

HOW DO LEADERS ENABLE PERFORMANCE IN ADVERSE CONDITIONS?
LEADERSHIP IN DEFENSE OF THE ALCAZAR

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

HOW DO LEADERS ENABLE PERFORMANCE IN ADVERSE CONDITIONS?
LEADERSHIP IN DEFENSE OF THE ALCAZAR by Major Edward Clark III, 120
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This thesis uses the Siege of the Alcazar (July-September 1936) as a case study to investigate what leadership factors enable units to perform beyond expectations under conditions of extreme hardship for extended periods of time and then evaluates the Army's Leadership requirements model against the findings to determine whether it is a suitable model in facilitating the same results.

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ACRONYMS

A&Cs	Attributes and Competencies: depending on context, refers either to the attributes and competencies contained within the Leadership Requirements Model, or to the attributes and competencies displayed by the leadership examined in this thesis.
LRM	Leadership Requirements Model or Army Leadership Requirements Model as per Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), or Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, <i>Army Leadership</i> .
MMAS	Masters of Military Arts and Sciences

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Here the smoke of incense and the smoke of cannon, rising to God in Heaven, denote a single vertical will to affirm a faith, to save a world and to restore a civilization.

— Jose Maria, *Peman, ¡Atencion! ... ¡Attention! ... Arengas y cronicas de Guerra, Cadiz.*

Background

In 1936, a state of civil war broke out in Spain forcing nearly everyone to choose between loyalty to the government in Madrid, or the Nationalist rebellion against that government led by several Spanish Generals. In the small town of Toledo, a disparate group of soldiers, officers and political activists who sided against the government, along with their families sought refuge at the campus of the Spanish Military Academy known as the Alcazar. The group soon came under siege by forces loyal to the government. For the next two months, the defenders of the Alcazar held out against all odds, enduring severe deprivation.

The fact that the defenders were able to function at a high level and were able to maintain, in the face of such hardship, a generally positive outlook and relatively high morale, is remarkable.

This thesis examines the defense of the Alcazar and, in particular, the leadership decisions and actions throughout the defense, in an attempt to discover what factors helped lead their units to triumph over adversity. The thesis goes on to compare the demonstrated attributes and competencies of the leadership at the Alcazar to those delineated in the Leadership Requirements Model (LRM) of ADRP 6-22, *Army*

Leadership. Some brief background of the Spanish Civil War and of the Siege is required.

Problem Statement

The modern American warfighter generally has sufficient food, is well equipped, and lives comfortably. In recent history, with a few exceptions, the American Soldier has not been called upon to endure extreme deprivation on anything close to the scale that was almost commonplace a few generations ago and beyond. Just because it has not happened lately, does not mean it will not happen again. In order to prepare ourselves for that possibility, we need to study what factors have enabled military organizations to succeed under those conditions in the past. Further, studying what has enabled success under harsh circumstances, will help us to develop strategies for success in less extreme circumstances.

Primary Research Question

What leadership factors contribute to the ability of military organizations to surpass expectations in degraded environments for extended periods of time? This will be a case study of the successful defense of the Alcazar of Toledo in 1936.

Secondary Research Questions

1. Can the LRM adequately account for the results at the Alcazar? Are there any behaviors or values demonstrated by Col. Moscardo and his leadership team (the Junta) that directly contradict those called for by ADRP 6-22? Or, are there values and behaviors called for by ADRP 6-22 that the Junta would

reject? Are there leadership behaviors or values demonstrated by the Junta that are not explicit or implicit in the LRM?

2. Do the facts at the Alcazar demonstrate leadership factors which might be further explored in modifying or understanding the LRM?
3. What implications are there for the way we train and select leaders today?

Historical Context

The following introduction to the war and to the Siege is provided as context. Key points to consider when reviewing the historical facts outlined below are:

1. How the defenders at the Alcazar must have viewed themselves in contrast to the enemy, namely that they considered themselves not revolutionaries, but counter-revolutionaries.
2. The difficulties that must have been involved with deciding which side to claim allegiance to, i.e. that the outcome of the war was unpredictable, and casting one's lot with one side or the other entailed a great amount of personal and professional risk.

These points will be considered in the analysis during chapter 4, as they relate directly to the character of our subjects.

Causes of the Spanish Civil War

A detailed analysis of the causes of the Spanish Civil War is beyond the scope of this thesis. To provide context for the Siege, it is enough to have a brief sketch of the key events of the five or so years preceding the war, and to know something of the key factions and ideologies on either side.

In 1931 King Alfonso XIII, in the wake of resounding electoral defeats of monarchist politicians, declared:

Sunday's elections have shown me that I no longer enjoy the love of my people...I am determined to have nothing to do with setting one of my countrymen against another in a fratricidal civil war. Thus, until the nation speaks, I shall deliberately suspend the use of my royal prerogatives.¹

The abdication did not have its intended effect. The intervening years would see enormous pendulum swings between the political left and right, mostly favoring the left.

Immediately upon the King's leaving the country, Niceto Alcala Zamora, the newly elected Prime Minister declared a Second Spanish Republic (the first occurred during the 1860s) and his party set about drafting a national constitution.² The first Prime Minister was somewhat of a moderate but most of his government was extremely left. He would resign before the end of the year amidst pressure from those on the right who were angry that he was not doing enough to stop angry mob attacks against the Catholic Church and those on the left whose leader (and Zamora's eventual replacement) Manuel Azaña, declared "all the conventos in Spain are not worth the life of a single republican."³

Between 1931 and 1934, the governments of Spain moved increasingly toward the left. Each successive government⁴ blamed the previous one for not being radical enough in ridding Spain of the influence of traditionalism (The Catholic Church, the

¹ Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1986), 32.

² Warren Carroll, *The Last Crusade* (Front Royal: Christendom Press, 1996), 9.

³ Ibid., 8.

⁴ Depending on how you count, Spain had up to 5 governments between 1931 and 1934.

Monarchy, aristocracy etc.) which was blamed for any economic misfortune that Spain suffered. By 1934, the attacks against traditional powers (both those sanctioned by the government and those done at the hands of the mob) had become so widespread and so indiscriminate, that the pendulum began to swing the other way. In 1934, large numbers of right-leaning republicans were elected, but not enough to form a majority government. The next two years only got worse. The left, unable to use the government to further its agenda, took to the streets. They began by burning down churches and monasteries and continued by murdering Priests and members of religious communities. Communist workers unions revolted against the now moderate government. Right wing political parties formed militias and began preparing for war. Violence, not unlike modern Gang violence, erupted in the streets.⁵

Having lost ground in the elections of 1934, the political left, following the advice of the Comintern,⁶ formed an alliance which would come to be called the Frente Popular (Popular Front) comprised of communists, anarchists, socialists, and separatists.⁷ Those on the right responded by forming the Nationalist Front comprised of various monarchists, right wing republicans and fascists.⁸ National elections were held in

⁵ Major Geoffrey McNeill-Moss, *The Siege of Alcazar a History of the Siege of the Toledo Alcazar, 1936* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937), 10-11.

⁶ Carroll, 17.

⁷ Carroll, 16. The 5 Major parties of the Popular Front were the Socialists, Communists, Anzanas Left Republicans, Republican Union, and Catalan Esquerra. The Anarchists and Basque separatists were not official members of the Popular Front, but were united with them in their opposition to the nationalists.

⁸ The Fascist Falange, was not technically a part of the Nationalist front, but was sympathetic and later came to dominate Nationalist politics. Stephen Tongue, "The

February of 1936. The conservatives (Nationalists) won the majority of the popular vote, but due to the electoral system in place at the time, the Popular Front won the absolute majority in the Cortes (parliament).⁹

With the left back in power, the extremists on that side went to work - the result was chaos. The new government enacted amnesty for prisoners jailed within the past two years.¹⁰ Agricultural Laborers began to seize lands promised them in 1932, an overflow of leftist exuberance led to even more destruction of churches and convents.¹¹ For the most extreme, things were not happening fast enough. There was talk of Communist revolution, directly supported by Moscow. Attacks against churches evolved into attacks against those who attended mass or carried a rosary. The existence of private property, freedom of worship, and the family were all being attacked on a grand scale.¹²

Amidst this chaos, certain members of the Army whose sympathies were with the right but who had resisted any impulse toward rebellion thus far, decided to take matters into their own hands. On 17 July 1936, in Spanish Morocco, General Francisco Franco declared that he was unable to take orders from Madrid and began to move the Army of Africa into Spain to advance on Madrid. General Emilio Mola, the architect of the coup, declared the same from the north of Spain and began his attack south. Throughout Spain,

Spanish Civil War,” The Web of English History, October 15, 2015, accessed January 23, 2016, <http://www.historyhome.co.uk/europe/spaincw.htm>.

⁹ McNeill-Moss, 12.

¹⁰ McNeill-Moss, 12; Carroll, 16.

¹¹ McNeill-Moss, 16.

¹² Ibid.

tiny garrisons and local municipalities began to declare for one side or the other. The Alcazar at Toledo was one of these garrisons.

The Siege of the Alcazar

In the middle of Spain, a fifty-eight-year-old, semi-retired, Colonel heard the news on the radio and stopped packing his bags - he was scheduled to leave to coach the Olympic soccer team in Berlin. He drove to the military academy at Toledo to inquire about the rebellion and ended up leading the defense of the academy against the government for the next two months. His leadership and the collective leadership of his lieutenants during that time is the subject of this study.

The Combatants

The pre-war Spanish Army comprised the Regulars, the Tercio (Foreign Legion) and the Guardia Civil. Although the Tercio were crucial to the eventual Nationalist victory, and relieved the garrison at Toledo (the Alcazar), they were not involved in the siege. The Regular Army (also referred to as the Peninsular Army) and the Guardia Civil figured heavily.

The Spanish Army was conscripted. Conscripts served for twelve months and were usually about seventeen or eighteen years old. There was, of course, a more permanent officer corps which was considered highly trained and well educated for its day but whose upper ranks had been decimated by the political back and forth of the pre-war years.¹³ At the outbreak of the war, there were about 112,228 Soldiers and 8,851

¹³ Ibid.

Officers in the Regular (Peninsular) Army. About two thirds of the officers and a fifth of the men ended up joining the Nationalist cause. At the Alcazar, there were 150 Regular Army Officers, 160 young Soldiers (most of whom were assigned as stable hands, cooks etc.) among the defenders.¹⁴

The Guardia Civil were a police force officered by the Army and organized militarily. Historically, they were responsible for keeping order in the vast wildernesses and rural areas of Spain, not municipal police work. They had a reputation for impeccable character and professionalism.¹⁵ About two thirds of the Guardia Civil sided with the Nationalists.¹⁶ There were 600 who defended at the Alcazar.¹⁷

A second paramilitary group, the Guardia de Asalto (Assaultos), had been formed in 1931 in order to provide a (loyalist) police force, capable of keeping order in urban areas. These sided mostly with the Republicans, and were a large part of the assault force against the Alcazar.

The Spanish Air Force, which was a part of the Army, was also fairly small and out of date, but played a direct and daily role in the Siege.¹⁸ Unlike their ground counterparts, most of the pilots of 1936, ended up siding with the Republicans.

¹⁴ Ibid., 52.

¹⁵ Ibid., 19.

¹⁶ Of an original force of 69,000, an estimated 42,000 joined the Nationalist side. John Simpkin, *The Spanish Civil War* (Spartacus: 2012), Kindle loc 3526.

¹⁷ McNeill-Moss, 52.

¹⁸ Ibid., 19.

Militia Groups with loyalties to one political party or another were eventually brought into line with either the Republican or the Nationalist Army, but in July of 1936, that had not yet happened. Among the defenders at the Alcazar, there were 70 men that were civilian members of various political parties. Some came armed, some did not-all who were able bodied joined the fight. The besiegers were mostly of this type, militiamen and women who came to the battle with the Red Militia (later renamed the Militia Populares).

Table 1. Approximate Strength of Defenders at the Alcazar			
COMBATANTS	NUMBER	NON-COMBATANTS	NUMBER
Officers	150	Men, too old or unfit	100
Cadets	6	Women	520
Soldiers	160	Children	50
Guardia Civil	600		
Fangalistas	35		
Renovacion Espanolas	25		
Carlists	10		
Peasants and Workmen	40		
Total	1032	Total	670

Source: Created by Author with data from Major Geoffrey McNeill-Moss, *The Siege of Alcazar a History of the Siege of the Toledo Alcazar, 1936* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937), 53.

Weapons

By the time the siege was underway, the defenders had an ample supply of rifles ammunition, but only a few machine guns (10-12) and a handful of sub-machine guns, which were kept at the Academy as instructional samples and had seen 15 years of constant abuse by cadets. There were a limited number of hand grenades available.¹⁹

The enemy had no shortage of ammunition or small arms either. They also had machine guns, flamethrowers, tanks, armored cars, heavy artillery and bombing planes and dynamite. The dynamite would prove especially valuable as they mined beneath the fortress and reduced one side of the Alcazar to rubble.

The Building

The Alcazar stands above the city of Toledo. It was the historic home of the Catholic Monarchs Isabel and Ferdinand. It had been gutted by fire and rebuilt several times through the years, thus it had a combination of thick masonry and steel girders. The building is square, with an open center and arcades facing in. Under the building, and of immense importance throughout the siege, were large catacombs running the lengths of its sides. The building was more important as an icon than anything else. For the Nationalists, it stood for tradition and the past glories of Spain. For the Republicans it was a symbol of classist oppression.²⁰

¹⁹ McNeill-Moss, 55.

²⁰ Ibid., 61.

Brief Summary of the Battle

Col. Moscardo, was assigned to the relatively unimportant job of Director of the Central School, essentially the physical education satellite of the military academy whose main campus was at the Alcazar and whose cadet population had dwindled to about 150 cadets under the new Republican Government. Because the Superintendent of the Academy was on leave for the summer, Col. Moscardo was the senior officer on site when news of Franco's rebellion was announced over the radio.

Col. Moscardo, upon hearing the news, did not hesitate as to which side he should join. In fact, he was eager to announce his loyalty to Franco and declare as (acting) Military Governor of the region, that Toledo was declaring war on the Republican government. It was only on the advice of several junior officers that he delayed making his announcement until absolutely necessary. The Republican War Bureau in nearby Madrid made several requests to turn the ammunition and arms in Toledo over to the government, but Col. Moscardo, following the advice of his junior officers, shrewdly rebuffed them by demanding that the order be given according to procedure (in cipher). By the 21st of July (just two days after taking charge), the announcement of the Alcazar's stand against the Republican government was finally made official following a vote among the Junta. General Requelme, a Guardia General loyal to the Republicans called Col. Moscardo to demand once more that the arms and ammunition be turned over.

General Requelme: Why do you take this attitude of defiance?

Col. Moscardo: Because I love Spain and have confidence in General Franco, furthermore it would be dishonorable to surrender the arms of gentlemen to your Red rabble.

GR: Then I will seize them.
CM: I am informed General.²¹

The first bombs dropped on the Alcazar that night. Over the next 65 days, the Republican planes attacked at least 35 more times and Republican Artillery, ranging from small mortars to 155mm was incessant. At least 9,000 Republican militiamen and highly trained Assaultos surrounded the fortress and made numerous attempts to overrun it. The tactically insignificant castle became a propaganda rallying point for both sides. The Republicans invited press to watch the Alcazar fall, and Franco's Nationalists raced to relieve the defenders knowing the delay on the way to Madrid could prolong the war.

The defenders were poorly armed in comparison to the attackers, but they had an ample supply of ammunition thanks to the quick thinking of Col. Moscardo who had moved the ammunition located at a nearby factory into the Alcazar. There was insufficient food from the outset and the arrival of the non-combatant refugees in the first few days made matters worse. In the end, a siege which was expected to last only a few days, lasted two months. The defenders held out against all odds until the arrival of Franco's Army in September.

Life During the Siege

As this thesis is focused on how leaders enable units to persevere and overcome adversity, this section provides some context about the conditions within the Alcazar which the defenders had to endure. Life at the Alcazar was tough. There was a constant

²¹ Cecil D. Eby, *The Siege of the Alcazar* (New York: Random House, 1965), 49.

shortage of food, barely enough water, hygiene was deplorable, not enough sleep, and there was no safe refuge from the constant threat of death or injury.

After the first week, and until the end, the defenders were limited to a meager diet, which was barely enough to prevent immediate starvation. Fresh meat and vegetables did not last past the first few days, wheat stores had run out a few days after that along with any supplies of coffee or tobacco. Later, stores of wheat were found and brought in from outside the perimeter and there were occasional additions to the food stores made either through successful foraging sorties or through air drops from Nationalist planes. The standard daily ration was one liter of water, a fist sized piece of bread made from wheat or oats and largely indigestible, and occasional finger sized slivers of horse meat.

