

110 YEARS OF HUMILIATION FROM 1839 TO 1949:  
CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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## ABSTRACT

110 YEARS OF HUMILIATION FROM 1839 TO 1949: CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY, by Major Christopher B. Williams, 71 pages.

The purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how the century of humiliation plays a role in the formulation of China's overarching grand strategy. Recently, a number of scholars disagree on the extent to and ways in which China is influenced by its history and culture. Gerrit Gong argues that history offers value to what individuals and countries remember and what they forget. From the context of psychological and historical perspectives, this study is anchored using a psychological theory, specifically the social-psychological attribution theory. This study concludes that the Chinese government continues to use the century of humiliation to play an important role in the formulation of its grand strategy. This study has some significant limitations such as a small sample size of documents and the selection of the documents. Notwithstanding, this study makes a contribution to understanding the influence the century of humiliation plays in the formulation of China's grand strategy.

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## ACRONYMS

|     |                            |
|-----|----------------------------|
| CCP | Chinese Communist Party    |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

If there be ground for shame on account of (a deficiency of) resources, this is sufficient to stimulate and secure them; if there be ground for shame on account of the condition of the states, this is sufficient to revive and renew them.

— Liji, *Book of Rites*

One prominent Chinese scholar, Professor Zheng Wang agrees with the ancient Chinese writer Liji on the perspective that “one cannot understand China’s current situation without knowing China’s past” (Wang 2012, 3). In particular, the idea that historical memory is one of the most salient points to understanding the inner mystery of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ approach to international relations strategies. Sinologist William Callahan elucidates that the century of national humiliation is the official view of modern Chinese history in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Callahan 2004). Equally important, historical memory goes beyond processing and past events. From this perspective, Wang argues that the way in which the government defines history is a deeply political issue that is mutually aligned for the legitimacy of the government and national identity (Wang 2012). Reasonably, national identity is described in both terms of the individual and the collective, and has domestic and international dimensions (Honghua 2014).

National identity, in terms of the domestic dimensions, is a powerful psychological emotion that is “manifested in citizens’ sense of belongingness and their mentality and behavior in committing themselves to their country” (Honghua 2014, 191). Similarly, to Wang’s assertions, Men Honghua places emphasis on the fact that national identity reflects national cohesion and provides a major source for the legitimacy of the

government (Honghua 2014). In addition, at the international dimension, national identity reflects the nation-state role in the international community.

The intent of this thesis is to articulate China's century of humiliation and its role in the formulation of international relations strategies. For the remainder of this paper, these approaches are characterized as grand strategy. From a political perspective of the CCP, China's grand strategy is evaluated using elements of a realist approach to international relations. In this view, the realist approach implies that the focus of the analysis is based on the party's general secretaries. This study, in essence, is based on the author's premise that across the five CCP leaders, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, of the PRC based their grand strategies on China's past humiliation.

### Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how the century of humiliation plays a role in the formulation of China's overarching grand strategy. Recently, a number of scholars disagree on the extent to and ways in which China "is influenced by its imperial history and revolutionary heritage" (Joseph 2014, 13). Gerrit Gong argues that history offers value to what individuals and countries remember and what they forget (Gong 2001). From the context of psychological and historical perspectives, this study is anchored using a psychological theory, specifically the social-psychological attribution theory. Attribution theory explains the behavior of an individual, which the author suggests is applicable to a nation-state collective behavior. Overall, the study seeks to explain why China's unresolved trauma of the mid-nineteenth

century and early twentieth century has not been exorcised, particularly after the century of humiliation ended in 1949.

### Research Questions

The primary research question is: does China's century of humiliation play an important role in the formulation of its grand strategy?

The secondary research questions are:

1. What is the century of humiliation?
2. Did China's grand strategies from 1949 to 2015 include any aspect of national humiliation?
3. How do the CCP leaders use national humiliation to inspire their grand strategies?

### Definitions

Grand Strategy: "as an integrated and coherent set of ideas about a state's ultimate objectives in the international system, and how it should go about achieving them" (Norton 2015, 3).

Hegemony: "the preponderant influence (social, cultural, ideological, and economic) or authority of a dominant power" (Goldstein 2005, 107).

Humiliation: "enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity" (Lindner 2003, 49).

National Humiliation: "a determinist notion of primordial national history that naturally defines eternal enemies; a political culture that is manipulated by elites in power politics" (Campbell 1998, 67).

National Identity: “manifested in citizens’ sense of belongingness and their mentality and behavior in committing themselves to their country” (Honghua 2014, 191).

Peaceful Development: “China should develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to world peace through its own development. It should achieve development with its own efforts and by carrying out reform and innovation; at the same time, it should open itself to the outside and learn from other countries. It should seek mutual benefit and common development with other countries in keeping with the trend of economic globalization, and it should work together with other countries to build a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity. This is a path of scientific, independent, open, peaceful, cooperative and common development” (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC 2011, 2).

### Limitations

Inherent limitations of qualitative study include the fact that the results are more easily influenced by the researcher’s personal biases, idiosyncrasies, and selection of documented sources. Next, generalizations of authoritative sources, secondary sources, and primary sources are not conclusive. In addition, generalizations may be limited to this particular country. Additionally, the author relies on translated documents. To account for personal biases, idiosyncrasies, and selections from documented sources, the author will include documents contrary to his beliefs to include in the literature review to enhance the credibility and transferability of the study.

### Significance of the Study

In the last two decades, the rise of China has become a new-norm within the international community and media. Beginning in the early twenty-first century, many internationally recognized magazines, newspapers, and journals have devoted significant resources to the rise of China. Since this topic has captured the attention of the United States government policymakers, scholars, China's neighboring states, military analysts, and the international community, many stakeholders are concerned with the emergence of China as a regional hegemon and global power (Godwin 2004; Kissinger 2012).

In the 2015 White Paper, *China's Military Strategy* China says, "oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion" (The State Council Information Office, 2015). A potential hegemon is defined as a state that has the political will and capability to control a region by dominating its great-power neighbors (Godwin 2004, 83). Additionally, this study is concerned with the extent to which CCP leaders consistently involve a very active notion that a recovery from national humiliation is necessary for China's grand strategies (Zhao 2015). The potential value of this study is to inform key stakeholders about the significant role that the century of humiliation plays on the CCP's legitimacy and China's emerging grand strategy. This study intends to contribute to the field in such areas as international relations, political science, psychology, and military science.

### Outline of Study

In this framework, chapter 2 is the literature review and the methodology. This chapter covers the following sections: first, an overview and definition of national humiliation; second, a discussion about what Western and Chinese scholars consider the

implication to China's grand strategies; third, a summary of the sources used to discuss China's period of humiliation from 1839 to 1949; fourth, a discussion of the five documents selected to analyze using content analysis of the general secretaries from 1949 to 2015, and ends with the methodology.

Chapter 3 discusses key dates and events that the CCP recognizes as the century of humiliation. Specifically, the author discusses the humiliating events as recognized by the China Propaganda Department. These events are the First Opium War, the Second Opium War (Burning of Summer Palace in Beijing), the First Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Twenty-one Demands and the Second Sino-Japanese War (Wang 2012). This chapter ends with a recap of why this period is considered the century of humiliation.

Chapter 4 presents the analysis and a discussion of the role humiliation played in the five documents representative of the grand strategies of the general secretaries from 1949 to 2015. The past general secretaries were Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao. The current general secretary is Xi Jinping. This chapter outlines how humiliation is used in each of the documents analyzed in the general secretaries' formulation of their grand strategies. Finally, chapter 5 concludes the thesis by answering the research questions, making recommendations for future studies, and offering final observations.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

Economic globalization and world multi-polarization are gaining momentum . . . The rise and decline of international strategic forces is quickening . . . new emerging powers are arising. Therefore, a profound readjustment is brewing in the international system.

— The State Council Information Office,  
*China's National Defense of 2008*

This chapter provides an overview of the key literature used to analyze the role of China's humiliation influencing the formulation of its grand strategy. This chapter covers the following sections: first, the definition of humiliation; second, Chinese historical memory; third, a discussion about what Western and Chinese scholars consider humiliating to China; fourth, a summary of the sources used to discuss China's humiliation history from 1839 to 1949; fifth, a discussion of the five documents selected to study from the general secretaries from 1949 to 2015. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodology used to analyze the five key documents to ascertain the influence of the century of humiliation.

#### Humiliation

The dynamics of humiliation are a complex phenomenon. Peter Coleman, Jennifer Goldman, and Kathrin Kugler suggest that humiliation is a systematic process of subjugation, which potentially damages a nation's dignity (Coleman, Kugler, and Goldman 2007). Further, Coleman and his colleagues argue that humiliation "is an emotion triggered by public events, which evokes a sense of inferiority resulting from the realization that one is being, or has been treated in a way that departs from the normal

expectations for fair and equal human treatment” (Coleman, Kugler, and Goldman 2007, 6-7). Dr. Arland Jacobson notes the emotional responses to humiliation may vary significantly, and may elicit some or all of these emotions: anger, shame, guilt, fear, hatred, a desire for revenge, embarrassment, dishonor, rejection, betrayal, or diminishment (Jacobson 2013, 67). Researchers’ understanding of these emotions may proffer an answer to the question; why does humiliation resonate from one generation to the next even when that generation did not experience humiliation?

