

USAFRICOM HEADQUARTERS: THE COMPLEXITY OF MOVING
THE HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONTINENT OF AFRICA AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE ARMY'S ORGANIZATIONAL
DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL APPROACH

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Strategic Studies

by

DEVANIE N. JOHNSON, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY
B.A., Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina

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Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Jack D. Kem, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Michael J. Burke, M.Ed.

_____, Member
Terrance M. Portman, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2016 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

USAFRICOM HEADQUARTERS: THE COMPLEXITY OF MOVING THE HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONTINENT OF AFRICA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ARMY'S ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL APPROACH, by Major Devanie N. Johnson, 73 pages.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AMB	Ambassador
AOR	Area of Operation
AU	African Union
AWFC	Army Warfighting Challenge
C2	Command and Control
CAPE	Capabilities and Program Execution
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM	Combatant Command
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
EUCOM	European Command
FAS	Feasible, Acceptable, or Suitable
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Plan
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JTF	Joint Task Force

MILCON	Military Construction
NSS	National Security Strategy
OUSD	Office of Undersecretary of Defense
OUSD (C)	Office of Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller
PACOM	Pacific Command
TDY	Temporary Duty
UCC	Unified Combatant Command
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAFRICOM	US Africa Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The Department of Defense created a command structure in 2008 to address the growing issues in Africa that affect the United States national interests. This command is a Department of Defense (DoD) combatant command, or organization responsible for wartime functions in a specific region of the world. USAFRICOM's responsibility is the continent of Africa (excluding Egypt).

USAFRICOM faces significant challenges due to its mission load. In fact, in 2014 USAFRICOM conducted a total of sixty-eight operations, eleven joint exercises, and 595 security cooperation activities using minimal resources and struggling to integrate Intelligence Surveillance and Renaissance (ISR) assets.¹ Additionally, a previous Government Accountability Office (GAO) study highlights USAFRICOM's reliance upon interagency support and a whole-government approach, and is experiencing difficulty with encouraging the necessary collaboration. USAFRICOM struggles to fill key interagency positions despite having a civilian, deputy position for with Department of State (DoS) experience.² USAFRICOM fails to identify a clear mission not solely focused on combatting terrorism. There is a requirement for a command presence in proximity to troops and Africa's state partners to increase the sense of urgency, and establish necessary relationships to assure security cooperation and unity of effort. USAFRICOM can potentially achieve a command presence if it moves its headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany, to a host nation in Africa.

Relocating the headquarters could yield major dividends for USAFRICOM and US national interests to include increased funding. If Congress were to approve moving USAFRICOM to Africa, it would show commitment to African state partners. 'These suppositions support the primary research question, should USAFRICOM relocate to the African continent? This larger question leads to subsidiary or secondary questions. Such as, would a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) with proximity to forces enhance operational reach—and what other issues could prevent relocating the headquarters?

To properly frame the question of moving USAFRICOM headquarters to the African continent, the Department of Defense should thoroughly analyze the initial challenges that affected the establishment of the command in the first place. The overarching argument against establishing a dedicated combatant command headquarters in the African theater was cost. At the time this command was set up to address African issues, DoD was challenged to identify efficiencies in its budget. A new combatant command was hardly at the top of the priority list for DoD at the time; however, recent events have shown that issues in Africa are strongly tied to US interests and global security.

The plans for USAFRICOM began in 2007 while the United States was in the midst of a Presidential transition with a focus on efficiency and more cost-effective DoD expenditures. The estimated cost for renovating facilities in Stuttgart was over \$40 million. There was an additional estimate for an investment of an additional \$43 million in command and control communications infrastructure and computer systems to operate the headquarters. The headquarters element totaled an estimated cost of \$125 million, and the subsequent budget year was \$390 million for FY 2009.

From inception, USAFRICOM's existence had negative political effects. Stakeholders associated with the command were concerned with establishing a combatant command in the Africa theater. Specifically, the stakeholders (particularly NGO partners) feared that the combatant command would militarize humanitarian aid versus resolving various conflicts in the area. US Agency for International Development stated, "Creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development, and defense, thereby militarizing US foreign policy."³

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

USAFRICOM is an ever-evolving organization that arguably may require a different approach from other COCOMs. Essentially, this thesis will examine if USAFRICOM headquarters should move from Stuttgart, Germany, to a stable host nation in Africa. This study will examine this question by evaluating if such a move is feasible, acceptable, or suitable (FAS). The criteria will be a detailed evaluation of current challenges that GCCs face on the continent from their geographically dispersed subordinate units. Another question is whether the move is cost effective with regards to current budget constraints compared to the effects achieved with aggregate cost.

An earlier evaluation showed that relocating the headquarters to an established area of a US location with modern infrastructure would cost between 300-350 million dollars. The costs associated with moving to a potentially less-stable host nation could far exceed this estimate. Another question would be, "what other issues would affect relocating and building a headquarters in Africa?" This question relates to political concerns and the actual stability of the country. Relocating to Africa should have the full support of the African Union (AU) and DoS. Without the political will to support

USAFRICOM relocation, not only will the organization suffer, but so will the USAFRICOM mission. Some of the key concerns are what stakeholders believe USAFRICOM priorities should be, and whether USAFRICOM is truly there to support African stability and security, or if it is a ploy to further US national interests. Finally, to determine if a move is feasible, acceptable, or suitable, this study will evaluate potential locations based on the ability of that location to host the headquarters, and ensure that there is a positive impact to operations (particularly command and control capability).

Reviewing the usefulness of relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters directly correlates to Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) that need to be addressed by using the Army Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. The DOTMLPF construct is a way to evaluate requirements and determine solutions across the Army to manage changes across multiple domains in the Army. The research question primarily looks to resolve Army Warfighting Challenge #2, *Shape the Security Environment*.

DoD established USAFRICOM to protect national interests and contain threats to global security. The Al Shabaab in Ethiopia has continually attempted to disrupt local governments and preys on the instability in the region. Similarly, Boko Haram has a large influence in Nigeria, where they notably kidnapped schoolgirls in the name of extremist Islamic beliefs. Additionally, extreme poverty requires the Combatant Command (COCOM) to focus consistently on humanitarian aid efforts. Humanitarian aid helps stabilize the region, and deters the threat of terrorists recruiting civilians who are in desperate situations.

The study will also address Army Warfighting Challenge #12, *Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations*. USAFRICOM is responsible for executing joint, multinational exercises that focus on the host nation leading the efforts to resolve the issues in the region. For example, in 2013 USAFRICOM conducted over ten exercises and 481 humanitarian aid missions and fifty-five operations. The need to contribute to global security is a high priority, according to the current National Security Strategy (NSS), but DoD is charged with the task of doing so on a minimal budget. The challenge associated with supporting AWFC #12 is the ability to understand the complexity of the problems in the AO, specifically, a commander's ability to focus on command and control (C2) and facilitate relationships at the operational and strategic levels.⁴

Currently, AU identified a lack of commitment and focus to plan exercises and the coordinate/integrate humanitarian efforts. Additionally, a presence on the continent may potentially support the USAFRICOM Commander, General Rodriguez's goal to better integrate ISR assets in the theater. His concern is a lack of adequate ISR assets as well as funding and control. Establishing a staff and support of Military Intelligence Support Operations personnel on the ground could adequately support counterterrorism efforts.

The USAFRICOM is a relatively new COCOM with an ever-expanding mission. DoS guided its focus to specific hotspots, areas that concern national interests, or deemed a focal point by the United Nations and coalition partners:

1. Somalia—fighting piracy
2. South Africa—diplomatic relations

3. Liberia–fighting Ebola/UN mission
4. Nigeria–Boko Haram threat/instability
5. Libya–civil unrest
6. Kenya, Ethiopia and Sub-Saharan Africa - accelerate economic growth, strengthen democratic institutions, and improve security
7. Democratic Republic of the Congo–instability/unrest
8. Senegal–maritime threats
9. Sudan–humanitarian support due to conflict and disasters
10. South Africa–diplomatic relations and China involvement in politics⁵

The growing threat of Islamic extremist organizations such as Boko Haram and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continues to grow. These organizations seize the opportunity to draw valuable resources such as oil, coal, wood, gold, and diamonds from various countries in Africa. The organizations also benefit from lucrative drug trades and highly successful recruitment due to the extreme poverty and political instability throughout much of the continent. The US interests in the region are tied to a need for stability, the continual violation of United Nations (UN) mandates, and rules for maintaining global peace. Additionally, states such as China gained influence in Africa and systematically extract resources from many nations. The 2015 USAFRICOM posture statement highlighted these issues as being a threat to US national interests as tensions with China continue to increase. The headquarters element struggles to assure effective command and control of subordinate units. AFRICOM cannot show commitment or be legitimate without the headquarters being on the continent. The Joint Task Force (JTF) in

the Horn of Africa is not sufficiently resourced to focus on the multitude of issues in Africa that affect national and international stability.⁶

Assumptions

The emerging threats in USAFRICOM will continue to legitimize the requirement for an African command, and will eventually necessitate a headquarters on the continent. There have been significant gains in achieving the desired stability in countries in Africa. Diplomatic relations between the United States and members of the AU will continue to affect the decision to increase forces in USAFRICOM, and will certainly shape any possible decision to establish a headquarters in Africa. Another assumption is that relocation to the continent will improve the ability to actively engage and project military force as an instrument of power. Relocation potentially allows USAFRICOM commanders to effectively execute command and control of assigned forces. Maintaining awareness and having an understanding of the operational environment (OE) is difficult when a headquarters resides on another continent. For political reasons, the United States does not appear to be a committed partner with other stakeholders due its reticence to establish a headquarters in Africa. The cost of moving and sustaining a headquarters in Africa is a limiting or possible deciding factor. Other factors that will affect relocating the headquarters are the stability of the potential host nation and the organizational structure.

