CAN COUNTER-GANG MODELS BE APPLIED TO COUNTER
ISIS'S INTERNET RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN?

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In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) came to the attention of the world community due to its rapid takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria. Since then, ISIS has executed an Internet-based recruitment campaign directed at vulnerable populations worldwide, to include the United States, in order to recruit followers and encourage attacks within their homelands. Through utilization of American-based social media companies, ISIS has been able to reach its target audience in a manner that has frustrated U.S. counter-efforts due to the enormous size of the social media environment.

Through an analysis of influencing and recruitment operations, a linkage is shown between vulnerable populations susceptible to gang and terrorist recruitment. Analysis of the gang and terrorist mitigation models used against these groups draws key distinctions between intervention and deterrence-based models. Selection of specific case study applications of the models facilitates answering the primary research question: can models utilized against gangs in the United States be applied to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign?

The conclusion is that a modified deterrence-based model can be applied to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. However, the model should be applied against the technology companies providing the communication medium for ISIS's messaging.

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ABSTRACT

CAN COUNTER-GANG MODELS BE APPLIED TO COUNTER ISIS'S INTERNET RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN? by MAJ Scott M. Hinz, 102 pages.

In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) came to the attention of the world community due to its rapid takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria. Since then, ISIS has executed an Internet-based recruitment campaign directed at vulnerable populations worldwide, to include the United States, in order to recruit followers and encourage attacks within their homelands. Through utilization of American-based social media companies, ISIS has been able to reach its target audience in a manner that has frustrated U.S. counter-efforts due to the enormous size of the social media environment.

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ACRONYMS

AQI	al-Qaeda in Iraq
CSCC	Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
G	Gang
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISP	Internet Service Provider
JP	Joint Publication
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
NG	Non-gang
NSA	National Security Agency
U.S.	United States
USA PATRIOT Act	Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) came to the attention of the

world community due to its rapid takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria. Since then, ISIS

has executed an Internet-based recruitment campaign directed at vulnerable populations

worldwide, to include the United States, in order to recruit followers and encourage

attacks within their homelands. Through utilization of American-based social media

companies, ISIS has been able to reach its target audience in a manner that has frustrated

U.S. counter-efforts due to the enormous size of the social media environment. By one

estimate, supporters created 27,000 Twitter accounts in support of ISIS in the month

following the August 2014 execution of American, James Foley.[1]

This campaign has also sought to encourage Americans to travel to Syria in order

to join the group. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey estimated

that two hundred fifty Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to join the

group in testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security on 21 October

2015.[2] Though this number may seem small, it is worth noting that FBI Assistant

Director for Counterterrorism, Michael Steinbach, estimated that number at only one

hundred fifty on 26 February 2015 representing a 67 percent increase in eight months.[3]

Social media has provided terrorist groups such as ISIS with the ability to present

multiple narratives to target audiences. Due to the popularity of social media with

younger generations, ISIS is able to apply a framework to spot, assess, recruit, and

radicalize in order to draw vulnerable populations to their cause.[4] Utilization of

technology to reach followers is not a new concept for terrorist groups. In a 2005

message, Al-Qaeda Deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, "More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media."[5] ISIS has adapted this threat by blending homegrown violent extremism with foreign fighter ideology in a manner designed to engage a target audience with varied motivations in order to facilitate radicalization.[6]

The targeted recruitment of vulnerable populations is not without precedence in the United States. These same vulnerable populations are representative of the audience that gangs recruit from through targeted messaging. Much like ISIS, these gangs offer their potential members the protection and emotional and social support which is frequently lacking amongst at-risk youth.[7] By the FBI's estimation, there are currently 33,000 gangs in the United States, with 1.4 million members.[8] Joining a gang, much like the radicalization of a youth by ISIS, is a gradual process and does not usually occur due to a single incident or grievance. Research shows that the youth are pushed and pulled into gangs over a length of time spent with members – often as much as a year.[9] This gradual process is not without costs to communities. In the 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, gangs accounted for an average of 48 percent of violent crime in most jurisdictions, and up to 90 percent in others.[10]

Because of the toll these gangs take on their community, there have been multiple models developed to counter gangs as well as reduce their influence in the community. Due to gang problems not being a new issue, researchers have been able to apply a more rigorous examination of both the issue as well as the models designed to counter gangs over time. This differs with the issue of ISIS's recruitment campaign, whose currency

prevents that framing. Through an examination of the models used to counter gangs, this thesis will attempt to establish a model to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment efforts.

This chapter introduces the background and problem of ISIS's Internet recruitment efforts to the reader and the parallels to gangs in the United States. The primary and secondary research questions are introduced which will guide the research and findings of subsequent chapters. Key assumptions, definitions, and scope of the study provide the background and boundaries of the study. Additionally, limitations and delimitations narrow the focus of the research for both feasibility and applicability. This study emphasizes the size and scope of the social media environment, and the parallels between involvement in gangs and terrorist groups such as ISIS. The end of the chapter summarizes chapter 1 and provide the structure of the following chapters.

<u>Primary and Secondary Research Questions</u>

The primary research question of the thesis is can models utilized against gangs in the United States be applied to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign? In order to answer the primary research question for the thesis, secondary research questions are needed to guide the research and findings of later chapters. The secondary research questions to support the primary research question are the following: (1) Are there demographics within the United States more susceptible to gang and terrorist recruiting; (2) Does public perception or involvement affect the success or failure of a model; and (3) Are there methods within models which are effective but susceptible to legal challenges?

<u>Assumptions</u>

Assumptions are key when examining a topic that resonates in our current environment. Additionally, these assumptions help to ensure the continued relevancy of the topic due to remaining in affect. The key assumption of this study is that ISIS will continue to utilize the Internet and social media as a successful recruitment method. Additionally, ISIS will continue to present a credible threat to the United States, which will require efforts on our part to counter them. This will include ISIS continuing to call for attacks on the United States and other Coalition member nations. These assumptions are valid as demonstrated in the terrorist attack in Paris, France, on 13 November 2015, San Bernardino, California, on 2 December 2015, and Brussels, Belgium, on 22 March 2016.

In regards to counter-gang efforts, the models are assumed to meet legality criteria. This includes both our criminal and Constitutional legal framework. This is vital to ensuring that lessons learned from their application will maintain relevancy due to acceptability and feasibility. This will become key in later chapters when developing a proposed model to counter ISIS's recruitment campaign.

<u>Definitions</u>

As part of the introduction chapter, it is important to provide the reader with a definition and explanation of any terms which are key to understanding the research study. In accordance with Student Text 20-10, this section provides the reader with the definitions of terms used throughout the study. This facilitates the reader framing the definitions in a specific manner in order understand the thesis.[11] For the purpose of this

thesis, definitions are across three categories: (1) the threat, (2) information operations, and (3) models for countering influencers (gangs, terrorists, etc.).

The focus of this paper and primary threat it addresses is that of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also referred to as ISIS or the Islamic State. Many readers are mistaken into believing that ISIS did not exist before 2014, when it became prevalent in Western media reporting. As detailed by the Chairman of the Threat Knowledge Group and Distinguished Chair of Military Theory of the Marine Corps University, Dr. Sebastian Gorka, there is much more to their past. ISIS is in actuality the evolution of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that fought against Coalition forces during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation NEW DAWN. With the death of al-Zarqawi in 2006, AQI leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri formed the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under ISIS's current leader, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. ISIS expanded after the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 and became a player in the Syrian Civil War in 2013.[12] The combination of instability in Iraq and Syria allowed ISIS to gain strength and territory with the May 2014 seizure of Ramadi and June 2014 seizures of Samarra, Mosul, and Tikrit. On 29 June 2014, al-Baghdadi announced the re-establishment of the worldwide Islamic caliphate and the renaming of ISIS to the Islamic State.[13]

The priorities for ISIS are much different from that of Al-Qaeda, which has facilitated its rise to dominance. The three priorities of ISIS are Allah, the Caliphate, and the Ummah – the global community of Muslims.[14] These priorities differ from Al-Qaeda, which focuses on the enemies of Israel and the United States. AQI, and now ISIS, focus on the al-Sham, often referred to as the Levant.[15] Many readers will distinguish this wording in how some refer to ISIS as ISIL, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The

Levant refers to the areas of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, and is destined as the location for the final Jihad between Muslims and Crusader Christians.[16] This Jihad will culminate in a final battle in the Syrian city of Dabiq, also the name of ISIS's propaganda magazine, where the world will end, and Allah will judge who goes to hell and who goes to heaven.[17] ISIS and its estimated sixty thousand followers are in many ways no different from any other "end of days" fanatical cult.[18] The issue is that most cults do not possess territory, thirty-five affiliated worldwide groups, or an estimated yearly income of $500 million.[19]

In regards to information operations, in both gangs and terrorist groups, it is necessary to define target audiences and vulnerable populations who are susceptible to messaging. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, *Information Operation*, refers to target audiences as, "An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA."[20] This is key when we examine how both gangs and terrorist groups deliberately target certain individuals or demographics for their influencing operations. These influencing operations can lead to anything from recruitment to motivating an individual to conduct a violent act on the group's behalf.

Within target audiences is the sub-set of vulnerable populations. Though JP 3-13 serves as the key Joint Publication for information operations, it does not provide a definition for vulnerable populations, despite the referenced concept within the JP. Vulnerable populations are not defined higher up the doctrinal chain to JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, despite the Department of Defense's key role in the fight against ISIS. In fact, the majority of accepted definitions for the term found on the Internet deal with health care. The best

definition of vulnerable populations, and most relevant to this thesis, comes from Yale

University's Human Subject Research Resource and Education Program, which

researchers use as a guide to the Common Rule for human subject research. It defines

vulnerable populations as individuals with conditions, either intrinsic or situational, that

interfere with the individuals' autonomy or decision-making abilities. These individuals

have difficulty providing consent to protect their interests or are at-risk to intimidation or

exploitation.[21] They further divide vulnerable populations into the following categories:

(1) cognitive or communicative (disabled, seriously ill, children, etc.), (2) institutional

(prisoners, students, employees), (3) medical (terminally ill), (4) economic (dependent,

impoverished), and (5) social (minorities).[22] Understanding vulnerable population is key

when examining models to counter influencers later in the thesis.

Defining the intervention and deterrence-based models facilitates the modeling of

later chapters. Intervention-based strategies require the coordinated intervention of law

enforcement, educators, job-training resources, parents, and community groups in order

to reduce the involvement of high-risk youth in gangs. Key to those is the coordination of

efforts and information sharing among these agencies in order to ensure a comprehensive

approach to the problem. These strategies show communities with high gang activity

generally have high poverty levels, joblessness, and poor coordination of prevention

services.[23]

Deterrence models (also referred to as "pulling levers" policing) focus deterrence

actions on a specific problem within an area. The models target a specific criminal

behavior (such as gun violence) being committed by a small number of chronic offenders.

These offenders, in order for the model to be effective, must be vulnerable to sanctions or

punishment. In this model, law enforcement directly confronts the offenders, informs them the targeted behavior will no longer be tolerated, and that all means (or levers) will be applied against them. This then requires coordinated action to swiftly target and punish those who refuse to comply with the warnings. To enhance these efforts, positive incentives (job training, social services, etc.) assist those who comply.[24]

<div align="center">Scope</div>

Originally, this research focused on two populations: gangs and hate groups. Hate groups were removed due to initial research showing the targeted audiences and methods between gangs and hate groups were divergent. Additionally, the audience for hate group recruitment was different from the primary audience for ISIS. Hate groups, by definition, attempt to recruit from within their own race and culture, and direct their hate at outsiders. ISIS, on the other hand, has devoted specific attention to radicalizing outsiders, whose familiarity with their own culture makes them more difficult to detect prior to a terrorist act.[25]

Additionally, the timeframe was narrowed in scope to post-World War II through the present day. The key aspect of technology guided this decision. The assumption is also made that the older the research and findings are from our present day, the more issues that will arise due to relevancy and changes within a society.

The models were expanded to encompass both intervention and deterrence-based models. This allows the research to gain credibility by looking at models from two different perspectives in order to gather lessons learned across the counter-gang and counter-terrorism approaches. Additionally, this allows development of a more robust

model to counter ISIS's recruitment efforts due to the terrorist group's demonstrated adaptability.

Limitations

A key limitation that exists is the lack of publicly available information on the ISIS threat within the United States and known American sympathizers. The FBI has roughly nine hundred active investigations in the United States of sympathizers of ISIS and other extremist groups.[26] Due to these being ongoing investigations, information on the individuals is not available. Additionally, much of the data on ISIS efforts within the United States is For Official Use Only or Law Enforcement Only classification, and would affect the overall classification level of the thesis.

Another limitation that exists is the lack of reliable statistics from social media companies in regards to the quantity of ISIS-affiliated sites, which exist on their servers. Much of this is due to the lack of active monitoring measures utilized by social media companies. Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube all rely on user-generated reports in order to flag content for further investigation. Facebook, for example, will only disclose data to law enforcement under the basis of a valid subpoena, a court order, or search warrant. They additionally state, "We interpret the national security letter provision as applied to Facebook to require the production of only two categories of information: name and length of service."[27]

Delimitations

Self-imposed constraints focus the research efforts as well as add significance to the study. This study focused strictly on ISIS recruitment efforts directed at the U.S.

population, and did not examine their efforts directed at other nations. Researchers estimate roughly 20,000 foreign fighters that have joined ISIS from over one hundred nations.[28] It would not be feasible to thoroughly research that wide of an audience, and there are issues due to varied legal laws and restrictions that govern nations. Additionally, in order to construct a model, it would be necessary to research the gang issues in all of those nations.

