

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE PLANNING AND
COORDINATION EFFORTS IN WEST AFRICA

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE PLANNING AND COORDINATION EFFORTS IN WEST AFRICA? by Major Jamaine J. Williams, 82 pages.

This research seeks to answer the question: Do the DOD and DOS conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, in order to coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development mission. There are three case studies used in this research to consider whether security and development missions being conducted in Liberia are having a positive effect in West Africa according to U. S. National Security Strategy.

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ACRONYMS

ACSS	African Center Strategic Studies
AFRICOM	United States Army Africa Command
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
GSCF	Global Security Contingency Fund
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HN	Host Nation
HS	Homeland Security
OHASIS	Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
SPP	State Partnership Program
USARAF	United States Army Africa
WHO	World Health Organization

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Africa's dynamic security environment is characterized by great diversity from conventional challenges such as insurgencies, resource and identity conflicts, and post-conflict stabilization to growing threats from piracy, narcotics trafficking, violent extremism, and organized crime taking root in Africa's urban slums, among others.¹

— African Center of Strategic Studies 2012

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine if the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, in order to coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development missions. The 2015 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) does not rely solely on ground forces to assure national security; on the contrary, there is great emphasis on supporting security by seeking stability in different geographic regions around the world. The United States remains committed to stability in Africa and investing in Africa's future. This is being done in developing countries, such as those in West Africa.² “American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the

¹ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Africa Security Trends,” accessed December 22, 2015, <http://africacenter.org/security/topic/#sthash.a5ogkOkz.dpuf>.

² The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2015), 5, accessed December 22, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

dignity and human rights of all peoples.”³ The NSS addresses the economic complexities around the world and the security challenges which require strategic patience and persistence. West Africa requires special attention from the United States because of the growth of extremist groups in the region.

The DOD and the DOS inherently share the responsibility of leading security and development efforts in West Africa. The African continent as a whole became an area of responsibility for the Combatant Command U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2003. The Department of State and USAFRICOM share the responsibility to foster stability in West Africa through security and development programs. Liberia is a key country in West Africa, and the United States has a long-standing colonial history and influence in the region.

Other world powers such as China, Russia and India also have economic and political interests in western African countries, especially those countries recovering from conflict.⁴ Liberia and other Western African countries are rich with agricultural resources. One major resource in West Africa is natural fuel. The coal mining industry is an enormous economic commodity for Liberia. The coal mining industry economic infrastructure was severely impacted during the Liberian civil war. Major economic power-based countries are trying to capitalize on Liberia’s fragile economic

³ Ibid., 8.

⁴ USAID, *A Guide to Economic Growth in Post Conflict Countries* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2009), accessed January 11, 2016, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO408.pdf.

infrastructure. This is one area where the US is trying to influence global economic order as an end state in the NSS.

USAFRICOM was designed specifically to assist with security, economic growth, and health concerns in Africa and to advance U.S. national interests. The USAFRICOM mission, in concert with interagency and international partners, is to build defense capabilities, respond to crises, and to deter and defeat transnational threats.⁵ United States Army Africa (USARAF), the Army component command, was designed to protect the United States from transnational terrorist threats/attacks and in recent years rendered aid to nation states in Africa. Together, USAFRICOM and USARAF conduct regional missions to help military partner nations and interagency partners respond to humanitarian needs or terrorist events in Liberia and West Africa.

In an effort to seek stability in West Africa, Liberia receives extensive support from the Department of Defense and Department of State. Liberia was the epicenter of a major health pandemic which had international ramifications. Liberia received direct support from the DOD and DOS during the Ebola pandemic in the fall of 2014. USARAF deployed to Liberia to provide medical resources and capabilities to assist in the containment of the Ebola virus and the DOS provided interagency assistance and coordinated resources with other health agencies. The DOD and DOS worked in concert as a crisis action response team to help eradicate the Ebola virus from Liberia.

The legal premises of the combined crisis action response were met “according to the DOD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and from Title II,

⁵ United States Africa Command, “About the Command,” April 15, 2014, accessed December 22, 2015, www.africom.mil.

DOD Appropriations Act, January 2014.”⁶ Additionally the DOS, OHDACA, and Operation and Maintenance (O&M)-funded humanitarian activities funded by the DOD have utilized the OHASIS on multiple occasions. Liberia recently received extensive assistance from the DOD and DOS to promote civil structure in order to improve educational institutions, local government facilities, and road networks that connect outlying villages and smaller communities.⁷

Furthermore, the DOD and DOS have assisted Liberia during the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome epidemics. They also worked with the World Health Organization (WHO) to administer medicine in small Liberian villages in 2012, and partnered with interagency United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to develop a budget to supply vaccinations for malaria and polio vaccinations, both preventable diseases.⁸

⁶ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *FY2014 DOD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)*, January 2014, accessed December 23, 2015, www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/ohdaca.

⁷ Abdel-Fatau Musah, *West Africa: Governance and Security in a Changing Region* (New York: International Peace Institute, February 2009), accessed April 23, 2016, <https://www.ipinst.org/by/abdel-fatau-musah>.

⁸ Library of Congress, “World Health Organization: Legal Responses to Health Emergencies,” June 9, 2015, assessed December 23, 2015, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/health-emergencies/who.php>; Department of State, *Foreign Operations Budget* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, May 2013), assessed December 12, 2015, www.state.gov.

The United States Strategic Plan is to conduct combined DOD and DOS initial planning operations with African partner nations beginning Fiscal Year 2011.⁹ As a result, the DOD and the DOS need each other to conduct security and development programs with partner nations. The DOD and the USARAF have an extensive history of providing aid and foreign assistance. However, the DOD is governed by rules of engagement in both permissive and non-permissive environments. However, the DOS, with interagency assistance, has more freedom to engage and interact with local populations and government heads of state.

During the recent Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operation United Assistance (OUA) in Liberia it became paramount that both the DOD and DOS key staff members needed to be available to assist in mission planning and execution.¹⁰ The combined staffs helped develop long-standing relationships between the DOD and DOS. This combined staff concept ultimately helped determine the true operational environment for mission planning and execution.¹¹ During crisis action events synchronization, such as having the right personnel and resources during mission planning, coordination and execution is very important.

⁹ US Department of Defense, *QDR Execution Roadmap: Building Partnership Capacity* (Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 2010), accessed December 23, 2015, www.hsdl.org.

¹⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned, Newsletter, Lessons and Best Practices, No. 15-09, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater: Creating Conditions for Success in West Africa* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, June 2015), 17.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 43.

There are U.S. National Security interests tied directly to Liberia such as increased global health security and investment in Africa's future for stability. The DOD and DOS utilize the 1207 Global Security Contingency Fund to enhance a nation's military capabilities, border and maritime security, internal defense, and counterterrorism operations.¹² These forces participate in or support military or stability operations consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, and the justice sector (including law enforcement and prisons) rule of law programs. Stabilization efforts take place in countries where the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State determine that conflict or instability in a country or region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such assistance.¹³

African nation states, to include Liberia, often spiral into conflict when trying to resolve development and security issues¹⁴ and need military security assistance. For example, Liberia is slowly rebuilding from over five years of civil war that began during a tribal dispute and security conflict.¹⁵ The DOS and USARAF are often called on to assist nation states in Africa to resolve their internal disputes and the synchronization and

¹² Nina M. Serafino, *Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview* (Washington, DC: Congressional Service, 2014), accessed December 23, 2015, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf>.

¹³ Clarence J. Bouchat, "Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach" (Letort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2010), 9.

¹⁴ Laurie Nathan, "AFRICOM: A Threat to African Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 1 (April 2009): 60.

¹⁵ Rama Mani, "Exploring the Rule of Law in Theory and Practice," in *Civil War and The Rule of Law: Towards Security Development and Human Rights*, ed. Agnes Hurwitz with Reiko Huang (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2008), 11.

interaction of these departments play a vital role in setting the conditions for success in countries like Liberia recovering from conflict.

West African violence has increased significantly since 1999, which brings particular attention to Liberia because of the terrorist threat from organizations like Boko Haram in nearby Nigeria.¹⁶ To quote former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “You can’t have security without development and you can’t have development without security.”¹⁷ The different levels of focus can yield great benefits as USARAF continues to track terrorist activity in West Africa with assistance from the DOS and other key interagency organizations. Terrorist groups have shown that they have the ability to jeopardize security and development operations in Liberia, and they are especially successful when they are not monitored or contained. Terrorist groups want to influence the economic structure of other West African counties as well.¹⁸

Government agencies have clearly defined the strategic goal for development in Liberia; to improve the lives of the citizens within the context of a growing the Liberian economy with an emphasis on good community relations.¹⁹ Liberia is still recovering

¹⁶ Nathan, “AFRICOM: A Threat to African Security,” 60.

¹⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), accessed December 18, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2010_national_security_strategy.pdf; Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 7.

¹⁸ United States Africa Command. “About the Command.”

¹⁹ The White House, *National Security Strategy 2010*; Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 7.

from a recent civil war, 1999 -2000, when over 200,000 people were displaced.²⁰ The Liberian federal government has drawn up national development plans and policies based on the needs of the citizens such as reducing poverty, providing affordable and available housing and community development.²¹

The previous United States DOS Ambassador to Liberia, Deborah Malac, served as the Deputy Director in the Office of Agricultural, Biotechnology, and Textiles Trade Affairs and political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Dakar, Senegal. Ambassador Malac is familiar with the economic challenges associated with countries in West Africa. “Despite the economic challenges in the fishing and mining industry Liberia is committed to trade and development projects under the African Growth and Opportunity Act.”²²

Ambassador Malac was instrumental in building DOS assistance packages with interagency officials in Liberia while other countries in West Africa have not been able to implement and fully utilize economic aid packages.²³ Ambassador Malac worked closely with the DOD on key security and development issues in Liberia. For example the human rights perspective became a major concern. Often women and girls are the targets of rape,

²⁰ UN Secretary-General, UN Coordination of Rule of Law Activities, *The Rule of Law and Transnational Justice*, April 18, 2011, 17.

²¹ USAID, “International Development,” accessed December 28, 2015, www.state.gov.

²² Department of State, “U.S. Foreign Military Training Programs,” accessed December 28, 2015, www.state.gov.

²³ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 27.

sexual slavery, and human trafficking in West African countries.²⁴ This act of human right invasion was a major concern for both the DOD and DOS. This led to development based programs from DOD and DOS to dissolve the human rights invasion issue. Liberia DOS as the government lead agency provided a leadership perspective and a sense of urgency, urging transparency and effective communication with the World Health Organization.²⁵

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa set the stage to increase health awareness and to gain greater assistance from the international community. The international response to the Ebola outbreak was truly unprecedented; humanitarian and public health interventions combined on a scale that had never been done before. Ultimately, DOD and DOS and partner nations' efforts in controlling the outbreak required the combined efforts of not only disease experts and national governments, but citizens, political and religious leaders, community workers, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), U.N. agencies and even militaries.²⁶

In this thesis the researcher used the Lykke Model of Strategy Formulation which can help track the successful and unsuccessful execution of strategy as well as the rise

²⁴ Catherine Russell and William R. Brownfield, "Steps to Justice: How the United States is Supporting Survivors of Sexual Violence," *Department of State Official Blog*, December 22, 2015, accessed December 23, 2015, <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/201512/22/steps-justice-how-united-states-supporting-survivors-sexual-violence#sthash.tQMBj4zY.dpuf>.

²⁵ Justin Pendarvis, "Unprecedented Coordination Helped Turn the Tide of an Unprecedented Outbreak," *U.S. Department of State Official Blog*, December 15, 2015, accessed December 21, 2015, <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2015/12/15/unprecedented-coordination-helped-turn-tide-unprecedented-outbreak#sthash.roNDwCsF.dpuf>.

²⁶ Ibid.

and fall of nation states. Dr. Jack Kem, professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, provides the strategy definition as the integration of ends, ways, and means - while accounting for risk to meet national objectives.²⁷ This strategy is heavily influenced by Carl Von Clausewitz and prevalent in U. S. doctrine. The strategy formulation provides a systematic process of analyzing general truths, facts, opinions, and causation. The components of the strategy formulation as previously defined by Dr. Jack Kem are the conceptual framework of integration of ends, ways, means and risk. The DOD, the DOS, and Liberia are intertwined with US interest in security and development in West Africa.

The components of the Strategy Formulation are the pillars for success and balance. For example, during crisis action planning, organizations that are forced to operate under strict timeline constraints will tend to work together as a team. In the Lykke model the ends are "objectives identified in the NSS," the ways are the "concepts constricted during the planning" for accomplishing the objectives, and the means are the "resources the military and interagency counterparts" for supporting the concepts. The DOD, the DOS and Liberia have to be synchronized to successfully execute the objectives, the concepts and to productively execute security and development programs. The Lykke proposition illustrates the stool tilts if the three legs are not kept in balance. If any leg is too short, the risk is too great and the strategy falls over.

²⁷ Dr. Jack D. Kem. *Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 2012, updated June 2013), 30.




Figure 1. Lykke Model of Strategy Formulation

Source: J. Boone Bartholomees, ed., *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy*, 3rd ed. (Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 46, accessed May 15, 2016, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB870.pdf>.

Ends Ways and Means

The Strategy Formulation three-legged stool provides a suitable analogy for a balanced strategy which is solid, but the ends, ways and means must be aligned to reduce risk. The end state must provide solutions and results of the objectives regardless of how difficult it is to achieve. For example the US NSS stresses to lead Liberia toward greater peace, stability and prosperity while advancing the nation's interest and values.

Therefore, Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means. In order to prevent future conflicts, support humanitarian and disaster relief, and protect US security interest, partnership with DOD,

DOS and partner nation have the greatest potential to influence staffs to achieve US NSS end-states.²⁸

The ways in which the strategy formula is accomplished defines how the DOD and DOS are linked in completing synchronized security and development missions in Liberia. The DOD and DOS work in varied time constraints or planning horizons. The range of success levied against both organizations as the DOD logistically paced with assets and resources. The DOS is more reliant on personnel and broad interagency relationships. These factors can possibly place strategic strain on current DOD and DOS structure if not synchronized or well-planned.

USARAF's attempt to complete security and development missions in Liberia must synchronize with the slower-paced DOS planning and policy.²⁹ Planning efforts accomplishment in unison and a reasonable expectation of a completion timeline require establishment. "Often there are many different ways to achieve a given end. The key is to find the best way to support with available means. For example the DOS in concert with the DOD and partner-nation completed multiple planning conferences with USAID and the WHO in order to develop a comprehensive plan to defeat the spread of Ebola in Liberia."³⁰

²⁸ General David M. Rodriguez, "Posture Statement of U. S. Africa Command 2014," accessed December 28, 2015, <https://www.africom.mil/doc/28035/2016-posture-statement>, 6,

²⁹ U.S. Africa Command, "Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, U.S. Africa Command," accessed December 22, 2015, <http://www.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp>.

³⁰ World Health Organization, "Emergencies and Disasters," accessed December 22, 2015, www.who.int.

The means are the resources which may stifle planners and affect execution; it is important to create a guiding coalition to mitigate against resourcing flaws. Often security and development programs begin with one or two key individuals from either the DOD or DOS, and working along with the host nation of Liberia. Each member must work with their counterparts to form a coalition to ensure the success of the program and their organization. Each component has key resources which assist in completing the desired result. The DOD and DOS team must figure out the type and amount of personnel, resources, and time necessary to achieve the strategy end state. Although, Liberia is a struggling country, the resources necessary to secure stability remain severely stretched during each planned event.³¹

Organizations can sometimes provide too little, too much, or outdated visions which can create domino effects of negative outcomes. A lack of synchronization may disrupt the internal structures and operating procedures of USARAF and the DOS in Liberia. Liberian partners have suffered from leaders with a lack of vision; this has resulted in friction and lack of external focus on accomplishing security and development missions. The end state or success for US National Security Strategy requires teamwork and a common vision through planning, coordination, and execution of security and development program operations.

USARAF and the DOS Liberia train to conduct crisis action planning and to combine their expertise to ensure their efforts achieved. The US military known to conduct swift operations, protect its personnel, and support the mission intent. The DOS

³¹ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 18.

is a small organization but has many external players, such as nongovernmental organizations, interagency partners, and social programs that assist in development efforts. The focus is to avoid internal agendas from either the DOD or DOS and maintain a common operational framework. This is a true test of synchronization and leadership between the DOD and DOS.

Definitions of Key Terms

This section will explain the key definitions that apply to security and development missions between the DOD and DOS. One underlying problem may be that the current DOD definition of security, development, and civil support blur in comparison to interagency terms related to national development (DOD supports development and conducts security). Security and development are the two primary parameters for this thesis. The 2015 NSS supports security and development programs by way of partner nation building and stability efforts in Africa. The terminology used to describe security and development also reflected in the 2015 AFRICOM posture statement.

African Strategic Studies (ACSS): Supports U.S. foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways that promote civil-military cooperation, respect democratic values, and safeguard human rights.³²

³² Africa Center Regional Office West Africa, “Interagency Development,” June 2010, accessed November 19, 2015, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets>.

Civil Military Operations (CMO): The activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (HN).³³

Civil Support (CS): Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, for designated law enforcement, and other activities as directed.³⁴

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, National Guard forces performing duty in accordance with Title 32, United States Code, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, and DOD component assets, in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for special events, domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other domestic activities. Support provided by National Guard forces performing duty in accordance with Title 32, United States Code considered DSCA but conducted as a State-directed action.³⁵

Development Assistance: Programs, projects, and activities carried out by the United States Agency for International Development that improve the lives of the citizens

³³ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), accessed December 22, 2015, armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.

³⁴ Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010, as amended through 15 February 2015), accessed November 19, 2015, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

³⁵ Ibid

of developing countries while furthering United States foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and promoting free market economic growth.³⁶

Homeland Defense (HD): The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.³⁷

Host Nation (HN): A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies from allied nations, coalition partners and/or NATO organizations located on, to operate in or to transit through its territory.³⁸

National Security: A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: (1) A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; (2) A favorable foreign relations position; or (3) A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.³⁹

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO): NGOs are independent, diverse, and flexible, grassroots focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations. Their

³⁶ Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), I-1, accessed November 19, 2015, http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf.

³⁷ Department of Defense, JP 1-02.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives.⁴⁰

Stabilization: The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order managed and reduced, while efforts made to support preconditions for successful long-term development (FM 3-07). Army units may precede an extensive presence of the Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In many situations, however, the host nation (HN) will have long established, existing programs from the Department of State, USAID, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Depending on the circumstances, Army units may or may not operate without significant interagency involvement and conduct transitions as other United States Government (USG) actors become more prominent.⁴¹

State Partnership Program (SPP): The National Guard conducts military-to-military engagements in support of defense security goals but also leverages whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres.⁴²

⁴⁰ Department of Defense, JP 3-08, I-9.

⁴¹ The White House, *National Security Strategy 2010*; Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 7.

⁴² National Guard, “State Partnership Program,” accessed December, 27, 2015, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/JointStaff/J5/InternationalAffairsDivision/StatePartnershipProgram.aspx>.

Security: Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness.⁴³ A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensures a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.⁴⁴

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM or AFRICOM) is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands of the United States Armed Forces, headquartered at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. It is responsible for U.S. military operations and military relations with 53 African nations – an area of responsibility (AOR).⁴⁵

U.S. Army: The organization comprised of Active Duty, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard of the several states, and civilian components.⁴⁶

U.S. Army Africa (USARAF): U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force employs Army forces as partners, builds sustainable capacity, and supports the joint force in order to disrupt transnational threats and promote regional stability in Africa.⁴⁷

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD): A department of the federal executive branch entrusted with formulating military policies and maintaining American military forces. Its top official is the civilian secretary of defense.⁴⁸

⁴³ Department of Defense, JP 1-02.

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ United States Army Africa, “Mission of U.S. Army Africa,” accessed November 19, 2015, <http://www.usaraf.army.mil/mission.html>.

U.S. Department of State (DOS): A department of the federal executive branch primarily responsible for making and conducting foreign policy. DOS commonly called the State Department and headed by the secretary of state.

The graphic below illustrates key locations in Africa where state partnership programs conducted. West Africa has four countries with state partnership programs. This shows the importance of this African region. Since 2009, Liberia has partnered with the state of Michigan. The Michigan State Partnership Program (SPP) military reserve and national-guard elements have extensive knowledge on conducting security and development operations in Liberia.




Figure 2. State Partnership Program Locations in Africa

Source: USARAF, State Partnership Program In brief (USARAF Slide presentation 2012).

⁴⁸ Department of Defense, JP 1-02.

Research Question

Primary Question: Does the Department of Defense and Department of State conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, in order to coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development missions? The researcher will dissect three case studies where the military DOD and DOS interagency conduct planning, coordination and execution efforts during all phases of operations. The researcher will attempt to answer whether DOD and DOS synchronization during security and development operations and are they working in unison.

The DOD and DOS have key roles and responsibilities in Liberia; however, the organizations have distinct and different operational approaches. Often the DOD is the lead element during the initial planning, coordination and execution phases and has the brunt of logistical resources. Additionally, the DOS with its interagency counterparts has a key role during planning, especially during the coordination and execution phases.

The answer to this question will hopefully help us understand the importance of synchronization and management efforts to the success or failure of security and development in Liberia.

Secondary Question 2: What are the ends, ways and means associated with development and security in Liberia?

During the initial planning phase for each program the DOD and DOS must agree on a common goal end state. The end state must nest with a National Security Strategy objective. Consequently, the DOD and DOS must clearly define the security and

development programs and establish the ways and means to accomplish the desired end state.

Assumptions

The key assumption for this thesis is that USARAF and the U.S. DOS work together in unison and conduct synchronized development and security efforts in Liberia. Additionally, this thesis assumes that USARAF and the DOS have a systematic approach to conduct development and security missions successfully.

The army uses the military decision-making process (MDMP) to conduct planning/orders for programs. The DOS conducts the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to conduct planning and orders for security and development programs. The researcher assumes that the MDMP and ICAF planning methods work well together. However, both the DOD and DOS may utilize a third planning method which is a conceptual planning arrangement.

The DOD and DOS presumably continue to plan and evaluate their present roles and responsibilities.⁴⁹ The researcher also assumes that Liberia security and development program end-states have a direct impact on neighboring countries.

⁴⁹ AFRICOM, "US Africa Command Fact Sheet," May 2012, accessed December 22, 2015, <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/congo/76240/pdfs/AFRICOM-factsheet-english.pdf>, 16,

Limitations and Delimitations

The limitations for this research study include limited access to key AFRICOM, USARAF and DOS Liberia personnel and no access to classified information that pertains to security and development missions.

The delimitations of this paper include omitting the other partner nations in West Africa in which USARAF conducts security and development missions.

This thesis is limited to the development and security activities in Liberia conducted solely by USARAF and the DOS.

This thesis will acknowledge data from public resources, international publications, United States policies, historical data, fact sheets, and guidance from the DOD. Recommendations based on that data and from information supplied by African regional experts.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the USARAF DOD and the DOS in Liberia security and development mission definitions. The U.S. National Security Strategy acknowledges Liberia as a key country in West Africa and the DOD and DOS conducts planning, coordination, and execution of operations in order to maintain and advance national security strategy objectives influence in Liberia. The security and development programs designed by USARAF and the DOS require many moving pieces (personnel, resources, funding and time). Africa is a very fluid and volatile place. USARAF and the DOS do not focus solely on the military security aspects of operations in support of the NSS program end state. Both the DOD and the DOS worked together on several large scale security and development program efforts in Liberia such as the Ebola pandemic,

the HIV / Aids recovery missions and human right protection programs. Both the DOS and DOD were involved in humanitarian assistance programs where security was not the only focal point.

The researcher will attempt to dissect three security and development case studies in Liberia to identify the synchronization and unison utilized in each program to accomplish U.S. NSS end states through planning, coordination, and execution of programs. USARAF and the DOS in Liberia are able to make significant contributions to understanding what many nations in Africa, especially Liberia, need in terms of security and development programs. The U.S. influence throughout the volatile West African region is strong and the DOD and DOS will coordinate program efforts in order to achieve the NSS end state.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide comments from key African literature from both civilian and military organizations used to answer the primary research question: “Does the DOD and DOS conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, in order to coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development missions?”

USARAF and DOS Liberia have designed development and security programs to meet the national security objectives of security, prosperity, values, and international order. According to the NSS the African continent is tied to four areas of interest and are specifically addressed as US national security objectives, under international order, that seeks stability and peace in the Middle East and North Africa, and while investing in Africa’s future.⁵⁰

The following documents used to answer the research thesis question. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlines the emergence of global powers that will shift efforts to empower smaller countries, non-state actors, and private citizens that will in turn have a direct impact on global economies and regional stability.⁵¹ The Department

⁵⁰ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 2015, 26.

⁵¹ Department of Defense, JP 1-02.

of Defense QDR provides literature for this study which outlines and determines overall mission success of security and development operations conducted in Liberia.⁵²

The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines goals to keep terrorist activity in West Africa under control and monitored. The National Security Strategy also identifies Liberia as a key location in Africa, where medical and human rights education efforts must continue to build stability in the West Africa region.⁵³

The 2014 USARAF Operations United Assistance AAR provided a literature review of the Ebola pandemic resurgence in Liberia and the actions taken in response. The DOS in Liberia and USARAF teamed up to plan and execute a humanitarian crisis action plan which provided detail on security and development.⁵⁴

There is limited available scholarly literature in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on security and development activities designed by USARAF and DOS in Liberia. However, one primary African literature source is the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. In 2014 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies addressed the legal authority in response to security and development missions in Liberia, which is predicated on accuracy and relevant information in this thesis study.⁵⁵ The Africa Center for Strategic Studies keeps a

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 2015, 32.

⁵⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 50.

⁵⁵ Nestor A. Sadler, "Whole of Government Approach in West Africa" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2012), 37, accessed April 18,

comprehensive journal of all Humanitarian Assistance (HA) events in Africa. It is necessary to review and compare literature that captures information regarding (HA) in Liberia, which is a primary development effort conducted by USARAF and DOS support.

The African Center for Strategic Studies organizes programs that are complex in nature with the support of DOD, African governmental and civilian agencies. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is a DOD-sponsored institution for strategic security studies, research, and outreach in Africa. It engages African partner states and institutions through rigorous academic and outreach programs that build strategic capacity and foster long-term, collaborative relationships.⁵⁶

The researcher also drew from several online interagency databases designed to capture data related to humanitarian assistance and outreach programs in Africa. These databases provide additional information about key development programs and resources committed to aid Liberia. The Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS) database identifies Humanitarian Assistance offices, which include the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) which manage the full life cycle of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects.⁵⁷ OHASIS provides this data to all of the

2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279372107_The_Whole_of_Government_Approach_in_West_Africa.2015.

⁵⁶ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 22.

⁵⁷ Kathleen H. Hicks, *AFRICOM Vision and Prospects*, Statement before the Committee of Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs US House of Representatives, July, 23, 2008, accessed December 22, 2015, [csis.org/files/media/isis/congress/ts080723hicks.pdf](https://www.csis.org/files/media/isis/congress/ts080723hicks.pdf).

Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Liberia is one of the foremost identified countries requiring humanitarian assistance because of the Ebola outbreak, the recent civil war, and HIV recovery efforts.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies also compiles data from security and development programs and evaluates the data for studies from a U.S. assistance perspective. This relationship assists in constructing ongoing development of security and development missions in Liberia.

Lastly, the DOS Liberia fact sheet was a valuable resource reference items as it provided a clear depictions of DOS related support facts on Liberia. Colonel Bradley Wolfing from the DOD Center for Lessons Learned provided literature related to the Ebola HA mission Operation United Assistance (OUA), USARAF Liberian Mission AARs, to include OHASIS and the OHDACA projects material.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this literature provided a framework that helped the researcher answer the thesis question and identifying development and security operations in Liberia. The literature review also provided key informational tool used by DOD-sponsored institutions, the DOD, and DOS where synchronization elements for development and security operations in Liberia used, such as OHASIS and OHDACA. The literature review identified the importance of the African continent, which outlined in part of the National Security Strategy.

In the next chapter, the researcher provides examples and analysis of security and development activity in Liberia. This researcher will provide the methodology used to draw a parallel of formulation analysis in this thesis study, and the outline the approach

of how development and security operations conducted in Liberia by the DOS and USARAF.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to connect the research methodology used by the researcher in the literature review discussed in the previous chapter and to answer the primary research question: “Does the DOD and DOS conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, which coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development missions?” The methodology should help the researcher answer the thesis question and identify where synchronization conducted by the DOS and DOD occurs. The literature and data collected from DOD and the DOS Liberia agencies provided a qualitative research basis on this thesis topic. There are three types of security and development missions: national security, civil support, and medical support. Each area of focus promotes regional security, stability, and prosperity.⁵⁸

The following methodology utilized in this chapter includes research in the areas of historical investigation, comparative study, and the Lykke Model Strategy Formulation for analysis.

⁵⁸ United States Africa Command, “Exercises,” accessed December 19, 2015, <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises>.

Historical and Comparative Study Methods

The researcher used a historical investigation method which involves comparing shared data on previous security and development missions conducted in Liberia. This data hopefully will correlate the synchronization between the DOS and DOD through the specific types of security and development missions. This data factors in the frequency and trends of one mission over the other. The data compares DOD state partnership and security cooperation missions with DOS interagency missions.

Research Design

There were five steps to this thesis research design. The first step in the research design was to conduct a conceptual and detailed research of material that encompasses how the U.S. performs its security and development missions in Liberia. The second step in the research design was to collect data from the research conducted and applies it against the NSS ends, the program planned ways, and DOD/DOS means comprehensive to the National Security Strategy. This also includes the identification of the current operational environment for building partnership capacity through security and development in Liberia. The third step in the research design was to take the data and findings from the comparative analysis and historical analysis, then identify the risks of conducting and not conducting security and development missions against the Lykke model of ends, ways and means. This step also helped provide recommended solutions for organizational change and structure to mitigate risk if necessary. The fourth step in the research design was to answer the primary research question-“Does the DOD and DOS conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, which coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a

full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development missions?” This question requires a direct yes or no response and will included caveats. The fifth and final step in the research design provided a conclusion of the data, researched and applied in the previous two steps. The fifth step provided recommendations on how the DOD and DOS can improve its current security and development program synchronization in Liberia.

Conclusion

Comparative study methods and historical information included applied analyzed security and development missions completed by the DOD and DOS in Liberia. This was done while taking into account other interagency and interoperability assets necessary to complete security and development missions. The validity of material provided an accurate methodology to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

The next chapter in this study will utilize the comparative and historical information framework to determine what problems currently exist between DOD and DOS, while conducting security and development missions in Liberia. The next chapter will also draw comparisons and differences from three development and security missions conducted in Liberia by the DOS and DOD. The Lykke Model used in this thesis will determine if the ends, ways and means associated with risk are acceptable according to the NSS, while completing security and development missions in Liberia.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter will present the facts and findings of security and development missions in Liberia. The research will look at three distinct security and development programs, identify the planning considerations, coordination, and execution between the DOD and DOS. The analysis of the material reviewed will answer the primary research question—“Does the DOD and DOS conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, which coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development missions?”

The analysis will begin with Operation United Assistance (OUA). This mission was a security and development mission completed by the DOD and DOS in Liberia beginning September, 2014.

Operation United Assistance: Planning, Coordination and Execution

Operation United Assistance: On September 16, 2014, President Barack Obama announced the deployment of 3,000 U.S. military personnel to West Africa in response to the Ebola crisis. White House press secretary, Josh Earnest, said the 3,000 troops would not provide direct care to Ebola patients. The deployed Soldiers would primarily be

located in Liberia, where they would provide logistical, training, engineering and other support.⁵⁹

USARAF and the DOS in Liberia and partner nation Armed Forces Liberia (AFL) conducted an operational environment planning conference in September of 2014.⁶⁰ There were four primary areas of key considerations for security and development in Liberia with strategic outlines. The strategic threats to U. S. security interest are political unrest, health services, instability, and terrorism within West Africa.⁶¹ The combined planning conference developed a synchronized approach to protect U.S. national interest. On September 16, 2014, WHO reported 4,985 (probable, confirmed and suspected) cases and 2,461 deaths related to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (included were Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, and Senegal).⁶² The sheer numbers and locations of the Ebola outbreak had the world pondering how large the numbers would rise before the situation was contained.⁶³ The size of the Ebola outbreak made it a U. S. national interest.

⁵⁹ White House, “Fact Sheet: Operation United Assistance Response,” Office of the Press Secretary, September 2014, accessed December 28, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov.

⁶⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 19.

⁶¹ World Health Organization, “CDC in West Africa,” accessed December 28, 2015, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/22/2/15-1456_article.

⁶² White House, “Fact Sheet: Operation United Assistance Response.”

⁶³ World Health Organization, “CDC Response,” accessed November 15, 2015, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/22/6/16-0021_article.

Table 1. Reported numbers of Ebola victims during the beginning of the Ebola Pandemic of 2014

	Suspected and Confirmed Case Count	Suspected and Confirmed Case Deaths	Laboratory Confirmed Cases	New Suspected and Confirmed Cases since last report
Guinea	936	595	743	75
Liberia	2407	1296	790	326
Nigeria	21	8	19	0
Senegal	1	0	1	0
Sierra Leone	1620	562	1464	196
Totals	4985	2461	3017	595

Source: World Health Organization, “Ebola Situation Report–16 September 2015,” accessed December 22, 2015, <http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-16-september-2015>

As Liberia continued to struggle with the Ebola outbreak, the possibility of terrorist activity impacting OUA remained a problem, especially since Boko Haram and Al Qai’da cells are prominent in the Western Africa region.⁶⁴ USARAF conducted detailed security coordination efforts with the DOS in Liberia and the AFL to set the conditions for Operation United Assistance and helped oversee the security posture of U.S. and international relief efforts in Liberia.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy,” April 2013, accessed December 22, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>.

⁶⁵ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 28.

The establishment of a separate DOD regional intermediate staging base was needed to help accelerate transportation of urgently needed equipment, supplies and personnel. Major General Darryl Williams, USARAF Commander, orchestrated operations in Monrovia, Liberia by standing up a Joint Force Command Headquarters.⁶⁶

The DOS and DOD acknowledge the security threat of the pandemic-level Ebola outbreak. On September 16, 2014, USAFRICOM released an Exercise Order directing the deployment of two mobile Ebola virus testing labs to Liberia on or about September 21, 2014.⁶⁷ In the operations planning order, USAFRICOM requested the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the DOS to provide support to USARAF in deploying the mobile labs. Additionally, the Exercise Order specified that Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)/Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) would provide funding for DOD assistance.⁶⁸

The WHO and USAID, both interagency counterparts addressed major concerns and developed strategic plans with USARAF and the DOD as the lead logistical element. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) joint operations cell specifically requested that DTRA accelerate efforts to produce fielded Transportation Isolation System (TIS) capability as quickly as possible in light of impending deployment into the Ebola-affected areas of West Africa. USTRANSCOM submitted a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) statement on September 16th or 17th to the Joint Staff in

⁶⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁶⁷ The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy.”