The inhabitants of the Alcazar were nicknamed flies, partly as a play on the commander's name, (mosca is the Spanish word for fly) and partly because of the filthy conditions and the swarms of actual flies which hovered over the Alcazar. The conditions at the Alcazar did not allow for proper hygiene. There were approximately 1,600 people crowded within the perimeter. Sewage and water lines were destroyed after the first couple of days. The civilian population was crowded into underground corridors with barely enough room to sit. There was nowhere to bury the dead, whose numbers increased daily. Bodies were stuffed into lockers and decayed in the summer heat. The stench was so bad at the Alcazar, that it was not uncommon for the inhabitants to vomit back their meager rations.

On top of inadequate food and incredible filth, the defenders of the Alcazar lived under the constant threat of death. With rare exception, the Alcazar was shelled

throughout the day and well into the night. Many survivors claim that noise made sleep almost impossible. The building was crumbling, and even when the shells or bombs were not falling, there was danger of being buried alive. Close range small arms fire was constant. There were several attacks made by flooding the building with gasoline and lighting fires. There was an attack with tear gas, there were occasional probing attacks, and there was always the threat of a large scale assault. Worst of all for many of the defenders, was the fact that they could hear the Republican tunneling efforts and so lived they lived with the certainty that at some unknown point in the near future, the entire building would come down and they would all die.

This is just a brief outline of the conditions which the defenders of the Alcazar had to endure. Somehow, they were able not just to endure them, but to continue to function as a coherent combat force and to, eventually, win.

Proving the Dependent Variable

This thesis explores how leadership aides in enabling military units to perform beyond expectations. Therefore, performance beyond expectations for extended periods of time under degraded conditions is the dependent variable. Thus, it is necessary at the outset to establish that the organization at the Alcazar did indeed perform beyond expectations for an extended period of time under degraded conditions. Performance beyond expectation can be demonstrated briefly in three points:

1. Relative combat power analysis - the besiegers outnumbered the defenders by at least 10:1 and had overwhelming firepower.²²

²² Judith Keene, *Fighting for Franco*, 2nd ed. (London: Hambledon, 2007), 61.

2. The expectations of the combatants - Col. Moscardo stated at the outset that he expected they might have to hold out for a few days. Two months far surpassed his expectations or the expectations of his men; several Republican Generals, especially General Ansensio who led the final assaults, predicted an easy capture.²³
3. Public perception - both sides expected the Alcazar to fall quickly. The Republicans, were so confident that they would win, that they designed vast propaganda messaging around their victory; Franco was ever-nervous he would not make it in time and the Nationalists side was easily duped by Republican reports that the Alcazar had already surrendered.²⁴

The argument that the defenders did not exceed expectations, if it is made, will likely rest on two main arguments:

1. That the defenders were able to succeed because of the inept conduct of the attacks.
2. The structure of the Alcazar itself mitigated the numerical disadvantage of the defenders.

Both of these points are valid to a certain extent, but both fall short. Anyone who has seen the pictures of the Alcazar before and after will have a hard time arguing that the defenders should have been victorious. There was almost nothing left of the Alcazar at the end. The extent to which the attacks were disorganized can be argued to be a result of

²³ Eby, 27

²⁴ Ibid., 70.

the successful defense as much as a failure of the offense, i.e. just because the attackers may have failed to meet their expectations, does not imply that the defenders failed to surpass theirs.

As for the second part of the dependent variable, extended time and degraded conditions, this is not contested and is obvious from a cursory review of the facts. The defenders were subjected to constant bombardment and harassing fire, survived on meager food and water rations, and lacked most creature comforts for two months.

Assumptions, Scope and Limitations

The object of this study is to evaluate the leadership factors that enabled results which surpassed expectations using one specific historical case study and to determine the applicability of the LRM to the case to determine its efficacy in predicting these same results. Thus, the scope of this study is limited to the Siege of the Alcazar and to the LRM and can only make assertions about the LRM based on the facts at the Siege. As a matter of history, the defenders of the Alcazar were a disparate group of trained and untrained men with experienced and inexperienced junior leadership. They all had their own individual reasons for being at the Alcazar and for deciding to defend it. The men defending the Alcazar were a product of a unique culture and time. The leadership at the Siege, had a raw material and problem set that was necessarily unique. The extent to which the lessons learned from their experience can be applied to contemporary military problems will have to be studied further.

Significance of Study

This study furthers our understanding of how leaders enable organizations to adapt to and overcome extreme adversity and it contributes to an understanding of the scope, limitations and applicability of the LRM. Secondly, it contributes to our understanding of siege warfare, organizational resilience, the mechanics of character formation and the historical episode used as the case study.

Using the Siege of the Alcazar as a case study, this thesis explores and attempts to categorize the actions and attributes of the leadership in order to determine the extent to which they aided in the successful triumph over adversity. These leadership characteristics may be further explored and tested in future studies to determine whether they apply universally or nearly universally with the goal of creating descriptive or prescriptive models which may be used to predict or enable organizational resiliency.

The results of this study will either validate LRM as is, as a means of arriving at the DV or show that the LRM is an insufficient model to explain results beyond expectation. Either way, it will further understanding as to how the Army should develop leaders.

The field of siege warfare, so long neglected, has seen a resurgence recently especially with Syria and Isis in Iraq. Although this study does not analyze the tactical aspects of the siege, knowing something of the psychology of the besieged and the leadership characteristics that lead to successful defense may help contribute to the understanding of siege warfare.

This study is focused on leadership and how it either supports or undermines the resiliency of a particular organization. Current resiliency models and studies largely focus

on individual resilience. This study will provide insight into an area not as widely pursued, namely organizational resilience in a military context. In addition, as this study concludes that the resiliency of an organization depends heavily upon the character of the leaders, and upon the already-formed character of the led, this study contributes at least in a tertiary way to the perennial discussions on the significance of character and, more importantly, how it is developed.

Finally, as there is limited English language analysis of the Siege of the Alcazar. This brief study will contribute to that body of knowledge by aggregating several sources and promoting further study by emphasizing the episode's applicability to understanding a wide range of contemporary challenges.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to give a broad analysis of the various literature available on the subject of this thesis. As this is a case study, comparing a historical case against a modern leadership model, that literature falls into two categories: (1) That bearing on the history (which is further divided into literature devoted to the Spanish Civil War in general, and literature devoted to the Siege of the Alcazar in particular), and (2) that bearing on leadership. This chapter will deal with each category separately and, as such, it is organized into three main sections consisting of an analysis of historical literature, an analysis of leadership literature, and finally, a general summary.

Historical Literature

Accounts of the Siege of the Alcazar

The purpose of this section is to give a broad overview of the literature available on the Siege of the Alcazar, especially that used for this research and to discuss some common themes and limitations of that literature. Primary source material covering the Siege of the Alcazar is scant even in Spanish, in English it is non-existent unless you count various news reports which were of little value for the specific purposes of this study. One of the common complaints about the histories of the Spanish Civil War is that they are all biased. No one is neutral, some are just less biased than others. This is especially evident when studying the Siege of the Alcazar. The event was relatively tactically insignificant, but had huge symbolic implications for both sides. Authors with

Nationalist sympathies tend to stress the abuses of the Republicans, especially the persecutions of clergy. They are sometimes guilty of hagiography, especially of Col. Moscardo. This problem is compounded by two major factors, (1) the Franco regime kept tight control of the history after the war, (2) the Republicans, who were by nature ideologically revolutionary and anti-authoritarian, were not disposed to keeping good records. Authors with Republican sympathies commit the same errors from the opposite side. The results are often that the Siege gets ignored completely, as it was an embarrassment to their side or, they demonize the defenders and make outrageous claims that do not seem to be supported by even the most skeptical readings of the available facts. I have attempted to choose less biased sources when possible and identify biases when not.

Sources

The primary source document for the Siege of the Alcazar is the, “Diario des Operaciones,” written by Col. Moscardo. It is the daily journal which was kept by the Commander throughout the Siege. It is succinct and official in tone; it does not elaborate on the Commander’s inner thoughts and motivations but records in brief outline the significant events of each day. Its value for this study was somewhat limited by Col. Moscardo’s modesty. On the rare occasions that he discusses himself, he does so in the third person.²⁵

²⁵ It is believed by this researcher, although he can find no explicit evidence to support this claim that the “Diario” was actually written by one of his lieutenants and that, as Commander it was attributed to him. This assertion is made because of the use of the third person when referring to the commander.

Two English texts on the Siege of the Alcazar stand out above all others. In fact, all others rely heavily on them. They are *Toledo, 1936 The Epic of the Alcazar*, by MAJ Geoffrey McNeill-Moss²⁶ and, *The Siege of the Alcazar*, by Cecil D. Eby.²⁷

Published in 1937, *Toledo*, can be considered a contemporary document. The author arrived in the town of Toledo just after the siege and researched the book over the next three months. It relies heavily on Moscardo's diary and a series of letters written by one other officer (unnamed) as well as what interviews he was able to get. It is a primarily a day by day account but occasionally breaks from its chronological scheme to offer statistics and explanations. It contains helpful sketches, maps and photographs, but is poorly footnoted. The primary strength of the text, that it was written immediately following the Siege, is also its weakness. The chaos that was part of the environment in Toledo following the Siege meant that some sources that would come to light later, were not available to the author. Further, the sources are almost entirely one-sided, as the Republicans had already retreated and were not available for interviews by the author.

The Siege of the Alcazar, is the predominant source for almost all English language histories written after it. Eby, in turn, relies heavily on McNeill-Moss, but is able to fill in his gaps through further research. One of the most valuable aspects of this book is its detailed notes on and analysis of other sources. Among the resources mentioned by Eby which may be of use to future researchers are:

²⁶ McNeill-Moss.

²⁷ Eby.

El Asedio del Alcazar de Toledo, Major Alfredo Leal (survivor of the siege), the fourth edition of which has Moscardo's logbook, lists of personnel, diagrams etc.

La Epopeya del Alcazar de Toledo, Fr Alberto Risco, which has extensive interviews from survivors.

El Sitio del Alcazar de Toledo, by Arraras and Pozas, which is an anthology with a reprint of Moscardo's *Diario de Operaciones* and excerpts printed from *El Alcazar* (a paper printed by the defenders during the siege).

In addition to these histories, there is a film produced by the Nationalist government in 1940 called, "L'assedio dell'Alcazar." The imagery used is often blatantly propagandist, but as far as has been determined through this research, the key events portrayed are factual.

Themes in the Accounts of the Siege of the Alcazar

There are a few common, if sometimes unstated, themes and theses in all of these histories of the Siege of the Alcazar. These are contradicted only by a few sources, most of which are overtly hostile to the Nationalist side, usually overtly friendly towards communism or socialism, and can be easily dismissed both because of their bias and because they tend to make assertions without citing evidence.²⁸ The common themes are, that the defenders were intrinsically motivated, that they viewed themselves as loyal Spaniards defending against foreign ideologies, that they would rather die than accept the dishonor of surrender. Another, less obvious theme, is that the defenders believed they

²⁸ These sources are not usually scholarly, one possible pseudo-scholarly example, is Robert C. Goldstein, *The Siege of the Alcazar: July-September, 1936 Fascism Defeats Democracy in the Spanish Civil War* (New York: F. Watts, 1972).

would die at the Alcazar. These are important points to this particular study because, if universally true (or nearly so), these same characteristics can be attributed to Col. Moscardo and his Junta and can be used in determining and evaluating their Attributes and Competencies (A&Cs).

As viewed by the outside world, the Siege took on a symbolic significance that far outweighed its tactical importance. For the Nationalists, it took on mythic proportions almost instantly. This characterization can best be summarized in the prologue that introduced the film “L’assedio dell’Alcazar” in Spain and Fascist Italy in 1940.

In Spain, Bolshevism threatened to sink the land into chaos. Then a small group of nationals gathered around General Francisco Franco to fight against the Red Peril. In the final hours, the group was successful in saving Spain from certain destruction by the red hordes.²⁹

Accounts of the Spanish Civil War

The purpose of this section is to give an overview and brief analysis of the sources used for this research, and to discuss common themes. This thesis is centered on one particular battle during the war, thus the accounts of the Spanish Civil War were used merely to provide context. However, this section may be of use to anyone hoping to explore other aspects of the war.

Sources

Literature about the Spanish Civil War is plentiful and usually very biased one way or the other. This study relied heavily on three sources: *The Battle for Spain*, by

²⁹ Marla Stone, “Italian Fascism’s Wartime Enemy and the Politics of Fear,” in *Fear: The History of an Emotion in Global Perspective*, ed. Laffan Michael and Max Weiss (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 120, accessed April 12, 2016, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/carl/detail.action?docID=10583903>.

Antony Beevor; *The Last Crusade*, by Warren Carrol, and *The Spanish Civil War Encyclopedia*, compiled by John Simpink. A brief discussion of each follows.

The Battle for Spain, by Antony Beevor³⁰ is well researched. If there is bias, it is hard to detect.

The Last Crusade,³¹ is extremely biased toward the Nationalist side, with a particular emphasis on the violence done against the Catholic Church by the Republicans. It is a useful book in that Carrol has described the atrocities committed by the Left, which are often bypassed or explained away by other historians. He documents his facts sufficiently and if nothing else, his views are helpful if trying to understand the mindset of the average Nationalist fighter (if there is such a thing).

The Spanish Civil War Encyclopedia,³² is useful because it contains exhaustive firsthand accounts in the form of letters, speeches, diaries etc. It leans heavily on Republican sources, probably in large part due to their availability in English as many of the fighters on the Republican side were English speaking. There are however, many discrepancies within the text, so any statistical citations from the book should be double checked.

³⁰ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1949* (London: Penguin Books, 2006).

³¹ Carroll.

³² John Simpink, *The Spanish Civil War* (Spartacus Educational: 2012), Kindle.

Themes in Historical Accounts of the Spanish Civil War

Unlike the accounts of the Siege, which are nearly unanimous in their praise of heroism and character of the defenders, histories of the Spanish Civil War are disparate in their theses. Broadly speaking, a commonality can be found in the characterization of the war as a dress rehearsal for World War II. The Nationalists were directly supported by Hitler and Mussolini, the Republicans by the Soviet Union, and the involvement of those powers escalated or extended the war, or both. To the extent that it escalated the war can be plainly seen. To the extent that it extended the war can be argued, and is.

Where there is divergence of theses, it is usually in the characterization of the two sides. On the one side, the narrative (which has become the dominate narrative) is that Franco was cut from the same cloth as Mussolini and Hitler, that his victory was a victory for brutal fascist totalitarianism over the progressive forces of democracy. On the other side, the narrative is that the Republican government was a puppet of the Soviet Union, who had manipulated the elections of 1936 and were bent on re-creating Spain in the image a communist “utopia.” There are, of course, middle narratives that recognize truth and error in both of the former narratives.

These arguments are important to this study-insofar as they give an idea of how the combatants may have viewed themselves and the enemy or are helpful in making hindsight generalizations about their motivations.

Leadership

This section is primarily limited to discussion of the major themes and theses of three sources relied upon heavily for this research. Those sources are (1) Army doctrine:

ADP 6-22 and ADRP 6-22³³ (2) An MMAS thesis titled, “Competent, Confident and Agile? A Study of the U.S. Army Leadership Requirements Model and Its Application for U.S. Army Company Commanders,” written by Captain Alexander Jankov, of the Norwegian Army in 2011;³⁴ and (3) a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS) thesis titled, “Emotional Intelligence Competencies and the Army Leadership Requirements Model,” written by Major Tanekkia M. Taylor-Clark in 2015.³⁵ The Army’s doctrine will be covered in one sub-section, the two master’s theses in another.

Army Leadership Doctrine

The focus of this paper is not aimed at Army Leadership doctrine as a whole, but focuses on the Leadership Requirements Model (LRM). The ADP/ADRP 6-22 Series on Army Leadership introduces the LRM and provides its context. The ADP gives a broad overview of Army Leadership philosophy, the ADRP is more detailed. Definitions for each of the categories and sub-categories on the LRM are given in the ADRP and are discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis. The broader topic of this study, namely the exercise of leadership under adverse conditions, is addressed in Chapter 9, “Leadership in Practice” of ADRP 6-22.