Definitions

Combatant Command—A unified combatant command (UCC) is a DoD command composed of forces from at least two military departments with a broad and continuing

mission. These commands provide effective command and control of US military forces, regardless of branch of service, in peace and war. They are organized either on a geographical basis, known as “area of responsibility” (AOR) or on a functional basis, such as special operations, power projection, or transport. UCCs are “joint” commands with specific badges denoting their affiliation. Title 10, US Code Sections 161–168 legally mandates the creation and organization of UCCs.⁷

Evaluation Criteria—For the purposes of this thesis, the criteria used to determine the validity of a course of action, as well as the criteria used to discern the best course of action, are:

1. Feasibility—Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.
2. Acceptability—Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.
3. Suitability—The COA can accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent and planning guidance.

Measure of Effectiveness—Criterion, used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment, evaluates the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

Measure of Performance—Evaluates the performance of tasks by asking, “are we doing things right.”

Mission Command—The concept of mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. Mission command is essentially the method a commander uses to

direct the operational flow and ensure that his or her subordinates are able to execute with little or ambiguous guidance. It is based on the premise that the commander can trust members of the organization to do what is necessary to accomplish the mission.⁸

Readiness and Capacity of the Designated HQ—Readiness includes organize, man, train, and equip requirements. Capacity is a function of experience, capability, endurance of the HQ, span of control, and understanding of supporting enablers such as special operations or cyber mission forces. These have implications on the HQ's ability to execute the potential scope of the mission set.⁹

Responsiveness—Ensures that the option is actionable within the mission time constraints. This consideration tends to favor the use of standing organizations, including the service component headquarters, single-service force, or the Theater Special Operations Command options that reside in-theater, and can rapidly assume command and control of response forces.¹⁰

Unified Action—The degree that the option can support or leverage international, regional, DoD, and interagency relationships, enablers, and efficiencies recognizing how DoD operates. While unity of command should always be a goal, achieving unity of effort is often more realistic and amenable with likely mission partners. This consideration directly relates to the discussion on the capability of the designated headquarters to work with mission partners.¹¹

Limitations

The availability of diverse sources of information is a limitation. Most references and materials are from the DoD, DoS, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or other government agencies. Another limitation is the inability to test this thesis without relying

on outcomes from previous studies. Research for the thesis relies upon historical data or research conducted by other individuals; therefore, only DoD-established vectors will be analyzed because there is no control over data collection by the researcher.

USAFRICOM is not a mature COCOM, so there are few research studies to reference. Individuals with vast amounts of experience in USAFRICOM are not available or accessible for interviews. The existing comparative historical analysis will require use of assumptions and data linkage to make the data relevant to the current situation. The ability to fully explain earlier decisions or provide the desired depth of information to explore the thesis topic is limited by access to classified data. The classified information has the potential to provide greater context, and contains detailed analysis of the theater. This study will not address all of the current DoD efforts to relocate the USAFRICOM headquarters due to limited access to data.

Delimitations

This study relies on interviews that AFRICOM conducted with previous commanders or leaders within the organization. The historical analysis of these interviews will be restricted to current or former senior leaders of the US Armed Forces with in-theater experience, who can discuss the complexities that currently affect major decisions and shape strategy related to the operational environment (OE). Using information from opposing viewpoints will prove the validity of the question. There will be some data collected outside of DoD to reduce the risk of bias. Research will generally exclude analysis of data from sources that focus on other combatant commands. However, some select data from other COCOMs is included to compare AFRICOM to other similar organizations. Potential locations for establishing the headquarters will be

restricted to the most stable countries in Africa, but does not imply other countries are incapable of hosting AFRICOM. An additional constraint will be time; therefore, interview collection is limited to the period of 1 November 2015 to 15 December 2015. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, research information is limited to unclassified information.

Chapter Summary

The goal of this study is to explore options available to USAFRICOM leadership to establish a functional and properly manned and equipped headquarters capable of executing C2 over US forces assigned to USAFRICOM. The purpose of relocating the headquarters would be to improve USAFRICOM's response to conflicts or execution of operations in support of US national interests. The literature review will show the necessity of exploring this pivotal decision, and will identify potential enhancements to USAFRICOM and the barriers to a successful relocation of the headquarters.

A headquarters located on the continent of Africa was an option in 2008 when DoD first established the COCOM. Arguably, existing evidence should logically support a headquarters in West Africa as the best viable option. However, similar arguments could be made for other countries such as Ethiopia or South Africa. If a headquarters location cannot be immediately established, then the question is when and in which country. Determining a potential location is critical to answering the proposed thesis of relocating the headquarters to Africa. This question can only be explored through careful review of prior research, case studies, or through the examination of writings of other experts on this topic. Chapter 2, the literature review, will provide a review of relevant and recent bodies of work that will help gain an understanding of the complexities

associated with relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters as well as provide research data to conduct the actual study.

¹ US Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-646, *DoD Must Reassess Options for Permanent Relocation of US Africa Command* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2013), accessed May 29, 2016, <http://gao.gov/assets/660/657492.pdf>.

² John Pendleton, GAO-08-947T, *Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the US Africa Command* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, June 2008), accessed 30 May 2016, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-947T>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Department of Defense, Report to Committee on Armed Services, “Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 and the Future Years Defense Program,” US Senate, 6 March 2014, accessed 30 May 2016, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/14-10-2-25-14.pdf>.

⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, “South Africa,” *The World Factbook*, 17 April 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Joint Staff, Deployable Training Division, *Insights and Best Practices: Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) Command and Control Organizational Options* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7 Joint Training Directorate, 2014), 1-11.

⁸ Department of Defense.

⁹ Joint Staff, Deployable Training Division. *Insights and Best Practices*, 1-11.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Introduction

Multiple resources address the challenges that USAFRICOM faces. Relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters to the continent of Africa could potentially mitigate these challenges. The literature review will provide information to help shape the primary research question, “should USAFRICOM headquarters relocate to the continent of Africa?” Therefore, analysis of different studies is a required approach to determine if the USAFRICOM headquarters relocation is feasible, acceptable, or suitable through evaluation of secondary research questions. The readings help shape the ideas that feed into the question of whether there are additional factors that will affect relocating the headquarters. These readings will also help evaluate whether a potential move is cost effective. The combined questions discuss the overarching question, should the USAFRICOM headquarters move to the continent of Africa?

Command and Control and the Influence on Operational Success

The Joint Staff and Army Staff are key sources for defining and understanding the role of a GCC such as USAFRICOM. Understanding the factors that affect the functionality of the GCC is a critical primary area of concern for establishing a GCC or JTF headquarters. All GCC’s face the same challenges with regard C2. A Joint Staff J7’s article highlighted five conditions that a GCC should consider when establishing C2 nodes. The five conditions are effectiveness, simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, unified action, and readiness. Specifically, a GCC senior leader is required to be capable

of C2 for multiple, concurrent contingencies in the AOR in times of peace, crisis, and war. The commander needs to be able to rapidly employ forces to transition from peace to crisis without relying on individual augmentation to form a headquarters. An additional consideration is the use of service component commanders as a functional and permanent headquarters to ensure AOR-wide effectiveness that supports multiple, concurrent tasks. All of these factors support the overarching requirement that a GCC headquarters be both responsive and simplistic.¹

Currently, the USAFRICOM headquarters is located at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart-Moehringen, Germany. There are approximately 1,500 personnel working in that location with five hundred others dispersed to field offices at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida and Royal Air Force Molesworth in England. The COCOM has an approximate annual budget of \$276-million. These factors support the command's ultimate goals and priorities to interface with US partners. The staff works directly with the Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense Attaché Offices in thirty-eight nations to coordinate security cooperation activities and contingency operations. Of the six subordinate USAFRICOM commands, only one C2 element—the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa—resides on the continent of Africa in Djibouti.²

In addition to military concerns, there are multinational and interagency concerns. A GCC has to ensure that it can immediately integrate with interagency and multinational approaches. Physical proximity and immersion of the headquarters into the AOR benefits the effective control of subordinate units and ensures that the establishment of a closer working relationship with coalition partners located in that region. Other considerations are those presented in the USAFRICOM posture statement. One of the primary goals of

USAFRICOM leadership is to address various regional challenges affecting security. Criminal and terroristic activities that link Europe to Africa are the two types of security challenges that require the most focus.³

