


AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN OR DIFFERENT COINS
ALTOGETHER?
COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM INDIGNEOUS
GOVERNMENT AND OCCUPIER PERSPECTIVES**



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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Disclaimer

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Dedication

This study is dedicated to my loving wife, without whom my life is empty.




Table of Contents

Disclaimer	2
Dedication	3
Illustrations	5
Tables	6
Abstract	7
I. Introduction	8
A. Setting the Context	12
B. Background of the Sri Lankan Conflict	16
II. COIN approaches	19
III. Similarities and differences between COIN as occupation and governmental policy	23
A. Adopting strategy based on insurgent's worldview and identity	25
B. Role of public opinion and the support of the population	28
C. Stabilization and reconstruction	29
D. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) from a culturally aware standpoint	31
IV. Conclusion	35
Bibliography	38

Illustrations

Figure 1: World View of Sri Lanka. Congressional Research Service, “Sri Lanka, A Country Study.” <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lktoc.html> (accessed 28 November 2011).

Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of Ethnic Groups. Adapted and Reproduced by Permission from Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy* (New York, N.Y.: iUniverse Press, Inc., 2009), 86. Original sources: Sri Lankan Population Census, 1981; Robert Stoddard ‘Regionalization and Regionalism in Sri Lanka’, Paper presented at Session on South Asian Geography: Changing Trends and Patterns, Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison, Wisconsin, 7 November 1986, Map 6 (based on Assistant Government Agents’ Divisions).

Figure 3: The Claimed Greater Tamil Nadu. Adapted from and Reproduced by Permission from Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy* (New York, N.Y.: iUniverse Press, Inc., 2009), 4. Original source: <http://www.gobalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lte-maps.htm> (accessed 10 September 2008).

Figure 4: A Pyramid Organization. Adapted from and Reproduced by permission from Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism and Homeland Security* (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 36.

Figure 5: Range of Coercive Action



Tables

Table 1. Similarities and Differences of COIN Conducted by an Occupation Force and Indigenous Government

Table 2: Lessons Learned from the Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency

Table 3. Comparison of Sinhalese and Tamil Culture, Religion, and Language



Abstract

This study investigates the similarities and differences between counterinsurgency (COIN) conducted by an indigenous government and an occupying force. It concludes the apparently successful Sri Lankan experience demonstrates indigenous governments possess distinctive advantages over an occupation force. This is a result of its more advanced knowledge of the culture, language, and geography of the operational environment. It also is a consequence of the widespread support of its domestic populace due to the shared existential threat it faces from insurgent attacks and extortion. Indigenous governments have a deeper understanding of the human terrain and as a result are able to conduct more effective social network analysis and take more decisive kinetic action than an occupation force. The utility of these lethal attacks are they purge insurgents from the population. After this is accomplished counterinsurgents can effectively utilize non-kinetic means to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations. The key lesson occupying forces like the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan can learn from COIN prosecuted by an indigenous government like Sri Lanka is building a host nation's capacity is the most effective means to prevail in COIN because they have intimate cultural, linguistic, and geographic knowledge of the area of operations. An appropriate mix of kinetic and non-kinetic tactics is also vital to ending the conflict and building a sustainable peace.

I. Introduction

The sun sets tranquilly through the tropical green palm trees on the isle shaped liked a pearl in the Indian Ocean twenty-nine kilometers off the southeastern coast of India. For the first time in thirty years, there is no threat of suicide bombers thrashing international flights transiting the capital city's airport. Nor is there any danger of guerilla assaults on the public transportation or the cars roving on the freshly paved blacktop highways stretching to the baroque tourist hotels and beaches of the island. Today for the first time in three decades the nation of Sri Lanka is at peace. How did this happen?

Sri Lanka had formerly been terrorized by a separatist group called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since 1972 LTTE executed hit-and-run and suicide attacks against Sri Lankan government, religious, business, and civilian targets. Many analysts believed they were unstoppable. They said LTTE would achieve its goal of a separate ethnic homeland on the island which is approximately the size of West Virginia (Figure 1). Yet the Sri Lankan government waged a successful campaign to destroy LTTE beginning in 2006. This study explores how they did it.




Figure 1: World View of Sri Lanka. The Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka, A Country Study." <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lktoc.html> (accessed 28 November 2011).

This study will also endeavor to answer why a government who combats an internal separatist organization like LTTE has distinct advantages over a foreign occupying power like the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is currently a fashionable buzzword in military and academic circles, but little analysis has been given to the similarities and differences between COIN conducted by an occupying force and one fought by an indigenous government. This study will argue indigenous governments garner more public support than an occupying force from their domestic population because they face a shared existential threat from insurgent attacks and extortion. This gives their governments the ability to take decisive kinetic action against insurgents. Furthermore, indigenous governments have a deeper knowledge of the cultural, linguistic and geographic terrain of the operating area. They start their campaign at a more advanced knowledge point than an occupying force, and are able to wage COIN more effectively. The United States Army and Marine Corps COIN manual published in 2006 recognized the importance of such cultural awareness when it asserted:

Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency. American ideas of what is “normal” or “rational” are not universal. To the contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, and norms concerning gender. Thus, what may appear abnormal or strange to an external observer may appear as self-evidently normal to a group member. For this reason, counterinsurgents--especially commanders, planners, and small-unit leaders--should strive to avoid imposing their ideals of normalcy on a foreign cultural problem.¹

Table 1 illustrates the similarities and differences between COIN carried out by an occupying force and an indigenous government. Its contents are addressed throughout this paper.

Table 1. Similarities and Differences of COIN Conducted by an Occupation Force and Indigenous Government

Characteristic	Indigenous Government	Occupation Force
COIN Strategy and Tactics	Governments kinetically strike insurgent command and active cadre, and seek to win over the support of the insurgency's active and passive supporters.	Occupiers target insurgent command and active cadre, but the focus is on non-kinetic winning of the hearts and minds of the population.
	Government intimately knows the language, culture, and geographic terrain as well the political and economic grievances surrounding the conflict. Their native knowledge greatly informs their operational design.	Occupying forces face a gap in native language and cultural awareness. Forces require language and cross-cultural training; they often deploy inadequately prepared to operate in a foreign environment.
	Rehabilitation and development tailored to meet the populations' long-term needs.	Rehabilitation and development projects likely to be ethnocentric and may not meet population's true needs. Stabilization and development based on short term (quarterly) thinking.
Military Information Support Operations (MISO)	Insurgents attack government forces and indigenous population.	Insurgents target occupying forces or their domestic support. Propaganda aimed to influence counterinsurgent's domestic audience (e.g., "Proud to be Iraqi" sticker printed in English).
	Less likely to create collateral damage because governmental forces know the population and its linguistic and cultural traditions well; they can identify insurgents and suspicious activity.	More potential for collateral damage because lack of organic cultural and linguistic knowledge makes it hard for counterinsurgents to distinguish insurgents from native population. ²
	They also have an incentive not to harm the population because they want to reincorporate them into the state.	Need to build security and intelligence capability from scratch.
Role of public opinion and the support of the population	Information operations and conduct of forces will be carried out in accordance with cultural sensitivities of the population.	Information operations could be ethnocentric and miscommunicate the counterinsurgents' message (e.g., wrong cultural context, misused language, and inappropriate labels).
	Insurgent attacks increases population's support of the government. Ending the insurgency is a Just Cause and a vital state interest because it ensures the nation's survival.	Operations dependent on the support of domestic population (especially in democracies); counterinsurgent casualties can lead to withdrawal from occupied county.
	Population sees similarities in language, culture (ethnicity, race) with governmental forces; harder for insurgents to demonize them and rally population against them (unless they are corrupt, inept, or abusive).	Population perceives occupiers as outsiders and it is accordingly easier for insurgents to rally public support against them.
	If the conflict is long-term, it is possible outside groups (other states, international organizations, etc.) could intervene in the conflict.	Conflict maintained between occupying forces and political groups within the occupied country; outside intervention unlikely because the occupying force is likely the stronger state.

The lessons an occupying force can draw from the apparently successful Sri Lankan conflict are summarized in Table 2. The most obvious is a counterinsurgent must understand the insurgent's cultural, linguistic, and religious worldview and tailor their COIN strategy appropriately.³ The other is governments must gain and sustain domestic public support through Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and the provision of security and basic services to the populace. Since ethnic groups in contact with one another grow organically over time and intimately know each other's culture, religion, and linguistic traditions, it is in an occupying force's strategic interest to utilize indigenous forces when waging COIN to the fullest extent. So long as they are not acting outside the boundaries of international law, occupiers can build their partner nation's capacity to forge closer ties with them, improve the occupying nation's public image, and facilitate more effective COIN due to the host nation's familiarity with the operating area. Partner nations relieve the burden of unilateral engagement from occupation forces and significantly augment their cultural, linguistic, and geographic knowledge of the operating area.

Table 2. Lessons Learned from the Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency

Primary Lines of Effort	Secondary Lines of Effort
Cultural Awareness. Know the enemy as yourself. Understand their worldview, reality, identity, historical viewpoint, and meaning of existence. Getting inside the insurgent's mind can help the counterinsurgent develop a strategy to decisively defeat them.	Leverage the host nation's indigenous forces and intimate knowledge of the operational environment to the fullest extent.
Operational Design. Based on knowledge of the insurgent, tailor your strategy to defeat them. Use both lethal and non-lethal COIN tactics, avoiding collateral damage to the population. ⁴	Install competent leaders who possess the will to win the COIN campaign.
	Fatally strike insurgent command and cadre and persuade the population to support counterinsurgent stabilization efforts. ⁵ Deploy counterinsurgent forces for the long-term to facilitate realization of culturally appropriate COIN stabilization and reconstruction projects. ⁶
Military Information Support Operations (MISO). Carefully manage information operations to sustain domestic support and international opinion over the duration of the campaign.	Rapidly colonize media sources and deploy public affairs and counter-propaganda messaging to blunt insurgents and their supporters' message in the global marketplace of ideas. They should be short and attention-grabbing and speak to the indigenous population's true needs and fears. ⁷
	Isolate the enemy and overcome the domestic public's aversion to kinetic attacks through patriotic appeals. ⁸

Killing and capturing insurgents are often deemphasized aspects of COIN in the United States Government. However, they were vital to Sri Lanka's success against LTTE. Since kinetic operations are sometimes controversial, it is not the purpose of this study to weigh their morality. It is easy for outsiders viewing counterinsurgent actions from afar to lay judgment on their tactics. It is far more difficult to prosecute internal COIN where insurgents are indiscriminately targeting your countrymen. This study will not delve into the ethics of COIN strategies but will seek to assess their merits according to the value they bring to COIN efforts. Ethical questions in war are best left to moral philosophers.