³³ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012); Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

³⁴ Alexander Jankov, “Competent, Confident and Agile? A Study of the U.S. Army Leadership Requirements Model and Its Application for U.S. Army Company Commander” (Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2011).

³⁵ Tanekkia M. Taylor-Clark, “Emotional Intelligence and the Army Leadership Requirements Model” (Master’s thesis Command and General Staff College, 2015).

ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, introduces the LRM:

The Leadership Requirements Model conveys the expectations that the Army wants leaders to meet. A common model of leadership shows how different types of leaders work together and is useful for aligning leader development activities and personnel management practices and systems. One set of requirements consists of attributes of what leaders should be and know and the second is a set of competencies that the Army requires leaders to do. The single model organizes the disparate requirements and expectations of leaders at all levels of leadership.³⁶

This paragraph makes several claims that are discussed in this research, those claims are (1) that the LRM shows how different types of leaders work together, (2) that the LRM is useful in aligning leader development activities; (3) that the LRM applies to all levels of leadership. These are bold claims, and there is a red flag, noticed by this researcher, with at least the second claim. That is, that since the LRM is descriptive in nature (describing what leadership looks like) instead of being prescriptive (a how-to model), it is hard to support the claim that is useful tool for doing anything aside from describing and perhaps evaluating leadership. Commenting on an earlier but similar model used by the Army (the Army Leadership Model of FM 22-100), LTC David J. Smith in a U.S. Army Strategy Research Project paper written for the Army War College in 2000, makes the same criticism.³⁷ He goes on to recommend that the Army incorporate a more prescriptive approach such as that used by Franklin Covey. This recommendation, apparently, was not heeded. Similar criticisms about the current model were made in the two MMAS theses discussed below. In defense of the LRM, it might be noted that the

³⁶ Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, 5.

³⁷ David J. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army, "The Army and Franklin Covey Leadership Models: A Comparison" (Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2000), 9.

LRM is not a stand-alone document, it is a model for which the two manuals provide background, further context and descriptions. However, again echoing the criticisms of LTC Smith, it quickly becomes a list of lists which continue to describe what a leader looks like, but is not of much value in prescribing how he gets there.

The LRM does not speak specifically to the circumstances explored in this thesis, i.e. enabling performance through harsh conditions over an extended time. However, Chapter 9 of ADRP 6-22 does address these circumstances briefly under a subheading “Combat and Operational Stress.”³⁸ The section stresses the importance of mitigating the effects of psychological trauma by “taking positive action to reduce combat and operational stress” throughout “all phases of force projection.”³⁹ However, this section is surprisingly underdeveloped. Aside from suggesting realistic training before the fact and providing access to operational stress control teams/behavioral health etc. after the fact, it gives little in the way of concrete advice. In the concluding sentences of the section, it is asserted that:

Leader competence, confidence, agility, courage and resilience helps units persevere and field workable solutions to tough problems. The Warrior Ethos and resilience mobilize the ability to forge success out of chaos to overcome fear, hunger, deprivation and fatigue to accomplish the mission.⁴⁰

Interestingly, the above list is entirely attribute-based. Throughout the section, competencies are addressed indirectly if at all.

³⁸ Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, paras 9-22–9-28.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, para 9-24.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para 9-26.

Further, FM 6-22 usually puts stress and the ability to handle stress within the context of personal attributes. It mentions the ability to handle stress as an individual performance measure.⁴¹ It mentions the ability to reduce stress as an performance measure and makes mention of reducing stress in several places but there is little concrete advice on how this should be done or any in depth analysis on how to endure long term combat stress.

There are two noticeable gaps or shortfalls in how the doctrine addresses the specific phenomena explored in this thesis. First, there is very little insight given which would help the leader understand individual and collective effects of adverse conditions.⁴² Second, there is minimal guidance given about what leaders should do during combat (as opposed to before or after) to mitigate the effects of extreme adversity.

Critiques of LRM

Given the bold claims made about the LRM in Army doctrine, and the emphasis that the Army places on leadership and leader development in general, there is a surprising lack of research available on the LRM specifically. Among the few research documents found, are two Command and General Staff College theses. One is Jankov's thesis of 2006, the other is Taylor-Clark's thesis of 2015. The primary arguments and significance of each as related to this research are discussed below.

⁴¹ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Leader Development* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), table 6-2, 7-2.

⁴² The only obvious exception is in paragraph 9-27 which essentially says that fear can paralyze, and that seeing friends die makes Soldiers aware of their own mortality. Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, para 9-27.

In “Competent, Confident and Agile? A Study of the U.S. Army Leadership Requirements Model and Its Application for U.S. Army Company Commander” CPT Jankov does a thorough review of the LRM as it applies to direct level leaders and suggests that the LRM should be re-written to address the different levels of leadership directly. He also makes a broader argument criticizing the mechanics of how the Army’s leadership doctrine is presented and taught. Furthermore, he proposes that Mission Command be used as the lens through which all other Army doctrinal leadership models are developed and interpreted.⁴³ In short, Jankov makes the case that in its attempt to remain broad and timeless, the LRM ceases to be practical.⁴⁴ He demonstrates this lack of practicality by showing a lack of correlation between the attributes and competencies (A&Cs) of the LRM and the “real world” actions and values of a polled population of officers who recently served as company commanders.

Of significance to this study, was Jankov’s assertion that broad and timeless equals impracticality. One of the difficulties this researcher has encountered, is the fact that the broadness of the terms used in the LRM makes its use as a tool for case study analysis extremely subjective. This fact alone is not enough to warrant criticism of the LRM, but if the LRM is intended to be a prescriptive and practical guide as well as a marker by which leaders are evaluated then perhaps the criticism that it is overly broad and not easily quantifiable is well founded.

⁴³ Jankov, 76.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 73.

In “Emotional Intelligence Competencies and the Army Leadership Requirements Model,” Major Taylor-Clark explores the correlation between emotional intelligence as described in various models, and the A&Cs of the LRM. Her conclusion is that the LRM fails to explicitly incorporate fundamental aspects of emotional intelligence shown through research to correlate with or predict successful leadership, and that as a consequence of this gap, Army leadership doctrine and Army leader development lacks the specificity needed to “make good leaders great.”⁴⁵ This criticism echoes the criticism of Jankov and further validates the initial instincts of this researcher in that the LRM, being overly broad, does not lend itself to ease of use as a practical and subjective tool for evaluation (as in evaluation reports, or case study analysis) or as a guide for behavior and development.

Of particular significance to this study, were Taylor-Clark’s methodology which served as a rough model for this research, and her work showing how the various A&Cs described within the LRM translate into established descriptors of various facets of emotional intelligence.

Summary

This chapter has discussed the historical literature related to the Spanish Civil War and the Siege of the Alcazar as well as the literature pertaining to the LRM which was called upon directly or indirectly in the course of this research. The primary historical sources are limited but in combination with secondary sources, there is adequate information available for determining the nature of the leadership at the Siege

⁴⁵ Taylor-Clark, 73, 78.

and for understanding the broader context of the events. The leadership literature described in this chapter is limited to the Army leadership doctrine and a few key studies which examine that doctrine in general and the LRM in particular. The doctrine seems to make a case that the LRM is a sort of Swiss-Army-Knife of leadership models, in that it can be used at all levels and for multiple practical purposes. The researchers cited in this chapter however, generally make the claim that although the LRM may be of use in describing the “what” of leadership, it is not useful in describing the “how”.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methodology used in this thesis. This chapter consists of this introduction (which includes a review of the problem), an overview of the two methods used for evaluation, a more detailed explanation of the each method, a discussion about validity, and a summary.

The problem, as stated in chapter 1 and summarized here is that military organizations may be called upon in the future, as they have in the past, to perform beyond expectations for long periods of time under extremely degraded conditions. In order to best prepare for that eventuality, we need to understand what contributes to the ability to fight and win under those conditions. This particular thesis uses a historical case, the Siege of the Alcazar, and examines the leadership demonstrated at the Siege.

Case Study Methodology

There are three preeminent theorists in the field of case study research: Robert Yin, Sherran Merriam and Robert Stake. Their approaches have been ably summarized in “The Qualitative Report” by Bedrettin Yazan. Generally, Yin is an advocate of a regimented approach highly reliant on quantitative data points and meta-analysis for reaching logical, almost mathematical, conclusions. Merriam and Stake, although they

differ from one another in details, advocate a more organic approach with an emphasis on intuition and experience.⁴⁶

According to Yin, case studies (to include historical case studies) fall into three broad categories: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. There is usually overlap between the three.⁴⁷ Exploratory case studies involve initial exploration into a particular phenomenon and serve as preludes to additional research. Descriptive case studies describe phenomena against contextual backdrops, they gather information without manipulating the environment but usually involve a theory to help guide the research process.⁴⁸ Explanatory case studies attempt to discover how or why something happened.

One important convergence between the three case study theorists is in their ideas about validation. Again, the theories are complex and nuanced but in general terms they seem to agree on validating through triangulation—the use of multiple methods, sources, and critics etc. to ensure external and internal validity.

The methodology used in this particular case study is Stakian in nature in that it relies a great deal on making common sense and intuitive assumptions. This is not a critique of Yin’s methods, but a function of the reality of the case—the data is not available to do a more quantitative analysis. In short, the method here is to use the

⁴⁶ Bedrettin Yazan, “Three Approaches to Case Study Methods in Education: Yin, Merriam, and Stake,” *The Qualitative Report* 20, no. 2 (April 2015): 134-52, accessed January 25, 2016, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR20/2/yazan1.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Robert Stinson, “Braxton Bragg on Leadership: A Historical Case Study on Leader-Member Exchange in the Army of Tennessee” (diss., University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, 2013), 1-3, accessed January 25, 2016, <http://scholar.utc.edu/theses/403/>.

⁴⁸ Office of Research Integrity, “Case Example for Descriptive Studies,” accessed January 25, 2016, <https://ori.hhs.gov/education/products/sdsu/index.html>.

researcher as a tool to interpret data, identify patterns and themes and make-meaning and then to make recommendations based on the analysis.

Method of Analysis

This research can be logically divided into two main parts. The first part is related to characterizing the leadership exhibited at the Siege of the Alcazar by Col. Moscardo and his Junta. The second part is a comparison of that leadership with the A&Cs required by the LRM. Each of these parts uses a different methodology, the first is inductive and qualitative, and the second is deductive and also primarily qualitative.

Research theory is a field which goes beyond the scope of this paper, however, it is necessary to explain how this research has incorporated and interpreted key aspects of that theory. Briefly, the primary distinction between inductive methodology and deductive methodology is that inductive begins with facts, asks questions, and generates theories while deductive methodology begins with theories and validates or invalidates them based on facts. While qualitative and quantitative analysis may be used by either method, qualitative analysis is typically associated with inductive methodology and quantitative analysis is more often associated with deductive methodology. However, because of the nature of this particular case study, both methodologies will rely on the researcher to do qualitative analysis.

Inductive Analysis

The inductive method of research begins with a question, examines facts and generates theories. In this case, the question is: What leadership factors contribute to the ability of military organizations to surpass expectations in degraded environments for

extended periods of time? The data used to answer that question are the varying accounts of the Siege of the Alcazar as compiled by the researcher.

The resulting theory derived from the inductive analysis of the data is further explained in chapter 4, but briefly it is that leaders must be able to address the spiritual, social, and physical needs of the unit and be able to adequately address the tactical problem at hand. These four categories yield a model.

In chapter 4, the model derived from the inductive analysis serves as a means of deductively analyzing the LRM. It also serves as a means of organizing, presenting and supporting the results of the inductive analysis. In other words, for clarity and brevity, the results of the inductive analysis are presented in reverse order. The model was the result of a holistic look at the data but will be used as a starting point to re-present that data.

Deductive Analysis

Deductive analysis begins with a theory, model, or hypothesis, asks questions, interprets data and either validates or invalidates the theory based on that data. In this case, the research is aimed at determining whether or not the LRM adequately accounts for those leadership qualities which are necessary to lead military organizations to surpass expectations in degraded environments for extended periods of time.

In order to validate or invalidate the LRM as a tool for achieving these results, this analysis does two things. First, it evaluates the leadership exhibited at the Alcazar using the LRM as a measurement. Second, it evaluates the LRM against the model derived from the inductive research. If the leadership at the Alcazar adequately exhibits the LRM's A&Cs, then we can deduce that it is a useful model. However, if the LRM fails to account for certain significant actions deemed by the interpretation of the

inductive research to be necessary, (i.e. it does not correspond with the model derived by the inductive research), then we can know that the LRM is insufficient.

The dependent variable (DV)⁴⁹ in this study is the performance of an organization (the defenders of the Alcazar) beyond expectations, for an extended period of time (65 days) under degraded conditions (constant threat, lack of food, etc.).

The independent variable (IV)⁵⁰ is the leadership of the Junta (Col Moscardó and his lieutenants). Specifically, the attributes and competencies exhibited by them during the defense of the Alcazar.

The Hypothesis (H1): The A&Cs described in the LRM are sufficient to describe the leader characteristics needed to get organizations to perform beyond expectations.

Null Hypothesis (H0): The A&Cs described in the LRM do not sufficiently explain getting organizations to perform beyond expectations.

As a part of the analysis the IV is “manipulated” by contrasting it to the Army’s LRM and applying deductive reasoning to determine the significance of any divergence between the two. This is done in two mutually supporting ways. First, the IV is graded using the LRM as a measuring stick. The leadership at the Alcazar is scored on a scale of (-2) to (+2) according to how strongly they displayed each attribute or competency described by the LRM. Second the LRM is compared to the model derived from the inductive research. Any discrepancies between the two models will be evaluated.

⁴⁹ The dependent variable is that which depends on the independent variable, i.e. it is the result. “Variables,” Research Methods Knowledge Base, accessed May 5, 2016, <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/variable.php>.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

If the divergence between the LRM and the Junta's leadership is significant then we cannot reject the null hypothesis. If however the convergence is overwhelming and there is no significant divergence between the A&Cs displayed by Moscardo and his Junta and the LRM, the null hypothesis may be rejected and the LRM stands, at least in this particular case, as a sufficient means of explaining the attributes and competencies needed to arrive at the DV.

Validity and Limitations

Broadly, there are two primary dangers to the validity of this study: (1) the sample—the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data used; (2) the subjective nature of the analysis. In order to mitigate those dangers, the study uses as wide a spectrum of source documents as possible, and uses multiple methods of analysis. However, because the case used happened in 1936 and much of the source material is either in Spanish or is inaccessible, or was not written specifically for answering the questions posed in this research, and because the methodology ultimately relies on the interpretations of the researcher, extant danger to validity remains.

This study is limited in that it explores only one historical episode as its case model. Therefore, in the end, the conclusions can only serve as a starting point. Universal applicability cannot be demonstrated without further research.

Summary

The primary purpose, of this study is to determine the leadership characteristics necessary to enable organizations to perform beyond expectation under degraded conditions. This is the Dependent Variable (DV). The secondary purpose is to determine

the validity of the LRM in enabling the same results. These ends are met using two different but mutually supporting methods. The inductive analysis method is used to answer the primary purpose. The deductive analysis method is used to answer the secondary purpose. The results of this study will either support the Army's use of the LRM as it stands or will suggest ways it could be improved. Either way, this study will contribute to our body of knowledge on how to lead organizations through tough times to victory, i.e. what a leader does or should do when the situation seems hopeless.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine what leadership factors contribute to an organization's ability to perform beyond expectations under extremely degraded conditions for extended periods of time and, secondarily, to determine whether the A&Cs delineated in the LRM correlate with those leadership factors.

This chapter is organized into an introduction (which includes a review of the research questions and a summary of the conclusions derived from the research), two main sections, and a final summary of the analysis. Section 1 is an inductive analysis of the leadership at the Alcazar using the historical data, Section 2 is a deductive analysis of the LRM using the results of the first section.

Review of Research Questions

The Primary Research Question

What leadership factors contribute to the ability of military organizations to surpass expectations in degraded environments for extended periods of time? This will be a case study of the successful defense of the Alcazar of Toledo in 1936.

The Secondary Research Questions

1. Can the LRM adequately account for the results at the Alcazar? Are there any behaviors or values demonstrated by Col. Moscardo and his leadership team (the Junta) that directly contradict those called for by ADRP 6-22? Or, are there values and behaviors called for by ADRP 6-22 that the Junta would

reject? Are there leadership behaviors or values demonstrated by the Junta that are not explicit or implicit in the LRM?

2. Do the facts at the Alcazar demonstrate leadership factors which might be further explored in modifying or understanding the LRM?
3. What implications are there for the way we train and select leaders today?

Summary of Conclusion

This research yielded a rough model containing four categories of leadership factors demonstrated at the Alcazar which were needed to enable the unit to perform through adversity over a long period of time. It revealed that there is a shortfall in the LRM's ability to account for all of these factors, and it revealed that the LRM's practicality suffers from its intrinsic ambiguity. These findings along with some general comments on some of the unique aspects of the case study used in this thesis are discussed below.

Those leadership factors that contribute to the ability of military organizations to surpass expectations in degraded environments for extended periods of time, as exhibited in this case study of the siege of the Alcazar, are the ability to appeal to three components of the human dynamic and to the tactical dynamic. The three components of the human dynamic are (1) the Noble (Spiritual), (2) the Social, (3) the Animal. These three dynamics are not original. They roughly correspond with the components of morale

(spiritual, intellectual, material) as laid out by Field Marshall Slim and were, according to Slim, key to maintaining a fighting spirit.⁵¹ Morale, according to Slim was:

that intangible force which will move a whole group of men to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves.⁵²

His components of Morale are discussed in more detail and with examples in the inductive analysis portion of this chapter.

The tactical component of the Four Dynamics refers simply to the physics of the military situation. Although these categories may be similar to existing models, the research which produced them was not done deductively (beginning with a theory) but inductively (beginning by observation of the facts) and the categories were developed by the researcher through analysis and correspond with Field Marshall Slim's components of morale.

The primary shortfall of the LRM in describing the leadership factors demonstrated at the Alcazar is its inability to adequately address the spiritual component of the human dynamic. This same shortfall was also noticed by LTC David J. Smith in his comparison of the Army Leadership Model circa 2000.⁵³ LTC Smith suggests that the spiritual aspect of the human dynamic be recognized and included in Army leadership

⁵¹ Frederick Baillergeon, "Field Marshall William Slim and the Power of Leadership" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 69.

⁵² Field Marshall Viscount William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India 1942-1945* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 182.

⁵³ David J. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army, "The Army and Franklin Covey Leadership Models: A Comparison" (Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2000), 15.

doctrine. Although he was commenting on an earlier form of Army doctrine, his critique still holds true. Like LTC Smith, this researcher recognizes the controversial nature of the suggestion, but maintains the opinion that it can and should be further studied and considered as a leadership factor.

Additionally, the LRM's efficacy as a prescriptive or evaluative tool is compromised by its intrinsic ambiguity and subjectivity. This subject has been treated somewhat in the literary review portion of this thesis. Bluntly put, there is a case to be made that because the descriptors used in the LRM are largely subjective, they can be loosely made to fit or made not to fit almost any leader, depending on the interpretations of the evaluator. Further, because the descriptors are meant to apply broadly, they do not serve as a meaningful how-to. This problem is not sufficiently mitigated by the larger context of the 6-22 ADP/ADRP series. However, it is not the contention of this researcher that the LRM be discarded as a model because of its ambiguity. The LRM is meant to be a generalizable model, it may be enough to simply know its limitations and if more objective prescriptive models are needed they can be developed and integrated into Army doctrine as supplements to the LRM.

The following conclusions were not derived from a formal part of the analysis but are broad observations which became apparent to the researcher in the course of the study. Briefly, the character of the led matters just as much as the character of the leader.⁵⁴ In the particular case of the Alcazar, the defenders had a pre-existing level of

⁵⁴ Sharon Latour and Vicki Rast, "Dynamic Followership the Prerequisite for Leadership," Gov Leaders.org, accessed May 3, 2016, <http://govleaders.org/dynamic-followership.htm>.

character that provided the raw material necessary for the Junta to lead them through adversity. This assertion is made based on the following premises: (1) that the defenders, like anyone else, were largely formed by their individual histories,⁵⁵ (2) that no amount of leadership could have been successful had it not had sufficient raw material upon which to work.⁵⁶ This is of the utmost importance when considering how the lessons of this research might be applied today as it implies that great leadership works to mobilize the latent power of character. The character of the led is prerequisite. The extent to which the character of the defenders represents an intervening variable which may undermine the arguments within this thesis must be addressed. In short, because this study seeks to determine those leadership factors which led to the success at the Alcazar, the character of the defenders can be considered a part of the environment. Whether the same leadership characteristics would be equally successful given a different set of circumstances is a matter for further research and will be discussed only peripherally here

The job of leadership then, is to (1) develop and refine character before the crucible, (2) to sustain that character against the spiritual, intellectual and material attacks which occur during the crucible, and (3) apply the appropriate tactical expertise to the military problem. This is in keeping with the Army's approach of applied leadership throughout all phases of the force projection process that is emphasized throughout the 6-22 series.

⁵⁵ Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, para 3-5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para 2-1.

As pre-existing character is the given raw material upon which leadership must work, the particular character of the defenders at the Alcazar should be explored and compared in broad terms to what the contemporary leader will face. The problem of developing character today is different from that of Spain in the 1930s. If we subscribe, to Aristotelian virtue ethics theory, then character is developed through practice as a part of a culture.⁵⁷ The defenders of the Alcazar were raised in a culture whose values were shaped by a distinctly Catholic world view.⁵⁸ Soldiers of today are raised in a much more pluralistic society.⁵⁹ The leadership at the Alcazar could make assumptions about the values held by their soldiers that leaders today cannot make. The Catholic worldview which was common to the defenders at the Alcazar emphasized collective responsibility (solidarity is a tenet of Catholic social justice)⁶⁰ and embraced suffering as a path toward individual and collective sanctification. It also stressed obedience to proper authority, and asserted the real existence of non-material reality including objective right and wrong. Its practice required individual discipline and the ordering of human passion.⁶¹ Although we

⁵⁷ Joe Sachs, "Aristotle," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed April 28, 2016, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-eth/>.

⁵⁸ McNeill-Moss, 19.

⁵⁹ Brian Koyn, "Religious Participation: The Missing Link in the Ready Resilient Campaign," *Military Review* 95, no. 5 (September-October 2015): 122.

⁶⁰ Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, ed., *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd ed. (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2013), under "paragraph 361," accessed April 21, 2016, <http://ccc.usccb.org/flipbooks/catechism/index.html#110>.

⁶¹ Jason King, "Catholic Moral Theology: Commentary on the Catechism," October 20, 2011, accessed April 28, 2016, <http://catholicmoraltheology.com/catechism-post-passions/>.

live in a pluralistic society, it may be argued in broad terms that its general inclinations are antithetical to some of the values listed above. That is, that there is an emphasis on the individual, questioning authority is lauded, there is a tendency to avoid and disdain suffering, and the existence of an objective reality beyond the material is questioned. Passions are meant to be indulged and right and wrong are subjective.⁶² The problem of how a leader of today is to inculcate common values and develop character and then sustain that character through adversity is more than can be fairly treated in this thesis. However, the Army has decided what those values should be and has written them down in ADRP 1, *The Army Profession*. They are also encapsulated in the attributes of the LRM. One of the unavoidable conclusions of this study is that if we mean to successfully lead military units through adversity over long periods of time, those values must be ingrained in our soldiers.

Inductive Analysis of the Siege

The approach (and its limitations and justifications) used for this portion of the analysis, is detailed in chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis. In short, the research was conducted inductively; it begins with data and derives a theory. That is, through reading the multiple accounts of the siege, certain leadership attributes and competencies were drawn from the facts of the case and were synthesized into a coherent and original model that the researcher has coined “The Four Dynamics of Military Leadership.” This model is

⁶² Jan Joseph Herchold, “Alasdair Macintyre's Rejection of Liberal Modernity, in the Academia,” accessed April 28, 2016, <https://independent.academia.edu/>.

similar but not identical to Field Marshall William Slim's theory on the components of morale.

This inductive analysis portion of the thesis is organized into three sub-sections. The first section explains the model which was derived from a holistic look at the data. The second section lists certain general observations pulled from the data, interprets those observations, then gives the conclusions drawn from the interpretations. The third section is the summary of the findings. The data itself consists of the multiple historical sources used throughout the course of this study which are summarized in the analysis.

The Four Dynamics of Military Leadership

As the model and its categories are discussed throughout this analysis, this section introduces and explains the model. The Four Dynamics of Military Leadership model which was derived from the inductive analysis comprises four broad categories:

1. Appeals to the Noble (Spiritual) –those actions or character attributes which build or sustain within the individual a high sense of purpose. This category has a dual nature in that it includes intangible values that are considered higher than self which are both religious (such as duty to God) and secular (such as patriotism, and honor).

2. Appeals to the Social—those actions which build or sustain a sense of duty to or belonging within the unit. To some extent the concepts (such as duty to country, family, etc.) appealed to may overlap with appeals noble, but is, nonetheless distinct, as it has more to do with the structures themselves than concepts of higher purpose. Lord Moran,

in his book, *An Anatomy of Courage*, calls this a “religion of the regiment,”⁶³ but more specifically when used here, it refers to the maintenance of general military discipline, law and order and reinforces social bonds. It also refers to actions which build or sustain a belief that the leadership is acting in the best interest of the individuals within the unit and actions that instill confidence in the possibility of successful mission accomplishment.

3. Appeals to the Animal—simply the maintenance of physical needs and, as far as possible, provision for physical comforts.

4. Appeals to the Tactical—the application of military art and science to the tactical problem. In the case of the Alcazar this would be the defense of a strong point with a given supply of troops, weapons and ammunition against a numerically superior assaulting force.

Table 2. The Four Dynamics of Military Leadership	
Noble (Spiritual): Purpose higher than self, duty to God, appeals to virtue (pertains to human spirit and formal religion) of the individual.	Social: The social needs of the human person with a group.
Animal: Meeting the physical needs and wants.	Tactical: The military art and science, skillful application of force.

Source: Created by Author.

⁶³ Lord Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage: the Classic WWI Account of the Psychological Effects of War* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 154.

Though this model created by the researcher based on observations of the leadership at the Alcazar, its purpose within this analysis is to repackage the data and present the conclusions of the inductive analysis in a coherent manner, as well as to provide a template against which to evaluate the LRM during the deductive analysis.

The strength of this model is its focus on effects. Whereas the LRM focuses on two separate domains: what a leader is (the attributes), and what a leader does (the competencies), this model is used to describe and categorize the results of both. It incorporates both domains of the LRM in an effort to determine how the leadership's character and decisions affected the various dynamics of those they led. Working the other way, this model can begin with observed effects, categorize them and make conclusions about what leadership factors led to those effects. Further, this model can also be used to describe the effects or intended effects of the enemy. In fact, at least in the case of the Alcazar, it is much easier to categorize the dynamic against which each enemy action was directed than it is to categorize some of the decisions made by the Junta. The focus on effects is important because the data available about the Alcazar is largely written in those terms. The data amounts to a narrative or series of narratives mainly describing effects and results.

On the other hand, the two domains of Animal and Tactical may be at odds with the Noble or Social. For example, it may make tactical sense to order troops to do something that violates their sense of justice (part of the Noble dynamic). In particular, at the Alcazar, it would have made sense on an animal level to feed the non-combatants or hostages less than the soldiers who, presumably, had need for more sustenance but this would have offended aspects of both the Social and the Noble dynamics.

Though this model was developed inductively, to help explain and categorize the data of this particular case study, it does have similarities with other leadership theories. In particular, the Four Dynamics model bears a striking resemblance to Field Marshall Slim's philosophy on the foundation of morale which, for Slim had three components: the spiritual, the intellectual and the physical.⁶⁴

Inasmuch as the Four Dynamics model is similar to the theory of Field Marshall Slim on morale, the validity of the model derived from this research may be tied to the validity of Field Marshall Slim's ideas. The validity of his theory was put to the test during the Burma-India campaign of World War II under conditions that bear resemblance in terms of austerity and hardship to the conditions at the Alcazar. Briefly, Field Marshall Slim took a multi-national, under equipped, under trained corps and transformed them into a formidable fighting force that eventually repulsed the attempted Japanese attack into India and defeated the Japanese Army in Burma.⁶⁵

There are a few nuanced differences between the Four Dynamics model and Field Marshall Slim's theory but, on the whole, they agree. Slims spiritual category and the Four Dynamic's Noble (Spiritual) roughly correspond but there is a nuanced difference. Slim does not use the word spiritual in a religious sense, but to refer to higher purpose;⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Baillergeon, 69.

⁶⁵ Scott Porter, "Leadership in Multi-National Operations: Slim in Burma" (lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012), accessed April 28, 2016, https://cgsc.blackboard.com/webapps/blackboard/content/listContent.jsp?course_id=_5128_1&content_id=_346178_1.

⁶⁶ Baillergeon, 69.

the Four Dynamics' definition is broadened to include religion.⁶⁷ His intellectual category, when broken down, fits squarely in the Social category of the Four Dynamics,⁶⁸ Field Marshall Slim lumps into the physical what the Four Dynamics model separates into Tactical and Animal.

Observations and Analysis of the Data

Exhibit A: Character of Colonel Moscardo (Noble and Social)

Col. Moscardo's character and role in the defense as characterized in the, *L'assedio dell'Alcazar*, are summarized as follows:

At the top of the patriarchy stands Colonel Moscardo, shepherd to the flock of besieged, who leads with faith and the knowledge that God will bring "our own" (Franco's Troops).⁶⁹

From the data available to this researcher, it is observed that this characterization is not far from the truth.

The words Col. Moscardo gave to his son as he refused to surrender the Alcazar to save him from execution "commend your soul to God, shout viva Espana (and die like a man),"⁷⁰ exemplify those nobler values for which the defenders of the Alcazar fought.

⁶⁷ For the defenders at the Alcazar, religion was part of their higher purpose. Thus it is included in the Four Dynamics model.

⁶⁸ Ibid. LTG Slim's intellectual category is broken down into (1) an attainable object, (2) the knowledge that the unit is capable and working to that object, (3) Confidence in leadership.

⁶⁹ Stone, 120.

⁷⁰ "*encomendara su alma a Dios si llegara el caso y diera un Viva España muy fuerte*" this line is taken directly from a hand-written letter written by Col. Moscardo to his wife dated July 25, 1936. It was found among the papers of his daughter Marichu Moscardo. The parenthetical is added by this researcher but based upon other accounts of

Col. Moscardo was a devoutly religious man with a high sense of duty to his country. He was able to empathize with his men but was not always able to inspire them on a direct level. His military career before and after the siege reveals a man who was of average ability as a tactician. He was “a tall, reserved, gentle-mannered man; a little awkward, rather punctilious; happy enough with the few people he knew well, but shy in company. He had a strict sense of duty. He was religious. In a nation where most were slack, he was exact.”⁷¹ He is otherwise described in Eby’s history as “none too bright and certainly not stable” a “blimpish . . . myopic anachronism” that lacked the ambition and expertise needed to further his military career, and the political savvy to navigate the troubled times he was in. He was prone to speak his mind to anyone who would listen and therefore his political views were well known. The fact that he was allowed to maintain his position as the Director of the Army’s School of Physical Education, speaks to the disregard that the Republican Government had for him. He was more interested in coaching soccer than in military training and was not considered a threat.⁷² Following the siege, he was made a General. His performance throughout the rest of the war was lackluster, he maintained a reputation as a kindly but slightly inept grandfather-type; he maintained a fondness for his men that sometimes manifested as lax disciplinary action.⁷³

the conversation, many of which contain this or similar wording. The translation is dynamic (as opposed to literal) and is made by the author. The original can be seen on various websites to include elalcazar.info, “Correspondencia,” <http://elalcazar.info/correspondencia>.

⁷¹ McNeill-Moss, 26.

⁷² Eby, 9, 15-16.

⁷³ Ibid., 222.

The conclusions drawn from these observations is that Col. Moscardo's value to the defense of the Alcazar was primarily on an organizational level and appealed to the Noble and Social aspects of the human dynamic. What he may have lacked in social intelligence or tactical ability, he left for his subordinates. He was an inspirational icon—a personification of the noble. His nobility, and in particular his self-sacrifice inspired a sense of duty and obedience among those he led—an appeal to the Social. They could not be seen by their peers to shirk responsibility after their leader had sacrificed so much.