USAFRICOM Challenges

Currently, USAFRICOM has a focus to resolve the multiple regional issues pointing to instability in the region, primarily terroristic threats and criminal activity. Many of the fifty-three African countries are prior or current colonies of European nations with political sensitivities that the COCOM should take into account before taking any action in the theater.⁴ DoS determined and commented on the role of the United States in Africa. DoS focused on how critical it is to support the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism that manage counterterrorism programs because counterterrorism is a strategic imperative for the US. In his testimony to congress, Ambassador (AMB) Don Yamamoto explained the need for continued diplomatic relations to ensure the growth of democracy and stability in Africa. Yamamoto's opinion carries weight in the discussion of the strategic focus of moving the USAFRICOM headquarters because of his positions as the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Ambassador to Ethiopia, as well as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary within the Bureau of African Affairs. He was an integral part of the planning to resolve the on-going Chadian-Sudanese conflict that still causes instability in the AOR. He also helped establish US and Ethiopian relations through his initial contact with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.⁵

The Combatant Commander from USAFRICOM highlighted numerous challenges that hinder the command's ability to succeed. In the 2015 USAFRICOM

posture statement, General David Rodriguez stated that he experienced a multitude of challenges, many of which relate to a lack of resources or an inability to focus on a combined effort with the current force structure. The command cannot gather the needed intelligence information without adequate ISR assets, and thus, there is a lack of focus on the most important issues. An added concern is the lack of force structure to allow the staff to effectively plan and analyze information to support the numerous directed missions. For example, the task of eliminating the threat of Boko Haram is resource intensive. The USAFRICOM staff also has to focus on Somali pirates, the growing presence of ISIL, the need to assist other nations with military transformation, and support peacekeeping in unstable regions such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The COCOM relies on the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the Horn of Africa to establish and maintain the partnerships and relationships with coalition partners on the ground. The CJTF executes these roles instead of the USAFRICOM headquarters committing to the mission by having a physical presence on the continent.⁶ The GAO also evaluated the problems identified by the COCOM commander in 2013. The USAFRICOM commander stated his concern for more of a presence on the continent to establish control of operations on the continent. He also requested additional personnel. In a DoD study in 2013, the USAFRICOM commander specifically identified that he needed a greater amount of access to the AOR in order to ensure positive command and control over the service component commands (commanders of military services). The commander's intention, when making this statement, was to remain in Stuttgart, Germany; however, the comment still resonates as a reason to have proximity to the operating forces.⁷

Current Research

The GAO published a report in September 2013 calling for a more thorough investigation of the decision to keep the USAFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. The GAO noted that the Office of Secretary of Defense Capabilities and Program Execution (CAPE) conducted a programmatic cost-benefit analysis in 2012 that was limited in scope, and failed to properly support the decision to allow the headquarters to remain in Stuttgart. The CAPE focused on completing a performance-based study to analyze the possibility of relocating USAFRICOM HQ and the cost-effectiveness of the move. CAPE considered that USAFRICOM shares resources and facilities with the US European Command (EUCOM). The CAPE's cost-benefit analysis contributed to the Office of Secretary of Defense's goal of government fiscal efficiencies by showing a cost savings of approximately \$60-\$70 million annually over a five-year period. The Cape's study also yielded results that a strategic move of the headquarters to the United States would allow for proper command and control, and would help the economy by creating jobs and \$450 million in income. However, the GAO was not able to determine how the cost savings and potential economic stimulation from a HQ in the United States affected the DoD's decision to remain in Stuttgart. The GAO report also highlighted that the number of staff used to support USAFRICOM and pre-USAFRICOM missions has increased 50 percent since 2001. It is reasonable to assume the staff will continue to grow in response to emerging threats.⁸

History of Establishing a Headquarters in Africa

The DoD initially desired to establish a headquarters in Africa with five regional offices to address issues on the continent.⁹ Liberia was one of the few countries

considered that welcomed the presence of a headquarters in their country. The United States made offers to Libya and South Africa, but both of those countries hesitated to allow a headquarters to be established.¹⁰ The GAO did an assessment of the history of the headquarters. Initially, the President of the United States directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a COCOM in Africa. Additionally, this COCOM was not going to only tackle new issues in Africa, but also inherited activities from other COCOMs. The major responsibilities that transferred from the EUCOM were Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara, Africa Partnership Station, medical exercises fighting pandemics and providing immunizations, international military education and training, and humanitarian assistance, which included forty-two countries. US Central Command (CENTCOM) relinquished control of the JTF in the Horn of Africa, which is still the largest activity throughout seven countries, excluding Egypt. US Pacific Command (PACOM) contributed the Pacific Endeavor activity and the Tempest Express, a multinational workshop with military personnel in three countries.

From inception, the command was primarily military in order to balance with the presence of DoS that is also present in Africa. The composition of the initial headquarters was 63 percent military, 36 percent DoD civilian, and 1 percent interagency positions. One interesting fact about the development of the headquarters is that it strove to integrate interagency personnel in a different manner. USAFRICOM placed the interagency civilians in key leadership positions to assist with the planning and execution of missions that are diplomatic in nature. This structure should have assisted USAFRICOM leadership with integrating in Africa, but personnel still had to rely on

shared resources with EUCOM and funding for Temporary Duty (TDY) trips to Africa to maintain situational awareness and to liaison with regional partners.

USAFRICOM has five strategic imperatives according to the Army Strategic Studies Institute, they are:

1. Allocate forces to carry out short-term training engagements in Africa.
2. Give preference to emerging democracies in the selection of the command's partner nations.
3. Strengthen the capacity of regional, African Union, and sub regional organizations to respond to regional conflicts.
4. Resolve that the location of command headquarters should remain in Stuttgart for operational efficiency.
5. Carry out top-down, right-sizing exercises at USAFRICOM at a time of severe budget constraints.

Of these imperatives, this study focuses on the future location of USAFRICOM headquarters and current concerns. Prior research shows that only small countries like Liberia welcome a headquarters in Africa, while the larger countries do not welcome the idea. However, there has not been any direct answer from the respective governments to use for future analysis. The Army Strategic Studies Institute also highlighted that USAFRICOM headquarters must remain in Germany or move to the United States because of political objection to moving the headquarters to Africa.¹¹

Common Ground in Current Research

All of the studies and data described in the literature review analyze the rationale that supports the current and future potential locations of the USAFRICOM headquarters.

Most of the research on this topic was administered through US government agencies, but this study will not be limited to this data to avoid bias. Current research also focuses on economic impacts associated with each proposed course of action. All relevant research studies include a cost-benefit analysis. Cost effectiveness is a primary concern in DoD decision-making as it is an overall goal to reduce defense spending and consolidate initiatives whenever possible.

To understand the need for moving the USAFRICOM headquarters, it is important to understand the process for establishment of USAFRICOM's original headquarters. The President directed the Secretary of Defense to create the new geographic combatant command, USAFRICOM, to address the issues in Africa when EUCOM was no longer able to focus resources. The newly established COCOM was responsible for dealing with combating infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, provide C2 to the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, and conduct security cooperation activities. Previously, three COCOMs–EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM –shared the responsibility of these regions or issues in Africa. Government leadership hoped to establish a first-class organization capable of coordinating interagency actions with a staff size relative to other COCOMs. The COCOM ultimately employed a staff of 1,356 personnel. This is a moderate size staff comparable to the mission, but ultimately the cost of building facilities in Africa were the driving factor that led DoD to co-locate the headquarters with EUCOM in Stuttgart, Germany.¹²

The DoD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) conducted a cost-benefit analysis, and determined the approximate cost to relocate the headquarters would be between \$350-\$400 million, and would cost an annual \$60-\$70 million per year to

operate. The DoD assessed that it would be more cost effective to maintain the headquarters in Stuttgart. Travel costs may have been higher for staff to manage forces and programs in the USAFRICOM theater at \$13.9 million, because the COCOM was not located on the continent or close to the United States. CAPE assessed that the best course of action would be to move the headquarters to the United States to reduce travel costs.¹³




Figure 1. Notional USAFRICOM Regional Supervision

Source: US Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-646, *DoD Must Reassess Options for Permanent Relocation of US Africa Command* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2013), accessed May 30, 2016, <http://gao.gov/assets/660/657492.pdf>.

Prior to the establishment of the USAFRICOM headquarters, many planners for the Department of Defense attempted to map out a plan for establishing the initial regional boundaries related to the effective command and control of military personnel and effective supervision of civilians. The purpose of the regional concept was to enable the combatant command to focus on the diverse subset of issues that include the terrorist threats in the northern part of Africa that were formerly part of CENTCOM AOR. Additionally, the culture and political situation of every region differs. The goal was to establish five regional offices and one main headquarters.




Figure 2. Previous Analysis of Potential USAFRICOM Headquarters

Source: US Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-646, *DoD Must Reassess Options for Permanent Relocation of US Africa Command* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2013), accessed 30 May 2016, <http://gao.gov/assets/660/657492.pdf>.

Figure 2 represents previous locations that DoD surveyed and analyzed for potential headquarters relocation. The four options included a cost-benefit analysis and an overall assessment on feasibility based on the current political concerns. Overall, DoD determined that relocation was not possible due to two critical factors, which were cost (based on constrained resources) and stability of the host nation (geo-political concerns). The ultimate decision was to co-locate the USAFRICOM headquarters with EUCOM in Stuttgart, Germany, in order to share resources and mission load. The options were evaluated based on the cost to relocate the headquarters and were ultimately based on the political sensitivities at the time. The headquarters relocation was considered at a time when there was increased scrutiny on DoD spending and funding. In addition, many of the staff members were reticent to live in what they considered austere living conditions. The greatest challenge would be infrastructure. At the time, the advantages of effective command and control were not a consideration.¹⁴

Table 1 depicts the total costs for operations annually for each combatant command. USAFRICOM noticeably spends more than the other combatant commands, and GAO audits are necessary complements to the analysis of cost versus operational effectiveness or output. The USAFRICOM theater is much larger and more complex than others are. USAFRICOM is a less mature COCOM. The Ebola outbreak factors into managing daily operations, and DoD provides a high level of support to ensure security while conducting peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid campaigns. The majority of literature suggests there is a correlation between the proximity of the headquarters and effective command and control. The US government needs to evaluate whether the

USAFRICOM headquarters should be relocated through analysis of data and previous studies.

Table 1. FY16 Operations and Maintenance Funding Estimates (Office of Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller)

COMBATANT COMMANDS

\$ in Millions

Combatant Commands FY 2014 - FY 2016 Budget (\$ Millions)

Combatant Command¹	FY 2014² Actual	Program Change	FY 2015³ Enacted	Program Change	FY 2016³ Estimate
U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)	254.3	-6.5	247.8	2.0	249.8
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)	257.6	-86.7	170.9	-17.3	153.6
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)	135.7	-13.5	122.2	1.5	123.7
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)	215.0	-42.9	172.1	7.9	180.0
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)	316.0	-136.8	179.2	-7.2	172.0
U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)	191.7	-1.4	190.3	-3.3	187.0
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)	941.5	-203.7	737.8	14.4	766.3
TOTAL	2,311.8	-491.5	1,820.3	12.1	1,832.4
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) ⁴	7,090.1	-2,100.2	4,989.9	310.4	5,300.3
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) ⁵	8,262.0	-1,552.3	6,709.7	-493.7	6,216.0
Numbers may not add due to rounding					
Source: Component PB-58 exhibits.					
¹ COCOM amounts reflect Headquarters and Mission Support O&M Funding					
² FY 2014 includes Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.					
³ FY 2015 and FY 2016 do not include OCO funding.					
⁴ USSOCOM includes HQ and operational funds.					
⁵ USTRANSCOM is funded predominately with customer orders in the Working Capital Fund.					

The funding reflected above supports COCOM day-to-day operations and mission activities that promote regional stability. The funding for TRANSCOM and SOCOM is shown separately because they also include operational funding.

Source: Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2016 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 104.

The study will also determine if there is a benefit of relocating the headquarters based on proximity to forces deployed on the continent. In the 2015 USAFRICOM

Posture Statement, General Rodriguez highlighted that his approach required a strengthening of relationships with multinational and interagency partners to achieve strategic goals in a cohesive manner. Specifically, he wanted to ensure close teamwork and trust facilitated by a presence in Africa.¹⁵

Chapter Summary

DoD established the USAFRICOM headquarters to alleviate the pressure on EUCOM and CENTCOM due to overwhelming operational requirements. The President of the United States directed the DoD to establish a command to address the issues on the African continent. One of the challenges the new command faced was limited resources to establish the command. USAFRICOM was a priority for the President and the DoD, but was not a priority for Congress, especially in consideration of the perception that operations in Africa were not in US interests. The location of the command headquarters for USAFRICOM was a major consideration along with the organizational structure. Ultimately, several studies evaluated the costs for infrastructure, employee travel, and the best positions to achieve the desired unity of effort in Africa. The DoD decided to establish the headquarters in Stuttgart, where it would be co-located with EUCOM. This decision enabled a burgeoning COCOM to work closely with another while sharing resources. The decision to remain in Stuttgart supported conservation of resources and maintaining a proximity to troops that enables a commander to be effective in an AOR. However, this study poses the question, is the proximity is enough in today's complex environment? Essentially, this study evaluates whether the USAFRICOM headquarters should be relocated to Africa. To evaluate this question, several methods will be used to evaluate the question and the validity of any possible solutions.

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- ¹ Joint Staff, Deployable Training Division, *Insights and Best Practices*, 5.
- ² US Africa Command, “United States Africa Command 2015 Posture Statement,” USAFRICOM, accessed 30 May 2016, <https://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/document/25285/usafricom-posture-statement-2015>.
- ³ Joint Staff, Deployable Training Division, *Insights and Best Practices*, 7.
- ⁴ Ibid., 9-11.
- ⁵ US Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-646.
- ⁶ Department of Defense.
- ⁷ US Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-646.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ British Broadcast Corporation, “US Shifts on AFRICOM Base Plans,” *BBC News*, 18 February 2008, accessed 27 May 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/>.
- ¹¹ David Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New US Combatant Command* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2013), 1-20, accessed 15 October 2015, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1164.pdf>.
- ¹² Pendleton, GAO-08-947T.
- ¹³ US Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-646.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ US Africa Command, “United States Africa Command 2015 Posture Statement.”

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

The proposed research will use a mixed-methods approach due to the complexity of the problem. Several methods used will include case studies, personal interviews, and historical analysis. This research will explore the primary research question, should USAFRICOM headquarters move to the continent of Africa? A secondary question is, if USAFRICOM headquarters moves to one of the stable countries in Africa, what construct would be needed. Overall, through analysis of data and various reports, the goal is to determine if moving the headquarters is advantageous for C2. The study will review the cost-benefits, unity of command, proper command and control, possible force structures, barriers to relocating the headquarters, and current arguments for maintaining the headquarters in Europe. A combination of research methodologies assures a comprehensive approach. In addition to the primary question, there are secondary questions. To assure a holistic approach, research will explore strategic and operational advantages and disadvantages of moving the headquarters to the continent of Africa based on the current USAFRICOM priorities and emerging threats. The research will answer whether the headquarters should move from Stuttgart, Germany, to Africa, or at a minimum, provide additional information to decision makers.

Data Collection Methods

The proposed research is qualitative and quantitative in nature. The use of statistics, costs, and concepts and opinions of senior leaders will assure that the study

looks at the major factors that support the potential decision to move the headquarters. Qualitative data derived from historical analysis of commentaries, white papers, or other articles by individuals who worked in the USAFRICOM theater are cited.

Additional analysis of qualitative information derives from historical personal interviews with subject matter experts or highly qualified experts. Due to the nature of this study, there will not be a random sampling of subjects; however, the study will focus on senior military leaders with experience either in theater under the C2 of the USAFRICOM commander or staff officers who previously worked at the headquarters facility. Most of the referenced material was reviewed at the beginning of the study to ensure a real-world perspective.

Historical analysis is used in quantitative methods. This study will use reports and data from previously completed studies on topics related to this study, particularly data published by DoD directly related to relocating the headquarters facility. Previous financial execution reports and current economic reports will be used to support the thesis statement that USAFRICOM headquarters should be relocated due to the mission requirements, as well as there is sufficient stability in Africa to support a headquarters. There is a limited amount of information related to this question; however, annual reports from the Office of Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller (OUSD (C)) will be an additional source of information for analysis. The validity of the data is not questionable, but one consideration is that, as the GAO report suggested, reports from DoD may be biased toward a known and desired outcome. Therefore, additional data sources and information outside of the DoD channels will be sought.

A portion of this study will rely on statistical analysis. The intent is to include Army G1 and DoD human resources estimates to assist with analysis of the personnel cost associated with moving the headquarters. Outcomes of the Total Army Analysis provide additional data sources, which can help define the importance of USAFRICOM to DoD priorities and the National Military Strategy. One drawback to using this data is that it is limited in scope and does not take other factors into account outside of military channels that can affect the decision to move the headquarters. For example, the political environments in the United States, Africa, and Europe all weigh heavily on the decision to move the headquarters. Additionally, the impact to local African economies does not appear to be a focus of prior research. One way of delimiting this data would be to compare data from other departments and potential host nations.

A case study approach will compare the original thesis and arguments associated with moving the headquarters to Africa. This study will compare the overall planning and data associated with the establishment of other COCOM headquarters. The study will review the initial phases of more established COCOMS, including challenges they faced, to provide relative data and context to the findings of this study. Some general areas of concern are diplomatic relations in the region, proposed force structure, after-action reports, military construction, procurement funding costs, and synchronization with the USAFRICOM mission and posture statement.

Data Analysis Method

Data analysis for this study will involve answering and evaluating the possibility of USAFRICOM moving its headquarters to West Africa. Case studies and statistics to build cost-benefit analysis of the proposed countries in West Africa that could be host

nation for a COCOM headquarters will be reviewed. The data analysis method is similar to that of cost-benefit analysis. DoD expenditure reports are highly useful in determining operating costs, and how plans could be implemented through historical comparisons, cost models and proposed. Additionally, the reports can determine ways to make the original plans for headquarters in Africa more cost-effective.