Avishai Margalit insinuates that insults are the reason that humiliation resonates from one generation to the next generation. Margalit opines that individuals remember the humiliation because of the brain’s ability to recall information. She writes, “the wounds of insult and humiliation keep bleeding long after the painful physical injuries have crusted over” (Margalit 2002, 120). On the other hand, psychiatrist Vamik Volkan argues that humiliation is most prevalent when a sense of identity is under threat (Volkan 1998). In the same vein, Arland Jacobson states, “since identity requires the recognition of others to be created and sustained, the denial of dignity, honor, and identity can be not only powerful, but its imprint on the individual or group psyche can be virtually indelible” (Jacobson 2013, 67). As in the case with China, humiliation can last for more than a century at the national level, which may directly influence the decisions and policies of the party and its leadership.

A leading expert in humiliation, Caroline Varin explicitly warns against the humiliation on a national level because the humiliated nation is debased in its collective pride, identity, and in its will (Varin 2009). Likewise, Arland Jacobson further asserts one of the extreme responses from a nation-state is to retaliate against the humiliator with

war, which can employ all forms of humiliation such as rape, dehumanization of the enemy, and manipulation and exploitation of memories from past humiliation (Jacobson 2013, 68). For example, scholar Evelin Lindner provides clear evidence that humiliation may lead to war in cases such as World War I, World War II, and Cambodian genocides (Lindner 2006, 85). Likewise, a noted social psychologist Hebert C. Kelman hypothesizes that international conflicts are driven by collective needs and fears (Kelman 2008). Interestingly, Kelman elucidates that collective needs and fears are the impetus of conflict (Kelman 2008). On a national level, collective needs are expressed as “strong emotions, such as fear, nationalism, and pride” (Lacey 2011, 76).

On a national level, for humiliation to be sufficient, the humiliators must be able to control the communication systems. According to Arland Jacobson, the mechanisms the humiliator uses must posit two key factors such as having a monopoly on defining reality and the ability to manipulate communal memory (Jacobson 2013). Semantic priming with symbols and public rituals may alter the collective narrative memory on a nation state’s history. For example, its efficacy is shown with the use of monuments, museums, and memorials to manipulate communal memory (Whitmarsh 2001). In this example, the observation of the artifacts is semantic priming. Semantic priming is activated when prime with similar concepts or pictures is later processed or recognized.

Another mechanism the humiliator can employ is to assert the humiliator’s victimhood. Lacey describes victimhood from a psychological perspective as a “state that comes with being subjected to an extreme or persistent low level sense of mortal vulnerability” (Lacey 2011, 80). According to Jacobson, asserting to real or perceived victimhood is a ploy used to justify one’s actions (Jacobson 2013). Researchers indicate

that manipulation and exploitation of social memories can be exploited through systemic forms of humiliation and with the construction of victimhood narratives (Jacobson 2013, 70). Memory is malleable, which can be easily influenced. Therefore, the one who is skilled at exploiting memory or historical narratives can use this method for his/her purposes. Similarly, historical narratives may play a role in how a nation implements its grand strategy.

### Chinese Historical Memory

Potentially, Chinese historical memory is the key ingredient to understanding China's grand strategy. Specifically, modern China's historical memory is influenced by the century of humiliation from 1839 to 1949. Andreas Forsby indicates the century of humiliation has "inscribed on the Chinese soul an inferiority complex that has mostly manifested itself as revanchism directed at the Western powers and in particular Japan" (Forsby 2011, 9). Similarly, political scientist Peter Hays Gries contends, "it is certainly undeniable that in China the past lives in the present to a degree unmatched in most other countries . . . Chinese often, however, seem to be slaves to their history" (Gries 1999, 15). Parks Coble agrees with Paul Cohen "New Remembering and Forgetting National Humiliation in Twentieth-century China." He argues there is a resurgence of anti-Japanese in the country (Coble 2007). Adding another perspective, Anne F. Thurston contends that the traumas so many Chinese have experienced in the past thirty to 150 years are too painful and difficult to overcome in a generation (Thurston 2001). The effects of humiliation may influence China's foreign policy in the international community (Deal 2013; Thurston 2001; Townsend 1974).

For example, Minxin Pei opines, “China’s national experience and collective memory constitute a powerful force in foreign-policy decisionmaking” (Pei 2001). As part of China’s grand strategy, scholar Wang argues that China considers its past humiliation as it rises in both terms of economic and military power (Wang 2014). In *Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-first Century*, historians Orville Schell and Jonathan Delury explain how national humiliation has galvanized the party to maintain political legitimacy and to increase wealth and power (Schell and Delury 2013).

Previous works by Dongsheng Di and Kenneth Lieberthal conclude that historical context has guided China’s grand strategy (Di 2007; Lieberthal 2004). Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg suggest how the United States and China should approach their foreign relations (Economy and Oksenberg 1997). Almost a decade later, Prasenjit Duara’s article “Historical Consciousness and National Identity” addresses how to understand China’s foreign relations. Duara argues that if we want to know how the Chinese leaders view their world in contemporary times, we only need to look to the past (Duara 2008).

#### Humiliation and China’s Grand Strategy, 1949 to 2015

Accordingly, the PRC’s general secretaries may employ parts or all of the definitions of humiliation as proposed by Coleman, Goldman, and Kugler, Margalit, Varin, and Jacobson in the previous section (Coleman, Kugler, and Goldman 2007; Jacobson 2013; Margalit 2002, Varin 2009). This section focuses on the integration of humiliation and China’s grand strategy assessment from the Western and Chinese scholars’ points of view. Specifically, this section examines a few selected sources that the author uses for analysis.

In several peer-reviewed journals, numerous authors have debated China's humiliation and grand strategy. Within the last two decades, Joseph Cheng and Franklin Zhang; Dongsheng Di; Andreas Forsby; Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breslin, Chih-yu Shih and Chiung-chiu Huang's articles covered China's humiliation and grand strategy (Cheng and Zhang 1999; Di 2007; Forsby 2011; Shih and Huang 2015; Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin 2015). These authors, in essence, focus on the rise of China and its Sino-centric foreign policy course. The studies provide detailed analysis on one or more of the general secretaries' policies and implications. For example, Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin used a mixed method methodology to assess 108 articles written by Chinese scholars that focus on China's core interests (Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin 2015). Their conclusion on China's core interests remain vague (Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin 2015).

More recently, Shih and Huang carefully outline China's power and rise (Shih and Huang 2015). They argue that China has used role-playing to execute a grand strategy to influence the United States into acknowledging the PRC role in the international community. According to Shih and Huang, China's goal is to restore its greatness, and the resulting grand strategy is to preserve national differences in the international relations (Shih and Huang 2015). They also conclude that at times, China foregoes its own core, national interests. From a historical perspective, Shih and Huang indicate the Chinese grand strategy should ensure that other nations benefit from China's greatness.

Cheng and Zhang's article "Chinese Foreign Relation Strategies under Mao and Deng: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis" examines Mao and Deng's foreign relations strategies (Cheng and Zhang 1999). They conclude that China is becoming truly

capable of an “overthrow of the planetary balance” (Cheng and Zhang 1999, 91). The authors outline Mao’s concerns, which include the following: safeguard national security; guarantee sovereignty; territorial integrity; and enhance international status. While on the other hand, Deng focused on the establishment of a new international order and political and economic order (Cheng and Zhang 1999).

Di compares Mao, Deng Jiang, and Hu’s grand strategies (Di 2007). Respectfully, he outlines the general theme of each general secretary. Di explains the intentions and capabilities of each grand strategy. For example, Di explains that Mao’s grand strategies contained two aspects such as the national security and integrity of sovereignty, while on the other hand, Hu’s grand strategy focused on peaceful development. His conclusion includes that China focuses on the stability of the international system and economic diplomacy (Di 2007).

On the other hand, Andreas Forsby argues that the rise of China is one of the pressing challenges to “Western Liberal Order” (Forsby 2011). Forsby also suggests that state identity helps shape interests and the overall foreign policies. He argues that China may seek to adopt the culturally based exceptionalism characteristics of the Middle Kingdom. He adds to the body literature with his conclusion that China seeks a new Sino-centric international order (Forsby 2011).

In their works, Peter Brookes, Minxin Pei, Paul Gewirtz explain the salient points of humiliation and China’s grand strategy (Brookes 2005; Gewirtz 2014; Pei 2001). Brookes argues that China is ready to take a leadership role in the international community. His analysis takes into consideration China’s economic growth, political stability, and military capabilities (Brookes 2005). Pei concludes that China’s past is

linked to its foreign policy decision-making (Pei 2001). Similarly, Gewirtz argues that China's past is linked to its humiliation (Gewirtz 2014).

There are seven books which are excellent sources to explain grand strategies and through deductive reasoning assess the impact of humiliation on the PRC identity. They are written by Eric Anderson; K. J. Holsti; William Joseph; Ye Zicheng; Colin Gray; Kennedy Paul; William Martel (Anderson 2010; Gray 1999; Holsti 1995 Joseph 2014; Martel 2015; Mosher 2000; Paul 1989; Zicheng 2011). Some authors cover grand strategy in the broadest sense while others focus on the implications of being humiliated. For example, Kalevi J. Holsti suggests that the way to analyze foreign relations strategy includes a state's domestic attitude and the structure of the international system (Holsti 1995). From a Chinese perspective, Zicheng explains the intricate details of China's grand strategy and the impact of its identity. Conversely, Gray's book extensively examines modern strategy from a Western perspective. Similarly, Martel's book also provides an in-depth analysis of grand strategy from historical and modern times. On the other hand, Anderson's book connects strategies to politics. Collectively, the numerous authors provide a comprehensive analysis of grand strategy and its implications.

#### China's History, 1839 to 1949

The decline of imperial China in the mid-nineteenth century and the rise of China at the beginning of the twenty-first century have come full circle. A century-and-a-half of history has broadened Chinese thinking of foreign affairs. Professor and Director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, Suisheng Zhao, best illustrates this point: "While the memory of the glorious empire has left a legacy of an ethnocentric world outlook, the century of humiliation at the hands of

foreign imperialist powers has created a unique and strong sense of victimization, insecurity and righteousness in foreign affairs” (Zhao 2015, 961). A growing number of scholars have focused on China’s century of humiliation. This section examines a few selected sources that the author uses to describe key events of China’s century of humiliation from 1839 to 1949. It is not intended to fill the entire lacuna but rather provide a sample of the sources discussed in chapter 3.

The first general source of the history of this period comes from the Director at Seton Hall University, Zheng Wang and his book *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (Wang 2012). Wang records the historiography of *bainian guochi* (century of national humiliation). He provides a comprehensive overview of the First Opium War, the Second Opium War to include the burning of the Summer Palace, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Twenty-one Demands, and the Second Sino-Japanese War. Interestingly, Wang also provides a contemporary account of the psychological impact that the century of humiliation plays in Chinese politics and foreign relations decisions from the CCP leaders. Equally important, he argues that the CCP mobilizes support from the government following the Tiananmen Square incident by invoking China’s past mantra, never forget national humiliation as a way of reestablishing support from the population. The campaign of humiliation by the CCP has profoundly intertwined China’s relationship with its citizens and foreign policy (Wang 2012).

Second, similar to Wang’s general overview of China’s history of humiliation, professors Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine present in their book, *Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present*, a comparative approach to understanding

Chinese history. The authors draw on a wide range of materials in setting the historical context of China's century of humiliation as well as explaining the significance of the results. Although Elleman and Paine explain the cascade of internal rebellions from 1839 to 1949, they allow the reader to draw his or her conclusions on whether or not the internal conflicts contribute to China's overall century of humiliation (Elleman and Paine 2010).

Third, *The Cambridge History of China*, edited by Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, provides a broad overview of the historical chronology of China's history from 1839 to 1949. The selected authors in the book comprehensively examine the century of humiliation. *The Cambridge History of China* volumes 10 and 13 specifically cover the decline of imperial China, the century of humiliation, and the Republic of China era. Internationally recognized as an authoritative source, *The Cambridge History of China* traces China's past with chapters written by distinguished Chinese scholars (Twitchett and Fairbank 1978). Specifically, the volumes of *The Cambridge History of China* provide accounts of the Opium Wars, Twenty-one Demands and the Sino-Japanese Wars, respectfully.

Fourth, the narrative of humiliation is not solely a Chinese creation. In fact, in *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century*, historians Orville Schell and John Delury provide a comprehensive recounting of the Second Opium War and how the British army set out to humiliate China. The British Army destroyed the Summer Palace also known as Yuanmingyan. Additionally, Schell and Delury connect the past with the present, which they argue is needed to understand the domestic and foreign affairs decisions of Beijing today (Schell and Delury 2013).

Fifth, Diana Preston, an Oxford-trained historian, has written a detailed and comprehensive book on the Boxer Rebellion. *The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900* chronicles the uprising of the foreign community and ministries in Peking (Beijing) during the summer of 1900. Preston uses memoirs, diaries, letters, and her own extensive research from both Chinese and Western perspectives to write this book (Preston 2001).

Sixth, in *The Chinese Opium Wars*, Jack Beeching provides an explanation why and how the Opium Wars began in China. He articulates the psychological ramification of the Opium Wars, which he asserts remain today. Beeching makes a claim that the victor today hardly remembers the war, but the Chinese remember the incidents (Beeching 1975).

Seventh, in *Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945*, William Beasley outlines the origin of the Japanese Imperialism. He provides detailed accounts of Korea and Japan as a vassal state of China. Beasley covers the end of World War II, which ended the occupation of the Japanese in China (Beasley 1987). In addition, Hu Puyu provides a Chinese perspective of the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. His perspectives add to the literature authenticity (Hu 1974).

In summary, this section examines a few of the selected sources that the author used to describe China's century of humiliation from 1839 to 1949. Collectively, these selected authors helped portray an accurate account of the century of humiliation in China's history during the 1800s and 1900s. The next section introduces the general secretaries from 1949 to 2015.

### General Secretaries, 1949 to 2015

This section will briefly introduce the general secretaries from 1949 to 2015 and their key policies. A specific document for each general secretary is analyzed in chapter 4 to assess the role of humiliation in their grand strategies. A specific document from each general secretary (Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping) is analyzed.

Mao Zedong was born during the last imperial dynasty and experienced the transition period after the collapse of the Qing dynasty. Therefore, one could consider that Mao was influenced by the imperial thoughts, which he assessed, as a weak China because its economic and military strength was inadequate to the Western powers and Japan. Mao established an authoritarian government and a centralized army. Mao aimed to shape the cultural sphere and to invoke a Chinese national culture. Some scholars have suggested that Mao Zedong thought was derived from a combination of the Marxist and Leninist communist theories and his personal view to bring about a new Chinese culture. Mao served as the first chairman of the PRC from 1949 until his death in 1976. Following Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping inherited a country in turmoil (Elleman and Paine 2010).

Deng Xiaoping's legacy remains three decades later after reform and opening up. In 1978, Deng became the general secretary. His strategy emphasized individual self-interest, unlike Mao, whose strategy was a Marxist state approach to economic growth. Deng's strategy is known as the Deng Xiaoping Theory. In foreign affairs, Deng opened China's trade and culture to the West. Perhaps more importantly, he opened up Chinese enterprises to foreign investment. However, in 1989, Deng faced many massive student

demonstrations at Tiananmen Square. The demonstrations marked an attempt to reform the country from an authoritarian government to a democratic government. The Tiananmen Square incident marked a turning point in China's domestic policy. As a result, the CCP gained more control and introduced patriotic education. The Tiananmen Square incident reinforced the CCP leadership and ushered in Jiang Zemin as the party leader. Shortly after, Deng Xiaoping relinquished leadership in 1992 (Meisner 1996).

Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng as the general secretary in 1993. Jiang represented the third generation of leaders since the establishment of the PRC. He came to power following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, when he replaced then Zhao Ziyang as general secretary. Under Jiang's leadership, China experienced substantial economic growth and reforms. During Jiang's leadership, China regained sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom and Macau from Portugal. Jiang contributed to China's guiding principles with his policy of Three Represents. The Three Represents is described as China's advanced social productive forces, progressive course of China's culture, and the fundamental interests of the majority. In 2002, Jiang Zemin relinquished his position as the general secretary to his successor Hu Jintao (Jiang 2004).

Hu Jintao became the general secretary from 2002 to 2012. Hu aligned his philosophical position with Deng Xiaoping's faction. He represented the fourth generation of the PRC leaders. During his ten-year leadership, China's global profile improved with it successfully hosting the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010. China's economy grew from approximately \$1.46 trillion in 2002 to \$7.74 trillion in 2012, and its military strength has grown relative to other major power statuses such as the United States, Russia, and Japan (International Monetary Fund 2015;

Perlo-Freeman et al. 2016). Hu administration promoted the Peaceful Development, Scientific Development Outlook, and Socialist Harmonious Society. Hu's administration coined the term socialism with Chinese characteristics. In 2012, Hu named his successor as Xi Jinping (Nathan and Scobell 2012).

Xi Jinping became the general secretary in 2012. He is considered the fifth in the generation of PRC leaders. Currently, Xi is in charge of the world's second largest economy. He has called for the renewal of the country to achieve the China Dream, which reflects the Chinese renaissance where the country can take its rightful place in the international community. Thus far, Xi announced the New Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. His initiative consisted of three factors: energy; security; and markets. These factors create the interconnected transport corridors and port facilities that will increase trade, improve security, and aid strategic outcomes. Overall, the "Belt and Road" concept is connected to the Xi administration's foreign policy strategy (Wang 2014).

This section introduces and lays the foundation for the reader about some of the characteristics and policies of the general secretaries from 1949 to 2015. By understanding the background of the general secretaries, the reader may appreciate the documents written and analyzed from the CCP leaders. The next section explains selected documents from each of the general secretaries' administrations.

### Documents Analyzed

This section outlines the documents analyzed and provides a brief justification for how the documents were selected. Statements and documents from the CCP are authoritative (Heath 2012). The selection criteria included a review of the general

secretaries' autobiographies, diplomatic speeches, and policy strategy documents from 1949 to 2015. Each document was evaluated to determine whether the authoritative sources focused on humiliation and included any components of a grand strategy. Once the documents met the criteria, they were assigned a random number for sample purposes. The sampling procedures used were random selection and systematic random technique.

The document analyzed for Mao Zedong is the *Collected Writings of Chairman Mao: Volume 3--On Policy, Practice and Contradiction*, dated 1955. Mao provides analysis on policy and practice and contradiction in this volume on the behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP. This specific policy met the criteria of grand strategy by including economic, cultural, and military policy.

The document analyzed for Deng Xiaoping is the "Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China," dated October 22, 1984. Deng's speech lays out the general principles and broad policy goals, recaps China's major achievements, and describes the challenges and opportunities confronting the party.

The document analyzed for Jiang Zemin is the "Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China," dated July 1, 2001. Jiang's speech recognizes China's history and commemorates the founding of the CCP. His speech also provides a strategy for China's future.

The document analyzed for Hu Jintao is "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All," dated October 24, 2007. Hu makes his argument

before the National Congress of the CCP. This article outlines China's strategy to meet its challenges near term.

The document analyzed for Xi Jinping is *China's Military Strategy*, dated May 2015 from the State Council Information Office of the PRC. Xi's administration provides analysis on the state of the military. This document covers China's history and provides analysis of the modernization and readiness of the force.

### Methodology

The primary research design used for this study is content analysis. The methodology used in this study applied a set of variables to investigate whether humiliation played a role in the general secretaries' formulations of their grand strategies. The variables selected represent words associated with humiliation or returning to greatness such as: nationalism, *wuwang guochi* (never forget national humiliation), *bainian guochi* (century of national humiliation), cleanse, backward, subjugation, defeat, rejuvenating the Chinese Dream, *fuxing* (rejuvenation), and victimization. The author looked for commonalities from public statements made by the general secretaries during their leadership periods. The documents were analyzed using Nvivo qualitative research software. Nvivo software is designed to help organize, analyze, and find insights in the documents.

### Selection of Data

China's political system is a single party rule by the CCP, the apex of the government, and social institutions (Heath 2012, 55). Since the party's committees and institutions issue relatively few policies, the party exercises its authority through strategic

guidance and a state bureaucracy. Heath points out the authoritative documents are linked to changes in the party's theory that are approved by the Central Committee at the Party Congress. Two important documents that lay the foundation for the CCP strategy are the CCP Constitution and the Party Congress Work Report. The CCP Constitution outlines the desired end state while the Party Congress Work Report provides the guidelines and instruments to achieve the desired end state (Heath 2012, 55).

Speeches by selected Politburo Standing Committee members and top foreign policy officials articulate the messages from the CCP Constitution and the Party Congress Work Report (Heath 2012, 57-58). Statements and documents are authoritative from the CCP (Heath 2012). The selection criteria includes autobiographical information, diplomatic speeches, and policy strategy documents from 1949 to 2015. Each document was evaluated to determine whether the authoritative sources focused on humiliation and included any component of a grand strategy. Once the documents met the criteria, they were assigned a random number for sample purposes. The sampling procedures used were random selection and systematic random technique.

### Data of Analysis

The primary research design used for this study is content analysis. Content analysis is a research technique used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within a set of sets of texts. Researchers quantify and analyze the words or concepts, meanings and relationships, and then make replicable and valid inferences from the texts (Salkind 2010, 233). Specifically, the author used latent content to provide deeper meaning from the emerging themes to potentially understand how the century of humiliation plays an important role in the formulation of China's grand strategy. To

demonstrate reliability using content analysis, two confederates will be trained to show the inter-coder reliability. Simply, inter-coder reliability is the systematic approach that two or more readers, using the same procedures and operational definition concur on the content themes applied to the material analyzed. Greater concurrence increases the researcher's confidence that the meaning of the content themes is well defined with sufficient clarity and precision.

The documents analyzed are:

1. Mao Zedong's document is Collected Writings of Chairman Mao: Volume 3--On Policy, Practice and Contradiction, dated 1955;
2. Deng Xiaoping's article is "Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China," dated October 22, 1984;
3. Jiang Zemin's article is "Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China," dated July 1, 2001;
4. Hu Jintao's document is "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All," dated October 24, 2007;
5. Xi Jinping's article is the China's Military Strategy, dated May 2015 from the State Council Information Office of the PRC.

### CHAPTER 3

#### CHINA'S CENTURY OF HUMILIATION

Arise, ye who refuse to be slaves!  
Let us amount our flesh and blood towards our new Great Wall  
The Chinese nation faces its greatest peril,  
The thundering roar of our peoples will be heard!  
Arise! Arise! Arise!  
We are many, but our hearts beats as one!  
Selflessly braving the enemy's gunfire, march on!  
Selflessly braving the enemy's gunfire, march on!  
March on! March on! on!

— *China's National Anthem*

This chapter provides an overview of China's century of national humiliation as recognized by China's Propaganda Department (Shambaugh 2007). More importantly, this chapter offers an initial analysis of the uses of humiliation in the context of nationalism, identity, and the CCP formulation of policies. Recently, many scholars have agreed that the focal point of Chinese nationalism is the century of national humiliation (*bainian guochi*). *Bainian guochi* is a term coined by the Chinese to refer to the period from the First Opium War in 1839, until the end of World War II in 1945 (Wang 2012, 32). State-owned publishers, The People's Education Press is responsible for writing history textbooks to ensure Chinese history is duly promoted (Shambaugh 2007, 59). The People's Education Press follows the guidelines set by China's Propaganda Department (Shambaugh 2007). The People's Education Press textbook company publishes selected events that are sanctioned as humiliating for the Chinese people. Specifically, the humiliating events include the Opium Wars, the destruction of the Summer Palace in Beijing, the Boxer Rebellion, the Sino-Japanese Wars, and the Twenty-one Demands.

Psychologically, the premises that conjure up the Chinese sense of national humiliation derive from three phenomena. First, the Chinese consider China as the Middle Kingdom, the cultural center of the world. Second, the Chinese are proud of their enduring civilization, which extends over 5,000 years. Third, in the past, China was the East Asia regional hegemon that was subjugated by foreign imperialist powers starting in 1839. Based on the 5,000-year civilization, China's weakness was exposed in the spread of colonialism and loss of sovereignty (Keith 2009, 2). As Peter Gries writes, "the 'Century' threatened a Chinese identity based upon the idea of a universal and superior civilization—the '5,000 years'" (Gries 2005, 109). Arguably, these events still play a significant role that affects Chinese politics and foreign policies (Wang 2012, 32). The next section discusses the beginning of the century of humiliation, which began with the first Opium War.

#### First Opium War, 1839 to 1842

The consensus among Chinese scholars and the People's Education Press agrees, China suffered at the hands of foreigners during the Qing dynasty, from 1839 to 1911. Internally, the First Opium War began when the Qing foreign policy assumed the foreign merchants would follow the status quo when conducting business in China. The status quo was foreigners could only conduct transactions with the Hong merchants (Elleman and Payne 2010, 117). The Qing foreign policy also restricted the movement of foreigners to the southern port cities of Macao and Guangzhou (Canton). Externally, China's political power and territorial integrity were threatened by foreign nations that perceived China as a lucrative trading market. The British sought a reciprocal trading market from the sale of Indian opium.

Recognizing the detrimental effects of opium on the general population, the economy, and military readiness, Emperor Daoguang ordered Lin Zixu the governor-general to eliminate all opium imports. By 1832, opium consumption among a growing number of soldiers affected the readiness of the military. Opium not only affected the military; the Qing court was becoming addicted to opium as well. Lin had dual authority over the military and civil control to enforce the opium ban. For disobeying Lin's authority to ban the sale of opium, in February 1839, a smuggler was executed in front of the foreign-run factories in Guangzhou. This execution increased Sino-British tensions. Within seven months of this incident, the First Opium War began, when the British government sent its warships up the Pearl River to force the continuation of the opium trade against the Chinese Emperor Daoguang's will (Elleman and Payne 2010, 121). In 1840, Britain and China continued to engage in indiscriminate small battles.

A turning point occurred on January 20, 1841, when the Manchu official, Qishan, and the British commander, Charles Elliot, negotiated and signed the Convention of Chuanbi (Wakeman 1978, 199). Originally, the Convention of Chuanbi authorized Britain to take control of Hong Kong, pay a \$6 million indemnity, more control of the Canton trade in accordance with British terms, and direct official intercourse on an equal basis (Wakeman 1978, 199). Officially, neither the British nor the Chinese emperor recognized or agreed to the terms signed by the British naval commander and the Chinese representative. Since Britain and China did not recognize the Convention of Chuanbi, the skirmishes between China and Britain continued until 1842.

How was China humiliated? Officially, to end the First Opium War, Britain and China signed the Treaty of Nanking. The outcome of the Treaty of Nanking obliged

China to cede Hong Kong to Great Britain, pay indemnities, open five additional ports, agree to diplomatic relations with Britain on terms of equality, and apply tariffs uniformly on both exports and imports (Wakeman 1978, 212). The unequal treaty system was forced upon China because it did not want to participate in normal international diplomatic relations (Wakeman 1978, 213). In less than twenty years, China rebelled against this unequal treatment and entered into the Second Opium War.

### Second Opium War, 1856 to 1860

As China rebelled against the unequal treaty, it entered into a Second Opium War (Beeching 1975). In 1856, less than fourteen years after the conclusion of the First Opium War, Great Britain, France, and China began the Second Opium War. This war is also known as the Arrow War. The premise of the war started when the British and French governments were not pleased with China's progress of complying with the Treaty of Nanking.

The British demanded Chinese protection for their ships from piracy along the Pearl River. The Chinese refused the demands. As the tensions rose between China and Great Britain, on October 8, 1856, Chinese police boarded and seized a Chinese-owned, Hong Kong-registered, and British-captained ship called the Arrow (Beeching 1975; Elleman and Payne 2010). The police hauled down the British flag. Ye Mingchen, the Viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, refused to apologize to Great Britain for violating the British flag.

This event encouraged Britain to initiate war. The British attacked Guangzhou in the spring of 1857. By December 1857, a joint Anglo-French force captured Guangzhou. On June 26, 1858, the Xianfeng emperor signed the Treaty of Tianjin with Great Britain.

Soon after, the following countries signed parallel treaties with China: the United States, Russia, and France. This unequal treaty gave Great Britain access to more ports, direct liaison with Peking (Beijing), and tariff revisions (Elleman and Payne, 2010, 142). After the British fleet withdrew, the emperor ignored the treaty. Predictably, engagements continued for another two years. In 1860, Great Britain sent an emissary, Lord Elgin for further negotiations. In 1860, the British and French signed separate Treaties of Beijing, followed by the United States and Russia. Russia, as the arbitrator to Qing court, acquired 1,722,342 square kilometers of territory under the Treaties of Aigun, Beijing, and Tarbagatai (Elleman and Payne 2010, 145).

How was China humiliated? At the conclusion of the Second Opium War, China was once again defeated by the imperial Western powers, which resulted in the loss of more territory, revenue, and opening of more ports. Historian Lucian Pye best describes how China viewed the loss of the Opium Wars. He states, “The impact of the West was a completely different order, for it represented a political and military threat based on modern science and technology. China became aware they were facing a challenge unknown in their previous history” (Pye 1972 117). China began to recognize the concept of the Mandate from Heaven was being challenged by barbarians (Pye 1972).

### The Burning of Summer Palace in Beijing

One of the architectural wonders of the world during the Qing dynasty, the Imperial Summer Palace, was destroyed in 1860, by Anglo-French forces. Lord Elgin set out to humiliate the Chinese by attacking the Summer Palace also known as Yuanmingyuan Garden in Chinese in the aftermath of the Second Opium War.

Many historical examples of war show where one opponent may attack a strategically insignificant target in order to score a psychological victory over the adversary. For example, militarily, the palace had no significant value; however, it was more influential psychologically. The destruction of the palace was a humiliating victory for the Anglo-French (Schiavenza 2013). To illustrate this point, Orville Schell and John Delury wrote:

The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was to be a “solemn act of retribution,” said the British commander Lord Elgin, in which no blood would be spilled, but an emperor’s “pride as well as his feelings,” would be crushed. Indeed, before the foreign expeditionary force arrived in Beijing, the young emperor Xianfeng had already fled along with his concubine to safe haven in Manchuria. With the Son of Heaven in hiding far to the north in his hunting lodge, British and French soldiers set about teaching the Qing [Dynasty] a lesson they would never forget: that the British crown would not tolerate having the rights of Englishmen violated, even in faraway China. (Schell and Delury 2013, 40)

How was China humiliated? The intentional destruction of the Imperial Summer Palace, which contained significant historical artifacts, secured a psychological victory of the Chinese (Schiavenza 2013). Today, the Communist Party continues to memorialize the ruined state of the Imperial Summer Palace as an embarrassing reminder of the humiliation inflicted by the Anglo-French soldiers during the Opium Wars. In addition to the monetary and physical defeat, the Chinese people experienced a psychological defeat with the destruction of the Summer Palace.

#### Sino-Japanese War, 1894 to 1895

Nearing the end of the nineteenth century, China’s primary adversarial enemy shifted from Western countries to Japan. This shift marked the emergence of Japan as a major regional power and the continued decline of the Chinese empire (Beasley 1987, 29). Of importance, Korea and Japan were once vassal states controlled by China (Beasley 1987, 42). Japan declared it was no longer a vassal of China, and wanted more

influence in Korea. The war was between Japan and China, and was for control of Korea. However, the Li-Ito Convention allowed both China and Japan to station troops in Korea.

In 1894, the pro-Japanese Korean leader Kim Ok-kym was assassinated in Shanghai. His body was returned to Korea, where it was on display to warn others not to support Japan. The Japanese government took this as a direct affront. The situation deteriorated more when the Tonghak rebellion broke out in Korea, and the Chinese government sent reinforcements to disperse the rebels (Kissinger 2012, 82). The Japanese considered this a violation of the Li-Ito Convention and they sent troops as well to Korea. Prior to the declaration of war, China and Japan fought many small battles. On August 1, 1894, Japan declared war (Beasley 1987, 48). With alacrity, Japan ended the war by April 1895.

How was China humiliated? At the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese were forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki. This treaty gave Japan control over the Island of Formosa (Taiwan), the adjoining Pescadores, and the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria, opened more ports, and again they had to pay an indemnity. In addition, China was forced to recognize the independence and autonomy of Korea (Korea) (Hirobumi et al. 1895, 1-8). This short war was another humiliating loss for China. The Chinese were defeated by the Japanese a smaller country that was still seen as a tributary state.

### Boxer Rebellion

The Qing dynasty and Chinese peasants were concerned about China being arbitrarily carved up by the imperialists. An organization known as the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists rebelled against the Westerners in the Boxer Rebellion.

The Boxer Rebellion, in essence, was a show of force from the Chinese nationalists in response to foreigners occupying in China. The Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists coined the slogan, Revive the Qing, destroy the foreigners. The society accused the Chinese Christian missionaries of afflicting disasters upon China such as severe drought and economic decline (Sun 2008, 200).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, China's relationship with the West was brought to an unprecedented nadir. From 1900 to 1901, a Chinese clandestine organization known as the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists led an uprising in the vicinity of what is now the district of Beijing to restrict Western and Japanese influences in China. The Westerners called the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists, Boxers because they performed physical exercises and rites that the Boxers believed would withstand bullets (Preston 2001).

The Boxers began a siege of Beijing's foreign legation district on June 20, 1900. Soon after, Qing Empress Dowager Cixi declared war on the foreign nations who operated within China's territory to include the United States, Germany, Japan, Britain, Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (Preston 2001).

How was China humiliated? The outcome of the Boxer Rebellion forced the Qing court to sign another unequal treaty. The peace treaty, the Boxer Protocol, accepted by the Qing court in 1901, is considered the most severe of the many unequal treaties signed since the First Opium War, some sixty years earlier. The Qing court agreed to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels of silver over thirty-nine years, and designate the Dongjiao Minxiang as the embassy area for the eight-nation alliance. In addition, the government had to destroy all forts from Beijing to Dagu and allow foreign troops to be stationed at

strategic locations along the railroad between Beijing and Shanhaiguan (People's Education Press 1992, 109; Preston 2001). Ultimately, the Imperial court fled into exile. At the conclusion of the Boxer Rebellion, the Qing court recognized that the imperialist West once again humiliated China.

### The Twenty-one Demands

In ten years, the dynastic rule ended in China. The Republic of China was born under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen, the first provisional president of the Republic of China in 1911 and the Chinese elites, perceived China as the superpower of Asia. Now after the Japanese victory in 1895 and occupying Korea as a colony in 1910, China was in an inferior position with the most minuscule negotiating power. Subsequently, in 1915, the Japanese imposed the Twenty-one Demands on the Chinese government.

The Twenty-one Demands were five sets of secret requirement levered by Japan. The first two comprised of agreeing to Japan's dominant position in strategic locations such as Shandong, Manchuria, and eastern Inner Mongolia. The third set demanded China to recognize Japan's special interests in an industrial complex in central China. The fourth set prohibited China from relinquishing any territory to foreign nations except for Japan. The fifth set required China to install Japanese advisors in key leadership positions including government, military, and financial institutions (Hunang 2015). On May 9, 1915, Chinese President Yan Shikai accepted Japan's ultimatum. On May 25, 1915, Chinese President Yuan signed the Twenty-one Demands with the exception of fifth set, which required China to install Japanese advisors in key leadership positions (Hunang 2015; Luo 1993).

How was China humiliated? Accepting the Twenty-one Demands Treaty by a nation roughly one-tenth its size and a former vassal Asia state was the epitome of humiliation; Yuan declared May 9, 1915, China's National Humiliation Day. Consequently, the newspapers published the slogan: "Do not ever forget this extreme national humiliation" several days following the declaration (Luo 1993, 309). Unconcerned by China's pronouncements of national humiliation, Japan continued to build a stronger military for preparation for its further expansion to the Asian mainland.

### Sino-Japanese War, 1937 to 1945

Ten years after the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan defeated Russia for control of the Manchurian territory (Pu-yu 1974; Kissinger 2012, 86). Japan became the regional hegemon in East Asia after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904 to 1905 (Cohen 2007, 690). Japan's victory over Russia also humiliated China. The humiliation was because Manchuria was part of China.

In 1931, Japan invaded and occupied Manchurian the northeast territory of China. Moreover, many scholars inferred that this occupation of Japan in northern China aligned with the Japanese strategy. Within six years of occupation in Manchurian, the Japanese declared war on China in 1937.

By 1938, the Chinese had evacuated its capital in Nanking and lost the vital Yangtze River Valley. The Second Sino-Japanese War began when the Japanese army invaded eastern China, which was vital to the Japan national strategy of building the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Coble 2007).

How was China humiliated? The Japanese military took the key cities and industrial complex of China. They also inflicted significant atrocities during the Second

Sino-Japanese War toward the citizens of China. Parks Coble reported that the Japanese military killed over 300,000 civilians during the Nanjing Massacre and raped 20,000 to 80,000 women (Coble 2007). Meanwhile, scientists conducted experiments on Chinese prisoners to understand the effects of the Bubonic Plague to vivisections. It was the end of World War II with Japan's defeat by the Allies that ended her occupation.

### Initial Analysis

These humiliations outlined above play a prominent role in the construction of collective memory. China's loss in the First Opium War symbolized the beginning of the collapse of the old dynasty and the start of national humiliation. The loss in the Opium Wars and subsequent wars challenged the Chinese paradigm of being the Middle Kingdom, the regional hegemon, and its superiority to all of its neighbors. Historian Lucian Pye purports:

The impact of the West was a completely different order, for it represented a political and military threat based on modern science and technology. China became aware they were facing a challenge unknown in their previous history. Perhaps most significantly the psychological impact after the First Opium War challenged the Mandate from Heaven. (Pye 1972, 117)

The Chinese emperors believed they had a Mandate from Heaven to rule. Pye continues to posit, that "the moral theory of the dynastic cycle was encouraged by the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, by which emperors could legitimately rule so long as their conduct was consistent with the Will of Heaven" (Pye 1972, 54). However, China's superiority was now being fundamentally challenged by the Opium Wars, the destruction of Summer Palace in Beijing, the Boxer Rebellion, the Sino-Japanese Wars, and the Twenty-one Demands.

The vicissitudes of contemporary China personally show the kind of nation and society that the CCP contemplates in its search for modern China and an identity for the Chinese people. Prasenjit Duara suggests if one wants to know how the Chinese leaders view their role in the world, one needs to consider how they perceive their history (Duara 2008, 46). Perhaps as Gries put forth, Chinese identity is based upon the “idea of a universal and superior civilization” (Gries 2005, 109).

The century of humiliation at the hands of foreign aggression has galvanized a “strong sense of victimization, insecurity, and righteousness in foreign policy” (Zhao 2015, 691). Parks Coble and Zheng Wang agree that the atrocities inflicted upon the Chinese still evoke painful memories today (Coble 2007; Wang 2012). Zheng Wang concludes that there is evidence, which shows a significant link between historical memory and political legitimacy (Wang 2012, 41). These collective historical memories have been a “powerful psychological force” that unites the Chinese people and motivates the party leaders to restore China to its rightful place in the international community (Zhao 2015, 961).

In their article, Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg note in the twentieth century after World War I and World War II that China did not participate in establishing regional security arrangements in her own region (Economy and Oksenberg 1997). Detrimental to its sovereignty, the West made decisions that adversely affected China’s interests. They concluded that the lack of China’s participation in the international community might indicate the rise in stimulating Chinese nationalism and defiance of the Western arrangements. From a psychological and historical consciousness perspective, humiliation has played a prominent role in shaping China’s outlook of the Western world.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

At times when China is relatively weak, as it was during the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its central location invites foreign penetration; but when it is strong, it is in a position to exercise influence over an area of vast extent and importance.

— James R. Townsend, *Politics China*

The purpose of this qualitative document review is to explore and identify how humiliating factors contributed to the general secretaries' grand strategies from 1949 to 2015. The research questions guiding this thesis are:

1. Does China's century of humiliation play an important role in the formulation of its grand strategy?
2. Did China's grand strategies from 1949 to 2015 include any aspect of national humiliation?
3. How do the CCP leaders use national humiliation to inspire their grand strategies?

Chapter 4 presents an analysis and discussion of the role humiliation played in the general secretaries' grand strategies from 1949 to 2015. The past general secretaries were Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. The current general secretary is Xi Jinping. This study examines one key document from each of the general secretaries.

This study focuses on these five documents:

1. Mao Zedong's document is *Collected Writings of Chairman Mao: Volume 3-- On Policy, Practice and Contradiction*, dated 1955;

2. Deng Xiaoping's article is "Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China," dated October 22, 1984;
3. Jiang Zemin's article is "Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China," dated July 1, 2001";
4. Hu Jintao's document is "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All" dated October 24, 2007;
5. Xi Jinping's article is the China's Military Strategy, dated May 2015 from the State Council Information Office of the PRC.

For data analysis, the author used Nvivo qualitative research software, which assisted with coding and analyzing the large volume of data accessed into manageable themes. The words or phrases used are outlined in the methodology in chapter 2. Additional themes emerged which offered more context to the meaning below the surface of the words. Significant ideas were selected from the documents to support the various themes. Altogether, fifteen themes emerged during the analysis. Although fifteen emergent themes were identified from the documents, the themes were further consolidated to align with the research questions. Therefore, each theme was assigned and grouped accordingly.

The emergent themes were grouped by similarity, and given a short title to identify the category. Preliminary variables were selected that were considered to be associated with humiliation and/or restoring China to greatness such as nationalism,

*wu wang guochi* (never forget national humiliation), *bainian guochi* (century of national humiliation), cleanse, backward, subjugation, defeat, rejuvenating the Chinese Dream, *fuxing* (rejuvenation), and victimization. Analysis of the response percentages and selected quotes from the documents are provided below.

### Mao

The analysis of Mao's document indicates that China's century of humiliation played an important role in the formulation of his grand strategy. The analysis also indicates Mao's grand strategy included some aspect of national humiliation and CCP influence in his formulation of grand strategy. Of the nine variables, Mao's document covered seven variables with an overall aggregate total of 77 percent.

*Collected Writings of Chairman Mao: Volume 3--On Policy, Practice and Contradiction* discussed nationalism 168 times. For example, "Culture new-democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation" (Mao 1955). He mentioned defeat nineteen times. The word defeat was only captured when the meaning implies to China's humiliation from external influences. For example, Mao mentioned defeat in reference to the Japanese seizing part of China's territory and the Chinese recognized this action as a defeat. In other instances, Mao mentioned defeat to reference internal forces with the Chinese Nationalist Party.

Although Mao mentioned backward eight times, he adamantly condemned China's lack of technical and economical advancements in the modern world. He believed the CCP had the right and responsibility to bring China out of its backwardness condition. "In other words, not only do we want to change a China that is politically

oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is politically free and economically prosperous, we also want to change the China which is being kept ignorant and backward” (Mao 1955). The analysis indicates that Mao mentioned victim, cleanse, and subjugation once in his document; however, each of the words played a role in his strategy. Particularly, his thought on China as the victim, “China is a colonial and semi-colonial country which is a victim of aggression” (Mao 1955). Mao used the content of history and memory to influence his grand strategy. Overall, it is clear Mao’s writing does include humiliation.

### Deng

The analysis of Deng’s speech indicates that China’s century of humiliation played a role in the formulation of Deng’s grand strategy. The analysis also indicates Deng’s grand strategy included some aspect of national humiliation and CCP influence in his formulation of grand strategy. Of the nine variables, Deng’s document implicitly covered five variables with an overall aggregate of 55 percent.

In his speech, “Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China,” Deng articulated 4,616 words. His speech inferred five of the nine themes. Deng mentioned Hong Kong eighteen times during his speech. This is relevant since 1842; the Treaty of Nanking ceded Hong Kong to British after the loss of the First Opium War (Beeching 1975). Deng made reference to the Qing dynasty downfall in terms of economic and education. “As a consequence, the country declined into poverty and ignorance. After the founding of the People’s Republic, during the period of the First Five-Year Plan, we did open our country to the outside world, but only to the Soviet Union and the East European countries” (Deng 1984). This statement also

implies the CCP is responsible for the Chinese pathway toward becoming a prosperous nation.

It is also inferred that Deng understood the splendor of the Middle Kingdom and its implications for China with his persuasive words “China will be truly powerful, exerting a much greater influence in the world” (Deng 1984). Deng urged the Central Advisory Commission members to open the economic doors for China’s prosperity and not to return to backwardness or isolate itself from the international community. Although Deng used history and memory to influence his grand strategy, this speech moderately indicates humiliation, but provides guidance toward the future of China. Overall, it is clear Deng’s speech does include humiliation.

### Jiang

The analysis of Jiang’s speech indicates that China’s century of humiliation played an important role in the formulation of his grand strategy. The analysis also indicates Jiang’s grand strategy included some aspect of national humiliation and CCP influence in his formulation of grand strategy. Of the nine variables, Jiang’s document covered seven directly and implicitly with an overall aggregate of 77 percent.

In his speech, “The Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China,” Jiang articulated 2,498 words. The analysis clearly indicates that international standing and backward is expressed in Jiang’s grand strategy. An example, Jiang elucidates that it has “taken us just a little more than a half a century not only to put an end to the backward state of poverty and blankness characteristic of the old China” (Jiang 2001). Most scholarly discussions on the nature of Chinese grand strategies during Jiang administration include some aspect of national humiliation (Wang

2012). Jiang expressed in his speech that China “abrogated the unequal treaties imposed upon China by Western powers and all the privileges of imperialism in the country” (Jiang 2001). He argued that the party was able to restore China from its backwardness and predictably would be capable to reunite Taiwan as it did for Hong Kong and Macao.

This analysis also indicates the employment of attribution theory. According to attribution theory from the lenses of international relations and psychological perspectives, attributions may include the need to protect or enhance one’s self-esteem, to promote a favorable impression to others, and to believe in a harmonious world (Heradstveit and Bonham 1996). Jiang emphasized that the CCP had made the ultimate sacrifice in safeguarding China’s national sovereignty. To illustrate a point, Jiang declared, “it is only after our Party came to power that the people being were the real masters of their country” (Jiang 2001). Overall, it is clear Jiang’s speech does include humiliation.

### Hu

The analysis of Hu’s speech indicates that China’s century of humiliation played an important role in the formulation of his grand strategy. The analysis also indicates Hu’s grand strategy included some aspect of national humiliation and CCP influence in his formulation of grand strategy. Of the nine variables, Hu’s document mentioned six variables directly and implicitly with an overall aggregate of 66 percent.

In his speech, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All,” Hu articulated 20,710 words. Hu’s speech emphasized the importance of the party:

The whole Party must unswervingly hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics . . . ever since its founding in July 1921, the CPC has bravely dedicated itself to the historical mission of leading the Chinese people in striving for a happy life and for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. (Hu 2007)

The analysis indicates that Hu was concerned about China's sovereignty. He mentioned the need for the Anti-Secession Law specifically in his speech "The Anti-Secession Law was enacted to resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" (Hu 2007). This law is aimed at Taiwan since Hong Kong and Macao were returned to China's authority. Further, the analysis indicates China was making progress in such areas as in political, cultural, and social development, which is capturing the international community's attention. This progress is part of the rejuvenation.

The analysis also signifies Hu's commitments to not going backward. He argues that the party will not, "wallow in backwardness" (Hu 2007). Hu further described how China could restore the nation-state to its previous splendor:

Taking the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics means we will, under the leadership of the CPC and in light of China's basic conditions, take economic development as the central task, adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles and persevere in reform and opening up, release and develop the productive forces, consolidate and improve the socialist system, develop the socialist market economy, socialist democracy, an advanced socialist culture and a harmonious socialist society, and make China a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country. (Hu 2007)

The analysis indicates Hu recognized the content of history and memory to influence his grand strategy. Overall, it is clear Hu's speech does include humiliation.

## Xi

The analysis of Xi's document indicates that China's century of humiliation played a role in the formulation of his grand strategy. The analysis also indicates Xi's

grand strategy included some aspect of national humiliation and CCP influence in his formulation of grand strategy. Of the nine variables, Xi's document implicitly and directly covered four variables with an overall aggregate of 44 percent.

In his document *China's Military Strategy*, Xi wrote 6,435 words. Although Xi implicitly and directly mentions four variables, his military strategy reflects China's past weak military. It is inferred from the military strategy that a strong defense is key to maintain sovereignty and to protect the integrity and core interests of China. Xi mentioned that People's Liberation Army would, "resolutely safeguard China's sovereignty, security and development interests, and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the 'two centenaries' and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (Xi 2015).

The analysis also indicates rejuvenation and the Chinese Dream were the top priorities in this document. For a military document, Xi mentioned rejuvenation five times within the first four pages. He argued that China must "strive to provide a strong guarantee for completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (Jinping 2015). The analysis indicates Xi used the content of history in his writing to express his issues with the Japanese military buildup. In his speech, he argued, "Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies" (Xi 2015). Xi also recognized the importance of the CCP to orchestrate the Chinese Dream. The analysis indicates Xi used the content of history and memory to moderately influence his grand strategy. Overall, it is clear Xi's document does include humiliation.

### Humiliation and China's Grand Strategy, 1949 to 2015

This section focuses on the integration of humiliation and China's grand strategy from the Western and Chinese scholars' point of view. In chapter 4, the author specifically cover the PRC general secretaries' grand strategies from 1949 to 2015. Specifically, the purpose of this section is to lay the foundation of how the Chinese general secretaries employ humiliation through memory of past events and how that might influence the formulation of their strategic vision.

Potentially, Chinese historical memory is the key ingredient to understanding China's grand strategy. Andreas Forsby indicates the century of humiliation has "inscribed on the Chinese soul on inferiority complex that has mostly manifested itself as revanchism directed at the Western powers and in particular Japan" (Forsby 2011, 9). Similarly, political scientist Peter Hays Gries contends, "it is certainly undeniable that in China the past lives in the present to a degree unmatched in most other countries . . . Chinese often, however, seem to be slaves to their history" (Gries 1999, 15). Adding another perspective, Anne F. Thurston contends that the traumas so many Chinese have experienced in the past thirty to 150 years are too painful and difficult to overcome in a generation. The effects of humiliation may influence China's foreign policy in the international community (Thurston 2001, 170).

For example, Minxin Pei opines, "China's national experience and collective memory constitute a powerful force in foreign-policy decision-making" (Pei 2001), but as part of China's grand strategy, Wang argues that China considers its past humiliation as it rises in both terms of economic and military power (Wang 2014). In *Wealth and Power*, historians Orville Schell and Jonathan Delury explain how national humiliation has

galvanized the CCP to maintain political legitimacy and to increase wealth and power (Schell and Delury 2013). Previously, Dongsheng Di concludes that historical context has guided China's grand strategy (Di 2007).

To start with, the PRC is located in the far eastern part of the Asian continent. It is important to understand the etymology of the name of China in order to understand China's grand strategy today. China in English roots can be traced to the Persian and Sanskrit in reference to the ancient Qin kingdom in what is now northwest China (Joseph 2014). Interesting to note, the king of Qin became the founder of China's first imperial dynasty in 221 BCE (Joseph 2014). The Chinese term for China is Zhongguo, which means Middle Kingdom. The Middle Kingdom represents the idea that China is the center of the civilization, culture, and political authority.

The grand strategy of the PRC is the manifesto of Chairman Mao's vision. From the time when Mao declared the PRC has stood up in 1949, he attempted to transform China into an independent and important strategic power according to Joseph Cheng and Franklin Zhang (Cheng and Zhang 1999, 91). Since Mao's proclamation in the twenty-first century, China rose from a Third World country to an important and leading nation-state in the international system. Recognizing this fact, Steven Mosher proclaimed in his book, *Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World*. His provocative statement about China's ambition states, "the role of the Hegemon is deeply embedded in China's national dream work, intrinsic to its national identity, and profoundly implicated in its sense of national destiny" (Mosher 2000, 1).

Contrary to Mosher's writing that China seeks to become a hegemon, some Chinese scholars disagree with his assertion. In a recent publication in *International*

*Affairs*, Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breselin assert Chinese policy has not fundamentally changed from its core interests and principal of peaceful development (Zeng, Xiao, and Breselin 2015). For example, the current general secretary, Xi Jinping's publicly announced that China:

will stick to the road of peaceful development, but will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the 'bitter fruit' of harming our sovereignty, security or development interests. (Zeng, Xiao, and Breselin 2015, 245)

Furthermore, China's White Paper supports the ideal of peaceful development for the Chinese grand strategy.

China's grand strategy and its State Constitution adhere to its core interests which include the following: "state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's political system establishes by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development" (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC 2011, 4). More recently, Chih-yu Shih and Chiug-chiu Huang conclude that China's grand strategy is to restore the nation to its greatness (Shih and Huang 2015).

To restore China to its greatness, the Chinese are guided by their foreign relations strategy with Chinese characteristics. The Chinese interpretations of foreign relations strategy align with the Western view of the meaning, but with minor differences such as the CCP focusing more on the long-term aspects of its foreign relations strategy (Cheng and Zhang 1999, 93). Accordingly, foreign relations strategy is defined as "a process in which the long term and overall plan of action is designed by the states through their own perceptions of the internal and external environment, in order to guide their foreign

relations and realize maximum national interest” (Cheng and Zhang 1999, 94). Holsti suggests that the ways to foreign relations strategy include the state’s domestic attitudes and socioeconomic needs, geographic location, endowment in natural resources, and the structure of the international system (Holsti 1995).

In addition to assessing the principal ways, policy makers should consider the means and ends. When considering the means and ends, the proposed questions should focus on: what national interests are at stake, and are they vital to the prosperity and survival of the state? In their analysis of foreign relations strategy, Cheng and Zhang conclude that China’s ancient civilization and its century of humiliation contributed to its strategic strategy. In addition, some scholars postulate that China’s grand strategy may include some aspects of psychological sources (Cheng and Zhang 1999).

Recently, Chih-yu Shih and Chiung-chiu Huang suggest that China’s grand strategy includes psychological sources (Shih and Huang 2015). For example, Peter Van Ness was able to show that China employed psychological sources when the country leaders approved national liberation, “to win supporters to the Chinese programmed for radical change in the international system” during the Cultural Revolution (Ness 1970, 189). Psychological sources refer to the cognitive construction of role. The psychological role helps shape the nation-state self-identity (Shih and Huang 2015, 4). As Paul Gewirtz argues, China’s future is predicated in part on her ability to recognize an exploitable past (Gewirtz 2014). Adding another perspective to this narrative, Minxin Pei opines, “China’s national experience and collective memory constitute a powerful force in foreign-policy decision-making” (Pei 2001). Similarly, Peter Brookes of The Heritage Foundation concludes that “Chinese leaders believe that if its economic growth continues

apace, China will overcome 150 years of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, returning to its past glory as the Middle Kingdom” (Brookes 2005, 1). In China’s view, economic growth allows her to play an important and central role in the region’s geopolitics.

Peter Brookes argues with the Chinese “economic growth, political stability, and a growing military capabilities” China now believes that it has earned the respect of a global community (Brookes 2005, 2). A classic example of wealth and power is announced during the Warring States period. Around the fifth century BCE, legalist philosopher Han Feizi states, “If a wise ruler masters wealth and power, he can have whatever he desires” (Schell and Delury 2013, 21). The pursuit of wealth and power is similar to the Chinese idea of national rejuvenation. Chinese history reinforces China’s role as a world power that was lost at the hands of the imperialist West beginning in 1839 with the First Opium War. Ye Zicheng of Beijing University writes, “there is a close connection between the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and China’s becoming a world power. If China does not become a world power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been achieved” (Zicheng 2011, 74). Brookes further asserts, “If all goes according to Beijing’s plans, in the next few decades China will take its ‘rightful place’ among the great powers in the international system—if not atop the international system” China’s objectives are clear and reflect her status as a global rising power in the international system (Brookes 2005, 2).

To recap, Chinese grand strategy aspires to eradicate the last vestiges of the century of humiliation. The Western and current Chinese literature supports that Chinese leaders are seeking to restore China as the Middle Kingdom (Anderson 2010; Zicheng

2011). To appreciate China's quest to return to its glory days, it is important to understand its history from 1839 to 1949 from the Chinese leaders' perspective.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Heaven is above, earth is below, and that in between heaven and earth is called China. Those on the peripheries are the foreign. The foreign belong to the outer, whilst China belongs to the inner. Heaven and earth thus make it possible to differentiate the outer from the inner.

— Shi Jie, *On the Middle Kingdom*

This chapter examines and provides the aggregate analysis from chapter 4, which is substantive and twofold: first, Chinese century of humiliation cannot be separated from any aspect of China's current national humiliation, and second, the CCP leaders use national humiliation to inspire their grand strategies. This chapter continues with the limitations and implications. This chapter ends with the recommendations.

#### Conclusions

Chinese history emphasizes China's role as a regional, and in their view global superpower. This view was decimated at the hands of foreigners beginning in 1839 with the First Opium War. From then until the founding of PRC in 1949, is described as the century of humiliation, China was engulfed in turmoil that rendered it weak and exploitable. Since 1839, CCP leaders have sought to restore China to its rightful place in the world (Schell and Delury 2013). This study concludes that the Chinese government continues to use the century of humiliation to play an important role in the formulation of its grand strategy.

With an aggregate of 66 percent, the Chinese general secretaries mentioned and expressed in a key written document one of the critical variables defining humiliation toward China's storied past words, such as humiliation, backward, rejuvenation and/or

the economy, all indicate that China's century of humiliation played an important role in the formulation of its grand strategy. It is important to note that when one of the key variables was mentioned, the tone expressed were reminiscent of the humiliating past. For example, Xi mentioned, "Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies" (Xi 2015). Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg express that Chinese leaders are driven by "deep-seated fears of resurgent Japanese militarism, future Russian expansionism, U.S. resistance to China's rise and an American missionary impulse to press foreign values on the country" (Economy and Oksenberg 1999, 31-32). Further, the finding indicates the century of humiliation psychologically contributes to China's wariness toward international arrangements that have been created by major powers. Mao expresses his reservation, as "The imperialist powers certainly do not invade China with purpose of transforming a feudal China into a capitalist China" (Mao 1955). In other words, major powers want to exploit China's resources for economic benefits. In addition to the previous findings, the finding analysis suggests that attribution theory can be applied in the analysis of decision making from China's general secretaries.

The supporting evidence indicates that 93 percent of China's grand strategies from the documents analyzed include some aspects of national humiliation. Chairman Mao indicated China's backwardness led to the demise of the Qing dynasty (Mao 1955). While on the other hand, General Secretary Xi articulates the Chinese Dream as the pathway to achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Xi 2015).

In another key example, Jiang elucidated the progress China has made since the founding of the party. Jiang announced that it has "taken us just a little more than a half a

century not only to put an end to the backward state of poverty and blankness characteristic of the old China” (Jiang 2001). He was referring to the unequal treaties imposed upon China and the privileges of imperialism in the country.

Assessing the documents analyzed, the analysis indicates the theory of attribution can be applied to each general secretary decision. Attributions may include the need to protect or enhance one’s self-esteem, to promote a favorable impression to others, and to believe in a harmonious world (Heradstveit and Bonham 1996). Specifically, Xi commented that he would “resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic goal of the “two centenaries” and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi 2015). Examining this study from the theoretical lens of attribution theory, the finding indicates that China’s grand strategies from 1949-2015 all included some aspects of national humiliation.

Importantly, the analysis reveals there is a positive correlation from the time of Chairman Mao to the current General Secretary Xi who used humiliation as a political instrument to placate or galvanize the population to influence its grand strategy (Mao 1955; Xi 2015). Through the collective narrative of historical discourse, the CCP leaders were able to use psychological pressures of national humiliation indoctrination to inspire their grand strategy. Particularly, the evidence points to Deng’s narrative on the policy of one country two systems. Deng’s remarks illuminate the past humiliation that “China is faced with the problems of Hong Kong and Taiwan. There are only two ways to solve them. One is through negotiation and the other is by force” (Deng 1984). Evelin Lindner points out that “a rhetoric of humiliation is also used to justify lust for power and shield

ulterior motives” (Lindner 2006, 85). In this study, China’s grand strategy of denunciation and expression is allowing the domestic healing process to start, as well as setting the conditions in which to exploit national hatred against the humiliators.

Another example of the CCP leaders’ employment of national humiliation to inspire its grand strategy is illustrated in Xi’s military strategy document:

China’s national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the CPC celebrates its centenary; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary. (Xi 2015)

Next, the finding indicates only 40 percent of documents mentioned patriotic. However, the literature suggests after 1990, patriotic education and patriotic remarks were significantly mentioned in authoritative documents (Wang 2012).

### Limitations and Implications

This study has some significant limitations such as a small sample size of documents and the selection of the documents. However, it offers a useful starting point and methodology. Notwithstanding, this study makes a contribution to understanding the influence the century of humiliation plays in the formulation of China’s grand strategy.

This study suggests when policy makers shape their policies they should consider the psychological impact as well. Once considered a feeble nation in the mid-nineteenth century, the imperialist West and Japan, psychologically and militarily humiliated China. No longer, the imbecile of East Asia, China, the largest standing military, and the second largest economy in the world, has started to wield its power. As China wields her power, it is essential to remember the policies implemented from the First Opium War by the West still influence Chinese policies today.

Likewise, Callahan points out that humiliation studies should be understood in contexts of political and historical narratives (Callahan 2004). Understanding the political and historical narratives, policy makers must be aware of how humiliating a nation-state may have a short-term advantage in demoralizing resistance. However, in the long term, government officials need to be cognizant that within some cultures, reprisal is a powerful driving force that can potentially lead to conflict, which can emerge years, even decades, after the event. Past research shows there is an established link between various aspects of humiliation and war (Lindner 2003). From this study, there is an indication that China's grand strategy seeks to increase economic growth, military readiness, and global power to expunge the century of humiliation. Significantly, while more research in these interdisciplinary domains is clearly needed, the existing research findings suggest that humiliation may influence the decision making process at the individual and nation-state levels (Pei 2001).

### Recommendations

It is evident, from this study, that there are no definitive answers in the extant literature about whether the century of humiliation played an important role in the formulation of China's grand strategy. This thesis suggests new questions and approaches to examine further, whether the century of humiliation potentially plays an essential role in the formulation of China's grand strategy. In this study, there is an indication that China's grand strategy seeks to increase economic growth and global power to undo the century of humiliation. This study adds to the body of literature in explaining how China uses humiliation to formulate its grand strategy and builds upon the body of literature using attribution theory.

Future studies should conduct a mixed method study with Chinese experts to assess whether they considered that the century of humiliation is still playing an important role in China's foreign policy. The next recommendation is to replicate this study by using a larger sample size of documents to further support whether China's century of humiliation indeed played an important role in the general secretaries' formulation of their grand strategies. Additionally, future studies should examine how humiliation as an emotion affects a developed nation's behavior in international relations.

In summary, perhaps most importantly, does China's desire to never again suffer this humiliation of 1839 to 1949 make that nation more prone to conduct offensive military action and war? A war with China today would be catastrophic.

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