

What Is Mine Is Yours: The Art of Operational Integration

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

What Is Mine Is Yours: The Art of Operational Integration, by MAJ William W. Shelton, 55 pages.

Integrating partners, both joint and multinational, is essential to victory for the United States Army in today's complex world. How does a commander successfully integrate partners into his operations so that they can together attain their objectives? Current doctrine contends that this is important, but does not offer any guidance on the tools necessary to ensure effective integration.

This monograph proposes that the personality of the commander is of the utmost importance when attempting to integrate partners. A commander who strives to achieve shared understanding with his partner, is willing to use his force to help his partner accomplish his mission, and is humble and self-aware can effectively integrate his unit across services or national boundaries.

Two contrasting case studies will be used to support this theory. The first, LTG Sandy Patch in Operation Anvil/Dragoon in 1944, will show a humble commander who strove for shared understanding with his Air Force counterpart, and used his forces to help the Air Force achieve its mission while he sought to successfully complete his own. The second case study, LTG Joseph Stilwell in the China-Burma-India in 1944, will demonstrate how his abrasive personality, a misunderstanding of strategic objectives with the Chinese, and lack of resources led to the failed integration in the disastrous First Burma campaign.

The conclusion of this monograph argues that the personality of the commander is the most significant part of operational integration. The commander who is willing to listen to, assist, and respect his partner will be far more effective at integration than the commander who cannot do any of these things.

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Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
FM	Field Manual

Introduction

It would be tidier, less of a theoretical problem, if the contingent promised – ten, twenty, or thirty thousand men – were placed entirely at the ally's disposal and he were free to use it as he wished. It would then in effect be a hired force. But that is far from what really happens. The auxiliary force usually operates under its own commander; he is dependent only on his own government, and the objective the latter sets him will be as ambiguous as its aims.

- Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 8, Chapter 6

The United States Army published the official definition of integration in 2011's Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 to provide guidance to leaders regarding the difficult operational task of using the capabilities of multinational, joint, and interagency partners during operations.¹ Long before the Army had codified doctrine, its commander, a self-educated Virginian, wrestled with this same problem. George Washington had a choice to make in the fall of 1781. He could attempt to attack New York to end the Revolutionary War, or cooperate with the French navy and army in Yorktown, Virginia. He chose the latter, successfully integrating the Continental Army with the French forces to defeat the Earl Cornwallis in the last major combat operation of the war. Washington believed it necessary to attack the British in New York with a combined American-French army.² However, he allowed the French army and navy commanders, Lieutenant General Rochambeau and Admiral de Grasse, to influence him and change his objective to Yorktown, where Cornwallis' army waited.³ Throughout the months-long siege at Yorktown, Washington coordinated operations with both French services, culminating in Cornwallis' surrender on October 19, 1781.⁴ Washington's ability to understand, influence, be influenced by, and

¹ Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 7.

² John M. Selby, *The Road to Yorktown* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 182.

³ James L. Nelson, *George Washington's Great Gamble* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 265.

⁴ *Ibid*, 310.

cooperate with the French enabled the coalition to defeat the British in Yorktown, hastening the end of the long Revolutionary War. George Washington provides an example for commanders in contemporary United States Army missions of the successful integration of operations effectively with multinational, joint, and interagency partners.

The Army suggests that integration requires commanders to understand, influence, and cooperate with unified action partners – the Army’s name for the collective of multinational, joint, and interagency partners.⁵ However, the Army does not explore the importance of shared understanding, the use of organic assets to facilitate integration, or the type of personality by the commander conducive towards making integration work. Two World War II commanders faced the integration problem with varying results, based on characteristics of the commanders, the nature of their unified action partners, and the scope of their duty. The case studies center on Lieutenant General (LTG) Alexander Patch’s drive from the Mediterranean to the Rhine in 1944’s Operation Anvil/Dragoon, and LTG Joseph Stilwell’s command of operations in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater around the same time. Both LTG Stilwell and LTG Patch could understand and cooperate with their unified action partners. LTG Patch effectively partnered his Seventh Army with the Army Air Corps in southern France, while LTG Stilwell had trouble collaborating with his Chinese counterparts and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in CBI.

In World War II, the Allies named their invasion of southern France and its subsequent operations, which occurred between August 10, 1941 and September 14, 1941, Operation Dragoon. The Mediterranean theater commander, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson of the British Army, appointed LTG Alexander Patch, commander of Seventh United States Army, as the operational commander of Anvil/Dragoon.⁶ The Allies originally planned for this operation to

⁵ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 3.

⁶ Steve Zaloga and John White, *Operation Dragoon 1944* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009) 9-10, 13.

coincide with Operation Overlord in Normandy. However, Overlord's required the majority of the coalition's resources, delaying Anvil/Dragoon's execution by two months.⁷ British hesitance to sanction Anvil/Dragoon and French stubbornness during the invasion added to LTG Patch's problems throughout the planning and execution of the operation. In addition to these partners, LTG Patch and his Seventh Army staff had to integrate the US Navy and its 843 ships and 1,267 landing craft.⁸ Additionally, LTG Patch's staff in its plans had to account for four phases of air operations by 48 heavy bombers and 63 medium bombers of the US Army Air Force.⁹ With all of these different partners, Seventh Army successfully achieved the mission objectives of Anvil/Dragoon. It linked up with LTG George Patton's Third Army on September 10, 1941, and concluded the operation shortly thereafter.¹⁰

LTG Joseph Stilwell commanded in the CBI Theater from the summer of 1942 until his relief on October 19, 1944.¹¹ During this time, LTG Stilwell had to integrate operations of the US Army Air Corps as well as the Chinese Army in his two roles as American theater commander in CBI and the chief of staff for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, the Chinese Nationalist leader.¹² The Americans desperately wanted to keep the Chinese in the war in order to occupy Japanese attention in the Pacific, allowing the US to keep its World War II main effort in Europe.¹³ Generalissimo Chiang had other, conflicting needs. He wanted to use US resources to neutralize

⁷ Anthony Tucker-Jones, *Operation Dragoon* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 73.

⁸ Zaloga and White, *Operation Dragoon 1944*, 24.

⁹ Tucker-Jones, *Operation Dragoon*, 100.

¹⁰ Zaloga and White, *Operation Dragoon 1944*, 10.

¹¹ Frank Dorn, *Walkout* (New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1971), 244, 247.

¹² Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), xi.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 386.

Chinese communists inside of China. Additionally, Army Air Corps Brigadier General Claire Lee Chennault, Stilwell's senior air representative resented Stilwell's emphasis on land forces and wanted to prove that the Air Corps could contribute significantly to the war in the Pacific.¹⁴ Despite these issues and initial struggles, Stilwell managed to set the conditions for the defeat of Japan in north Burma and the completion of the land route of resupply to China towards the end of the war.¹⁵

The Army, in its definition of integration in ADP 3-0, states that the integration of multinational partners requires the same characteristics in the integration of joint or interagency partners. Throughout this publication, the Army emphasizes joint, interagency, and multinational integration as essential in future operations.¹⁶ ADP 3-0 does not differentiate how leaders should integrate joint services as opposed to coalition partners. Instead, it places all three types of unified action partners in one category and broadly explains how leaders should integrate these partners into their operations. This guidance is not a new concept, either. General Jacob Devers, the Sixth Army Group commander in 1944, who was also LTG Patch's superior during Operation Anvil/Dragoon, stated that the "problems presented a theater command in combined operations...are, in the main, no different in character from those presented a theater commander in joint operations."¹⁷ Leaders can use the same basic tools to integrate multinational partners as they do to integrate joint or interagency partners into operations.

¹⁴ Monroe M. Horn, "Everything Old is New Again: The American Military Effort in China, 1941-1945," in *The U.S. Army in the War against Japan: 1943-1945* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 328.

¹⁵ Dorn, *Walkout*, 246-247.

¹⁶ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 7.

¹⁷ Jacob L. Devers, "Major Problems Confronting A Theater Commander In Combined Operations", *Military Review* 27, no. 7 (1947): 3.

Academic literature on the evolution of the concept of integration breaks down into three separate categories: doctrine, combined operations, and joint operations. The Army began placing emphasis on joint operations with the Navy and Army Air Corps in 1939 to coincide with the development of the aircraft carrier, and continued to refine this notion until its most recent form in ADP 3-0. The category of combined operations with multinational partners reflects the reality of the Army collaborating with coalition forces in almost all conflicts from World War I to present day. The final category, joint operations, evolved from two services occupying the same battlefield together and their interdependency during contemporary conflicts. These three categories all describe why the Army integrates with partners, as well as the importance of the Army's continued integration of partners in future conflicts.

The evolution of Army doctrine from before World War II until the present day follows the realization that mission success requires careful coordination with multinational, joint and interagency partners. In the 1920s and 1930s, field grade officers in the Army studied the effects of integrating with other services. The Army War College, which LTG Patch attended in 1931-1932, taught the importance of joint operations in future wars.¹⁸ FM 100-5 in 1939, and the subsequent version in 1941, echo this school of thought by referencing the need for liaison officers in order to ensure smoother operations with joint services.¹⁹ World War II, however, emphasized to the Army the absolute necessity of joint and combined operations to achieve mission success. FM 100-5 in 1944 specifically mentions success resulting from close coordination and training with air organizations.²⁰ The Army Air Force also recognized the

¹⁸ Michael R. Matheny, *Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 61; William K. Wyant, *Sandy Patch* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), 31.

¹⁹ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 30; Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 37.

²⁰ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 23.

requirement to closely coordinate ground and air forces in 1944.²¹ The Army continued to revise FM 100-5 through the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In its next big revision to FM 100-5 in 1976, the Army's doctrinal guidance emphasized joint and combined operations in order to defeat the United States' adversary, the Soviet Union.²² The concept of AirLand Battle appeared in 1982's FM 100-5, highlighting the importance of the Army coordinating closely with the Air Force to achieve victory against a Soviet invasion of Germany.²³ AirLand Battle continued to influence the Army, as well as the idea of combined operations with allied partners, in the 1986 version of FM 100-5.²⁴

Desert Storm, the first large-scale war for the Army after its major revisions in FM 100-5, reinforced the importance of combined and joint operations. The later conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq also underscored the necessity of working closely with allies, joint services, and interagency to accomplish operational objectives. ADP 3-0 reflects these lessons learned with the official inclusion of integration as a tenet of unified land operations. The Army stresses close coordination with partners in ADP 3-0. It also, for the first time, tells leaders how to effectively integrate them through understanding, influencing, and cooperating.²⁵

Books about combined operations tend to focus more on the strategic level than the operational level. Literature on the strategic level of war provides examples of effective combined

²¹ Field Manual (FM) 100-20, *Command and Employment of Air Power* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 14.

²² Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1976), 8-1.

²³ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 15-1.

²⁴ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 161, 164.

²⁵ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 7.

operations. Historian Ian Hope noted that armies after World War I realized that coalition warfare would be necessary in future wars. These armies needed to maintain a unity of effort – a common cause towards the same ends – in order for alliances to be successful in war.²⁶ Patricia Weitsman, in *Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions and Institutions of Violence*, contends that fighting alongside allies is an element of the contemporary American way of war. Because Americans heavily depend on alliances, commanders will have to learn how to be flexible due to the inherent differences in partners' language, way of communicating, organizations and doctrine.²⁷

Academics have written about how to maintain an effective combined partnership at the operational level. These authors explored how leaders can ensure combined partners operate together towards the same objective. Keith Nelson, in his 1983 book *Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord*, used two historical case studies: one involving the German-Ottoman alliance in World War I, and the other a Canadian civil servant in World War II. In these studies, he provided two examples about successful combined partnerships. First, he stated that personalities of leaders play an important role in maintaining an effective combined partnership. Second, he noted, like Hope, that unity of effort is essential to maintaining an effective partnership to accomplish strategic objectives for all nations involved.²⁸ Sophy Gardner expounds upon this idea in her critique of coalition operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. She offered that not only is unity of effort important, but the personal relationships between commanders and staffs with their counterparts in different countries matter greatly.²⁹ Both of these authors point out that there is

²⁶ Ian C. Hope, *Unity of Command in Afghanistan* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 2.

²⁷ Patricia A. Weitsman, *Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 4, 189.

²⁸ Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete, *Coalition Warfare* (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983).

²⁹ Sophie Gardner, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Operations," *Air and Space Power Journal* 18, no. 4 (2004): 89-90.

more to combined operations than just coordination. They understand that leaders will have to interact at a personal level to maintain the effectiveness of the partners during operations. There are times that coordination alone will not be sufficient for mission success.

David Jablonsky's book, *War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command*, bridged the literature gap between combined and joint operations. In it, he describes the problems that General Eisenhower faced through the World War II evolution of these operations, from Operation Torch in North Africa, to Operation Husky in Sicily, ending with Operation Overlord in Normandy. He revealed that Eisenhower's selection as a theater commander had less to do with this operational and tactical prowess, and more to do with "his ability to get along with others and make them work together."³⁰ Additionally, Jablonsky attributed the difficult time the Allies had in Sicily to the lack of proper integration of joint services. Eisenhower's lack of control and ability to coordinate between air and land forces resulted in the lack of air cover for the assaulting forces, causing major damage to both army and naval assets by the German Luftwaffe. Finally, Jablonsky reviewed the recognition by Eisenhower to have seasoned commanders with experience in combined and joint operations in command so that they could work effectively with their counterparts. He contended that integration was essential to the success of the Allies in the European theater, quoting Eisenhower's thought "that the greatest value of any of the three services is ordinarily realized only when it is utilized in close coordination with the other two."³¹

The execution of joint operations reflects the problems of combined operations. Literature since World War II has numerous examples of the importance of joint operations.³²

³⁰ David Jablonsky, *War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unity of Command* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 64, 96-97.

³¹ Ibid, 109, 100-101.

³² Ellwood P. Hinman, Thomas E. Jahn and James G. Jinnette, *AirLandBattle21* (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009), 8.

However, there are not many mentions of how to best integrate joint services into Army operations. Technological advances in each component of the United States military assisted in integration of these services and the Army.³³ Joint operations require unity of effort among the services operating together in order to achieve the strategic purpose.³⁴ Authors James Winnefeld and Dana Johnson used the Solomon Islands Campaign from World War II to validate the need for unity of effort. In this campaign, the Navy and Marine aviation branches had to coordinate closely and cooperate to achieve control of the islands.³⁵ This campaign provided lessons for future cooperation during operations between the different services to achieve mission success.

Just as in combined operations, personalities can greatly affect the proper integration of joint services into operations. Winnefeld and Johnson concluded that the level of trust between the services directly related to the level of trust between the senior operational commanders of each service involved.³⁶ Leaders who were willing to interact with their counterparts early and often provided an example to their staffs that aided cooperation and sharing of information.³⁷ Personalities of the leaders and staffs facilitate effective partnerships during the execution of joint operations.

How can Army leaders successfully integrate unified action partners into operations? The current literature on joint and combined operations explored the importance of these partners in future combat. It also investigated how personalities can help maintain, or hinder, these

³³ Peter F. Herrly, "Joint Warfare: The American Way of War," *Military Review* 72, no. 2 (1992): 14.

³⁴ Thomas A. Cardwell, *Airland Combat: An Organization for Joint Warfare* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1992), xiv.

³⁵ James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, *Joint Air Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 145.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Michael A. Vane and Robert M. Toguchi, *The Enduring Relevance of Landpower* (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2003), 12.

partnerships. However, these writings do not analyze how the Army can leverage leaders' personalities to ensure mission success with integrated partners, nor do they explore how shared understanding among partners facilitates integration or what role the assets under a command play in partnership efforts.

The campaigns of LTG Patch and LTG Stilwell expand upon ADP 3-0's tools for integration. The first part of the monograph will follow LTG Patch's command of Seventh Army and his attempt to integrate air assets during his landing and subsequent operations in DRAGOON. The second part of the monograph will address LTG Stilwell's uphill battle to integrate the Chinese forces in the CBI theater. The final section of this monograph will consider the lessons learned from both case studies. It will discuss how the Army can emphasize the importance of shared understanding, its leaders' personalities, and the willingness to use organic assets to help the partner in future integration efforts.

The lens of this study will be through ADP 3-0's guidance that understanding, influencing, and cooperating with unified action partners is the best way to integrate forces during operations. Each section will explore if each commander achieved shared understanding with their partners, and why this was important. Additionally, each case study will look at the personality of LTG Patch and LTG Stilwell, and the role personality played in the integration effort. Finally, it will explore the implications being able to use assets to help with integration, and, conversely, how the lack of assets hurts integration. The case studies will show that not only is shared understanding an important starting point for integration, but the personality of the commander himself and his willingness to share assets determines if integration is even possible during operations.

LTG Alexander Patch and Operation Anvil/Dragoon

The Allies in World War II originally planned the invasion of southern France – Operation Anvil, later Operation Dragoon – to coincide with Operation Overlord, the Allies’ invasion of France along the beaches of Normandy. Planners intended this operation to act as a pincer against the German Army on the Western front, squeezing the Germans out of France in conjunction with General Eisenhower’s thrust from the English Channel. Though delayed due to a lower priority for landing craft than Overlord, Allied staff still planned for the eventual execution of Dragoon.³⁸ The planning staff for Operation Anvil/Dragoon formed “Force 163” in Algiers in order to chart a course of action for the invasion of southern France.³⁹ Planning for this operation remained under a cloud of uncertainty up until six weeks prior to the actual invasion.⁴⁰ President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who ultimately won the argument, felt this invasion supported the strategic goals of the Allies, while Winston Churchill and his generals believed it a waste of men and equipment.⁴¹ While the strategists continued to argue the importance of this mission, Lieutenant General Alexander Patch knew that he had to plan for the invasion of southern France. Because of his past experiences, he also understood that the Air Force – then known as the Army Air Force – would play a vital role in any invasion off the beaches of the Mediterranean. LTG Patch developed shared understanding with the Air Force and used the power of his Army, personality, and his past experiences to drive integration between Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force.

³⁸ Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 319.

³⁹ Seventh United States Army, *The Seventh United States Army Report of Operations in France and Germany, 1944-1945* (Nashville, TN: Battery Press, Inc., 1988), 3.

⁴⁰ Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 413.

⁴¹ Stephen Sussna, *Defeat and Triumph* (Philadelphia, PA: Xlibris, 2008), 159-60.

The Modest General: Sandy Patch

LTG Alexander “Sandy” Patch replaced LTG George S. Patton as the commander of the Seventh United States Army when LTG Patton moved to England on his way to Third Army. The two men, who were friends, had very different personalities, something that would serve Patch well as he directed the invasion of Southern France. While Patton displayed a loud and flamboyant character, LTG Patch presented a quiet and determined personality.⁴² Additionally, instead of being a dramatic figure like LTG Patton, who sometimes verbally, and on one memorable occasion physically, abused his troops, Patch “encouraged development of...camaraderie through his humility and good sense of humor.”⁴³ A spectator of his mission on Guadalcanal remarked that he had “great character and an iron will...modesty, and strength of determination” that all of his staff and subordinate soldiers observed every day.⁴⁴ Finally, LTG Patch seemed to side more with commanders than staff, believing that the staff’s primary function was to support the commanders and their troops.⁴⁵ Establishment of this command climate facilitated the cooperation between the Army and Air Force during planning for Anvil/Dragoon.

In addition to his personality, Patch brought with him experience that carried legitimacy in the eyes of his superiors in the Mediterranean, coalition and service partners, and subordinates.⁴⁶ Prior to taking command of the Seventh United States Army, then-Major General Patch served as an Army division commander on Guadalcanal. In 1942 and 1943, as the commander of the 23rd Infantry Division – the Americal Division – and later the XIV Corps,

⁴² William K. Wyant, *Sandy Patch* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), 3.

⁴³ John A. English, *Patton's Peers* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2009), 172.

⁴⁴ Wyant, *Sandy Patch*, 59.

⁴⁵ English, *Patton's Peers*, 172.

⁴⁶ Wiegley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, 324.

Patch worked alongside the United States Marines and United States Navy to defeat Japanese resistance on the island.⁴⁷ During this operation, MG Patch learned the value of working with the Army's service partners to achieve the overall objectives of a campaign. During the final push on Guadalcanal, MG Patch, on his own accord, formed a composite division consisting of marines from the 2nd Marine Division, soldiers from the Americal Division, and other service members in order to reinforce his offensive against the Japanese.⁴⁸ Furthermore, MG Patch learned the value of cooperation among the services when, in order to continue operations, he helped supply the marines and sailors on the island following a Navy oversight of supply requirements. During this campaign, he also experienced how a lack of air support could harm operations, struggling through October 1942 without much air cover until reinforcement airplanes arrived at the end of November.⁴⁹ This understanding facilitated the relationship between the Seventh United States Army and the XII Air Command during the planning for Anvil/Dragoon. Finally, MG Patch learned how to communicate effectively between services. While on Guadalcanal, he answered to United States Navy Vice Admiral William Halsey, with whom he communicated often. The Guadalcanal campaign proved to be vital to LTG Patch's view of joint operations during the planning for Anvil/Dragoon.

LTG Patch's personality and experiences played a large role in how the Seventh United States Army integrated with the Air Force during Anvil/Dragoon. He set the priorities and established the example for his subordinates and staff to emulate while working with other services. He made the critical planning decisions for Anvil/Dragoon, ensuring the integration of the Air Force's capabilities into the Army's plan.⁵⁰ LTG Patch garnered considerable respect

⁴⁷ Wyant, *Sandy Patch*, 39.

⁴⁸ English, *Patton's Peers*, 168.

⁴⁹ Wyant, *Sandy Patch*, 55.

⁵⁰ Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert R. Smith, *European Theater: Riviera to the Rhine* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1993), 577.

from his staff and his fellow interservice commanders as “a steady if quiet leader and professional soldier’s general, who...was less concerned with the prerogatives of command than with getting the job done.”⁵¹ He made it apparent to those that worked with him that he was above rivalries, be it between services or with other countries, so that he could accomplish the mission. This quality was critical to his ability to integrate the Twelfth Air Force into Anvil/Dragoon.

Integration during Anvil/Dragoon: An Overview

The Combined Chiefs of Staff issued guidance for LTG Patch and Seventh United States Army to establish a beachhead east of the port city of Toulon, France, as a base for the capture of the port of Toulon. In order to achieve the objective of opening a new line of communication in southern France and link up with the Normandy invasion force, LTG Patch’s Seventh Army staff had to plan with the Twelfth Air Force for the entirety of the operation. Seventh Army planned an intricate ground operation while Twelfth Air Force planned to support with a four phased air operation. Because both staffs worked together to plan the mission, Operation Anvil/Dragoon quickly became a success.

In August 1942, LTG Patch’s force, in conjunction with the Twelfth Air Force, seized the major port of Marseilles, and then moved towards Lyon and Vichy, France, joining with the Allied forces coming off the beaches at Normandy.⁵² The order of battle for this invasion included the VI Corps, commanded by MG Lucian Truscott, which consisted of the 3rd, 45th, 36th Infantry Divisions, as well as a French Armored Combat Command. Additionally, French Army Group B followed VI Corps on the beaches to capture Toulon and Marseilles. American and British paratroopers jumped into southern France to secure interior lines of communications

⁵¹ Clark and Smith, *European Theater: Riviera to the Rhine*, 33.

⁵² Steven T. Ross, *U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 241.

for forces coming off the beach.⁵³ The United States Navy and other Allied navies provided 843 ships and 1,267 landing craft to support the landing on the beaches.⁵⁴ The Twelfth Air Force provided hundreds of light, medium, and heavy planes in their parallel, four-phased operation supporting Anvil/Dragoon.⁵⁵

After Air Force bombardments of Southern France that lasted for months, soldiers of VI Corps landed on the beach between Baie de Cavalaire and la Calanque d'Antheor on August 15, 1944.⁵⁶ Planners thought that the first objective, capturing Toulon, would not occur until late September. However, both Toulon and Marseilles fell to the French Forces under LTG Patch's command on August 28, 1944.⁵⁷ The speed at which the French captured the two ports enabled Seventh Army to quickly continue its movement north to link up with the Normandy forces. By September 10, 1944, Seventh Army units began linking up with LTG Patton's Third Army in central France. On September 14, 1944, control of Seventh Army and the rest of the Dragoon forces passed from the Mediterranean Theater command to GEN Eisenhower and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).⁵⁸

Within a month, Seventh Army and its interservice partners successfully completed the invasion of Southern France. The Twelfth Air Force maintained air superiority for the Seventh Army, and continued to bomb targets in accordance with the joint plan. The Allies captured both Toulon and Marseilles two weeks after landing on the beaches. Anvil/Dragoon relieved pressure

⁵³ Seventh United States Army, *Report of Operations*, 56-58.

⁵⁴ Steve Zaloga and John White, *Operation Dragoon 1944* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009), 24.

⁵⁵ Tucker-Jones, *Operation Dragoon*, 100.

⁵⁶ Wiegley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, 326, 332.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 334-35.

⁵⁸ Zaloga and White, *Operation Dragoon 1944*, 10.

from the Normandy invaders. Finally, the forces of Anvil/Dragoon linked up with SHAEF forces, preparing to drive across the Rhine River and defeat Nazi Germany inside of its country.

The Partner: Twelfth Air Force

At the time Force 163 began planning for Anvil/Dragoon, the XII Air Force supported Operations in the Italian theater. Major General John K. Cannon commanded this Air Force as it reorganized to assist in this operation.⁵⁹ Generally, this command handled responsibility for bomber and troop carrier operations, and cooperated with the United States Navy to provide air cover within forty miles of the beaches.⁶⁰ This force consisted of strategic bombers for deep interdiction in France, troop carriers to transport airborne soldiers, and the fighter bombers for close air support. MG Cannon, a veteran of working with the Army, analyzed how to divert enough air forces from Italy to support the invasion of France without negatively impacting the momentum of the Fifth and Eighth Armies moving north out of Rome. Additionally, he needed to build up air bases on the island of Corsica to give him better access to the area of operations for Anvil/Dragoon.⁶¹ The nature of this operation required that MG Cannon plan with coequal, independent commanders of the Navy and Army forces, under the direction of the theater commander.⁶² MG Cannon needed to work well with the other service leads because of the coequal nature of the different services during planning. Cannon balanced demands from the theater commander, other services, and his own Air Force, while making positive contributions to the operation.

⁵⁹ Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 414.

⁶⁰ Clarke and Smith, *European Theater: Riviera to the Rhine*, 44.

⁶¹ Headquarters, Army Air Forces, *Wings at War*, 2.

⁶² Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III*, 415.

MG Cannon's subordinate, Brigadier General Gordon P. Saville, commanded the XII Tactical Air Command, the unit that worked the closest with the Seventh Army planners during Anvil/Dragoon.⁶³ His responsibilities included coordinating close air support in Southern France and on the beaches themselves.⁶⁴ BG Saville's duties required him to communicate the Air Force's needs clearly and effectively to the Army. Additionally, he needed to adjust his plan to fulfill the mission objectives of the Army. BG Saville and his staff assumed that the Germans would be able to draw in support from other areas in France to assist the already 200 estimated planes in or adjacent to the landing sites.⁶⁵ This assumption meant that in addition to the Army and Navy's considerations for the operation, he needed to include the Air Force's requirements for air superiority. He balanced preparing the landing sites for the invasion with the need to clear the threat posed by German planes and anti-aircraft batteries. This particular problem presented itself throughout the planning for Anvil/Dragoon. BG Saville understood that his role in the operation was to support the Seventh Army. He and his staff achieved this objective, and played a vital role in ensuring integration between Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force.

Facilitating Integration: Shared Understanding of the Strategic Objective

The strategic context and objectives of Anvil/Dragoon assisted the Seventh Army staff and the Twelfth Air Force staff in achieving shared understanding for the operation. ADP 3-0 states that "only by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force...can Army leaders integrate their actions within unified action and synchronize their own operations."⁶⁶ LTG Patch understood this concept due to his experience in

⁶³ Tucker-Jones, *Operation Dragoon*, 98.

⁶⁴ Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III*, 414.

⁶⁵ Seventh United States Army, *Report of Operations*, 31.

⁶⁶ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 3.

Guadalcanal working with the Navy and Marine Corps. He ensured that both staffs understood the strategic objectives so that they could effectively plan together.

The invasion force received three additional military strategic objectives. First, they needed to compel the Germans to split their forces fighting in Normandy in order to protect southern France. GEN Eisenhower supposed the German lines would be too spread out defending both Normandy and southern France, decreasing their ability to mount an effective defense of Western Europe.⁶⁷ Second, the operation needed to capture a major port to alleviate the congestion of supplies on the Normandy beaches, therefore solidifying the lines of supply for the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe.⁶⁸ Allied analysis of ports in southern France determined the large port of Marseilles capable of handling more tonnage than any port along the Normandy coast.⁶⁹ The tactical mission tasks given for Anvil/Dragoon were to first “establish a beachhead east of Toulon as a base for the assault and capture of Toulon,” followed by the “capture of Marseilles.”⁷⁰ Finally, the force needed to join the southern invasion force with the Normandy invasion force, in vicinity of Lyon and Vichy, for a decisive battle against the German armies on the Western Front.⁷¹ The directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff went on further to state that the Air Force “will provide full air support for the operation,” ensuring the Air Force’s compliance with the ground operation.⁷² Both the Seventh United States Army and the Twelfth United States Air Force recognized that these objectives were paramount during the planning of Anvil/Dragoon. The two staffs understood the strategic objectives of Anvil/Dragoon. This shared

⁶⁷ Wiegley, *Eisenhower’s Lieutenants*, 322.

⁶⁸ Headquarters, Army Air Forces, *Wings at War*, 3.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ross, *U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945*, 241.

⁷¹ Ibid.; Barbara Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 385.

⁷² Seventh United States Army, *Report of Operations*, 50.

understanding set the conditions for the staffs to work together during the invasion of Southern France.

LTG Patch's Experience and the Integrated Planning Staff

Planning for Anvil/Dragoon presented the staff of Seventh United States Army with a unique set of challenges for it to integrate the plan for Anvil/Dragoon with the Twelfth Air Force. To begin, the Seventh Army remained only a shell of an army headquarters that had been sitting in Italy awaiting orders to invade France.⁷³ Additionally, the Combined Chiefs of Staff could not decide when, or if, Anvil/Dragoon would take place. Staffs from different commands in the Army, Navy, and Air Force planned for the operation within this cloud of uncertainty about the mission. Not only did the services have to work together for the plan of Anvil/Dragoon, but they also had to include British and French planning elements. These factors posed challenges for the Seventh United States Army to integrate the Twelfth Air Force properly into its plans for Anvil/Dragoon. The force of personality from LTG Patch ensured that Seventh Army integrated the Twelfth Air Force despite these issues.

Even with the small headquarters in Seventh Army, its staff still needed to plan for Anvil/Dragoon. Therefore, early on, it established Force 163 in Algiers with a small contingent of air and navy staffs.⁷⁴ The Army learned a valuable lesson from Operation Torch – the invasion of North Africa in 1942 – and Operation Husky – the invasion of Sicily in 1943. The Army, Navy and Air Force realized the need for a joint planning staff to conduct successful and coordinated joint operations.⁷⁵ LTG Patch agreed with his naval counterpart, Vice Admiral Henry Hewitt, in that they needed to get the staffs together as soon as possible in order to begin planning for the

⁷³ Wiegley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, 326.

⁷⁴ Seventh United States Army, *Report of Operations*, 11.

⁷⁵ Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit*, 388.

invasion.⁷⁶ The joint staff for Anvil/Dragoon met for the first time in February 1943, and had the first draft of the air mission written by March 31, 1943. This was approximately 15 months prior to the actual invasion.⁷⁷ The move to join the staffs sooner, rather than later, resulted from the lessons learned by LTG Patch on Guadalcanal.

Patch established a work climate within his staff that encouraged close collaboration with other staffs. He issued guidance to his staff that they could say “yes” to other staffs and subordinates, but only he alone could say “no.”⁷⁸ In other words, he wanted to ensure his staff could work effectively with other staffs. Patch, by issuing this directive, protected his staff from potential disagreements that could hurt a partnership. He believed that it was up to him to work directly with the partnered commander if there was something Seventh Army could not accomplish. He took on this responsibility from his staff because of his distinctive personality. When Patch discussed a disagreement with peers, subordinates or superiors, there was “no evasion, no partial truth, no unnecessary euphemisms...and he stayed on the subject rather than shunting...off onto something else.”⁷⁹ By using his personality strengths, he shielded his staff from destroying relationships with other staffs over disagreements on tasks and responsibilities.

LTG Patch facilitated integration by ensuring that his staff and the staffs of the other services combined this far in advance of the invasion. It allowed planners to begin coordinating with each other and begin understanding what each service could bring to the invasion. LTG Patch did not have that opportunity in Guadalcanal, where his division lacked air assets to sustain offensive operations for a two-month period, something that had caught him and his staff there by

⁷⁶ Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit*, 385.

⁷⁷ Headquarters, Army Air Forces, *Wings at War*, 3.

⁷⁸ English, *Patton's Peers*, 172.

⁷⁹ Wyant, *Sandy Patch*, 34.

surprise.⁸⁰ By the time the invasion arrived, the Seventh Army staff and Twelfth Air Force staff intimately understood the plans and capabilities of each other, ensuring that the surprise LTG Patch met in Guadalcanal did not repeat itself in southern France.

The Role of LTG Patch's Personality in Integration

The shared understanding between the Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force made it easier for the two services to cooperate during the planning and execution of the invasion. One of the biggest challenges that Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force faced was how to balance between ongoing operations in Italy, and future operations in France. Additionally, the Air Force's preparatory bombings could give away the location of the landing, allowing the Germans to build up their defenses on the beaches the Army were to invade. Patch would use his personality to ensure cooperation. Described as soft-spoken, LTG Patch "brought out the best in those serving under him."⁸¹ He needed this personality trait to lead his staff in cooperating with the Air Force. Shared understanding and LTG Patch's desire to avoid the mistakes made in Guadalcanal ensured that the Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force cooperated with each other to alleviate these potential issues.

Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force compromised on the mission plans in order to meet both services' requirements during the operation. In addition to the Seventh Army worries about German's established defenses along the selected invasion beaches, the buildup of German anti-aircraft weapons unsettled the Twelfth Air Force. LTG Patch wanted a heavy bombardment of the coastal guns along the southern France beaches prior to the invasion. However, the Air Force did not want to concentrate on these guns because it could result in the Germans moving more anti-aircraft capability into the region to prevent air attacks along the coast. After much deliberation,

⁸⁰ Wyant, *Sandy Patch*, 55.

⁸¹ William B. Breuer, *Operation Dragoon* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987), 64.

LTG Patch received the support he wanted from the Air Force in exchange for relenting to the Air Force's demands to bomb multiple targets along the coastline towards Italy.⁸² LTG Patch's calm demeanor and ability to speak of joint operations with authority due to his time in Guadalcanal enabled him to convince the Air Force to provide the support he needed for the bombardment.

In order to integrate the Air Force into the operational plan, LTG Patch deferred other pressing demands so that the Seventh Army could cooperate with the Twelfth Air Force by working within the constraints of the disposition and capabilities of the Air Force. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to effective air support was the Twelfth Air Force's pending move from Italy to the island of Corsica prior to the operation. Planning continued as the Air Force shifted operations to the region.⁸³ A barren island with few resources for aircraft, Corsica demanded substantial additional resources to build the airfields to handle the airplanes and crews required for the operation.⁸⁴ This move to Corsica meant that the Air Force could not immediately strike near the landing point. However, strategic bombing deep into France could continue because of the fuel load of the heavy strategic bombers. Seventh Army waited while MG Cannon and BG Saville built up sufficient forces on Corsica to support the invasion.

Shared understanding of the strategic objective of the invasion also facilitated the Twelfth Air Force's cooperation with the Seventh Army. This cooperation allowed the Allies to maintain the element of surprise during the invasion. The Air Force worked closely with Seventh Army planners to choose targets for pre-invasion air bombardments. Phase II of the Twelfth Air Force operation, known as Operation Nutmeg, began on August 10, 1944, and targeted coastal batteries, radar stations and coastal defense troops along the beaches of southern France. However, the Air Force, at the Army's request, bombed additional targets between Italy and Spain in order to keep

⁸² Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III*, 416.

⁸³ Ross, *U.S. War Plans*, 246.

⁸⁴ Craven and Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume III*, 417.

the Germans from pinpointing the exact landing spot of Seventh Army during the invasion. The two services hoped that the “intensity of the cover plan...would be sufficient to conceal true Allied intentions until about 1800 the evening of D minus one.”⁸⁵ In fact, the deception operation, which the Air Force played a part in by dropping bombs all over the coast of southern France, worked so well that the Germans were surprised by the invasion in the vicinity of Toulon, and therefore not prepared.⁸⁶ Had the two staffs not cooperated, it is highly unlikely that the invasion would have been successful with all of its different factors. Only cooperation among the staffs mitigated the risks that these variables created.

“Unselfish”: LTG Patch’s Example on Developing Relationships

LTG Patch’s calm personality and his ability to convey shared understanding enabled the Seventh Army to influence the Twelfth Air Force, and vice versa. Shared understanding set the conditions for the staffs to work together. LTG Patch set the example for his staff to work well with other staffs. LTG Truscott, the VI Corps commander subordinate to Patch during Anvil/Dragoon, “came to regard him [Patch] highly as a man of outstanding integrity, a courageous and competent leader, and an unselfish comrade-in-arms.”⁸⁷ These factors led to the personal relationships that facilitated influence between the two staffs, therefore allowing the plan to change to meet the requirements of both services.

In order to ensure the success of Anvil/Dragoon, the commanders and staffs of the Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force developed personal relationships with each other. These relationships resulted in the ability for Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force to influence each

⁸⁵ Seventh United States Army, *Report of Operations*, 61.

⁸⁶ Jacob Devers, “Operation Dragoon: The Invasion of Southern France,” *Military Affairs* 10, no. 2 (1946): 23.

⁸⁷ Lucian K. Truscott, *Command Missions: A Personal Story* (New York: Dutton, 1954), 383.

other during the planning for the Operation. The ability to affect the plan from both the Air Force and Army perspective enabled for a frank exchange of ideas between the staffs and a more thorough product heading into the invasion.

The staffs set the tone early on for establishing the relationships necessary to work well together. The joint staffs established Force 163, the predecessor to the Seventh Army staff, at the end of 1943 to begin planning for the invasion.⁸⁸ Led by Army Brigadier General Garrison H. Davidson – the Seventh Army engineer – the staff also included elements from the French Army, the United States Navy and the United States Air Force. In fact, the Air Force, known among the military in those days as not very interested in planning, ensured that a general remained in the planning cell from the very beginning of Force 163 until Seventh Army departed for Toulon.⁸⁹ During this time, the staffs worked together to plan the invasion while simultaneously solving problems that arose between the services.⁹⁰

LTG Patch forced the staffs to influence each other. He significantly influenced all of the services preparing for Anvil/Dragoon because he maintained the primary planning responsibilities for the Operation. LTG Patch's personality fit this role perfectly. He consistently maintained a good sense of humor, and encouraged the staffs to develop friendships with each other that they could leverage during the planning process.⁹¹ He recognized that, in order for him to be able to influence the plan, he had to establish a positive relationship with the other services.

Resources Matter: Seventh Army's Part in Integration

⁸⁸ Tucker-Jones, *Operation Dragoon*, 87.

⁸⁹ Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit*, 384.

⁹⁰ Seventh United States Army, *Report of Operations*, 14.

⁹¹ English, *Patton's Peers*, 172.

From the beginning, LTG Patch established a climate within the Seventh Army staff that encouraged integration with the Twelfth Air Force. He did this through his words as well as his temperament. Additionally, LTG Patch set the example through how he interacted with the Twelfth Air Force. He did this by agreeing to use Seventh Army forces to achieve Air Force objectives during Operation Anvil/Dragoon. He enabled integration by showing the Twelfth Air Force that Seventh Army was willing to help them during the operation. He understood that he had to give some assets in order to gain some assets.

During planning for Operation Anvil/Dragoon, the Twelfth Air Force had two main worries on the ground: the German anti-aircraft batteries and locations and security for airfields in southern France. During the process of planning, LTG Patch agreed for Seventh Army to search for and destroy the anti-aircraft batteries, as well as locate and secure potential airfields.⁹² During the planning process for the operation, the Seventh Army staff made special considerations for the security of potential airfields near Toulon. The staff ensured that the initial assault in southern France gave enough room to secure the airfields for the Air Force.⁹³ Additionally, Seventh Army instructed its airborne troops to locate and destroy anti-aircraft batteries inside of southern France.⁹⁴

Twelfth Air Force could maneuver more freely over southern France as Seventh Army advanced north because of Seventh Army's actions to destroy anti-aircraft batteries and secure airfields. LTG Patch facilitated integration because he ordered his staff to assist the Twelfth Air Force with Army assets. LTG Patch continued to show humility by understanding that he owed the Air Force some assistance in return for their help during the operation.