After data collection, the criteria will be scored according to a range of values. The values are based on the desired end state. The desired end state is a relocated headquarters in a host nation where the optimal relocation cost is minimal, and the stakeholders will support the move politically. Two primary factors will evaluate the end state, which are the overall stability of the potential host nation and cost-effectiveness. The stability of the host nation includes the current security posture as defined by the CIA and DoS, the political support the US would have if relocating the headquarters, the existence of training facilities or partnerships, and if the host nation is a member of the AU. These stability factors will determine if the move is both feasible and acceptable. The factors will each be scored, but not weighted to develop a raw composite score. The criteria will not be weighted as each factor is equally as important to the desired end state and the potential relocation of the headquarters cannot occur if there is a lack in any of the categories. Next, the estimated cost is calculated separately from the stability score.

The study will determine the cost-based benefit analysis or cost-comparison by evaluating the potential cost of a new facility to accommodate the staff as well as the relocation costs of the staff. These two criteria will be equally weighted for matters of simplicity. However, the relocation costs of staff could potentially include other benefits that extend into constructing new facilities or hiring staff to accommodate the personnel

moving to Africa. The range of costs for facility construction will have scoring coefficients from the range of one to five dependent upon the benefit of the cost. The personnel relocation costs are equally weighted as they are assumed to be a low estimate as a baseline for potential personnel relocation costs. The other component of cost-based analysis is determining if there is a cost-related legitimacy or suitability associated with relocating the headquarters, based on comparing operational tempo to funding levels. This analysis will determine if relocating the headquarters is a legitimate concern, and will identify the need for evaluating the thesis statement based on a scientific method. The costs are a major part of the overall analysis based on the move being feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

The stability and cost-comparison data will be analyzed using criterion that supports evaluation whether the move of USAFRICOM headquarters is feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Feasible options are those that can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations. Acceptable must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained. Suitable options are those that can accomplish the mission within the commander's intent and planning guidance.¹ The analysis will determine if each potential host nation has the capacity for the construction of an USAFRICOM headquarters. The stability data will determine if relocating the headquarters is acceptable based on the risk identified by the COCOM commander and strategic imperatives as well as the advantages of moving the headquarters based on feasibility.

Research Design

The major question is, should the USAFRICOM headquarters be moved to the continent, and if so, what would be an ideal location? This study will use quantitative analysis of qualitative data as a research approach. Most importantly, the method of comparative analysis will help shape the argument embedded in the thesis, and help identify any biases or gaps in knowledge or information. This study will leverage the availability of current existing studies that have looked into factors that affect this study, such as GAO audits and reports. Additionally, the study will use information and data from a variety of national sources such as BBC, DoD, congressional testimonies, military posture statements, DOS reports, and CIA analysis.

The study will look at two primary factors that drive the ultimate recommendation, which are the cost effectiveness of a potential relocation of the headquarters and the operational benefits. Subsidiary to these two main factors, the study will have to evaluate the political considerations as well as social considerations to understand the problem set. The budget data is helpful in determining cost effectiveness. One method will be to use current budget and historical data to develop a future estimate for cost along a defined timeline of five years. The goal is to conduct a five-year interval, which is consistent with any Future Years Defense Plan or strategic policy analysis. This extrapolated data can form an overlay that can accompany the current policies and ideologies that others in DoD are evaluating.

The research will consist of the following steps:

Step One: The primary portion of analysis will be the literature review. The purpose of the literature review is to compare other similar works or works that address

the topics introduced in this study. The literature will serve as the first step toward comparative analysis of case studies. The comparisons from the literature review will assist in analyzing the major thesis question.

Step Two. The second step will be to review the data from other cost comparisons or budget data to evaluate the thesis. The data will compare costs to operational data within USAFRICOM as well as identify potential costs associated with relocating the headquarters.

Step Three. The third step will be to review criteria associated with political support of relocating the headquarters. The international community and AU should support any potential move. Overall, all of the data will be evaluated and weighted against feasible, acceptable, and suitable criteria. These criteria are often used to support a commander's decision in operational design, but is also a useful analysis of plans that effect operations, such as relocating a COCOM headquarters.

Step Four. The final recommendation will combine the results of the comparisons with the political stability of potential host nations to answer whether the headquarters should be relocated, and what country is a possible best location.

The scoring criteria for evaluating the potential location are based on the DoD assuming prudent risk prior to deciding to relocate the headquarters. In this study, prudent risk ensures that any option is close to the optimal relocation cost of \$300 million, and ensures that there is not excessive political risk in relocating the headquarters, to include ensuring a potential host nation is stable. The scoring criterion is robust to take into account all of the factors evaluated based on the research

methodology, which is a mixed methods study. The scoring criteria are based on the option being feasible, suitable, or acceptable.

Step Five. Once the primary question is answered based on comparative analysis of prior case studies regarding command and control of forces, the data analysis that shows the potential host nation with the highest score and does not violate the risk for cost or stability, will be the optimal choice for potential relocation as well as justifying that DoD should relocate the headquarters.

Step Six. The final step in the research design will be to provide conclusions and recommendations from the research. Recommendations for both decision makers and future researchers will be provided.

Threats to Validity

A major threat to validity is the presence of biases due to the data collection methods. Most data are taken from research studies or statistics gathered from government agencies in support of current strategic interests. Therefore, the data could be biased by supporting a pre-conceived idea or thesis and merely be in support of a commonly accepted idea. Additionally, few experts on the issues of Africa exist, and the data and professional opinions of those individuals are difficult to access. To remove any possible threats to validity, additional or potentially more obscure sources have been sought to balance the opinions and data used in the research design. Any data or information that may be rooted in bias would therefore be weighted to a lesser degree in data analysis and in comparing data. Use of numerical data and weighting criteria helps to determine if the analysis proves the thesis. Currently, the goal is to compare data and perform an analysis of factors that contribute to DoD decision-making. Concerns such as

mission command and commitment are not measurable, but can be evaluated using comparative analysis. Once all of the information is considered holistically, it will be clear to see if the USAFRICOM headquarters should be re-located, and if the actual move could be considered feasible, acceptable, or suitable as an option.

Chapter Summary

The research methodology chosen allows the study to evaluate the primary research question if it is prudent to relocate USAFRICOM headquarters to Africa. The overall methodology is a mixed methods study that includes comparative analysis and analysis of data. This methodology uses scoring criteria in conjunction with an analysis whether the potential course of action is feasible, suitable, or acceptable. The criteria will be compared by examining the Army Warfighting Challenge #2, which is to “Shape the Security Environment.” Relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters ties into this challenge because the need to shape the security environment in Africa is increasingly important to US national interests. The challenge of GCCs to meet operational needs is tied to the commander and his or her staff’s effectiveness.

Chapter 4 will provide the data presentation and analysis for the thesis. In this chapter, the research methodology will first examine the validity of the thesis statement that USAFRICOM headquarters should relocate. Then it will delve into analytics concerning the FAS of relocating to a potential host nation based on robust scoring criteria to support the DoD taking prudent risk in any particular course of action. Once the data are analyzed, then a formal recommendation for relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters or not can be made using the results of the research study.

¹ Jack Kem, *Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2013), 136.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Chapter Introduction

This study answers the primary question, should USAFRICOM be relocated to the continent of Africa? The evaluation criteria for evaluating this question will include a robust analysis of the actual costs associated with re-locating the command, the political opinions of the stakeholders, the benefits to the US interests in the USAFRICOM theater and the impact to effective command and control of units assigned to USAFRICOM along with the ability to improve relationships. These criteria will be applied to first determine if the headquarters should be relocated to Africa. The next step in presenting data is to weigh out the feasibility and positive impact of specific countries that could be a host nation for the headquarters. The potential countries are Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, and South Africa. The benefit of moving to each of these countries are weighted and based on factors that correlate with national interests for the US, socio-economic stability of the country as well as the cost to establish facilities and forces in the country.

Results of Literature Review

The review of applicable literature shows that the GCC needs a C2 structure that is adaptable and flexible enough to meet the unique challenges in the USAFRICOM footprint. One concern is that the force structure for an organization such as USAFRICOM needs to accommodate the needs of the commander. Another concern is that the proximity of the headquarters to the military units in Africa enhances the

flexibility and responsiveness. A command is most responsive when decisions can be made quickly with an accurate and holistic understanding of the operational environment. It is clear that the previous models for GCCs are not applicable for USAFRICOM, which is indicative of how USAFRICOM developed a force structure that is unlike any of the other COCOMs. USAFRICOM has a civilian deputy with prior Department of State experience. The staff also has a greater number of civilian personnel than other COCOMS with over 36 percent being civilian personnel.

The comments from prior commanders and the current USAFRICOM commander show that proximity to military units provides the flexibility and ability to control forces. The USAFRICOM commander stated that he needs access to his military forces and requested to remain in Germany in lieu of moving to the United States where he would be less effective as a commander. Another issue related to proximity is that a GCC needs to have unity of action and currently, USAFRICOM struggles to achieve this. In the 2015 USAFRICOM posture statement, the commander discussed how difficult it was to unify actions of those units dispersed across the continent, to include ISR assets. There is only one JTF established in the Horn of Africa and it is not sufficient to control the geographically dispersed brigades over such a vast continent. The current challenges span across the continent from Boko Haram in Nigeria and West Africa to Somali pirating in East African waters, to the instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the issues in Libya.

