the prevalence of cell phones and internet access in Nigeria over 2000 Colombia. As expressed in the preceding table, each of these two categories received a score of 1 due to this high degree of variance. From this, it is clear that the average Nigerian has significantly greater access to information technologies than their 2000 Colombian counterparts.

However, the social globalization variance of only 5.5 percent and subsequent subcategory score of 4 indicates that Nigerians have yet to fully realize the informational potential created by these more readily available information technologies.

These stark differences in access to information technologies, coupled with the surprisingly similar level of social globalization found in these two countries within the evaluated periods resulted in an overall category score of 2. This signifies an extremely high level of unmitigated risk when applying Plan Colombia to Nigeria in regards to the information environment.




Figure 38. Risk of Applying Plan Colombia to Nigeria in Regards to the Information Environment Without Mitigation

*Source:* Developed by Author.

### Infrastructure

As discussed in chapter 3 analysis of infrastructure similarities between 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria relies on information gathered from the CIA World Factbook 2000 and 2016 and World Bank Developmental Indicators. The sub categories chosen for this category are: access to drinking water, access to electricity, and airports with paved runways to population ratios.

These subcategories were chosen because they represent the prevalence of access to basic utilities and mass transit. These data points are widely accepted as indicators of the level of infrastructure development present within areas and therefore this research considers them good indicators of the overall level of infrastructure development present within a country.

Access to water and electricity data was taken from the World Bank Development Indicators and data on the numbers of airports with paved runways and total country population were taken from CIA data. All of this data was calculated and scored in accordance with methods outlined in chapter 3 and recorded. Scores for each country and timeframe subcategories, their variance, resulting subcategory scores, and overall category score are detailed in the following table.

Table 16. Infrastructure Situation Comparison

| INFRASTRUCTURE               |               |              |             |                       |
|------------------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|
|                              | Colombia 2000 | Nigeria 2016 | % Variance  | Similarity Rating 1-5 |
| Access to Drinking Water     | 90%           | 69%          | 21%         | 1                     |
| Access to Electricity        | 97%           | 56%          | 41%         | 1                     |
| Population to Airport Ratio* | 1:440951      | 1:4539051    | 91%         | 1                     |
| 0-4% = 5                     | 5-9% = 4      | 10-14%=3     | Total Score | 1                     |

15-19% = 2      20 and greater = 5

\*Airports with paved runways

Source: Developed by author using data from: CIA 2000; CIA 2016; World Bank 2016a.

This table and the data it represents clearly shows that there is significant differences in situations present in 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria. Every category received a score of 1 including airports to population ratio for which a variance of 91 percent was observed, the largest gap in this research. These significant differences resulted in an overall category score of 1. This places the risk of applying elements of Plan Colombia to current state Nigeria where infrastructure is a concern, without mitigation, at no reason to expect similar results. This is the lowest score for an overall category and clearly represents the largest environmental obstacle identified in this study.



Figure 39. Risk of Applying Plan Colombia to Nigeria in Regards to Infrastructure Without Mitigation

Source: Developed by Author.

## Feasibility Assessment

Taking the scores of each category into account this research determined the overall similarity in operational environments between 2000 Colombia and current state Nigeria by averaging those scores together. This resulted in an overall score of 2.5 and this score is halfway between dissimilar and somewhat similar and is illustrated in the following table.

Table 17. Overall Operational Environment Similarity Scores

| Overall Situation Scores |     |
|--------------------------|-----|
| Political                | 2.8 |
| Military                 | 3   |
| Economic                 | 4.3 |
| Social                   | 1.7 |
| Infrastructure           | 1   |
| Informational            | 2   |
| Overall Average          | 2.5 |

*Source:* Developed by Author.

This places the overall risk of applying Plan Colombia to current state Nigeria without any mitigation halfway between extremely high and high.




Figure 40. Risk Assessment Associated with the Application of Plan Colombia to Nigeria

Source: Developed by Author.

The largest contributors to this relatively low score are found primarily in the political, social, infrastructure and information categories. The likely impacts of these low scores and their impact on the likely outcome of implementation of Plan Colombia in Nigeria are the next topic of examination.

In regards to the political category, the primary differences between environments were attributed to three subcategories that deal with a government's ability to function in a way that produces quality representation for its citizens. While both countries received relatively low scores in relation to the international community, Nigeria rated significantly lower than Colombia in regards to Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption. These low ratings coupled with a sizable variation between political environments mean that significant portions of Plan Colombia designed to have effects within the political environment in Colombia would likely be inadequate to achieve desired effects in Nigeria. Failure to achieve these effects would then translate into an inability to realize at least a portion of the desired end state.

Likewise, differences in the social environment not only highlight cultural differences at work in Nigeria, but also serve to foreshadow the likelihood of additional differences and sources of conflict in Nigeria not seen in Colombia. Again, these

differences in social environments mean that significant portions of Plan Colombia designed to have effects within the social environment in Colombia would likely be inadequate to achieve desired effects in Nigeria.

In addition to these differences in environment, Nigeria is significantly more connected in the information environment than was 2000 Colombia. Though this has not yet translated into a significant difference in social globalization between the two country states, the potential energy these advancements and the subsequent diffusion of these communications technologies produces significant risk in regards to the implementation of a strategy whose development occurred before these advances and diffusions were realized. This potential for new information technologies to influence the environment in ways not possible in 2000 Colombia means that Plan Colombia would need a significant overhaul in regards to the information environment to achieve the same effects and end states.

These significant differences in environments between country states creates significant obstacles and risk in regards to the implementation of Plan Colombia in current state Nigeria. In fact, these differences represent such significant opportunities for variations in effects and results that if left unmitigated, they make the implementation of a similar strategy to Plan Colombia in current state Nigeria unfeasible.

### Cost Benefit Analysis

Based on the costs associated with Plan Colombia expressed previously in this chapter, this research developed estimates for the potential cost of implementing a strategy to stabilize Nigeria modeled on Plan Colombia over a 15 year period.

This estimate increases ESF funding to 150 percent of that of Plan Colombia to account for the variances in economic and infrastructure environments, and then multiplies that number by four to account for Nigeria's projected four-fold difference in population size from that of 2000 Colombia. When calculated this puts ESF funding in the ballpark of \$7.5 billion dollars over 15 years.

Due to the lack of drug cultivation, much of the counter narcotics missions required for Colombia would not be required in Nigeria. However, training of law enforcement would still be required, as well as smuggling interdiction, therefore funding for INCLE was not eliminated, but it was cut in half. This resulted in an INCLE budget reduction of 50 percent bringing the total to around \$736 million dollars over 15 years.

Specific funding for the stability strategy, represented in Colombia by ACI funding, would likely remain the same due to the highly similar size of both Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram in comparison to their Colombian counterparts: this total comes in at \$3.77 billion dollars. These similarities in sizes also carries over to retaining levels of funding for a Nigerian strategy with that of Colombia in regards to NADR, IMET, and FMF funds. This translates to funding levels of \$74 million dollars, \$119 million dollars, and \$597 million dollars respectively over 15 years.

Funding for health development and food aid as part of GHP funding would remain at current levels. This represents close to half of the total cost and represents significant levels of funding over that used for Plan Colombia. This disparity between the two is almost entirely due to differences in infrastructure capabilities present in the two states. This translates into \$10.5 billion dollars over 15 years.

These levels of estimated funding requirements represents a 300 percent increase over that of funding for 15 years of Plan Colombia which roughly translates to an additional \$1 billion dollars in aid per year to Nigeria above current funding levels. While a 300 percent increase in the level of funding seems significantly larger than what was spent on Plan Colombia, it actually represents about a 20 percent reduction in cost per capita in Nigeria due to the significantly larger population of Nigeria, but similarly sized security and insurgency forces operating there. The following table illustrates these funding estimates.

Table 18. Cost Estimates for a 15 Year Plan Colombia Based Strategy for Nigeria

| \$000      | Plan Nigeria 15<br>Year Estimate | Funding Estimate Considerations                                                                             |
|------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ESF        | 7563066                          | Funded at 150% of PC to address infrastructure deficits then multiplied by 4 for population considerations. |
| INCLE      | 736978                           | Decreased by 50% per year due to lack of drug cultivation.                                                  |
| ACI        | 3768977                          | Carried over due to similar size of military and insurgency forces.                                         |
| NADR       | 74673                            | Carried over due to similar size of military and insurgency forces.                                         |
| IMET       | 118640                           | Carried over due to similar size of military and insurgency forces.                                         |
| FMF        | 596736                           | Carried over due to similar size of military and insurgency forces.                                         |
| GHP        | 10500000                         | Kept at current rate.                                                                                       |
| 15yr total | 23359070                         | A roughly 300% increase over Plan Colombia.                                                                 |
| per year   | 1668505                          | Represents an increase of foreign aid to Nigeria per year of \$1bn.                                         |

*Source:* Developed by Author based on Plan Colombia Funding levels adjusted for situational variations, population, and current levels of funding to Nigeria.

### Acceptability Assessment

Based on the estimated cost of a strategy modeled on Plan Colombia for stabilizing Nigeria and defeating Boko Haram, this research determines that it would likely be acceptable to policy makers considering US national interests represented by a stable Nigeria free of Boko Haram.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, it was determined that the answer to the primary question, should Plan Colombia serve as a model for a security cooperation strategy designed to stabilize Nigeria, was no, at least not at this time. This chapter analyzed Plan Colombia as a strategy in regards to ends, ways, means, environmental framework, operational approach, and results achieved in Colombia. It then assessed the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of utilizing Plan Colombia to stabilize current state Nigeria while accounting for risk.

This chapter determined that Plan Colombia was successful in regards to end states achieved in Colombia and that as a strategy for Nigeria it would be suitable in addressing the security issues present there.

Furthermore, given an estimated cost of \$23.4 billion dollars over a 15 year period, a strategy based on Plan Colombia for stabilizing Nigeria would likely be acceptable to policy makers.

However, environmental differences in regards to the political, social, infrastructure, and information environments represent significant obstacles to implementation of such a strategy in Nigeria. These obstacles create a situation in which the risk to mission success hovers between high and extremely high. These risks if left unmitigated, would result in the strategy becoming unfeasible for use in current state Nigeria.

Therefore, because of the unfeasibility of implementation within the operational environment present in Nigeria, and the disproportionate level of risk it creates in regards

to likely mission success, Plan Colombia is assessed as inadequate and should not be used as a model for stabilizing current state Nigeria.

The next chapter will offer a final discussion on results and their implications, offer recommendation for further research, and provide recommendations for policy makers.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having determined no as the answer to the primary question, should Plan Colombia serve as a model for a security cooperation strategy designed to stabilize Nigeria, this chapter will discuss this finding, make recommendations to both policy makers and future research.

#### Conclusions

2000 Colombia and present state Nigeria suffer from many of the same security concerns and working to stabilize Nigeria supports US national interests. Though much of Plan Colombia holds promise for implementation in Nigeria, the current operational environment within Nigeria would likely prevent a Plan Colombia from being used as a successful model for security cooperation there.

Plan Colombia was highly successful in helping to stabilize Colombia by addressing not only the security situation there directly, but also indirectly through programs designed to improve economic and governmental development. Not only did Plan Colombia confront the FARC threat and cartels through direct action and security force assistance, it also targeted the population's support for these entities by providing economic alternatives while reducing corruption and improving government accountability and function. This four-prong approach utilized all elements of national power and was a successful example of the application of smart power. The result of which was a more secure and stable Colombia capable of exporting security to the surrounding region, maintaining or increasing its contribution to energy markets,

drastically reducing its cocaine production, and ensuring basic human rights for its citizens.

Based on the analysis of the Plan Colombia's operational approach, the Plan Colombia model would be suitable for Nigeria provided it could be implemented. Its ability to address Boko Haram, corruption, poor economic opportunities, weak government, and illicit markets and networks would likely result in a secure and stable Nigeria. Furthermore, Nigeria would likely emerge capable of exporting security to the surrounding region, maintaining or increasing its contribution to energy markets, drastically reducing it as a smuggling gateway to the EU, and ensuring basic human rights for its citizens.

Furthermore, a Plan Colombia modeled security cooperation strategy for Nigeria would likely be acceptable. At 7.5 billion dollars, Plan Colombia cost the US about the same as one month of the Iraq War yet managed to stabilize a country with almost twice the population. At an estimated cost of around 23.4 billion dollars a Plan Nigeria would cost less than four months of the Iraq War with the potential to stabilize a US priority state with a population over three times that of Colombia. This coupled with the defeat of Boko Haram, an ISIS ally, would likely prove acceptable to US policy makers.

However, significant differences in the operational environments present in 2000 Colombia and present state Nigeria make it unfeasible to expect that similar results would be achieved. While the military and economic, and to an extent political, environments are similarly enough that a Plan Nigeria based on Plan Colombia could achieve similar results, the marked differences in the social, infrastructure, and information environments create significant doubt as to the ability to achieve like effects.

