

THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE'S PRIVATE PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP (P3) PROGRAM
IN SUPPORT OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER'S SECURITY
COOPERATION ACTIVITIES AND THE READINESS
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE

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Strategic Studies

by

CARMONA C. MARCH, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY
M.A., American Military University, Manassas, Virginia, 2013

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Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
MG (Ret) William D. R. Waff, D.Min.

_____, Member
Jeffrey D. Vordermark, M.A.

_____, Member
LTC John T. Schulte, M.S.S.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2016 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE'S PRIVATE PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP (P3) PROGRAM IN SUPPORT OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER'S SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES AND THE READINESS OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE, by Major Carmona A. March, 94 pages.

As fiscal austerity continues to impact each U.S. Army component's readiness posture, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) realized the need to diversify the means to obtain training opportunities for the reserve force. One of the many innovative opportunities for soldiers, leaders, and units is the USAR's Private Public Partnership Program (P3). This program has three lines of effort (LOE), all of which work towards maintaining the operational readiness of the USAR. The collective element of the program, titled P3 Unit Readiness, serves to advance the geographic combatant commander's (GCC) building partner capacity activities while providing the USAR units training opportunities. This thesis sought to validate whether P3, in particular, the unit readiness LOE, provides the USAR an increased capability when supporting an Army service component command and/or GCC's security cooperation activities and/or programs. Secondly, the thesis examined whether the P3 provides opportunities for USAR to maintain its readiness posture.

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ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ADM	Army Design Methodology
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AR	Army Reserve
AREC/T	Army Reserve Engagement Cell/Team
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
AT	Annual Training
ATFP	Army Total Force Policy
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCMD	Combatant Command
COCOM	Command Authority
CT	Counterterrorism
DOD	Department of Defense
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
LOE	Line of Effort
MSC	Mission Support Command
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
ODT	Overseas Deployment Training
OSM	Operation Soifua Manuia

P3	Private Public Partnership
P3s	Public-Private Partnerships
PPC	Public Private Collaboration
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
RC	Reserve Component
SC	Security Cooperation
SFA	Security Force Assistance
TA	Total Army
TCP	Theater Campaign Plan
TCSP	Theater Campaign Support Plan
USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USARAF	U.S. Army Africa
USARPAC	U.S. Army Pacific
USARSOUTH	U.S. Army Southern Command
USG	U.S. Government
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

They're not going to take us to war again without the Reserves.

— Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, “From the Top: Then and Now, From Manpower Reserve to Operational Reserve”

Throughout time, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) supported various global operations and contingencies. The support of the force dates back from World War I, where medical doctors served to provide critical civilian medical expertise to the sick and wounded. During Operation Provide Comfort, the USAR restored electricity, and provided food, water, and shelter to Kurdish refugees. The most recent major USAR contribution was to the Global War on Terror, where over 310,000 soldiers mobilized and deployed to support the joint force in the fight against terrorism.¹ That being said, the need for the reserve component (RC) will steadily rise as situations around the world continue to impact our nation's security interests and homeland defense.

The USAR enables the active component (AC) to obtain the operational capabilities and strategic depth required to support and defend U.S. security interests worldwide. This is primarily due to the USAR's force structure, where the preponderance of the total Army's (TA) critical technical enablers resides in the USAR.² These key units

¹ Private Public Partnership Office, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, “Private Public Partnership Overview Brief” (PowerPoint presentation, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Fort Belvoir, VA, November 2015), 6.

² U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, submitted by Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Talley, 32nd Chief of Army Reserve and 7th Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command. Reserve Command. House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, March 22, 2016, 7.

include petroleum pipeline and terminal operations, rail units, biological identification detachments, broadcast operation detachments, civil affairs, theater engineer commands, and medical logistics.³ Figure 1 depicts the percentage of units by type assigned to Army components. The chart indicates that the majority of the life-saving and life-sustaining capable units reside in the USAR. Therefore, when the need arises for sustained unified land operations, the AC will undoubtedly call on the USAR for support.




Figure 1. AR Capabilities

Source: Major General Peter S. Lennon, “The United States Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation” (PowerPoint presentation, Brigade/Battalion Pre-Command Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 March 2016), slide #9.

³ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 8.

The geopolitical trends around the globe present risks to our nation. In Europe, Russia's nuclear capabilities coupled with her willingness to support non-state actors makes them adversaries to the United States. In Southeast Asia, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant threats (in Syria and Iraq) cause civil unrest in the Middle East such that a massive movement of refugees traversed through the European continent. Iran's nuclear ambitions continually require the United States to reinforce the obligations set by the international community. On the continent of Africa, continuous regional governance issues exacerbate humanitarian crisis and civil strife. In the Pacific, China's activities in the South China Sea and Spratly Islands as well as North Korea's provocations continue to threaten the littorals and America's access to global commons in the region. India's volatile relationship with Pakistan risks a destabilization in the region and nuclear conflict. Meanwhile, transnational criminal organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean region remain entrenched with sophisticated smuggling networks in the United States and worldwide, spreading access to illicit drugs and human trafficking throughout the globe. At home, threats from natural disasters and cyberterrorism add complexity to the responsibilities of global order. Threats to our nation's security interests are present in every geographic combatant commander's (GCC) area of responsibility (AOR).

Therefore, as fiscal unpredictability continues, is the U.S. military, in particular the U.S. Army, still able to meet its security commitments around the world and at home?


Annual fiscal shortages significantly impact the TA's formations. The results from these budgetary reductions caused force structure cuts and modifications, such as the reductions in the number of AC brigade combat teams from forty-five to thirty-

seven.⁴ To emphasize the long-term effects of our current fiscal realities, figure 2 illustrates the projected decline of the Army force structure within the next five years. The graph shows a downward trend in the TA's force structure, with a potential end strength of loss of 125,000 by 2019⁵ if budget reductions continue to strain the U.S. military. The cascading effects of this reduction affects the USAR, as illustrated in figure 3. The graph indicates a reduction in the RC from 205,300 to 195,000 soldiers. The current and projected end strength reductions across all Army components makes it challenging for the TA to continue its responsibilities around the world. If more cuts continue over the course of time, the TA will reach a global support threshold. According to the National Commission on the Future of the Army report, 920,000 soldiers is the lowest number in order to continue its support based on the current strategic environment.⁶ If the strategic environment changes to where more support is required to maintain global stability while the TA continues to decline in end strength, the United States risks its ability to protect its national security interests.

⁴ U.S. Army, "Feb. 24, 2012–Gen. Odierno AUSA Winter Symposium," February 28, 2012, accessed 25 January 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/74650/Feb_24_2012_Gen_Odierno_AUSA_Winter_Symposium, 2.

⁵ National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*, National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/content/download-full-report.html>, 122.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.



Sources: Army, PB16 Submission; National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2016 (DoD Green Book); HQDA, G-8, Program, Analysis and Evaluation

Figure 2. Authorized End Strength for Active Army, National Guard, AR and Civilian Corps: Past, Present and Projected over the Next Five Fiscal Years

Source: National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*, National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/content/download-full-report.html>, Appendix D.




Figure 3. End Strength Ramps for AR and Full-time Support (ARNG and USAR)

Source: National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*, National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/content/download-full-report.html>, Appendix D.

In an effort to reduce the risk to force readiness, the USAR found innovative ways to acquire training opportunities. Applying the whole of government approach, the USAR established the Private Public Partnership program (P3) to mitigate the readiness gaps caused by fiscal unpredictability. This program seeks to help soldiers find employment or advance their careers in the private sector and enhance the individual and operational readiness of our forces. P3 provides mind/body/spirit programs to enhance individual readiness; job-specific credentialing to hone leader readiness; and private sector partnering and training to enhance unit readiness to meet specific requirements of the GCCs. For instance, to enhance a unit's readiness, USAR engineers build a new medical building in Samoa while partnering with General Electric to support the effort with hardware and equipment.

The program has three lines of effort (LOE), all of which work towards sustaining the operational readiness of the RC. The collective element of the program, titled P3 unit readiness, serves to enhance the GCC's building partner capacity (BPC) activities and provide employers with skilled employees while benefiting the USAR with training opportunities. The P3 program merges military training with civilian professional development and Title 10 training to enhance the skills and competencies of soldiers and leaders at both the civilian and military levels and advance the operational readiness of the USAR.⁷ The problem statement this paper seeks to address is: how can the USAR remain operationally ready in order to better serve the Army service component command (ASCC)/GCCs in light of the enduring resource constraints?

⁷ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 8.

The purpose of this research paper is to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The primary research question is: does P3 unit readiness provide the USAR an enhanced capability while supporting ASCCs/GCCs BPC activities? If so, which ASCC/GCC BPC activity does P3 best support? The secondary research question is: does P3 provide opportunities for the AR to remain operationally ready? If so, how does the P3 provide training opportunities for the RC?

The TA's primary challenge is the ability to sustain a readiness posture that overcomes near-peer threats during a time of budget uncertainty. As force structure reductions impede the TA's ability to support its global commitments, the force will eventually reach a capability threshold. Fiscal austerity has led to a paradigm shift in the TA, where dependency on the USAR to enhance the AC's capabilities is more than ever. Thus, it is essential the USAR retain its operational readiness posture so that it can support when called. Knowing that with force end strength reductions comes constrained training environments, the USAR is seeking innovative ways to acquire training opportunities while exercising fiscal efficiency. P3 is one of the many innovations established by the USAR to help with soldier, leader, and unit readiness. The focus of this thesis is the unit readiness LOE within the P3 program. It discusses whether the LOE is an appropriate training mechanism to achieve the USAR's desired objective to remain operationally ready.

Assumptions

The following assumptions were used to form the basis of this thesis. The researcher believes the assumption are true and will remain true in perpetuity. First, the USAR will continue to be an operational reserve as defined under Department of Defense

Directive 1200.17, Subject: Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force. The second assumption is that fiscal reductions will occur in subsequent years while requirements for unified land operations increases. Lastly, the P3 program will continue to be a command focus for the new Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) and commander of the United States Army Reserve Command. As a result of these assumptions, P3 will be a viable way for the USAR to remain operationally ready. In effect, P3 would enhance the USAR's sustainment capabilities and capacity to better support the ASCC/GCCs BPC activities.

Definitions

The definitions below help the reader gain a comprehensive understanding of the thesis topic. The definitions are divided into three sections: military terms not understood by a general reader, terms used differently in military parlance than in standard writing, and shorthand terms that are used in place of lengthier phrases throughout the document.

Military Terms

Army Design Methodology (ADM): a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them.⁸ ADM includes interconnected thinking activities that aid in conceptual planning and decision making. By first framing an operational environment and associated problems, ADM enables commanders and staffs to think about the situation in depth. From this understanding, commanders and staffs develop a more

⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 12.

informed approach to solve or manage identified problems. During operations, ADM supports organizational learning through reframing—a maturing of understanding that leads to a new perspective on problems or their resolution.⁹

Army Reserve Engagement Cells/Teams (ARECs/Ts): Active Guard Reserve planners from AR enabling commands that provide supported commands with AR subject matter expertise across the war fighting functions. They are forward stationed, located at ASCCs at both Army corps-level commands and GCCs to facilitate access to USAR Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF).¹⁰ They address long-term opportunities for the AR to support CCMDs, facilitate unit and individual training, and provide reach-back conduit to Continental U.S.-based capabilities.¹¹

Army Reserve Regionally Aligned Forces (AR RAF): tailorable AR forces that affords the Combatant Commander (CCDR) to shape the environment and respond to a full range of requirements.¹²

Army Service Combatant Command (ASCC): a service component command, consists of the service component commander and all Service forces that have been assigned or attached to the Combatant Command (CCMD). In general, the service

⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP 5-0.1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2011), 11.