The literature review also showed that any move to the continent has political implications. The United States justifies the existence of USAFRICOM as a COCOM due to national interests. The command is newer and criticized for being ineffective,

especially as it pertains to establishing the necessary relationships with partners and stakeholders in Africa. The AU criticized USAFRICOM for having a lack of commitment to the issues that are a priority to Africa. Building a headquarters fosters a sense of commitment that will allow better contact with these strategic partners and will legitimize the command's existence and assure effectiveness. Liberia offered to host the USAFRICOM headquarters, which shows that the original DoD study in 2008 was potentially flawed when stating there was a lack of support in moving the headquarters to the continent. The GAO audit from 2013 requested that DoD revisit its stance on relocating the headquarters due to a lack of achieving the performance measures and incomplete studies that were limited in scope. In short, the GAO challenged the integrity of the data that DoD presented as justification to remain in Stuttgart, Germany.

Analysis of Funding Compared to Operational Requirements

Comparatively, USAFRICOM has the most complex and geographically dispersed problem set with a budget that is relatively small compared to its growing requirements. Additionally, the staff is minimal and shares some facilities with EUCOM. The staff uses TDY as a way to maintain effectiveness and awareness in the AO. Figure 4 depicts a chart that compares funding versus workload of USAFRICOM to the funding levels across select years. The GAO conducted a series of studies and audits on AFRICOM throughout the years that it existed. The most prominent recommendations are that the COCOM should meet operational needs at lower costs and calls for a comprehensive and well-documented analysis of options for the permanent placement of the headquarters for USAFRICOM. The recommendation includes a request for documentation on whether the operational benefits of each option outweigh the costs.

The method of comparative analysis analyzed the results of the data. The analysis includes hard data linked to cost and subjective data that is linked to geo-political concerns and support of national strategy. Merging both types of data in a focused analysis yielded a scoring (similar to efficiency reporting) that supports or denies the hypothesis.

Cost, sustainability and overall impact to operations drive the decision to move the headquarters. All of these conditions must be met in order to prove the thesis that DoD should move the headquarters to Africa. Figure 5 depicts the criterion and how they are weighted for purposes of this study. Figure 6 depicts an analysis of the criterion and given values, and how each of the criterion was applied to the potential countries or locations for an USAFRICOM headquarters. The option to move or not was evaluated using each of the prospective countries (identified based on economic and political stability that the CIA and DoS evaluated) and determining if the score yields a score of 80 or above. The baseline coefficient of 80 for a success rate assures there is minimal risk in moving an established headquarters and thus proves the thesis while making a potential recommendation on the location of the headquarters. The countries that are potential headquarters are Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, and South Africa.




Figure 3. USAFRICOM Funding FY13-FY16

Source: Developed by author. Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2016* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 40-135; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Chief Financial Officer, *Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 6, 47-60, 107-109.

Figure 3 depicts USAFRICOM funding compared to countries with Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance operations. This figure also depicts trends in USAFRICOM showing disproportionate growth of missions relative to funding and infrastructure. USAFRICOM leadership testified to congress that there are numerous operations and missions conducted with minimal increase in resources. Additionally, the lack of proximity challenges critical relationships and partnerships. Majority of staff costs are associated with the cost-of-living allowances for personnel to reside in Europe as well as swelling costs to support frequent TDYs. Political criticisms are also that the TDYs and mission costs exceed the benefits. The 2013 GAO audits identified that the

Department of Defense is failing to meet prescribed performance measures and that the organization as a whole is not able to reach its desired end-state. Additionally, the review of the Future Years Defense Plan shows that the growth of overall USAFRICOM funding averages approximately \$22 million with a growth percentage of 17 percent. Conversely, there was a 56 percent growth in actual tasks identified from inception of the USAFRICOM combatant command to 2015. Further analysis shows that the actual weapons systems are not adequate for the operational environment, which makes the current headquarters location not suitable for current operational requirements.

FAS Analysis of Compiled Data

Table 2. Criteria for FAS Analysis

Stability Analysis of Potential Host Nations					
COUNTRY	EMBASSY (Y/N)	EXISTING TRNG FACILITIES (Y/N)	MEMBER OF AFRICAN UNION	STABLE SECURITY POSTURE	TOTAL SCORING
Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	4
Liberia	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	3
Morocco	Yes	No	No	Yes	2
South Africa	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	3
Notes: - Existence of an U.S. embassy shows the minimum required positive political relationship between the U.S. and potential host nation. - Existing training facilities highlight that the country possesses infrastructure capable of supporting a headquarters element. - African Union (AU) membership indicates a country's willingness to support multi-national interests and be a potentially strong and stable partner. - Stable security posture was determined by reviewing the Department of State advisory on internal security.					

Source: Developed by author. Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2016* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 40-135; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Chief Financial Officer, *Operation and Maintenance Overview Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Estimates* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 6, 47-60, 107-109; Central Intelligence Agency, "Ethiopia," *The World Factbook*, 10 May 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html>; Central Intelligence Agency, "Ghana," *The World Factbook*, 6 April 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html>; Central Intelligence Agency, "Liberia," *The World Factbook*, 6 April 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html>; Central Intelligence Agency, "Morocco," *The World Factbook*, 9 May 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html>; Central Intelligence Agency, "South Africa," *The World Factbook*, 17 April 2016, accessed 30 May 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html>.

Table 2 depicts weighting of criteria for analysis of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of COA to move USAFRICOM headquarters to alternate locations. Criterion were analyzed against each of the prospective countries/areas (Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, South Africa, and Ethiopia). A feasible outcome is one where the course of action or strategic plan will accomplish the mission or desired end state within a given time, space, and resource limitation. This essentially means that the ways have means to achieve the end state without leveraging additional resources. An acceptable option is balanced between the cost and risk of potential advantages; acceptable options use prudent risk and take into consideration the factors that make the option unreasonable. Suitable options will accomplish the desired national end state within the limitations set by the political leaders and strategic policies.¹

Relocating a headquarters is costly and this is critical criteria for analysis. Cost affects the feasibility of the thesis to move the headquarters to Africa. The current budgetary concerns rule out any option that requires excessive costs (any amount greater than \$30 million). The cost should also be feasible, meaning that any resources used to establish and maintain a headquarters should be developed within current fiscal constraints. Congress limited the overall operating budget for USAFRICOM to \$276 million in fiscal year 2012. Additionally, the costs of relocating are only acceptable if the move does not exceed prudent risk. The costs would exceed prudent risk if too much of the operating budget were used to relocate the headquarters, which would result in insufficient funding to accomplish critical missions, such as counterinsurgency against Boko Harem, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or the Lord's Resistance Army terrorist organizations.

Table 3. Cost Comparison Criteria

Scoring Coefficient	Facility Construction Cost Range	Personnel Relocation Cost Range
5	\$0 - \$300 m	\$0-\$15,000
4	> \$ 300 mil - \$ 500 m	> \$1500 - \$18,000
3	>\$ 500 m - \$ 700 m	> \$18,000 - \$21,000
2	> \$ 700 m - \$ 900 m	> \$21,000 - \$24,000
1	> \$ 900 m - \$ 1 b	> \$24,000 - \$ 27,000
0	> \$ 1 b - \$ 1.3 b	> \$27,000 - \$ 30,000
Notes: Scoring coefficients developed by student • \$300 million is optimal construction cost • Facility construction does not include \$140 million estimated for construction of facilities to support dependents		

Source: Created by author.

Table 3 depicts the criteria for the current infrastructure takes into account the ability to use a “plug and play” method when relocating the headquarters. Due to cost limitations and inability to utilize additional forces to establish a new headquarters, the plan should leverage existing infrastructure in a stable country. DoS and CIA identified the most viable countries based on the country’s Gross Domestic Product, leaders’ political will to cooperate with the United States, and the existence of US contingents and units. The countries that could best support a headquarters based on this definition are Liberia, Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Morocco. These countries are only feasible solutions if the headquarters could be relocated and fully operational within five fiscal years, which is the amount of time permitted to spend military construction (MILCON)

funding. Additionally, the DoD should be able to establish the headquarters with minimal cost or political opposition. In short, this option needs to be acceptable and not risk the existing relationships and partnerships that the US developed. Similarly, the costs associated with relocating the personnel are a minor issue. USAFRICOM will need to address the entire logistical challenge, but the initial cost estimates are a starting point for decision-makers.

The political concerns for relocating the headquarters are also of great impact. If a country is not a willing partner with the US to address the multitude of issues in Africa, then the relocation is not acceptable. The risk would endanger US national strategic goals. Scoring of the political support is derived from factors that support occupying a host nation in previous OEs such as stability of the economy, will of the local populace, ability of the government to manage its internal affairs and approval of the international community (particularly UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organization partner states). Prudent risk in this situation would be to ensure that relocating the headquarters has the support of the major players within the African Union to establish a commitment that considers the plans and strategic goals of the nations affected. Moreover, the political and diplomatic courses of action cannot exceed existing resources or the capacity of the White House, DoS, and the DoD to achieve the national intent to create stability in Africa to prevent war criminals and terrorists from taking a foothold on the region. This ensures the act of moving the headquarters is actually feasible. Political relationships can help focus on the eradication of terrorists and war criminals attempting to exploit the weaknesses of the African states. Finally, the high scores to move the headquarters are acceptable based on the evaluation criteria.

The two countries with the highest scoring stability index are Ethiopia and Ghana, which meet all the conditions for a stable and potential host nation. Liberia and South Africa are countries with the second highest scoring index. The criterion is based on the ability to support a headquarters in areas requiring less build-up costs. This criterion allows staff to safely relocate their families, utilizing the same facilities that service members or other US Government employees working in the country use. The optimal cost to build a new headquarters is \$300 million to ensure the actual operating budget is minimally affected. Training facilities in a country prove that the country can support personnel and the technical needs as well as acceptable living conditions. One note is that, politically, Liberia publicly offered to host an USAFRICOM headquarters in 2008, which makes this country, at minimum, a viable option for the USAFRICOM headquarters or a potential joint task force headquarters. Similarly, Ethiopia has a large training facility, and is a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping missions as well as a key partner in counterterrorism. Ethiopia is in close proximity to existing military contingents and hot spots. Additionally, Ethiopia is the headquarters of the AU, and the ability to directly interact with AU officials would be positive. It has shown a willingness to host US facilities and exercises. It is clear that there is potential for USAFRICOM headquarters to be re-located, but the countries should be evaluated further, and plans should be detailed.

Cost Comparison of Relocation

The potential costs associated with relocating a headquarters are a primary concern for any commander. There is no publicized data to specifically estimate the cost of the USAFRICOM headquarters. This study strives to provide a broad estimate to

provide relevance to the analysis of the thesis for relocating the headquarters.

Comparable building structures on the continent of Africa were used to determine an average cost in the potential host nations. These costs were then aligned with staff relocation costs based on UN personnel, and then, finally, the costs associated with hiring additional staff. These costs combined, provide a broad estimate that show the feasibility of relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters within a reasonable cost constraint. The overall focus is to establish a baseline for cost. Initially, in the 2009, the GAO assessed the costs associated with relocating the to the United States at approximately \$350 million. This cost is the maximum threshold for relocating to Africa for the purpose of this study.

In 2013, the GAO noted in its assessment, *DoD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent Location of US Africa Command*, that it cost \$140 million to develop Stuttgart with adequate facilities for family quarters, child development center, commissary, officer's club, and offices. Essentially, this was the cost to establish the fundamental facilities to support the dependents of the USAFRICOM staff. This same cost can be used to estimate expanding existing support systems of an embassy in the potential host nation that provides office space, warehouses, motor pools, and power generation.

This GAO audit also discussed staff size, which is a cost measure associated with relocated the staff. The relocation costs will include a permanent change of station cost for all military, DoD, and military service component civilians assigned to or employed at USAFRICOM headquarters. The current staff is comprised of two thousand personnel; the average cost associated with relocating personnel will vary by country.

Approximately 47 percent of the personnel are military, 49 percent are DoD civilian, and

4 percent are interagency positions. The estimated cost of moving from Europe to Africa was evaluated based on DoD locality rates and moving estimates based on these personnel categories.

The final aspect is MILCON expenditures, or the cost to build a facility in a potential host nation. An official MILCON estimate is a lengthy process that is typically executed using a combination of engineers, contractors, financial analysts, and military and civilian experts. However, this study establishes a baseline cost for potential countries of Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana, South Africa, and Morocco through general analysis of facilities that would meet USAFRICOM requirements. Essentially, these facilities are headquarters that accommodate other organizations that are comparable to a COCOM headquarters in size and function. Once aggregate estimates are calculated for each potential host nation, then the scoring table can determine if the relocation cost is feasible, acceptable, and suitable, leading to an overall recommendation that supports or rejects the thesis to relocate the USAFRICOM headquarters to Africa. If the aggregate cost exceeds \$1 billion, or a potential host nation is not suitable for selection as a headquarters due to lack of stability or political support, then the thesis would be considered invalid. However, if there is a finding that a host nation could support the headquarters relocation, and if there are operational benefits, then the thesis is proven valid.

Table 4. Cost Analysis of Facility Construction and Personnel Relocation

Potential Host Nation	Facility Cost	Total Employee Relocation Cost
Ethiopia	\$ 200 million	\$18,250
Ghana	\$ 600 million	\$14,847
Liberia	\$ 100 million	\$15,321
Morocco	\$ 600 million	\$13,745
South Africa	\$ 311 million	\$17,928
Notes: • Facility cost determined by comparable facilities built in that potential host nation • Personnel relocation cost range determined by norms for other COCOMs • Personnel relocation cost formula = # of personnel x (average dislocation allowance [\$2842.14] + \$2500 + home furnishing shipping costs for specific country) - Costs to ship home per country based on average 7,500 lb. household - \$2500 is flight cost that incorporates average # of dependents into overall equation		

Source: Created by author. Department of the Army, “PB-31Q Exhibit, Manpower Changes in Full-Time Equivalent OUSD(C)-1, Manpower Changes in Fulltime Equivalent (FTE),” in *Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 8-11, 292; The Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee, “The Joint Travel Regulations: Uniformed Service Members and DoD Civilian Employees,” Department of Defense, 10 October 2014, accessed 30 May 2016, <http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/Docs/perdiem/JTR.pdf>.

Again, the cost analysis is a critical component of the analysis. Overall, the country that was most cost-effective was Liberia, but when evaluating the cost efficiency scoring criteria in table 3 against the cost comparison data in table 4, the overall recommendation showed that the country with the best potential combined with cost-effectiveness was Ethiopia. This recommendation also has potential for a subjective analysis based on economic impacts related to diplomatic interests, as well as projected threats and opportunities in that host nation.

Table 5. Combined Scoring of Potential Host Nation

Potential Host Nation	Stability Score	Facility Cost Score	Employee Relocation Score	TOTAL SCORE
Ethiopia	4	5	3	12
Ghana	4	3	5	12
Liberia	3	5	4	12
Morocco	2	3	5	10
South Africa	3	4	4	11

Source: Created by author.

Table 5 depicts the overall scoring of each potential host nation when compared against the weighted criteria to evaluate that nation would be feasible, suitable, and acceptable. The data offers an unbiased method of comparing data to determine the most suitable options. However, in terms of acceptability, there is subjective judgment when weighing the stability of the host nation and identifying the diplomatic nuances that will affect the ultimate recommendation to answer the primary research question.

Answer to Primary Research Question

The primary research question is, should the Department of Defense relocate the USAFRICOM headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany, to the continent of Africa? Analysis of this research question determines if there is an operational advantage gained by relocating the headquarters to Africa, which is in closer proximity to the military units. This research question delves into the topic and secondary research questions need

exploration in order to evaluate the thesis that the relocation would be in support of US national interests. One secondary research question is, what are the challenges faced by geographical combatant commands not physically located in their respective areas? Another question is, would building a headquarters in Africa be cost effective? Cost effectiveness is a primary concern for the DoD as Congress continues to require more of the DoD, but with a streamlined budget. What are the issues associated with building a headquarters in Africa? These issues can be political in nature or associated with the stability and physical security of the potential host nation, which leads to the final question, where in Africa should USAFRICOM's headquarters be built? The final question is the end result of exploring all of these factors and calculating an overall score based on the FAS analysis of the research question.

The findings of the study are that the DoD should relocate the USAFRICOM headquarters to Africa. The answer to the research question, "should the Department of Defense relocate the USAFRICOM headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany, to the continent of Africa," is yes. The relocation should occur based on several factors outlined in the research methodology. The relocation to Africa is feasible acceptable and suitable as an option for DoD and USAFRICOM. The results of the literature review showed a consensus that the previous analysis by DoD for keeping USAFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart was limited and insufficient to justify the ultimate decision. Specifically, in 2013, the GAO audit called for the DoD to reassess its decision, and the Secretary of Defense concurred. There was an overwhelming response on behalf of the GCCs that a commander's proximity to his or her personnel produces significant advantages for understanding the operational environment and assuring effective control of the personnel

executing their duties. The cost of relocating the headquarters to the potential host nation of Ethiopia falls within the parameters of an optimal cost of \$300 million, in addition to meeting other requirements for stability and political support. Ethiopia has the necessary infrastructure and a lower risk of external threats to the headquarters and its personnel.

Chapter Summary

Of the five countries sampled, only two show both stability and a willingness to cooperate with the United States in a permanent fashion. Ethiopia had the strongest stability score and shows resolve as a nation. Ethiopia has existing infrastructure, and is capable of becoming a powerful nation in Africa. Additionally, the US Government has held exercises there, and works jointly with Ethiopia to neutralize Islamic State threats. Ethiopia is the top choice for a potential host nation.

Liberia is a secondary option for a host nation. The current UN mission in Liberia is near drawdown, but the existing facilities previously used by the UN headquarters are an optimal location for a potential USAFRICOM headquarters that could be executed with limited costs. The headquarters would be located in a major city with existing resources and facilities, and living accommodations for staff members. Overall, both countries have welcomed both US forces and US diplomatic attempts. Both are conveniently located near hot spots, which provide the opportunity to provide effective command and control of forces operating within Africa. Aside from operational concerns, the command could consider relocating to make a strong statement that the United States is willing to commit to its operations and missions in Africa.