Exhibit B: The Delay and Declaration of War (Social and Tactical)

The decision to delay the announcement of the declaration of war against the government that was made by Col. Moscardo, at the advice of his Junta, along with the manner in which he executed the decision, the actions taken by the defense during the delay and the eventual declaration of war all appeal to the social and tactical dynamics of military leadership. Col. Moscardo wished to make an immediate declaration of war but was urged by his Junta to delay this announcement until absolutely necessary so that preparations could be made for the defense of the Alcazar. Col. Moscardo held the officials who were demanding he turn over the arms and ammunition in Toledo to the government in Madrid at bay for 48 hours by citing irregularities in the orders. Meanwhile, his Junta worked to shore up the defenses and secure all available food and ammunition within the Alcazar. Finally, when further delay was no longer feasible, Col. Moscardo refused the orders directly saying that it would be dishonorable to turn over the weapons of the gentlemen under his command to “red rabble” in Madrid. He then ordered

a formal declaration of war to be read publicly and with all military ceremony in the center of the town of Toledo.⁷⁴

From these actions it is observed that (1) Col. Moscardo trusted the advice of his subordinates and felt a duty toward them which superseded his personal desire to make his motives public—appeals to the Social Dynamic. (2) That the leadership of the Alcazar was intent on gaining every advantage for the eventual defense of the Alcazar—the Tactical Dynamic and (3) in the formal declaration of war, that that the leadership placed a value on military order and discipline—the Social Dynamic.

Exhibit C: The Ransom (Noble, Social)

Early in the Siege, Col. Moscardo received a phone call from the leader of the Republican forces in Toledo. They informed him that they had arrested his son and that they would execute them if the Alcazar did not surrender immediately. There are varying accounts of the exact conversation but the bottom line was that Col. Moscardo refused the surrender.⁷⁵ What this decision says about his character and how it bolstered his status and reputation has already been discussed in Exhibit A. Here, we will look at the same incident from a different angle to determine how the leadership at the Alcazar used it to have further impact on two of the four dynamics. This incident not only set Col. Moscardo up as a man of honor and self-sacrifice, it was used in conjunction with other

⁷⁴Ibid., 49.

⁷⁵ Various accounts of the conversation which occurred on 23 July 1936 have been put forth, and some historians have attempted to deny that the conversation took place. Various evidence and testimony regarding the conversation has been compiled at elalcazar.org, “Louis Moscardo,” accessed May 17, 2016, <http://elalcazar.org/Louis%20Moscardo>.

incidents to demonize the enemy. It was the job of the leadership at the Alcazar to ensure that the defenders understood that they were not just fighting for something—that was noble—but that they were fighting against something that was ignoble. In threatening the life of an innocent family member, the Republican side played into the hands of the Junta’s internal information operations campaign. The data available to this researcher is not clear on how and in what context the ransom conversation was conveyed to those at the Alcazar, but it is fairly clear that word got around quickly and that the two themes that emerged from the incident were (1) Col. Moscardo is honorable, and (2) that the Republicans were a bunch of savages. The second theme was reinforced by other incidents (discussed as separate exhibits below) and was pounced upon by the defenders. We see evidence of how pervasive this theme was, in some of the accounts of the jeers that were shouted from the windows of the Alcazar to the Republican militias that had surrounded them.

The conclusions drawn from these observations, is that themes and messages that demonize the enemy can be just as important in appealing to the Noble and Social dynamics as positive messaging about your own side. You cannot fight for something without fighting against something. Sometimes what you are you fighting against can made more tangible than what you are fighting for.⁷⁶ The ability to contrast the values of the enemy with your own, not only makes it psychologically easier to fight him, it helps

⁷⁶ The psychological power of demonizing the enemy has been treated here: “Enemy Imaging: A Handbook for Reducing Enmity,” Psychiatrists for Social Responsibility, accessed May 1, 2016, http://www.psysr.org/about/pubs_resources/Enemyimagesmanual.pdf.

to create your own group identity.⁷⁷ The leadership at the Alcazar understood this and, as is evidenced by the effects, used this type of messaging to these two dynamics.

Exhibit D: No Women Combatants (Social and Noble)

This exhibit will specifically analyze the decision not to use women in the defense. The decision of keeping non-combatants within the Alcazar at all is handled separately. This particular aspect of the defense of the Alcazar is relevant to the contemporary debates about the role of women in the military; especially as it represents viewpoints contrary to those currently prevailing.

The leadership at the Alcazar made the remarkable and sometimes baffling decision not to allow women to participate in the defense of the Alcazar. Taken at face value, the decision seems to contradict the Tactical dynamic which would call for maximizing the amount of combat power available to the defense. However, the analysis indicates that there were less tangible moral reasons for the decisions and that, in this case, the Junta chose to emphasize appeals to the Social and Noble dynamics.

Some of the pertinent facts relating to this issue are: (1) There was a contingent of women who petitioned the Junta for permission to join the defense (on or about 15 August). (2) This petition was denied and according to Eby, the suggestion that the wives of gentlemen should kill was met with horror by Col. Moscardo. (3) Col. Moscardo had

⁷⁷ G. N. Sande et al., "Value-Guided Attributions: Maintaining the Moral Self-Image and the Diabolical Enemy Image," *The Journal of Social Issues* 45, no. 2 (1989): 91-118, accessed May 2, 2016, <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?sid=0150cff8-acbe-4fb5-b076-4f371f5e4e32%40sessionmgr105&vid=0&hid=110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl&preview=false#AN=20491132&db=sih>.

apparently made repeated pledges that no women or children would be killed during the siege and when the request was put forth, Col. Moscardo asked his officers all to join him in renewing this pledge. (4) Women were integrated into the attacking Republican militia. (5) Women within the Alcazar were not allowed to participate in any tangible way to the defense, to include cooking and care for the wounded—to do so would have exposed them to increased risk.

From these facts, the most obvious explanations for the decision seems to be that it was done for the protection of the women and as a matter of honor. However, there are additional theories which must be considered. The first is very cynical, it is that the Junta did not want to compromise the non-combatant status of the women at the Alcazar because they understood their value as human shields. The second is that the Junta wanted to maintain a sense of military discipline and order that would have been compromised by using women and civilians in the defense.

The first explanation seems practical at first glance but presupposes that the defenders of the Alcazar were willing to hide behind their families, and that they thought their enemy would not be willing to kill them. To say that they were willing to hide behind their families would contradict everything else we know of their character. To say that they believed the enemy would hesitate in killing them contradicts what we know of their opinions of the enemy and contradicts the facts about how the attackers actually proceeded with their attacks. However, in effort not to be overly charitable to the Alcazar leadership, it may be said that the Junta must have understood that the presence of women and children within the Alcazar represented a public relations challenge for the attackers and that allowing them to fight would mitigate that challenge for them.

The idea that the Junta wanted to maintain an atmosphere of good military order and discipline is fairly sound. It is likely, as McNeill-Moss posits, that this was a major component of the decision not to allow women to fight.⁷⁸ The integration of women would have, at least, complicated the chain of command and accountability. Further, it may have led to discipline and fraternization issues. The practical, physical aspects of hygiene, modesty etc. must have also been considered.

The conclusions drawn by this researcher from the totality of the available evidence and context, as they relate to the Four Dynamics Model are: (1) That the Junta wanted to preserve the contrast between themselves as the protectors of tradition and virtue, and innocence and the enemy who was attacking those values. They believed the idea of defending women would be of more value than the physical aid they could offer on the line—thus appealing to the Noble and Social over and above the Tactical. (2) That they thought integrating women into the defense would degrade the good order and discipline of the fighting units and have adverse effects on cohesion, esprit de corps etc.—thus appealing to or sustaining the Social dynamic. (3) That the Junta understood and thus tried to avoid the negative morale repercussions that the death of women would have had on their formation—the Social dynamic.

It should be noted that the decision not to allow women to fight should not be interpreted as a statement about their courage. To the contrary, the bravery and sacrifice of the women was well known and accepted and a source of inspiration.⁷⁹ The women

⁷⁸ McNeill-Moss, 85.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 88.

were resolved to die alongside their men, and often sacrificed their meager rations for them.⁸⁰

Exhibit E: Innocents at the Alcazar
(Noble, Social above the Animal and Tactical)

Roughly a third of the population of the Alcazar during the siege were non-combatants, i.e. women, children, elderly, infirmed. The decision not to allow them to participate directly in the defense has been handled above. This exhibit examines the reasons why they were there and why they remained there throughout the siege, and touches upon some of the policies they were subject to in order to determine what these things can tell us about the Junta.

Broadly, the non-combatants that sought shelter within the Alcazar did so because they feared for their lives outside. Many were family members or the defenders, others had associations or known political views that would have placed them at risk of execution by the Republican militia and military in Toledo. While this does not, in itself, seem to tell us much about the leadership at the Alcazar, it does help to illustrate the stark contrast between how the defenders viewed themselves and how they viewed the enemy. As has been alluded to in the analysis above (regarding the role of women and the conversation regarding Col. Moscardo's son) this contrast was a powerful motivating theme for the defense. In a commentary about the film, "L'assedio dell'Alcazar", Marla Stone summarizes the situation well:

a healthy and organic national community in the shape of a traditional patriarchal family emerges: the men take care of the women; the young take care of the old; everyone reveres the Virgin Mary. The besieged are a family, as embodied in "the

⁸⁰ Ibid., 86, 88.

nation”—mothers, fathers, elderly, children, and babies—all—under the double protection of the Patria (the flag) and the Church. The soldiers in the Alcazar shield the threatened Nation and endangered womanhood.⁸¹

In this exhibit, we have yet another case of two seemingly competing interests within the Four Dynamics model. Viewed pragmatically, the decision by the Junta to house so large a population who would be of no use to the defense seems to contradict the animal and tactical dynamics of the model. There is no indication from any of the data available that anyone who sought refuge was turned away. Thus, not only did the Junta stretch the already thin resources to house them, they opened themselves up to the possibility of subterfuge –thereby violating the Tactical dynamic. To answer the second point, it is likely that those seeking shelter were known either personally or by reputation, and so the danger of letting in spies was minimal. The first point however is more complicated. Although it is true that the non-combatant population represented a drain on physical resources it is also true that their presence must have provided a source of moral strength and supported the social needs of the defenders. The Junta, in this case as in the case above, decided that the Noble and Social outweighed the Animal and Social.

The Junta realized the potential for positive and negative moral effects that were represented by the non-combatant population. Thus, they carefully balanced social interaction (which had a positive effect) with safety restrictions (to prevent the negative effect that civilian casualties would have). Defenders with family members at the Alcazar were allowed to visit them, but for the most part, the families had to remain below ground. There were some exceptions to this policy however. There were a few occasions

⁸¹ Stone, 120.

where social functions above ground were organized. There were walks, concerts and even dances which allowed families to be together and younger soldiers to interact with the young ladies.

The non-combatants at the Alcazar were given the opportunity to leave. On the most notable instance, which occurred during negotiations during a temporary cease fire on 11 September, three women were called into the headquarters where Col. Moscardo was entertaining a Republican officer who had entered under a white flag to negotiate. They were told that they would be allowed to leave the garrison and would be unharmed, and were asked to bring this proposal to the rest of the women and come back with their answer. They returned with the following reply:

they would never desert their men; that, even if the men wished it, they would always oppose the surrender of the Alcazar; that if the time should come when there would not be enough soldiers left to man the defenses, then they would take up arms and do so themselves.⁸²

Another woman was quoted by the negotiator as saying; “Our families will perish with us. If we could we would carry the whole world with us to death.”⁸³ This incident speaks again to the low opinion the defenders had of their enemy, in that they likely did not trust the guarantee of safety, but also speaks to the courage of the women, which must have been a source of inspiration to the men. The refusal of the women to surrender is made more poignant by a couple more points. The first is that compared to the men who

⁸² McNeill-Moss, 203.

⁸³ Eby, 148.

were able to keep busy and see daylight, their living conditions were much worse.⁸⁴ The second point is that compared to the men, their outlook was much less hopeful.⁸⁵

The effects of this inspiration were likely two fold, on the one hand they appealed positively to the sense of the Noble, and on the other hand, they must have reinforced the Social dynamic. How could the men consider surrender when the women showed such resolve?

The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the facts presented in this exhibit as they pertain to the Four Dynamics Model, are: (1) The women and children at the Alcazar reinforced social bonds and were tangible reminders of why they fought—appeals to the Social and Noble. (2) For the Junta, these intangible motivations outweighed the tangible costs of housing the non-combatants—Noble and Social above the Tactical and Animal (3) The hatred of the enemy (and the contrast between them and the defenders) was deeply rooted not only in the minds of the soldiers, but in their families as well—Noble and Social.

⁸⁴ McNeill-Moss, 86. A typical account of the living conditions can be seen in the testimony of one woman, as recorded by McNiel Moss: she lived in a thirty by fifteen foot cellar with no light or ventilation with ninety-five women and children for the duration of the siege.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 88. McNiel-Moss and others have noted that the women tended to think that death was the only possible outcome of the siege. This is probably due in large part to the fact that they were confined to the cellars where they constantly heard the mining efforts of the Republicans beneath them and the bombs and artillery above them.

Exhibit F: The Conduct of the Defense (Tactical and Social)

It is beyond the scope of this study to explain, in detail, the conduct of the defense at the Alcazar. However, broad trends can be related which are of help in understanding the leadership. First, the defense was conducted somewhat passively with the apparent aim of preserving manpower and reducing daily casualties. Second, the leadership had an adequate understanding of their vulnerabilities and placed their combat power accordingly. Third, the leadership stressed the importance of preparing and rehearsing their defensive plans. Fourth, the overall approach to command and control was distributed, not centralized. Finally, the Junta placed a greater importance on maintaining military discipline than they did on maximizing physical combat power. From these broad trends, it is deduced that the leadership had adequate technical and tactical expertise and an understanding of some of the psychological effects of siege warfare.

The leadership at the Alcazar weighed the advantages that could be gained from direct engagements with the enemy against the toll it would take physically and psychologically on their troops and decided on a conservative approach. The overall conduct of the defense can be loosely categorized as passive. Although the Republican militia surrounding the Alcazar spent their time sniping at the defense, the defenders were for the most part forbidden to retaliate. This was done for several reasons, one was to preserve ammunition, another was to prevent casualties and another was to reduce communication with the outside. Within the Alcazar, the defenders chose positions which would provide them adequate observation but would reduce the chances of being hit by snipers. If needed, observers would sound the alarm and forward positions would be occupied in order to repel an attack. This tactic was successful. The numbers of casualties

at the Alcazar due to direct fire is relatively low. In addition to preserving manpower and ammunition, this tactic reduced the amount of interaction that the soldiers on the line had with the outside. As ranges were close, there was much conversation between attackers and defenders. The attackers waged what amounted to an informal form of psychological warfare against the defenders⁸⁶ and on a few occasions certain defenders abandoned their posts and defected. The Junta's policies quickly evolved to mitigate the negative effects of these interactions—they forbade conversations across the lines, and they placed more leadership at points where their soldiers were likely to ignore the orders or defect.

The Junta placed adequate combat power at those points which were most vulnerable to enemy attack. The precise placement of combat power need not be discussed in detail, it is enough to say that they were able to identify the enemy's most likely avenues of approach and planned accordingly by placing the right weapons and the right units at the right places. Proof of this can be demonstrated by the fact that numerous enemy probes and attacks were repulsed and that areas likely to sustain high casualties on a regular basis or which would, if taken, be decisive for the attackers were manned by units which proved to especially resilient and dedicated.

The Junta stressed the importance of planning and rehearsing. This proved invaluable both physically, and psychologically. Physically, the defenders were prepared for a variety of situations and were able to react efficiently.⁸⁷ Psychologically, they had

⁸⁶ This informal psychological warfare was in addition to the formal psychological warfare waged through loudspeaker.

⁸⁷ Three examples which demonstrate the depth and breadth of planning and rehearsals are: (1) The reaction to chemical attack on 18 July; (2) The repeated reactions to gasoline attacks, (3) The quick reaction to the attacks following the explosion of the mines on 18 September along with a contingency plan (never needed) to continue the

increased confidence in their ability to survive and win. One of the things that is said to have had a profound impact on the psyche of the soldiers in the Alcazar was the sound of tunneling. Everyone within the Alcazar expected the entire building to implode, they just did not know when it would happen. To combat this fear, the Junta came up with plans for reacting to the eventuality and attempted to ascertain the direction of the tunneling to minimize casualties. These plans and actions may have had more of a psychological motive than a physical one. ADRP 6-22 emphasizes the need for rehearsals and training to reduce the stresses of combat and overcome fear.⁸⁸ Likewise, Field Marshal Slim emphasized the value of action in reinforcing confidence in the unit and its ability to attain its object (key aspects of the intellectual components of morale).⁸⁹ It is apparent that Junta understood these principals.