An additional self-imposed constraint was the decision not to seek information or interviews with ISIS or its representatives. This is for feasibility as well as safety and security concerns. Additionally, any research material gathered from a terrorist group would likely affect the overall classification level of the thesis. It also would not be practical.

<center>Significance of the Study</center>

The highest levels of our government recognize the threat posed by utilization of social media by adversaries. In a 23 October 2015, House Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee meeting, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Michael D. Lumpkin, spoke on the unprecedented scope of the challenges posed by our enemy's usage of the Internet to spread information.[29] During the meeting, Lumpkin stated, "Social media and other communications technologies have enabled the virtual and, in some cases, actual mobilization of dispersed and demographically varied audiences across the world."[30] The military is already recognizing the relevance of this issue with such actions as the U.S Special Operations Command expanding its Military Information Support Operations (MISO) training to include social media use, online advertising, and web design.[31]

<center>10</center>

The size of the social media environment itself requires an analysis of models to counter our adversary's usage. According to Twitter's internal statistics, they have approximately 320-million monthly active users with thirty-five-plus languages supported and 77 percent of accounts located outside the United States.[32] YouTube cites having over a billion users with mobile users averaging forty or more minutes per viewing session.[33] Facebook estimates having 1.44 billion monthly active users with 75 percent located outside the United States.[34] With the audience reach, growth, and low/no cost that social media provides, it is unrealistic to think ISIS would stop utilizing this communication medium to reach audiences.

By examining the social identity theories of gang membership, we are better able to frame why ISIS holds appeal to vulnerable populations. To the average individual, the violent behavior of a street gang or ISIS is equally unappealing. Yet, both groups continue to increase membership and influence audiences. Social identity theory examines how identification with a group affects an individual's views of themselves and others, and their behavior to both group members and those outside of the group.[35] This view not only helps explain the violence perpetrated by gang members or terrorists, but also how the threat of violence results in solidarity amongst members. Psychologist, Eric Shaw, has examined this through his "personal pathway model," which explains how terrorists solidify their identity through the cohesion and connections from shared experiences and hardships.[36] This same concept can be applied to gang members when examining how the threats posed by rival gangs and police help to increase the cohesion amongst members.[37]

<u>Structure of the Paper</u>

This chapter introduced the background and problem of ISIS's Internet recruiting efforts. The primary and secondary research questions were detailed. Assumptions, definitions, and scope of the research established the boundaries of the study. Additionally, limitations and delimitations focus the research. The parallels between involvement in gangs and involvement in terrorist groups demonstrates the significance of this study. Additionally, the size and reach of social media environment is shown.

Chapter 2 provides the literature review of the key models developed to counter gangs and terrorist groups. For countering gangs, the effectiveness of intervention-based and deterrence-based models is examined. For intervention-based models, the Spergel Model is the primary point of research and analysis due to its primacy in the Federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention program. For deterrence-based models, the primary point of research is focused deterrence models with emphasis placed on real-world application such as in the Boston Gun Project of the mid-1990s. Amongst countering the influence of terrorist groups, the emphasis is on lessons learned from previous attempts to counter messaging and the technology that supports it. Examination of these actions, within a framework of intervention or deterrence, facilitates the analysis of later chapters.

Chapter 3 outlines the research methods and techniques utilized to gather the data for the analysis and findings of chapter 4. This includes the methodology of the research as well as the methods of data collection. Chapter 3 additionally details the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen research method and the sources of data. The specific case studies analyzed in chapter 4 are also noted.

Chapter 4 identifies the key lessons and effectiveness of the counter-gang and counter-terrorist models based on the case studies in chapter 3. The secondary research questions are applied against the selected case studies in order to guide the analysis of the chapter. This analysis facilitates the conclusions and findings in chapter 5.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and recommendations of the thesis based on the analysis of the case studies in chapter 4. A proposed model is developed, through the case study analysis, for application against ISIS's recruitment efforts. Additionally, how this model applies in the current U.S. operating environment is examined. Due to the timeliness of this problem, this hypothesis testing relies on assumptions. Any gaps in the research and data, as well as areas for further research, are detailed. The significance of the findings of the thesis to the field of study details and demonstrates the successful answers to the primary and secondary research questions.

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this study is to examine whether models utilized against gangs in the United States can be applied to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. A key part of this is conducting the literature review. A literature review provides the reader with the background literature and research that has been done on models to counter gangs and terrorist groups. With this background, the reader will be able to follow the analysis of the lessons learned and the development of a proposed model to counter ISIS's recruitment campaign.

Chapter 2's review divides the literature into three separate sections: influencing and recruitment, gang mitigation models, and the terrorist mitigation models. The section on influencing and recruitment will separately focus on processes used by terrorist groups and those utilized by gangs. The section on gang mitigation models will focus on the separate approaches of intervention and deterrence-based models. The section on terrorist mitigation models will also focus on intervention and deterrence-based models, but with an emphasis on online efforts. The goal of the sections on gang and terrorist models is to provide a basis of knowledge on the current literature without drifting into the analysis and findings of chapters 4 and 5.

Influencing and Recruitment

A review of the literature on influencing and recruitment is necessary in order to understand how individuals are influenced to join groups, whether a criminal gang or a terrorist group. Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, provides an examination

of how our military utilizes targeted messaging to influence groups. A primary point of

the publication is the process that occurs in order to influence a target audience. Targeted

audiences are divided into the sub-sets of key influencers, mass audiences, and vulnerable

populations. With an identification of the target audience, analysis on how the target

audience perceives its environment based on rules, norms, and beliefs occurs. This

analysis allows an influencer to decide on an integrated application of means (assets) in

order to achieve a desired end-state of modifying how a target audience collects,

processes, perceives, disseminates, and acts (or does not act) on information.[1]

Figure 1.   Application of Information-Related Capabilities to Achieve Influence

Source: Office of the Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, *Information Operations*
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 27 November 2012), I-7.

The RAND Corporation examined this further in their study of individuals influenced and recruited to support terrorist groups and the process that leads to carrying out a terrorist act. In its study, *Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect Potential Violent Acts*, examination is made on how individuals move through the process and indicators that are present for potential identification. Its research identified five phases individuals go through in order to carry out an act: (1) developing intent, (2) planning and laying groundwork, (3) immediate pre-execution, (4) execution, and (5) aftermath.[2]

Within the first phase of developing intent, three sub-phases explain how an individual develops a motivation, disposition, or inclination for an [terrorist] act. The sub-phases are: (1a) psychological and emotional development; (1b) psychological convergence; and (1c) recruitment or joining.[3] Psychological and emotional development deals with early indicators of behaviors and risk factors for a potentially vulnerable population. One key aspect was that risk factors usually occur in clusters and have a much greater affect than a single risk factor. An example is a Surgeon General study which found, ". . . a 10-year-old exposed to 6 or more risks factors is 10 times as likely to be violent by age 18 as a 10-year-old exposed to only one factor."[4] As a vulnerable individual is influenced by a group, they transition into a second sub-phase called psychological convergence. In this sub-phase, an influenced individual is now committing to involvement in a cause, belief system, or group with violent intent. This includes radicalization and direct involvement with a group, with social media becoming a key indicator.[5] The final phase discussed is that of recruitment or joining where an individual directly participates in a group's activities. The study also notes that some

individuals can jump directly to this phase due to population or socially normative environments.[6]

The concepts of terrorist messaging and target audiences was examined further by Professor Gabriel Weimann in his book, *Terror on the Internet*, which was supported by an endowment from the United States Institute of Peace. In his examination of target audiences, he identifies that terrorist messaging has four audiences: supporters of the terrorist organization, the population the organization purports to serve, the enemy, and international public opinion.[7] In examining the violent rhetoric of terrorist sites, he discusses Albert Bandura's theory of selective moral disengagement, which describes how individuals generally refrain from (violent) behavior until they have justified the morality of their actions. This includes methods such as displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, dehumanization of targets, use of euphemistic language, making of advantageous comparisons, distortion of sequences of events, and attribution of blame.[8] This becomes a key concept when examining how a group attempts to gain legitimacy in the eyes of an audience in order to progress through the stages of "developing intent," as detailed in the RAND study.

The role of risk factors was observed by Jody Miller in her study, *"Getting into Gangs,"* which examined gang membership and influencers on female gang populations. In her study, she examines three common pathways for why the forty-eight females in her study became involved in gangs. They are neighborhood exposure, gang-involved family members, and problems within the family. A key point of her study is that few girls joined the gangs due to a single pathway. Instead, 90 percent reported two or more of the pathways and 44 percent reported all three pathways influenced their gang involvement.[9]

Miller further compared the three pathways to gang membership for her forty-eight study cases against forty-six females who were not involved in gangs. When comparing the three pathways, the biggest gap between the two groups was in the area of "problems within the family." Miller shows the influence the family has on delinquency and gang behavior amongst the two groups (Gang-G/Non-gang-NG) in such areas as: witness to physical violence between adults (56 percent-G, 26 percent-NG); abused by family member (46 percent-G, 26 percent-NG); regular drug use at home (58 percent-G, 17 percent-NG); three-plus family problems (60 percent-G, 24 percent-NG).[10]

Terence Thornberry examined of the linkage between delinquency and gang membership in his study, "Longitudinal Perspectives on Adolescent Street Gangs." In this study, he identified three models to explain the linkage. The first was the selection model. This model argues that individuals inclined towards violence and delinquency are more likely to seek out or be recruited into a gang. These individuals would still engage in violent or delinquent behavior, even if not part of a gang.[11] The second model was the facilitation model. This argues that gang members do not have a higher propensity for violence and delinquency than non-gang members do. By joining the gang, group processes and dynamics facilitate an increased involvement in delinquent behavior.[12] The third model was the enhancement model. This argues that individuals already involved in delinquency are more likely to join gangs, and their delinquency is likely to increase once in the gang.[13] Thornberry's modeling was applied to longitudinal studies conducted by himself and other researchers to examine the influence of gangs on individuals over time. Three key findings have come from those studies. First, there is no evidence in support of the pure selection model, which suggests gang members have a higher rate of

delinquency than non-members do. Second, delinquency almost universally increases

when adolescents join gangs. Third, there is a minor selection effect in support of the

enhancement model.[14]

Gang Mitigation Models

When reviewing gang mitigation models, the two primary types researched were

intervention models and deterrence models. Intervention models have both a prevention

and intervention basis with a goal of preventing gang membership and removing

individuals from gangs once they become involved. They, additionally, have the goal of

suppressing the influence of the gangs within a community.[15] Deterrence models require

gang suppression efforts designed to directly target gangs and their structures. The small

group of individuals who are responsible for the bulk of crimes are directly targeted.

Frequently, increases in gun violence and/or homicides within a specific location are

recipients of these efforts.[16]

Gang Intervention Model

The primary intervention model examined, and most prevalent throughout

research, is the Spergel Model. The Spergel Model is based on gang intervention research

conducted by researchers, Dr. Spergel and Dr. Curry, in the 1980s, through data collected

from 254 law enforcement and social service agencies, nationwide. In their research, they

identified the five primary intervention strategies of: (1) suppression, (2) social

intervention, (3) organizational change, (4) community mobilization, and (5) social

opportunities. Suppression is direct law enforcement and legal action taken against gangs.

Social intervention is primarily crisis responses to immediate issues with gang members

and their families with a goal of separating gang members from vulnerable individuals. Organizational change involves the creation of task forces to coordinate efforts against gangs. Community mobilization addresses the fundamental causes of gangs and gang members and requires coordinated actions between families, schools, community and religious organizations, as well as law enforcement. Finally, social opportunity approaches deal with addressing expansion of job prospects and educational assistance in order to address the fundamental causes of gang membership.[17]

In their findings, they found suppression was used by 44 percent of respondents, social intervention was used by 32 percent, organizational change was used by 11 percent, community mobilization was used by 9 percent, and social opportunities was only used by 5 percent. Despite this low utilization of community mobilization and social opportunities, these gang intervention strategies were identified as the most effective by the participating cities.[18] Through analysis of these findings, Dr. Irvin Spergel created the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program.[19] This program is referred to as the Spergel Model, and is focused on flexible community-wide approaches to gang problems that can be tailored to the specific location. It does this through combining all five of the previously mentioned strategies while emphasizing the often-neglected aspects of community mobilization and social opportunities. The prominence of the Spergel Model resulted in its central role in programs led by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.[20]

<center>Gang Deterrence Model</center>

Whereas intervention models address the root causes of gang membership, deterrence models are designed to address the problems generated by gangs. The first

<center>23</center>

step of the process involves a mobilization of both law enforcement and community resources to coordinate efforts against an identified problem and the groups or individuals responsible for the problem. Targeting of the offending group and individuals occurs through a "pulling levers" approach, which involves applying a wide-range of actions against the group in order to change behavior. Key to the process is communicating with the group the reason they are receiving the attention, and the changes in behavior required to make the efforts stop.[21]

A primary application of this deterrence model was the Boston Gun Project/Operation Cease-Fire of the mid-1990s in the city of Boston. Faced with an increase in youth homicides within the city of Boston, a working group was created consisting of federal and local law enforcement, community organizations, and civilian researchers. When examining the murders in Boston from 1990-1995, they concluded that one percent of the gang members in the city were responsible for 60 percent of the city's homicides. Additionally, a majority of the victims and offenders had previous criminal infractions.[22] As a response, the Boston Gun Project in 1995 targeted both the supply side of the illegal firearms market as well as the demand side. The supply side was targeted through focused investigative and prosecution efforts at both the federal and state level. On the demand side, probation and parole officers increased visits to clients, which facilitated searches and enforcement of sentencing conditions.[23] The program was followed by Operation Cease-Fire in 1995, which focused efforts in neighborhoods with elevated gun homicide rates. The first step was meetings between law enforcement and gang members in order to communicate a "zero tolerance policy" for youth involved gun violence. Additionally, law enforcement emphasized that noncompliance would result in

an application of the "pulling levers" approach and extra attention. The second step was the actions to support the message. In this phase, law enforcement focused resources on enforcing minor quality of life statutes to prevent more serious crimes by gang members. These include such statutes as graffiti, truancy, noise complaints, or public drinking.[24] In initial evaluations of the approach, the program's efforts were associated with a 63 percent decrease in monthly youth homicides, a 32 percent decrease in shots-fired calls, and a 25 percent decrease in gun assaults.[25]

Terrorist Mitigation Models

When reviewing terrorist mitigation models, two models are applicable to countering terrorists in cyberspace. The first model examined is an intervention model based on the usage of counter-messaging and digital outreach in order to delegitimize the messages of the group and their influence on potential audiences. The second model is a deterrence model based on utilization of Department of the Treasury regulations and Federal Legal Statutes to target individuals and companies providing the needed technological infrastructure for terrorist messaging.

Terrorist Intervention Model

The primary force behind counter-messaging and digital outreach in the United States is the U.S. State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CSCC was created in the fall of 2011 with the initial mission to "identify, confront, and undermine the communications of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates."[26] With the rise of ISIS in 2014, the CSCC's mission evolved to directly target the utilization of social media by ISIS and others groups around the world. This occurs

through its "Think Again Turn Away" program, which seeks to use social media platforms to, "expose the facts about terrorists and their propaganda." This program involves the creation of videos and images in order to expose the brutality of ISIS and other terrorist groups. Additionally, the group directly engages with terrorists and their sympathizers through the social media platforms in order to present a counter-narrative.[27] According to CSCC coordinator, Alberto Fernandez, "Our target audience is not the extremists. It's the people the extremists are talking to, trying to influence. It's people who have not yet become terrorists."[28] The model of using the Internet to proactively target terrorist groups is not without precedence. In 2004, Britain's domestic secret service, MI5, launched a website designed to provide detailed information to the public on specific threats posed by terrorist groups as well as proactive measures. The site also provided the public with email addresses and telephone numbers so that the public could provide terrorism related information to the security agencies.[29]

<div align="center">Terrorist Deterrence Model</div>

The second model examined was the utilization of existing Treasury regulations and Federal legal statutes in order to target the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which provide the digital infrastructure for terrorist online communication. The key concept of this is targeting of the ISPs, which host terrorist websites, rather than engaging in a counter-message fight with the website itself. As part of this deterrence-based model, the first step is communicating the issue with the ISPs. This is significant since many are simply unaware of the content they are hosting. Mr. Mansour Al-Hadj, of the Middle East Media Research Institute, detailed the power of communicating to these ISPs in a 2010 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. He

detailed how in 2007, his group notified fifty U.S.-based ISPs that they were hosting

Jihadist content with a request to voluntarily remove the sites. In one week, thirty-two of

the fifty removed the content.[30]

For ISPs who refuse to remove content, Gregory McNeal, associate professor of

law at Pepperdine University, has proposed a "pulling levers" approach based on the

existing Treasury regulations and Federal Statutes already utilized to target terrorist

groups and supporters. In the same 2010 House Subcommittee hearing, he addressed the

application of Executive Order 13224, enacted after 11 September 2001. This order

provides the basis for, "blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who

commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism." This order initially designated twenty-

seven targets, including Al-Qaeda, but provided the Secretary of State and Secretary of

the Treasury with the ability to add additional individuals or entities to the list.[31] Included

within the Executive Order is Section 1(d)(i), which specifies, "[persons who] assist in,

sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other

services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed in the Annex to

this order or determined to be subject to this order."[32] Mr. McNeal argues that the

placement of a group on the list requires that U.S. persons, including ISPs and domain

name registers, not provide support to these designated sanction targets.[33] This is codified

in Section 2 (a), which states, "any transaction or dealing by United States persons or

within the United States in property or interests in property blocked pursuant to this order

is prohibited, including but not limited to the making or receiving of any contribution of

funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of those persons listed in the Annex to this

order or determined to be subject to this order."[34] National emergency powers under

Executive Order 13224, provide the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control with administrative and enforcement powers. Within their enforcement powers is the ability to impose controls on transactions as well as freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction, which opens violating companies to penalties and sanctions.[35]

Mr. McNeal also presents a case for legal action for ISPs who refuse to comply with Executive Order 13224 and pursuant Treasury regulations. Federal prosecutors possess this power under U.S. Code Title 18 – Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Section 2339A – *Providing Material Support to Terrorists*.[36] Under 2339A, material support is defined as, "any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communication equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, and transportation."[37] Violations of this section subject the offending party to both financial fines as well as prison term of up to fifteen years. However, if a violation results in the death of any person, the prison term increases to any term of years or life in prison.[38] This statute provides a basis for charges against individuals in the U.S. who create terrorist websites for recruiting and financial purposes as shown in the 2004 indictment of Babar Ahmad in Connecticut.[39]

<p align="center">Summary</p>

This chapter introduced the reader to the background literature and research on models to counter both gangs and terrorist groups. The three separate sections: influencing and recruitment, gang mitigation models, and terrorist mitigation models were reviewed. The gang and terrorist mitigation models were divided into subsections

focused on intervention and deterrence-based models. This demonstrated the differences in the models, which is key to the analysis and findings of subsequent chapters in order to develop a proposed model to counter ISIS's recruitment campaign.

The section on influencing and recruitment demonstrated the linkage between the target audiences for gang and terrorist recruitment. Additionally, the process individuals transition through in order to develop intent shows the role of risk factors and social groupings. Terence Thornberry researched this further in his examination of the interaction between individual delinquency and susceptibility to membership in a group.

The intervention models, for both gangs and terrorist groups, shows the key combination of intervention and prevention actions in order to suppress negative group behaviors. This requires unity of effort between multiple stake-holders, in a tailorable approach to a specific problem-set. Additionally, thorough analysis must be done on the environment and personnel to ensure efforts are directed at the correct influencers and audiences.

The deterrence-based models, for both groups, relies on the identification of specific problems and responsible individuals within a community. This allows communication by the authorities, to the offending individuals, regarding the unacceptability of the behavior and the potential application of "pulling-levers" deterrence actions if actions continue. This approach also relies on unity of effort amongst organization to increase the effectiveness of the actions and bring about behavioral change.

The literature review provides the reader with the background knowledge necessary to follow the analysis and modeling of later chapters. The understanding of the

similarities and differences between models provides a point of reference for development of a proposed model in response to the primary research question. Additionally, the reader is able to analyze past actions and modeling to develop an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses inherent to both models. In the thesis text, titles of books, published documents, magazines, journals, and newspapers are italicized;[40] thesis and dissertation titles are enclosed in quotation marks.[41] See chapter 22 of Turabian for more formats for titles.[42]

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[1] Office of the Joint Staff, JP 3-13, I-4-5.

[2] Paul Davis et al., *Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect Potential Violent Acts: A Review of the Science Base* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 10-11.

[3] Ibid., 15.

[4] Ibid., 16.

[5] Ibid., 25-26.

[6] Ibid., 26.

[7] Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: the New Arena, the New Challenges* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 38.

[8] Ibid., 55-57.

[9] Miller, 87.

[10] Ibid., 92.

[11] Terence Thornberry and Marvin Krohn, "Gang Membership and Offending Patterns," in *The Modern Gang Reader*, ed. Cheryl L. Maxson, Arlen Egley, and Malcolm Klein (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 412.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 418.

[15] Irving Spergel, Kwai Ming Wa, and Rolando Sosa, "The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Program Model," in *The Modern Gang Reader*, ed. Cheryl L. Maxson, Arlen Egley, and Malcolm Klein (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 451.

[16] Anthony Braga, "Focused Deterrence Strategies and the Reduction of Gang and Group-Involved Violence," in *The Modern Gang Reader*, ed. Cheryl L. Maxson, Arlen Egley, and Malcolm Klein (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 475.

[17] Decker, 47-48.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Spergel, Wa, and Sosa, 451.

[20] Decker, 51.

[21] Braga, 475-476.

[22] Colleen Heath, "Boston's Gang Intervention Plan: A Program Evaluation," *Discourse of Sociological Practice* 3, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 19, SocINDEX with Full Text, EBSCOhost.

[23] Decker, 56.

[24] Heath, 19.

[25] Braga, 477.

[26] House Committee of Foreign Affairs, House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, *The State Departments Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications: Missions, Operations, and Impact*, 112th Cong., 2d sess., 2012, serial 112–164, 2.

[27] Yasmin Tadjdeh, "Government, Industry Countering Islamic State's Social Media Campaign," *National Defense* 99, no. 773 (December 2014): 24, accessed 11 November 2015, http://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=99889630&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[28] Altman, 2.

[29] Weimann, 239-240.

[30] House Committee Foreign of Affairs, House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, *U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites*, 111th Cong., 2d sess., 2010, serial 111-130, 7.

[31] Ibid., 27-29.

[32] George W. Bush, Executive Order no. 13224, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism," Code of Federal Regulations 66 FR 49079, title 3 (25 September 2001): 49080, accessed 11 November 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/13224.pdf.

[33] House Committee on Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites*, 29.

[34] Bush.

[35] Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), "Terrorism and Financial Intelligence," U.S. Department of the Treasury, accessed 11 November 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx.

[36] House Committee, *Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites*, 31-32.

[37] U.S. Code, Title 18 – Crimes and Criminal Procedure, "Section 2339A. Providing Material Support to Terrorists," 18 U.S.C. 2339A, 3 January 2012, accessed 11 November 2015, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2014-title18/pdf/USCODE-2014-title18-partI-chap113B-sec2339A.pdf.

[38] Ibid.

[39] McNeal, House Committee, *U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites*, 32.

[40] Turabian, 316.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid., 316-17.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to devise a model to apply against ISIS's recruitment strategy, it is necessary to develop a research methodology to guide the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data. In chapters 1 and 2, the reader was introduced to the background data of the problem and key literature that has been written in this regard. This assists the reader in developing the framework of the problem in order to understand the analysis of the later chapters. The research methodology presented in this chapter provides the reader with the linkage between the background material and the analysis.

Chapter 3 is organized into three sections. The first is the methodology section, that provides a description of the methods used to guide the research and analysis. The section also details strengths and weaknesses of the research methodology chosen. The second section is a description of the primary case studies analyzed to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The case study analysis will allow later answering of the primary research question: can models utilized against gangs in the United States be applied to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. The secondary research questions to support the primary research question are the following: (1) Are there demographics within the United States more susceptible to gang and terrorist recruiting; (2) Does public perception or involvement affect the success or failure of a model; and (3) Are there methods within models which are effective but susceptible to legal challenges? Through selection of appropriate case studies, analysis and findings will be available to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The third and final

section is a summary of the information provided in this chapter and the description of the structure of the following sections of the paper.

Methodology

A qualitative research methodology and case study design is used for this thesis. Creswell describes qualitative research as, "a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions or procedures; collecting data in the participant's settings; analyzing the data inductively; building from particulars to general themes; and making interpretations of the meaning of the data."[1] This differs from quantitative research which tests or examines theories through the relationship of measurable variables, usually through statistical procedures.[2]

Within qualitative research, there lies a multitude of approaches. This thesis utilizes a case study based design. Case study design require researching a particular program, event, activity, or process in-depth and collecting data through a multitude of procedures.[3] In analyzing the effectiveness and lessons of the counter-gang models, it is necessary to examine specific instances of the models applications. These applications of the models become the specific case studies for research.

The overall purpose of case study design is to generate relevant findings beyond the scope of the individual cases. Case study design is considered appropriate when 1) a large and varied set of factors and relationships are present, 2) no clear law exist regarding the relationship between factors and their levels of importance, and 3) when the factors and relationships can be observed and/or interpreted by the researcher.[4] The ever-

evolving nature of gang and terrorist recruitment, combined with the multitude of approaches to counter, makes selection of a case study design an appropriate choice.

An additional strength of case study design is the flexibility of the approach. Case study design does not rely on the rigid structure of other designs. The researcher is better prepared to deal with unexpected findings and reorient the study as developments occur. As a result, the researcher is forced to consider, and analyze, the interrelations of factors in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the events being studied while developing more general theoretical understanding[5]. This allows repeated analysis of initial data throughout the study with new data and analysis directing additional investigation. This assists the researcher identifying potential theoretical implications through identifying facts to confirm or deny assumptions guiding the research[6].

Key to assessing the quality of research results is the factors of reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the extent which repeated application of the same research instruments, under constant conditions, produces the same results[7]. Case studies cannot claim this widely accepted definition of reliability due to the lack of constant conditions. The lack of consistency is actually a strength of case study design since the varied ways in which an event occurs are relevant to developing general theoretical understanding[8]. Validity refers to the degree which the researcher has investigated what they set out to investigate. This is a concern with case study design due to the reliance on subjective understanding and analysis. This poses a potential for bias by the researcher[9]. Researchers counter this through application of varied controls to test the validity of findings. Additionally, the researcher must base interpretations on several sources of evidence while revalidating the findings based on comparison of evidence[10].

A potential problem for case study design is the introduction of researcher bias into the study. The unstructured nature of the problems studies through case study design often prevents introducing this bias[11]. Additionally, the background and experience of the researcher can result in the introduction of bias[12]. This is countered by selecting respected and reputable researchers who data and analysis are widely accepted. Additionally, in this thesis, the researcher lacks a professional background in the topics analyzed and lacks previous biases which could prejudice the analysis and findings.

The intervention and deterrence-based models for gang and terrorist mitigation were introduced to the reader in chapter 2's review of the literature. For each model a specific counter-gang and counter-terror case study is selected for analysis. In chapter 4, each of the case studies is framed against the secondary research questions in order to provide analysis. This allows the reader to compare and contrast the approaches, and provide a comprehensive analysis of strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned. The goal is to develop theoretical understanding and findings beyond the scope of the individual case studies. These findings will assist in the conclusion and development of a proposed model for the primary research question in chapter 5.

<u>Counter-Gang Case Studies</u>

The Spergel Model was selected due to its prevalence and status among the specific intervention-based, counter-gang models. The case study of the Chicago community of Little Village was chosen to analyze the model's application to the goal of reducing violence between two opposing Latino street gang coalitions.[13] This is a well-analyzed case study among multiple researchers, to include the U.S. Department of Justice. From 1992-1995, the Chicago Police Department applied the Spergel Model in

the Little Village neighborhood through a program called the Little Village Gang

Violence Reduction Project (GVRP).[14] Little Village was a community of about 5.5

square miles and located approximately 8 miles from the Chicago's business center. This

area was a comprised of an estimated 60,000 residents and 30,000 undocumented

aliens[15]. Of the 90,000 inhabitants, approximately 90 percent were Mexican or Mexican-

American. Despite the physically small size of this community, it was one of the most

violent gang areas in Chicago with gang membership split between the Latin Kings and

the Two-Six. From 1989-1992, these two gangs accounted for 75 percent of homicides,

batteries, and assaults in Little Village[16].

For deterrence-based counter-gang models, the case study of the Boston Gun

Project was chosen and initially detailed in chapter 2. This was done both to the

prevalence of research and analysis done on this well-known application of deterrence-

based modeling as well as the specifics of the project. Much like the Little Village GVRP

detailed in the previous paragraph, this model was applied in a large city in the early to

mid-1990s timeframe. Additionally, both approaches were applied in areas with a youth-

oriented gang problem, whose population was out of proportion to the amount of violence

they were responsible for within their cities. Examining case studies focused on youth-

oriented gangs will become key to the analysis of later chapters due to the statistical data

on ISIS recruits within the United States.

<center>Counter-Terror Case Studies</center>

For intervention-based counter-terror models, the case study of the U.S. State

Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications program was

chosen. The actions of this program are part of the federal government's larger

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) campaign, which seeks a wide-range of efforts against violent extremist elements such as ISIS. Though the goal is to develop a new model to apply against ISIS, understanding what we are currently doing is key. This allowed establishment of a base line of the current program as well as analysis from other researchers in regards to the successes or failures of the current campaign. Potentially, the model developed during the course of the research may be a replication of these current efforts, which then would support our current course of action.

A specific case study for a deterrence-based counter-gang model is one of the more difficult aspects of this thesis. When researching this model, it became clear that there was not a specific case study, which fits this model and applies to technology-based companies. As detailed in chapter 2, there a multitude of approached that have been introduced regarding utilization of treasury regulations and federal statues to target the digital infrastructure of terrorist online communications. Due to this, an examination was made of how these regulations and statues apply against organization and individuals accused of supporting terrorist groups and individuals. This allowed analysis of the effectiveness of these measures as well as the challenges and arguments against their utilization.

<center>Summary</center>

This chapter detailed the methodology and design facilitating the research and analysis of the paper. Additionally, the case studies for chapter 4 were provided. Through an examination of case study design, the reader has an understanding of how data collection is conducted in order to provide reliable and valid analysis. This is key to ensuring the primary and secondary research questions are properly analyzed and

answered. Additionally, discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen approach ensure avoidance of biases in the research methodology.

Chapter 4 provides the analysis and eventual findings of the thesis. This occurs through application of the secondary research questions against the case studies in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the models and their potential application against the primary research question. This facilitates the findings and conclusion in chapter 5 based on the theoretical understanding derived from the analysis.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusion of the thesis and areas where further research could occur. Additionally, research difficulties and unforeseen findings are examined for their impact on the research process. Chapter 5 ensures the primary and secondary research questions are satisfactorily answered, and that the research findings have contributed to the field of study.

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[1] John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches,* 4th ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2009), 232.

[2] Ibid., 233.

[3] Ibid., 13.

[4] Raya Fidel, "The Case Study Method: A Case Study" (Master's thesis, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of Washington, 1983), 273.

[5] Ibid., 274.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., 276.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., 286.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Decker, 51.

[14] National Institute of Justice (NIJ), "Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (Comprehensive Gang Model), NIJ-Practice Profile," accessed 13 December 2015, http://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=278.

[15] Spergel, Wa, and Sosa, 453.

[16] NIJ, "Little Village Gang Violence."

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether counter-gang models can be applied against ISIS's Internet based recruitment strategy. Chapter 3 provided the framework for the research methodology utilized in order to gather information addressing the primary and secondary research questions. Within this methodology was the selection of the specific case studies, which were analyzed, based on the research questions, in order to develop the answers to the primary research question.

Chapter 4 is divided into two specific sections in the following order: (1) secondary research question analysis, and (2) summary of analysis. The secondary research questions are analyzed against the case studies in order to guide the reader through the specific subordinate data and analysis. This provides the basis for answering the primary research question in chapter 5. The three secondary research questions are answered as separate sections with the analysis from the four case studies nested within. Certain secondary questions, such as *are there demographics within the United States more susceptible to gang/terrorist recruitment*, will be combined analysis from the case studies. Secondary questions, such as *does public perception or involvement affects the success or failure of a model*, will have separate analysis by case study due to the specificity of the question and the differences inherent to the models.

The summary of analysis provides a consolidation of the analysis of the secondary research questions. Additionally, a table provides a point of reference for the conclusions and findings of chapter 5. This leads into chapter 5's conclusion and recommendations, which will provide further interpretation of the analysis and findings of the thesis and a

"way forward" for model development and application. Within this section is analysis of if, or how, gangs and terrorist groups are similar. This facilitates the application of counter-gang models against a terrorist group.

Are There Demographics Within the United States More Susceptible to Gang/Terrorist Recruitment?

Gang Recruitment

When examining the demographics of gangs, and those who are susceptible to recruitment, it is easy to assume the image presented in the media and popular culture is correct. Researcher M. W. Klein reinforces this image in the following excerpt from his 1995 study, *The American Street Gang,* where he states, "Street gangs are an amalgam of racism, of urban underclass poverty, or minority and youth culture, of fatalism in the face of rampant deprivation, of political insensitivity, and the gross ignorance of inner-city (and inner-town) America on the part of most of us who don't have to survive there."[1] The attempt to group gangs and their members into an image of an inner city, poverty-stricken, ethnic or racial minority, young adult male is incorrect. When examining the data and analysis of multiple researchers and organizations, it becomes clear that gangs are, in fact, an evolving entity with presence and growth across demographics and regions.

This was documented by Diego Vigil in a 2002 study where he compared the experience of new immigrant groups (Vietnamese and Salvadorian immigrants) in differing regions and city sizes against traditional minority groups (African-American and Mexican-Americans) in order to gauge the susceptibility to gangs and crimes. In his study, he found that the structural changes brought by immigration and attempted

assimilation to society was key to the development of a gang within a community due to the group processes that occur during times of structural change and instability. When documenting these group processes, he found four specific elements common to the growth of gangs within the differing ethnic groups: (1) adolescent grouping, (2) formation of opposition groups, (3) group conflict, and (4) diminished stake in mainstream society-specifically economic and social marginalization.[2] What becomes key is that susceptibility to gang recruitment is less based on who you are (race, ethnicity, location, etc.) and more about the risk factors (as discussed in chapter 2) and instability within one's community. This framework links to the growth of terrorist recruitment within new immigrant populations that will be discussed in later sections of this chapter.

The differences among gang demographics across the United States are well documented in the United States Department of Justice-National Gang Center's 2011 National Gang Survey, which documented demographic info on gang members from 1996-2011. The findings confirm many common demographic indicators when combined with data across the country. It also shows a divergence in data when comparing area types (large cities, suburban counties, smaller cities, rural counties) against the combined data. One example is the difference between juvenile and adult gang members when separating data for the area types from the overall population. Below is the chart showing the combined data for the United States:

Figure 2.   Age of Gang Member, 1996-2011

Source: National Gang Center, "National Youth Gang Survey Analysis," accessed 22 December 2015, http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis.

When examining the year 2011, this data can be interpreted to mean there are more adult gang members in an area than juveniles, and that is where counter-gang models should be applied. However, the following chart shows a difference in the age demographics when the data is separated by area type.

Figure 3.   Age of Gang Members by Area Type, 2011

Source: National Gang Center, "National Youth Gang Survey Analysis," accessed 22 December 2015, https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis.

The above chart shows that the previous assumption that counter-gang models should be applied against adults versus juveniles is incorrect if in a small city or rural county where juveniles represent a larger percentage of gang members. Data comparison of these two charts demonstrates the differences in gang age demographics between area types versus the overall national data and the danger of applying models in the same manner across differing environments. By attempting to make generalized statements about the demographics that make up gangs versus examining the specifics of an area, counter-gang models are susceptible to failure due to misapplication against an incorrect target audience. This same divergence in data occurs when examining the race/ethnicity make-up of gang members. The following chart shows combined race/ethnicity data of gang members in the United States from 1996-2011:

Figure 4. Race-Ethnicity of Gang Members, 1996-2011

Source: National Gang Center, "National Youth Gang Survey Analysis," accessed 22 December 2015, https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis.

The chart can be interpreted to demonstrate that Hispanic/Latino populations are the key race/ethnicity demographic for counter-gang models to be applied against. Their higher percentage versus the other groups as well as the relatively steady rate of all race/ethnic groups across the span of data demonstrates this. However, if the year 2011 is broken out by area type, there is again a divergence of data as shown in the table below:

Table 1.   Average Race-Ethnicity of Gang Members by Area Type, 2011

	Larger Cities	Suburban Counties	Smaller Cities	Rural Counties
Black or African American	39.0%	32.7%	20.3%	56.8%
Hispanic or Latino	45.5	51.0	53.8	24.8
White	9.7	9.1	14.6	14.9
Other	5.8	7.2	11.3	3.4

Source: National Gang Center, "National Youth Gang Survey Analysis," accessed 22 December 2015, https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Survey-Analysis.

This table confirms the data of the previous chart with regards to the preponderance of certain ethnic groups making up the membership of gangs compared to other groups. When examining specific areas, it can be seen where attempts to make broad assumptions on applying counter-gang models will fail. If living in a small city in 2011, the gang population is 53.8 percent Hispanic/Latino versus 20.3 percent Black/African American. If living in a rural county, however, the opposite data for gang population is 24.8 percent Hispanic/Latino versus 56.8 percent Black/African American.

The difference in data, as shown in the previous charts/tables, demonstrates the issues that arise with trying to apply counter-gang models in broad brush strokes without analysis of the target audience within the specific area. In the case study of the Little Village Gun Violence Reduction Project of 1992-1995, the model was correctly applied against the Hispanic/Latino gang population since they made up 90 percent of the community and the two primary gang populations.[3] This is in accordance with the data tables that show a dominance of Hispanics/Latinos within large cities. This ignored the data regarding the percentages of adult versus juvenile gang members. Initially, the program only targeted adult gang members in the range of 17-24 years old. This fails to

account for the juvenile gang members who in the combined national data from the next year, 1996, accounted for 50 percent of overall gang members across the country. As a result, the program was later modified to target gang members in the range of 12-27 years old.[4]

<center>Terrorist Recruitment</center>

When examining the demographics of terrorist recruitment, strong linkage occurs to the finding of Diego Vigil, as described in the section on gang recruitment demographics. His findings detailed how new immigrant groups were susceptible to gang recruitment based on risk factors such as instability within their communities and social and economic marginalization. This same framework supports the research of Marc Sageman, who researched biographical data on 172 global Jihad participants in his book, *Understanding Terror Networks*.[5] When discussing how a person transitions from a Muslim to a Jihadist, he details the key role that disruptive events play in a person lives. He asserts that new religious and social affiliations are usually not sought by an individual until a significant change affects their established social networks. He describes these significant disruptive events as geographic mobility, changing schools, marriage, or even imprisonment.[6] The parallels to Vigil's study on new immigrants, their susceptibility to gangs, and the group dynamic they represent are quite strong.