A strong political statement is key in establishing and maintaining the necessary partnerships to be successful in Africa. All of these factors lead into showing how

relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters could pay big dividends for the COCOM and the United States. A consideration for all senior DoD leaders is the need for better use command and staff to provide stability for Africa. Ultimately, it is clear that relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters to Africa is an optimal solution for command issues to achieve desired results in Africa.

Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations from the study. Chapter 5 explains the opportunities to expand on the findings of this study through in-depth research. The next chapter will also provide leaders with a potential way of implementing recommendations to establish USAFRICOM on the continent.

¹ Kem, *Planning for Action*, 136.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Introduction

The primary research question to this study was, should the Department of Defense relocate the USAFRICOM headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany to the continent of Africa? The answer to this question, as outlined in the previous chapter, is yes. This study's purpose was to evaluate if the DoD should relocate USAFRICOM headquarters to the continent of Africa, and address the additional conditions that would impact and influence this decision. The United States could invest funding the relocation of the headquarters to optimize operational approach, ensuring the COCOM's success. USAFRICOM is highly likely to increase effectiveness if the commander and staff have proximity to the forces and operational environment, especially when dealing with today's complex problems. Relocating the headquarters to a host nation such as Ethiopia appears to be feasible, acceptable, and suitable based on the evaluation criteria and requirements of GCCs. However, future decision makers should ensure that they take prudent political risk in an already turbulent area of operations. The goal of future leaders should be to thoroughly plan and lay the groundwork by fostering stronger relationships with stakeholders prior to implementing any plans as well as looking at other factors (such as economic impact) that this study did not evaluate.

Conclusions

US national interests focus on defeating terrorism and creating a stable environment in Africa. Failed states allow for organizations such as Lord's Resistance

Army and Boko Haram to rise to power. These organizations thrive on funding generated by taking advantage of the resource-rich countries of Africa that have little governance. The US response to these threats and recent Ebola pandemic is simplified by providing forces and resources to assist in ensuring stability. In order to effectively do this, the United States has to answer one question, Should the USAFRICOM headquarters relocate to Africa to support operational needs? This move requires the United States to make the appropriate political commitment.

In conclusion, it is clear that the benefits of moving the headquarters outweigh the risks. In terms of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability, relocating the headquarters is an appropriate course of action. The move could be made despite current resource constraints. The option is acceptable because there are ample opportunities and resources to effect this move. The option is also suitable because the headquarters realignment meets the strategic imperatives prescribed by the NSS and guidance from the President of the United States, as well as showing a commitment to partners in the region. Overall, Ethiopia would be the optimal choice with Liberia as a potential alternative option. Both countries offer stability and the necessary political relationships. Additionally, both countries will allow the USAFRICOM commander and staff to maintain an appropriate proximity to forces and key partners in the region in order to improve relationships, and have a better understanding of the operational environment. An added benefit is that, over a continuum of time, the relocation is cost effective because the COCOM will save money on TDY costs and wasted programs due to lack of synchronization.

Successful GCCs rely on proximity to forces to ensure the science of control. The most successful military strategies rely on a staff that has a high level of understanding of

the operational environment. Additionally, the increasing need for joint, multinational, and interagency operations exacerbates the need for proximity. A diverse team needs proximity to build trust. One primary goal is to refine the posture and presence in Africa to reduce risk to the operations. Therefore, USAFRICOM cannot remain in Europe and, at the same time, develop, and sustain the critical partnerships with an ever-expanding overall mission. The commitment to USAFRICOM is a strategic imperative and commitment by definition of the African Union is a physical and operable headquarters that is located on the continent of Africa in a stable country that is also a key player.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Decision Makers

DoD should strive to build a much stronger relationship with the AU and key players in the region. Increasing exercises and military training opportunities via the Defense Cooperation programs is an optimal way to forge relationships. The State Partnership Program is a great way to foster long-term and cost-effective relationships as well, and support stability to combat terrorism. USAFRICOM currently is projected to be resourced at a higher amount in FY17. Emphasis should be put on incrementally building infrastructure within Ethiopia or Liberia prior to removing the staff currently residing in Stuttgart, Germany. A site survey is required to understand the current capacity of the existing facilities in the country. The staff will likely require growth to expand the current structure in the embassy compounds to support the staff and dependents who will reside and work in the areas. A priority for relocating the staff is to ensure that the organizational structure can operate independently once separated from EUCOM, where there overlap of responsibilities.

After establishing priorities, leadership should focus on the potential for additional regional headquarters. The regional headquarters should affect Western Africa, Eastern Africa, South Africa, and Central Africa, and would likely need to be a JTF with an integrated force structure. However, manpower assessments are recommended to determine the correct personnel mix as well as personnel authorizations. The command should determine which countries present the best location to support operational reach and effective synchronization of personnel deployed to the theater. There should be significant research to determine how personnel will flow in and out of theater, and which will be the main terminal. As USAFRICOM grows, it is important to establish a military system that allows joint forces to effectively operate, but without making the same mistakes as Afghanistan or Iraq. DoD should establish subordinate headquarters based on the region with the highest threat level to ensure that instability does not spread to more peaceful areas.

Recommendations for Future Research

Future research should further analyze the stability of prospective host nations. An analysis of the economy and potential for disruption due to corruption and terrorism are key areas for concern. In concert with analysis of stability, the organizational structure should be closely evaluated to ensure the staff has the right personnel mix to accomplish the ever-changing USAFRICOM mission. The equipment required to support a staff is key, particularly communications systems. Many countries in Africa, with exception of countries such as South Africa, do not have well-developed communications systems or availability of satellites. Alternative forms of communication or a redundant system should be researched. Similarly, generators that rely on diesel fuel predominately

produce the electricity. Advanced equipment to augment facilities will need to be purchased, but first should be added to the MTOE (force structure document) for the organization. Another area to research is the logistical challenges associated with supporting the staff and dependent population. DoD should research how much support is needed in Africa versus Germany, which is developed and has an effective democratic government. Overall, organizational structure should be researched to determine what the regional headquarters should be. In short, there should be regional JTFs established in stable countries within the continent to ensure proper integration and synchronization of units (especially stand-alone brigades), and to ensure the concerns of the GCCs are addressed. Mission command is only effective when there are proper controls in addition to the art of command. A regional JTF construct will help provide this control, due to the vast space within the continent.

Another critical factor that should be evaluated is the economic impact. One potential justification for relocating the headquarters is the positive economic impact to the host nation. Liberia, for example is recovering from its civil war, and the UN mission is beginning to draw down. Therefore, there will be less jobs in the country when the UN departs. The presence of the USAFRICOM headquarters could stimulate the economy long-term and provide additional support for any other country chosen, as it continues its transition to greater economic stability. The economy would also have the benefit of the investment of permanent party and their families in properties. A headquarters should also be evaluated on the potential increase in tourism to the particular country, based on increased exposure to Americans. Undoubtedly, there would be additional development in the country to accommodate, not only the headquarters, but also other offices and

programs as USAFRICOM continues to grow. The United States should promote national interests by determining how the headquarters could be established, while simultaneously leveraging the local populace for laborers and employees. This needs to be accomplished without growing the economy at too rapid of a rate. Future researchers could also focus on the gross domestic product, and predict a potential inflation of the currency based on increased US economic stimulation. Another consideration would be security; a large American headquarters, with many Americans living in the surrounding areas, would present a lucrative target for terrorist attacks.

Aside from economic stimulation, the impacts to the local culture are worth considering from a social science perspective. It is clear that basing in a country not only stimulates the economy, but it also affects the local culture. The potential to influence local partners, based on a presence in the country, has potential to positively or negatively impact diplomatic relations. An increased presence and a commitment of a headquarters may help with the overall goals for stability and security based on Army WFC #2, but the presence could also have unknown impacts on local culture and partners in the region. The AU and other regional partners from the UN and European Union should be consulted to determine if there are any unknown desires for economic growth.

Most importantly, further research should evaluate the joint, multinational, and interagency stakeholders to determine what efficiencies can be addressed. This study did not address the redundancy, which falls within the DoD, between AFRICOM and DoS functions. One key factor is that the command is less effective, not only because of C2 issues, but also because of failed synchronization at the strategic levels. The agencies should be analyzed and realigned in a force structure that supports a singular senior

civilian with the capacity and authority to unify efforts between DoD and DoS. This analysis is critical in ensuring the success of a potentially relocated headquarters element. Research should determine the top priorities in Africa based on the NSS, and then ensure there are operations or programs to address those priorities that can be impacted. The key would be to ensure that the organizations operate together to achieve goals. USAFRICOM is increasingly overwhelmed with tasks or missions that should be inherently the focus of the AU or UN.

Closing Thoughts

War used to be something you could stand on the nearby hill and watch. Now we have total war; everybody's in it. We have total economics as well. Everything affects everybody. The Malaysian currency shakes, and people around the world are seriously affected.

— Salman Rushdie

The issues that Africa faces are difficult, and it is clear that the US will strive to have a role in resolving those issues through continual partnerships and interagency coordination. The DoD needs to quickly evaluate relocating the USAFRICOM headquarters. We will rely on others to help develop our understanding and be successful and we can no longer plan and integrate from afar with such intricate circumstances in our operating environments.

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