Decisive Combined Arms Maneuver and Atomic Fires: The Emergent Role of the Artillery
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph is to provide context for the examination of doctrine as it evolves during and following a period of conflict. To accomplish this, the lenses of anticipation, adaptation, and emergence are applied to the US Army Field Artillery's role through a chronological historical case study of US Army Field Artillery doctrine from 1919-1954. This is done by using the Interwar Period that lead to the 1939 doctrine, the European and Pacific Theater experiences in World War II, and the time period leading up to and through the Korean War. This analysis focuses on the FM 6-20 Artillery Tactics and Technique and the FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations, and the iterations published between 1939 and 1954. By utilizing the overarching doctrine and examining the understanding of that doctrine as it applied at the time, along with political aspects that affected the strategic aims, an understanding of how the new doctrine developed emerges. It is possible, then, to extract the implications of the assumptions originally made and how they influenced the requirements for Field Artillery in performing their doctrinal role. This monograph concludes that following the Korean War, the recognition of a need for more artillery in heavier calibers emerged. This resulted in the advent of artillery's role as both an atomic capability and a contributor to combined arms maneuver, providing a more comprehensive anticipation for future combat through long-range conventional and atomic fires than was previously described in doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 18, 2016
- Accession Number
- AD1021970
Entities
People
- Wayne Iii A. Fogel
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies