Illusion Of Defeat: Egyptian Strategic Thinking And The 1973 Yom Kippur War

Abstract

The 1973 Yom Kippur War was a landmark event in the oft-troubled history of Arab-Israeli relations. Anwar Sadat conducted a war for limited objectives to discredit the myth of Israeli vulnerability, jump-start a stalled political process, reclaim the Sinai Peninsula, and ultimately achieve peace with Israel. Egypt had lost tactically, but won strategically. As a result, Sadat is widely believed to be a master strategist. But was he? This monograph explores Egyptian strategic thinking leading to the 1973 October War through the lens of Dolman's Pure Strategy. Specifically, Dolman's notions that strategy is not about winning in the traditional sense, but about achieving a position of relative advantage, and that the strategic purpose of war is to attain a better condition of peace.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 04, 2016
Accession Number
AD1022141

Entities

People

  • Steven R. Meek

Organizations

  • School of Advanced Military Studies

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Defense Systems
  • Early Warning Systems
  • Foreign Policy
  • Intergovernmental Organizations
  • International Organizations
  • Military Operations
  • National Governments
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Recreation
  • Terrorists
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • Warfare
  • Warning Systems

Readers

  • East Asian Political and Security Studies within the Soviet Union
  • International Relations and Conflict Resolution
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies