


AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

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Who should command and control stability operations and what role does operational planning play?



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Abstract

The United States Government (USG) to include civilian and military entities has been involved in both major combat operations (MCO) and irregular warfare (IW) operations since September 11, 2001. SSTR - Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction as a part of both MCO and IW has recently seen renewed emphasis by the U.S. State Department and U.S. Department of Defense—essentially as the main tool in the counterinsurgency tool kit.

The U.S. military has recently been thrust into the position of lead agency in many aspects of SSTR and is uncomfortable in many parts of these demands. This runs counter to what many host nation's desire, which is civilian lead of SSTR operations. Planning, funding and execution of SSTR in addition to command and control or unity of command are key aspects examined in this research paper.

SSTR operations have been carried out by American government and non-government agencies since World War II (WWII), when the Marshall Plan helped rebuild Europe and General MacArthur guided the reconstruction of the Japanese nation. The concept of nation building and economic reconstruction is not new. Who would be plan, finance, and execute the reconstruction has been a contentious issue from since the initial planning for post-WW II occupation was considered by allied leadership.

We will examine research available since WW II paying particular attention to case studies involving Post war Europe and Afghanistan SSTR operations. Questions considered include those of adequacy of guidance, funding, and trained personnel. Additionally the question of who should be in charge of SSTR will be examined. Finally we will look at the role planning plays SSTR operations.

Introduction

SSTR - Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction in its present form is a relatively new concept that emerged from the signing of two documents, NDPD 44 and DOD Policy 3000.05. The U.S. military is still wrestling with its role in stability operations. Key questions to be explored are the military role in humanitarian assistance, governance, reconstruction or rehabilitation of infrastructure, the rule of law, and economic recovery. A related issue is to explore the security dimension of stability operations so others can do the functions listed above.

Historically, civilian reconstruction and stability operations have required more capabilities than they have been able to support. Likewise for civilian agencies, including governmental and non-governmental, key areas to be explored is their role in humanitarian assistance, governance, reconstruction, or rehabilitation of infrastructure, the rule of law and economic recovery. The military is obviously tasked with providing a secure operating environment for the civilians to operate, but to how far do security operations extend into the actual activities being conducted?

Military and civilians require different planning considerations to execute operations that may be both similar and dissimilar in nature. Post conflict conditions may vary greatly be required where military operations are or will be conducted. Military commanders have plans covering all levels of SSTR, whereas some civilian agencies do and others do not. Military organizations have clearly delineated lines of operational authority based on strategy, doctrine and plans. Civilian agencies depend much more on a collaborative framework of cooperation that is less formalized in order to conduct operations. Civilian and military organizations do not typically plan stability operations in concert, but due to lack of resources and comprehensive plans, many functions of stability operations better accomplished by civilian experts often times default to the

military, which is sometimes less than desirable on many accounts. Unity of effort and unity of command are sometimes at odds with one another. What tools does the CJTF commander have to ensure unity of command does not hinder unity of effort while planning and conducting SSTR planning and execution?

Operational planning has a role for all entities involved in stability operations. Where should command and control of planning reside in the current structure of US military and civilian agencies? Do changes need to be made within the current structure of the United States Government (USG) or does a completely new organization need to be created to plan, resource, and conduct stability operations?

The analysis will use comparison and case study methodology to outline the situation for each nation in which stability operations was conducted. Case studies for each example will examine conditions present before and during operations in addition to the following: Willingness of affected nation to address conditions that led to intervention?; Conditions within and around the country; Ethnic homogeneity; Colonial legacy; Preexistence of a functioning state(government and infrastructure); Status of military; Status of police and judicial system. It will then cite the successes and failures of military and civilian operations and what contributed to the success or failure.

Next, the paper will draw lessons learned from each case and assess if those lessons were incorporated into future planning processes. It will focus on the areas of failure and analyze which entity could better address those lacking areas. The paper will also analyze and discuss the areas of military and civilian expertise and what mechanisms exist or should exist to better integrate command and operations of stability operations. The obstacles to effective civilian participation in the planning functions and the incentives needed for all agencies to collaborate

more will be analyzed and solutions proffered to define planning and participation for stages of future postwar operations.

Background

Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations have been present in different forms before the United States became an independent nation. America's first significant foray into stability operations came after the conclusion of World War II (WWII). Most often, the controlling nation's preference is for a civilian lead. However, civilians often have not been successful at such endeavors. How should the military commander approach this command and control issue and what role does operational planning play?

To fully explore what the military commander must take into consideration we will examine roles that military and civilian organizations play. Specific areas such as governance, reconstruction of infrastructure, establishment of rule of law, economic recovery, command and control executed by the military and civilians will be discussed. Execution of SSTR operations will look at methods of collaboration between all involved parties to determine what works best. Problems and successes of policies and organizational structure will be highlighted with successful examples expounded as lessons learned and the way forward for future SSTR leadership.

Many contextual factors are involved throughout the entire spectrum of SSTR operations. Factors such as host-nation governance and economic capacity, SSTR operations lead nation resources and capability, wartime or peacetime environment, and finally other outside entities such as the United Nations (UN) and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) participation. While these are not all factors that must be considered in conducting SSTR operations, they are the most relevant and should be considered for planning purposes.

The particular security situation that is present plays a key role and determines who will take the lead in SSTR implementation. Dangerous environments where ongoing hostilities are present will limit civilian agency options, because of their inability to provide for security of their organization as well as that of the host nation population. Whether wartime or peacetime, command and control is necessary, and who takes the lead will be determined by civilian leaders. Even so, the military commander must be prepared whether he is tasked to lead SSTR operations or to provide support the civilian agency. To be most effective and responsive to whichever role is assigned; the military commander must optimize his use of operational planning to cover most possible contingencies. A key contextual factor to keep in mind throughout consideration of all phases of SSTR is that US civilian leadership has the first and last word on SSTR policy implementation.

Planning and Implementation

Military leaders have a more formalized process for planning which allows consideration for implementation of varying degrees of SSTR operations. Civilian agencies such as the United States Department of State (DOS), has planning guidance that is less inclusive than that of the military, which itself has not previously planned or resourced SSTR operations adequately since WWII. Planners must plan for situations as varied as Germany after WWII to the current situation in Afghanistan. Post war Europe had had functioning governments and associated services that been fully functional prior to the conflict. Afghanistan, on the other hand is still a nation embroiled in conflict, with a marginally functional government, providing only minimal services to its citizens.

Germany after their surrender to the Allies in May of 1945 represents the situation in which SSTR operations could be optimally planned and executed. Time, personnel, and resources

were available prior to the need to implement SSTR operations. The initial recognition of the need to prepare for governance post WWII originated with the Army.¹ As early as 1941 SSTR training was begun by the Intelligence Training Centre of the British War Office. Two American officers attended this training and their subsequent report written about this training in addition to Army Field Manual (FM) 27-5 was the basis of future WWII civil-military governance training programs implemented by the U.S. Army. A more formalized curriculum was embodied in the Schools of Military Government established by the Secretary of War at the University of Virginia in April of 1941.² Even though the need for a formalized training program was evident to both military and civilian leadership, the roles played by the military and civilians during would always be a source of conflict.

As far as planning was concerned, both camps went into the endeavor somewhat reluctantly. Reasons varied, but the two of the major ones were manpower and money. The ongoing war in the European and Asian theaters were a taxing drain on qualified men. Military personnel are trained to conduct combat operations and all associated support operations to enable and sustain those operations. Military commanders have access to trained reserve forces that can supplement or replace active units when the need arises. Civilian agencies such as the Department of State are not structured and employed in the same manner as the military, with one of the largest limiting factors in SSTR operations being the trained ready reserves. Throughout all of the conflicts covered in this paper from WWII to Afghanistan, this lack of trained personnel is an ongoing planning consideration.

Not only were assigned roles in SSTR operations in WWII contentious, but how and when to start planning for SSTR operations were contentious as well. As late as September 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt stated "...it is very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for

Germany but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe speed in such matters is not an essential....I dislike making plans for country which we do not yet occupy.”³ Plans to execute actual combat operations were highly orchestrated as evidenced by planning for Operation Overlord, but once an enemy is vanquished, planning is usually inadequate. Inadequate planning most often leads to poor execution whether implemented by civilian agencies or military personnel, as evidenced by post Operation Iraqi Freedom prior to the surge of coalition forces during the 2006 timeframe.

The main planning effort for post WWII Germany for the military was contained within the document published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067. Initial planning for postwar Germany from the executive branch of the U.S. Government originated from the Department of State (DOS) Territorial Studies Division, and culminated in the document known informally as the Morgenthau Plan, named after Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau. The formal document was entitled, *Program to Prevent Germany from Starting World War III*. Morgenthau advocated a position that was punitive to Germany, with emphasis on punishment whereas the JCS 1067 plan emphasized making the country, its economy, and its citizens functional again, albeit in a manner dictated only slightly less harsh than the Morgenthau Plan.⁴ The rift illustrated between these two plans illustrates much of the divide that is frequently present between civilian and military planning efforts.

Subsequently, JCS 1067 was the plan that President Roosevelt and later President Truman would direct to implement. In its most basic form, it covered most areas of SSTR operations that needed to be addressed in postwar Germany, and its remnants formed the basis of future SSTR operational planning. However it took a commander on the ground, Deputy Military Governor

Major General Lucius D. Clay, familiar with the operating environment in Germany to temper the harsher elements out of JCS 1067 that would prevent it from being as effective as possible.⁵

In its most essential form, JCS 1067 covered these essential areas for operational planning purposes to be implemented by the military civil affairs teams:

JCS 1067

Governmental Affairs

1. Hold a conference of local officials. Announce the military government proclamations and ordinances and make necessary plans for enforcing them.
2. Post the proclamations and ordinances noting time and date.
3. Reconnoiter the area.
4. Make arrangements for billeting military personnel in the area.

Public Safety

1. Hold a conference of local public safety officials.
2. Secure guards for supplies, important installations, and municipal records.
3. Control circulation of the local population (especially displaced persons and refugees).
4. Impound all weapons, explosives, narcotics, and radio transmitters in civilian hands.
5. Inspect local prisons and detention camps.
6. Investigate unexploded bombs, minefields, booby-trapped areas, and ammunition dumps.

Public Health

1. Re-establish local public health organizations.
2. Secure care for civilian sick and wounded.
3. Report incidence of communicable diseases.
4. Correct serious hazards in environmental sanitation, particularly in water supply and sewage disposal systems.
5. Establish strict control over medical supplies.

Public Welfare

1. Re-establish local agencies for handling relief.
2. Provide adequate food distribution facilities.
3. Establish information and lost and found bureaus.

Utilities and Communications

1. Establish military control over all means of communications and all utilities.

2. Restore civilian services, including water, sewage, power and gas, telephone and telegraph, and postal service as well as streets and roads.

Labor, Transportation, and Salvage

1. Coordinate local labor exchanges.
2. Establish control over all means of transportation.
3. Set up a system of salvage collection.

Resources, Industry, Commerce, and Agriculture

1. Procure and provide materials and services for the military and food for civilians.
2. Restore price and rationing controls; suppress black markets; institute first aid for restoration of normal civilian requirements.

Legal

1. Set up military government courts as necessary.
2. See that proper proclamations, ordinances, regulations, and orders are posted and published.
3. Co-operate with the public safety contingent and Counterintelligence Corps on release of political prisoners.
4. Make recommendations on local legislation to be suspended.

Fiscal

1. Guard banks and other depositories of funds.
2. Require continuance of local tax collection.
3. Assure proper custody of all enemy, abandoned, or absentee-owned property.

Supply

1. Contact local government officials in charge of food and clothing supplies and find location of storage points and available stocks.⁶

The list above may seem simplistic to plan for the governance of postwar Germany, but serves adequately as a guide for properly trained personnel to conduct SSTR operations in most any situation. Policy is established by civilians while strategy is formulated by the military. “What strategy is to military operations, policy is to civil affairs and military government. Policy lends form and purpose to the government of occupied and liberated territory and is

ultimately as much concerned with winning wars as the military strategy itself.”⁷ What needs to be accomplished is generally not as contentious as how it will be accomplished, and who will actually carry out the policy or strategies. This is where the contentious area of military versus civilian control first manifests itself, but certainly not the only area. Where the host nation perceives the originator or implementer of SSTR operations is the other area where the civilian versus military control is manifested.

Strategy and policy is a key area where leaders must ensure unity of effort and subsequently unity of command is maintained. SSTR operations present unique challenges for the military commander and his concomitant planning process. He must be able to conduct the civilian type of SSTR operations and enable the actual process with logistic support, security support, command and control support while always striving to ensure the SSTR operations conveys a civilian not military flavor on it.

While conducting research for this paper, there was no shortage of military and civilian guidance for conducting SSTR operations, perhaps to the point of being guidance overload. The Department of State and the Department of Defense also identified the over abundance of guidance on SSTR operations and attempted to streamline and consolidate civilian and military guidance by publishing two new documents. “On the civilian and interagency side, National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) established a broad outline of the new approach and gave general guidance as to the development of the interagency process regarding SSTR operations. On the military side, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05 provided the structure to revamp the whole way that the armed forces plan, prepare, and execute SSTR operations.”⁸

Even though clear guidance emanates from both the Executive Branch via the Department of State (DOS) and DOD formulated in the above mentioned documents, there is still a divide which we will identify as strategic versus tactical levels of planning for SSTR operations. This divide prevents both unity of effort in planning and implementing SSTR operations by civilian and military agencies.

The primary difference in the two planning efforts is that the military utilizes a deliberate planning process that is tailored for its two main planning lines—crisis action planning and contingency operations planning. The armed forces tend to approach planning with the mindset of planning for the most likely courses of action, while also keeping an eye on what may happen in a worst case scenario. Theirs is a more procedures based approach, not considering the immediate availability of resources until the plan is actually near or at implementation phase. This entire process is very well encapsulated in Joint Planning (JP) Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. Civilian planning on the other hand tends to emanate more from an approach that first considers resource availability. “The limited resources and regular budget cuts for the main civilian SSTR-relevant agencies have fostered a culture of planning that boils down to apportionment of resources for what is feasible and achievable in a persistent context of uncertain funding and conditions of open-ended missions.”⁹

Even though the military has a more deliberate planning process than the civilian agencies, both agree on the main efforts to be conducted in conducting SSTR operations. The list described above in JCS 1067 that was used in WWII postwar SSTR operations is essentially the same as the task lists and strategic objectives found in guidance today for operations such as those conducted in Kosovo, Bosnia, and East Timor. The essential challenge for command

elements on both the military and civilian side is how to transform strategy and tactics into actual work and deeds on the ground.

Documents such as *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation* from the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; *Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 1* published by the DOS Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs; *Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (A Guide for Government Planners)* published by the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in conjunction with the Joint Policy Council's Security and Regional Stability Working Group and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and U.S. Army FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* all provide guidance on all levels for planning and execution of SSTR operations. Whether in phase zero deterrence operations or phase four SSTR operations, the military commander must use the applicable policy guidance, available organizations, and have resources and personnel in place to address whatever issue presents itself in the host nation.

The operating environment that exists within the host nation can vary as widely as that which exists in Afghanistan today to that which was present in postwar Germany. A situation that has combat operations ongoing, a weak national government, active insurgency, and austere operating environment like exists in Afghanistan is quite different than the atmosphere encountered by occupying forces in Germany, where there had been a highly functional government at all levels, a well diversified economy, good infrastructure and a well educated population that had unconditionally surrendered to allied forces.

The difficulty lies in knowing when and to what degree to begin SSTR operations. Often the optimal time frame is missed owing to decisions made and implemented by the President and his staff, due to reasons as varied as political considerations or coalition partner's inputs. At this juncture, the facet of planning known as operational art can pay huge dividends. "Operational art is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. It is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission. Operational art also promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving the national strategic end state."¹⁰

Relevant planning, whether military or civilian starts with understanding what the national strategic end state is. It may or may not be clear, but it is up to the military commander or civilian agency head to fully understand what his mandate actually is. Without clear guidance, the leader cannot formulate a clear and concise military end state, on which the subsequent operational planning for SSTR operations will be based. Another key element which cannot be ignored in planning or SSTR operations are assumptions. "An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in a plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue."¹¹

Although operations are still ongoing in Afghanistan, some military thinkers and writers have suggested that some of the U.S. Governments planning assumptions need a degree of major

adjustment in order to achieve a measure of success defined by civilian and military leadership. Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (retired), Major William S. McCallister, USA (retired), and Colonel John M. Collins, USA (retired) writing in *Proceedings* magazine contend that there are six key assumptions regarding planning in Afghanistan (all are related to SSTR either directly or indirectly) that need to be corrected, as they contend all six are incorrect.

The first assumption is that the best course of action is the establishment of a strong centralized democratic government in Kabul. The authors conclude that a strong democratic government is just not feasible and another type of power sharing structure should be established. The second assumption that President Karzai can form a government universally recognized as legitimate is doubtful. Unless a legitimate form of national government can be established, then coalition SSTR operations will not be seen as legitimate. Third, the assumption that U.S. public opinion will support sizable troop increasing for several more years is suspect. Until the host nation forces are able to establish a credible size force seen as legitimate among the Afghans, U. S. public support will wane. Fourth, current counterinsurgency strategy of winning hearts and minds presupposed that the establishment of a more western style of governance is the key. The Afghan populace must feel secure and have faith in locally established forms of government before they will have faith and confidence in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. Assumption five presumes the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will provide the resources to conduct COIN operations. More accurate planning would assume military and civilian personnel numbers will decrease as will associated funding. The sixth and final assumptions contend that Afghanistan is more important to American than Pakistan. If for no other reason than the fact that Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, U.S. efforts at combating terrorism should focus more on Pakistan.¹²

The views held by the above authors are not necessary correct, though they do have merit. The point is that unless the key assumptions for conducting any type of SSTR operations must be mostly correct so that corollary plans based on those assumptions will be realistic, logical and essential. “The focus is on developing plans that contain a variety of viable, embedded options for the President and SecDef to consider as the situation develops.”¹³ Not only must assumptions have the above named attributes, but national strategy must possess those same qualities. Unless both assumptions and national strategy in synchronization with one another, planning and subsequent execution of SSTR operations as less likely to succeed.

SSTR operations where the assumptions and national strategy were correct and planning was essentially correct and adequate include postwar Germany and Japan. Although a truly large, manpower, and resource demanding endeavor, there was a clear national and coalition strategy with a clear end state—the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. Many aspects of SSTR operations were already in place, with host nation populations that were trained, willing, and ready to rebuild their nation’s economy and government in the prescribed manner dictated by the United States and the Allies. It is highly unlikely that future planners and commanders will have such an opportunity to formulate SSTR operational plans from the ground up and with such willing host nation support to execute them. Manpower and resources will continue to be scarce and the host nations will more than likely be weak and failing states with little to offer as far as host nation support is concerned.

Conclusion

There is a way forward that will allow all concerned players to be in the best possible position to leverage the key resources and abilities they uniquely possess in a collaborative and long term manner. Suggestions for improvement in national-level options, DOD-level options and Army-

level options follow. On the national level, the President and Congress must reform and resource the DOS and USAID, while simultaneously developing the civilian personnel with key SSTR skills that will be in an accessible reserve status for utilization on relatively short notice when needed. Until Congress and the President places SSTR operations in a position of importance and properly resources it accordingly, civilian input into and execution of SSTR operations will continue to fall short.¹⁴

On the DOD level, much of the needed changes have been incorporated into planning documents. The basic problem that must be managed within DOD deals with actual management of personnel and their careers within the DOD in relation to staffing SSTR operational entities. Suggestions for improvement in this area include institutionalizing and regularizing the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG); and also setting up a national Title 10 organization focused on SSTR operations, which will give civilian agencies legal authority to act and a higher public profile.¹⁵

Army level changes in SSTR planning and execution focus mainly on increasing interaction and collaboration with other agencies including both governmental and non-governmental agencies (NGOs). As with DOD, the Army must place SSTR operations in a higher profile comparable to that of combat arms. This would be accompanied with the requisite personnel and funding to assist in developing a more robust Civil Affairs capability in both active and reserve pools of capability. With improved manpower, skills and resources the Army should develop horizontal links with civilian agencies with planning and execution organizations. This would build stakeholders from the very beginning of the process and would cultivate a sustained atmosphere of ongoing cooperation.¹⁶

Perhaps one of the most important contextual factors in the success of SSTR operations planning and execution is the willingness of the United States to take a long-term approach to SSTR operations. The American public has grown accustomed to quick solutions to military problems—Desert Storm, for example. Leaders that implement SSTR operations must look for solutions that will have long term results, which will often require considerable time and resources. Civilian skills that take years to develop are critical for SSTR operations to succeed. Skills possessed by engineers, scientists, economists, and educators take time to develop and must be practiced regularly to maintain currency and relevance. This type of manpower is expensive to maintain and deploy and it must be cultivated in a manner that can offer a viable and rewarding reason to stay in government service. This is a long-term problem that will demand a long-term solution supported at the highest levels if civilians are take the much need lead in SSTR operations.

¹ Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, V.

² Ibid., 4-7.

³ Ibid., 106.

⁴ James Dobbins, Michele A. Poole, Austin Long, Benjamin Runkle, *After the War: Nation-building from FDR to George W. Bush*, Rand Corporation, 2008, 20.

⁵ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, 283.

⁶ Ibid., 70-71.

⁷ Ibid., 34.

⁸ Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brook Stearns Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, Zachary Haldeman, *Integrating Civil Agencies in Stability Operations*, Rand Corporation, 2009, xiii.

⁹ Ibid., xix.

¹⁰ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*, 26 December 2006, IV-1.

¹¹ Ibid., III-26.

¹² Col T.X. Hammes, USMC (retired), Maj William S. McCallister, USA (retired), and Col John M. Collins, USA (retired), Afghanistan: "Connecting Assumptions and Strategy," *Proceedings*, November 2009, 16-20.

¹³ Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*, 26 December 2006, I-11.

¹⁴ Szayna et al., *Integrating Civil Agencies in Stability Operations*, xxii.

¹⁵ Ibid., xxiii.

¹⁶ Ibid., xxiii.

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