¹⁰ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 8.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 7.

component commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as tasked by the next higher commander.¹³

Army Total Force Policy (ATFP): is a directive for the integration of the Army's AC and RC as a Total Force. As one total force, the active Army, Army National Guard and the USAR provide operating and generating forces to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) and Army commitments worldwide. The Army ensures that the total force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped and employed to support CCDR requirements as force packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives.¹⁴

Building Partner Capacity (BPC): programs encompass security cooperation (SC) and security assistance activities that are funded with U.S. Government (USG) appropriations and administered as cases within the foreign military sales infrastructure. These programs may provide defense articles and/or services to other USG departments and agencies under the authority of the Economy Act or other transfer authorities for the purpose of building the capacity of partner nation security forces and enhancing their capability to conduct counterterrorism (CT), counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations, or to support U.S. military and stability operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs.¹⁵

¹³ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 103.

¹⁴ Secretary of the Army, Memorandum, Army Directive 2012-08, *Army Total Force Policy* (Washington, DC:, Department of the Army, September 4, 2012), 1.

¹⁵ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, A520, *Security Cooperation Course Book* (Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 2016), 70.

Combatant Command (CCMD): A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁶

Combatant Command (COCOM): the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of COCOM by Title 10, U.S.Code, Section 164 (or as directed by the president in the Unified Command Plan and cannot be delegated or transferred.

COCOM provides full-authority for the combatant commander (CCDR) to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally joint force commanders, service and/or functional combatant commanders.¹⁷

¹⁶ Director, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 8, 2008, as amended through February 15, 2016), accessed May 27, 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, 37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 161.

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1200.17: establishes the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the RCs as an operational force.¹⁸

Foreign Security Forces (FSF): those duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a government.¹⁹

Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC): assigned a geographic AOR by the President of the United States with the advice of the Secretary of Defense as specified in the Unified Command Plan. GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate joint force commanders that conduct military operations within their geographical AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations within that area.²⁰

Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR): provides the direction for AR planning to accomplish the mission of providing trained units and individuals to support Army mobilization plans.²¹

Security Assistance (SA): programs and activities are authorized by either Foreign Assistance Act (U.S.Code 2151) or the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.Code 2751).

¹⁸ Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 29, 2008), 1.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 56.

²¹ U.S. Army War College, *2013-2014: How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013), 7-11.

These are resourced annually through processes unique to security assistance. Support is requested and reviewed on an annual basis consistent with the State Department and Defense Security Cooperation Agency planning, programming, budgeting, and execution cycle. The primary security assistance activities that the Army executes are:

Foreign military sales (FMS)

Foreign military construction services (FMCS)

Foreign military financing program (FMFP)

Leases

Military assistance program (MAP)

International military education and training (IMET)

Drawdowns

Excess defense articles (EDA)²²

Security Cooperation (SC): all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.²³

SC is further defined with assigned DOD responsibilities: activities undertaken by the DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and

²² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31, *Army Programs, Army Security Cooperation Handbook* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2015), 10.

²³ *Ibid.*

security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.²⁴

The seven categories of DOD-authorized SC programs are:

Security assistance administered by DOD

Global training and equipment

International armaments cooperation

Humanitarian assistance

Training and education

Combined exercises

Contacts²⁵

Security Force Assistance (SFA): the united action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. SFA is the supporting military instrument of the larger concept of foreign international defense.²⁶ Further defined, SFA is DOD activities that contribute to the unified action by

²⁴ Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, *Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, October 24, 2008), 4.

²⁵ Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance (SFA)* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2010), 3.

²⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, May 2009), 27.

the U.S. Government (USG) to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.²⁷

Sustaining Readiness Model (SRM): the successor to the decade-old Army force generation model, in which brigade combat teams constantly moved through a stable, predictable cycle of training, deployment, and post-deployment reset. The sustainable readiness model seeks to broaden the portion of the TA that can be tapped for operational deployments by bringing more National Guard and Reserve combat units into the mix.²⁸

Theater Campaign Plan (TCP): a commander's strategy implementation document. TCPs drives CCMD activity in a coordinated, strategy-centric manner throughout an AOR. TCPs establish a framework for CCDRs to prioritize, organize, and integrate all steady state activities within an AOR. It is the only plan to comprehensively do so, and forms the basis for GCCs/FCCs to achieve their long-term theater strategic end states and pursuit of long-term USG interests such as preventing conflict, promoting good governance, building partner capacity, developing cooperative relationships with critical partners, and facilitating freedom of movement.²⁹

²⁷ Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, 3.

²⁸ Association of the United States Army, "New 'Sustainable Readiness Model' Coming Soon," April 12, 2016, accessed April 22, 2016, <http://www.ausa.org/news/2016/Pages/New%E2%80%98SustainableReadinessModel%E2%80%99ComingSoon.aspx>. At this time, the USAR has not codified the definition for sustaining readiness model for the RC.

²⁹ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, *Theater Campaign Planning: Planner's Handbook*, ver. 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2012), 1.

Theater Campaign Support Plan (TCSP): a supporting commander's strategy implementation document to their supported command's TCP.

12304b Authority: an order for the Selected Reserve to active duty for pre-planned missions in support of the CCDRs. The authority is authorized:

(a) When the Secretary of a military department determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command, the Secretary may, subject to subsection

(b) order any unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in section 10143(a) of this title), without the consent of the members, to active duty for not more than 365 consecutive days. The limitations to this authority are as follows:

(1) Units may be ordered to active duty under this section only if: (A) the manpower and associated costs of such active duty are specifically included and identified in the defense budget materials for the fiscal year or years in which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty; and (B) the budget information on such costs includes a description of the mission for which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty and the anticipated length of time of the order of such units to active duty on an involuntary basis.

(2) Not more than 60,000 members of the reserve components of the armed forces may be on active duty under this section at any one time.³⁰

Ordinary Terms Used Differently in Military Phrasing

Private Public Collaborations (PPC): as defined by the DOD, are voluntary, non-contractual collaborations between DOD and non-federal entities, through which each party leverages the expertise, resources, and incentives of the other to achieve mutually agreed goals.³¹

³⁰ U.S. Code, Title 10 - Armed Services. "U.S. Code § 12304b - Selected Reserve: Order to Active Duty for Preplanned Missions in Support of the Combatant Commands," U.S. Government Publishing Office, January 13, 2012, accessed May 16, 2016, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/pdf/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleE-partII-chap1209-sec12304b.pdf>.

³¹ Defense Business Board, *Public-Private Collaboration in the Department of Defense*, Report 12-04 (Washington, DC: Defense Business Board, 2012), 5.

Private Public Partnership (P3) Program: as defined by the AR, is a program that focuses on fostering long-term partnerships with companies, corporations, foundations, academia, and non-governmental organizations to increase leader and unit readiness as well as enhance individual soldier physical, mental, emotional, spiritual, financial, and employment readiness. P3 provides specialized opportunities in business and interagency environments for AR soldiers to make immediate and meaningful contributions to both a robust national economy and the defense of the nation. To help identify the best opportunity for each soldier, P3 has developed a nationwide-network of individuals who provide readiness support.³² The program operationalizes this approach through three LOEs:

Individual Readiness: Provide employment opportunities, advance physical, mental, emotional, spiritual and financial readiness for our soldiers, civilians, and family members.

Leader Readiness: Provide opportunities for professional and trade career development, mentor-protégé, credentialing, and certification opportunities.

Unit Readiness: Provide real world, Title 10 training opportunities for the USAR by utilizing private and public relationships to enhance unit readiness by employing the USAR operational and enabling capabilities to GCCs and ASCCs theater security cooperation (TSC) efforts.³³

Public-Private Partnerships (P3s): a contractual arrangement between a public agency (federal, state, or local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each

³² U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 7.

³³ Private Public Partnership Office, “Private Public Partnership Overview Brief,” 11.

party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility.³⁴

Plan, Prepare, and Provide: a readiness model of the USAR. Under this model, the AR provides trained, equipped, and ready soldiers and cohesive units to meet global requirements in support of unified land operations.

The “Plan” portion of the readiness model regionally aligns AR units to ASCC and CCMDs. AREC/Ts and direct staff planning support provide reach-back capability to assist ASCCs and CCMDs with accessing capability found in AR forces. “Prepare” involves training, assessing, and certifying soldiers, leaders, and units for contingent and combat missions. “Provide” is the act of deploying those trained and ready AR soldiers and units in support of planned or unforeseen ASCC or CCMD mission requirements under the auspices of the ATRP.³⁵

Shorthand Terms

Unit Readiness: The unit readiness LOE is referred to as P3 throughout the entire document for ease in writing. It is important to note that P3 follows the definition of unit readiness in this context, unless specifically referred to as the P3 program. The thesis uses the term, P3 program, when referring to the program as a whole.

³⁴ The National Council for Public-Private Partnerships, “7 Keys to Success,” accessed May 8, 2016, <http://www.ncppp.org/ppp-basics/7-keys/>.

³⁵ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 7.

Limitations

This thesis primarily focuses on the unit readiness LOE within the P3 program and briefly discusses the individual and leader readiness LOEs. The research did not use P3-like programs of sister services, such as the Navy, Air Force, and Marines, nor did the thesis compare the programs to that of the Army and USAR. No research was done on the program's funding source. Additionally, the research did not gather feedback from the public or private sector's leaders of industry due to privacy regulations.

Delimitations

The primary focus of the thesis is on P3, its effects on a reserve unit's readiness, its applicability for each CCMD's AOR, and the readiness effects it provides the RC. The research examined three CCMDs based on their region's potential for suitability for P3 implementation. Furthermore, all feedback regarding P3 originated from the USAR community.

Significance of the Study

This research seeks to provide the P3 community items to consider as the program advances into further development. Additionally, the thesis seeks to inform the Army community, and the ASCC/GCCs about the potential gains USAR units with P3 can provide while supporting their BPC program.

Conclusion

This thesis examined the unit readiness LOE and sought to validate whether it provided reserve units the enhanced sustainment capabilities and capacity when supporting ASCCs/GCCs BPC activities. Additionally, this research sought to validate

whether the P3 provides additional training opportunities for the USAR to remain operationally ready. In order to reach the conclusions, this research focuses on three regions and their respective CCMDs: Latin America and the Caribbean/U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Indo-Asian-Pacific/U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and Africa/U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). These regions and their CCMDs were selected because their current operational environment shows the highest potential for seamless integration of P3. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature collection by discussing the relevancy of the sources used for this topic. Chapter 3 explains the methodology of the qualitative and quantitative data used for the research. Chapter 4 discusses the findings of the research. Chapter 5 contains a brief summary of the findings and provides recommendations for the program. Appendix A includes a case study regarding P3 efforts in the USPACOM AOR, the existing USAR-public sector partnerships, and the partnership benefits available to USAR soldiers and families.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The demand for Army forces is well above what was originally expected three years ago, and continues to dramatically rise as our geopolitical environment becomes increasingly volatile. This unpredictability has led to one of the most dangerous times in the history of our Nation, as the velocity of instabilities stemming from greater hybrid and non-state threats, as well as a myriad of humanitarian and assistance missions, requires your Total Army to be fully engaged in multiple, strategically imperative operations around the globe.

