Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge Based Programs

Abstract

We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability,and sequential equilibrium can be givena uniform definition in terms of knowledge-based programs. Intuitively, all solution concepts are implementationsof two knowledge-based programs, one appropriate for games represented in normal form, the other for games represented in extensive form. These knowledge-based programs can beviewed as embodying rationality. The representation works even if (a) information sets do not capture an agent's knowledge, (b) uncertainty is not represented by probability, or (c) the underlying game is not common knowledge.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2007
Accession Number
AD1020529

Entities

People

  • Joseph Halpern
  • Yoram Moses

Organizations

  • Cornell University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Autonomy

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Electronic Mail
  • Extensive-Form Games
  • Notation
  • Probability
  • Standards
  • Switches
  • Switching
  • Uncertainty
  • Universities

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Software Engineering.