⁹² Ross, *U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945*, 243; Seventh United States Army, *Report of Operations*, 114.

⁹³ Clarke and Smith, *Riviera to the Rhine*, 75, 77.

⁹⁴ Breuer, *Operation Dragoon*, 121.

Conclusion

The Allied invasion of southern France turned out to be a quick success. This fact is startling considering that only a few months before the operation was in flux. The personality of LTG Patch set the conditions for the integration necessary to triumph in Anvil/Dragoon. The Seventh United States Army and the Twelfth United States Air Force integrated quickly and efficiently to plan for, and execute, Anvil/Dragoon. Much like the invasion of Normandy, the close air support was not very effective.⁹⁵ The low bombing success occurred not because of a lack of planning, but more likely a result of the conditions on the ground and the inability to determine targets from the air. However, the Twelfth Air Force conducted air Operations where the Seventh Army requested. LTG Patch and the Seventh Army staff proved that it could understand, cooperate with and influence the Twelfth Air Force staff.

Another reason this integration occurred is that Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force shared an understanding of the strategic objectives of Anvil/Dragoon. Both organizations knew that this operation needed to pull German defenders from the Normandy area of operations. Additionally, they recognized that the operation needed to open a major port in the south in order to get more supplies and personnel into the European theater. Finally, these two units understood that they needed to facilitate the link up with the units from Overlord in order to facilitate a major offensive onto German soil, causing the surrender of the Germans.⁹⁶ Because of this shared understanding of the strategic goals, the two staffs could work together to figure out how to best support the country's policy.

⁹⁵ Breuer, *Operation Dragoon*, 97.

⁹⁶ Headquarters, Army Air Forces, *Wings at War*, 3.

Finally, LTG Patch enabled integration by his use of Seventh Army units to secure airfields and destroy anti-aircraft batteries. He understood that not only could the Air Force not achieve its objectives without the Army's support, but the Air Force also would expect to benefit from the use of ground assets to ensure security in the air. LTG Patch's willingness to use his Army in support of the Air Force showed his humility as well as his understanding for how to create an effective team across the services.

LTG Stilwell and the Burma Road

LTG Joseph Stilwell seemed to have all the characteristics necessary to lead the Chinese to victory in Burma: a recognized excellent field commander known throughout the United States Army as an “expert’s expert” in Chinese culture and military operations.⁹⁷ However, unlike LTG Patch in France, LTG Stilwell did not effectively integrate his Chinese partners into operations in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater in 1942. His attempts at integration failed because he lacked what LTG Patch had – shared understanding with his partners and a humble and respectful personality that facilitated working with others. After arriving in Burma on March 11, 1942, LTG Stilwell found the situation almost beyond hope.⁹⁸ Two under-strength Japanese infantry divisions were in the midst of defeating the combined British, Indian, and Burmese armies in southern Burma. The British, in charge of defending the strategically important Burma Road, requested Chinese support to avoid Japanese victory in the area.⁹⁹ LTG Stilwell arrived in Lashio, Burma, believing that he had command of the Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma in accordance with the desires of the head of the Chinese Nationalist Government, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.¹⁰⁰ However, he quickly learned that he had command in name only. Chiang continued to issue orders to his army commanders in Burma without informing LTG Stilwell.¹⁰¹ In some cases, he directly countermanded orders Stilwell gave.¹⁰² Because of this dynamic during

⁹⁷ Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 94.

⁹⁸ Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: W. Sloane, 1948), 59.

⁹⁹ Nathan Prefer, *Vinegar Joe's War* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000), 16.

¹⁰⁰ Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 118.

¹⁰¹ Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 283.

¹⁰² Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions* (New York: Random House, 2013), 150.

the campaign in Burma, LTG Stilwell needed to integrate the 5th and 6th Chinese Army commanders into his operational plans in order to either defeat the Japanese, or delay them long enough for reinforcements to arrive from India and China. However, as the results of the 1st Burma Campaign indicate, LTG Stilwell did not successfully integrate the Chinese into his operations. LTG Stilwell never effectively developed a shared understanding of the end state of operations with the Chinese because of different strategic objectives between the United States and China. Additionally, his abrasive personality hindered his integration effort, stalling his attempts to coordinate with or influence the Chinese. Because of this lack of integration, the Japanese defeated the Allied forces in Burma in 1942. The Allies did not regain the Burma Road from the Japanese for three years.¹⁰³

The Evolution of “Vinegar Joe”

LTG Stilwell’s background helps explain why he did not integrate the Chinese into his planned operations. In fact, his nickname, “Vinegar Joe,” provides insight into his caustic personality. He received this moniker while he worked at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. When LTG Stilwell faced what he felt was ineptness or stupidity, he made sure that the offender knew how he felt. After one such incident at Benning, a student depicted LTG Stilwell on a vinegar bottle, showing his personality to have a “vinegar element.”¹⁰⁴ This nickname remained with him for the rest of his life. British Field Marshal William Slim, whom LTG Stilwell worked with in the CBI Theater, summed up Stilwell’s personality: “He was over sixty, but he was tough, mentally and physically; he could be as obstinate as a whole team of mules; he could be, and frequently was, downright rude to people whom, often for no very good reason, he

¹⁰³ Robert Lyman, *Slim, Master of War* (London: Constable, 2004), 255.

¹⁰⁴ Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, 125.

did not like. But when he said he would do a thing, he did it.”¹⁰⁵ LTG Stilwell’s personality hindered his attempts to integrate the Chinese in CBI in fulfillment of his mission to open the Burma Road.

In spite of his harsh personality, LTG Stilwell proved to be very good at training troops and one of the Army’s premiere experts on China. After his graduation from West Point, LTG Stilwell served many years in China and Asia. He conducted tours of duty as a language officer in China, as the commander of the United States 15th Infantry in Tientsin, China, and as the United States Military Attaché in the American Embassy in Peiping. His experience in China for over ten years ensured his fluency in Chinese and his familiarity with the politics and culture of the country.¹⁰⁶ His experience in China and his reputation as an outstanding instructor at Fort Benning gained the attention of influential people within the United States Army. General George Marshall, the architect of the United States Army in World War II, thought highly of LTG Stilwell, believing him to be “qualified for any command in peace or war.”¹⁰⁷

When the time came for the United States to send someone over to China to assist in the war effort there, GEN Marshall advocated for LTG Stilwell. The Chinese preferred someone unfamiliar with the area and culture to allow Chiang Kai-Shek to manipulate operations. Instead, GEN Marshall chose “an expert’s expert, a man who believed he was more qualified to run China than was Chiang Kai-Shek.”¹⁰⁸ GEN Marshall did choose a competent Chinese expert to send to Asia in order to reinvigorate the war effort there. However, he also sent a man who believed he was the only one, including Chiang, who could lead the Chinese to victory. LTG Stilwell’s belief

¹⁰⁵ William J. Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 51.

¹⁰⁶ Jingchun Liang, *General Stilwell in China, 1942-1944: The Full Story* (Jamaica, NY: St. John’s University Press, 1972), 2-3.

¹⁰⁷ Prefer, *Vinegar Joe’s War*, 14.

¹⁰⁸ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 94.

in his own capabilities, and his inability to respect the abilities of others, played an important part in the disaster of the first Burma campaign.

The Results of Failed Integration on the Burma Road

LTG Stilwell arrived in Burma knowing that he had to integrate the Chinese troops into operations. The Burma Theater had the British, Burmese, and Indian armies locked in combat with the Japanese since January 10, 1942.¹⁰⁹ These armies could not defeat the Japanese, who possessed less manpower and equipment than the Allies in CBI. LTG Stilwell did not view the British in a positive light, and he felt they were unfit to fight effectively in the Burma Theater.¹¹⁰ In fact, the British army considered surrendering to the Japanese prior to the arrival of the Chinese troops.¹¹¹ They ultimately requested the support of the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies, which LTG Stilwell, at least nominally, led.

LTG Stilwell's plan to defend central and northern Burma required close integration of the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies. However, as the results of this operation show, he did not succeed in this effort. Originally, he intended to ambush the Japanese with two Chinese Divisions with the result of forcing the Japanese out of the CBI. His plan called for the 200th Chinese Division to delay the Japanese as it moved north on the Burma Road. He stationed the 22nd Division and 96th Division on either side of the road. LTG Stilwell expected both of these divisions to attack the left and right flanks of the Japanese, at which point the 200th Division would stop and join the fight. This action, he hoped, would destroy the Japanese Army in Burma, therefore opening the supply route to China.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Prefer, *Vinegar Joe's War*, 15.

¹¹⁰ Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 54.

¹¹¹ Dorn, *Walkout*, 85.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 67-68.

The Chinese units, however, did not successfully implement this plan because LTG Stilwell failed to integrate them into operations properly. Instead, the Japanese army took advantage of ill-equipped and unmotivated Chinese soldiers to break through any attempt to slow them down. LTG Stilwell ordered reinforcements for the ailing Chinese divisions fighting the Japanese. However, the Chinese did not follow them, leaving these divisions to be routed by the Japanese.¹¹³ LTG Stilwell's first encounter with the Japanese proved to be an unmitigated disaster. At the end of the 1st Burma Campaign, his Chinese units had to retreat on foot back to India, leaving behind 13,500 casualties. LTG Stilwell led a group of soldiers out of Burma himself.

Stilwell hoped he could return to the Burma Road a later time with a better trained, more disciplined Chinese Army to defeat the Japanese.¹¹⁴ From 1942 to 1944, Chiang allowed him to organize and train fifty-three thousand Chinese soldiers and organize them into a unit called the "X Force."¹¹⁵ This well-trained force, along with Merrill's Marauders from the United States Army, performed much better in the second Burma campaign in 1944 and early 1945. Because he now had operational control of both Chinese and American units, Stilwell immediately made headway in the effort to recapture the Burma Road from the Japanese. By January, 1945, the Allies controlled a route through Burma and into China, finally meeting the operational objective of the United States. Before this happened, though, President Roosevelt relieved Stilwell of command at the behest of Chiang. Therefore, he was not on hand to see the fruits of his labor.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Lyman, *Slim, Master of War*, 24.

¹¹⁴ Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, 292.

¹¹⁵ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 127.

¹¹⁶ Prefer, *Vinegar Joe's War*, 276-280.

The Collapse of Shared Strategic Understanding

The strategic context of LTG Stilwell's mission in China restricted his ability to integrate Chinese troops into his operations in Burma. His view of the mission in China differed greatly from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's idea of what LTG Stilwell's mission should be. Additionally, LTG Stilwell did not fully appreciate the delicate balance Chiang had to maintain between the external Japanese threat and the internal Communist threat to his Nationalist government. LTG Stilwell did not match his objectives with Chiang's when he arrived in CBI. Thus, he failed create a common understanding with the Chinese, which led to the ultimate defeat of Chinese forces along the Burma Road in 1942.

The United States viewed China as a vital disruption to Japanese plans for hegemony in the Pacific. LTG Stilwell needed to ensure that the Chinese maintained this disruption by keeping them in the war through opening the Burma Road for resupply into China. In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt determined that "Japanese control of China endangered the security for...the United States."¹¹⁷ Roosevelt and his strategic advisers concluded that the United States had to provide support to the Nationalist Chinese, then the dominant force in China's ongoing civil war, in order to keep China in the war and "consume so many Japanese divisions."¹¹⁸ Thus, the United States could use economy of force in the Pacific theater while its main effort fought in Europe. Aid in the form of money and equipment, strategists hoped, would allow China to withstand the Japanese assault on the mainland, essentially enabling the Chinese to fight the United States' war in lieu of actual American divisions.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Prefer, *Vinegar Joe's War*, xi-x.

¹¹⁸ Paul M Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory* (New York: Random House, 2013), 297.

¹¹⁹ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, x.

In order to achieve this strategic objective, the United States military's leaders decided that an officer needed to deploy to China to control the Lend-Lease program there, as well as provide Chiang with sound military advice and the Chinese units with good military leadership. LTG Stilwell, considered to be one of the foremost Chinese experts in the military, received this mission.¹²⁰ In addition to these roles, LTG Stilwell received guidance from GEN Marshall to keep open the Burma Road, the designated supply route for Lend-Lease equipment into western China.¹²¹ If the Japanese maintained control of this road, then China could not receive support from the United States, and therefore would ultimately capitulate to the Japanese. LTG Stilwell received the task to regain control of the road.

The Chinese seemed to agree with the demands of the United States in exchange for access to Lend-Lease. These stipulations included LTG Stilwell's authority over American and Chinese troops in theater, his control of Lend-Lease, and the commitment of Chiang to arm thirty Chinese divisions for combat in Burma.¹²² LTG Stilwell's mission in China appeared straight forward within the context of these Chinese agreements. However, he soon learned that Chiang never intended to give him control of the Chinese armies.¹²³ LTG Stilwell and the strategists in the United States did not fully understand what Chiang's ultimate goals were with the money and equipment the United States provided him to fight the Japanese.

By the time LTG Stilwell arrived in China in 1942, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists had been fighting Mao Zedong and the Communists for seven years. This contest continued until the Communist's ultimate victory in 1949.¹²⁴ Additionally, Chiang had to maintain order in China

¹²⁰ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 94.

¹²¹ Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 150.

¹²² Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 95.

¹²³ Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 150.

¹²⁴ Jonathan Fenby, *Chiang Kai Shek* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), 253.

as a de-facto warlord, keeping tight control of all the mechanisms of national power, to include the Nationalist army. LTG Stilwell committed a major mistake by not fully appreciating and responding to Chiang's opinion that the Communists were a bigger threat to China than the Japanese, and that Chiang was also a warlord in addition to his role as Generalissimo. This lack of understanding set the groundwork that ultimately led to Stilwell's inability to integrate the Chinese and his failure in Burma in 1942. Throughout the entire war, Chiang saw his real enemy as Mao Zedong and the Communists, with the Japanese threat serving as only a secondary worry.¹²⁵ While Chiang wanted and needed aid from the United States, it was not to defeat the Japanese, but instead to prop up the Nationalist government and ultimately defeat the Communists.¹²⁶

Not only did Chiang deem the Communists a threat to his position of power, but he also believed that his fellow Nationalists desired to depose him. Chiang's ability to keep the Nationalists together was because of his experience as a warlord in China. Chiang consolidated his power in the country through leading violence against his fellow countrymen, and negotiating with other warlords.¹²⁷ In fact, Chiang was obsessed with his desire for control, to the point where he ignored other problems in his country, such as the Japanese threat.¹²⁸ As a warlord, Chiang did not trust anyone outside of his influence. This included LTG Stilwell. Because of this lack of trust, LTG Stilwell did not fully understand and appreciate Chiang's perspective of events in China. Not only were the Communists a threat, but his own army could potentially overthrow him. Stilwell singularly focused on the Japanese in Burma, and did not make considerations for

¹²⁵ Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 417.

¹²⁶ Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, 3.

¹²⁷ Brian Crozier and Eric Chou, *The Man Who Lost China* (New York: Scribner, 1976), 126.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.

Chiang and his own personal dilemma. Therefore, Chiang looked suspiciously on whatever Stilwell did to strengthen the Chinese army against the Japanese. This suspicion only grew as LTG Stilwell continually failed to understand Chiang's role as a warlord in China.

Because of Chiang's perception of the threats at play, he made decisions that were oftentimes contrary to what LTG Stilwell and the United States felt prudent. As an example, Chiang never intended to give LTG Stilwell full control of Chinese armies, at least not initially. He felt that a fully trained army, funded by an outside source, was a threat to his autonomy and therefore strategically a mistake.¹²⁹ Chiang's actions made it clear that he would only accede to the requests of LTG Stilwell that strengthened his position in China through the ultimate defeat of the Communists, not necessarily through the defeat of the Japanese.

LTG Stilwell's guidance for his mission in China, along with his perception of events inside the country, differed greatly from Chiang's perception of the goal for American intervention in that theater. Chiang worried about the Communists and his control of power, while LTG Stilwell worried about the Japanese on the Burma Road.¹³⁰ This lack of shared understanding at the strategic level between Stilwell and Chiang resulted in an inability to successfully integrate Chinese troops into American plans at the operational level. LTG Stilwell never could convince the Chinese to follow his orders, or even his suggestions, because he and the Chinese were attempting to achieve different goals.¹³¹ During the Burma campaign, one Chinese general remarked that Stilwell "only thinks he is commanding. In fact he is doing no such thing. You see, we Chinese think that the only way to keep the Americans in the war is to give them a few commands on paper. They will not do much harm as long as we do the work!"¹³²

¹²⁹ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 106.

¹³⁰ Liang, *General Stilwell in China*, xii.

¹³¹ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 102.

¹³² Prefer, *Vinegar Joe's War*, 17-18.

LTG Stilwell and Chiang could never reconcile these goals in order to meet both of their objectives at the strategic and operational levels.

The Burma front collapsed and LTG Stilwell issued orders that the Chinese commanders ignored. Instead, they were more interested in solidifying their standing through wealth than holding off the Japanese threat.¹³³ Had LTG Stilwell fully understood and appreciated the true strategy of Chiang and the Nationalists, he possibly could have used it to his advantage. In doing so, he would have to convince the Chinese that defeating the Japanese would also assist them in meeting their strategic objective of defeating the Communists. Tailoring his objectives so that they met both the United States and Chinese strategic goals could have allowed him to utilize the Chinese troops how he saw necessary. Instead, LTG Stilwell unsuccessfully attempted to integrate the Chinese units through other means, continuing his mission in Burma down the path of failure.

LTG Stilwell's Contributions to Chinese Lack of Cooperation

LTG Stilwell's failure to understand the Chinese view of combat operations in Burma hampered his ability to integrate the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies into his operations. In order to successfully use this combat power in the campaign for Burma Road, he needed to figure out another way to integrate the Chinese. ADP 3-0 lists two other ways to integrate partnered forces besides understanding: cooperating and influencing.¹³⁴ LTG Stilwell's next course of action in Burma when he realized he did not have Chiang's full support was to cooperate with the 5th and 6th Armies as they tried to destroy the Japanese presence in the region. LTG Stilwell understood that "the active cooperation of partners often allows Army leaders to capitalize on organizational

¹³³ Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 88.

¹³⁴ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 3.

strengths while offsetting weaknesses.”¹³⁵ In order for the Allied effort to have any success in Burma, the Chinese units needed to coordinate actions with the American leader and participate in his plans. Without them, LTG Stilwell understood that the Burma Road would be lost to the Japanese.¹³⁶ However, as much as LTG Stilwell tried, the repercussions of his lack of understanding China’s strategic objectives reverberated into the operational level. Although he respected the Chinese soldiers for their fighting ability, he did not respect the Chinese generals and treated them harshly.¹³⁷ His personality therefore resulted in the lack of full cooperation among the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies in the Burma Road mission.

After meeting with Chiang and departing for Burma, LTG Stilwell operated with the understanding that he commanded the Chinese units along the Burma Road.¹³⁸ Chiang’s promise that the Chinese would operate with LTG Stilwell as the commander turned out to be false, however. Privately, Chiang held LTG Stilwell in contempt because of his desire to place the Burma Road ahead of the Communist threat. He also perceived a personal threat LTG Stilwell presented towards Chiang’s stronghold on all of China’s national instruments of power.¹³⁹ Therefore, Chiang created a near impossible chain of command that had to vet any orders LTG Stilwell gave to Chinese soldiers, thus inhibiting cooperation:

There was, moreover, a system of liaison officers working under the Generalissimo and it appeared that no orders by...General Stilwell...could be carried out unless they had the sanction of the Generalissimo, which had to be obtained through the latter’s Liaison Mission, whose head was General Lin Wei in Lashio, who in turn had a forward liaison

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 68.

¹³⁷ Wesley M. Bagby, *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), 57.

¹³⁸ Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, 267.

¹³⁹ Rana Mitter, *Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1945* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 257.

officer in General Hou at Maymno. Such an arrangement was obviously quite unsuitable for modern war.¹⁴⁰

This inefficient set up that LTG Stilwell faced when attempting to get the Chinese to cooperate culminated with his plan to destroy the Japanese army in Burma. He attempted to set a trap using the 200th Division as bait for the Japanese to chase north. He then intended to have the 96th Division and 22nd Division ambush the Japanese along the road, wiping out their force in being inside of Burma.¹⁴¹

However, LTG Stilwell could not get the Chinese to cooperate in this plan. He blamed Chiang's meddling for losing the opportunity to defeat the Japanese early in Burma. He attributed this to "stupidity, fear, and the defensive attitude" of Chiang and his generals.¹⁴² The fact that the Chinese would not fully cooperate with LTG Stilwell in Burma meant that the first campaign there would not be successful.