⁶⁸ DITRA, (RCT-Ebola has established a focus page on the UNET), accessed December 22, 2015, https://opscenter.dtra.mil/auth/cfapp/cffocus/RCT_crisis_14/.

support of the RDT&E efforts for the TIS. A follow-up meeting on the TIS test plan completed on September 19, 2014.⁶⁹ USARAF was very successful during the 2014 deployment to Liberia in the wake of the Ebola outbreak.⁷⁰ Prudent planning with the DOS and partner nation leaders helped set the conditions for the crisis action response and establishment of shared equitable systems to defeat the Ebola virus from spreading to global capacity. President Obama outlined the Ebola response strategy predicated on four key goals: controlling the epidemic at its source in West Africa; mitigating second-order impacts, including blunting the economic, social, and political tolls in the region; engaging and coordinating with a broader global audience; and, fortifying global health security infrastructure in the region and beyond.⁷¹

The employment of a capable DOD military task force and DOS interagency assets not only set the conditions to eradicate Ebola in Liberia; but the planning, coordination, and execution paved a way for future security and development missions in the West Africa region. The African Center for Strategic Studies said that the “Ebola outbreak in Liberia showed the world how medical breakthroughs and development of the OUA task force saved millions of lives.”⁷² With the addition of military personnel,

⁶⁹ DITRA.

⁷⁰ USAFRICOM, “USARAF deployment to Liberia,” Press Statement, December 2014, accessed December 12, 2015, <http://www.africom.mil/>.

⁷¹ The White House, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa,” September 16, 2014, accessed April 12, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/16/fact-sheet-us-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa>.

⁷² Global Net, Center for African Strategic Studies 2014, 33, accessed March 26, 2016, <https://www.acsscommunity.org>.

the U.S. had new initiatives: (1) Train as many as 500 health care workers a week, (2) Erect 17 health care facilities in Liberia of 100 beds each, (3) Set up a joint command headquartered in Monrovia, Liberia, to coordinate between U.S. and international relief efforts, (4) Provide home health care kits to hundreds of thousands of households, including 50,000 that the U.S. Agency for International Development will deliver to Liberia this week, and (5) Carry out a home- and community-based campaign to train local populations on how to handle exposed patients.⁷³ These initiatives set conditions for additional security and development missions in West Africa.⁷⁴

The security and development programs designed because of OUA by DOD and DOS had direct impact on the West African region. There are U.S. agencies operating in Liberia with national strategic goals for Liberia and these agencies design programs with partner nation entities are the benefactors of security and development in Liberia.⁷⁵

This operation was well organized and synchronized between DOD and DOS counterparts. This operation was successful because all of the key members (DOD, DOS, and the HN) participated in during each phase of the combined planning process. The communication parameters established during the initial planning phase set the tone for follow on planning conferences. Each perspective member during the planning process was able to provide their trained subject matter experts and communicate where their

⁷³ DITRA.

⁷⁴ Global Net.

⁷⁵ The White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy," April 2013, accessed December 22, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>, 16.

shortfall may occur. DOD and DOS each knew their limits and sought each other's expertise for support to accomplish the mission. One other important note is that there were ongoing assessments conducted by DOD and DOS which helped set the conditions for follow on missions or mile stones. This was important to prevent redundancy, and to avoid skipping an important step which identified planning and synchronization necessary during the combined planning conference. DOD and DOS shared concepts and ideas which alleviated friction. The usage of liaison officers from both the DOD and DOS paid great dividends, supporting both the policy and operations process of mission execution.

Civil Support Program: Planning,
Coordination and Execution

The second case study with security and development mission having major DOD and DOS planning considerations, coordination, and execution is the Civil Support program. AFRICOM had worked closely with the Liberian DOS and State Partnership Program (SPP) to develop a comprehensive Civil Support program. The Civil Support program is an opportunity-based mechanism to help gain legitimacy, information, and access to areas of instability.⁷⁶ In 2010, USARAF briefed that instability is still a major concern in Liberia from an economic and social injustice perspective. The Civil Support program designed by USARAF, DOS, and lead agency NGOs planned several engagement opportunities to support future state partnership and security cooperation

⁷⁶ The White House, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy," 18.

missions.⁷⁷ The majority of the Civil Support planning between USARAF, SPP and DOS focuses on economic recovery.

The planning mechanism used by the DOD and DOS required extensive assistance from partner-nation and interagency counterparts. This was done because the Civil Support programs were primarily economic focused; the operational planning objectives were not all inclusive.⁷⁸ The partner-nation planning leads were responsible for capturing the economic necessity for each targeted community. This is a time consuming effort, which requires lots of community and interagency support. For example the Liberian economic operational environment is heavily involved with countries such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the as well as the European Union.⁷⁹ Other entities played a major role in planning considerations for interagency counterparts. Whereas DOD planners are only looking at the progress of the mission in an expedient manner, and are not totally focusing on the other external planning considerations which are truly optimal here in this situation.

The U.S. import market into Liberia fails to achieve large and enduring business, because of the other international employers. The U.S. is trying to engage in West African countries that can help lead to economic, health, and security stability across the

⁷⁷ Amy Richmond Krakowka and Laurel J. Hummel, *Understanding Africa: A Geographic Approach* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 123, accessed December 22, 2015, <http://www.usma.edu/gene/siteassets/sitepages/publications/understanding%20africa.pdf>.

⁷⁸ Schachchandra M. Lele, "Sustainable Development: a Critical Review," *World Development* 19, no. 19 (2011): 609.

⁷⁹ Carl J. Schramm, "Expeditionary Economics," *Foreign Affairs* 89 (May-June 2013): 12.

West African region.⁸⁰ Therefore, the planning, coordination and execution between the DOD and DOS in Liberia in support of Civil Support program is a key piece to U.S. regional strategy.

Despite a limited partner-nation staff, funding and resources, the Civil Support program had coordinated with many U. S. agencies and initially achieved both intergovernmental and nongovernmental goals.⁸¹ During the execution of the Civil Support Programs, the DOD and DOS have been able to build partnerships and stakeholders in several Liberian communities. These Liberian stakeholders have completed strategic engagements, humanitarian projects, exercise planning, tactical program implementation, and information outreach.⁸²

The Civil Support program had assessments and committee meetings planned to help keep the program relevant. The African Cooperate Council for the Western Africa region execution of strategically engagements focused on providing DOD and DOS senior leaders with information and expertise on issues relevant with the Liberian civil society. Commanding General William ‘Kip’ Ward of AFRICOM convened the Senior Leadership Advisory Group with the African Center for Strategic Studies and African Cooperate Council for the Western Africa region.⁸³ This was an opportunity for DOS

⁸⁰ Schramm, 12.

⁸¹ Jeffrey Swedberg and Steven Smith, *Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID’s Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa* (Washington, DC: USAID, February 2011).

⁸² William Ward, “Posture Statement of US African Command,” USAFRICOM, March 2010, accessed December 22, 2015, <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/congo/76240/pdfs/AFRICOM-factsheet-english.pdf>.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 8.

agency representatives and the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct future planning and recap the previous Civil Support mission.

Unfortunately, the Civil Support program developed between the DOD and DOS agencies did not capitalize on the research and planning for future projects in Liberia. The majority of Civil Support programs no longer existed by 2012; the initial strategy changed after two years of progress.⁸⁴ The initial synchronization efforts were too reliant on DOD key leaders. The DOS counterparts failed to continue research and provide assessments to focus the Civil Support program on key issues and areas where support was truly necessary.⁸⁵

The abandonment of the Civil Support program stopped many humanitarian and economic projects in Liberia. AFRICOM remained engaged in direct contact with NGOs and USAID to keep other programs from completely dying.⁸⁶ The development of humanitarian projects and proposals became part of the Humanitarian Health Activities and U. S. Embassy country teams' responsibility, which coordinate theater security cooperation objectives.⁸⁷ Immediately the issue with the HA Civil Support program projects became apparent because the implementation process of project funding,

⁸⁴ Swedberg and Smith, 5.

⁸⁵ The Economist, "America in Africa: A Light Footprint," April 14, 2011, accessed December 21, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/node/18561821>, 7,

⁸⁶ Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (June 2010): 9, accessed December 12, 2015, <https://www.usnwc.edu/events/csf/documents/Helping%20Others%20Defend%20Themselves.pdf>.

⁸⁷ Ward, 7.

contract coordination and quality assurance responsibility lacked vetting.⁸⁸ As a result, the Civil Support program only took advantage of three humanitarian projects between 2011 and 2012, out of seven planned in Liberia. The total cost for the programs ranged from \$100,000 to \$3,000,000.⁸⁹

The combined effort from DOD and DOS in the execution of for Civil Support programs was completely flawed. The Civil Support program was totally unmanageable, due to lack of project synchronization planning, coordination and execution.⁹⁰ The program was simply reliant on personality rather than planning and synchronization. The loss of personnel from the DOD ranks disjointed the continuity between the DOD and DOS counterparts and which the Civil Support program never recovered. A shift of new ideas and new agendas focused on building logistical means for West African partner-nations instead of Civil Support.⁹¹ The initial synchronization and planning which occurred between DOD, DOS, and interagency counterparts failed to solidify future planning horizons. There was a need for a permanent DOD and DOS planning team to navigate the Civil Support program, providing ongoing assessment and feedback for the AFRICOM command and Department of State. This program lacked an established long

⁸⁸ Government Accountability Office, *DoD Needs to Determine the Future of Africa Task Force* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 2012), accessed December 12, 2015, www.gao.gov/new.items/d10504.pdf.

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013).

⁹¹ Carter Ham, "Posture Statement of US African Command," United States Africa Command, March 2012, accessed December 12, 2015, <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/congo/76240/pdfs/AFRICOM-factsheet-english.pdf>.

range plan. Therefore, continuity and long range planning objectives are major considerations for development of future programs in West Africa.

Security Sector Reform: Planning,
Coordination and Execution

The third case study with security and development programs focused on human rights and educational stability. The operational planning approach for USARAF and the DOS is for human rights and educational stability as maximum effectiveness, predicated on national priorities, in response to the changing needs related to commodities, production systems, disciplinary expertise, and requirements. USARAF and DOS planning efforts in Liberia focused on sure stability parameters.

Liberia is recovering from two civil wars, fought between 1989 and 2003. The First Civil War began on December 24, in 1989, and continued until 1996, with presidential elections the year after. The Second Civil War began after a short period of calm brought about because of the electoral victory of the rebel leader, Charles Taylor. When Taylor proved unable to bring stability, many began to see regime change as the only way to bring peace.⁹²

United States Army Africa's mission is to coordinate with the Liberian DOS, to employ army forces as partners, build sustainable capacity, and support the joint forces in Liberia in order to disrupt transnational threats and promote regional stability in Africa.⁹³

⁹² BBC, "Crime, Law, Justice, and Police Blotter Monrovia," September 20, 2013, accessed November 29, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa, 9.

⁹³ USARAF, "Mission Statement 2015," accessed December 22, 2015, <http://www.usaraf.army.mil/>.

The Armed Forces Liberia (AFL) has adopted the promise “No looting, no raping, no loving to your friend’s wife or girlfriend, don’t kill friend or innocent people.”⁹⁴ This adopted value of Liberia supports the U.S. NSS objectives to continue international support to strengthen and expand global norms of human rights values. The NSS also supports women, youth, civil society, journalists, and entrepreneur as drivers of change in response to mass atrocities.⁹⁵ This security and development missions tied directly to implementing stronger safe guards supporting international human values.

USARAF and an NGO community led the stability effort, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) which involved initial phase, planning, and coordination from USAID and AFRICOM in support for the Security Sector Reform program.⁹⁶ The SFCG program reinforced the respect for human rights and education awareness activities. The program development was to promote peaceful cohesion between ethnic groups. Liberia’s SFCG worked with the national police and Armed Forces Liberia to successfully embed an effective system where civilian institutions were lacking.⁹⁷

Direct planning with partner-nation armed forces and interagency counterparts helped employment of the SFCG program.⁹⁸ USARAF and USAID made initial contact with NGO leads in charge of the human rights awareness project. Security was a major

⁹⁴ BBC, “Crime, Law, Justice, and Police Blotter Monrovia,” 12.

⁹⁵ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 2015, 21.

⁹⁶ All Africa, “Security Sector Reform,” accessed December 23, 2015, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201506021565.html>.

⁹⁷ BBC, “Crime, Law, Justice, and Police Blotter Monrovia,” 12.

⁹⁸ All Africa, “Security Sector Reform.”

issue in the building of the SFCG which required special attention from DOD and Armed Forces Liberia. The security concerns were primarily ethnic group centric.⁹⁹

African Strategic Studies Human Rights Watch accused Charles Taylor of "playing the ethnic card by accusing people from the Mandingo, Krahn and Gbandi groups of backing the rebels," which led to a crackdown on the individuals committing mass atrocities.¹⁰⁰ The southeastern region of Liberia was determined to oust Taylor which was a major contributor to the human rights violations.¹⁰¹ USARAF and the DOS with the support of the NGO community executed a comprehensive plan to mitigate any other military coups from occurring in Liberia.¹⁰²

Coordination for Security Sector Reform programs using SFCG required an initial stimulus from DOD and DOS by using necessary assets and resources. The commander of AFRICOM captured the lesson learned through detailed planning and coordination with partner-nation's armed forces.¹⁰³ Execution of the SFCG required heavy reliance on

⁹⁹ Department of State, Department of Defense, and United States Agency for International Development, *Security Sector Reform*, accessed February 16, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ Ploughshares, "Armed Conflicts Report–Liberia," updated January 2005, accessed February 16, 2016, <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Liberia.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ BBC, "Crime, Law, Justice, and Police Blotter Monrovia," 12.

¹⁰² Department of State Liberia, "Liberia 2013 Human Rights Report," accessed February 28, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220339.pdf>.

¹⁰³ Global Security, "Liberian Security Sector Reform (LSSR) Program Security Sector Reform for National Defense Program," accessed February 11, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/lssr.htm>.

partner nation leader influence.¹⁰⁴ The SFCG tied greatly to U.S. national security interest because strong national values in a region promote regional security. The major flaw in the planning of SFCG was the relinquishment of budget outside of DOD confines. Budget planning considerations are pivotal in long range planning. Although, the initial planning and synchronization between the DOD and DOS took shape, the DOD and partner nation's armed forces conducted the majority of the planning horizons. Unfortunately, leaving the DOS counterparts with fragmented programs with limited funding prevents DOD and DOS from achieving a positive end state. The African Union and USAID agreed that the program required additional oversight.¹⁰⁵ As a result, the DOD and DOS must commit to long range efforts with defined end states.

The testimony of the USAFRICAOM combatant commander provides an assessment that supports the qualitative study of this research paper. The Ways, Means, and Risks associated with completing security and development in Liberia shape the end state of NSS objectives. In the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Commander of USAFRICOM, General Rodriguez, posited, "We believe efforts to meet security challenges in Africa are best led and conducted by African partners. We work with partners to ensure our military efforts support and complement comprehensive solutions to security challenges that leverage all elements of national and international power,

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Africa Command, "Security Sector Reform Program," *AFRICOM Blog*, July 7, 2010, accessed February 15, 2016, <https://africom.wordpress.com/tag/security-sector-reform-ssr-program>.

¹⁰⁵ Department of State, Department of Defense, and United States Agency for International Development, *Security Sector Reform*, accessed February 11, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf>.

including civilian efforts to gradually strengthen governance, justice and the rule of law.” General Rodriguez also pointed out that security cooperation is the key to executing military activities to support national security objectives in the Africa AOR.¹⁰⁶

USARAF and DOS in Liberia are steadily planning for future security and development programs. The African Union in support of West African National Security Strategy agreed that there are several programs which can help Liberia further gain stability. The African Union agreed with AFRICOM to implement a child abuse awareness studies development program (Protecting Children Justice Ministry), and an economic development program, led by USAID, which is critical to income generation and government revenue creation for Liberia.¹⁰⁷ Liberia still struggles to rebuild its infrastructure and agricultural systems destroyed during more than two decades of civil war. The DOS in Liberia supports the United States African Development Foundation (USADF), which provides grants to strengthen Liberia’s small-holder agricultural sector that in turn reduces the country’s dependence on food imports and fosters self-sufficiency.¹⁰⁸ The rebounding of the agricultural sector is essential to post-war peace and social and economic development. Power Africa Off-Grid Energy Challenge: Many Liberian communities in rural and marginalized areas lack access to electricity for their

¹⁰⁶ Rodriguez, 9.

¹⁰⁷ IBI International, *GEMAP and Liberian Institute of Public Administration Build Public Sector Capacity*, vol. 2, May 2014, accessed November 29, 2015, www.gemap-liberia.org/success_stories.html, 12.

¹⁰⁸ United States African Development Foundation, “Power in Africa,” accessed April 18, 2016, <http://www.usadf.gov/power-africa/>.

businesses, home and daily activities.¹⁰⁹ To tackle this problem, USADF, USAID and General Electric Africa have launched the Power Africa Off-Grid Energy Challenge. The Challenge awards grants of up to \$100,000 to African companies and organizations providing off-grid solutions in Liberia that deploy renewable resources and power local economic activities.¹¹⁰

When comparing security and development missions in Liberia it is important to recognize the diversity of missions completed by USARAF which is designed to have a large impact on a region, against the types of long-standing centralized mission completed by DOS. Figure 2.0 identifies the types of operations and number of personnel used to conduct security and development missions in Africa by USARAF.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Civil Action Program Database, "OHASIS," accessed May 15, 2015, accessed March, 2016, <https://www.ohasis.org/OHASIS/projects/.aspx?COCOM>.




Figure 3. USARAF Mission Set Slide 2014 Command Brief

Source: USARAF, State Partnership Program In brief (USARAF Slide presentation 2012).