— Honorable John M. McHugh and General Raymond T. Odierno,
*Statement by Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army
before the Commission on the Future of the United States Army*

This chapter provides a review of the literature that supported the research of the thesis topic, P3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the general reader a review of each source used and its relevancy to the P3. The literary collection is comprised of national strategic direction documents; BPC reports; official USG documents relevant to SC and the USAR, GCC's, Army, and USAR commanders' posture statements, and literary works on P3. Additionally, various forms of USAR communication outreach publications were used, such as magazines, brochures, and pamphlets.

National Strategic Direction

The Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, defines strategic direction as process and products by which the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the joint staff, CCMDs, services, and combat support agencies.³⁶ Strategic direction is the foundation

³⁶ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 39.

that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the National Security Council and is the vehicle that enables the National Security Council to provide strategic guidance.

Therefore, SC planners must follow these key high-level documents: *National Security Strategy* (NSS), *National Defense Strategy* (NDS), *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), NMS, *Global Employment of the Force*, *Joint Capabilities Support Plan*, global force management implementation guidance, and theater campaign plans (TCP). The *Global Employment of the Force*, *Joint Capabilities Support Plan*, global force management implementation guidance, and TCP were not used and therefore not included in this literature review. The information contained in those documents are classified and deemed not authorized for use to support this research.

The NSS outlines the president's vision for providing security for the nation. The provision of the nation's security is based on the U.S. enduring security interests, as outlined in the 2010 NSS:

The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;

A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;

Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and

A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.³⁷

The NSS outlines four LOEs to minimize the risks to the nation's security interests. The first LOE, Security, is most relevant to the thesis topic because one of its

³⁷ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), accessed January 12, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdfObama, 2.

objectives, build capacity to prevent conflict, discusses the necessity of partnerships in order to safeguard the enduring national interests against global risks. The NSS further states that partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international behavior.³⁸ The United States is able to prevent attacks by expanding the scope of cooperation to encompass other state partners. Such practice would address the root causes of the conflict before they erupt. Yet, when they do, partnering would assist in conflict containment and resolution.

The NDS, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century*, is DOD's internal strategic guidance. The document emphasizes the importance of engagements with other nations in order to protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the NSS. The NDS emphasizes the need for a U.S. military with the capacity, capability, and readiness to simultaneously defend the homeland, conduct sustained, distributed CT operations; and, in multiple regions, deter aggression and assure allies through forward presence and engagement.³⁹ Additionally, the NDS identifies that U.S. capabilities cannot address all the global challenges and will therefore require support from other nations in the coming years.

The QDR is a review of the strategy, programs, and resources in an effort to rebalance the U.S. military to meet the strategic realities of today. The QDR prioritized

³⁸ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, 10.

³⁹ U.S. President, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: The White House, January 2012), 7.

missions based on the national security interests, of which conduct of military engagements and SC was among the top ten.⁴⁰

The NMS provides an overview of the nation's strategic challenges and details how the United States will employ the joint force in order to render safety to the United States and its allies. The NMS provides military leaders the direction to prioritize their mission according to the national security interests. In turn, these interests allow leaders to recommend when and where to use military force, the type and degree of force to employ and at what cost,⁴¹ which then develops into national military objectives. One the many ways the document describes to protect the homeland is through strengthening our global network of partners and allies, by preserving our alliances, expanding partnerships, and maintaining a global stabilizing presence, and conducting training, exercises, SC activities, and military-to-military engagement.

Building Partner Capacity Research Reports

There was a myriad of information regarding BPC. To provide the audience a comprehensive view of the thesis topic, RAND reports were reviewed to gain insight on the existing solutions that were recommended to the Army for advancing SC activities to bolster multinational forces capabilities and for implementing SC activities in developing nations.

⁴⁰ Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 60-61.

⁴¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015), 17.

A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships, discusses an assessment model to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of existing DOD SC programs. The determination is based on the achievement of the desired end states defined in the strategic level documents discussed previously. Chapter 3 of the report provides the elements required in the assessment framework: strategic guidance, categorical scheme, stakeholders, authorities, and measures of effectiveness by way of inputs, outputs, and outcomes.⁴² This report provides the P3 community a framework to assess the effectiveness of a BPC program and allow USAR leaders to make informed decisions as to whether it provides them the appropriate opportunities for training the force.

Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations, provides the Army and other DOD leaders an approach to assist them with BPC planning and programming. Chapter 3 of this report describes the existing BPC programs within the Army, other USG agencies, and U.S. allies. BPC encompasses various events and activities, yet the primary activity types are conferences, workshops, information exchanges, training, and education.⁴³ As for CCMDs, their BPC activities are mainly support stability operations. USSOUTHCOM, for example, has the largest share

⁴² Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, and Gregory F. Treverton, *A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 17.

⁴³ Jefferson P. Marquis, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Justin Beck, Derek Eaton, Scott Hiromoto, David R. Howell, Janet Lewis, Charlotte Lynch, Michael J. Neumann, and Cathryn Quantic, *Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 54.

of stability operations events focused on BPC.⁴⁴ The Army programs relevant to BPC, such as the Military Personnel Exchange Program, promotes a mutual understanding of how other militaries operate and reassure potential future allies and partners.⁴⁵ The Army also has a number of rule-of-law/governance programs, most notably are the West Point Center for the Rule of Law, the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, and the Center for Law and Military Operations.

There are also many non-DOD programs that support BPC objectives on a whole of government approach. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program is Department of State managed, but implemented by the departments of State, Commerce, Energy, and Homeland Security. The benefits of the program are the broad range of countries it works with. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance EXBS focuses on weapons of mass destruction source countries as well as states on potential smuggling routes.⁴⁶ Another program is the Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. The goal of the program is to develop professional law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.⁴⁷ There are numerous allied BPC activities, most of which focus on peacekeeping training.

⁴⁴ Marquis et al., 54.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 57.

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of State, “The EXBS Program,” accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/ecc/c27911.htm>.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of Justice, “International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP),” accessed May 16, 2016, <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap>.

Although there is a difference between peacekeeping and BPC for stability operations, the skills developed are very similar. As stated, there are a myriad of allies' BPC activities, yet this excerpt will cover only a program from Turkey, as it holds relevancy in today's national security environment. One of Turkey's main training centers, the Center for Excellence against Terrorism, offers specialized training and education in CT for international security forces. Participants include nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Partnership for Peace, and Mediterranean Dialogue.⁴⁸

Chapter 5, "Analyzing Potential Partners," presents methodology for determining potential country partners, pros and cons of each partner, and methods to weight and assess selection factors. Often times the basis for establishing foreign partnerships is unclear or stem from a political aim that does not necessarily support the BPC for stability operations. The analysis serves to provide an objective and transparent prioritization methodology for DOD organizations to implement when selecting partnering nations.

2016 Posture Statements of Geographic Combatant Commands, Army, and Army Reserve Commands

CCDRs' posture statements are written testimonies of GCCs and functional combatant commanders to the Senate Armed Services Committee regarding the use of the allocated and required resources to continue operations in their AOR. These posture statements provide an overview of the CCMD's strategic environment and command priorities to combat the challenges that threaten the security and prosperity in their regions. The strategic environment of the examined CCMDs is not discussed in this

⁴⁸ Marquis et al., 67.

chapter; it is covered in detail in chapter 4. This chapter does address the operational environment of the AC and AR. The focus of this section is to provide the reader the GCC's command priorities, approaches, and activities that are most applicable to P3.

U.S. Southern Command

Of the four command priorities, BPC is the cornerstone of USSOUTHCOM's efforts. Their efforts help build and nurture committed and capable partners, address drivers of insecurity and instability, respond to natural and man-made disasters, and contribute to regional security. Of the six ongoing BPC efforts in the region, humanitarian and civic assistance exercises are most suitable for P3 application.

USSOUTHCOM's humanitarian assistance and humanitarian and civic assistance programs provide a significant return on engagement. These programs help improve their partners' abilities to provide essential services to their citizens, reduce human suffering, and support economic development.⁴⁹ Annual humanitarian exercises like Beyond The Horizon and New Horizons help advance security, prosperity, and good governance, while building the capacity of partner nations to respond to disasters independent of U.S. assistance. As part of the exercise, the command partnered with regional militaries and civilian agencies to construct disaster relief warehouses, emergency operation centers, schools, clinics, and hospitals in remote or under-serviced areas. These exercises were supported by private sector and non-governmental organizations partners, who provided nearly \$4 million in donations of gifts-in-kind and services for the citizens of Latin

⁴⁹ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, United States Southern Command before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee*, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 10, 2016, 14.

America.⁵⁰ Another humanitarian assistance exercise is Continuing Promise, which provides medical support, through the USNS *Comfort* hospital ship, to the Haitian population. These exercises are prime candidates for P3 application since the intent of the humanitarian assistance and humanitarian and civic assistance program aligns with the effects of the P3 provisions.

The remaining BPC efforts are: continued support to Colombia's efforts in demobilization of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), counternarcotic strategy, humanitarian demining, and the transformation of the Colombian military; advances in officer and senior enlisted leaders' professional development through international military education and training, military and defense exchanges, and security seminars; progression of the human rights initiative with military forces; continuation of peacekeeper training through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, advancement of defense cooperation through the State Partnership Program and multinational exercises; and contingency planning and preparation via exercise such as Panamax, Fused Response, Fuerzas Humanitarias, and Integrated Advance.

U.S. Pacific Command

USPACOM's SC approach focuses on building partner readiness, reducing partner capability gaps, and building partner capacity. Of the many engagement resource tools to advance their SC efforts, USPACOM uses foreign military financing to mitigate

⁵⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, United States Southern Command before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee*, 17.

regional challenges like border security issues, disaster response, CT, and maritime security.

Other activities that support the command's SC approach are the U.S. Army Pacific's (USARPAC) Pacific Pathways program and the U.S. Pacific Fleet's Pacific Partnership mission. Pacific Pathways enables the forward presence of Army elements in multiple countries. It serves to ensure that RAF/elements are able to deploy and fight in the Indo-Asian-Pacific with allies and partners. Pacific Partnership is an annual disaster response preparedness mission to the Southeast Asia and Oceania regions. The mission improves cooperation and understanding between partner and host nations ahead of natural disasters that require a multinational response.

U.S. Africa Command

Africa continues to be an enduring interest of the United States. In 2015, the command conducted seventy-five joint operations, twelve major joint exercises, and 400 SC activities.⁵¹ Its regions are very dynamic; thus causing instability throughout the AOR. Unemployment and wide-spread disenfranchisement coupled with inefficient public and security infrastructures have allowed criminal and terrorist networks to infiltrate areas with weak governance. Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa continues to lead the efforts in coordination with the African Union Mission in Somalia to fight against al Shabaab in southern and central Somalia while U.S. forces in North Africa work towards containing Libyan instability and countering violent extremist

⁵¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Senate Armed Services, Committee, Washington, DC, March 8, 2016, 4.

organizations (VEOs). In West Africa, similar efforts are being done to contain and degrade Boko Haram Islamic State-West Africa Province as parallel efforts in Central Africa in collaboration with the African Union Regional Task Force works to counter Lord's Resistance Army. Although South Africa remains relatively stable, U.S. force assistance intends to combat economic and social challenges such as poverty, crime, social inequality, and corruption.

USAFRICOM identifies SFA and exercises as the decisive efforts to BPC.

Through this operational approach, the command seeks to disrupt and neutralize transnational threats by building African partner defense capability via the following LOEs:

Neutralize al Shabaab and transition the African Union Mission in Somalia to the Federal Government of Somalia

Degrade violent extremist organizations (VEO) in the Sahel Maghreb and contain instability in Libya

Contain and degrade Boko Haram

Interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and through central Africa with willing and capable African partners

Build African peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response capacity⁵²

SFA and exercises support the premise of the command's TCP—establish an environment where African nations are capable of addressing security threats through governance, security, and development.⁵³

⁵² U.S. Congress, Senate, *Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 14.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

U.S. Army

The U.S. Army has proven to be an agile force throughout a decade-plus of global instability. To date, the Army has supported a range of missions: fighting terrorists around the world; training Afghan and Iraqi Army forces; peacekeeping in the Sinai Peninsula and Kosovo; missile defense in the Persian Gulf; security assistance in Africa and South America; deterrence in Europe, the Republic of Korea, and Kuwait; rapid deployment global contingency forces; and response forces for the homeland.⁵⁴ Additionally, the force responds to natural disasters; patrols the southern borders; and supports activities in response to the outbreak of pandemic diseases.

To maintain a “Ready to Fight Tonight” posture in a time of fiscal unpredictability, the Army prioritizes readiness⁵⁵ while reducing end strength and funding for modernization. Despite the high emphasis on readiness, the Army is in a paradox: devoting resources to today’s readiness invariably decreases investments for the future.⁵⁶ Therefore, while the Army prefers investments for current and future readiness, the security environment of today demands readiness for global operations and contingencies.

⁵⁴ U.S. Congress, House, *Statement by the Honorable Patrick J. Murphy, Acting Secretary of the Army and General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff United States Army before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, March 16, 2016, 1.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 5. The Army has four components of readiness: manning, training, equipping, and leader development. These components describe how the Army prioritizes its efforts to provide trained and ready forces ready to fight and win our Nation’s wars.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

The Army posture statement indicated methods in which they plan to ensure the force's capability and capacity meets today's demands: resource-driven efficiencies, equipment modernization strategy, and investments in future soldiers, soldiers, and families. Of the efficiency methods described, multicomponent units and investment in the Army community provide potential for P3 success. The Regular Army can leverage the P3 services brought on by partnerships with the AR. In turn, these partnerships provide better support services for soldiers and families as well as enhance training activities and missions for the unit. The Sustaining Readiness Model (SRM) as well as the equipment modernization strategy, can assist P3 practitioners with program planning management. P3 practitioners can use the SRM and modernization strategy to map out which private and/or public industries to partner with based on the CCDR's requirements and the AR's capabilities and readiness posture.

U.S. Army Reserve

The USAR have been globally engaged for more than fourteen consecutive years of war. Since 2001, more than 310,000 USAR soldiers have been mobilized and deployed across the globe, to include every major combat zone.⁵⁷ Based on these contributions, the USAR proves to be an essential element of the TA and the joint force.

The volatility of the global security environment coupled with the adversarial and fiscal uncertainties of the future will add stress to the already overtasked AC. This will result to a bigger reliance on the reserve forces. As commitments around the world continue, the AC capacity will wear thin due to fiscal austerity. Through the duration of

⁵⁷ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 3.

these issues, the TA sustainment capabilities continue to reside in the USAR. The current demand for the USAR force is about 25,000 annually.⁵⁸ This implies that at least one-third of the force must sustain a prescribed level of all readiness components to meet operational requirements. Therefore, a ready and operational USAR force is necessary to ensure the TA and the joint force succeeds in their mission. Of the many solutions the USAR identifies to promote readiness, the P3 is a program that supports the CAR's readiness priorities. Its supporting objectives: help soldiers find employment or advance their careers in the private sector; and enhance individual and operational readiness of our forces, ultimately serves to advance the ATRP.

In support of the ATRP, the USAR implemented the Plan, Prepare, Provide readiness model. This model serves as framework for AR to provide trained, equipped and ready soldiers and units to support unified land operations requirements around the world. The Plan portion of the model regionally aligns AREC/Ts to support Army corps, ASCCs, and GCCs. These AREC/Ts support the commands by assessing the best fit USAR capabilities to support the objectives in their Army campaign plan, TCSP, and TCPs, respectively. The Prepare portion involves training, assessing, and certifying soldiers, leaders, and units so that they are viable assets for contingent and combat missions. The Provide portion delivers the soldiers, leader, and units to the Army for employment throughout the world.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 5.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

The command identified multiple ways to sustain the force's operational posture. Most relative to P3 is the use of the USAR in SC missions. This avenue decreases the demand on the AC's capabilities, which allows the them to maximize time at home between deployments. In turn, this provides the USAR with the opportunity to employ and refine its military and civilian acquired skills. Additional solutions to promote the reserve's readiness and resourcing that are noteworthy to mention but were not discussed in detail in this thesis: full time support and personnel, equipping and modernization, and taking care of soldiers and families.

Army Reserve Private Public Partnership Program

The USAR is finding alternate ways to sustain the force's readiness while dollars for soldier and unit training steadily decline. In order to increase the demand of USAR elements to support requirements worldwide, USAR sought ways to enhance their capabilities in order to better support the sustainment needs of the Army. The USAR identified partnerships with the public and/or private sectors as a means to achieve this end state. According to Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, P3s have been proven to be a successful infrastructure procurement approach for resource-constrained government agencies around the world.⁶⁰ For example, member countries of the European Union, like the Netherlands, used the design-build-finance-manage⁶¹ procurement route to assess whether P3s could deliver value for money for the upgrade of the N31 road to a dual lane

⁶⁰ Tony Kinn, Steve Bonner, Dr. William Rowe Jr., Carol Bailey, Jennifer Curtin, and Fred Meurer, *Public-Private Partnerships: Five Principles for Success* (McLean, VA: Booz Allen Hamilton, 2014), 1.

⁶¹ Design-Build-Finance-Operate is the Highway Agency's term for its availability payment based on P3 program.

motorway. The evaluation assessed that the P3s provided not only improved availability, but also 20 percent financial savings, even after 10 percent adjustment for aggressive bidding by the private sector consortium.⁶²

Keeping the same concept in mind, the USAR adopted the P3s infrastructure procurement approach and tailored it to sustain individual and unit readiness, known as the P3. The P3 leverages the construction aspect of a project and the private sector's capital as a means to gain occupational specialty training for soldiers, acquire materials to build the project, and provide a training venue for the unit. Through P3, the USAR seeks to expand its training opportunities with and through private industries. The USAR represents most of the TA force's medical, logistical, transportation, engineering, civil affairs, legal, and chemical capabilities.⁶³ Therefore, P3 enhances reserve capabilities, serves to better support GCC requirements in support of SC efforts, while fostering relationships with private sectors to better serve the communities of USAR Soldiers.

Other Relevant Sources

The *Defense Security Cooperation Agency Vision 2020 Executive Summary*, addresses the complex and urgent issues regarding SC programs via a three-fold approach: synchronizing SC activities, meeting customer expectations, and ensuring the

⁶² Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc., *Delivering the PPP promise: A review of PPP issues and activity*, accessed 23 January 2016, <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/government-infrastructure/pdf/promisereport.pdf>, 21..

⁶³ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 5.

effective and efficient use of SC community resources.⁶⁴ Of these LOEs, synchronizing SC activities is most applicable to the national military objective, because it strengthens the U.S. global network of partners and allies.⁶⁵ Chapter 4 of the strategic plan discusses the goal, end state, objectives required to attain a more responsive industry participation in SC activities. In support of this LOE, the goal is to sustain a whole of government effort in order for the SC community partners with industry to actively apply innovative approaches to fulfilling international capability requirements. To achieve this end state, they seek to facilitate industry engagement that provide and capitalize on SC opportunities.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency Vision 2020 Executive Summary* (Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, October 2015), accessed February 21, 2016, <http://dsca.mil/strategic-plan-vision-2020-update>. 9.

⁶⁵ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 5.

⁶⁶ Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency Vision 2020 Executive Summary*, 19.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Over the past 14 years, the operational use of the Reserve Component provided the necessary strategic flexibility and operational depth to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We need a scalable, flexible Reserve that provides the increased depth required to respond to strategic uncertainty. As we rebuild our Total Army we need . . . enduring operational access to the Reserve Force to ensure successful execution of operations.

— Honorable John M. McHugh and General Raymond T. Odierno,
*Statement by Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army
before the Commission on the Future of the United States Army*

Overview

This chapter discusses the methodology for data collection and analysis. The information collected during the research derived from literature pertaining to the topic and insight on P3 from USAR representatives. It sought to validate whether P3 enhances AR capabilities, especially when employed in CCMD AORs to support TSC efforts. Additionally, the research examined P3's effects on USAR's readiness posture, and whether P3 provides the USAR the training opportunities to remain operationally ready. Chapter 3 is divided into two sections: Data Collection Methods and Analysis Methodology.

Data Collection Methods

This research utilized qualitative information to answer the primary and secondary research questions. USG documents and official briefings pertaining to the topic were the primary qualitative sources used to compile the information. Telephonic conversations with a P3 program officer was initially conducted to gain a better

understanding of the AR's desired end state with the P3 program. CCMD-specific feedback regarding P3 were provided by the AREC/T staff members from USSOUTHCOM/U.S. Army Southern Command (USARSOUTH), USPACOM/U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), and USAFRICOM/U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) through electronic correspondence or by telephone. Additional correspondence was conducted with the 9th Mission Support Command (MSC) P3 program coordinator to gain insight on the P3 efforts in USARPAC. Lastly, P3 industry-based information such as best practices and current initiatives were collected at the National Council for Public-Private Partnerships Federal P3 Summit. On the other hand, no quantitative data was used for this thesis. Several attempts were made to collect raw data pertaining to the topic, yet such data was not authorized for public access.

The intent of this research was to better inform the Army community about the P3 program. The findings and recommendations are guided by the thesis chair and committee to provide the intended audience a well-rounded publication. The primary intent for this research is to inform Army leaders about the P3 program and leverage the partnerships to enhance GCC's BPC programs and activities. Additionally, the secondary goal of this thesis is to provide the P3 program office an external perspective to assist with P3 development.

Analysis Methodology

This thesis developed the recommendations for P3 through the application of the ADM. The research collected relevant information to gain a thorough understanding of the program, synthesized the information via the ends, ways, means, and risks construct, and developed a recommend operational approach for P3 refinement.

The thesis developed an operational approach that supports the CAR's P3 objective: enhance the individual and operational readiness of the USAR.⁶⁷ The research initially examined the current posture of the P3 program by studying the purpose, relationships, and progress of each readiness LOE and sought to answer the question; what is P3 at this time? Subsequently, the research identified the problems relating to the focus topic, and looked to answer the question; what prevents the USAR from implementing P3 in each ASCC/GCC AOR? Lastly, the research developed a desired end state for P3 based on the CAR's objective and sought to answer the question; where/what does the USAR want P3 to effect?

Due to progressive disposition of the P3 program, the research criteria for the information used had to be current, dating no more than three years from the production of this thesis, with the exception of strategic direction (national, defense, and military guidance publications). Additionally, information regarding the P3 posture derived from primary sources such as: program action officers, coordinator, theater specific AR subject matter experts, and P3 leaders of industry. The research determined the ADM was the best approach to obtain the thesis results and develop the recommendations based on the P3's infancy.

⁶⁷ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 8.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Citizen-Soldiers are highly educated, and professionals in their civilian careers. They are our doctors, lawyers, academics, scientists, engineers and information technology specialists on the leading edge of high-tech industry – a new generation of Soldiers who grew up with technology in their hands, practice it in their professions and leverage it while in uniform. As threats and technologies change, the civilian skills Army Reserve Soldiers develop will enable our formations to provide a highly specialized talent pool to meet current needs and lead early experimentation and utilization of emerging capabilities.

— Lieutenant General Jeffery W. Talley, *Written Statement on the U.S. Army Reserve Command by the 32nd Chief of Army Reserve and 7th Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command, to the National Commission on the Future of the Army*

Introduction

The DOD cannot achieve its security responsibilities unilaterally; therefore, it is essential that the United States continue to collaborate through a whole of government approach in order to secure the nation’s vital interests. President Barack Obama described collaborations between the public and private sector as critical to U.S. security at home and abroad, stating, “Collaborations offer potential opportunities to increase the Department’s mission effectiveness by leveraging the capabilities, knowledge, processes, and infrastructure brought to bear by private sector entities.”⁶⁸ Furthermore, in light of declining budgets and increased requirements for national security, the President emphasized the use of PPCs stating, “We must use every tool at our disposal to create jobs now and lay the foundation for future prosperity, including better collaboration

⁶⁸ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, 10.

between the public and private sectors.”⁶⁹ In light of these directions, PPCs or variations thereof, will eventually become a common procurement practice in the U.S. industry, to include the military.

Chapter 1 briefly explained that there is not one internationally accepted definition of P3; each entity varies the definition to fit their needs. Despite this fact, the conceptual characteristics remain relatively similar. It is important to note that the application of P3, as they are known in the private and public sectors, must adapt to the environment in which they operate. In other words, it is not a one size fits all concept. This thesis discovered this dilemma while researching the P3 program and its viability with ASCC/CCMD’s TSC activities.

Organization of this Chapter

Chapter 4 is organized in two sections in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Does the P3 unit readiness LOE enhance the AR’s capability when supporting the ASCC/GCCs’ SC efforts? If so, what type of SC effort does P3 unit readiness best apply towards? The subsequent research question is; does the P3 program provide opportunities for the AR to maintain its readiness posture? If so, how does the P3 program provide the opportunities for the AR?

Section one discussed why P3 does not currently provide the AR an increased capability when supporting ASCC/GCC’s SC efforts. This section also identifies the

⁶⁹ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Presidential Memorandum -- Expanding Public-Private Collaboration on Infrastructure Development and Financing,” January 17, 2014, accessed May 16, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/17/presidential-memorandum-expanding-public-private-collaboration-infrastru>, 1.

regions which can potentially benefit from P3 based on their current operational environment. Section two of this chapter discusses why P3 has the potential to keep the USAR operationally ready. In an effort to validate these findings, this thesis examines three ASCCs and their supported CCMDs for P3 applicability: USARPAC/USPACOM, USARAF/USAFRICOM, and USARSOUTH/USSOUTHCOM. This thesis specifically examines these CCMDs due to the current P3 effort in the Pacific, the existing PPC program in USSOUTHCOM in addition to its long standing SC program, and the potential benefits P3 can provide to the continent of Africa.

Section One Findings

This research examined P3 in order to validate whether the effort provides the USAR an added capability to better support the ASCC/GCC's SC efforts. In order to reach this validation, the research identified the current posture of the P3 program; yet primarily focused on the unit readiness LOE. The research analyzed the LOE's stakeholders and activities with the current OE of each region. The analysis found various issues that did not appropriately render the implementation of P3, such as incompatibility of the AR's desired effects and ASCC/GCC's desired outcomes; and insufficiencies in the P3 program's development. Therefore, the determination was that P3 does not currently enhance the USAR unit's capabilities when supporting ASCC/GCC SC efforts. These findings predicated on two factors: regional dynamism and insufficiencies in the P3 construct.

U.S. Army Pacific/U.S. Pacific Command




Figure 4. USPACOM AOR

Source: U.S. Pacific Command, “USPACOM Area of Responsibility,” accessed May 6, 2016, <http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMAreaofResponsibility.aspx>.

The USAR must tailor P3 to a region’s operational environment for best applicability. The dynamics of each region does not allow P3 to universally apply its concept to all CCMDs. The Indo-Asia-Pacific region (figure 4) is an example. The region’s geography is extremely expansive, stretching from the waters off the west coast of the United States to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. Figure 5 depicts the spatial challenges by the amount of sea travel days from the

Continental United States to USPACOM AOR. The geography alone makes the region vulnerable and U.S. interests susceptible to threats.

The Indo-Asian-Pacific is also diverse an operating environment driven by the resources in the surrounding islands. China's actions of continued territorial assertion and militarization in the South China Sea, North Korean provocation of weapons of mass destruction, Russia's revitalization of long-range strategic patrols in the Pacific, and terrorist attacks in Bangladesh and Indonesia are the current challenges that pose high risk to our nation's security interests. The effects of these strategic problem sets in the region significantly impact the security interests of the United States, its allies, and partners (Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, India, New Zealand, and Oceania). The region's conglomeration of issues coupled with the tyranny of distance makes its TCP unique and complex; and requires a strategic whole of government rebalancing effort.

One of the many efforts towards rebalancing the Pacific region is through SC. This approach focuses on building partner readiness, reducing partner capability gaps, and BPC.⁷⁰ Foreign military financing is one of the main vehicles used by USPACOM to support the development of a nation's defensive posture. For example, the United States provided foreign military financing to the Philippines and South Korea for the development of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in order to meet challenges such as military modernization efforts, border security issues, disaster

⁷⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture*, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 23, 2016, 16.

response, CT and maritime security.⁷¹ The effects of P3, on the other hand, is on the opposite side of the BPC spectrum; its effects serve to increase the quality of life for the supported population. P3 enables local populations to attain life enriching and sustaining institutions, such as schools, water wells, or roads. Therefore, P3's effects are counter to the GCC's desired SC outcomes.

Friction stemming from regional dynamics is the USAR's challenge with Samoa. P3 efforts are not able to advance due to the USAR's inability to deliver donated items, in the form of medical equipment and supplies, to the Samoan district medical clinics. The provision is currently upheld due to lack of funding to ship the equipment from mainland United States to Apia, Samoa. As regional instability continues in the USPACOM AOR, strategic force posture efforts are the primary foci rather than improved social well-being in Oceania. Yet, from the USAR's perspective, it is in the best interest of the CCMD to fund this transaction in order to strengthen the U.S. partnership with the commonwealth. The competing interests of both commands are prime examples of how dynamism can hinder the progress of development.

⁷¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture*, 2.

MAP 2

The Tyranny of Distance

Steam times are in parentheses.



Source: Heritage Foundation estimates based on data from Shirley A. Kan, "Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments," Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2014, Table 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=752725> (accessed January 13, 2015).

heritage.org

Figure 5. The Tyranny of Distance

Source: The Heritage Foundation, "2016 Index of Military Strength: Asia," April 29, 2014, accessed March 24, 2016, <http://www.heritage.org/multimedia/infographic/2015/02/2015-index-us-military-strength/the-tyranny-of-distance>.

U.S. Army Africa/U.S. Africa Command



Figure 6. USAFRICOM AOR

Source: Bing Images, “Images of Map of USAFRICOM AOR,” Bing, accessed May 6, 2016, <https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=images+of+africom+aor&view=detailv2&qpv=images+of+africom+aor&id=AC2EB07723359B1751DBD4B4262B829FBC01AC5C&selectedIndex=1&ccid=bzK7KTTg&simid=608008310307554503&thid=OIP.M6f32bb2934e01e75ac275ace28988b77H0&ajaxhist=0>.

The strategic environment in Africa is volatile—suffering from poor governance, economic and environmental challenges and threats from VEOs and transnational criminal organizations. For example, Africa’s population is at one billion and projected to

grow to 1.6 billion by 2030.⁷² Africa’s size and diversity is made up of fifty-four sovereign nations, 400 ethnic groups and occupy a land mass more than three times the size of the United States.⁷³ This fact is exacerbated by the increase in urbanization and youth demographics. These compounding issues have led to unemployment and disenfranchisement throughout the continent. Furthermore, as national systems such as essential services, security, and infrastructure undergo stress in ungoverned or under governed areas, terrorist organizations perpetuate the situation by exploiting the weaknesses of the government and infiltrating acts of extremism. The “Fragile States Index of 2015,” indicates the continent houses the world’s most fragile countries (figure 7).⁷⁴ Similar to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, Africa’s dynamics present a myriad of security threats to our nation’s security interests: al Shabab, Boko Haram, Islamic State – Libya or Islamic State in the Levant expansion, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb al-Murabitan, and Ansar al-Din.⁷⁵

In light of these issues, the continent of Africa is an enduring interest for the United States and requires a whole of government approach to combat the risks of

⁷² Douglas W. Merritt, *African Horizons: The United States Army Working Toward a Secure and Stable Africa* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, February 2016), 1.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ The Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index* (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2015), accessed March 12, 2016, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf>, 4-5.

⁷⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 14.

destabilization, radicalization, and persistent conflict.⁷⁶ In order to achieve such measures, USAFRICOM uses SFA as the primary SC means in their TCP.

SFA is defined as the DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. These activities include organizing, training, equipping and advising foreign security forces their supporting institutions on their supporting institutions from the tactical to the ministerial levels. The goal is to strengthen a force and ultimately a state, to increase its ability to provide internal security and contribute to broader regional and global security challenges in alignment with U.S. interests.⁷⁷ USAFRICOM's desired end state is to increase partner capacity and the supported nation's willingness to successfully provide their own security, counter VEOs and illicit trafficking, respond to crisis, as well as contribute to peacekeeping operations.⁷⁸ This is inconsistent with P3 because the partner capacity effect is restoration of life sustaining systems. Despite this incompatibility, the USAR continues to support the CCMD by participating in multi-lateral exercises, such as the Accord series and medical readiness training exercises with medical, civil affairs, and other sustainment enabling capabilities.

⁷⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, USA, Commander, United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2.*

⁷⁷ Director, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), 133.

⁷⁸ Numerick, USAFRICOM ARET staff, e-mail correspondence with author, February 23, 2016.




Figure 7. Fragile States Index: Fragility in the World, 2015

Source: The Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index* (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2015), accessed March 12, 2016, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf>, 4-5.

U.S. Army Southern Command/U.S. Southern Command




Figure 8. USSOUTHCOM AOR

Source: U.S. Southern Command, “USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility,” accessed 6 May 16, <http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Area-of-Responsibility.aspx>.

The strategic environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is dangerous to the nation’s security interests due to its proximity to the United States. Contrary to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, where tyranny of distance defies U.S. global projection, the Americas and Caribbean exhibit tyranny of proximity, which brings threats to the United States at an increased velocity. Despite the improvements made over the past centuries,

the region continues to endure socio-economic challenges such as VEOs, widespread poverty, institutional fragility, corruption, inequality, and deteriorating citizen safety.⁷⁹ These permeable issues have already reached the United States, exemplified by the mass migration of unaccompanied children and families in 2014 and the persistent violence stemming from existing transnational criminal networks. Foreign terrorist fighters, Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, refugee and street gang proliferation, and Chinese and Russian engagements influence the region's security environment and threaten the southern approaches of the United States. The drug trafficking routes shown in figure 9 depicts how porous the southern approaches easily threaten not only the United States, but also the world.

USSOUTHCOM addresses these challenges with their robust SC program. This program includes activities such as: supporting Colombia, defense professionalization and human rights; humanitarian and civic assistance; Global Peace Operations Initiative, State Partnership Program and multinational exercises.⁸⁰

USSOUTHCOM's long standing efforts towards SC distinguishes itself from other CCMDs. Its strong SC program predicated on the command's PPC program, which is proven to be a force multiplier in exercises, operations, and engagement activities. In 2014, the PPC yielded over \$10 million in service and gifts-in-kind to partner nations in conjunction with their annual exercises.⁸¹ Therefore, P3 has the potential for success in

⁷⁹ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, United States Southern Command before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee*, 5.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

this CCMD due to the existing viable program. The efforts towards P3s predicate on regional dynamics; it may be complementary in one region, but counterproductive in others.

Each CCMD has unique challenges that defy their capabilities to attain regional security in their AOR. To some extent commands such as USSOUTHCOM have reached an operational climate that fosters partnering efforts, while other commands are in their conception or infancy.



Figure 9. Major Drug Trafficking Routes in Latin American and the Caribbean

Source: Clare Ribando, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, May 2011), accessed January 17, 2016, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf>, 3.

This dynamic, coupled with the volatility of global affairs, effects GCC's priorities. Therefore, if the command priorities do not foster the need for public/private sector collaborations or partnerships, resources to build the effort are either limited or non-existent. P3 falls into this situation; it currently has insufficiencies in its construct that preclude its progression.

The most significant insufficiencies in the P3 program are the absence of DOD directives and funding. The absence of an overarching DOD policy providing authority for private and/or public sector collaborations implies that ASCCs/GCCs are not required to implement civilian-military partnerships into their command practices. To date, the only substantial document that directs the government agencies to implement P3 projects is the President Barack Obama's Memorandum, "Expanding Public-Private Collaboration on Infrastructure Development and Financing. (Appendix 3)." Yet, this document is primarily for infrastructure procurement, which is quasi applicable to the P3 program.

There are numerous DOD statues, regulations, and guidance that affect P3, yet the majority applies to depot level maintenance. There are also other partnering authorities that apply to other defense industrial activities beyond depot maintenance, which are designed for facilitate, test, development activities and cooperative research and development agreements.⁸² Since the current library of existing DOD policies for partnering with private and/or public industries all support maintenance, DOD P3 practitioners (of other foci) must apply these policies to support their function. In turn,

⁸² Department of Defense, Maintenance Policy and Programs, *Public-Private Partnering for Sustainment Guidebook* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2012), accessed 15 May 2016, [https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/495747/file/62530/Public-Private%20Partnering%20for%20Sustainment%20Guidebook%20\(1%20Feb%202012\).pdf](https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/495747/file/62530/Public-Private%20Partnering%20for%20Sustainment%20Guidebook%20(1%20Feb%202012).pdf), 42.

this permits variation in the practice traditionally understood by the P3 community. This variance in application, can lead to unexpected outcomes that are not favorable for the other party. To illustrate, the definition of DOD P3 substantially varies between the P3 community and the DOD. As presented in chapter 1, the definition of P3s:

A contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public or private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility.⁸³

In contrast, the DOD refers to partnerships as collaborations. According to the DOD, PPCs are voluntary interactions between public and private sector entities through which both parties leverage the expertise, resources, and incentives of the other in order to address an issue or opportunity with greater speed, effectiveness, efficiency, or residual impact.⁸⁴

Branching from the DOD's definition of PPC, the USAR modified the definition to have force readiness as the program's focal point. The USAR's version of P3 provides mind/body/spirit programs to enhance individual readiness, job-specific credentialing to enhance leader readiness; and private sector partnering and training to enhance unit readiness to meet specific global needs.⁸⁵

These divergences have led to variations in application and conflicting interests. The DOD implements PPC to advance activities which support cyber defense,

⁸³ National Council for Public-Private Partnerships, "Public-Private Partnerships."

⁸⁴ Defense Business Board, *Public-Private Collaboration in the Department of Defense*, 2.

⁸⁵ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, 8.

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, research and development programs, and warrior and family support programs. On the other hand, the USAR serves to support warrior, leader, and unit readiness, in response to the Chief of Staff of the Army's strategic priorities. The civilian based P3 community uses partnerships as cost saving procurement approach. Unless philanthropically associated, private industries' expected outcome are sufficient revenue stream potentials or, in other words, a viable return on their investment(s). Therefore, a DOD-led policy for the use of PPC/P3 will not only align the intentions of the services with the partnering civilian entity, but also mandate the services to leverage civilian-military partnerships while executing global commitments.

Another insufficiency in the P3 program is funding. The shortage of funding for the program prohibits the hiring of additional manpower to work the program objectives at the headquarters and operational command levels. Currently, the P3 program has a staff to support each of the LOEs, with the exception of unit readiness. Additionally, there is only one P3 program coordinator supporting the USPACOM AOR; no other P3 program coordinators exist to support the other ASCC/CCMDs. Therefore, while these critical shortages exist, there will be little to no progression in P3.

There are USAR staff/liaisons present in the ASCC and CCMD structures, the AREC/T, but they do not have any responsibilities to support the P3 program. The primary responsibility of the AREC/T is to facilitate the planning and sourcing process of USAR units for each CCMDs and ASCCs TCP and TSCPs. AREC/Ts are the primary contacts for ASCCs/CCMDs to request USAR forces to enhance AC's capabilities during exercises, operations, and engagements. At this time, the P3 program office relies on

these elements to assist in the P3 efforts. This issue has led to the manning gaps discussed. However, AREC/Ts do assist the effort by notifying the P3 program office of any potential events that may benefit from P3.

Another funding issue for P3 is training venue the program states that it would best support. As the CAR explained, the unit readiness LOE leverages Title 10 training—whether annual training (AT) or overseas deployment training (ODT)—to partner with the private companies in order to use their assets to execute sustainment requirements in support of the GCCs SC activities. The authorized training days for a unit to execute training under ODT is restrictive, especially when it plans to leverage P3. AR RAF units (figure 10) participating in activities supporting an ASCC or GCC’s SC executes Title 10 training in support of a CCDR’s TCP under AT, Overseas Deployment Training or other authorizations under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. According to Army Regulation 350-9, *Overseas Deployment Training*, AR units deploying under ODT will use statutory AT funding as the primary source of funds.⁸⁶ Under this authority, the available length of an ODT cannot exceed twenty-two days for the main body of a unit and cannot exceed twenty-nine days for advanced and rear detachments.⁸⁷ Moreover, the Headquarters, U.S. Army Reserve Command, directs that the planning factor for ODT funding is fifteen days, to include travel days, while the ASCC or GCC funds the unit’s

⁸⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-0, *Overseas Deployment Training* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2004), 9.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

travel to the training location and in-country costs.⁸⁸ Regardless of the derivative guidance, the authorized days for a unit to effectively leverage P3 while on ODT are not conducive, because the travel to and from the training site and back to origin and preparatory events are all included in the allocated training days.

This claim can be described as follows. First, the training days allocated can potentially take up to four days, dependent on the overseas training location and the unit's origin. Second, the emersion period may potentially be one to three days depending on the unit's size and mission complexity. Lastly, preparation and coordination activities such as leader's planning conferences and/or pre-deployment site surveys and can potentially use up to seven additional days, depending on the number of planning conferences and the pre-deployment site survey location and coordination activities. Therefore, at best, units can only support an ASCC or GCC's SC exercise no more than fifteen days.

Therefore, ODTs are best executed by no larger than platoon-sized elements because the authorized training days are not conducive to support units of larger footprints. This limitation will require the USAR to find alternate ways to leverage P3 if the sustainment requirement overseas for the USAR is for high demand-low density sustainment capabilities. As trends indicate a slight increase in USAR forces to support ASCC or GCC SC⁸⁹ efforts, interest in ODTs will grow as AC commands shift to

⁸⁸ U.S. Army Reserve Headquarters, Memorandum, *Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Annual Training and Active Duty Training Resourcing Guidance* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Reserve, October 15, 2015), 2.

⁸⁹ G3/7, USARC, March 30, 16, email between USARC HQ and OCAR regarding the ODT trends for the USAR for FY16. The information was in response to the research request in an effort to gather information regarding ODT trends and the potential for P3.

additional real world missions and partnership training. Thus, the USAR will need to examine partnerships with private companies that provide specialized assets or services.




Figure 10. AR RAF

Source: Major General Peter S. Lennon, “The United States Army Reserve: A Life-Saving and Life-Sustaining Force for the Nation” (PowerPoint presentation, Brigade/Battalion Pre-Command Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 March 2016), slide #12.

Section Two: Findings

This research also examined P3’s effects on the USAR force. The research deduced that P3 has the potential to increase the USAR readiness based on the outcomes achieved through the individual and leader readiness LOEs. The public-public partnerships established obtained a multitude of internships and life enhancing services

for soldiers (see Appendix B); thus the benefits from these services indirectly support the efforts towards unit readiness. However, there is currently no data that captures how the soldier benefits from the services provided by the partnerships. The absence of information cannot validate whether P3 truly enables the AR to remain operationally ready. Yet, through the number of established partnerships and the services they provide the soldiers and families, one can deduce that there is a level of improvement in both individual and leader readiness. In turn, these results will contribute to the improvement of unit readiness and subsequently enable the USAR to maintain operationally ready.

Conclusion

At this time, there is no substantial data to validate whether P3 provides ASCC/GCCs the appropriate effects for their SC program and the USAR the opportunities to remain operationally ready. The dynamics within each ASCC/CCMD require the P3 coordinators to tailor the provisions of the partnership to meet the requirements of the operational and strategic environment. The absence of P3 coordinators in each operational command (with the exception of 9th MSC) stagnates the progression of P3. While AREC/Ts are present in each ASCC and CCMD, they do not directly support P3; thus leaving no one to work the P3 effort beyond the headquarters. Unless other vehicles of employment are found, no larger than platoon-sized elements can conduct ODTs. In turn, this restricts the civil-military partnerships to the provision of specialized assets and services.