Col. Moscardo and used a decentralized style of leadership that capitalized on the cohesion and esprit de corps already present within the units under his command. While this is not explicitly stated in any of the data available for the research, it is deduced from a close examination of certain key incidents and facts. Primarily, this can be seen in two events involving sorties beyond the perimeter which ran contrary to Col. Moscardo's plans. The first incident occurred the day after the infamous ransom conversation and

defense from one of the outlying buildings should the Alcazar be completely destroyed. Jose Moscardo, "Diario de Operaciones desde el Día 18 de Julio al 28 de Septiembre de 1936, de la Comandancia Militar de Toledo," accessed April 11, 2016, <http://elalcazar.org/diario.htm&prev=search>.

⁸⁸ Department of the Army. ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, paras 9-12, 9-27.

⁸⁹ Frederick Baillergeon, "Field Marshall William Slim and the Power of Leadership" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 71-72.

resulted in members of the Guardia Civil capturing and detaining several prisoners,⁹⁰ the second incident involved the loss and subsequent attempts to recapture the body of a member of the Falange.⁹¹ On both occasions, the units involved took initiative which ultimately proved to go beyond the wishes of Col. Moscardo but, on both occasions the Junta chose to be lenient in order that they not squash morale or initiative. Further, what admonitions were given were tempered by recognition of the individual and collective bravery that was demonstrated.⁹² This demonstrates the fact that the Junta saw the importance of the Social Dynamic, especially as it relates to esprit de corps and cohesion at the lower echelons and that they took every opportunity to reinforce the nobler dynamics of courage and honor.

The final theme observed from the conduct of the defense is that the Junta placed more emphasis on maintaining military discipline than it did on maximizing physical combat power. The decision not to use women in the defense or in supporting roles is the first example. Another example, is that despite the fact that the officer to enlisted ratio was so high, the distinction between their roles remained constant. That is, enlisted men manned rifles and officers were given leadership roles or assigned other duties.⁹³ Officers did not fight alongside the enlisted in the sense of having identical roles. It seems that the potential for familiarity outweighed the benefits to be gained by having more riflemen.

⁹⁰ Moscardo, under July 24, 1936.

⁹¹ Ibid., under July 27, 1936.

⁹² Eby, 142.

⁹³ McNeill-Moss, 68.

In conclusion, the general conduct of the defense at the Alcazar demonstrates that the leadership was technically and tactically proficient and maintained an ability to balance and reinforce the human dynamics throughout the defense. This can be seen in their employment of combat power, their foresight and rehearsals, and in their overall leadership style.

In terms of the Four Dynamics Model, the interpretation and conclusions drawn from the facts are: (1) That the Junta demonstrated adequate technical and tactical proficiency—the Tactical dynamic. (2) The Junta understood the value of action (rehearsals, raids etc.) in overcoming fear—this appeals to the Social, insofar as it reinforces confidence in the unit and appeals to the Animal as it relates to the human instinct for survival (3) In those instances where there was a conflict between the Noble or Social and the Animal and Tactical, the Noble and Social dynamics usually took precedence.

Exhibit G: Military Discipline (Social and Tactical)

There are numerous examples throughout the various stories of the Siege that demonstrate the Junta's continued emphasis on the maintenance of military discipline and culture. Taken as a whole, it is apparent that the Junta understood the value of an established military culture as a means of maintaining social cohesion and tactical proficiency.

That the Junta emphasized the military culture and all it entails can be demonstrated by pointing to just a few obvious examples: (1) Official ceremony to

include the formal declaration of war and the formal handover to relieving troops.⁹⁴

(2) Daily formal orders which included recognizing bravery and excellence for actions taken by the defense.⁹⁵ (3) The continued reliance on organic chains of command of the various units participating in the defense (discussed in exhibit F). (4) The decision (discussed in Exhibit D) not to use non-combatants in the defense and the decision (discussed in Exhibit E) not to level the roles of officers and enlisted. (5) The Junta's reactions to desertion and theft.

The first four points listed above are obvious examples of the Junta's emphasis on maintaining the military culture, the fifth point is not as obvious. The Junta understood the negative impact that desertions and theft (of food) would have on the social dynamic. They responded to each threat by using tools available to them as a part of a military culture. Namely, they used increased officer presence and threat of harsh punishment as negative incentives, and esprit de corps as a positive incentive.

Given the stresses and duration of the defense, a degradation of military discipline might have seemed inevitable. However, it is evident that there was a deliberate effort on the part of the Junta to maintain strict military discipline and that this effort was largely successful. The success is ultimately attested to by the successful coordinated defense against the attacks which followed the implosion of the building. Aristotle's theory of virtue ethics relies on a culture of virtue. The leadership at the Alcazar understood that

⁹⁴ Eby, 43, 218.

⁹⁵ These daily ceremonies are mentioned incidentally in most historical accounts and in the "Diario", there is not much detail about how they were conducted but from these incidental remarks it appears that any official orders from the Junta would be read aloud, that awards and decorations were given, and that the dead were recognized.

the military culture was vital to maintaining the virtues of fortitude, temperance and justice within their perimeter.

Exhibit H: High Society at the Alcazar
(Noble, Social)

The Junta reinforced the Noble and Social aspects of the human dynamic by placing an emphasis on cultural identity which connected the defenders with each other and with a higher purpose. This section will cite examples, and analyze possible effects and motives to determine what they can tell us about enabling performance under degraded conditions for long periods of time.

Daily News: There was a daily newspaper printed throughout the siege called “El Alcázar”. The bulk of the paper was devoted to relaying news from nationalist radio stations but it also served to repeat any general orders given by the Junta and to further recognize individuals and units for their contributions to the defense. When needed, it was used to explain or white-wash certain decisions made by the Junta regarding diet and hygiene⁹⁶. That the paper existed in the first place and continued to be printed without fail throughout the siege speaks to the importance the Junta placed on it. Jerry Knudson, in an essay discussing the newspaper comments:

“*El Alcázar*” is a classic example of the deep-seated need for man to communicate with his fellow beings, even under the most adverse conditions-or perhaps especially during times of extreme stress. “*El Alcázar*” was the social bonding which held that besieged group of persons together despite near

⁹⁶ Jerry W. Knudson, “El Alcazar: Daily under Siege,” *Journalism Quarterly* 66, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 471-73, <http://search.proquest.com>

starvation, aerial and artillery bombardment, and a sense of isolation from the broader world.⁹⁷

Although he is referring only to the paper, his comments can be applied to other cultural and social initiatives within the fortress.

Clubs and Recreation: There were several clubs founded within the Alcazar, including a few debate clubs and a music club. There were several concerts and dances, a circus, wrestling matches and even a soccer match commissioned by Col. Moscardo himself all held during a five-day lull in the bombardment which occurred within the first few weeks of the siege. All of these were promoted in the daily newspaper and supported by the Junta.⁹⁸

Protection of Cultural Heritage: There was a building near the Alcazar called the Santa Cruz which was occupied by the besiegers. It was used as a base from which to launch several attacks and a position from which to place direct fires into the Alcazar. Oddly, despite the threat, the defenders were under orders to minimize damage to the building. Eby relays the remarks of a member of the Junta as he made his rounds for inspection: “be sure not to hit that molding on the Santa Cruz. It’s priceless, you know. Remember, we are civilized and respect art, whatever the Rebels may do.”⁹⁹ Amazingly, this order was followed. According to McNiel-Moss, who includes pictures of the

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Eby, 80.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 110.

building in his book, the bars on the windows were completely destroyed by rifle fire from the Alcazar, but the carvings sustained almost no damage at all.¹⁰⁰

This data reveals that despite the hardship, or perhaps because of the hardship at the Alcazar, the Junta placed an emphasis on maintaining the cultural and social bonds which would help to sustain morale and reinforce the higher purposes for which they fought. It is clear that, in the minds of the Junta, in order to perform through degraded conditions for long periods of time, military units must be allowed a certain amount of recreation and must be reminded of the broad cultural values they represent.

Exhibit I: Basic Sustainment (Animal Dynamic)

This topic has been briefly touched upon in chapter 1 under the section entitled “Life During the Siege,” this section will examine some of the daily living conditions at the Alcazar along with relevant policies and decisions made by the Junta in order to determine what they may tell us about the leadership.

Generally, there are no surprises to be found here. The rations at the Alcazar were minimal and were equally shared with the notable exception of certain foodstuffs such as condensed milk being reserved for children. Occasional sorties outside the perimeter were authorized throughout the siege to augment the food supply and when these were successful, the proceeds were divided equally. The water supply was sufficient but limited, and eventually the Junta had to issue an order not to use it frivolously. The hygienic conditions were deplorable but managed to the extent possible. In short, to interpret the actions of the leadership in light of the Four Dynamics, the bulk of the

¹⁰⁰ McNeill-Moss, 182.

evidence suggests that the Junta adequately understood and provided for the Animal dynamic. It may also be said that in providing extra rations to the children and equal rations to the few prisoners, they appealed to the Noble aspects by emphasizing charity and justice and appealed to the Social aspects by showing a concern for the families of the defenders.

There is but one incident or decision within this category that seems surprising. There was a large supply of wheat that was discovered outside the perimeter but within relatively easy reach of the defense. Despite the fact that this cache might be discovered by the enemy at any time, there was no attempt to retrieve the entire supply. Instead, the Junta seems to have decided to take just enough to last for a few days at a time. This decision has baffled historians and no first hand explanation has been recorded. McNiel-Moss, in his history posits an explanation which this researcher accepts with a small caveat. That is, that Col. Moscardo and the Junta had such implicit faith and trust in divine providence, that they saw no need to take all of the wheat at once.¹⁰¹ God would provide. The caveat proposed by this researcher is that this explanation assumes as a premise that it was possible for them to have taken it all at once. It may have been that there were factors not described in any of the historical accounts that made this impossible. However, if McNiel-Moss's explanation is true it indicates the Junta favored the Noble (spiritual) component over the Four Dynamics over the Animal component.

¹⁰¹ McNeill-Moss, 101.

Exhibit J: The Spirit of the Alcazar (Noble and Social)

This exhibit briefly describes some of the data that relates directly or indirectly to the spiritual and religious climate within the Alcazar and attempts to interpret that data to determine what it tells us about the leadership. Taken as a whole, it is apparent from the data that the leadership of the Alcazar was religious and placed an emphasis on the spiritual needs of those they led as a component of the Noble (Spiritual) Dynamic.

The religiosity of Col. Moscardo: This has been described or alluded to in various places throughout this research, particularly in Exhibits A&C. There are practical examples to be added of how his religion shaped his decision making. The first example is the fact that his only request to his enemies was that they send a Priest to say Mass, hear confessions and baptize the children born during the siege. The second example is his reaction to a request from one of his soldiers to be civilly married to one of the women within the Alcazar. His answer was no, his justification, was that marriage without a Priest was little better than the “barbaric free-love relationships proliferating among the Reds outside.”¹⁰² The final example is his seemingly genuine and unabashed reliance on divine providence, sometimes over actual planning and action.¹⁰³

El Cristo de la Vega: This incident was relatively minor, but is useful in understanding the pull that religion had on the defenders and the fact that the besiegers

¹⁰² Eby, 80.

¹⁰³ “God will provide” is a line attributed to Col. Moscardo by both Eby and McNiel-Moss on a number of occasions in response to questions about preparedness. His last line in his journal before the explosion of the mines under the Alcazar was “All things possible having been done, we now commend ourselves to God.” Eby, 170.

recognized that pull. Early in the siege, Republican militiamen had pulled a famous wooden image of Christ from a nearby church and taunted the defenders by dismembering and burning it. They shouted “Here is El Cristo de la Vega...if you are true Catholics you will come down here and stop us!”¹⁰⁴ They were purposely trying to get the defenders to expose themselves to sniper fire. Despite orders not to shoot, the defenders took the bait by firing two rounds and dropping two militiamen into the bonfire. The Republican snipers however were not able to retaliate quickly enough.¹⁰⁵

The Virgin of the Alcazar: There was a chapel in the Alcazar in which those who were present, to include Col. Moscardo heard a final Mass before the siege. Despite the fact that there was no priest available, prayers in this chapel continued throughout the siege and implored the intervention of God and The Virgin of the Alcazar who was represented by an icon in the chapel.¹⁰⁶ In the absence of Priests, burial services and prayer vigils were conducted by Officers. When it was discovered that the enemy was digging mines for the eventual destruction of the building, the chapel was relocated to an area in less danger so that prayers could continue. The icon of the Virgin was placed on the line which marked the projected blast area of the mines.¹⁰⁷ When, following the explosion, it was discovered that no one had been killed, the histories tell us that cries of gratitude went up to the Virgin and that immediately following the attacks which

¹⁰⁴ Eby, 61.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ McNeill-Moss, 172.

¹⁰⁷ Eby, 163.

followed, and there was a call for prayer in the chapel. Many of the survivors would later attribute the survival of the icon as well as the survival of the defense following the attacks to the intercession of God and the Virgin of the Alcazar. Upon learning of the successful seizure of wheat stores from outside the perimeter, Col Moscardo is said to have gone immediately to the Chapel where he offered thanks to the Virgin.¹⁰⁸

The reception of the priest sent to the Alcazar: Before the siege, Toledo had an exceptionally large number of Catholic clergymen (estimated at over 600) but during the siege that number dwindled to perhaps less than a handful.¹⁰⁹ What Priests survived the occupation, had gone into hiding or fled. Thus, when the request for a Priest was answered, it was answered with a Priest who was known to sympathize with the Republicans.¹¹⁰ This priest was apparently sent, not just as a concession to the defense, but also to attempt to convince them, using his status as a religious authority, to surrender. The Priest crossed through the Republican lines giving the clenched fist salute of the Republicans.¹¹¹ As he entered the Alcazar, he was noticeably nervous. The defenders that greeted them said “Don’t worry Father, it is only those out there that shoot Priests.”¹¹² Immediately upon entering, he was asked if he was prepared to say Mass. He reluctantly agreed, but used the occasion of his homily to implore the defenders to

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 86.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 141.

¹¹⁰ Eby, 151.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 153.

¹¹² Ibid.

surrender, claiming that they would be held responsible in the afterlife for the death of innocents.¹¹³ This, apparently had more of an effect than all of the attempts at psychological warfare up to that point. Several of the defenders were visibly shaken. However, following the Mass, Col. Moscardo told the Priest that his purpose was to administer the sacraments, not negotiate a surrender. He then granted general absolution (because there was not time to hear confessions) and delivered the Eucharist to those not able to attend the Mass. He was closely watched, and when he was seen to engage in conversation that did not pertain to the administration of the sacraments, he was politely reminded of the limits of his duties.

The interpretation of this data is that the defenders had a deep devotion to their religion and the leadership at the Alcazar realized the importance of the spiritual component of the Noble Dynamic. These are but a four examples meant to convey the general religious tone within the Alcazar. In addition to all of this, there are many casual references to religion made throughout the historical accounts and can be seen, among other places, in some of the [forbidden] verbal exchanges between the defenders and the besiegers. This is not to say that it was used in a utilitarian fashion to bolster the morale of the troops, it is evident that the leadership was motivated by their religion as much as they understood its place in motivating and sustaining those they led. It is important to point out, that for the defenders at the Alcazar, the spiritual component of the four dynamics had a distinctly religious connotation which may be different from how the word is commonly used today and was used by Field Marshall Viscount Slim.

¹¹³ Ibid., 157.

Conclusions from Inductive Analysis

The inductive analysis answers the primary research question (What leadership factors contribute to the ability of military organizations to surpass expectations in degraded environments for extended periods of time?) by yielding a four part model into which the major decisions and characteristics of the leadership at the Alcazar can be organized and understood. Thus, the answer to the question is that the leadership must have an ability to appeal to and support the Four Dynamics of Noble (Spiritual), Social, Animal, and Tactical. Further, the subjective conclusion of this researcher is that at the Alcazar when the dynamics of Animal, and Tactical conflict with the dynamics of Social and Noble, the Noble and Social dynamics were emphasized.

Based on a broad reading of the case, it is apt to say that the strength of the defense lay more in the spirit of the defenders and their leadership than it did in their tactical expertise or their physical resources. In fact, it could be argued that the defense was successful despite the physical limitations and the limited tactical expertise. Col. Moscardo was no military genius, but he was stubborn and principled. Instead of Napoleon, the defenders got a cranky Physical Education teacher. A possible take away based on the evidence is that exemplary character can compensate for average tactical expertise. Once the physical needs have been met as much as possible and the tactical problem has been addressed without major flaw, it is up to the leader to reinforce the social and cultural bonds which hold his troops together, to provide a sense of purpose, and inspire the noble instincts.

Deductive Analysis of the LRM

Overview

The approach used for this portion of the analysis is deductive. It begins with a theory or hypothesis (That the LRM can adequately account for the Dependent Variable (DV)) and then analyzes the facts to determine whether or not the theory is valid. This theory will be tested in two ways. First, the Independent Variable (IV), which is the leadership at the Alcazar, will be judged against the LRM using a numerical scoring system. The model which was derived from the inductive analysis will be compared and contrasted with the LRM. The results of both methods will be used to either prove or disprove the hypothesis and answer the secondary leadership questions.

1. Can the LRM adequately account for the results at the Alcazar? Are there any behaviors or values demonstrated by Col. Moscardo and his leadership team (the Junta) that directly contradict those called for by ADRP 6-22? Or, are there values and behaviors called for by ADRP 6-22 that the Junta would reject? Are there leadership behaviors or values demonstrated by the Junta that are not explicit or implicit in the LRM?
2. Do the facts at the Alcazar demonstrate leadership factors which might be further explored in modifying or understanding the LRM?
3. What implications are there for the way we train and select leaders today?

The Leadership at the Alcazar as Judged Against the LRM

In this section, the researcher will award a score on a scale of -2 to +2 based on a subjective assessment of the extent to which the Junta exhibited each Attribute and

Competency (A&C) of the LRM; each judgement will be briefly justified. A score of -2 indicates a strong contradiction (i.e. that the Junta would disagree with the Attribute or Competency required by the LRM), (-1) indicates a significant deficit between the A&Cs exhibited by the Junta and the A&Cs called for in the LRM (not a contradiction), (0) indicates that there is not sufficient data to make a judgement, (+1) indicates a slight deficit, and (+2) indicates that the attribute or competency exhibited by the Junta fulfills the LRM requirement. Scores of zero are not factored in to the overall averages for each category.

LRM Attributes

The attributes of the LRM focus on what a leader is.¹¹⁴ They are the necessary raw material for being a successful Army leader.

Character

Definition: According to ADRP 6-22, character is comprised of a person's moral and ethical qualities, and provides motivation to do the right thing regardless of circumstances and to inspire others.¹¹⁵ The essential elements of character are: Army Values, empathy, Warrior Ethos and Service Ethos, and discipline.

Evaluation: The overall character score for the Junta at the Alcazar is a (+2), indicating that they fulfilled the requirements prescribed by the LRM completely. The facts demonstrate that the Junta was loyal to Spain (not to the sitting government, but to

¹¹⁴ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, para 1-28.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., paras 3-1, 3-2.

their idea of Spain and to the Nationalists forces attempting to replace what they saw as a corrupt government). They felt a duty toward their country that compelled them to take a stand at the Alcazar. That they treated others as they should be treated can be seen in their treatment of the few prisoners they had in their charge who were given equal rations and all survived unharmed, and in their courtesy to the various negotiators that they dealt with. Selfless–Service and Courage is obvious from the fact that they seized and held the Alcazar at great personal risk. The empathy of the command was exhibited in their many appeals to the Social and Animal dynamics discussed throughout the inductive analysis. Warrior Ethos and Discipline were also clearly demonstrated in that they refused to surrender and that they maintained a strict military discipline throughout.

Table 3. Evaluation of Junta according to the LRM attribute of Character		
Sub-Category	Definition (abbreviated)	Score
Army Values	Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless-Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage	2
Empathy	Propensity to experience something from another person’s point of view, desire to care for Soldiers	2
Warrior Ethos, Service Ethos	Internal shared attitudes that embody the spirit of the Army Never quit, never leave a fallen comrade, professionalism etc.	2
Discipline	Control of one’s own behavior, mindset to obey and enforce good orderly practices	2
Overall Character Score		2

Source: Created by Author using information from Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), para 3-4 and Table 3-1.

Presence

Definition: Presence is defined by ADRP 6-22 as “the sum of a leader’s outward appearance, demeanor, actions and words” and comprises the areas of military and professional bearing, fitness, confidence, and resilience.¹¹⁶

Evaluation: The Junta’s overall score for presence is (+1.5) indicating that they demonstrated adequate but not perfect compliance with the requirements of the LRM. The data concerning the military and professional bearing of the Junta is scant, but from photographs as well as what we know of the general military discipline, it is assumed by the researcher that they presented as professional an image as was possible under the circumstances. However, as some of the characterizations of Col. Moscardo present him as slightly pudgy and a bit awkward, and because the conditions prevented any of the Junta from conducting routine hygiene, the score is reduced to a (+1). Confidence is also scored at a (+1); although we know from the data that Col. Moscardo was extremely confident in their ability (with God’s help) to succeed, that same confidence was not shared by all of the soldiers or civilians of the Alcazar. This indicates that there was at least some lack of confidence among the leadership that translated to those they led. The Junta receives perfect scores for resiliency and fitness based on their ability to endure hardship and continue to maintain and maintain mission focus.

¹¹⁶ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, paras 4-2, 4-3.

Table 4. Evaluation of Junta according to the LRM attribute of Presence		
Sub-Category	Definition (quoted)	Score
Military and Professional Bearing	Projecting a commanding presence, a professional image of authority	1
Fitness	Having sound health, strength, and endurance, which sustain emotional health and conceptual abilities under prolonged stress	2
Confidence	Projecting self-confidence and certainty in the unit's ability to succeed in whatever it does; able to demonstrate composure and outward calm...	1
Resilience	The psychological and physical capacity to bounce back from life's stressors...	2
Overall Presence Score		1.5

Source: Created by Author using information from Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), para 4-2.

Intellect

Definition: ADRP 6-22 states that intellect “draws on the mental tendencies and resources that shape conceptual abilities applied to one’s duties and responsibilities.”

These conceptual abilities enable problem solving, critical thinking analytical reasoning, and the ability to anticipate second and third order effects.¹¹⁷ The conceptual components are: mental agility, sound judgement, innovation, interpersonal tact and expertise.

¹¹⁷ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, para 4-2.

Evaluation: The Junta's overall score for intellect is (+1.5), indicating that they exhibited the attribute well, but not perfectly according to the definitions contained within the LRM. The Junta received perfect scores for mental agility and innovation based on the fact that they were given a complex and novel problem set and were able to use the resources at hand to develop workable solutions. They received a lower score of (+1) for both sound judgement and expertise based off of the facts that they grossly underestimated the duration of the siege and the amount of food and equipment that they would need to survive. Had it not been for the fortuitous discovery of the wheat cache, it is likely they would have starved. Further, the fact that they did not immediately secure the entire supply speaks against their sound judgement. On the other hand, they did not receive a negative score because in all other matters, especially the conduct of the defense they made sound decisions. There is insufficient data to accurately judge their interpersonal tact but, as an aside, the data concerning Col. Moscardo seems to indicate that it was low.

Table 5. Evaluation of Junta according to the LRM attribute of Intellect		
Sub-Category	Definition (abbreviated)	Score
Mental Agility	Flexibility of mind, the ability to break through habitual thought patterns, anticipating uncertain situations; think through outcomes when current actions are not producing desired effects; apply multiple perspectives.	2
Sound Judgement	The capacity to assess situations and draw sound conclusions, make sensible decisions and reliable guesses, to assess strengths and weaknesses of subordinates, peers and enemy.	1
Innovation	Creativity and the ability to introduce new ideas based on opportunity or challenging circumstances.	2
Interpersonal Tact	The capacity to understand interactions with others. Awareness of how others see you and ability to interact with them effectively. Recognizing diversity and displaying self-control.	-
Expertise	Possessing facts, beliefs, logical assumptions and understanding in relevant areas.	1
Overall Presence Score		1.5

Source: Created by Author using information from Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), para 1-28.

LRM Competencies

The LRM Competencies focus on what a leader does. They follow from what the leader is, and translate into actions.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, para 1-28

Leads

Definition: ADRP 6-22 says that leadership is the application of the leader's attributes while guiding others to the fulfillment of a common goal. The influencing of others can range from obtaining compliance, which is the "act of conforming to a requirement or demand", to obtaining commitment, which is "willing dedication or allegiance."¹¹⁹ Within the competency category of leadership, the LRM lists the following sub-components: leads others, builds trust, extends influence beyond the chain of command, and communicates.¹²⁰

Evaluation: The Junta is scored at a perfect (+2), indicating that they completely displayed the attribute Leads as defined by the LRM. The Junta used several methods to influence according to which was most effective or appropriate. They enjoyed the trust of their subordinates, who were willing to die with them. Their influence beyond the chain of command is difficult to judge because the Alcazar was cut off from the outside, but two facts stand out: the first is that as the war broke out, they were able to gather a diverse group from a wide area into the Alcazar to help defend it, the second is that their stand at the Alcazar had morale effects which helped sustain the Nationalist cause. The Junta was subject to the same conditions that their men were and their sacrifices were as great as theirs. They communicated to their soldiers using a variety of means to ensure a shared understanding within their ranks.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 6-1, 6-2.

¹²⁰ Ibid., figure 1-1.

Table 6. Evaluation of Junta according to the LRM attribute of Leads		
Sub-Category	Definition (abbreviated)	Score
Leads Others	Motivate, inspire and influence others to take initiative. Includes use of appropriate methods of influencing, enforcing standards and balancing mission and welfare of Soldiers.	2
Builds Trust	Sets example, takes direct action to build trust, sustains trust.	2
Extends Influence Beyond Chain of Command	Understands sphere of influence, negotiates, builds consensus, and resolves conflict.	2
Leads by Example	Models desired behavior, leads with confidence, demonstrates technical and tactical proficiency, and seeks diverse ideas.	2
Communicates	Clearly expresses ideas and actively listens. Creates shared understanding, employs engaging communication techniques.	2
Overall Leads Score		2

Source: Created by Author using information from Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), chap 6.

Develops

Definition: ADRP 6-22 says that leaders “have a responsibility to leave an organization better than they found it and expect others to do the same”. This includes

personal and subordinate development and steering the organization toward short and long-term goals.¹²¹

Assessment: The subcategories of Prepares Self, and Develops Others were not scored due to a lack of data and because they are less applicable to the circumstances at the Alcazar. However, in the remaining two subcategories, the Junta is scored at a perfect (+2). This indicates insofar as was able to be observed, the Junta exhibited the competency of Develops completely. They fostered esprit de corps and a positive environment in a number of ways to include publicly recognizing superior performance and through planned recreational activities. That they were stewards of the profession is evidenced by the fact that a large reason for their stand at the Alcazar was to maintain the equipment for the Nationalist Army and keep it from being used by the Republicans. They exhibited cooperative planning throughout, to include the decision to declare war and to not accept terms of surrender, which were made democratically within the Junta.

¹²¹ Ibid., paras 7-1, 7-2.

Table 7. Evaluation of Junta according to the LRM attribute of Develops		
Sub-Category	Definition (abbreviated)	Score
Creates a positive environment/ Fosters Esprit de Corps	Establish and maintain positive expectations, support effective behaviors, improve the organization.	2
Prepares Self	Aware of limitations, continue to improve.	-
Develops Others	Facilitate the achievement of organizational goals through the helping others develop.	-
Stewards the Profession	Applying mindset that embodies cooperative planning and management of resources	2
Overall Develops Score		2

Source: Created by Author using information from Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), chap 7.

Achieves

Definition: Under the LRM competency of Achieves, is only one subcategory— Gets Results. This is further defined in ADRP 6-22 as that which embraces all actions to get the job done on time and to standard. It includes providing direction, guidance and priorities and monitoring performance to identify strengths and correct weaknesses.

Assessment: The Junta scores a perfect (+2) for this category. The results at the Alcazar speak for themselves.

Table 8. Evaluation of Junta according to the LRM attribute of Develops		
Sub-Category	Definition (abbreviated)	Score
Gets Results	Provide Guidance, manage resource, remove work barriers, provides feedback, and adjusts to external influences	2
Overall Develops Score		2

Source: Created by Author using information from Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), chap 8.

Findings from the Evaluation of the Junta using the LRM

The analysis shows that the Junta exhibited all of the LRM A&Cs either completely or nearly completely.

Comparison of the Four Dynamics and the LRM

The analysis of the Junta according to the LRM reveals that they exhibited the A&Cs required by the model. However, in order to confirm or deny the hypothesis, that the LRM is an adequate model to describe the leadership factors necessary to enable performance in degraded environments for long periods of time, we must first determine whether the Junta displayed certain leadership attributes or techniques which go beyond that prescribed by the LRM. To do this, the LRM is compared in this portion of the analysis to the Four Dynamics Model. The comparison between the LRM and the Four Dynamics model is done by plotting the subcomponents of each attribute or competency

on the LRM according to where it fits within the four dynamics and then analyzing whether those sub-components adequately meet the definitions of each dynamic.

Table 9. Attributes and Competencies of the LRM according to the Four Dynamics of Military Leadership	
Noble (Spiritual): Purpose higher than self, duty to God, appeals to virtue. • Army Values • Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos • Leads by Example • Esprit de Corps	Social: Duty to family, society, unit. Meeting social needs. • Empathy • Warrior Ethos • Discipline • Military and Professional Bearing • Confidence • Interpersonal Tact • Builds Trust • Extends Influence • Leads by Example • Esprit de Corps • Communicates
Animal: Meeting the physical needs and wants • Resilience • Prepares Self • Fitness	Tactical: The military art and science, skillful application of force. • Mental Agility • Sound Judgement • Innovation • Expertise • Gets Results

Source: Created by Author using information from Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

This table shows that the Animal, Social, and Tactical dimensions are adequately accounted for using the subcomponents of each A&C of the LRM. However, the definition of the Noble (Spiritual) dynamic is not fully supported.

While the LRM has several A&Cs and subcomponents of those A&Cs which fit within the Noble (Spiritual) dynamic, they do not fulfill the entire definition of that category. In particular, there is nothing within the LRM that adequately describes or appeals to the distinctly spiritual aspect of that dynamic. At the Alcazar, the great and noble purpose to which the defenders were called was inextricably linked to and supported by their religion. Their sense of justice, right, wrong, even their patriotism were all tied to their identity as Catholics and what they believed to be their duty to God. The sense of spirituality (used here with formal religious connotations) was part of who the leaders were (attributes) and part of what they did (competencies) at the Alcazar. This study simply points out the fact that the Spiritual dynamic was integral to the Junta's leadership at the Alcazar and that it is a factor excluded from the LRM.

Summary of Analysis

Based on the case study of the successful defense of the Alcazar of Toledo in 1936, the inductive analysis answers the primary research question: What leadership factors contribute to the ability of military organizations to surpass expectations in degraded environments for extended periods of time? The answer is that the leaders must be able to appeal to four separate dynamics which are summarized in the Four Dynamics of Military Leadership model which was created by the author to summarize and organize those leadership factors exhibited at the Alcazar.

The first part of the deductive research, the evaluation of the Junta at the Alcazar according to the A&Cs of the LRM answers the secondary research question: Does the Junta at the Alcazar exhibit the leadership attributes and competencies prescribed by the

LRM? The answer is yes. The Junta demonstrated all of the A&Cs prescribed within the LRM.

The second part of the deductive research, the comparison between the Four Dynamics of Military Leadership and the LRM answers the next secondary research question: Can the LRM adequately account for the results at the Alcazar? The answer is no. The hypothesis that the LRM can adequately account for the results at the Alcazar is disproved by demonstrating that the Junta's leadership included factors pertaining to the Noble (Spiritual) dynamic not accounted for within the LRM. Thus, at least in the case of the Alcazar, the LRM accounts for most of the leadership factors that enable the result, but not all of them. Therefore, the Null Hypothesis, "(H0) The A&Cs described in the LRM do not sufficiently explain getting organizations to perform beyond expectations," cannot be rejected.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.¹²²

— Napoleon Bonaparte

Conclusions

The LRM is insufficient to describe or direct all of those Attributes and Competencies necessary for the leaders at the Alcazar to enable performance through adversity over long periods of time. The facts at the Alcazar demonstrate that leaders needed to appeal to three separate human dynamics and one uniquely military dynamic in order to enable military units to perform through adverse conditions for long periods of time. The human dynamics are the Noble (Spiritual), the Social, and the Animal. The military dynamic is Tactical. The LRM adequately accounts directly or indirectly for all but the Noble (Spiritual) dynamic. Therefore, according to this limited case study, the LRM is not a sufficient model to explain the results.