LTG Stilwell could not leverage the manpower of the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies during the Burma campaign because of their refusal to cooperate with him. He was very outspoken about his contempt for Chiang and the Nationalists.¹⁴³ LTG Stilwell did not stay quiet about what he believed, as was true to his personality. Therefore, he undoubtedly let the Chinese generals in Burma know about his disapproval of Chiang and the Nationalists' ability to govern the war in Burma. Additionally, because of Chiang's influence over his generals in the field, they heard from him about his poor opinion of LTG Stilwell.¹⁴⁴ LTG Stilwell's inability to work with people

¹⁴⁰ Lyman, *Slim, Master of War*, 13.

¹⁴¹ Dorn, *Walkout*, 67-68.

¹⁴² Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 77.

¹⁴³ Max Hastings, *Retribution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 216.

¹⁴⁴ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 102.

he did not respect ensured that the Chinese generals would not fully cooperate with him on the battlefield.

While he received some cooperation from the 200th Division, both in their ruse against the Japanese and their attempt to save the British in Burma, LTG Stilwell was unsuccessful in gaining overall cooperation from the Chinese during March, 1942.¹⁴⁵ Chinese units operated without a coherent operational plan that, had they cooperated with LTG Stilwell, they would have received from him against the Japanese. Instead, the Chinese units more often than not ran away from the Japanese onslaught, resulting in a disaster for the Allies in the control of the Burma Road by Japan in 1942.¹⁴⁶

How the Personality of “Vinegar Joe” Failed the Mission

Because LTG Stilwell did not understand and appreciate Chiang’s strategic objectives, and due to the fact that he could not get the Chinese to cooperate at the operational level, all he could do was influence the Chinese generals to follow his plans in Burma. However, LTG Stilwell did not accomplish this, either. He could not influence Chiang at the strategic level to put forth the resources and manpower necessary to blunt the Japanese attack along the Burma Road. Additionally, LTG Stilwell did not influence the Chinese generals at the operational level to carry out any semblance of a plan of attack against the Japanese. LTG Stilwell’s brash personality prevented him from influencing the Chinese at the strategic and operational level. Together, these factors ensured that LTG Stilwell would not be able to integrate the Chinese in any fashion during the first Burma campaign in 1942.

LTG Stilwell’s inability to influence Chinese commanders stems from the clash of personalities between himself and Chiang Kai-Shek. LTG Stilwell mockingly referred to Chiang

¹⁴⁵ Dorn, *Walkout*, 67, 86.

¹⁴⁶ Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China*, 103.

as “Peanut,” in private correspondence and with his staff. In public, Stilwell was not much kinder, stating to President Roosevelt that Chiang was “a vacillating tricky undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word.”¹⁴⁷ Chiang mutually shared a loathing of LTG Stilwell. Throughout the campaign, he countermanded orders by Stilwell. By October, 1944, he pleaded to Roosevelt to relieve Stilwell of command in China: “Almost from the moment of his [Stilwell’s] arrival in China, he showed his disregard for the mutual confidence and respect which are essential to the successful collaboration of allied forces.”¹⁴⁸ Chiang’s generals followed his example, actively disobeying Stilwell’s orders and openly talking about their disregard for him and his mission in Burma.¹⁴⁹

While LTG Stilwell had the ability to personally influence Chinese troops, he could not influence the operational commanders, in part due to the example Chiang provided and in part due to their personal objectives in Burma. LTG Stilwell did not have the patience to work with commanders he deemed to be irresponsible and careless. His rude temper towards those he did not respect, such as most of the Chinese generals, prevented him from influencing their actions in Burma.¹⁵⁰ His inability to influence the Chinese from afar made LTG Stilwell realize that he had to be personally present with Chinese commanders in order to pressure them to carry out his plans, an unrealistic expectation given the number of Chinese division and army commanders fighting on the Burma Road.¹⁵¹ During the final days of the campaign in Burma, LTG Stilwell did not receive even token compliance from the Chinese generals. Instead, the Chinese commanders

¹⁴⁷ Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, 283, 371.

¹⁴⁸ Fenby, *Chiang Kai Shek*, 428.

¹⁴⁹ Persico, *Roosevelt’s Centurions*, 150.

¹⁵⁰ Liang, *General Stilwell in China, 1942-1944: The Full Story*, 3.

¹⁵¹ Dorn, *Walkout*, 245.

made excuses about why they could not carry out orders, or why they failed to devote their units fully to the cause of defending the Burma Road.¹⁵²

The Chinese generals complained about LTG Stilwell's guidance in Burma. First, they felt it absurd that an American could come in and try to provide a direction to their units in lieu of orders they received from Chiang. Despite the perceived viability of LTG Stilwell's plan in Burma, the fact that he gave them direction that directly went against Chiang's wishes meant that they could not follow these orders.¹⁵³ The second issue that prevented the Chinese generals from listening to LTG Stilwell was greed. These generals looked past the war with Japan in order to establish their foothold in the future Chinese economy. One general refused a request from LTG Stilwell to provide trucks to another Chinese division for reinforcements because he needed them to transport goods from Burma back into China for his own profit.¹⁵⁴ LTG Stilwell could not influence the Chinese to follow his plans because of their disparate views on Burma and their own futures. To the Chinese generals, LTG Stilwell "was treated merely as an advisor whom Chinese officers could disregard with impunity while they pursued their primary mission, using their position to enrich themselves."¹⁵⁵

ADP 3-0 states that "commanders inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations."¹⁵⁶ LTG Stilwell could not do this. He failed to influence Chiang about the importance of maintaining an open Burma Road. Instead, Chiang placed more emphasis on defeating the Communists. He directed his generals to effectively ignore LTG Stilwell's guidance. Additionally, LTG Stilwell could not impose the urgency of the situation in Burma on

¹⁵² Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 90.

¹⁵³ Hastings, *Retribution*, 216.

¹⁵⁴ Dorn, *Walkout*, 86.

¹⁵⁵ Persico, *Roosevelt's Centurions*, 150.

¹⁵⁶ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 13.

the Chinese officers there. He failed to explain what a Japanese victory would mean to their units at the operational level. This failure led to thousands of Chinese casualties in Burma in 1942, and an infamous retreat back to India for numerous Chinese and Americans whose units had all but disappeared when faced with the Japanese onslaught.¹⁵⁷ Most importantly, LTG Stilwell did not possess the personality to interact effectively with his Chinese counterparts. His inability to maintain his professionalism with those he did not respect prevented any chance he had at influencing the Chinese to implement his operational plans in Burma.

Alone and Unafraid: Lack of Resources and Hampered Integration

When LTG Stilwell received his mission to go to China, he did not get the accompanying US forces that a LTG would typically have during World War II. Instead, LTG Stilwell arrived in Burma with just himself and a nominal staff to support him. The Chinese did not trust him because he did not put US forces in the same dangers that they encountered. This severely hampered his ability to properly integrate with the Chinese.

LTG Stilwell did have access to one hundred old P-40 airplanes in Burma, commanded by Brigadier General Claire Chennault.¹⁵⁸ However, LTG Stilwell and BG Chennault did not get along well together. In fact, they saw the path to victory differently. Stilwell believed that only landpower, augmented by airpower, could triumph against the Japanese. Chennault advocated that his airplanes, if properly resourced, could defeat the Japanese without much landpower.¹⁵⁹ These different views, as well as Chennault's closeness to Chiang, prevented Stilwell from using

¹⁵⁷ Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, 292.

¹⁵⁸ Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 44.

¹⁵⁹ Horn, "Everything Old is New Again: The American Military Effort in China, 1941-1945," 328.

the air assets in the way that he saw fit. Additionally, even though there was some US Air Force support, the Chinese did not see any Army assets on the ground fighting with them.

LTG Stilwell knew that he had a problem since he was supposed to command Chinese troops in Burma without the assistance of any additional US troops. When he first arrived, the British found it odd that an American general was in the theater without any American troops to command.¹⁶⁰ He acknowledged that “it is expecting a great deal to have them [the Chinese generals] turn over a couple of armies in a vital area to a goddam foreigner that they don’t know and in whom they can’t have much confidence.”¹⁶¹ The Chinese had no reason to trust him since the United States did not believe that its soldiers should fight for Burma. Only Chinese soldiers should die to keep that supply road open. The distrust between the Chinese generals and Stilwell only grew due to this perceived indifference by the United States.

Conclusion

LTG Stilwell faced a very tough challenge when he accepted the role as Chiang’s chief of staff. The United States knew that China needed to remain in the war to occupy Japan’s military. However, the United States and LTG Stilwell did not fully understand and appreciate Chiang’s motivations for accepting help. LTG Stilwell understood his role was to achieve the military objectives of the United States in CBI by opening the Burma Road. He reflected in his diary the guidance that he received from GEN Marshall and President Roosevelt: “Coordinate and smooth out and run the road, and get the various factions together and grab command and in general give ‘em the works.”¹⁶² LTG Stilwell believed this to be the ultimate mission, even though it did not did not concur with Chiang’s objective of ruining the Chinese Communist party. He also did not

¹⁶⁰ Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45*, 256.

¹⁶¹ Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 79.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 26.

understand Chiang's position as a warlord, and his desire to maintain power not only against the Japanese and Communists, but also against his fellow Nationalists. Because of this dichotomy of views, LTG Stilwell did not plan operations that included what the Chinese believed to be important, resulting in a lack of enthusiasm or commitment to opening the Burma Road. The Chinese simply did not wholeheartedly support a mission that did not meet their strategic objectives, therefore hindering integration.

Because LTG Stilwell did not have shared understanding with the Chinese, he needed to rely on his personality to attempt to integrate them into his operations. However, unlike LTG Patch, LTG Stilwell did not possess the personal skills to influence or cooperate with the Chinese military leaders. His peers felt that he was an exceptional infantry commander, but lacked the other skills that leaders needed to successfully lead their units.¹⁶³ LTG Stilwell could not develop the personal relationship necessary to work with Chiang and his generals. As was his tendency, he treated the Chinese generals, most of whom he did not respect, with contempt.¹⁶⁴ His view and treatment of his fellow Chinese commanders prevented him from cooperating with and influencing them, therefore preventing integration. The Chinese did not want to work with him, and accordingly held back supplies and did not attempt to carry out his plans. LTG Stilwell did not realize the role that his personality played in getting the Chinese to participate in his operations. Therefore, the Allies and the Chinese failed in a poorly led campaign in Burma due to LTG Stilwell's inability to integrate the Chinese into his overall operations.¹⁶⁵

LTG Stilwell did not receive cooperation from Chiang until he had something to offer the Chinese leader in terms of assets. In the first Burma Campaign, Stilwell did not have much more than himself and his staff to direct the fight against the Japanese. However, when LTG Stilwell

¹⁶³ Bagby, *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance*, 29.