Professor Dipak K Gupta of the Department of Political Science at San Diego State University details the appeal of group dynamics to potential terrorist recruits. He presents a formula for (terrorist) participation as,

<center>Participant = Personal Benefit + Group Benefit - Cost.[7]</center>

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He argues that rational individuals can join a (terrorist) group even if there is a negative cost to their personal welfare (suicide bombing) as long as the perceived benefit to the group is positive.[8] Sageman's study on Jihadists further supports the strength of family and social bonds. With 150 of the 172 global Jihadists researched, he was able to tabulate data on their pre and post-Jihad social and family bonds. When analyzing this data, he documented that 75 percent of the Jihadists had preexisting social bonds to individuals already involved in the Jihad, or decided to join the Jihad as a group with friends or relatives.[9]

The power of the group dynamics to mitigate the effects of disruptive events is equally applicable to gang membership as it is to terrorist membership. When combined with Dr. Gupta's formula for participation in a group, it is easy to see how a rational individual chooses to affiliate with a group, even when their own well-being may be at stake. These same dynamics are seen in the growth of ISIS's recruitment efforts within the United States. Since March 2014, eighty-two individuals have been indicted in the United States for affiliation with ISIS with one thousand ongoing FBI probes.[10] Additionally, one third of the domestic ISIS cases in the past eighteen months have been individuals planning to carry out attacks within the United States.[11]

The Threat Knowledge Group created a page on its website that tabulates demographics and other data on eighty-two individuals indicted in the United States for involvement with ISIS.[12] When sorted in a table, some of the same data that Sageman documented, regarding the power of social and family bonds to motivate involvement in a terrorist group, is shown. The following table shows the data on three family members indicted for supporting ISIS.

Table 2.		Arrest Data of Khan Family Members Supporting ISIS				
Last Name	**First Name**	**Location of Arrest**	**Date of Arrest**	**Residency**	**Age**	**Charges**
Khan	Mohammed	Chicago, IL	10/4/2014	Bolingbrook, IL	19	Charged with attempting to provide material support to ISIS.
	Unidentified Minor	Chicago, IL	10/4/2014	Bolingbrook, IL	17	Younger sister of Mohammed Khan, stopped at airport before leaving for Syria; has not been charged with a crime yet.
	Unidentified Minor	Chicago, IL	10/4/2014	Bolingbrook, IL	16	Younger brother of Mohammed Khan, stopped at airport before leaving for Syria; has not been charged with a crime yet.

Source: Threat Knowledge Group, "ISIS: The Domestic Threat," 2015, accessed 1 December 2015, http://threatknowledge.org/isis-domestic-threat/.

The data shows one family with three siblings became involved with a recognized terrorist group. The assumption is made that the social and family bonds resulted in the two younger siblings being more susceptible to ISIS recruitment versus if they had been unrelated individuals. This demonstrates the theories of Dr. Gupta and Marc Sageman regarding the power of group and family dynamics in terrorist recruitment are replicated in ISIS recruits. This is not the only family drawn as a group to ISIS as shown by the following examples of five additional families indicted as a group.

Table 3.   Arrest Data of Family Members Supporting ISIS

Last Name	First Name	Location of Arrest	Date of Arrest	Residency	Age	Charges
Edmonds	Jonas	Aurora, IL	3/26/2015	Aurora, IL	29	Charged with conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS
Edmonds	Hasan	Chicago, IL	3/26/2015	Aurora, IL	22	Charged with conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS
Farah	Adnan	Minneapolis, MN	2/19/2015	Minneapolis, MN	19	Charged with attempt to provide material support to ISIS
Farah	Mohamed	Minneapolis, MN	2/19/2015	Minneapolis, MN	21	Charged with attempt to provide material support to ISIS
Hodzic	Ramiz	St Louis, MO	2/6/2015	St. Louis, MO	40	Charged with attempt to provide material support to ISIS
Hodzic	Sedina	St Louis, MO	2/6/2015	St Louis, MO	35	Charged with providing material support and resources to ISIS
Saadeh	Nader	Newark, NJ	8/10/2015	Bergen County, NJ	20	Charged with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS
Saadeh	Alaa	Newark, NJ	6/29/2015	Newark, NJ	23	Charged with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS
Saleh	Ali	Queens, NY	9/17/2015	Queens, NY	22	Charged with attempting to provide material support to ISIS
Saleh	Munther Omar	Queens, NY	6/7/2015	Queens, NY	20	Charged with attempting to provide material support to ISIS

Source: Threat Knowledge Group, "ISIS: The Domestic Threat," 2015, accessed 1 December 2015, http://threatknowledge.org/isis-domestic-threat/.

Though there is a lack of data on the specific individuals in these tables, the assumption is that the shared family name and residency/arrest locations denotes the individuals as family members. The two tables combined show thirteen of eighty-two indicted ISIS recruits had a family relationship, representing 16 percent of the total population. Though this is a small percentage of the total number, it shows ISIS recruits

are not entirely random individuals. It also shows that ISIS recruits are replicating many

of the same attributes of recruits to other terrorist groups which lends credibility to

studying efforts used to counter those groups. Additionally, Sageman's study on social

bonds apply to friendships as much as family relationships as shown in the arrest data of

one group of minors.

Table 4. Arrest Data of Teenagers Supporting ISIS						
Last Name	**First Name**	**Location of Arrest**	**Date of Arrest**	**Residency**	**Age**	**Charges**
	Unidentified Minor	Frankfurt, Germany	10/16/2014	Denver, CO	17	Questioned by the FBI, but released back to family's custody; investigation underway, but will likely not be charged
	Unidentified Minor	Frankfurt, Germany	10/16/2014	Denver, CO	18	Questioned by the FBI, but released back to family's custody; investigation underway, but will likely not be charged
	Unidentified Minor	Frankfurt, Germany	10/16/2014	Denver, CO	15	Questioned by the FBI, but released back to family's custody; investigation underway, but will likely not be charged

Source: Threat Knowledge Group, "ISIS: The Domestic Threat," 2015, accessed 1 December 2015, http://threatknowledge.org/isis-domestic-threat/.

It becomes clear when analyzing this data set that group dynamics influencing

involvement in gangs are equally a factor with terrorist recruits in the United States.

Comparison of gang and terrorist recruit demographics demonstrates that vulnerability to

recruitment is more about group dynamics rather than a single ethnicity, race, or age

group. This supports the literature detailed in chapter 2, which discussed how risk factors

for individuals within their environment heavily influenced involvement in gangs and

vulnerability to information operations. When combined with disruptive events such as immigration, violence, or incarceration, individuals seek out groups and group dynamics, which provide stability.

Does Public Perception or Involvement Affect the Success or Failure of a Model?

Counter-Gang Models

When analyzing the case studies of the two gang models selected for this thesis, the public's role becomes key due to the inherent community nature of gangs. The role of the public is two-fold: (1) the community's perception of the model, and (2) involvement of the members of the community in the actual implementation of the model. In both intervention and deterrence-based models, the dual role the community plays become key.

With the intervention-based case study of the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP), a key component is the role of the community outreach youth workers. These outreach workers perform critical roles in intervening within the community and engaging at-risk youth. In order for them to perform these tasks, they must have credibility within the community and those they are engaging. In this case study, the workers' credibility came from their history as former gang member within the two major gangs within Little Village. Though this provided a wealth of knowledge of the nature of the gang problem within the community, it also caused friction with the law enforcement and social service elements executing the program. As detailed by Spergel, the project had considerable issues with suspicion and resistance between the youth outreach workers, project police, and probationary officers. As a result, it took six months

for project workers to start sharing information amongst each other.[13] Additionally, the

prior gang affiliations of the youth outreach workers caused many to resist sharing

information amongst themselves. With considerable effort from project leaders, these

communication barriers eventually receded, though it took almost a year for the separate

project staff elements to reach a point of cohesion where they conducted joint efforts

within the community.[14]

Equally important in the Little Village GVRP, is the role of the community and

governmental bodies within the intervention-based model. These entities are key in three

of the five steps of the model: (1) organizational change, (2) community mobilization,

and (3) social opportunities. In the GVRP, there were multiple issues with mobilizing

community resources in order to develop a broader community approach to the gang

issue as well as an integrated steering community for actions.[15] Part of this came from the

intended makeup of the neighborhood advisory committee comprised of several

churches, two Boys and Girls Clubs, a local community organization, a business group,

social agencies, the alderman, and local residents.[16] As a result of this mixed dynamic,

there were multiple issues with defining the problem and a cohesive way forward.

Leaders could not agree on whether to develop individual service programs or an

interagency coordination group, and multiple agencies did not communicate or were

directly confrontational with each other. Additionally, the local youth agencies and police

could not sustain the committee's work resulting in the advisory group dissolving. As a

result of this lack of clarity of mission and community involvement, the Chicago Police

Department ended the program with three years of funding remaining.[17] When examining

the five components of the model, the National Institute of Justice stated that the program

accomplished the first two components of suppression and social intervention. On the

other hand, the program was not successful in mobilizing the community, organizational

change, or social opportunities (development).[18] According to Spergel's examination of

the program, top-level Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers insisted the primary

mission of the CPD was suppression, and not community organizations or social work.[19]

In a deterrence-based counter-gang case study, such as the case study of the

Boston Gun Project, the public also plays a key role. However, the role of the public is

different from that of an intervention-based model. In a deterrence-based model, the role

of the public becomes one of perception towards the actions that law enforcement is

taking against the problem. In the Boston Gun Project, the law enforcement organizations

attempted to suppress the influence and resulting gun violence of gangs by applying the

"pulling-levers" approach detailed in chapter 2. This involved the targeted searches of

parolees, enforcement of minor quality of life statutes, and punishment of probation

violations. This prevented these individuals from conducting more serious or violent acts.

As detailed previously, the program was successful in these areas, and was rated as

effective by the National Institute of Justice, which corroborated the program's findings

of a reduction in youth homicides, citywide gun assaults, and calls for service for shots

fired.[20]

The strong and targeted enforcement is vulnerable to perceptions of harassment

by the local community. In the case study, there was an initial pushback from the Ten

Point Coalition of activist African-American clergy in the area. The group was initially

founded as a community-oriented organization in order to prevent gang violence, but was

also critical of earlier aggressive enforcement actions by the Boston Police Department,

which they viewed as illegitimate.[21] Initially, the organizers for the Boston Gun Project failed to include the Ten Point Coalition in their program. This resulted in the coalition being very critical of the early law enforcement actions. The project coordinators quickly realized the influence the group had within the community and brought them in to the project in order to add legitimacy with the local community.[22] The Coalition's actions included such measures as accompanying law enforcement on visits to at-risk and gang youth within the community. Eventually the coalition began to work with community outreach workers from Boston's community centers and facilitating dialogue in forums between law enforcement and community members. It was through involvement of community organization, such as the Ten Point Coalition, which resulted in the targeted community supporting the Boston Gun Project as a legitimate youth violence prevention program.[23]

In the current domestic climate, it is easy to see the importance of both public perception and involvement to facilitate the success of a model. With the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and the continued tension between law enforcement and the public, a model must take into account the role of the public in adding or diminishing the legitimacy of law enforcement actions. The ability of program directors to bring community organizations, such as the Ten Point Coalition, into an effort is a key lesson in applying a model against a community problem.

<center>Counter-Terror Models</center>

The role of public perception is as important in counter-terror models as it is in the counter-gang models. As with gangs, the counter-terror models must successfully engage the public in order to both mitigate the influence of current members and prevent

<center>56</center>

the influence of potential members. Additionally, how the actions are perceived by both the target audience and the general public is integral to the legitimacy of the model.