These issues particularly hinder the progression of the unit readiness LOE, of which provides the USAR the holistic readiness outcomes desired from the program. The dynamics of the CCMD require different types of BPC activities, some of which are

inconsistent with the desired end state of P3. For example, the BPC programs for both USPACOM and USAFRICOM use SA or SFA activities, while USPACOM uses both SC and SA. The USPACOM AR RAF operational command continues efforts to implement P3 in the region with challenges. The competing SC interests between the AR and the CCMD stagnate the progression of the program. While similar USAR efforts are occurring in USAFRICOM, the demand for USAR forces to support combined exercises are currently for medical capabilities only. USSOUTHCOM, on the other hand, has been at the forefront of PPC advancement and commenced its collaborations over a decade ago. Despite this fact, P3 is non-existent in both ASCC and CCMD due to the absence of a dedicated P3 coordinator in the region.

Even though there was no data found to indicate positive trends in soldier and leader readiness LOEs, the existence of multiple partnerships with the public sector suggests that the benefits received from these partnerships render potential improvement in a unit's readiness. The P3 program's objectives are: to help soldiers find employment or advance their careers in the private sector; and enhance the individual and operational readiness of USAR forces.⁹⁰ With respect to the latter objective, improvements in individual readiness would in turn improve the posture of the unit. As multiple units undergo this systematic progression, the USAR force would continue to build upon their readiness posture. The true value of the USAR is the ability to provide high-quality

⁹⁰ U.S. Congress, House, *The 2016 Posture of the United States Army Reserve: A Global Operational Force*, submitted by Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Talley, 32nd Chief of Army Reserve and 7th Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command. Reserve Command, House Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, March 22, 2016, 8.

military capabilities enhanced by the civilian skills, education, training, and experience of USAR citizen soldiers. Therefore, the USAR is an essential force of the TA.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Private Public Partnership (P3) program recognizes that complex global problems cannot be solved by the government alone. The answer lies in the private-public sector – and the Army Reserve is in a unique position to be part of that solution.

— Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Chief of the Army Reserve and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, *U.S. Army Reserve At A Glance: Twice the Citizen*

The operational AR has proven over time that they are a necessary enabler for the TA and joint forces. Historical accounts dating from the Korean War (1950-1953) through today demonstrate how the force transformed from a strategic organization to an operational reserve that can quickly task organize into force packages . . . [that] can be tailored to support a full range of missions, including homeland response, theater SC, and overseas contingency.⁹¹ The USAR’s mobilization experience during the Korean War broached system inefficiencies, which led Congress to restructure the force into a Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve. Today, the USAR has been fundamental in providing critical logistical capabilities to the total force, accounting for 50 percent of the Army’s combat support and 25 percent of mobilization base expansion capabilities.⁹² As global instability continues to threaten U.S. security interests, the military’s responsibilities will endure to reach political aims. As stated in the various national level documents, the whole of government approach is essential in order to overcome the over

⁹¹ U.S. Army Reserve, “From the Top: Then and Now, From Manpower Reserve to Operational Reserve,” *Warrior Citizen Special Issue* 60, no. 1 (2015): 7.

⁹² *Ibid.*

reach caused by increased U.S. global responsibilities. Accordingly, one of the ways the USAR practices the whole of government approach is by implementing P3 as a supplemental means to increase the force's readiness and enabling capabilities to the ASCC/GCCs' BPC programs.

The purpose of this research was to validate whether P3 provides AR an enhanced capability when supporting an ASCC/GCC's BPC activities and whether the P3 program enables the AR to remain operationally ready. The research focused on P3, the unit readiness LOE, to determine the validity of the topic. The research briefly examined the other two LOEs, individual and leader readiness, to assist with determining the validity of the second thesis question.

This chapter is organized into two sections. The first section provides a brief summary of the findings from chapter 4, to include the significance, implications, and unexpected findings. The following section covers recommendations and additional approaches to the research to facilitate further study.

The thesis determined that at this present time, P3 does not enhance the USAR unit's sustainment capabilities when supporting ASCC/GCC BPC activities because the universal approach is not suitable. The regional dynamism that resides in each CCMD does not allow for an arbitrary implementation of the LOE. Another issue is that the organizational structure in the P3 program is underdeveloped. The research examined three regional areas and its respective CCMDs: Indo-Asian-Pacific/USPACOM, Africa/USAFRICOM, and Latin America and the Caribbean/USSOUTHCOM, to validate the effects of P3 on the AR's capabilities. The research found that the BPC priorities of each CCMDs may or may not be compatible with the effects of P3. For

instance, CCMDs that conduct SFA or SA to advance BPC efforts, do not want to entertain P3 into their business practices at this time. On the other hand, P3's effects fit well with USSOUTHCOM's BPC activities; as the CCMDs has a viable SC program. Yet, the absence of a dedicated program coordinators at the operational commands impede P3 from manifesting. Key insight from the AREC/T staff from each of the CCMDs was vital to the research; they provided their perspectives on the topic and its relevance to the ASCC/GCC's TCSP/TCP.

The AREC/T staff consensus to implement P3 in their respective CCMDs were differential. As discussed previously, P3 is underway in the USPACOM AOR. Similarly, the AREC staff from USSOUTHCOM echoed P3's potential in the AOR, but only if it is properly resourced. The USAFRICOM ARET staff had a different stance on P3. They stated that the program's effects do not align with the CCMD's BPC desired outcomes.⁹³

Another challenge is the underdeveloped organizational structure. The absence of P3 program coordinators at multiple operational commands, with the exception of one, ceases all efforts of the P3 program. The research also revealed that the P3 program office at OCAR did not have a lead action officer for the unit readiness LOE, but did have action officers for the other LOEs. Although there are AREC/Ts integrated in each of the CCMDs, their responsibilities do not directly support the P3 program. However, the AREC/Ts can serve as a supplemental data source for any P3 efforts. Manpower is not the only issue challenging the advancement of P3; the venue with which to implement P3 also has its limitations.

⁹³ USAFRICOM ARET staff (J03/J352), e-mail correspondence with author, February 26, 2016.

The current means for AR RAF units to support ODTs is through Title 10 authorizations. As stated earlier, the idea is for P3 to provide the USAR units assets or services to use while conducting ODT in order to enhance the reserve unit's sustainment capability. In turn, the reserve unit provides an increased sustainment capability and capacity to the GCC's SC activities. As discussed in chapter 4, the number of authorized training days is not conducive to effectively support the ASCC/GCC's SC activities because of the number of days for travel, transition, and execution of mission. Therefore, a large unit footprint cannot effectively conduct its transition and mission requirements with the authorized training days. Thus, the USAR will need to support the GCC's sustainment requirement with no larger than platoon sized elements and may also require the USAR to seek partnerships with private companies of niche capabilities.

The research did not uncover substantial data to validate whether the LOE enhances the USAR's capabilities when supporting ASCC/GCC BPC activities. Furthermore, the research could not validate whether P3 enables the AR to remain operationally ready. However, based on the multiple partnerships the AR established with various non-profit organizations, the life enhancing opportunities provided by the organizations can potentially lead to improvements in individual and leader readiness; with reciprocal effects on a unit's readiness. Currently, there are no quantifiable data to analyze the outcomes of the partnerships, yet efforts are in progress to collect the data from the partnering organizations by the P3 program office.

The significance of the findings opens the discussion on the latitude of the command's willingness to continue the program. First, P3 cannot be arbitrarily implemented in all CCMDs; each of their environments are dynamic. Therefore, since the

dynamics of a region influences the GCC's BPC priorities, P3 must be adaptive to the region's volatility. Furthermore, since P3 cannot be a one size fits all application, P3 program coordinators must be familiar with the BPC practices, GCC's TCP, ASCC's TCSP and a full understanding of the CCMD's operational and strategic environment in order to identify if P3 is appropriate and if so, then how to properly implement the effort in the AOR. Second, the guidance and manpower shortages in P3 framework indicates gaps in program's operational approach.

Unexpected Findings

An unexpected finding was the divergence in terminology between the P3 community and DOD. The terms between the practicing bodies differ substantially. The P3 community defines a P3s as a contractual arrangement between a public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility.⁹⁴ Conversely, the DOD views the concept as a PPC, a voluntary interaction between public and private sector entities through which both parties leverage the expertise, resources, and incentives of the other in order to address an issue or opportunity with greater speed, effectiveness, efficiency, or residual impact.⁹⁵ The DOD further outlines its provisions: that it has no involvement in direct financial payment or monetary transaction; common

⁹⁴ National Council for Public-Private Partnerships, "Public-Private Partnerships."

⁹⁵ Defense Business Bureau, *Public-Private Collaboration in the Department of Defense*, 2.

goals and governance is mutually determined along with shared decision making; private sector may include businesses, non-government organizations, foundations, academic and research institutes, and community-based and other non-public organizations; and multiple public and/or private sector involvement.⁹⁶ Therefore, this divergence can be a possible factor to the mediocre progression of the P3 practice within the DOD.

Recommendations

This thesis has several application recommendations to improve the potential for P3. First, to address the challenges of regional dynamics in each CCMD, the P3 program coordinators must be knowledgeable of their supporting ASCC/CCMD's OE, TCP and TCSP as well as practice of BPC. The knowledge base will allow the program coordinators to identify the best fit private sector niche capability for partnering based on the required sustainment capability. For example, program coordinators at the 310th Expeditionary Support Command supporting USARSOUTH are informed that the upcoming joint exercise requires an USAR water purification unit. The program coordinators work with the tasked unit to find out what assets the unit needs in order to provide an enhanced capability during the exercise. The program coordinator then searches for a private company that would provide such need to the reserve unit.

Second, P3 program coordinators need to continue leveraging the expertise of the AREC/T staff to find out what sustainment capabilities are required to support the GCC's SC efforts so coordinators can build a portfolio of P3 that support those types of units. Keeping with the scenario described above, the program coordinators would work with

⁹⁶ Defense Business Bureau, *Public-Private Collaboration in the Department of Defense*, 3.

the AREC/T to identify which USAR sustainment capabilities are in high demand and then generate a series of private sector partnerships based off the demand. Also, P3 coordinators conduct parallel coordinating efforts with the Department of State country team to find appropriate private sector partnerships for the supported local population.

The last recommendation is organizational reformation. The organizational reformation is essential to advance this program. First, management of this program needs to be transferred to the operational commands, while the policy formulation remains at the office of the CAR. This aligns with the functions of the organizations as defined in chapter 1. Second, the P3 office needs to formulate a program model that supports the CAR's readiness priorities. Since the program already has two supporting readiness objectives, the P3 program office will need to expand on the required tasks. Furthermore, the policy provisions should include additional funding authorizations to increase ODT training days for units engaged in partnerships. An option would be the expansion of the 12304b authority for use of ODT in support of ASCC/GCC SC activities or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief activities and supplemental funding for USAR utilization.⁹⁷

This would improve the USAR's ability to support TA and Joint Force requirements as well as improve USAR readiness while preserving the AC's readiness posture. Third, the USAR needs to consider hiring a P3 program coordinating team vice a coordinator. Since the nature of P3 program deals with leaders of industries and organizations, P3 coordinators must be able to operate in a high visibility environment.