A. Setting the Context

Two ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and Tamils, were fated by history and geography to live in close proximity to each other on the island of Sri Lanka. Despite their close association, they both possessed distinct languages, cultures, and religions. Scholars believe the Sinhalese, or the "People of the Lion," originated in northern India and migrated to Sri Lanka around 500 B.C.⁹ They speak Sinhala, an Indo-Iranian language linked to Persian, Hindi, Punjabi, and Urdu.¹⁰ In fact, they are the only group in the world which speaks Sinhala and professes their variant of Theravada Buddhism.¹¹ Their history includes many majestic kingdoms which championed Buddhism and successfully ruled the central and southern parts of Sri Lanka until the Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century.¹² The Sinhalese have a caste system but it is not as severe as the Hindu version due to the ameliorating effects of equality espoused in Buddhism.¹³ Sinhalese comprise the majority of the population and usually do not marry Tamils.¹⁴

There are two types of Tamils in Sri Lanka. Both speak Tamil, a Dravidian language which is the major regional language spoken in the Tamil Nadu state of southeast India.¹⁵ Sri Lankan Tamils are descendants of settlers and invaders from the distant past and are a native

minority.¹⁶ They live predominately in northern and eastern Sri Lanka (Figure 2).¹⁷ Indian Tamils are descendants of estate laborers imported by the British beginning in the 1830s.¹⁸ They live in the central highlands and are not as committed to the cause of a separate Tamil state as the Sri Lankan Tamils.¹⁹




Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of Ethnic Groups. Adapted and Reproduced by Permission from Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy* (New York, N.Y.: iUniverse Press, Inc., 2009), 86. Original sources: Sri Lankan Population Census, 1981; Robert Stoddard 'Regionalization and Regionalism in Sri Lanka', Paper presented at Session on South Asian Geography: Changing Trends and Patterns, Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison, Wisconsin, 7 November 1986, Map 6 (based on Assistant Government Agents' Divisions).

Both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils practice a type of Hinduism closely related to the cultural systems of Tamil Nadu.²⁰ Interestingly, Tamil Hindu shrines and statues coexist in Sri Lanka's Buddhist temples and their children attend school with the Sinhalese.²¹ Many Tamil Hindus also accept the Buddha as an important sectarian teacher or as a reformer of ancient Hindu culture.²² Numerous Tamils and Sinhalese are the best of friends, but they do not traditionally intermarry.²³ Table 3 contrasts Sinhalese and Tamil culture, religions, and languages.

Table 3. Comparison of Sinhalese and Tamil Culture, Religion, and Language

	Sinhalese	Tamil
Culture	Caste system - not as strict as Brahmanical Hindu social hierarchy History of majestic kingdoms with advanced engineering, horticulture, and warfare technologies since 500 B.C. Arranged marriages, strict obedience to parents, and great emphasis on education Kingdoms and State traditionally sponsored Theravada Buddhism	Hindu caste system similar to south India - do not intermarry with outside ethnicities or between castes History of Tamil kings invading Sri Lanka from the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu; at times, they ruled northern Sri Lanka Sri Lankan Tamils achieved social mobility under British Raj by learning their language, culture, and religion; great emphasis on education
Religions	Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhism Christianity (Catholic, Dutch Reformed Church, Anglican, Congregationalist, Methodist, and Baptist) Islam	Hinduism (based on south India practices) Christianity (Catholic, Dutch Reformed Church, Anglican, Congregationalist, Methodist, and Baptist) Islam
Languages	Sinhala derived from Indo-Iranian north Indian languages English	Tamil, a derivative of Dravidian south Indian languages English Sinhala

Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils possess a fear of assimilation by the Sinhalese majority, yet still see themselves as different from Tamils from southern India.²⁴ They feel an affinity for India, but are never truly sure they will receive support from the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu (Figure 3).²⁵ At the same time, the Sinhalese never forgot the linkages of northern Sri Lanka and southern India with the Tamil kingdom invasions in the past.²⁶ Indeed, India's southern Tamil Nadu state embodies a historical threat of Tamil emigration to the Sinhalese.²⁷ It is also a source of psychological and political-military support and sanctuary for Tamil politicians and separatists.²⁸




Figure 3: The Claimed Greater Tamil Nadu. Adapted from and Reproduced by Permission from Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy* (New York, N.Y.: iUniverse Press, Inc., 2009), 4. Original source: <http://www.gobalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lte-maps.htm> (accessed 10 September 2008).

Many Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils view their language, customs, and religion as greater to any other despite their understanding of several ethnicities and languages. According to a Library of Congress country profile of Sri Lanka:

Both Sinhalese and Tamils, occupying relatively well-defined geographical areas (the Sri Lankan Tamils in the Northern Province and parts of the Eastern Province, but with vulnerable enclaves in large cities; and the Sinhalese in the central and southern parts of the island), regard themselves as besieged minorities. Each community views itself as possessing a unique and superior culture, based on religion, language, and race. The integrity of this culture is perceived to be threatened by the encroachments of the other group. The Sinhalese perceive themselves as the only group of “Aryans” and Buddhists in an overwhelmingly Dravidian and Hindu region (including the populous state of Tamil Nadu and other parts of southern India), while Tamils see themselves as an endangered minority on the island itself. During the 1980s, this state of mutual paranoia sharpened the ethnic boundaries of both groups and intensified economic and social conflicts.²⁹

B. Background of the Sri Lankan Conflict

The ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils was exacerbated by colonial rule under the British Raj.³⁰ The British governed Sri Lanka from 1796 to 1948 and installed their form of western liberalism and market economy on the island.³¹ The colonial government favored certain minorities in the selection of military and civil service posts, including Tamils, who were more willing than the Sinhalese to attend Christian missionary schools where the curriculum was taught in English.³² This gave them a competitive advantage of knowing the language, culture, and faith of the colonial administrators and enabled them to enter technical and professional careers in great numbers.³³ Additionally, the Buddhist tenet of non-violence essentially prevented the Sinhalese from entering the colonial cadet corps.³⁴ Accordingly, Tamils and Burghers, who were the product of Dutch and Sri Lankan intermarriages, comprised less than twenty percent of the population but accounted for forty percent of all military officers.³⁵ Tamil social status under the British was disproportionate to their representation in the general population.³⁶

When British colonial rule ended in 1948 and Sri Lanka became an independent nation, the Sinhalese majority enacted legislation which was viewed by the Tamils as discriminatory.³⁷ In order to restore their social mobility, the Sinhalese dominated legislature made Sinhala the official language in 1956 and adopted Buddhism as the state religion in 1972.³⁸ The language policy effectively deprived Tamils of many of the advantages derived from their superior education and high social status in the Raj, and mandated they use state issued birth certificates, tax documents, passports, and land titles written in Sinhala.³⁹ Furthermore, Tamil applicants for coveted government positions and university entrance examinations had to take them in Sinhala instead of English or Tamil.⁴⁰ In the 1970's, the government instituted agricultural projects

which encroached on the Tamil minority's land. This policy resettled Tamil populations and sparked their further discontent.⁴¹ Also fueling the Tamil sense of grievance was the fact that most of the police force and the entire military in Sri Lanka were Sinhalese by the 1980's.⁴²

The rising ethno-nationalism within postcolonial Sri Lanka and the situation where the once dominant Tamils suddenly found themselves a political underclass had other precedents in the world. In Rwanda, Belgium elevated the minority Tutsis over the majority Hutu in their colonial government.⁴³ When they left, Hutus encouraged mass persecution and killing of more than 800,000 Tutsis in 1994 when the Hutu President's plane was shot down, even though most Hutus and Tutsis shared the same language, intermarried, and worshiped the same god-like Tutsi king.⁴⁴ Similarly, the President of Albania in the 1980's gave more prominence to the minority Tosks over the Gëgs and made the Tosk dialect the official Albanian language.⁴⁵ This politicization of linguistics engendered ethnic animosity because it put the Gëgs at an educational disadvantage like the Tamils and impaired their economic advancement and social mobility.⁴⁶ The political elite in Belgium who spoke French did a similar thing when they mandated the use of French in Belgian schools, thereby placing the Flemish at a disadvantage while extending social mobility to the Walloons, who already spoke French and comprised the Belgian middle classes.⁴⁷ As these examples show, government policies favoring applicants of a certain ethnicity result in social stratification, a sense of grievance for those who lose their social position, and at times armed conflict.

The consequence of the Sinhalese ethno-nationalist policies was a Tamil separatist movement beginning in 1972 led by Tamil politicians for a greater Tamil state (called Eelam, or "Precious Land") within Sri Lanka's borders. Various Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), adopted guerilla tactics against the Sri

Lanka government and contested its governance of the island.⁴⁸ One of the most successful and infamous insurgent leaders in the world, Velupillai Prabhakaran, led LTTE.⁴⁹ From 1983 to 2009, he waged a separatist revolt against the Sri Lankan government which caused over 70,000 deaths and displaced more than 460,000 people.⁵⁰ Prabhakaran's uncompromising attitude additionally led to the occupation of northern and eastern Sri Lanka by the Indian army from 1987 to 1990.⁵¹

Prabhakaran created a cult of personality and exploited Sri Lankan Tamil fears of losing their social status to attain power and create a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka.⁵² He was an eighteen-year-old high school drop-out and the son of a minor government official when he established LTTE using recruits drawn from the lower caste of Tamil fishermen.⁵³ He used Marxist ideology to gain support of Sri Lankan Tamils from all social classes and castes, and his magnetic charisma attracted many to his nationalist cause across the political spectrum.⁵⁴ The myth of his invincibility among some followers significantly rose after a band of three thousand LTTE fighters forced seventy thousand Indian peacekeepers to withdraw from Sri Lanka in 1990.⁵⁵ After this event, he became a romantic hero of Tamil nationalism. Above all, Prabhakaran knew the importance of winning the population's backing.⁵⁶ He stated: "After an initial attack, we give protection to the population. Without the people's support, we would have been betrayed and our movement would not have been there."⁵⁷ Additionally, he opined: "The Liberation Tigers are not different from the people. The Liberation Tigers is a people movement. The people are the Tigers."⁵⁸

The Sri Lankan conflict is most aptly termed an insurgency. The American Heritage dictionary defines an insurgency as an "instance of rebellion" and an insurgent as one who "rises in revolt against an established authority, especially a government."⁵⁹ Consequently, the

contemporary Sri Lankan conflict is most accurately called an insurgency because Tamils have been an organic part of the Sri Lankan island for thousands of years. Additionally, LTTE was condemned internationally as a criminal terrorist organization and rebelled against the legitimately elected Sri Lankan government.⁶⁰ It normally fought in civilian clothes using unconventional means.⁶¹ It was dependent on diaspora funds, international aid, and illegal activities such as the black market sales and extortion to fund its operations.⁶² Moreover, LTTE could not indefinitely govern the areas it controlled because it was not democratically elected and therefore lacked legitimacy.⁶³

II. COIN Approaches

Classical COIN theory stresses the support of the population to efficaciously locate and root out insurgents who use an ideology to mobilize the population.⁶⁴ It emphasizes the denial of the population to insurgents who would use it as the base of their popular and logistical support.⁶⁵ It envisions a tiered methodology to COIN in which counterinsurgents carry out targeted strikes against insurgent command and cadres using intelligence garnered through protection and support of the population (Figure 4).⁶⁶ It also stresses the importance of sustaining public support through economic aid and development to eliminate insurgent “shadow governments.”⁶⁷ This entails the provision of health, construction, and sanitation services and amenities such as shelter, food, clothing, water, electricity, and schools based on the needs of the community.⁶⁸ It is a winning of hearts and minds designed to delegitimize the insurgents and convince the population the government will prevail in its counterinsurgency campaign.⁶⁹ If successful, the population will move its support behind the government and shift the momentum towards the counterinsurgents. Sir Robert Thompson, the architect of the British COIN campaign in Malaysia, summarized classical COIN thought well when he stated:

“An insurgent movement is a war for the people. It stands to reason that government measures must be directed to restoring government authority and law and order throughout the country, so that control over the population can be regained and its support won.”⁷⁰




Figure 4: A Pyramid Organization. Adapted from and Reproduced by permission from Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism and Homeland Security* (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 36.