Further, as the LRM is a sort of bumper-sticker-guide to what a leader should be and what he should do, it lacks the specificity necessary to serve as a how-to guide for leadership. Presumably, this deficiency should be mitigated by all of the supporting literature that comprises Army Leadership Doctrine, especially in ADP and ADRP 1 and ADP & ADRP 6-22. However, that supporting literature is also lacking in sufficiently

¹²² Quotes.net, “Napoleon Bonaparte Quotes,” accessed April 21, 2016, <http://www.quotes.net/quote/40638>.

explaining how character is formed, and how a leader can or ought to appeal to the Noble dynamic.

The leadership at the Alcazar did exhibit all of those A&Cs called for by the LRM, but they also exhibited something more. The appeal to the great and noble end which Field Marshal Viscount William Slim says is a necessary component of morale was, at the Alcazar, inextricably tied to religion. Religion was a part of the social identity of the leadership and the led. Thus, it appealed simultaneously to at least two of the Four Dynamics by providing a basis for appeals to the Noble and by contributing to the common Social identity and norms of the defenders. Further, research has shown that the spiritual practice in the context of formal religion, has significant positive impact on individual resiliency, values based behavior, and strength of will,¹²³ all of which were necessary to achieving the results at the Alcazar. As the LRM does not explicitly or implicitly contain this distinctly religious aspect or even an appeal to greater purpose, it cannot adequately account for the results at the Alcazar.

The role of formal religion both in shaping the broader culture within which the characters of the defenders at the Alcazar was formed and in providing the basis upon which the leadership at the Alcazar could make appeals to the Noble and sustain the Social dynamics cannot be overstated. In contrast, the role of formal religion as a “tool for building unit and individual resilience” and for shaping a sense of morality and higher

¹²³ Koyn, 119-20; David B. Larson, Susan S. Larson, and John Gartner, “Families, Relationships and Health,” in *Behavior and Medicine*, ed. Danny Wedding (Baltimore: Mosby Year Book, 1990), 135-147; Patrick F. Fagan, Ph.D., “Why Religion Matters: The Impact of Religious Practice on Social Stability,” [heritage.org](http://www.heritage.org), January 25, 1996, accessed May 11, 2016, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1996/01/bg1064nbsp-why-religion-matters#6>.

purpose has been almost completely ignored in contemporary discussions within the Army about leadership, professionalism and resiliency.¹²⁴ This omission is in spite of the large and growing body of research and scholarly debate that indicates organized religion is a large contributor to the formation of individual and group identity, moral beliefs, resiliency and character.¹²⁵

The current political, legal and social climate can perhaps explain the absence of discussion about the practice of formal religion in the Army. Instead of wading into this morass of controversy, the Army, it seems, has decided to content itself with formulating and codifying a professional ethic. This ethic is derived from the nation's founding documents, laws, common societal norms and the Army culture. It serves, in the absence of formal religion, as the unifying code upon which leaders should appeal to the noble, build a sense of identity and sustain character development.

In summary, the leaders of the Alcazar had recourse to a commonly held religion to undergird their appeals to the Noble and Social dynamics and that same recourse is not, by virtue of the Constitution, available to the modern Army leader. The appeal to religion was vital to the morale of the defenders of the Alcazar, and by extension, to their eventual success. In place of organized religion, the U.S. Army has formulated a common ethic. The extent to which this ethic can replace the function played by organized religion is a subject for further research and debate.

¹²⁴ Koyn, 119-20. In this article, Chaplain (Maj) Koyn notes that there is no direct reference to involvement in organized religion in the 2013 chief of staff of the Army's strategic priorities or the subsequent documents meant to support his stated priorities which included spiritual resiliency.

¹²⁵ Koyn, 119-20.

Recommendations and Areas for Further Research

This project makes several recommendations and suggests several areas for further research, all noted within this section. The recommendations and areas of research are broken into the following categories: (1) Leadership Doctrine and the Army Ethic, (2) The Alcazar and Spanish Civil War.

Leadership Doctrine and the Army Ethic

The appeal to a common religion, common worldview and common societal values has been available to military leaders throughout history, and is available to leaders of less heterogeneous militaries today. That the formal religious appeal is not practically, doctrinally or constitutionally available to contemporary U.S. Army leaders has been discussed above. What remains to be discussed, researched and ultimately tested through experience however, is how suitable the Army's substitute, i.e. the Army Ethic is. The following paragraphs make recommendations and suggest areas for debate and research that will, it is hoped, improve the Army's ability to employ the Army Ethic to inspire soldiers to higher purpose and to understand better understand the challenges of leadership in an increasingly pluralistic society. These are organized into the following sub-sections: Societal Values and the Army Ethic, Foundations and Nature of the Army Ethic, Cohesion in Pluralistic Groups, The Practice of the Army Ethic.

Societal Values and the Army Ethic

Recommendations

1. Research the extent to which American Society in general and Soldiers in particular concur with the moral principles contained within the Army Ethic.

2. Develop clear strategies for inculcating the Army ethic within Soldiers. This must include the ability to appeal to a population with diverse and sometimes incompatible moral philosophies.

Discussion

ADRP 1 claims that the Army Ethic is derived in part from common moral principles.¹²⁶ Some researchers and theorists however hold that that “modern pluralism is so radical that it frustrates efforts to project overarching ethical values into the public sphere” and that “the collective bases of morality and identity are diminished or destroyed.”¹²⁷ If this is true, there is a practical question of how to inculcate the ethic in a population that does not already believe in it. There is the further problem of figuring out how leaders sell the Army Ethic to a population that has emerged from varying ethical traditions. Finally, as ADRP 1 also claims that the moral principles contained within the Army ethic are timeless,¹²⁸ it raises the question of how those individuals with moral philosophies which deny the existence of timeless moral truths can function in the Army without compromising their personal integrity. Can the Army say on the one hand that it is open to people of all backgrounds and beliefs and on the other hand require everyone to believe in or at least conform to a philosophy that asserts that there are metaphysical realities of right and wrong?

¹²⁶ Department of the Army, *The Army Profession*, para 2-1.

¹²⁷ Robert Hefner, “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27, no. 1 (1998): 83-105.

¹²⁸ Department of the Army, *The Army Profession*, paras 1-16.3-17.

Foundations and Nature of the Army Ethic

Recommendations

1. Clearly articulate and define the Army's timeless moral principles in ADRP-1, reiterate them throughout doctrine and incorporate them into a consistent, coherent ethical training regimen throughout the Army.
2. Clearly articulate the Army's ethical philosophy. Is it virtue based, deontologically based, consequentialist, or a mix?
3. Implement a holistic strategy for ethical training across the Army that is rooted in the ethical philosophy (as determined by the recommendation above). This strategy should further define and include the process for certification of character alluded to in ADRP-1.¹²⁹

Discussion

If the Army Ethic is to serve as a means of inspiring units to higher purpose and self-sacrificing action, its principles and the methodologies by which those principles are ingrained in Soldiers, must be clear.

ADRP 1 says that the Army ethic consists of changing and changeable laws, customs etc. that comprise the methodology of the Army Ethic, but that these are based upon unchanging moral principles.¹³⁰ The problem is, that it is difficult even after a thorough reading of the manual to determine what the unchanging principles are. The

¹²⁹ Department of the Army, *The Army Profession*, paras 2-22, 3-4, 5-11.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, para 1-16.

foundations of the moral principles are clearly delineated several times.¹³¹ They include common beliefs, the Nation's founding documents, laws, the Army Values etc. However, aside from the Declaration of Independence and the possible exception of universal norms (if you interpret this to refer to natural law), all of these sources are changeable. The constitution can be amended, laws are changed and by definition, values (as opposed to absolutist ethical laws) can change.¹³² Repeatedly throughout ADRP-1, one reads "rooted in the moral principles which are found in"¹³³ or words to that effect, but never does the manual clearly and directly delineate those moral principles. The closest it gets to definitive statements is to say that the moral principles are expressed in the Army Values¹³⁴ and later, to say that the Army Values are "inherent in the moral principles."¹³⁵ Are moral principles expressed completely in the Army Values? Can the Army values change?

Once the moral principles have been established, there remains the larger problem of defining and them. It may not be enough to say that the Army stands for the moral principles of liberty and freedom, those words mean different things to different people.

¹³¹ Ibid., figure 2-4.

¹³² The terms values, ethics and morals are often used interchangeably, even in this document, but there is a distinct difference. The language of values as opposed to morals or ethics connotes the possibility of change, and some would argue is rooted in relativist philosophy.

¹³³ This is not a direct quote, but meant to convey the general sense of several quotes throughout ADRP-1.

¹³⁴ Department of the Army, *The Army Profession*, para 3-4.

¹³⁵ Ibid., para B-13.

Depending on who you ask, liberty and freedom can range from licentiousness to unhampered pursuit of goodness, and everything in between.

After defining the moral principles, there lies the still greater task of defending them and inculcating them throughout the Army. Col. Moscardo could say “because tradition, the Church and God say so.” Islamic radicals can likewise appeal to the authority of their religion as interpreted by religious scholars. Moreover, in both of these cases, the appeal to authority may not be necessary since, presumably, the majority of the members of these groups would have been raised in a culture that instills through practice its version of virtue. We do not have these luxuries. We cannot assume that Soldiers come to the Army with a common cultural or religious understanding of what constitutes right action. It is therefore necessary to adopt a holistic program for ingraining a common ethic. In order for this program to remain coherent, it should stem from a coherent moral philosophy. A holistic reading of ADRP 1 and ADRP 6-22 leads one to believe that the Army has adopted a moral philosophy that leans toward virtue theory.¹³⁶ If this is the case, it should be clearly articulated so that the Army can design a pedagogical program which supports and certifies it.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ In fact, a White Paper which called for the formal codification of the Army Ethic, said that it was necessary to prevent conceding to rules-based and consequentialist theories. Mission Command Center of Excellence and U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, “The Army Ethic White Paper” (Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2014), 3, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://cape.army.mil/repository/white-papers/Army-Ethic-White-Paper.pdf>.

¹³⁷ For an extensive discussion on the various ethical philosophies and the methods of inculcation which follow from them in the context of modern militaries, see: Paul Robinson, *Ethics Training and Development in the Military* (2007), 23-37, accessed May 4, 2016, <http://cape.army.mil/cgsc-ethics/repository/Ethics-Training-and->

The Army Chaplain Corps, by virtue of its experience and expertise in balancing and protecting individual conscience along with the fact that many Chaplains undergo extensive academic training in philosophy and ethics makes them the ideal community for helping the Army to answer all of these questions. Furthermore, as the practice of organized religion, as opposed to the mere assertion of beliefs, has been shown through research to build those virtues the Army seeks, leveraging and empowering the Chaplaincy to provide increased individual access to the practice of religion seems warranted. It should be noted, that as an increasing number of Americans hold to no particular religion, the Army Chaplaincy should engage those individuals to determine how the practice of various humanist philosophies et al, can be used to answer the preceding questions.

Cohesion in Extremely Pluralist Groups

Recommendations

1. Research and the effects of contradictory moral philosophies or incompatible moral behaviors on unit cohesion.

Discussion

A common school of thought is that unit cohesion surpasses any abstract appeal to a great and noble cause in producing combat effectiveness.¹³⁸ Others argue that the great

Development-in-the-Military_Robinson_Parameters_Spring%202007_pages%2023-36.pdf.

¹³⁸ Geoff Van Epps, "Relooking Unit Cohesion: A Sense Making Approach," *Military Review* 88, no. 6 (November-December 2008): 102-10.

and noble cause is necessary not only for setting the conditions for unit cohesion but to prevent the unit from protecting itself at the expense of the whole.¹³⁹ Either way, the question of whether a group composed of individuals whose central beliefs are not just different, but fundamentally incompatible should be explored. If there are soldiers within the Army who adhere to utilitarian or relative moral philosophies that manifest themselves in behaviors which deeply offend the sensibilities of those adhering to absolutist philosophies, how can the camps really cohere in a unit? How can those who hold two drastically different absolutist philosophies cohere in a unit?

The current issues of sexuality and gender identity in the military is a good example to explore. The Command Sergeant Major of the Army in a recent impromptu address to CGSC when asked about incorporating polyamorous or cross-gender soldiers into the Army, stated that he did not care about a Soldier's sexuality, he just wanted people who were willing and able to "be on the team."¹⁴⁰ This viewpoint may seem extremely tolerant, but the fact is that there will be those in the Army whose moral philosophies (informed by religion or other) will not view a person's sexual decisions as peripheral, but central to their character.¹⁴¹ If this is true, to what extent does this impair

¹³⁹ Michael J. Hughes, *Forging Napoleon's Grande Armee: Motivation, Military Culture, and Masculinity in the French Army, 1800-1808* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 59-60, ProQuest ebrary.

¹⁴⁰ Daniel A. Dailey, "Chief of Staff of Army Address to CGSC" (lecture, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, March 22, 2016). These comments were made during the Chief's address which were for attribution.

¹⁴¹ To support this statement, one need only look at the stated doctrines of some of the major religions represented in the Army concerning gender identity, promiscuity, homosexuality etc.

unit cohesion? If cohesion is impaired, to what extent does it affect unit performance and how does the army rectify this problem?

Practice of the Army Ethic

Recommendations

1. Debate, research and ultimately give guidance to leaders on how the Army Ethic can be leveraged to produce some of the same results as organized religion.
2. Sustain support for and access to the practice of formal religious practice within the Army as a means of building character.
3. Incorporate the Army Ethic into the LRM. The LRM should be re-evaluated in light of the adoption of ADRP-1 into doctrine.

Discussion

Research has indicated that the practice of formal religion, all of those rituals, rites, restrictions etc. both during worship and as exhibited in daily life help to inform and support the formation of the individual conscience, consciousness and will as well as improve resiliency.¹⁴² If this is true, and if the Army Ethic is to stand in the place of a unifying religion, how does the Army replace or augment these other functions of the practice of organized religion? The emphasis on ensuring individual freedom to worship and practice religion within the constraints of the mission certainly helps to build these attributes in those who choose to practice a religion, but what about those that do not?

¹⁴² Koyn, 121-122.

How do we build these attributes in them? Chaplain Maj Koyn has also raised this question in his article on the role of organized religion in the Ready Resilient campaign.¹⁴³

Finally, the practice of appealing to the Army Ethic should be considered for inclusion in the LRM. ADRP 1, which formalizes the Army Ethic was written after the LRM was developed. Therefore, the Army Ethic is not explicitly included in the LRM and any revision of the LRM should include it. However, there are certainly aspects of the Army Ethic contained within the LRM; primarily in the attributes. For example a leader who exhibits the Army values, has character etc. However, the LRM is lacking a competency that explicitly relates to the need for inspiring soldiers to a higher purpose. Since the Army as an institution seems to be saying that the higher purpose is contained within the Army Ethic, a suggested competency might be “Instills the Army Ethic” or even “Inspires to Higher Purpose.” This could be placed under the existing categories of Leads, or under Develops, but as it is likely a necessary skillset to lead units to perform under harsh conditions for extended periods of time (as evidenced in the case study of the Alcazar), it should probably either go under Leads or should be in a category of its own.

Research Concerning Spanish Civil War and the Siege of the Alcazar

Because this research was conducted around a particular historical battle, it yielded additional areas for research not directly related to the topic of leadership. Two of

¹⁴³ Ibid., 121.

those areas are; the role of moral victories in shaping national will, and the role of women in combat.

The Role of Moral Victories in Shaping the National Will and Beyond

The Siege of the Alcazar may demonstrate the strategic power of a purely moral victory. The Siege was a tactically insignificant battle. Arguably, diverting troops to rescue the Alcazar extended the war another two years. However, it also helped to solidify public opinion behind Franco, not only against the Republicans, but against his Nationalist political rivalries. There is much to learn about Franco's ability to capitalize on this battle by inculcating it into the collective consciousness of Spain.

From the time the siege began, it took on epic and legendary proportions that only increased with time. It is, to this day, an important part of the Spanish identity. The legend, to include the film about the Siege, was used to excite anti-communist and pro-fascist sentiment in Italy and Germany before and during World War II. In the contemporary English speaking world, accounts of the Siege are told and re-told on websites and in books that are obviously hoping to reinvigorate traditional Catholicism. The value of the Siege to excite certain ideologies has not gone unnoticed by opponents of those ideologies. Throughout the years, various attempts have been made to discredit or downplay the typical accounts of the battle.

The Role of Women in Combat

As a matter of policy, this issue has been decided by the U.S. Army. However, debate will likely continue for generations. The Siege of the Alcazar in particular and the Spanish Civil War in general offers a near perfect case study for anyone wishing to

explore this issue from a historical perspective. Here, on the same battlefields, the Republicans and the Nationalists adopted policies at opposite ends of the spectrum.

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