For an intervention-based counter-terror model, the case study of the State Department's Strategic Counterterrorism Communications' "Think Away Turn Away" program was analyzed. This was due to the program's stated target audience whom terrorists are seeking to influence, but have not yet become terrorists. The aspect of public perception is key due to the program's utilization of social media in a direct communication role with terrorist sympathizers and members. The direct counter-narrative fight seems to be an example of the government's failure to properly analyze public perception, and how potential terrorist recruits would respond to communication from the government. As stated by Nicholas Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, to the Senate Intelligence Committee, "We try to find ways to stimulate this kind of counter narrative, this kind of counter messaging, without having a U.S. government hand in it. People who are attracted to this don't go to the government for their guidance on what to do, not the U.S. government and certainly not their governments in the Middle East."[24]

Additionally, this attempt by the federal government to engage in the ever-trending sphere of social media with young terrorist sympathizers is a prime example of bureaucratic failure to recognize public perception. As detailed by Jacob Silverman of POLITICO, "State's messages usually arrive with all the grace of someone's dad showing up at a college party . . . delivering hectoring messages written in the schoolmarmish tone of Reagan-era 'Just Say No' commercials."[25] The program's abysmal numbers demonstrate the failure to engage the target audience's perception. The

program's @ThinkAgain_DOS Twitter account had 3,341 followers as of July 2014.[26] This compares to Ahmad Musa Jibril, a radicalized Arab-American preacher in Dearborn, Michigan, who had 38,000 Twitter followers before his site was shut down.[27]

In order for an intervention-based, counterterrorism model to succeed, it is absolutely critical to engage public perception in an effective manner. There is an inherent disadvantage to the authorities in this arena. An individual who is drawn to terrorist influencers in the first place, does not likely view authorities or the government as a legitimate voice or messenger. For the U.S. government to overtly attempt to influence these individuals is a recipe for failure. Utilizing government employees in a massive bureaucracy to engage terrorists in the rapidly changing social media sphere is an attempt to force a non-adaptable solution onto an adaptable problem.

For deterrence-based models, the role of public perception becomes broader than in an intervention-based model. The utilization of Treasury regulations and Federal legal statutes is less about a targeted audience and more about the larger public's perception of the legitimacy and legality of the measures. In the current political climate, there is a conflict between Constitutional protections and the need for public safety. This has become especially true since 2013 with the revelations of Edward Snowden and the ensuing public debate regarding bulk data collection by the National Security Agency (NSA).

When examining the application of Treasury regulations and legal statutes to target terrorist supporters, a public policy conflict exists currently with how to target individuals without violating the privacy of the larger population. For example, according to the Counter Extremist Project, militants currently send approximately 90,000 Twitter

messages a day in order to promote terrorist ideology and recruit members.[28] In order to

target these groups and deter their communication, it is necessary for the government to

monitor these communications in order to identify where the threat exists. However, the

opinions of the American public of these measures have changed significantly since the

passage of the PATRIOT Act after 11 September 2001. This is demonstrated in the below

poll conducted in May 2015 when the PATRIOT Act was replaced by the USA Freedom

Act that eliminated the NSA's mass data collection program.

Figure 5.   Fourth Amendment

Source: YouGOV, "Public evenly split on Patriot Act extension, accessed 28 December
2015, https://today.yougov.com/news/2015/05/21/patriot-act/.

In order for the federal government to apply Treasury regulations or Federal statutes against ISPs supporting communication, it is necessary for the government to monitor that communication. As shown in the above poll, the public as a whole does not perceive the threat to warrant violations of their perceived rights. Additionally, this public perception has also shifted to encrypted communication mediums utilized by terrorists in order to avoid scrutiny from federal authorities. As stated by FBI Director James Comey to the Senate in December 2015, "We understand that encryption is a very important part of being secure on the Internet. We also care about public safety. We also see a collision course between those things right now."[29] If Treasury regulations and Federal statutes are utilized to target the ISPs supporting terrorist communication, the Federal government must be able to identify the source. This has become much more difficult with the debate of protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution versus providing for public safety.

Additionally, technology companies have gauged public opinion and have sided against providing federal authorities and intelligence officials access to their encryption technology. This is despite pressure from officials such as Senator Dianne Feinstein, co-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who unsuccessfully met with lawyers from top technology companies to request their assistance in this issue. As she stated, "They have apps to communicate on, which cannot be pierced even with a court order." Additionally, at least one telecommunication company (Apple) has stated that the government cannot decode data on its newest smartphone.[30] With a public that perceives government monitoring efforts as unconstitutional and intrusive, combined with a lack of assistance from the technology sector, applying a deterrence-based model becomes more difficult for authorities. This is due to two primary issues. The first is attempting to

identify the source of the communication, which has become increasingly difficult, as public opinion has moved against these efforts. The second is the lack of public support, needed if the federal government were to apply measures against a technology company or ISP provider. The technology sector is already correctly gauging this public support as shown with the lack of assistance to the federal government in decoding communications between potential terrorist supporters.

<u>Are There Methods within Models that are Effective
But Susceptible to Legal Challenges?</u>

Counter-Gang Models

When examining the legality of methods applied within counter-gang models, the legal challenges become less about the law and more about public perception. The two case studies analyzed for this thesis occurred during the 1990s when there was an increase in violent crime in major cities across America. In this environment, law enforcement found a more receptive public to methods such as increased police enforcement and suppression. In the current political climate, the American public is more likely to view such police actions as excessive and illegitimate in the targeting of high-risk populations. This is despite the statistical data from case studies such as the Boston Gun Project, which showed that methods of increased attention and enforcement of quality of life statutes (graffiti, littering, noise violations, etc.) bring about reduction in violent crime and gang-related shooting incidents.

Some of the resistance towards law enforcement actions is attributed to the demonization of the law enforcement profession over the last two years from incidents such as Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore, Maryland. Whether correct or not, the public

perception of unjustified and excessive force by police has brought an increased fear of public scrutiny and potential legal challenges for officers in carrying out their duties. The conflict between officer's action, and the public's perception was described in the fall of 2015 by comments from both FBI Director James Comey, and DEA Acting Chief Chuck Rosenberg, who attributed the increase in violent crime in most of America's fifty largest cities to the distrust of the police. In their view, this distrust has resulted in officer's hesitance to perform enforcement actions due to a perceived lack of public support. Director Comey described the reality of "a chill wind blowing through American law enforcement over the last year."[31]

The public perception of illegitimate police actions was also a factor during the implementation of these models during the 1990s. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Boston Gun Project initially met pushback from the Ten Point Coalition, who viewed the projects police enforcement actions as heavy-handed and illegitimate. As a result, Coalition members were brought into the project to add legitimacy to the police's actions in the local community. In the current climate, incorporation of local activists and organizations is necessary to ensure effective application of counter-gang methods and protect officers against legal and civil challenges. The enforcement of quality of life statutes to reduce the likelihood of more serious and violent offenses is especially vulnerable to public perception and challenges. Chief William Bryson, Chairman of the Delaware Police Chiefs Council stated, "Proactive policing is what keeps our streets safe. Officers will not hesitate to go into a situation that is obviously dangerous, but because of recent pronouncements about racism, they are not so likely to make a discretionary stop of a minority when yesterday they would have."[32]

Counter-Terror Models

The legal challenges to counter-terror models are less about public perception and more about the legality of the methods within the formal court of law. The legal challenges to the deterrence-based models stood out when analyzing the two counter-terror case studies. This was due to a chain of challenges to the legality and constitutionality of Executive Order 13224 and the enhancements of U.S. Code Title 18 under the PATRIOT Act.

U.S. District Judge Audrey B. Collins demonstrated this in 2006 when she ruled two key provisions of Executive Order 13224 were unconstitutionally vague when describing the ability to unilaterally designate organizations as terrorist groups and prohibiting association with those groups. This case was brought by the Humanitarian Law Project, which sought to provide non-violent and lawful support, such as political advocacy, to organizations designated as terrorist groups by the Executive Order. The group argued that the provisions of the Executive Order put charities and individuals at risk of prosecution by providing any level of support to groups designated as terrorist organizations by the government.[33] Judge Collins cited these provisions of the Executive Order were unconstitutional due to a limitless ability to designate groups or individuals as terrorists.[34]

The legal challenge did not end there. The Justice Department appealed Judge Collins' ruling and the U.S. Supreme Court eventually decided the case in 2010. In a six to three ruling against the Humanitarian Law Project, the Justices agreed that material support did include such actions as expert advice, technical assistance, or training as argued for by the Humanitarian Law Project.[35] The majority opinion, written by Chief

Justice John G. Roberts Jr., stated, "It criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur."[36] When examining the potential application of Executive Order 13224 and U.S. Code Title 18 against the technology infrastructure supporting ISIS's recruiting campaign, this Supreme Court case becomes a key test of constitutionality and success over the anticipated legal challenges.

<u>Summary of Analysis</u>

Throughout this chapter, analysis was conducted by applying the secondary research questions against the case studies. The secondary research questions analyzed the case studies individually, or in a combined manner, based on the specificity of the question and how the case study fit within the model. This facilitated research in a logical and valid manner to accurately gauge the strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned for the case studies. Additionally, by identifying case studies that frame against intervention-based or deterrence-based models, the reader is able to compare and contrast the models to develop understanding of the conclusion and findings. This has allowed a thorough analysis, while also identifying the differences within the models and case studies. The following summary table provides reference for the analysis of the case studies. This also provided a point of reference for the findings directed at answering the primary research question.

<table>
<tr>
<th colspan="2" rowspan="2"></th>
<th>Gang-Intervention (Chicago GVRP)</th>
<th>Gang-Deterrence (Boston Gun Project)</th>
<th>Terrorist-Intervention (DoS CVE Campaign)</th>
<th>Terrorist-Deterrence (Regulations/Statutes)</th>
</tr>
<caption>Table 5.　Summary of Case Studies</caption>

	Gang-Intervention (Chicago GVRP)	Gang-Deterrence (Boston Gun Project)	Terrorist-Intervention (DoS CVE Campaign)	Terrorist-Deterrence (Regulations/Statutes)
Question 1: Are there demographics within the United States more susceptible to Gang/Terrorist recruitment?	**YES;** - Attempting to assimilate into society (social marginalization) - Social/ethnic group dynamics	**YES;** - Poverty (economic marginalization) - Social/adolescent grouping dynamics	**YES;** - Group dynamics to mitigate instability - Social/family grouping dynamics	**UNKNOWN;** - Focus on companies and organizations
Question 2: Does public perception or involvement affect the success or failure of a model?	**YES;** - Public involvement key to 3 of 5 steps in Spergel Model - Outreach workers must be seen as legitimate by target audience	**YES;** - Community mobilization is key to efforts - Requires dialogue with gangs and community	**YES;** - Requires mitigate influencers while engaging target audience - Counter-narrative vulnerable to perception of illegitimacy	**YES;** - Public support key to govt. actions -**Conflict:** security vs. civil liberties
Question 3: Are there methods within models, which are effective but susceptible to legal challenges?	**YES;** -**Challenges:** proactive policing requires community support to prevent challenges -**Challenges:** change in public perception of law enforcement since 1990s (Black Lives Matter MVMT)	**YES;** -**Challenges:** public more accepting to enforcement actions when crime increases -**Challenges:** enforcement actions viewed as harassment	**NO;** - Program operates through current governmental systems and employees with established guidelines	**YES;** -**Challenges:** unconstitutionally vague language (what constitutes terror support?) -**Challenges:** perceived unconstitutional ability to designate individuals/groups as terrorist supporters

</table>

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Juvenile Justice Bulletin: Preventing Adolescent Gang Involvement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000); National Institute of Justice; "Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (Comprehensive Gang Model), NIJ-Practice Profile," accessed 13 December 2015, http://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails. aspx?ID=278; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Tore Bjørgo, ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward* (London: Routledge, 2005); Threat Knowledge Group, "ISIS: The Domestic Threat," 2015, accessed 1 December 2015, http://threat knowledge.org/isis-domestic-threat/; Irving Spergel, Kwai Ming Wa, and Rolando Sosa, "The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Program Model," In *The Modern Gang Reader*, ed. Cheryl L. Maxson, Arlen Egley, and Malcolm Klein (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 451; National Institute of Justice, "Operation Ceasefire (Boston,

Mass), NIJ-Program Profile," accessed 23 December 2015, http://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=207; Anthony Braga, "Focused Deterrence Strategies and the Reduction of Gang and Group-Involved Violence," in *The Modern Gang Reader*, ed. Cheryl L. Maxson, Arlen Egley, and Malcolm Klein (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 475; Jacob Silverman, "The State Department's Twitter Jihad," *POLITICO*, 22 July 2014, accessed 23 December 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/the-state-departments-twitter-jihad-109234; Dan Eggen, "Judge Strikes down Parts of Executive Order on Terrorism," *Washington Post*, 29 November 2006, accessed 29 December 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801438.html.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and findings of the thesis in order to properly answer the primary research question. This includes the development of a proposed model, taking into account the analysis of chapter 4 that could be applied against ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. A hypothetical description is made on how the model could be applied based on our current environment with an explanation of "why" it would be a viable option. Additionally, unexpected findings and research difficulties are provided. The chapter includes recommended areas of further research.

[1] U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, *Juvenile Justice Bulletin: Preventing Adolescent Gang Involvement* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000), 3.

[2] Decker, 12.

[3] NIJ, "Little Village Gang Violence."

[4] Ibid.

[5] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), cover.

[6] Ibid., 115-116.

[7] Tore Bjørgo, ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward* (London: Routledge, 2005), 18.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Sageman, 110-113.

[10] Gorka and Gorka, 1.

[11] Ibid., 2.

[12] Threat Knowledge Group, "ISIS: The Domestic Threat," 2015, accessed 1 December 2015, http://threatknowledge.org/isis-domestic-threat/.

[13] Spergel, Wa, and Sousa, 455.

[14] Ibid., 455-456.

[15] NIJ, "Little Village Gang Violence."

[16] Spergel, Wa, and Sousa, 456.

[17] Ibid., 456.

[18] NIJ, "Little Village Gang Violence."

[19] Spergel, Wa, Sousa, 456.

[20] National Institute of Justice (NIJ), "Operation Ceasefire (Boston, Mass), NIJ-Program Profile," accessed 23 December 2015, http://www.crimesolutions.gov/Practice Details.aspx?ID=207.

[21] Braga, 479-480.

[22] Ibid., 480.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS' Message," *New York Times*, 16 February 2015, accessed 23 December 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-effort-to-blunt-isis-message.html?_r=0.

[25] Jacob Silverman, "The State Department's Twitter Jihad," *Politico*, 22 July 2014, accessed 23 December 2015, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/the-state-departments-twitter-jihad-109234.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Gorka and Gorka, 1.

[28] Fox News, "Pentagon Reportedly Considering Stepping up Cyberattacks against ISIS," *FoxNews*, 20 December 2015, accessed 20 December 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/20/pentagon-reportedly-considering-stepping-up-cyberattacks-against-isis.html.

[29] Fox News, "Feds, Silicon Valley headed for 'collision' over encryption issue, post San Bernardino, wave of terror attacks," *FoxNews*, 13 December 2015, accessed 20 December 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/13/feds-silicon-valley-headed-for-collision-over-encryption-issue-post-san-bernardino-wave-terror-attacks.html.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Heather MacDonald, "Trying to Hide the Rise of Violent Crime," *Wall Street Journal*, 25 December 2015, accessed 29 December 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/trying-to-hide-the-rise-of-violent-crime-1451066997.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Dan Eggen, "Judge Strikes down Parts of Executive Order on Terrorism," *Washington Post*, 29 November 2006, accessed 29 December 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112801438.html.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Robert Barnes, "Supreme Court Upholds Ban on 'Material Support' to Foreign Terrorist," *Washington Post*, 22 June 2010, accessed 29 December 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/21/AR20100621101811_pf.html.

[36] Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether counter-gang models can be applied against ISIS's Internet based recruitment strategy. Chapter 1 introduced the problem and the significance of the research. The chapter additionally provided the research parameters used to frame the problem and the later analysis. Chapter 2 provided a literature review of works relevant to the research study and the topics. The chapter introduced the reader to the topic of influencing and recruitment, which leads to involvement in gangs or terrorist groups. Additionally, the gang and terrorist mitigation models were introduced with delineation between intervention and deterrence-based models and the differences in each approach. Chapter 3 described the research methodology utilized for the analysis and research. The specific case studies analyzed in chapter 4 were detailed, as well as how the analysis was conducted. Chapter 4 provided the analysis of the research paper. This occurred through framing the case studies against the secondary research questions to provide the foundation to answer the primary research question. Additionally, a summary section at the end of the chapter provided a reference to the reader for the interpretation of the findings in chapter 5.

Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and recommendations of the research based on the analysis of chapter 4. The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section is the interpretation of the findings based on the primary and secondary research question. This section is divided into six sub-sections: (1) primary research question findings, (2) secondary research question findings, (3) proposed model development, (4) how the model would be applied/why it would be effective, (5) research difficulties, and (6)

unexpected findings. The second section provides recommendations for areas of further

research. This includes potential research topics as well as examining how the paper

could have been researched differently. The third and final section of the paper provides a

conclusion detailing the significance of the findings to the field of study.

<u>Interpretation of the Findings</u>

Primary Research Question Findings

The purpose of this paper was to answer the primary research question of whether

counter-gang models could be used to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. The

analysis of chapter 4 facilitated an examination of the intervention and deterrence-based

models, and lessons learned from their application in specific case studies. The analysis

demonstrates that utilization of intervention or deterrence-based counter-gang models,

when applied against the target recruitment audience, would not be effective. However, a

modified deterrence-based model holds potential if applied against the technology

companies hosting the recruitment content.

Analysis of intervention-based models has shown that they do not present an

effective model for countering ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. The counter-gang

case studies show success when framed against specific groups within singular

communities. This cannot realistically be done with ISIS's current campaign. Earlier in

the paper, it was noted that the FBI currently has over one thousand active investigations

in all fifty states regarding potential ISIS supporters. Trying to frame a model, primarily

used in individual locations against the entire United States is simply not feasible.

Additionally, intervention-based models require identification of specific populations to

influence and intervene. This is not feasible when dealing with individual cases and small

groupings across an entire nation. By not being able to identify the target audience, the model cannot identify the community organizations and outreach individuals who can effectively intervene with the at-risk population.

Additionally, there are issues with the demographic differences between gang members and potential ISIS recruits. There are the similarities, as noted above, in the risk factors and indicators of gang and terrorist recruit demographics. However, it is a valid assumption that there is a difference between a young gang member committing low-level delinquency crimes and a potential ISIS recruit who is willing to commit mass murder and genocide. A child selling drugs on a street corner in Chicago is not the same as the individual who killed fourteen innocent civilians in San Bernardino, California. This leads to the inability to apply the model as an intervention to pull these individuals away from the influence of gangs or terrorist groups. Offering the social opportunities of the intervention model to the above-mentioned child in Chicago can be done with a reasonable assumption of receptiveness and potential success. Offering social opportunities to persons so dedicated to a cause they are willing to wear a suicide vest and kill themselves is likely not going to meet with success.

Another issue is the role of the public involvement in order to enact community mobilization and outreach actions within the model. Successful application of the Spergel Model requires public involvement for three of the five steps in the model. Additionally, outreach workers perform a key role in the dialogue and intervention actions and must be seen as legitimate by the target audience. This causes issues with ISIS's target recruitment audience because they do not see the government as legitimate and are not inclined to see outreach actions as coming from a legitimate source. The lack of

perceived legitimacy causes a Catch-22 situation where the government needs/wants to be involved in the intervention actions while not appearing to be the organization doing the action. This causes issues with the government potentially attempting to support local intervention actions without having a centralized control apparatus to coordinate the efforts. Lack of coordination of the efforts would lead to the same problem as the Little Village Gun Violence Reduction Project where lack of coordination between the various organizations involved resulted in a lack of unity of effort and failure in three of the five steps of the model (community mobilization, organizational change, and social opportunities).

Intervention-based models do hold potential for application against ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign once more data is obtained on the demographics of ISIS supporters within the United States. As noted in chapter 4, there have been eighty-three indictments of ISIS supporters within the United States. However, this presents too small of a sample population to make accurate statements about the demographics of supporters. Once more data is available, such as from the current one thousand FBI investigations, there is a potential for identifying key demographics, locations, or communities susceptible to ISIS's recruitment strategy. This would facilitate a potentially successful application of intervention-based models due to the ability to target specific groups and locations. Additionally, this would allow the government to analyze potential outreach organizations and individuals who have the legitimacy with the target audience in order to lead intervention actions.

Analysis of deterrence-based models shows they also do not present an effective model for countering ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. Applying the framework of

the deterrence-based model against ISIS, the influencer, will not work. Deterrence-based models require the targeted influencer to be susceptible to the messaging and deterrence-based enforcement actions in order to bring about a change in behavior. Applying the model against the potential recruits, the targeted audience, is difficult since they cannot be identified until the group has already influenced them through their actions or communications. At that point, an intervention-based model would be more successful since the authorities are essentially trying to pull the individual away from the influence of the terrorist group. But this approach would result in a game of "whack a mole" with authorities in a reactionary mode to ISIS's efforts.

A deterrence-based model against ISIS's recruitment efforts also has the same issues as the intervention-based model in regards to the role of the public. The successful application of the model, in the Boston Gun Project, required involvement of local organizations in order to initiate dialogue with the target audience. With the expansive environment ISIS is recruiting in, it not is feasible to the government to identify local organizations in every community across the country to communicate with potential recruits. Additionally, the model faces the same issue as intervention-based models with attempting to enact enforcement actions while putting a local image on it. The feasible way to facilitate local enforcement actions would be working through local law enforcement in the targeted communities. The result of this would be no change from our current efforts with the federal government supporting local law enforcement in identifying and investigating individuals within their communities. However, this approach completely misses the point of a deterrence-based model, which is to apply

enforcement actions in order to deter, and suppress, involvement in acts by the target audience prior to their involvement.

Secondary Research Question Findings

The analysis of secondary research question #1, Are there demographics within the United States more susceptible to gang/terrorist recruitment? demonstrated the similarities between the recruitment demographics in both groups. Chapter 4 showed how the convergence of risk factors within a demographic, specifically instability and marginalization, leads to group dynamics designed to offset this instability. This provides evidence for how individuals are drawn to both gangs and terrorist groups. Showing the linkage between gang and terrorist group demographics is key to model development by demonstrating that models developed for one group can be applied against the other.

Secondary research question #2: Does public perception or involvement affect the success or failure of a model? provided the key findings for development of a model by analyzing the case studies and the lessons learned from intervention and deterrence-based models. The case studies have shown that the success of both models requires identification of a target population and community for application of the model. In the case study of the Little Village Gun Reduction Project, the intervention-based model was applied against a primarily Latino community with a gang problem centered on two primary gangs. This facilitated the steps of the Spergel Model by identifying the key community organizations and public outreach workers who can assist law enforcement in their efforts. The effectiveness, and influence, of the outreach efforts is linked to the legitimacy of these individuals in the eyes of the gang population. Additionally, effective application of intervention-based models requires the organizational change, community

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mobilization, and social opportunities require a receptive community and target population. This same issue is present in deterrence-based models with the role of the public facilitating effective communication and legitimate enforcement actions within the local community.

The analysis of secondary research question #3, Are there methods within models which are effective but susceptible to legal challenges? links back to secondary research question #2 and the role of the public in the models. Both models require local public support to legitimize the actions of authorities in order to avoid legal challenges or perceptions of harassment. Additionally, public support is key to creating a permissive environment for authorities to apply the models. Without public perception there is a problem present, the authorities will lack the public support and assistance in applying the model successfully.

<center>Proposed Model Development</center>

A modified deterrence-based models holds potential for application against ISIS's Internet recruitment strategy. Whom to apply against, however, is key to the model's potential success. When examining ISIS's recruitment strategy, based on the influencing operations framework of Joint Publication 3-13 *Information Operations*, it breaks down into three key entities: (1) ISIS (influencer), (2) social media/technology companies (means), and (3) potential recruits (target audience).[1] Where the deterrence-based model holds potential is application against the social media/technology companies who are providing the means for ISIS to deliver their recruitment message. This is a modification of a traditional deterrence-based model, which is applied against the target audience of recruits/members. The justification is that social media/technology companies are

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providing the infrastructure and delivery system, which are facilitating ISIS's efforts. Even worse, these companies are indirectly profiting through ISIS's usage of their sites to reach potential recruits. Allow a comparison example to illustrate this point. If ISIS were to approach the advertising section of a major American newspaper and attempt to buy a full-page ad to recruit followers, the average citizen would consider this unacceptable. The company would be taking money from a known terrorist group, assisting an enemy of the United States, and potentially facilitating the death of innocent people. No company would want such a public relations image.

In a comparison example, Twitter earns 85 percent of its revenue from advertising; it generated an advertising base in the second quarter of 2014 of $277 million. Twitter makes this money through promoted Tweets (individual advertisements to individual Twitter feeds/cost: 50 cents-$2 per engagement), promoted accounts (advertisements placed in the users "Who to Follow" list/cost: $2.50-$4 per follower), and promoted trends (advertisements a user can click on/cost: as much as $200,000 per day).[2] In a lawsuit filed against Twitter by the widow of an American ISIS victim, it is alleged that ISIS has 70,000 accounts with Twitter, which post at a rate of ninety Tweets per minute.[3] Conservatively, and unrealistically in the digital age, if those 70,000 accounts only received one single-promoted Tweet each year at the low-end price of 50 cents, then Twitter would make a minimum of $35,000 annually from the ISIS accounts. How is Twitter making advertisement dollars from ISIS twitter accounts any different from a newspaper taking advertisement dollars directly from the group?

How the Model would be Applied/
Why it would be Effective?

The proposal for a modified deterrence-based model would be to use the deterrence framework introduced by Gregory McNeal, in chapter 2, to apply the existing Treasury Regulations and Federal Statutes to directly target the technology companies under the auspices of providing "material support" to a designated terrorist organization. Under U.S. Code Title 18 – Crimes and Criminal Procedures, Section 2339A – *Providing Material Support to Terrorists*, material support is defined as, "any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communication equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, and transportation."[4] With designation of ISIS as a terrorist organization, Executive Order 13224 Section 2(a) would specifically ban "any transaction or dealing by United States persons or within the United States in property or interests in property blocked pursuant to this order is prohibited, including but not limited to the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of those persons listed in the Annex to this order or determined to be subject to this order."[5]

Detractors to this approach would argue that technology companies hosting ISIS content should not be held legally responsible since they are not providing direct support, or knowingly supporting terrorist acts. As detailed in the legal challenges in chapter 4, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled against this line of argument. As Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., stated, "It (Executive Order 13224) criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur."[6] With technology

companies providing a communication medium to ISIS, they are allowing ISIS to devout their resources to carrying out attacks rather than recruiting members.

The United States Senate introduced a framework for how this could be applied in legislation in December 2015. Senator Dianne Feinstein, D-California, and Senator Richard Burr, R-North Carolina, introduced this legislation, which utilizes existing anti-child pornography legislation as a model. Under the counter-ISIS legislation, technology companies would be required to notify law enforcement of known terrorist content or face legal and financial repercussions.[7] The anti-child pornography legislation referenced is U.S. Code Title 18, Section 2258A, *Reporting requirements of electronic communication providers and remote computing service providers*. Section 2258A requires technology companies, when made aware of child pornographic content, to report the information to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. The legislation also specifies providing, "Information relating to the identity of any individual who appears to have violated a Federal law described in subsection (a)(2), which may, to the extent reasonably practicable, include the electronic mail address, Internet Protocol address, uniform resource locator, or any other identifying information, including self-reported identifying information."[8] Technology companies failing to report known incidents, or individuals, are subject to the deterrence of financial fines. As stated in the legislation, "An electronic communication service provider or remote computing service provider that knowingly and willfully fails to make a report required under subsection (a)(1) shall be fined—(1) in the case of an initial knowing and willful failure to make a report, not more than $150,000; and (2) in the case of any second or subsequent knowing and willful failure to make a report, not more than $300,000."[9] This legislation has two

key points. It does not require companies to actively target the content, merely to report the content once made aware. This negates the argument of those who would say such legislation unjustly requires companies to engage in law enforcement duties. The second point is that it provides a deterrence factor for companies that fail to follow the legislation. This includes not only the punitive fines detailed, but also the public relations damage for a company that knowingly ignores child-pornography content. In many ways, the public relations damage to a large technology company is more damaging than financial penalties.

This issue of public relations and corporate image is one of the key reasons anti-child pornography legislation has met success. After all, no publicly traded company wants publicity for knowingly trafficking in child pornography. In fact, a public image of actively targeting this content is what the companies want. In response to child pornography on their servers, Google and Microsoft introduced search engine modifications that prevent more than 100,000 search terms from generating results in over one hundred fifty languages. Additionally, YouTube created technology that actively identifies child pornography videos on their sites, and has publicly offered the technology to other companies and organizations. Google and Microsoft also created image matching and database technology that allows collaboration and content removal across service provider domains. Facebook is also actively utilizing this same image matching technology.[10] Google Chairman, Eric Schmidt, stated, "We've listened, and in the last three months put more than two hundred people to work developing new, state-of-the-art technology to tackle the problem." Prime Minister David Cameron stated on the efforts in the United Kingdom, "A recent deterrence campaign from Google led to a

20 percent drop off in people trying to find illegal content, so we know this sort of action will make a difference."[11]

As shown above, the technology companies are more than capable of creating technology to combat ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. The issue is not about lacking technology to combat the problem; it is about facing a deterrence-based model, which makes not acting costlier to the companies than acting. This is the same goal in a traditional deterrence-based model, which seeks to deter behavior by a target audience through making the cost of continued action, or in-action, costlier than compliance with authorities. The same companies, which are reactively, rather than actively, targeting ISIS content on their sites, are willing and capable of targeting child pornography. How can YouTube create and make technology publicly available to identify child pornography videos, but is unable to do the same for ISIS's videos on its site? How can Facebook use image technology to identify and remove child pornography images, but not do the same for ISIS's images on their site? If Google can put two hundred employees to work developing technology to combat child pornography, why do social media companies require user-reported violations to investigate ISIS content for removal?

The susceptibility of social media companies to the power of public opinion was recently demonstrated by Twitter. As of April 2015, Twitter had deleted approximately one thousand ISIS-supporting accounts. As the issue gained prominence in the public sphere, Twitter dramatically increased its efforts with the removal of 125,000 accounts since July 2015.[12] With a 125-fold increase in account deletion, Twitter is demonstrating the company's ability to take action when properly motivated.

The application of a modified deterrence-based model, targeting technology companies, holds the highest probability of success to counter ISIS's Internet recruitment campaign. By communicating the unacceptability of continued inaction, combined with leveraging existing regulations and legal statutes, the United States government has the ability to motivate these companies to actively target content. This requires a parallel communication campaign with the American public to explain the model and the actions or inactions the companies take in response. By combining the existing powers of the federal government with the public opinion and purchasing power of the American public, this model has potential to bring about the corporate responsibility required for success.

Research Difficulties

One of the biggest difficulties in conducting this research was the ever-changing nature of the topic. Throughout researching this paper, ISIS-related actions continued to occur, which both assisted and impeded the paper. This assisted the research in providing relevant and current information on an almost daily basis to add credibility and validity to the analysis and findings. At the same time, it required filtering to prevent the paper from continuously changing course as new issues or topics arose.

Another difficulty, due to the currency of the topic, was the amount of other researchers and officials working on the same problem. Though this assisted with information and resources, it also caused issues with preventing the research findings from mirroring those of others. One example is the U.S. Senate's proposed legislation to counter ISIS recruiting based on existing anti-child pornography legislation, introduced at

the same time as chapter 5 findings. Though frustrated by having the proposed model seem less original, it adds validity to the basis of the findings.

A key research difficulty has been the lack of publicly available demographic information on ISIS recruits within the United States. The only publicly available information for researching this paper was eighty-three current indictments. This provided too small of a sample size to make accurate assumptions based on the fact the FBI has over one thousand ongoing investigations in all fifty states. As a result, it required a deliberate effort not to make over-simplified assumptions based on the available information for those eighty-three cases. Analyzing that data provided information such as average ages of indicted personnel, place of residency, and place of arrest and findings in cities with multiple arrests or residency of ISIS sympathizers. It is an over-simplification to say a city that has more than one ISIS-sympathizer arrest indicates a trend or a key node of terrorist recruitment without further contextual information. It could simply be that city had an international airport and the authorities arrested the individual while traveling. Until information on the one thousand current FBI investigations becomes publicly available, it is difficult to develop demographic information on potential recruits to apply an intervention or traditional deterrence-based model against the problem.

<div align="center">Unexpected Findings</div>

The primary unexpected finding is the lack of corporate responsibility and accountability shown by social media companies. One of the great ironies is that the companies defend themselves based on the principles of freedom of speech while hosting content for a terrorist group, which believes in the exact opposite. Throughout the

research, it was surprising how little effort these companies are putting forth to counter ISIS's utilization of their communication platforms. On the other hand, when public opinion comes in to play, they have shown a remarkable ability to target content when the cost to corporate image and finances come in to play. This is shown in information on how the companies have actively targeted child-pornography content on their sites. This is key to justifying why the modified deterrence-based model would be effective since it demonstrates that the companies possess the capability to carry out the desired actions when properly motivated. This cost-benefit analysis is key to the successful application of any deterrence-based model, whether against gangs or terrorist groups.

Recommendations for Further Research

A further research topic that holds promise would be examination of detailed demographic information on individuals indicted in the United States for supporting ISIS and the current FBI investigations. This would allow analysis of whether there are risks factors or demographic data shared by recruits that increase vulnerability to recruitment. This would assist in developing indicators for law enforcement efforts and potentially allow the application of an intervention-based model through data on community and individual risk factors. The addition of the current FBI investigations would also allow trend analysis to examine whether the target audience is changing, or whether ISIS is remaining successful with specific demographics. This is key due to the evolving nature of the technology environment and preventing law enforcement from remaining in a reactionary mode to ISIS's efforts.

Conclusion: A Modified Deterrence-Based Model Could Be Used to
Counter ISIS's Internet-Based Recruitment Campaign

The technology environment, specifically social media, is an ever changing and evolving medium that will continue to hold prominence in the communication sphere. The ability of individuals and organizations to carry out influencing actions through this medium will only continue to increase as it gains prominence in our daily lives. ISIS is exploiting this medium in order to recruit members, raise funds, and carry out their campaign of terror. Unfortunately, they are assisted by the lack of active efforts by U.S. companies to stop their activities.

This requires a change in how to frame the problem. The United States must seize and retain the initiative in this fight and not allow a designated terrorist group to use our own technology against us. Applying a modified deterrence-based model, against the technology companies rather than the target audience, holds the greatest potential for success. This requires an active communication campaign with the companies and the American public to explain why this is necessary and the repercussion from continued inaction. Through leveraging existing regulations and legal statutes, combined with public opinion, the proper motivation can be applied to technology companies to secure their assistance in countering ISIS's efforts. The technology companies claim they are doing everything in their power to counter ISIS. However, as shown with their response to the anti-child pornography legislation, they are more than capable of actively and directly targeting ISIS, if properly motivated.

Through application of a modified deterrence-based model, the government can actively deter ISIS's recruitment efforts rather than continuing in a reactionary mode. This requires unity of effort between the government and the companies providing

content in order deny a key recruitment capability. It is only through denying further

recruits that we can hope to stop the spread of ISIS. If we fail in this regard, we are

destined to transition from a long-war to a never-ending war.

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[1] Office of the Joint Staff, JP 3-13, I-3-5.

[2] Investopedia, "How Does Twitter Make Money?," 1 December 2014, accessed 15 February 2016, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/120114/how-does-twitter-twtr-make-money.asp.

[3] Julia Jacobo, "Woman Sues Twitter for Allegedly Allowing ISIS to Spread," *ABC News*, 14 January 2016, accessed 13 February 2016, http://abcnews.go.com/US/woman-sues-twitter-allegedly-allowing-isis-spread-propaganda/story?id=36300304.

[4] U.S, Code, Title 18, Section 2339A.

[5] Bush.

[6] Barnes.

[7] Adam Shaw, "To Catch a Terrorist: Pols See Child Porn Laws as Model for Tracking Jihadists," *FoxNews*, 23 December 2015, accessed 13 February 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/23/to-catch-terrorist-pols-see-child-porn-laws-as-model-for-tracking-jihadists.html.

[8] U.S. Code, Title 18 – Crimes and Criminal Procedure, "Section 2258A. Reporting requirements of electronic communication service providers and remote computing service providers," 18 U.S.C. 2258A, 7 January 2011, accessed 13 February 2016, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2258A.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Steve Musil, "Google, Microsoft Ramp up Fight against Online Child Pornography," *CNET*, 18 November 2013, accessed 13 February 2016, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-microsoft-ramp-up-fight-against-online-child-pornography/.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Cathy Burke, "Twitter Deletes 125K Terrorism-Promoting," *NewsMax*, 5 February 2016, accessed 13 February 2016, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/twitter-social-media-delete-account/2016/02/05/id/712962/.

GLOSSARY

Deterrence-Based Counter-Gang Model. A problem-oriented approach which applies focused deterrence strategies towards a small number of chronic offenders responsible for the bulk of crime within a locality. Often used to respond to gun violence among gang related offenders and groups. (Source: *The Modern Gang Reader*)

Domestic Terrorism. Acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State. Intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. (Source: 18 U.S. Code-2331)

Facebook. An online social networking service. Through creation of a profile, users can share photos and videos, utilize apps, and communicate with other users. (Source: techterms.com)

Information Environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (Source: JP 3-13)

Information Operations. The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called IO. (Source: JP 3-13)

Information-Related Capability. A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. Also called IRC. (Source: JP 3-13)

International Terrorism. Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State. Intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (Source: 18 U.S. Code-2331)

Intervention-Based Counter-Gang Model. A flexible and comprehensive strategy designed to respond to gangs at the community level. This model utilizes the combined efforts of five primary strategies; Suppression, Social Intervention,

Organizational Change, Community Mobilization, and Social Opportunities. (Source: *The Modern Gang Reader*)

ISIS. Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Also known as the Islamic State and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Foreign Terrorist Organization formerly known as Al-Qaida in Iraq. Operates primarily out of Syria and Iraq with thirty-five affiliated groups. (Source: Threat Knowledge Group)

Social Identity. That part of an individual's self-concept which derives from knowledge of membership in a social group(s) together with the emotional value and significance attached to membership. (Source: *Differentiation between social group,* 1978*)*

Social Identity Theory. Theory that focus on the way people think about themselves and others in an intergroup context. (Source: *Gang Dynamics through the Lens of Social Identity Theory,* 2012)

Target Audience. An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA. (Source: JP 3-13)

Twitter. An online social networking service. Through creation of an account, users can communicate with others users through posts of 140 characters or less. Users can post their updates as well as follow other users posts which appear on the user's homepage. (Source: techterms.com)

USA PATRIOT Act. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. Bill passed by Congress in 2001 in response to the attacks of September 11th. Designed to give the law enforcement and intelligence communities the necessary tools to combat terrorism in the 21st Century. Passed with overwhelming bipartisan support (98 percent Senate, 83 percent House) (Source: U.S. DOJ)

Vulnerable Population. Vulnerability with regards to research is understood as a condition of individuals, either intrinsic or situational that may interfere with their autonomy or decision-making capacity. In general, persons are vulnerable in research either because they have difficulty providing informed consent or because their circumstances may subject them to intimidation or exploitation. (Source: Yale Human Subject Research Resource and Education Program)

You-Tube. A video sharing service that allows users to watch videos posted by other users and upload videos of their own. The service was started as an independent website in 2005 and was acquired by Google in 2006. Videos that have been uploaded to YouTube may appear on the YouTube website and can also be posted on other websites, though the files are hosted on the YouTube server. (Source: techterms.com)

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