Politically, the two suffer from essentially the same problems; Nigeria simply suffers more than Colombia did. While this represents a difference in environment, the obstacles it would create could likely be overcome by allocating additional means rather than requiring a change in strategy. Additionally, Nigeria seems poised to make significant steps forward on their own following the successful national elections of 2015.

Militarily the situation is almost identical, with the only real difference being the ratio of insurgents to the population, which in this case likely make the implementation of a Plan Nigeria more feasible than the score of three suggests. While this does represent an environmental difference, it would likely make a security cooperation strategy easier to implement than was the case in Colombia because the ratios in Nigeria are more favorable to government forces.

Economically, the environments are quite similar and would require little adjustment to strategy.

However, the divide between religions present in Nigeria was not present in Colombia and the fact that this separation is among the primary drivers of the insurgency within Nigeria complicate the situation much more than was the case in Colombia. This divide would likely require an additional line of effort for any future Plan Nigeria focused on building and strengthening social relationships between north and south Nigeria. This adds a major source of complexity to any strategy for Nigeria and would likely have to be custom developed from scratch.

In addition, the widespread availability of communications technologies not available within 2000 Colombia, but now available in Nigeria, represent potential energy

not accounted for in Plan Colombia. These new variables will create additional requirements in regards to messaging and portrayal of the mission in the international community, as well as among the civilian population of Nigeria. Again, this represents a source of complexity not present during the development and implementation of Plan Colombia and represents a potential obstacle in implementation.

Finally, the largest area of difference between the two counties is the stark difference in infrastructure. This difference would likely create significant problems for rapid security force capability advancement, while also requiring an extended initial investment before the average Nigerian began to see any benefits from the strategy as far as quality of life improvements go. While this does provide greater opportunity to make significant strides, it also represents a much longer initial development phase and would likely push the duration of the strategy well past the 15-year mark.

These differences in social, information, and infrastructure environments make the implementation of a Plan Nigeria based on Plan Colombia unfeasible anytime soon. However, these differences do not mean that after a period of development in Nigeria this strategy could not be used in the future. In fact it is entirely likely that as Nigeria continues to develop its infrastructure, government, and participate in social reconciliation this strategy will become feasible as well, making it an ideal model for security cooperation within Nigeria in the future.

### Recommendations for Decision Makers

The author recommends that national policy makers invest in programs designed to hasten the rate of Nigerian Governmental and infrastructural development, as well as those programs that aid in the social reconciliation process within Nigeria until such time

as improvements in these areas make a security cooperation strategy based on Plan Colombia feasible for Nigeria.

The author's recommendations for military decision makers is that this research be used in support of the current Army Warfighting Challenges one, two, and three. This research contributes to the development of a high degree of situational awareness within the complex environments present in Nigeria. Further, it can serve as a guide when determining how to shape the security environment within Nigeria to achieve sustainable security outcomes, both before and after the commitment of forces. Finally, it makes recommendations for a future operational approach that should prove successful provided the US continues to shape the political and infrastructural environments within Nigeria prior to the commitment of forces.

#### Recommendations for Future Research

The author makes two recommendations for further research. The first is for the development of a comparison of current Nigerian security force effectiveness in contrast to that of Colombian security forces in 2000. Understanding this would allow for the development of a baseline that could be used when determining the level of training and equipping Nigerian security forces are likely to need.

Second, a study should be done to identify and recommend developmental programs the US should pursue in Nigeria in order to improve environments there to a parity with Colombian environments in 2000 so that a stability strategy similar to the one outlined in this paper would be feasible.

### Closing

Nigeria appears ready to take significant steps towards stability and long-term prosperity. They are looking for American assistance in this mission, the question now is whether we as a nation are prepared to commit to the stability of Nigeria for the long haul? In closing a quote from President Buhari of Nigeria on his first visit to the White House in 2015 on the importance of US influence within Nigeria.

and the maintenance of pressure by the United States . . . to make sure that the elections were free, fair and credible led us to where we are now. It would have been almost impossible if the United States did not maintain the pressure on the former Nigerian government, but they would not accept anything less constitutional as far as the processes of the election are concerned. We will ever remain grateful to you because there are fundamental objectives that are identified by all of Nigeria's people's Congress--security, economy, employment especially of youth, and then fighting corruption. (Buhari 2015)

## APPENDIX A

### US PROGRAMS UTILIZED IN SUPPORT OF PLAN COLOMBIA

(All portions of this appendix were taken directly from the US Department of State 2005, *US Foreign Assistance Reference Guide*, and intended to provide the reader with details into the programs utilized as part of Plan Colombia.)