⁹⁷ National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*, 65.

Thus, the team must be staffed with strong leadership and an interdisciplinary group of people who are well versed in existing law and policy, private sector finance, risk management, procurement process, and negotiating.

Conclusion

Current budget authorizations for defense spending will only continue to decrease, effecting not only the end strength and modernization of the TA, but opportunities for training forces. This will require the TA to be innovative in training their forces. According to the National Commission on the Future of the Army 2015 report, one method to instill fiscal discipline while balancing the total forces' needs was to continue utilizing multicomponent units as part of implementing the ATRP.⁹⁸ Although the design of these multicomponent units must be deliberate, the concept achieves total integration, providing the National Guard Bureau and USAR units more training opportunities to work with their RAF RA units. In order for the USAR to continue to be a proven enhancing capability in multicomponent units, the RC needs more training opportunities as well as innovative means to hone their collective and individual specialty skills. P3 has the potential to enhance a reserve unit's sustainment capabilities, in turn enabling the USAR to remain operationally ready—providing that it undergoes certain reformations.

⁹⁸ National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*, 66.

APPENDIX A

2016 ARMY RESERVE P3 EFFORTS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

9th Mission Support Command and Med Share Partnership Supporting the Commonwealth of Samoa:

Summary: In 2015, a 40-man medical team from the USAR's 1984th U.S. Army Hospital unit, under the 9th MSC, Hawaii, partnered with the National Health Service in support of Operation Soifua Manuia (OSM). This operation aimed to augment Samoa's medical capacity during the Commonwealth Youth Games by conducting first responder training with the Samoa Red Cross volunteers and National Health Service staff as well as provide direct medical support to all sporting venues and athlete villages. Subsequent efforts also included direct medical and dental care to patients at the Faleolo, Poutasi, and Lufilufi district clinics as well as the Motootua hospital. The team also shared to best practices with Samoa's medical professionals. The 1984th Army Hospital provided this support during their AT. The after action reports indicated Samoa's desire for efforts like OSM to continue more frequently and for longer periods of time.⁹⁹

P3 Efforts: In response to the after action reports, the 9th MSC sought to advance its support to Samoa by partnering with Med Share, a non-profit organization. The partnership between Med Share and 9th MSC would provide the Samoan district clinics medical equipment and supplies to enhance the medical facilities' capabilities and ultimately, the medical care to the local population. The gifts-in-kind medical items from Med Share include x-ray machines, stethoscopes, and dental chairs.

⁹⁹ 9th MSC P3 coordinator in support of USARPAC/USPACOM, telephone conversation with author, October 2015, February 2016, March 2016.

Issue: The Samoan Government is apprehensive to accept the medical equipment and supplies due to insufficiencies in trained personnel, facilities, and monies for the equipment's operation, maintenance, and storage. Additionally, fiscal constraints within the 9th MSC impede the transport of the items to Samoa and they are currently stored in a warehouse in the U.S. mainland awaiting a funding source for delivery to Samoa.

Challenges: There are competing priorities between Samoa and the 9th MSC. The 9th MSC seeks to advance P3 to strengthen its partnerships with nations in the Oceania. The current issues occurring in the East and South China Seas threaten the security, prosperity, and freedom of action in the Indo-Asian-Pacific region. Small nations in the Oceania sub-region are susceptible to coercion and influence from greater Asian nations, which can possibly counter U.S. interests in the region. On the other hand, the priority for Samoa is economic sustainment; thus, focusing on activities such as fishery and agriculture.

An additional challenge for the USAR to support the desires of Samoa regarding OSM is the availability of funding to support exercises. The 1984th U.S. Army Hospital unit supported OSM during their AT. Under Title 10 authorizations, the maximum allowable training days for AT is fourteen to twenty-nine days, depending on the unit's readiness training cycle. During this operation, the 1984th U.S. Army Hospital unit was allowed fourteen days of AT. Furthermore, AT execution dates for units occur during a specific time of the year, typically during the third quarter of the fiscal year. This is due in part to accommodate the Army Reservist's full time schedule as well as provide employers, educational institutions, and families lead time to prepare for the soldier's

absence. Although USAR unit rotations can potentially fulfill Samoa's desires, it is not feasible due to the training days' limitations imposed by fiscal authorities.

In response to the positive feedback from OSM, the 9th MSC sought to advance Samoa's medical capabilities and capacity through the provision of medical equipment and supplies in light of the AT limitations. Although Samoa desires enhanced medical care for its population, the provisions set by Med Share and the 9th MSC are not the current focus of Samoa.

P3 Program Accomplishments under the Individual Readiness Line of Effort

The goal of this LOE is to make the Reserve soldier marketable to their families, civilian employers, and the Army. To date, the initiative has partnerships with the following non-profit organizations in support of physical readiness, mental readiness, emotional readiness, financial readiness/employment, and education:

Team Red, White, and Blue: organizes physical fitness activities for veterans and family members throughout the United States.

Health and Healing Network: provides a multi-platform service, providing integrative medicine/holistic health programming.

Give an Hour: provides mental health services for soldiers and families such as individual, couples and family counseling by over 7,000 licensed professionals.

Courage Beyond: provides confidential, no-cost programs and services to veterans and families facing post-traumatic stress disorder and other invisible wounds of military service.

Mission Continues: provides emotional support to veterans adjusting to life at home.

Suiting Warriors: provides professional apparel (business suits) to veterans who are currently searching for employment.

Employer Network: provides no cost employment assistance to AR soldiers, veterans, and family members through Army Career Employment Specialists and Transition Employment Liaisons.

Cyber Initiative: provides employment and internships to improve the readiness of AR cyber soldiers by partnering with academia and various employment partners.

Plural Sight: provides AR soldiers and family members discounted on-line training to obtain credentials, certifications, or assist with self-improvement.

Veterans Career Transition Program: provides post-9/11 veterans and spouses free online certification preparation and professional training courses.

Army E-Learning: provides AC, National Guard Bureau, AR an alternative learning environment for on-line courses.

P3 Program Accomplishments under the Leader Readiness Line of Effort

The goal of this LOE is to provide opportunities for professional and trade career development, mentor-protégé, credentialing, and certification opportunities, training and licensure that are recognized by the civilian sector.¹⁰⁰ The AR established four partnerships with the private industry to train soldiers in the following career fields: public affairs, medical, and cyber.

¹⁰⁰ 9th MSC P3 coordinator in support of USARPAC/USPACOM, telephone conversation with author, October 2015, February 2016, March 2016.

Major League Baseball Network: provides two paid internships annually for AR soldiers.

Logistics Health, Inc.: provides fifty paid internships annually for AR soldiers.

Parsons: provides eight paid internships for cyber/information technology related skills.

General Electric Healthcare: provides AR soldiers in the bio-medical repair specialty (68A) externships.

APPENDIX B

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Current budget constraints resulting from sequestration levels in the Budget Control Act significantly impacted the Army's force end strength. The manning reductions pose significant readiness challenges for the total force as its requirement to maintain support of global commitments remains unchanged. In spite of these resource reductions, the USAR strives to maintain an acceptable readiness posture in order to remain ready, responsive, and flexible to meet all of its requirements in support of the nation's security needs.

CCMDs continue to support requirements worldwide in spite of manpower and funding reductions. Global issues such as Chinese assertion in the South China Seas, North Korean provocations, weapons of mass destruction tensions in Central Asia, and heightened activities by VEO and non-state actors in the continent of Africa and the Middle East continue to stress the TA's operational reach. In order to promote regional stability in their AORs, CCMDs apply BPC mechanisms to ensure partner capacity in the regions. Most common SC practices of CCMDs are security assistance, security force assistance, and security cooperation in the form of exercises.

As fiscal austerity continues to impact each U.S. Army component's readiness posture, the USAR realized the need to diversify the means to obtain training opportunities for the reserve force. Of the many innovative opportunities for soldiers, leaders, and units is the USAR P3 program. This program has three LOEs, all of which work towards maintaining the operational readiness of the USAR. The collective element of the program, titled P3 Unit Readiness, serves to advance the GCC security cooperation (SC) activities while providing the USAR units training opportunities. This thesis sought to validate whether P3, in particular, the unit readiness LOE, provides the USAR an increased capability when supporting an ASCC and/or GCC's BPC activities and/or programs. Second, the thesis examined whether the P3 provides opportunities for USAR to maintain its readiness posture.

The research realized no substantive evidence to support whether P3 provides the USAR an increased capability when supporting ASCC/GCC BPC activities. Therefore, this thesis discusses why P3 does not provide the USAR an increased capability. Second, the research deduced that from the advancements made from the individual and leader readiness LOEs, there is a potential for units to improve their readiness posture and possibly sustained force readiness.

The research analyzed three regions: Indo-Asian-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean; and the continent of Africa as well as the BPC activities of three CCMDs: USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USAFRICOM for the applicability of P3. Additionally, the research examined the framework of the P3 program. The analysis found that there are two factors that challenge P3 to advance in the CCMDs: regional

dynamics and the P3 organizational structure. The dynamics in each region and the primary focus of the CCMD's BPC efforts is not compatible with the effects that P3 unit readiness provides its customers. Additionally, the current P3 unit readiness structure is insufficient to support the desired effects of the program. Therefore, if the USAR command desires to advance this program, they must execute the appropriate applications and mechanisms to support the SC activities of each CCMDs.

It is important to note that the USAR's application of P3 slightly diverges from the P3 community's generally accepted concept. P3 practitioners utilize P3s as a means for resource constrained governments to procure infrastructure. P3s combine public sector infrastructure needs with private sector innovation and capital to deliver critical infrastructure projects.¹⁰¹ The USAR applies the approach somewhat differently, by partnering with non-profit and for profit organizations and academic institutions to support the CAR readiness priorities. The program operationalizes this approach through three LOEs:

Individual Readiness: Provide employment opportunities, advance physical, mental, emotional, spiritual and financial readiness for our soldiers, civilians, and family members.

Leader Readiness: Provide opportunities for professional and trade career development, mentor-protégé, credentialing, and certification opportunities.

Unit Readiness: Provide real world, Title 10 training opportunities for the USAR by utilizing private and public relationships to enhance unit readiness by employing the USAR operational and enabling capabilities to GCCs and ASCCs theater security cooperation (TSC) efforts.¹⁰²

This divergence in application does not impede P3 from advancement, yet it is important to understand the differentiation in the applications to avoid confusion.

Support to this research was provided by examining three CCMDs: USPACOM, USAFRICOM, and USSOUTHCOM; the U.S. Army, and the USAR through their respective posture statements, official documents, and other official publications. Additionally, the research examined documentation, papers, and publications on P3, with specific focus on its application in support of SC efforts.

¹⁰¹ Kinn et al, 1.

¹⁰² Private Public Partnership Office, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, "Private Public Partnership Overview Brief," 11.

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