This is a relevant illustration to provide oversight as to how extensive the USARAF mission is in Africa to include Liberia. USARAF has over 54 countries to support. The turnover of personnel greatly affects the long-term relationship building process for security and development programs.¹¹¹ USARAF led missions differs from DOS led missions as the majority of DOS longstanding missions have long term agendas

¹¹¹ General Assembly Security Council, A/62/659-S/2008/39, *Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform*, January 23, 2008, accessed December 21, 2015, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9327.doc.htm>.

and keep the same personnel working the issues of the mission from start to finish.¹¹² The USARAF security and development program budget determines its future by forecasting DOS involvement in volatile regions where the risk of pandemic outbreak and instability continues to jeopardize national security objectives on the African continent.¹¹³ Government participation will increase the breadth of participation amongst multinational partnering nations.¹¹⁴

The DOD and DOS clearly did not define each other's roles and responsibilities during the establishment of the Security Sector Reform program. The initial planning for the Security Sector Reform program provided a vision, but the program planners failed to execute a concise agenda with goals. The DOD and DOS did not assign any specific requirements or develop an assessment tool to help monitor or gauge success or failure. Each member not only failed to identify their role, but also failed to synchronize important logistical and relationships with interagency counterparts. There was certainly a need for a permanent planning team from DOD and DOS. Having a permanent planning team would have alleviated many of the short falls which ultimately destroyed the program.

¹¹² The World Bank Group, *Options for the Development of Liberia's Energy Sector* (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2011); Winrock International, *USAID's Liberia Energy Sector Support Program (LESSP)* (Monrovia, Liberia: USAID, 2014), accessed December 21, 2015, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K8PB.pdf.

¹¹³ ACQuipedia, "Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBRs)," accessed December, 2015, <https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=cf5eb839-0881-4044-9f23-2c675726b481>.

¹¹⁴ Rodriguez, 23.

Issues with the Current Operational Approach

USARAF has over 1,800 personnel working in Africa, and there is a lack of continuity of personnel who work within West Africa. The Regional Security Officer, Defense Attaché' and country team advisors were recently replaced with new staff members at the Liberia Department of State. DOD staff members do the majority of the security and development planning initiative. DOS expresses concern that AFRICOM non-military activities overlap the spectrums of security, development, and diplomacy.¹¹⁵ As a result, there are criticisms against building partnership capacity and security programs as some interagency entities believe the DOD efforts overwhelm interagency efforts in Liberia.¹¹⁶ Interagency efforts are often long-term objectives which focus primarily on development and diplomacy efforts pertaining to foreign policy. The DOD is more expeditionary, readily mobile with assets to provide security and logistical support.

The researcher applied the Lykke Model structural formulation to the desired environment. USARAF can take the lead to establish a way forward that will create a more fluid relationship between the DOS and African partner-nations that will implement security and development with a cohesive initial phase planning agenda. This all must be done with a sense of urgency to develop a long-term success. It is paramount that the DOD and DOS promote a planning and coordination with an ongoing coalition between

¹¹⁵ Simon Center, "AFRICOM Support Plan," 2011, accessed December 23, 2015, <http://thesimonscenter.org/tag/state-department-dos/>, 6.

¹¹⁶ USAID, "Fact Sheet: Justice System Strengthening Program (JSSP)," August 13, 2014, accessed December 22, 2015, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets>, 18.

USARAF, partner-nation military counterparts, and other interagency leaders that work closely with Liberian heads of state. Liberia needs a common vision and strategy that supports U.S. national interests. The ends, ways and means for success starts with short-term wins. It is very important to maintain cohesive planning, coordination and execution between DOD and DOS; providing the DOS the ability to carry the mission to the finishing stage with the partner nation. The short-term wins will also lead to a review and update to the overall vision of security and development missions in Liberia. This type of planning, coordination and execution could lead to better achieve national security objectives for both the U.S. and Liberia. The coordination that takes place between the DOD and DOS is complicated, requires a true whole-of-government approach; two government agencies have to make decisions that influence success for the U.S. national security strategy. It takes sound decisions, clear guidance, and perfect execution to maintain balance and control in West African nations like Liberia. The NSS objectives are clear, counter violent extremist organizations and their networks, while building support defense institutions with partner nations to protect US national interest in West Africa.¹¹⁷

The Simon Center AFRICOM Support Plan summarized that the current AFRICOM command would need to include fifty two interagency positions within the command structure to properly support the current mission set in Africa.¹¹⁸ Insufficient interagency staffing harms the integration and planning process necessary to achieve NSS

¹¹⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 2015, 27.

¹¹⁸ Simon Center, 6.

desired end states for West Africa. The lack of DOS means ultimately hinders the whole-of-government approach between DOD and DOS in West Africa.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The purposes of this paper is to answer the question-“Does the Department of Defense and Department of State conduct continuous synchronized planning efforts, in order to coordinate security and development missions in West Africa, or is there a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development missions? USARAF designed to lead military planning, coordination, and execution efforts in Africa as during Operation United Assistance (OUA). In case study, one the researcher gave an example where USARAF and DOS in Liberia operated in unison. Security and development mission planning occurred in support of a humanitarian aid effort in Liberia where on September 16, 2014 U.S. President Barack H. Obama announced the creation of Joint Force Command headquartered in Monrovia, Liberia to provide regional command and control support for Ebola viral disease response.¹¹⁹ Operation United Assistance reignited “steady state operational partnership” in Liberia.¹²⁰ The reemergence of the combined DOD and DOS effort validates security and development synchronization in Liberia through the usage of LNOs from DOD, DOS interagency counterparts and partner nation-armed forces.

¹¹⁹ White House, “Fact Sheet: Operation United Assistance Response,” Office of the Press Secretary, September 2014, accessed December 22, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov.

¹²⁰ Department of State, *The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Executive Summary*, March 1, 2015, accessed December 22, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/>, 22.

The former Department of State in Liberia, U. S. Ambassador Deborah R. Malac, declaration of the Ebola Viral Disease (EVD) outbreak in Liberia August 12, 2014, reinforced the DOS commitment to security and development in Liberia, as fundamental security and development missions reemerged after the EVD outbreak. The building of economic security and human values programs, which are now security and development missions being conducted Liberia, encourage consistency with the 2015 NSS objectives.

The 2015 National Security Strategy addresses the need for investment in Africa and the need to assist with the global health care needs in Africa to prevent future pandemics. Inadequate health care facilities and lack of trained health care staff resulted in several countries in the West African region to spike the transmission of the EVD. Affected countries reported approximately 1,850 suspected and confirmed EVD cases resulting in more than 1,000 deaths.¹²¹ The DOS's activation of the U. S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to diagnose the outbreak created an opportunity to address the operational conditions. This was a suitable course of action given the challenges, training and needed expertise to combat the Ebola virus. The EVD outbreak required a whole-of-government approach to protect U.S. national interest.

USARAF and the DOS previously worked together completing medical training and values-based security and development mission in Liberia. The synchronization of USARAF logistical assets and DOS interagency experts in mission planning is necessary to protect U.S. national security interests. The DOS mobilization of USAID and U. S.

¹²¹ USAID-Tanzania, "Program Fact Sheet," August 13, 2014, accessed April 18, 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Education%20Fact%20Sheet%20Aug%2018%202014%20edits.pdf>, 18.

Center for Disease Control teams in response to the Ebola outbreak in Liberia provides necessary subject matter experts to support the planning process. The coordination between the U.S. Government and other agencies proves to be an important aspect to conducting security and development missions in Liberia.

The effectiveness of deploying a military force to assist with development can bring its own unique challenges. There can be both positive and negative impact to a region. One could broadly assume that a military presence in an unstable region would deter extremists from infiltrating the region. However, this is not always the case as military occupations sometimes bring outside influences which stagnate stability operations. OUA exemplified a synchronization and common goal approach for success during a large scale operation with multi-level of support between DOD and DOS. As a result, OUA prevented infiltration from extremist groups through security planning and execution objective, and likewise providing medical assistance through development planning and execution.

Ultimately, case study one shows that DOD and DOS require ongoing synchronization in order to continue productive security and development programs in West Africa. Although, OUA was a successful mission there are still U.S. national interests needing special attention according to the 2015 NSS, which require oversight planning and execution by DOD and DOS in West Africa.

The 2015 NSS addresses the need to increase stability in the West African region.¹²² Stabilization in Africa requires layers of support. It is not feasible to rely solely

¹²² The White House. *National Security Strategy*, 2015, 28.

on the military as the primary means in security and development mission execution. The researcher showed in the second case study that security and development missions need long-term commitments from both USARAF and the DOS in Liberia. There are several counter-partner interagency role players (USAID, NGO, The African Union, and the CDC) which assist both DOD and DOS in Liberia with proper planning and execution of security and development missions in Liberia. There were fifteen of sixty-seven West Africa security cooperation missions completed in Liberia during the 2013 fiscal year. Over fifty-five percent of the USAFRICOM security cooperation missions conducted were MEDCAPs. These are key development missions which nest with the 2015 NSS that can bring medical knowledge, build infrastructure and provide community educational assistance to stabilize the health crisis in Liberia and the Western Africa region.

The involvement of the partner-nation armed forces and interagency counterparts in security and development program execution is essential in West Africa. USARAF as the lead DOD agent does an excellent job of incorporating partner-nation armed forces and logistical assets. However, interagency counterparts are the key component to complete planning, coordination, and execution of security and development missions in Liberia. USAID is a key interagency representative. USAID is especially important in collaboration of planning and execution effort assisting in disaster assistance; pandemic planning, preparedness, and response to HIV prevention and supportive care.