#### Andean Counternarcotic Initiative (ACI)

##### Purposes/Uses

1. Reduce the flow of drugs to the United States by:
  - a) Continued eradication of illicit coca and opium poppy;
  - b) Increased interdiction of essential chemicals and cocaine products;
  - c) Economic development;
  - d) Increased successful prosecutions of narcotics related cases;
  - e) Improved quality of investigations into alleged human rights violations
  - f) Continued air support and aircraft safety programs, specifically
    - i. Expanded necessary aircraft maintenance, thus reducing airframe direct operating costs;
    - ii. Continued contractor logistical support, operational sustainment and continuous training for the Colombian Airbridge program;
    - iii. Infrastructure support, communications equipment and aircraft upgrades; and

- iv. Development of the infrastructure to move forward operating bases closer to where drug trafficking events occur.

2. Prevent instability in the Andean region by

- a) Increasing legal economic opportunities by introducing new licit crops, supporting agribusiness and forestry activities and developing local and international markets.
- b) Supporting vulnerable groups, democracy, rule of law, judicial reform, drug awareness and demand reduction by providing training, equipment, education, technical assistance and advisors in these areas.
- c) Providing equipment, training and database support to additional bomb squads to help stem further terrorist bombings.
- d) Helping to develop/rehabilitate roads, bridges, schools and health care systems and land reform.

Responsible agencies/bureaus/decision-makers:

State: Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

USAID: Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Economic Support Fund (ESF)

Purpose:

Promotes the economic and political foreign policy interests of the United States by providing assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy, supporting the Middle East peace negotiations, and financing economic stabilization programs, frequently in a multi-donor context. The U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID), with overall foreign policy guidance from the Department of State, implements most ESF-funded programs.

Uses:

1. Increasing the role of the private sector in the economy, reducing government controls over markets, enhancing job creation, and improving economic growth.
2. Assisting in the development of effective, accessible, independent legal systems operating under the rule of law, as measured by an increase in the use of the courts to decide allegations of human rights abuses or abuses of government authority.
3. Developing and strengthening institutions necessary for sustainable democracy through support for the transformation of the public sector, including assistance and training to improve public administration, promote decentralization, and strengthen local governments, parliaments, independent media, and non-governmental organizations.
4. Assisting in the transition to transparent and accountable governance and the empowerment of citizens, working through civic and economic organizations and democratic political processes that ensure broad-based participation in political and economic life, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

5. Strengthening capacity to manage the human dimension of the transition to democracy and a market economy and to help sustain the poorest sectors of the population during the transition period.
6. Balance of payments support, including cash transfer assistance and assistance to finance commodity imports.
7. Budget support.

Responsible agencies/bureaus/decision-makers:

State: The Deputy Secretary, “in cooperation with” (FAA §531(b)) the USAID Administrator.

#### Food for Peace Title II PL 480 (FFP)

Title II, Emergency and Private Assistance Programs. Administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), implemented by private voluntary organizations (PVOs, e.g. not-for-profit, nongovernmental organizations registered with USAID), cooperatives and intergovernmental organizations (primarily the United Nations World Food Program, “WFP”). Donations of commodities to address emergency needs and for developmental programs that reduce vulnerability to crises and improve the nutrition and food security of poor, malnourished populations. It is the main avenue for U.S. food assistance. (<http://foodaid.org/food-aid-programs/food-for-peace/>).

#### Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

Purposes

“The President is authorized to furnish military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization,

the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance, by . . . acquiring from any source and providing (by loan or grant) any defense article or defense service.” (FAA §503).

“The President is authorized to finance the procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine.”(AECA §23; the statute provides for a loan program. Applicable appropriations bills have annually provided funding for all-grant assistance.)

Objectives:

1. Assist the militaries of friendly countries and allies to procure U.S. defense articles and services that strengthen legitimate self-defense capabilities and security needs.
2. Promote bilateral, regional and multilateral coalition efforts, notably in the global war on terrorism.
3. Improve the military capabilities of key friendly countries to contribute to international crisis response operations, including peacekeeping and humanitarian crises.
4. Contribute to the professionalism of military forces of friendly countries and allies to include their understanding of the rule of law and military subordination to civilian control.

5. Enhance rationalization, standardization and interoperability of military forces of friendly countries and allies.
6. Maintain support for democratically-elected governments that share values similar to the U.S. for democracy, human rights and regional stability.
7. Support the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and services.
8. Create more professionally competent, properly equipped, and better-led peacekeeping units in selected foreign countries, thereby reducing reliance on U.S. forces.
9. Increase interoperability between foreign peacekeeping units and the U.S. military and its key allies.
10. Encourage other countries to establish peacekeeping training centers or dedicated training programs, develop national policies on peacekeeping and encourage nations to increase their own involvement in peacekeeping operations.
11. Expose international military forces to democratic ideals and principles of internationally recognized human rights and to prepare foreign militaries for peace support operations, including the capacity to contribute humanitarian assistance when called upon to do so.

Uses:

FMF provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.

Responsible agencies/bureaus/decision-makers:

State: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs/Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Purpose:

IMET provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, IMET training exposes foreign students to U.S. professional military organizations and procedures and the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control.

Objectives:

1. Further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the U.S. and foreign countries.
2. Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations' military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces.
3. Expose foreign military and civilian personnel to the important roles democratic values and internationally recognized human rights can play in governance and military operations.
4. Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military.
5. Contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotic law enforcement efforts.

6. Encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.
7. Improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.
8. Improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with, and to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving, internationally recognized human rights.

Uses:

Training and education may be provided through:

1. Attendance at military educational and training facilities in the United States (other than Service academies) and abroad;
2. Attendance in special courses of instruction at schools and institutions of learning or research in the United States and abroad; and
3. Observation and orientation visits to military facilities and related activities in the United States and abroad.

Responsible agencies/bureaus/decision-makers:

State: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs/Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.

## International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)

### Purposes:

(FAA §481(a)(1)) “International narcotics trafficking poses an unparalleled transnational threat in today’s world and its suppression is among the most important foreign policy objectives of the United States.” “Effective international cooperation is necessary to control the illicit cultivation, production, and smuggling of, trafficking in, and abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs.” “International criminal activities, particularly international narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and corruption, endanger political and economic stability and democratic development, and assistance for the prevention and suppression of international criminal activities should be a priority for the United States.”

### Objectives:

1. Fighting international crime and drug trafficking and strengthening law enforcement overseas.
2. “The suppression of the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in narcotic and psychotropic drugs, money laundering, and precursor chemical diversion, and the progressive elimination of the illicit cultivation of the crops from which narcotic and psychotropic drugs are derived.”

### Uses:

1. Provision of aviation expertise and resources to eradicate and interdict illicit drugs, as well as illicit drug demand reduction programs.
2. Strengthening of host nation law enforcement capabilities to work jointly with U.S. agencies on counterterrorism operations.

3. Civilian police and justice programs.
4. Improvement of security and political stability in post-conflict situations.
5. Enhancement of host nation capabilities to stem money laundering and interdict sources of terrorist financing.
6. Combating trafficking in persons.
7. Strengthening border protection and countering alien smuggling.
8. Increased host nation capacity to combat corruption and organized crime.
9. Cybercrime, cybersecurity and intellectual property crime programs.

Responsible agencies/bureaus/decision-makers:

State: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)

Purposes:

1. To enhance the ability of . . . law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in international terrorist acts such as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking.
2. To halt the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and conventional weaponry . . . [and to establish] verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.

Uses:

1. To enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and counter terrorism.
2. To strengthen the bilateral ties of the United States with friendly governments by offering concrete assistance in areas of mutual concern.

3. To increase respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.
4. To enhance the nonproliferation and export control capabilities of friendly countries by providing training and equipment to detect, deter, monitor, interdict, and counter proliferation.
5. Transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and of small arms and light weapons.
6. Prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons.
7. Prevention of diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise to terrorist groups or third countries.
8. To support conversion of defense-related industries and equipment for civilian purposes and uses.
9. To promote multilateral activities, including cooperation with international organizations, relating to nonproliferation.
10. To support humanitarian demining operations.

Responsible agencies/bureaus/decision-makers:

State: Assistant Secretaries for Bureaus of Political-Military Affairs and  
Nonproliferation; Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism.

(US Department of State 2005)

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