¹⁶⁴ Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 87.

¹⁶⁵ Prefer, *Vinegar Joe's War*, 18.

took over Task Force X for the second Burma Campaign, he came with United States Army units. These units included the famous Merrill's Marauders (5307th Composite Unit), as well as the 124th Cavalry Regiment and the 475th Infantry Regiment.¹⁶⁶ By having these units assigned to him, he showed that the United States was willing to face similar sacrifices as the Chinese in the battle against the Japanese. Before this, Stilwell had nothing tangible to offer the Chinese, therefore lacking perceived commitment to the cause in the China-Burma-India Theater.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 260-262.

Conclusion

ADP 3-0 emphasizes the need for the Army to work with joint and multinational partners in today's constrained fiscal environment. This guidance is not revolutionary. Since World War I, the Army has worked with joint and multinational partners to accomplish the strategic objectives of the United States. ADP 3-0, however, mentions integration for the first time in Army doctrine. In fact, ADP 3-0 emphasizes integration twice. The first discussion of integration occurs while describing the Army's role in a larger, unified operation. ADP 3-0 mentions the need for Army leaders to "understand, influence, and cooperate with unified action partners...by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force."¹⁶⁷ The second time ADP 3-0 refers to integration is as a tenant of unified land operations, the Army's warfighting doctrine. Again, ADP 3-0 talks about the importance of creating shared understanding and purpose, but also emphasizes the role of Army leaders in ensuring proper integration of Army forces with its partners.¹⁶⁸ LTG Patch and LTG Stilwell's experiences in World War II offer refinement to Army doctrine about integration: shared understanding and the personality of the responsible Army leader either facilitates or hinders integration.

LTG Patch during Operation Anvil/Dragoon shows the benefits of how shared understanding and the commander's personality led to effective integration. His previous experience at Guadalcanal and respectful personality ensured that his Seventh Army staff integrated early and efficiently with the staff of the Twelfth Air Force. He made it a point to develop camaraderie with the other staffs during planning using his humility and sense of humor.¹⁶⁹ Other commanders knew him as a quiet and steady leader, easy to get along with, and

¹⁶⁷ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 3.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁶⁹ English, *Patton's Peers*, 172.

constantly looking out for the best way to accomplish his assigned mission.¹⁷⁰ These attributes developed the environment necessary for the two staffs to work together and integrate operations. Additionally, LTG Patch profited from developing a shared understanding with Twelfth Air Force. He ensured that his staff had members of the Air Force in it from the earliest point of planning in order to develop a common understanding between the two services towards the operation.¹⁷¹ This shared understanding resulted in the Army and Air Force both accomplishing their missions while simultaneously supporting each other during Operation Anvil/Dragoon. LTG Patch utilized his personality and the mutual understanding to integrate the Twelfth Air Force into the Seventh Army's plans.

LTG Stilwell, however, could not integrate the Chinese during the First Burma Campaign because he lacked both shared understanding and the personality to work with his Chinese partners. While he did have plenty of experience in China and with the Chinese culture, he was extremely outspoken about people and issues.¹⁷² His personality made his job of integrating the Chinese more difficult because "disagreement with those he did not respect as men brought out his negative qualities," and LTG Stilwell did not respect Chiang or his generals in Burma.¹⁷³ In fact, other United States officers pointed out that he did not have the patience to be diplomatic with the Chinese, which led to his second problem of lacking shared understanding with his partners.¹⁷⁴ His inability to get along with Chiang led to a fundamental disagreement about Chinese priorities with United States resources. While LTG Stilwell believed he should use the Chinese to open the Burma Road, Chiang felt compelled to neutralize the communist threat to his

¹⁷⁰ Clark and Smith, *Riviera to the Rhine*, 33.

¹⁷¹ Tombin, *With Utmost Spirit*, 385,388.

¹⁷² Hastings, *Retribution*, 216.

¹⁷³ Davies, *Dragon by the Tail*, 262.

¹⁷⁴ Bagby, *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance*, 262.

government. LTG Stilwell did not seek to use his authority as the Lend Lease agent to China to come to a common understanding about how to accomplish both goals. Therefore, Chiang prevented LTG Stilwell from exercising any type of control over his generals in Burma. Additionally, LTG Stilwell could not influence the generals in Burma to carry out his operational plans to defeat the Japanese there. LTG Stilwell failed in Burma due to his personality and lack of shared understanding with the Chinese.

Implications

The first implication of the Patch and Stilwell case studies is that leaders need to develop a shared understanding with partners in order to integrate efforts. The dichotomy between LTG Patch's experience in Anvil/Dragoon and LTG Stilwell's experience in CBI can be partly explained by the status of understanding between the partners. Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force began planning from the same set of facts and assumptions based off their shared understanding of the operation and its objectives. This set the tone for the rest of Anvil/Dragoon. Additionally, both staffs could synchronize efforts within their commands to meet the common strategic objectives of opening the ports in southern France and linking up with the Normandy invasion force for the push across the Rhine into Germany. LTG Stilwell's mission in Burma was doomed to failure because of fundamental disagreements he had with Chiang and his generals about allocations of men and resources. LTG Stilwell did not lend any credence to the threat the Nationalists felt from the Communists, instead concentrating solely on Burma as the President ordered him. Because of this rigidity, LTG Stilwell did not receive any concessions from Chiang for control of his armies, and the generals refused to fully cooperate with him. It is essential for Army leaders to understand what the partner is attempting to achieve, as well as communicate to the partner what the Army's goals are, in order to properly integrate. Shared understanding means that both forces will work towards achieving their own objectives within the constraints of their

partner's mission. Without this, partners will only focus on achieving their own goals, possibly at the detriment of the Army. This focus will hamper integration efforts for the Army.

Perhaps the larger implication is the importance the Army leader's personality plays in integrating joint or multinational partners into operations. ADP 3-0 mentions cooperation and influence as characteristics of integrating partners. The personality of the leader matters when attempting to cooperate and influence. LTG Patch exemplified the type of personality needed to work with partners, while LTG Stilwell demonstrated the personality traits that prevent partners from integrating into operations. LTG Patch used his humble, respectful personality and his experience to ensure Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force integrated early in the planning process, and maintained that integration through the entirety of the operation. He showed the Air Force that he was willing to work with them, listen to their recommendations, and treat them as equal partners. There was never an issue with cooperation, and LTG Patch both influenced and allowed the Air Force to influence him when planning for the operation. LTG Stilwell abrasive personality and his glaring lack of respect for his Chinese partners meant that this extremely skilled tactical commander could not gain the compliance of the Chinese in Burma, despite the tactical soundness of his plans. Chiang labeled him as disrespectful, and Chinese generals marveled at the amount of hubris it took for a Westerner to come in and attempt to lead the Chinese armies in Western-style tactics. LTG Stilwell could not recover from the lack of shared understanding by influencing his Chinese counterparts. Instead, they explicitly went against his orders and suggestions, even to the detriment of the mission. Personality of the commander can either encourage or discourage integration among partners.

Finally, the case studies of LTG Patch and LTG Stilwell have a major difference that affects integration: LTG Patch had the entire Seventh Army during Operation Anvil/Dragoon, while LTG Stilwell only had himself and his staff during the first Burma Campaign. These two generals' experiences show that the ability to offer something to the multinational or joint partners facilitates integration. LTG Patch's army meant that the Air Force had help from the

ground to accomplish its mission in southern France. Patch did not just ask the Air Force for assistance without providing substantial manpower to the operation. Therefore, the Air Force and the Army were both invested heavily in the success of the mission, adding another layer of trust between the two services during the planning process. LTG Stilwell did not have the ability to offer substantial help to the Chinese in 1943. He could issue orders and develop plans, but he could not provide US soldiers to fight alongside the Chinese troops. Undoubtedly, this lack of investment by the United States did not go unnoticed by Chiang. Stilwell could not show that the United States was just as invested in the fight in Burma as the Chinese. Instead, it looked imperialistic that the United States could send one person over to the theater to get another country to fight for him. It was not until the second Burma Campaign that the United States invested more assets in the fight for the Burma Road. At this point, Chiang allowed Stilwell to form Task Force X from Chinese units, and lead the successful opening of the Burma Road.

Recommendation

ADP 3-0 already highlights the importance of shared understanding and its role in integration. It should continue to do this considering the importance shared understanding played for LTG Patch and LTG Stilwell during World War II. Instead of listing the requirements for integration as simply understanding, cooperation, and influence, the Army needs to point out that shared understanding among partners is paramount when integrating during operations.

Cooperation and influence are secondary to this.

The United States Army should change ADP 3-0 to emphasize the commander's role in integration, and the need for the commander's personality to be conducive towards working with others. ADP 3-0 alludes to the commander's role by saying that leaders "may find that integration...requires more of their time and energy than the synchronization of their own

operations.”¹⁷⁵ Beyond that, doctrine does not accurately reflect the role that only the commander can fill when integrating joint or multinational partners. Doctrine should be explicit in the fact that it is up to the commander to set the tone for his staff for integration, and personally work with partners to ensure integration occurs. It should show that commanders need to be willing to provide their own soldiers and assets to accomplish the mission alongside the multinational or joint partner, in order to demonstrate the willingness to work together with the partner on multiple levels. Additionally, doctrine should state that the personality of the commander could either facilitate or hamper integration. Army leaders responsible for integration need to be humble, empathetic, and respectful towards their partners in order to encourage cooperation. If the Army specifically lays out these requirements, then senior leaders will choose commanders whose personalities comply with these recommendations to ensure integration and mission success. As LTG Stilwell proved, being an excellent tactician and operational artists do not alone ensure integration. If the commander has the personality of someone like LTG Patch, he will have a much better chance of mission success with joint or multinational partners.

¹⁷⁵ ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 3.

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