The researcher found that the DOD in the planning process initially overlooked interagency counterparts for security and development missions. USARAF applied short-range planning aspects to many long term strategic objectives, outlined in the 2010 U.S.

National Security Strategy, for example Practicing Principled Engagement with Non-Democratic Regimes.¹²³ This objective produced by the Civil Support Program. The Civil Support program exemplifies the importance of proper planning tools; the interagency counterparts, DOD personnel/assets or DOS representatives in order to accomplish the NSS end state.

The Civil Support Program, although designed to gain legitimacy in West Africa fell short of its goal because the DOD, which has constant turnover of personnel, primarily led the mission. The long-term aspect of the Civil Support program in West Africa flawed. Key essential personnel from AFRICOM with a pure vested interest in the program's success were no longer available to keep its momentum going. This was necessary to keep the program legitimate at the regional level. The Civil Support Program mission failure to maintain legitimacy was also due to not having the relevant key essential personnel (CDC, USAID and WHO) available to conduct the long-range execution of the civil support program. The inconsistency of the Civil Support program which had MEDCAPS as its primary security cooperation mission in West Africa could have led to the tipping point of the EVD outbreak in the West Africa region in September, 2014.

This case study shows that some elements of security and development missions become disjoined or stifled and simply poor planning to attain an NSS end state, as the proper means for execution were not used during mission execution. This case study also shows that the organizational means necessary to develop security and development

¹²³ The White House, *National Security Strategy 2010*.

mission needs addressing. AFRICOM during 2011 was not fully staffed with the interagency organizational counterparts to plan and execute mission,” accepting interagency teammates at the AFRICOM headquarters has not been the entirety of AFRICOM’s commitment to the whole-of-government approach.”¹²⁴ This case study shows the need to have a synchronized DOD and DOS staff with an organizational structure that supports the requirements necessary to conduct security and development mission planning.

The third and final case study showed the importance of including the partner-nation leaders and armed forces embedded in the planning aspects of security and development missions. DOD and the DOS could similarly evaluate their combined results of synthesized best practices, and advance collaboration accordingly.¹²⁵ Security and development program coordination is a difficult and volatile process. The amount of oversight necessary to plan, coordinates, and execute a security and development program is enormous. DOD and DOS are required to control funding, find assets, utilize qualified personnel, and synchronize requirement of consistency to conduct security and development missions in West Africa. General Rodriguez Commander supports having the necessary means to include partner-nation leaders in the security cooperation planning process.¹²⁶ This assures that the partner-nation has a vested interest in the security and development program. The Security Reform Program had very little if any

¹²⁴ David E. Brown, “AFRICOM at Five Years” (Letort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, August 2013), 27.

¹²⁵ USAID-Tanzania, “Program Fact Sheet,” 7.

¹²⁶ Rodriguez, 5.

synchronization between the DOD and DOS. The DOD and the host nation armed forces completed the majority of planning and execution. The relationships, planning schemes, and execution process remained non-solidified between the DOD and DOS. Therefore, the proper ways and means necessary remained left out of the planning equation. The African Union and USAID agreed that the program needed additional oversight. This case study also supports the need to have a continuous DOD and DOS planning team to make sure programs have the right support to help achieve both West Africa and U.S. national interests. There is a need for DOD and DOS to commit a full-time plans and operations section to have oversight of West Africa security and development mission with caveats.

Recommendations

The researcher first recommends that West African partner-nation governments be more involved in the initial planning process for security and development programs. The commander USAFRICOM strongly supports the partner-nation influence in completing U.S. national security interest in Africa. The DOD, DOS and partner nations' heads of state in West Africa have the opportunity to conduct interoperability missions with the correct personnel in order to achieve success during security and development to operations.

The DOD, DOS in Liberia and partner nations are able to conduct planning, coordination and execution during large scale events, such as OUA. The DOD as the primary lead entity works best as the resource and asset coordinator. However, the researcher recommends that when building long-standing security and development programs the DOD is not the lead agency. The DOS with its interagency counterparts are

best-suited for long-standing operations. The DOS is also best equipped to understanding community needs while forging relationships between civilian and partner-nation military counterparts.

The researcher discussed that when both the military and civilian agencies share the same operational environment, tension may exist due to numerous factors. DOD planning teams strive for immediate results. DOD also plans to reduce the risk to the mission. Interagency counterparts in the state department often focus on repairing the structural faults in recipient of institutions, which have or could produce a crisis in government legitimacy, leading to US military involvement. These approaches are not necessarily compatible but necessary as both the DOD and DOS need each other to protect U.S. national interests. The relationship building phase between the DOS, DOD and partner nation may often lead to success in long term strategic planning, rather than leading to disjointed mission programming and disparate results. Immediate results are not always the best course of action as key role players must be involved in the original planning process. This is where the synchronization begins and ends.

Therefore, the researcher recommends creating a permanent integrated planning team and provides additional entities such as LNOs to address how activities may be best synchronized and complemented in West Africa. There is also need for an increase of interagency organizational personnel at AFRICOM to support longer-term planning efforts. Simply put all mission planning needs to begin at the same time. The DOD and DOS should consider ratifying its overall construct to achieve a more whole-of-government approach.

The three security and development programs compared in this thesis completed initial planning conferences with both the DOD and the DOS representatives. The planning conferences strategies derived from the NSS end state for stability in West Africa. The NSS clearly outlines specifics of security and development as a global stability issue.¹²⁷ State Partnership Programs and security cooperation missions are combined DOD and DOS efforts. There are several missions conducted by the DOD and DOS which tie directly to U.S. national security interests in West Africa. These missions are combined efforts to sustain defensive relationships and promote partnerships;¹²⁸ security cooperation and state partnering program relationships assist the U.S. in gaining access and support in West Africa. Once again, security cooperation missions with African partner nations are a key part of the U.S. strategic plan. DOD and DOS staff members plan stability assistance with security, civil and medical support as the programs parameters.¹²⁹ Initial planning operations should transition from the operational phase through a stability phase of operations with proper planning and execution. The DOS and DOD coordination are paramount for success during all phases of security and development program development. “The execution criteria for security and development to include security cooperation programs can range from civil stability and humanitarian assistance.”¹³⁰ An examination of how the U.S. Army is contributing to DOS efforts

¹²⁷ The White House. *National Security Strategy*, 2015, 21.

¹²⁸ Rodriguez, 14.

¹²⁹ Nathan, 61.

¹³⁰ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *DoD Transfer of Night Vision Devices Handbook*, Chapter 4, “DSCA LOA Preparation” (Arlington, VA: Defense Security

needs to be clearly articulated in terms of which interagency department associated with the DOS will conduct the nexus of the humanitarian assistance needed during the execution phase. This is an area where both the DOS and DOD have to agree, as the DOD will likely provide the majority of logistical support.

Both the USARAF and the DOS mission statements support security and development programs in Africa. USARAF's mission is to employ Army forces as partners, build sustainable capacity, and support the joint force in order to disrupt transnational threats and promote regional stability in Africa.¹³¹ The DOS mission is to promote peace, security and the resolution of regional conflicts, promote economic growth, governance, education, healthcare, and safety.¹³²

The DOD and the DOS need a continuous synchronized staff to coordinate its efforts to complete security and development programs in West Africa. Despite the loss of Civil Support programs in the past. The DOD and DOS are working together to achieve 2015 U.S. NSS regional end state in West Africa.

To achieve a more whole-of-government approach the recommendation includes the DOS develop an "Interagency Regional Center" (IRC) that would act as a regional interagency headquarters for foreign and defense policy. This new organization would result in the unification of the Department of Defense and the Department of State (as

Cooperation Agency, 2014), accessed April 21, 2016, <https://www.dsca.mil/2014-nvd-guide/Chapter-4>.

¹³¹ USARAF, Office of Public Affairs, "Security and Development Programs," April 15, 2013, accessed December 22, 2015, www.usaraf.com.

¹³² Department of State, "Interagency Plan," June 2013, accessed December 22, 2015, www.dos.gov.org.

well as other agencies and departments) at the regional level.¹³³ The Interagency Regional Center (IRC) must coordinate with AFRICOM on security and development missions. There is a need for an experienced “interagency regional director” to lead the IRC to report directly to the president or vice president of the United States.

The national security strategy developed by the president and the National Security Council should incorporate the IRC core objectives; this would allow the regional directors to implement their portion of the NSS at their regional level. The researcher assumes the process of filtering all proposed security and development missions through the regional director could cause potential delays as the DOD has recently spearheaded all security and development missions as of 2008.

The DOD and West African regional directors would advise and participate in the National Security Council to ensure integration of military and civilian coordination. The implementations of the interagency regional director would possibly strengthen relationships within the West African region, support more diplomacy and development efforts, by having led agency representative formally report to the Secretary of State in support of security and development operations in West Africa.

¹³³ Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-904SP, *Interagency Collaboration Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009), accessed May 1, 2016, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP.

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