Classical COIN emphasizes the discriminate and proportional use of force.⁷¹ Kinetic actions in some cases are counterproductive because heavy handed counterinsurgent reprisals against the population to eliminate insurgents can engender sympathy for the insurgents.⁷² COIN theory subsequently stresses unconventional tactics, including small unit patrols, ambushes, counter ambushes, intelligence gathering, the precise application of firepower, troop discipline and constraint, and the humane treatment of prisoners.⁷³ It also calls for mobile rapid reaction forces supported by surgical close air support and artillery.⁷⁴ Cultural and language awareness is a key aspect of orthodox COIN thought because it enables the counterinsurgent to create a rapport with the population to convince them of the government’s legitimacy and win them over to the counterinsurgent’s side.

As illustrated in Figure 5, efficacy in COIN is achieved by an optimal balance of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies. The American Heritage dictionary defines coercion as the ability “to force to act or think in a certain way by use of pressure, threats, or intimidation.”⁷⁵ It encompasses a range of actions which induce levels of shock which may or may not be sustainable. For example, highly kinetic coercive acts produce high shock value against an opponent but are not sustainable. A domestic or international audience may adversely react to them and pressure a government to reduce the lethality of its operations. Conversely, non-kinetic acts such as rebuilding infrastructure and providing education are highly sustainable because the population needs them in order to maintain their community. But they may not weed out the insurgents leading to increased insurgent kinetic attacks and recruitment activities. Ideally, counterinsurgents use a balance of kinetic and non-kinetic activities to ensure COIN success.




Figure 5: Range of Coercive Action.

Current United States COIN doctrine misplaces an emphasis on non-kinetic actions at the expense of kinetic strikes on insurgent leaders. For instance, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, offers United States military leaders the following contradictory maxims:

- Sometimes lethal responses are counterproductive. At other times, they are essential. The art of command includes knowing the difference and directing the appropriate action.⁷⁶
- In situations where civil security exists, even tenuously, Soldiers and Marines should pursue nonlethal means first, using lethal force only when necessary.⁷⁷
- Effective leaders are as skilled at limiting lethal force as they are in concentrating it. Indeed, they must learn that nonlethal solutions may often be preferable.⁷⁸

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, furthermore mentions the discriminate use of force to compel and control a host-nation's population but stresses non-kinetic actions. It states, Military forces can earn the trust and confidence of the people through the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, *not through lethal or coercive means*. Positive influence is absolutely necessary to achieve lasting control and compliance. It contributes to success across the lines of effort and engenders support among the people. Once attained, influence is best maintained by consistently exhibiting respect for, and operating within, the cultural and societal norms of the local populace.⁷⁹

United States doctrine thus focuses on winning the hearts and minds of the population through economic development and political persuasion over more lethal methods of defeating insurgents.⁸⁰ In a broad sense, such an approach is grounded in a liberal democratic political structure which requires public support.⁸¹ More attention to the kinetic aspects of COIN is however needed in order to maximize United States military effectiveness.

The Sri Lankan COIN experience proved kinetic operations are vital to eradicating the insurgent threat to a populace.⁸² Sri Lanka cut off the head of the LTTE snake, rallied its citizen's support, and executed lethal attacks of high shock value before engaging in non-kinetic

stabilization and reconstruction. This approach created the environment for long-term political resolution of their COIN campaign, which ended in May 2009.

III. Similarities and Differences between COIN as Occupation and Governmental Policy

An indigenous population supports their government's kinetic COIN operations more than the population of an occupation force because they use the same social institutions and have similar cultural reference points as the insurgent.⁸³ In developing countries, individuals from many different social classes, ethnic groups, and religious affiliations are interspersed throughout their nation's rural and urban environment.⁸⁴ They are not divided into neat segregated communities based on class or ethnicity as in the developed world.⁸⁵ They utilize the same schools, hospitals, government facilities, and even religious shrines.⁸⁶ They are exposed to the "Other's" language, styles of dress, food, holidays, and worldviews through fluid social interactions from a very young age, especially over national television and radio.⁸⁷ This social pluralism creates an intimate understanding and compassion among indigenous peoples unlike an occupation force, which has to rapidly learn the human and geographic terrain when it executes military operations. Indigenous counterinsurgents culturally, linguistically, and geographically start their campaign at a more advanced knowledge point than an occupying force. They are more effectively positioned to exploit shared meanings to win their campaigns and incorporate insurgent cadre into the state.

Indigenous populations are also more likely to tolerate the exercise of violence against insurgents than an occupation force because of the shared existential threat of insurgent attacks and extortion. Indigenous populations experience the conflict first-hand whereas the occupation population experiences it virtually through the media. Kinetic attacks, if unfavorably portrayed over the round-the-clock news cycle, can affect the withdrawal of an occupation force from the

area of operations.⁸⁸ In contrast, an indigenous government cannot retreat.⁸⁹ It is fighting a struggle for state survival and is consequently more predisposed than an occupation government to unleash its full kinetic capabilities on insurgents. An occupation force also has historically other military commitments and fights a much more limited war than an indigenous government. An occupation government's vital interests are not affected as much as an indigenous government if it loses its battle against an insurgency.

A local government furthermore is sovereign over its territory and possesses a monopoly of force over its citizens.⁹⁰ It is the sole legitimate authority with a "right to protect" its population against internal or external violence.⁹¹ Conversely, occupation forces are typically in another country at the request of its sovereign government. Their kinetic actions are more negatively viewed by the indigenous population because they do not possess a monopoly on violence, particularly if their operations result in collateral damage. Additionally, their presence is considered "foreign" by the domestic populace.⁹² They perceive the occupiers as interlopers who are not an organic part of the human and geographic terrain of their country.⁹³ A Philippine Lieutenant Colonel during the Huk rebellion in 1950 best expressed the ambivalence of the population towards occupiers when he said:

Foreign troops are certain to be less welcome among the people than are the regular armed forces of their own government. Local populations will shelter their own people against operations of foreign troops, even though those they shelter may be outlaws. For this reason, native troops would be more effective than foreign forces in operations against native communist conspirators. It would be rare, indeed, if the use of foreign troops would not in itself doom to failure an antiguerilla campaign.⁹⁴

The indigenous government also has an incentive to rehabilitate insurgent cadres to make them productive members of society because they are part of the historical landscape of the nation. Occupation forces do not have as great a need to reeducate insurgents and they can bring outside resources to rebuild the occupied state.

A. Adopting Strategy Based on Insurgent's Worldview and Identity

One of the key differences between COIN conducted by an occupying force and an indigenous government is their attitude toward the use of kinetic and non-kinetic actions. In the small wars throughout history, insurgents largely carried out attacks against occupying forces. In turn, occupying forces were spurred to engage in ever more destructive search and destroy conventional operations, as was seen in Vietnam and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹⁵ This was because occupation forces found it hard to distinguish insurgents from the civilian population.⁹⁶ They blended into the geographic and human terrain of the battlespace and counterinsurgents simply could not find them.⁹⁷ Additionally, counterinsurgents embraced lethal tactics out of frustration from continued harassment by insurgent forces on their lines of communication.⁹⁸ At times this led to indiscriminate use of lethal force against innocent bystanders resulting in alienation of the population and loss of domestic public support.⁹⁹

In COIN conducted by a native government, however, it was qualitatively easier for governmental forces to distinguish an insurgent from average civilians due to their comprehensive knowledge of the culture, language, and geography of their country.¹⁰⁰ For example, LTTE typically fought in civilian clothing and dissolved into the population to conceal themselves from Sri Lankan security forces.¹⁰¹ It was truly difficult to distinguish them from the civilian populace, and it was only accomplished because Sinhalese forces knew from lifetime

experiences to differentiate LTTE suicide attackers from Tamil civilians based on their mannerisms and speech.¹⁰²

Similarly, indigenous governments can more effectively influence its enemy than an occupation force due to its advanced familiarity with its adversary. For example, Sri Lanka opened its security checkpoints to allow LTTE to visit southern Sri Lanka from 2001 to 2005.¹⁰³ This enabled them to see firsthand Sinhalese and Tamils leaving peaceably together which starkly contrasted with LTTE propaganda that all Sinhalese were evil warmongers.¹⁰⁴ The government acquainted visiting LTTE with modern material abundance and technology after many years of deprivation under Prabhakaran.¹⁰⁵ This convinced some high-ranking members of LTTE's leadership to defect to the government's side, which led to the acquisition of invaluable intelligence and the construction of the LTTE social network by Sri Lankan intelligence agents.¹⁰⁶

Indigenous counterinsurgents are also generally more fired by patriotic fervor to locate and eliminate the threat to their countrymen than occupation forces because insurgents carry out attacks in the counterinsurgent's homeland. Throughout offensive operations, the Sri Lankan government broadcasted LTTE attacks on unarmed Sinhalese villagers and Buddhist monasteries, forcible recruitment of children as young as ten to become foot soldiers, and use of Tamil civilians as human shields to increase nationalistic support for governmental COIN efforts.¹⁰⁷ Sri Lankan military achievements and the names of its forces were publicized.¹⁰⁸ As a result, they became heroes to the population and reinforced the nationalistic mission of defending Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁹ Sri Lanka also significantly increased the morale and fighting spirit of its soldiers by monetarily providing for the families of the members of its armed forces.¹¹⁰ These actions mobilized Sinhalese popular support behind the government and facilitated the consolidation of

patriotic sentiment, justified expenditures on military forces, and galvanized commitment to repairing the war-torn regions of northern and eastern Sri Lanka.¹¹¹

Indigenous governments furthermore demonstrate a keen interest in rehabilitating insurgent cadre into the state's political-economic system. For example, over 9,000 captured LTTE cadres were rehabilitated, reunited with their families, and provided educational and employment opportunities based on their level of indoctrination.¹¹² Reintegration with the society even included college entrance exams and marriage ceremonies arranged by the Sri Lankan government. This level of concern for former foes revealed indigenous governments will go to great lengths to repair their war-torn country. Conversely, Ba'athists were purged from Iraqi government institutions by United States occupation forces thereby alienating them and producing substantial grievances against the Iraqi state, arguably leading to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).¹¹³

COIN conducted by contemporary occupiers was chiefly designed to non-kinetically persuade adversaries and their supporters to give up their struggle.¹¹⁴ For instance, United States commanders realized their kinetic strikes on Sunnis and Shias were turning Iraqi and American public opinion against them and shifted to protect the population in order to win their support.¹¹⁵ The Americans and the Iraqi national government erected concrete barriers creating strategic hamlets to keep insurgents out of civilian neighborhoods.¹¹⁶ Additionally, United States forces were divided into small units and conducted frequent dismounted patrols to interact with the Iraqis, provide a security presence, deter insurgent attacks, and gather intelligence.¹¹⁷ This created a level of trust between Iraqi civilians and occupation forces which Ricks credited with increasing cooperation and the supply of information to American counterinsurgents.¹¹⁸ The

occupiers also offered amnesty and money to insurgents and transformed them into tribal security forces called the Sons of Iraq.¹¹⁹

Multinational forces in Afghanistan similarly sought to build Afghan National Army and Police capabilities and improve the living conditions of the local populace. However, the security forces training curriculum did not account for the fact that only twenty-eight percent of the Afghan population was literate and spoke over thirty different dialects.¹²⁰ Consequently, the majority of Afghan recruits were not trained like their Iraqi counterparts since they could not read manuals, follow written instructions, and understand Afghanistan's laws at a rudimentary level.¹²¹ Occupation forces also planned to execute development projects like dams ten to twenty years in the future which did little to improve the Afghan citizen's quality of life or the legitimacy of the central government in the near term.¹²² This allowed the Taliban to fill the governance vacuum in basic services and win over the population's support in certain regions.¹²³

These examples reveal occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan adopted a strategy of persuasion after the relative miscarriage of their more lethal tactics. They endeavored to establish the rule of law and provide essential services to stem insurgent violence and gradually increase security and development. But these non-kinetic actions still did not completely eliminate the insurgent threat to occupation forces or the indigenous population. Like most occupiers, coalition forces were hesitant to use their full kinetic power due to its potential deleterious effect on host nation, domestic, and international support.¹²⁴ As a result, insurgents continued to greatly threaten the indigenous population throughout the occupation.

B. Role of Public Opinion and Support of the Population

Public support is a fundamental reason why modern occupying nations face more challenges than indigenous governments in a COIN campaign. Merom argued democracies were

comprised of elected officials whose constituencies adversely reacted to negative media images portraying brutal kinetic tactics used in a COIN campaign.¹²⁵ He cited Vietnam as an example where televised images undermined American public support for COIN on moral grounds eventually leading to Congressional withdraw of funding and the end of the American occupation.¹²⁶ Indeed, insurgents recognized democracies have a strategic vulnerability in domestic political support. Blaufarb et al. stated “when insurgent leaders have the requisite skills and understanding of how the western media function, they have a powerful tool to advance their cause by manipulating opinion overseas.”¹²⁷ Western liberal educational systems, free press and representative elections based on the concept of one person, one vote are therefore critical in COIN campaigns.¹²⁸ Counterinsurgent kinetic assaults on insurgents and collateral damage, if unfavorably portrayed in the media, can affect the withdrawal of counterinsurgent forces and facilitate strategic defeat.¹²⁹ Public enthusiasm for distant wars also wanes if citizens feel their government is not using overwhelming force to defeat insurgents.¹³⁰

C. Stabilization and Reconstruction

Successful COIN involves stabilization and reconstruction for both occupiers and indigenous governmental forces like the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.¹³¹ In the United States Army’s COIN manual, a strategy of clear, hold, and build was established as a means to fill the void left by retreating insurgents and establish governmental legitimacy.¹³² This was accomplished by troops living amidst the population in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹³³ It was also facilitated by the provision of public works and basic services, including roads, bridges, shelter, food, water, clothing, wells, medicine, electricity, and other services and infrastructure crucial to a functioning and stable civil society.¹³⁴ Similarly, the Sri Lankan government’s macroeconomic development plan called for substantial assistance and aid to its northern and

eastern regions, including mine removal, restoration of health, education, and civil administration, as well as resettlement, livelihood programs, literacy campaigns, and the rebuilding of banking and trading institutions.¹³⁵ Sri Lanka's new development strategy stated:

Economic development can promote peace. The conflict in the North and the East has taken a heavy toll on the resources of the country and has also weakened investor confidence. Therefore, promotion of *regionally balanced economic growth* becomes necessary to secure peace and prosperity. As part of the regional development strategy of the Government, a substantial investment on infrastructure development in the North and the East will be reflected in the national growth strategy to *promote lasting peace through economic progress and equal opportunities*.¹³⁶

The manner in which an indigenous government like Sri Lanka and an occupying force like the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan carried out stabilization and reconstruction differed in several important aspects. The Sri Lankan government intimately knew the language, culture, and geographic and human terrain as well as the political and economic grievances of its minority population.¹³⁷ It had a vested interest in accommodating their concerns because it sought to incorporate them into the nation. It also wanted to resettle more than 460,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) as soon as possible to make them productive members of society who contributed to its free market economy.¹³⁸ Its development projects were based on the needs of the population and were sustainable.¹³⁹ Sri Lanka's ninety-one percent literacy rate facilitated the government's rehabilitation efforts.¹⁴⁰

Conversely, occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan routinely had to scramble to create a pool of culturally and linguistically trained forces to conduct civil and development assistance.¹⁴¹ They faced a gap in their cultural, linguistic, and geographic knowledge which they

attempted to overcome through the enlistment of host nation support among other techniques.¹⁴²

As a result, stabilization and development projects at times did not take the true needs of the population into account and in fact increased rather than reduced the population's sympathy for the insurgency. They were typically wasteful and ill-planned.¹⁴³ For example, according to Van Buren, American forces established a chicken processing plant without consulting Iraqis who did not have the electricity, refrigeration, transportation to distribute the processed chickens, or income to purchase them.¹⁴⁴

Americans in such cases failed to understand the indigenous population's worldview, literacy proficiency, and need for basic services such as water, food, electricity, and sanitation which led to botched reconstruction projects. They saw their allies and adversaries as a mirror image and focused on short-term quarterly gains consistent with their cultural perspective. They would have been much more successful if they had worked more closely with their Iraqi and Afghan counterparts or even empowered them to execute their own redevelopment. They would have radically improved operational effectiveness by building Iraqi and Afghan capacity and then assisting them as necessary instead of unilaterally trying to reconstruct their nations.¹⁴⁵ As Kilcullen asserts, occupiers who work by, with, and through indigenous guides, interpreters, military personnel, and political leaders greatly improve their COIN efficacy.¹⁴⁶

D. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) from a Culturally Aware Standpoint

Sri Lanka took social factors into consideration as it carried out a comprehensive counterpropaganda campaign to blunt the insurgents' accusations of human rights violations, including purported retaliatory killings of Tamil civilians and wanton property destruction by Sri Lankan governmental forces.¹⁴⁷ It conveyed different messages to audiences with varied cultural backgrounds. For example, its message of combating terrorism resonated deeply with the

Sinhalese because they had been victims of LTTE's suicide attacks.¹⁴⁸ Its message to the international and Tamil communities included its pursuit of a humanitarian rescue operation with a policy of zero civilian casualties in its struggle with LTTE.¹⁴⁹ Likewise, it addressed Sri Lankan Tamils when it stated it would encourage reconciliation and accountability with an emphasis on post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in northern and eastern Sri Lanka if it prevailed against LTTE.¹⁵⁰

Sri Lanka endeavored to avoid collateral damage.¹⁵¹ However, LTTE's exploitation of the Sri Lankan Tamil population, including their positioning of artillery near hospitals and populated centers, made it very difficult to avoid such damage.¹⁵² Sri Lanka had a strong incentive to protect the Sri Lankan population because it expected to reincorporate them into society after the conflict's conclusion.¹⁵³ It additionally needed to deny LTTE recruitment of the Tamil population in order to win its existential struggle against the insurgents.¹⁵⁴

Consequently, Sri Lanka's kinetic assaults were discriminate and precise.¹⁵⁵ Before it began an attack, it announced to the population by radio, television, and leaflets it was going to commence operations.¹⁵⁶ It encouraged them to leave and many Tamils sought safety in Nongovernmental (NGO) shelters or made their way to government controlled safe havens.¹⁵⁷ This saved many Tamil lives and undoubtedly contributed to reconciliation and rehabilitation at the conflict's conclusion.

Sri Lanka's desire to avoid harming civilians was evidenced in its policies and strategic communications. For instance, it created a National Action Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights as well as a Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission.¹⁵⁸ Their intent was to institutionalize restorative justice and accountability for past events while increasing transparency of Sri Lanka's democratic processes. Moreover, Sri Lanka utilized its

U.N. mission to promote positive messages to the international community and counter LTTE propaganda.¹⁵⁹ For example, it disputed a British Channel 4 documentary alleging counterinsurgent raping and execution of Tamil civilians and LTTE cadre by showing they were “a concoction of fabricated footage and unfounded allegations propagated by the LTTE media.”¹⁶⁰ Sri Lankan officials requested international patience and assistance in rebuilding a nation torn by war stating “the government had a monumental task in providing relief assistance, education facilities for children, rehabilitating LTTE cadres, returning child soldiers to their homes, demining, and providing shelter.”¹⁶¹ It also asserted international rights groups wrongly focused on the final stages of the conflict while ignoring LTTE’s twenty-seven year reign of terror over the Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim populations of Sri Lanka.¹⁶²

There were significant informational differences from the Sri Lankan experience for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lack of cultural and linguistic awareness greatly impaired United States COIN operations. For instance, Van Buren chronicled how United States agencies tried to provide Iraqis with quick community development schemes, such as children’s bicycles, weight-lifting equipment, Yellow Pages, art, and internet service even though they lacked electricity, water, medical care, and sanitation.¹⁶³ These projects were based on American liberal free market traditions which did not resonate with local Iraqi beliefs, culture, and material needs.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, coalition forces tried to bring democratic governance to Afghanistan even though Pashtun tribal leaders felt they had democracy already through their jirga (tribal council), mullah (religious establishment), and wali (district governor) institutions.¹⁶⁵ They said, “We already have democracy, but at the tribal level, not the central state. How will elections improve things?”¹⁶⁶

Additionally, occupation forces adopted the wrong cultural context, symbols, and information distribution systems when creating their messages, such as when they disseminated “Proud to be Iraqi” car bumper stickers written in English.¹⁶⁷ They crafted their messages using their western traditions and the English language and missed critical opportunities to dislodge the population from insurgent control.¹⁶⁸ They also lacked linguists and employed disproportionate force in response to insurgent provocations, like the killing of twenty-four Iraqi civilians by United States Marines after their convoy was bombed in Fallujah.¹⁶⁹ As a result, the indigenous population perceived American forces as antagonistic outsiders. It was easy for insurgents to brand them as oppressors and turn public opinion against them because of their foreign worldview.¹⁷⁰

On the other hand, Sri Lankan public affairs were more attuned to the population’s cultural and linguistic traditions and stressed tolerance and coexistence.¹⁷¹ Even though Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese forces were ethnically, linguistically, and religiously different from the Tamil population, they were never completely viewed as a conquering force. They fulfilled the legitimately elected government’s obligation to protect its citizens.¹⁷² The Sinhalese never gave up their nationalistic support for their government’s long COIN operation because LTTE’s attacks struck close to their homes.¹⁷³ Information operations in Sri Lanka’s COIN were grounded in the Sinhalese and Tamil worldviews and this enabled the Sri Lankan government to convince domestic audiences of the government’s legitimacy and the need to employ unrelenting kinetic attacks to finally end the LTTE insurgency. Its continuous training of its forces and leadership emphasis on restraint enabled thousands of Tamil civilians to escape harm and expedited the ultimate destruction of LTTE in May 2009.¹⁷⁴

IV. Conclusion

United States military commanders frequently adhere to conventional warfare and the search for Napoleonic decisive battles while sidestepping the more difficult, nuanced kinetic approach to COIN espoused by classical COIN theorists.¹⁷⁵ Certainly advances in United States COIN doctrine have been profound due to American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and are laudable. However, democratic societies have shown a penchant to demand withdraw of their forces deployed abroad when confronted with images of brutality and casualties in the media. Since insurgents easily blend into the population, their propaganda inevitably accuses counterinsurgents of indiscriminate civilian killings. This can lead to decreased domestic public support and it is the strategic vulnerability in a contemporary occupier's COIN operation.

One of the vital aspects of counteracting insurgents is breaking their control over the population.¹⁷⁶ This is accomplished by understanding the population's worldview and speaking their language. In Iraq and Afghanistan the American military has learned operational lessons and adapted to changing circumstances by leveraging culture and language to enhance the population's security.¹⁷⁷ The Army and Marine Corps COIN manual published in 2006 stated:

Perhaps the biggest hurdle for U.S. forces is accepting that the host nation can ensure security using practices that differ from U.S. practices. Commanders must recognize and continuously address that this "the American way is best" bias is unhelpful. While relationships among U.S. police, customs, and military organizations works for the U.S., those relationships may not exist in other nations that have developed differently.¹⁷⁸

Joint Publication 5-0 additionally directed commanders and staffs to "consider differences in partners' laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, *culture*, politics, religion, *language*, and caveats on authorized military action" as well as "*geographical features*;


population demographics (ethnic groups, tribes, ideological factions, religious groups and sects, language dialects, age distribution, income groups, public health issues); and political and socioeconomic factors (economic system, political factions, tribal factions)” when planning military operations.¹⁷⁹

The codification of such thoughts in official United States military doctrine offers hope the United States will adopt a more socially nuanced COIN approach to future conflicts. However, current United States COIN doctrine emphasizes non-kinetic actions at the expense of kinetic assaults on insurgent leadership. This approach is only partly effective. To enhance it, United States theorists should incorporate kinetic strikes and combined small unit patrols using intelligence garnered from insurgent social network analysis in subsequent doctrinal versions.¹⁸⁰ This would prompt a cultural shift towards a more holistic attitude to COIN and enhance non-kinetic approaches, including stabilization and reconstruction.¹⁸¹ It would additionally refocus United States COIN on decapitating the insurgent’s hierarchical social structure and truly clear insurgents from the population, thereby expediting the long-term success of the clear, hold, and build strategy.

COIN conducted by an indigenous government and an occupier are not two sides of the same coin but are qualitatively different kinds of COIN altogether. An indigenous government can more effectively sustain domestic support due to the existential threat posed by the insurgents against the population. Indigenous governments also have intimate familiarity of the culture, language, and geographic terrain of the operating area and are thus better equipped to locate insurgents and convince the population of counterinsurgent legitimacy. In certain circumstances as shown by the Sri Lankan example, this knowledge enables counterinsurgents to utilize an effective mix of kinetic and non-kinetic tactics to militarily defeat insurgents and create

the political leverage for a long-lasting peace. Indigenous governments in these respects have definitive advantages over occupying forces when executing COIN operations.

United States military effectiveness would greatly benefit from greater use of advanced cultural and linguistic awareness in its COIN operations. Respecting a partner's abilities and building their capacity is crucial for an occupying force like the United States because indigenous forces have intimate cultural, linguistic, and geographic expertise and are much better positioned to locate insurgents and win the support of the population. As long as the host nation operates within the boundaries of international law, it is in an occupier's strategic interest to augment their capabilities and assist them in conducting a combined COIN campaign.¹⁸² United States planners should therefore leverage host nation cultural, language, terrain knowledge to the fullest extent in order to enhance United States COIN efficacy. Such security assistance aids both occupation forces and the host nation to realize their political objectives. With any luck, it will also lead to long-term operational success for both strategic partners.



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¹ Department of Defense, *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 2006), 1-15.

² James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Wichita, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 258, 262, 272. Corum and Johnson assert collateral damage by occupation forces enables insurgents to exploit civilian deaths for propaganda purposes. They also stated "aerial firepower often results in unintended civilian casualties, which is wholly counterproductive to a type of warfare where the popular support of the civilian population is the key to victory."

³ Ibid., 1-15; and Michael Vlahos, "Terror's Mask: Insurgency Within Islam", report (Joint Warfare Analysis Department of Applied Physics Laboratory, John Hopkins University, May 2002), http://www.jhuapl.edu/ourwork/nsa/papers/Terror_Islamism.pdf (accessed 5 October 2011), 7. It is fundamental in COIN for the counterinsurgent to know the enemy as they know themselves. Vlahos said the counterinsurgent must know the insurgent's worldview, including their definition of reality, identity, rules for living, viewpoint, and their meaning of existence. He also said they needed to know the insurgent's collective narrative utilized to place them within a historical context, particularly their culture, beliefs, behavior, and sense of belonging. A government is greatly aided in its COIN efforts by a thorough understanding and intimate knowledge of the population's cultural traditions, language, and worldview of combatants within the battlespace. This knowledge enables them to carry out tailored COIN strategies according to its geographic and human terrain.

⁴ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 5-0. Joint Operation Planning*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 2011), GL-13. According to Joint Publication 5-0, operational design is the conception and construction of a framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. In a

COIN campaign, kinetic and non-kinetic coercive and persuasive operations are grounded in cultural, linguistic, and geographic awareness of the operational environment.

⁵ Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: The Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran (New Delhi, India: Pentagon Security International, 2010), 394. Mehta stated counterinsurgents need to: always target the leaders; gain the support of the population by *not* doing them harm and locating physically near them; and offer amnesty to insurgents to turn them into sources of information.

⁶ Ibid., 394. Mehta said counterinsurgents must “control the area. The enemy must not have any place to rest. If they cannot rest, they will lose morale. If they lose morale, they surrender.”

⁷ Ibid., 394. Mehta stated insurgents and terrorist groups need outside (diaspora) support. “They need to have weapons and ammunition as supplies, safe resting and training facilities. This outside support is their life line. It must be severed.”

⁸ Ibid., 394. Mehta said, “The enemy must understand that you are ready to go to the end to win the war. That means a resolve for the long slog and a stomach for attrition. If the enemy thinks that you develop a feet of clay quickly, he will continue fighting.”

⁹ The Library of Congress, “Sri Lanka, A Country Study,” <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lktoc.html> (accessed 28 November 2011).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy* (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1986), 10.

¹⁸ The Library of Congress, “Sri Lanka, A Country Study.”; K.M. De Silva, *Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka* (New Delhi, India: Penguin Books, 1998), 9-11; and M.R. Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, The First Profile of the World’s Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader* (Columbo, Sri Lanka: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2004), 11.

¹⁹ The Library of Congress, “Sri Lanka, A Country Study.”

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.; and K.M. De Silva, *Reaping Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*, 12, 301. Aryans are meant in this passage to mean a member of the people who spoke a proto-Indo-Iranian language and included inhabitants of Iran, Afghanistan, and India in the distant past. It does not mean the erroneous Nazi theory of a non-Jewish Caucasian, especially of Nordic type, held to be part of the “master race.”

³⁰ S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy*, 77, 93-94, 97; M.R. Narayan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World’s Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 29-52; and Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 33-47.

³¹ Library of Congress, “Sri Lanka, A Country Study.”

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.; S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy*, 73-73, 79, 82. The British taught both the Sinhalese and Tamils the English language as well as western culture and government, but Tamils were favored in key administrative and civil service positions according to Tambiah.; and K.M. De Silva, *Reaping Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*, 309. De Silva said Samarasinghe stated “The Tamils have

already lost the relative position in central government employment that was enjoyed in the past. Apart from the obvious economic loss this entails, there is the psychological adjustment that many Jaffna (Tamil) families must make in the wake of this change. There is the fact that government jobs are no longer as easily obtained as they were a generation or two ago. The Sinhalese, on the other hand, are bound to view the change as a natural and inevitable adjustment that bestows on them their 'due' share. Clearly there are two different perceptions of the same phenomenon. The result is the Tamils have begun to feel they are 'discriminated' against and the Sinhalese feel recent changes have simply reversed the 'discrimination' they had been subjected to in the past."

³⁷ Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy* (New York, N.Y.: iUniverse Press, Inc., 2009), 29. K.M. de Silva said the Sinhalese and Tamils inherited "two different nations, from a very ancient period. These two nations differ entirely in their religion, language, and manners"; and K.M. De Silva, *Reaping Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*, 5-6.

³⁸ Ibid., 45-46; K.M. De Silva, *Reaping Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*, 45-48; and M.R. Narauan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World's Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 15; and Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 2005), 141.

³⁹ K.M. De Silva, *Reaping Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*, 52-55; M.R. Narauan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World's Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 15; and S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy*, 71.

⁴⁰ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 82; K.M. De Silva, *Reaping Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*, 15; and S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy*, 66, 74-76, 80.

⁴¹ S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy*, 141.

⁴² Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 175; and M.R. Narauan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World's Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 4.

⁴³ British Broadcasting Corporation, "Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened," <http://news/bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.htm> (accessed 1 December 2011).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ The United States Marine Corps, "Albania: A Country Study," www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/Albania%20Study_2.pdf (accessed 1 December 2011).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Making of Flemings and Walloons: Belgium: 1830-1914," *The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press* 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1974): 179-235, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/202507> (accessed 1 December 2011).

⁴⁸ Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 64-67.

⁴⁹ M.R. Narauan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World's Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 35-44.

⁵⁰ Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 168-172; and M.R. Narauan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World's Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 276.

⁵¹ Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 133-134; and M.R. Narauan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World's Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 206-210.

⁵² M.R. Narauan Swamy, *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran, First Profile of World's Most Ruthless Guerilla Leader*, 38-41; Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 1, 123-124; and Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, 141. LTTE conducted suicide terrorist and hit-and-run guerilla operations against Sri Lankan politicians, civilians, and prominent religious shrines for three decades. LTTE established its base of operations in northern and eastern Sri Lanka and used southern Tamil Nadu as a sanctuary and logistical base. LTTE's extortion of Tamils for monetary support, utilization of child soldiers as young as ten-years-old, and the methods in which it "perfected the use of suicide bombing; invented the suicide belt; pioneered the use of women in suicide attacks; [and] assassinated two world leaders [former Indian Premier, Rajiv Gandhi, and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa]" resulted in widespread Sinhalese support for the government's counterinsurgency campaign against LTTE.

⁵³ Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka, A Country Study."

⁵⁴ Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran*, 41, 92, 205, 213, 220. Prabhakaran vigorously read books on Che Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, and Ho Chi Minh in order to develop

asymmetric strategies for use against the Sri Lankan government and Indian army forces. He assiduously cultivated a sense of nationalism among the population to pull Tamils to his cause. He wrote, "Our liberation struggle as an oppressed nation is an integral part of this international war, a war of revolutionaries against the reactionary forces of oppression, the forces of imperialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, and racism. Our revolutionary armed struggle has proved to be a guiding force for the oppressed peoples and races of the third world. The lonely but valiant battle of our freedom fighters, both against the Sinhalese forces and the world's biggest armed force in India, has entered the pages of history." Prabhakaran's stubborn refusal to negotiate with the Sri Lankan and Indian governments and his insistence on the establishment of a separate Tamil state even though he had little chance of achieving his ultimate goal underscored his historic sense of mission. He saw himself as a rationale actor destined to free the Tamil people from Sinhalese tyranny, and this sense of identity fueled his movement.

⁵⁵ Library of Congress, "Sri Lanka, A Country Study."

⁵⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2006), 141-145. Hoffman stated Prabhakaran created a highly effective historical narrative around the martyrdom of its cadre for the utopian ideal of the Tamil nation of Eelam. Suicide operations were seen "as a 'gift of the self,' a 'self-gift,' an 'oath to the nation,' that is offered in the name of Tamil Eelam." This included cadre using suicide bombing tactics on land, sea, and air fashioned on total cadre ideological commitment. It was created through the use of cyanide if caught by counterinsurgents, sexual obstinacy, and ritual ceremonies affirming willingness to die for Prabhakaran.

⁵⁷ Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran*, 190.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ The American Heritage College Dictionary, 4th Ed. (New York, N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 720.

⁶⁰ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, 142. In fact, LTTE foreshadowed terrorist techniques adopted by Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah; and Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," monograph (The United States Institute of Peace, 2005), http://home.comcast.net/~christine_fair/pubs/Diasporas.pdf (accessed 9 November 2011), 144. Fair noted "the LTTE established ideological, financial, and technologies linkages with the various Khalistani-oriented Sikhs, the Kashmiri separatists, and other militant organizations based in the Middle East...The United States designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) as early as 1997. Ottawa followed in 1999. Later in 2001, Britain and Australia similarly designated the group."

⁶¹ Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011.

⁶² Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," 140-141, 143-144.

⁶³ Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," 146. Fair said LTTE was a co-participant in the 2002 Norway brokered peace talks, which in her opinion restored the international community's view of LTTE as an *insurgent* group vice a terrorist organization.

⁶⁴ Austin Long, "On the 'Other War': Lessons from the Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research", monograph (RAND Corporation, 2006), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf (accessed 5 October 2011), 15; David Galula, *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International, 2006), 4, 82, 86; and Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 34, 40.

⁶⁵ David Galula, *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 52, 75-94.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 75-76; and Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism and Homeland Security* (Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth, 2006), 35-37.

⁶⁷ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 62, 106; Department of Defense, *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, 5-15; and Douglas Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, *Fourteen Points: A Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C.: The BDM Corporation, July 1984), II-20.

⁶⁸ Department of Defense, *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, 5-15.

⁶⁹ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 169, 176-177.

⁷⁰ Blaufarb and Tanham, *Fourteen Points: Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency*, I-8.

⁷¹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 65; and Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (New York, N.Y.: The Penguin Press, 2009), 27.

⁷² Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 104-105.

⁷³ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 164-191; David Galula, *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 75-94; and Blaufarb and Tanham, *Fourteen Points: Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency*, II-18, II-19.

⁷⁴ David Galula, *Counterinsurgent Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 76; and Blaufarb and Tanham, *Fourteen Points: Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency*, II-23, II-24.

⁷⁵ The American Heritage College Dictionary, 4th Ed., 278.

⁷⁶ Department of Defense, *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, 7-5. It also says “Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is” on 1-27.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 7-7. Also on 1-27 it says “Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction.”

⁷⁸ Ibid., 7-9. Also on 1-27 it says “Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.”

⁷⁹ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 5-0. Joint Operation Planning*, III-31.

⁸⁰ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2009), 31-32, 60, 112, 124-125, 129, 145-146, 259, 266-268, 285-286. Kilcullen said “Typically, insurgents react to government countermeasures by going quiet (reducing activity and hiding in inaccessible terrain or within sympathetic or intimidated population groups) when pressure becomes too severe. They emerge later to fight on. *This is one reason why an enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency is often counterproductive.* It tends to alienate and harm the innocent population, who become caught up in fighting and suffer “collateral” damage, but does little harm to the enemy, who simply melt away when pressure becomes too great.” He also said “The [Afghan] government must de-energize the [Taliban] insurgency and break its hold on the population, *rather than seeking to solely to kill insurgents...*there is no known method of conducting [COIN] without using armed force to kill or capture insurgents. But...a government that is losing to an insurgency is not being outfought, it is being outgoverned.” Additionally, he stated, “because of the need to radically constrain costs in order to counteract AQ’s exhaustion strategy, *the use of U.S. military forces (air, ground, or maritime) in a direct combat role in this protracted conflict must be considered a last resort.*” Moreover, Kilcullen asserted “the aim should be not to arrest or kill adversaries but to co-opt them--not to destroy the enemy but to win him over.”

Kilcullen, one of the foremost experts on counterterrorism and COIN, in these statements shows his preference for population-centric COIN and downplays kinetic strikes on insurgent leaders. However, both are necessary to wage an effective COIN campaign in the author’s opinion. Insurgents will not fade away if counterinsurgents use non-kinetic stabilization and reconstruction efforts to establish their legitimacy and win the population’s support.

Surgical kinetic raids on insurgent leaders eradicate their influence on the population.

⁸¹ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 15.

⁸² John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 130. Tierney said the United States executed a similar COIN tactic in the Philippines when they deposed of the leader of the insurrection, Aguinaldo, through subterfuge by camouflaging white American soldiers among local fighters to infiltrate the leader’s camp. They captured him and thus degraded the insurrection, and “the rebellion began to resemble the writhing death throes of a headless body.”

⁸³ Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011. Although Sri Lanka did not officially conduct public opinion polls on its population support of governmental COIN efforts, senior Sri Lankan officials stated counterinsurgents received broad-based popular support from Sri Lankan citizens, particularly the Sinhalese. This was supported by anecdotal evidence in the author’s conversations with many Sri Lankan nationals; and John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*, 15. Tierney noted insurgents intimately know the operational environment. He said “guerillas know the land by heart; it is their home. They hide in the native mountains, swamps, jungles, farmlands, or urban sprawl, places where an outsider would seldom dare go.”

⁸⁴ Robert E. Gamer, *The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1976), 200-218. Gamer described how ethnicities, cultures, religions, and linguistics intermingle among groups within developing nations. He said Furnivall stated about Java, “It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, and its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the marketplace, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side-by-side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere, there is a diversity of labor along racial lines.”; and Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 5. Bandarage said in Sri Lanka caste, not language or religion, was the basis for social stratification. Additionally, she stated “there has been tremendous inter-mixture between Sinhala and Tamil populations as well as the Muslims who are considered an ethno-religious group in Sri Lanka.”

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid; and K.M. De Silva, *Reaping Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka*, 70. De Silva said “A settlement of Roman Catholics at Wahakotte in the hills of central Sri Lanka (close to Matale) going back to the 17th century still survives as a monument to the traditional tolerance of the Buddhists.”

⁸⁷ S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy*, 58. Tambiah said Sinhalese and Tamils were exposed to each other's languages in national insignia, currency, postage stamps, road signs, and official documents as well as national radio and television.

⁸⁸ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 63; and John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 167, 171, 175.

⁸⁹ David Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One*, 146. Kilcullen said indigenous populations are "fixed". They are "tied to their homes, business, farms, tribal areas, relatives, and so on."

⁹⁰ Jim Forsyth, "Realist Thought and Strategic Practice" (lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 22 August 2011); and Robert D. Kaplan, "To Catch a Tiger," editorial (The Atlantic, July 2009), <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/07/to-catch-a-tiger/7581/> (accessed 27 December 2011). Kaplan argued LTTE's brutality drove the Sri Lankan government to use overwhelming kinetic force to end the conflict, albeit with the support of China. He said their previous low-level kinetic and non-kinetic efforts were ineffective. He also stated the United States should not use Sri Lanka's indiscriminate methods but that they were very effective in killing LTTE leaders and ending its insurgency against the state.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One*, 34-38, 142-143.

Kilcullen calls the situation where a foreign force occupies a territory and conduct COIN the "accidental guerilla syndrome." His thesis is an extremist group enters an area, occupies its governance social structure and inculcates its ideology, and is positioned to turn indigenous locals against occupiers due to its influence. He cites Iraq as an example where Sunnis elected to fight alongside Al Qaida fighters because they felt they had to fight to protect their families and communities. Thus, foreign intervention creates second and third order effects, particularly support for extremists, which is mitigated by denying the population to the insurgents and establishing the host nation's legitimacy through good governance according to Kilcullen.

⁹³ Ibid., 235. Kilcullen said "the definition of 'foreigner' is elastic and rests in the eyes of the beholder."

⁹⁴ John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*, 225.

⁹⁵ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 236; Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 3-8; and John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*, 102. Tierney stressed the point occupation forces bring disruption to indigenous peoples, produce resentment, and lead to insurrection. This was seen in the United States intervention in the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

⁹⁶ Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, "Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009," www.defence.lk/news/20110801_Conf.pdf (accessed 3 November 2011), 14, 54. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence, LTTE wore civilian clothing and moved with civilians being evacuated from LTTE occupied zones in order to launch surprise attacks on Sri Lankan security forces. These included suicide bombings.

⁹⁷ John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*, 15. Tierney said "Guerillas...are true citizen-soldiers. They blend into the population easily and can include women and children, as well as men who farm the land at day and raid the enemy's outposts at night. They fight amid the native population and depend on the loyalty of their neighbors for their own lives. Disloyalty is punished severely, and enforced loyalty to the local cause can often be as brutal and as severe as the punishments inflicted by the outsider himself. By definition, guerilla war has also been labeled "internal war" since it involves civilians within an established locale either fighting among themselves or against outsiders"; and James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, 268. Corum and Johnson state "insurgents generally do not have strategic assets and infrastructure that can be targeted by airpower. Moreover, guerillas generally do not have easily identifiable fielded forces and quite often mingle with the civilian population." They contend large-scale use of air power in occupations such as Vietnam engender indigenous population support for insurgents and are thus counterproductive to a counterinsurgency campaign.

⁹⁸ Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 208-213; David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One*, 243; and Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* (New York, N.Y.: The Free Press, 1989), 304.

⁹⁹ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One*, 241-242, 253-254.

¹⁰⁰ Blaufarb and Tanham, *Fourteen Points: Framework for Analysis of Counterinsurgency*, III-11.

¹⁰¹ Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011; and Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 330-333, 377, 380.

¹⁰² Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011. There is an unclear “tipping point” where acts of war addressed by military forces become criminal acts addressed by civilian law enforcement. For instance, if soldiers are attacked, the military will consider it an act of war and respond with kinetic force. Conversely, if a crime takes place, like a murder, local law enforcement will treat it as a civil matter and investigate, pursue, and bring the perpetrator to justice, characteristically in a court of law. An indigenous government like Sri Lanka is better positioned than an occupation force to distinguish whether a crime is an act of war by insurgents or an act carried out by criminals due to their knowledge of the operational environment. Moreover, they are more likely to more quickly transition to the use of law enforcement once insurgent forces are “rolled back” from the operational area. In contrast, an occupation force keeps its forces in the operating area, leading it to rely on its deployed forces to use military force to respond to acts of petty criminals, potentially alienating the population through the use of heavy-handed kinetic actions. This was seen in Iraq where murders in Baghdad were treated as insurgent acts despite their obvious non-military nature.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. The Sri Lankan government established a military line of control and checkpoints cordoning LTTE areas in the north and east and barred Sri Lankan citizens from travelling there. It allowed only vital humanitarian shipments to these areas, most of which LTTE claimed and sold to Tamils at a high price. LTTE deprived Tamils living in the north and east many of the material benefits enjoyed by the Sri Lankan population living in the south, thus reinforcing the government’s message that life under its rule was better than life under LTTE; Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 378. Mehta described how the Sri Lankan government effectively facilitated defection of top ranking LTTE cadre, including Colonel Karuna, thereby gaining invaluable intelligence and counterpropaganda material. Sri Lanka opened the security checkpoints from 2001 to 2005 to allow LTTE to visit southern Sri Lanka. This enabled them to see firsthand Sinhalese and Tamils leaving peaceably together which starkly contrasted with LTTE propaganda that all Sinhalese were evil warmongers. Additionally, it acquainted visiting LTTE with modern material abundance and technology after many years of deprivation until LTTE. This convinced some members of LTTE’s leadership to defect to the government’s side, which led to the acquisition of invaluable intelligence and the construction of the LTTE social network by Sri Lankan intelligence forces; and Malik Ahmad Jalal, “Think Like a Guerilla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka,” monograph (Harvard National Security Journal Forum, June, 2011), <http://harvardnsj.org/2011/06/think-like-a-guerilla-counterinsurgency-lessons-from-sri-lanka/> (accessed 27 December 2011). Jalal cited the defection of Colonel Karuna, the LTTE military commander in eastern Sri Lanka, with weakening LTTE recruitment and destabilizing the organization enough to result in its defeat by Sri Lankan governmental forces.

¹⁰⁷ Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 124, 214-220.

¹⁰⁸ Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 115-199, 380. Mehta said the Sri Lankan government significantly increased the morale and fighting spirit of its soldiers by taking care of their families and reinforcing their nationalistic mission of defending the Sri Lankan homeland. It additionally enlisted the support of the Sri Lankan populace, who supported the government’s efforts. Leadership in Mehta’s opinion was the decisive factor leading to LTTE’s defeat in 2009.

¹¹¹ “Sri Lanka New Development Strategy”, report (Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2011), <http://www.recoverlanka.net/data/SLDF05/SLNDS.pdf> (accessed 5 October 2011), 3-5; and Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 238. Mehta noted “with colorful editorials, articles and pictures, the local media outmaneuvered...and counterbalanced Western criticism of the conduct of the war. The patriotic local media played a commendable role in disseminating news on the war and the Human Rescue Operation and supported the forces to preserve the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.”

¹¹² Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011. Rehabilitation of LTTE cadres was accomplished through educational programs based on their level of LTTE indoctrination. Reintegration with the society even included college entrance exams and marriage ceremonies arranged by the Sri Lankan government.

¹¹³ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 310-311; and Michael R. Gordon and Bernard R. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 2006), 169, 476-477.

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- ¹¹⁴ David Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in Midst of Big One*, 31-32, 60, 112, 124-125, 129, 145-146, 266-268, 285-286.
- ¹¹⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 200-201.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 217-218; David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 142-143; and John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*, 168. Tierney said the United States in the Dominican Republic in 1921 erected cordons to deny areas to insurgents and facilitate their capture and interrogation. Counterinsurgent overreaction often led to mishandling of innocent civilian caught in the cordon dragnet.
- ¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 208-216; and David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 142-143.
- ¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 190-194; and David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 142-143, 173.
- ¹¹⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 311.
- ¹²⁰ Jeffrey Reilly, "Developing an Operational Approach: Understanding the Operational Environment" (lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 9 January 2012).
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹²² *Ibid.*
- ¹²³ *Ibid.*
- ¹²⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 12; and Jeffrey Reilly, "Developing an Operational Approach: Understanding Operational Environment" lecture.
- ¹²⁵ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 15; and Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 251.
- ¹²⁶ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 241.
- ¹²⁷ Blaufarb and Tanham, *Fourteen Points: Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency*, IV-4.
- ¹²⁸ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 63; and John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 167, 171, 175. Nagl said media reporting of the Tet offensive significantly reduced American public support for the Vietnam conflict and created pressures on elected officials to change tactics and reduce American troop presence.
- ¹²⁹ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 71.
- ¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 21, 58.; and Walter R. Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2002), 222. According to Mead, the United States public turned against the Vietnam War not because Americans were opposed to military action but because they felt the government was not using overwhelming force to defeat the North Vietnamese.
- ¹³¹ Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran*, 374-376. Mehta noted "military force devoid of serious developmental content is doomed to failure" and it may not always be possible to win a war with purely military means, to the exclusion of development, diplomacy, public support, and so on."
- ¹³² Department of Defense, *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, 5-18; and Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 89.
- ¹³³ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq*, 89.
- ¹³⁴ Department of Defense, *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, 5-5; and David Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in Midst of Big One*, 87-93.
- ¹³⁵ "Macro Action Plan, 2011-2015", presentation, slides 48-56 (Sri Lanka Ministry of Economic Development, 2011), <http://med.gov.lk/english> (accessed 5 October 2011).
- ¹³⁶ "Sri Lanka New Development Strategy", 3.
- ¹³⁷ Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, "Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009," 14, 53, 83. The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence stated, "The LTTE's land fighting units had intimate knowledge of the ground terrain, and often fought in civilian clothing. This made it possible for its cadres to blend in with civilians and penetrate areas close to the detachments of the Security Forces. The knowledge of the ground and intelligence gathered about Security Force deployments proved a formidable threat when coupled with the scale of land fighting forces and the tactics it employed". The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence also stated, "During the Humanitarian Operation in the East, the strategy adopted with careful use of terrain imperatives by the Security Forces successfully managed to separate terrorists from civilians to a large extent."
- ¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 83-84.

¹³⁹ Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 372-373. Mehta cautioned the Sri Lankan government must avoid “winner take all” public affairs and strategic communications and “polarizing political rhetoric and tactics” among other things in order to create a sustainable and lasting peace.

¹⁴⁰ The State Department Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Sri Lanka Background,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm> (accessed 10 January 2012). According to the State Department, Sri Lanka has compulsory education to age 14 and a primary school attendance of 96.5%. The literacy rate is 91%.

¹⁴¹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 144; and Peter Van Buren, *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People* (New York, N.Y.: Metropolitan Books, 2011), 10. Van Buren says only 29 of the 610 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) members deployed to Iraq mid-2007 could speak Arabic.

¹⁴² Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 12.

¹⁴³ David Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One*, 287.

¹⁴⁴ Peter Van Buren, *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose Battle for Hearts and Minds of Iraqi People*, 140-148. Van Buren described a chicken processing plant in Iraq which failed because Iraqis kept live chickens imported from Brazil in their homes, which cost half as much as the Styrofoam packaged processed chicken created in a United States reconstruction project. Iraqis accordingly did not buy the chicken leading to failure of the reconstruction project.

¹⁴⁵ James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, 437. Corum and Johnson said “the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people is the most important factor in a counterinsurgency.” Consequently, “even with the best intentions, if another state intervenes to take over the fight against an indigenous insurgency, as was the case with United States intervention in South Vietnam, a majority of the population will come to resent the intervening power and the legitimacy of the government will erode. In the end, the insurgents will benefit politically from foreign intervention and will be able to credibly present themselves as the true representatives of the people while characterizing the national government as a ‘foreign puppet’.” Corum and Johnson offer a remedy for this dilemma. They advocate occupation forces equip, train, and provide intelligence and economic assistance to host nation forces in order to increase the counterinsurgency’s legitimacy in the eyes of the indigenous population.

¹⁴⁶ David Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One*, 15, 100, 112, 114, 181, 270-271, 289.

¹⁴⁷ “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka,” report (United Nations, Executive Summary, 2010), http://un.org/News/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (accessed 6 October 2011), vi.

¹⁴⁸ Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 210-211.

¹⁴⁹ “Report of Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka,” ii; and Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, “Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009,” 52-53, 62-70, 85. The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence stated, “Recognising the amount of force necessary for a Humanitarian Operation of this magnitude, Security Forces were equally aware of the possible adverse consequences of such force – namely, civilian casualties. As a result, Security Forces took utmost care prior to, during and after the operation to keep collateral damage at a minimum, having regard to Zero Civilian Casualty policy of the Government.” It noted “initial confrontations took place in the primary jungle, thus restricting effective use of Armour and Artillery. Built up areas were carefully avoided in keeping with the “Zero Civilian Casualty” policy that had been adopted.” It also used forward air controllers to call in accurate fires.

¹⁵⁰ “Report of Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka,” iv; and Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 389. Mehta said President Rajapaksa is “careful to use conciliatory language and speak about the importance of winning the peace, not just the war.” But, in his opinion, there is a way to go to create a long-term peace to the Sri Lankan insurgency.

¹⁵¹ Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, “Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009,” 54. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence stated, “All available high tech resources and skilled personnel ensured precision targeting of military objectives, which minimized collateral damage”; and Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 135, 213, 322-323, 364, 377, 397, 408. Mehta asserted the Sri Lankan Air Force operated continuously, including at night. He said it had a difficult time distinguishing targets and often struck friendly as well as insurgent forces. However, Sri Lanka did possess UAV’s from Israel, fixed and rotary wing aircraft from Russia and China, and radar from Pakistan which greatly aided its military operations against LTTE. Intelligence gained from LTTE defectors additionally supported the government’s interdiction campaign.

¹⁵² *Lies Agreed Upon: Sri Lanka Counters Channel 4* (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011), 58 min., 3 sec.; MPEG. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5O1JAfRXew> (accessed 7 October 2011); and Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, "Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009," 27, 57-70. Sri Lanka stated its tactics and training emphasized avoidance of civilian casualties in the large battles of magnitude against LTTE in 2008 and 2009. The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence alleged the families of the Tamil diaspora who resisted giving funds to LTTE were threatened. It also said LTTE used Tamil civilians as human shields and government security forces risked their lives to rescue them from LTTE cadre at great risk. It was hard to distinguish LTTE from the populace because they dressed as civilians and posed as innocents needing governmental rescue. While being rescued, they detonated suicide bombs, killing Sri Lankan government security forces.

¹⁵³ Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 214-216.

¹⁵⁴ Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, "Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009," 38, 62-63.

¹⁵⁵ Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 329-351, 366-367, 374-377; Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011; and S.J. Tambiah, *Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and Dismantling of Democracy*, 78. Mehta and Silva described in detail the Sri Lankan government's kinetic operations, including nighttime infiltration and attacks on LTTE's support bases as well as their interdiction of LTTE's lines of communication. According to Mehta, Sri Lankan forces halted their assaults to enable civilians to escape LTTE control. According to Silva, the Sri Lankan military became a true learning organization which adapted to LTTE's modus operandi. Since it knew LTTE's attacks were designed to provoke Sri Lankan overreaction, its kinetic assaults were discriminate and precise. Before it began an attack, it broadcast to the population by radio, television, and leaflets it was going to commence operations. It encouraged them to leave and many Tamils sought safety in NGO shelters or made their way to government controlled safe havens. The Sri Lankan government denied LTTE requests for negotiations because they allowed LTTE to rest and resupply their cadres. It did so because LTTE had reneged several times on previously negotiated agreements. The Sri Lankan navy blockaded the strait separating southern India from northern Sri Lanka to disrupt LTTE's financial and logistical support. It implemented flanking movements around LTTE positions and used its organic security forces to clear, hold, and build recaptured territory. They filled the void left by retreating LTTE cadre who had previously established a de facto government, including banks, courts, schools, security forces, and even their own time zone in insurgent controlled regions. Counterinsurgents quickly established civil administration and repatriated LTTE cadres and supporters into society through reeducation, redevelopment, and reconstruction programs. They also conducted information operations to convince domestic and international audiences it was fairly treating captured LTTE and those displaced by the conflict. Sri Lanka military leaders allowed the international media into forward combat areas to increase operational transparency. They announced LTTE had been militarily defeated in May 2009.

¹⁵⁶ Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, "Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009," 54, 63. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence stated, "Security Forces gave public notice through leaflets and amplifiers to encourage civilians to leave the combat zone, in case there were people left behind that the LTTE had not taken with them." It also used loudspeakers and radios to encourage civilians to escape.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 64, 69, 82. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence said it received civilians in receiving stations and then transferred them to civilian centres for occupation, where they were given medical attention, food, and shelter. They were held there until military operations ended and it was safe for them to return to their homes. Frequently this involved demining the surrounding territory; and Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, "Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009," 38, 62-63. Information operations carried an effective message to LTTE that it was the target of counterinsurgent attacks and to the population that their children would be coerced to fight for LTTE cadres. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence said LTTE abducted Tamil children as young as age ten and made them fight as insurgents. They forced Tamil civilians to remain in LTTE controlled areas to maintain their supply of such recruits. Accordingly, the population was fundamental in the Sri Lankan government's struggle against LTTE because it only could eliminate LTTE forces by cutting off its support and supply of resources, including recruits, from the population.

¹⁵⁸ Sri Lanka Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), "Peace and Reconciliation, Unity and Prosperity," <http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/> (accessed 9 October 2011), v; and Sri Lanka Internet Newspaper. "Sri Lanka Announces National Action Plan to Protect Human Rights," *ColomboPage*, 6 October 2011, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_11B/Oct06_1317912178CH.php; and Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, "Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009," 85. The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence stated, "On 15 May 2010, President Mahinda Rajapaksa established the Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) with the objective to heal the wounds created as a result of the protracted conflict and to bring about reconciliation and unity among the people of Sri Lanka. The Commission has the authority to investigate and report

on, inter alia, the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to 18 May 2009, inclusive of identifying persons or groups responsible for those events.”

¹⁵⁹ Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations in New York, “Human Rights Watch Challenged by the Sri Lanka Mission to the UN,” <http://www.slmission.com/news/news/16-mission-news/580-hrw-meeting.html>.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.; *Lies Agreed Upon: Sri Lanka Counters Channel 4*; Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, “Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006 – May 2009,” 54, 62-70, 71-79, 85; and Maj Gen Raj Mehta, *Lost Victory: Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo*, V. Prabhakaran, 242-243, 267. A Sri Lankan High Commission according to Mehta dismissed video and photographs of alleged Sri Lankan Armed Forces atrocities noting “in many instances in the past, various media institutions used doctored videos, photographs and documents to defame the Sri Lankan Government and armed forces.” The government thought they were “staged by Tamil supported who wish to discredit the Sri Lankan Army”. The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence stated, “...defeating the LTTE could not be achieved with a minimum operation or single tactic. Military victory required large-scale, coordinated effort, combining the strength of all three armed forces, a high level of discipline and the use of multiple tactics, adapted for different terrains and contexts.” It outlined the training of its forces on the Laws of Armed Conflict, discipline, treatment of civilians, knowledge of Tamil language and customs, and safe weapons handling. Additionally, the Sri Lankan Air Force used Precision Guided Munitions to avoid collateral damage. Sri Lankan forces also used “no fire zones” and strategic pauses to facilitate the rescue of civilians. The Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence stated, “Having exhausted all alternatives, Sri Lanka used military force at the point when it was necessary to defend its citizens and state from LTTE. The amount of force used was determined based on consideration of the strength, resources, and sophistication of the LTTE.” It noted the LTTE “carried the civilian population with them also to recruit them into their ranks.” And, “The LTTE had built bunkers around the [Roman Catholic] church and launched artillery from the premises.” Those who tried to escape LTTE controlled territory were killed by LTTE according to the Sri Lankan government.

¹⁶¹ *Lies Agreed Upon: Sri Lanka Counters Channel 4*.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Peter Van Buren, *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose Battle for Hearts and Minds of Iraqi People*, 208-215.

¹⁶⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 12-13, 162-165; and Peter Van Buren, *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose Battle for Hearts and Minds of Iraqi People*, 76, 14-141, 150-152, 160-161, 196-197, 208-215, 223, 245-254.

¹⁶⁵ David Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in Midst of Big One*, 77-78.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 78. Kilcullen said “women and children are excluded from this governance system and it does not cover the full range of state functions, but for male Pashtuns tribal governance is in principle very egalitarian; in ideal terms, except when appointed as a temporary war leader in time of conflict, no adult male Pashtun can tell another what to do. All have a theoretically equal vote in the jirga and a right to be heard.” In a sense, Pashtuns have democratic governance and do not necessarily need a western electoral government imposed on them by occupation forces.

¹⁶⁷ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 29-30; and Peter Van Buren, *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose Battle for Hearts and Minds of Iraqi People*, 45, 58, 72, 119, 139, 150-151.

¹⁶⁸ Jeffrey Reilly, “Developing an Operational Approach: Understanding the Operational Environment” lecture.

¹⁶⁹ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, 4-8.

¹⁷⁰ Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 100.

¹⁷¹ Asoka Bandarage, *Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, and Political Economy*, 219.

¹⁷² Malik Ahmad Jalal, “Think Like a Guerilla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka.” Jalal said Tamils in LTTE occupied territories had the chance to vote in popular democratic elections which determined whether the Sri Lankan government would take a hard line with LTTE. Following LTTE’s defeat in May 2009, they were also included in the elections which determined the fate of the leaders who had waged a successful kinetic campaign against LTTE. Jalal noted “the fact that the LTTE had to use threats and violence against its own community to enforce the boycott [of the elections] resulted in the government beating the insurgents in the fight for domestic public support...ultimately it was the democratic nature of the Sri Lankan government that enabled it to *successfully marshal public opinion to accept the human losses and financial costs of a sustained military campaign.*”

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Maj Gen Shavendra Silva, interviewed by the author, 7 November 2011. Sri Lanka adopted a multitier COIN strategy based on leadership, societal support, and stabilization and reconstruction. When Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected as President in 2006, he appointed his brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, as Minister of Defence. This ensured

the Sri Lankan military received the resources it needed from the state because the familial relationship eliminated bureaucratic obstacles. Sri Lanka organized, trained, and equipped its forces to wage dynamic COIN operations. Its military leaders were chosen based on their competence and not their seniority. Strong leadership coupled with increased resources enhanced morale, discipline, and training of Sri Lankan forces which led to operational successes and momentum against LTTE on the battlefield. Recovered territories were secured and the government instituted reconstruction programs. Humanitarian operation successes were given wide coverage over radio and television; and Malik Ahmad Jalal, "Think Like a Guerilla: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka." Jalal said Sri Lanka's promotion of competent military leaders who had autonomy and authority to carry out innovative military tactics including small man teams, rapid frontal assaults, and use of stealthy inflatable rafts instead of boats led to avoidance of large-scale casualties and destruction of LTTE cadre and leadership.

¹⁷⁵ John J. Tierney, *Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History*, 4-5, 239-242. Tierney said the United States has had counterinsurgency forces throughout its history, such as the Marines in the Philippines and the Green Berets in Vietnam. However, in his view, the larger strategic culture did not see COIN as part of its core competency, and therefore it continued to allocate resources and train to conventional warfare.

¹⁷⁶ James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, 272, 361, 372.

¹⁷⁷ Thomas E. Ricks, *Gamble: General Petraeus and American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, appendix D. Ricks summarized how the United States military operated in Iraq after 2006 under General Petraeus.

¹⁷⁸ Department of Defense, *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, 6-11.

¹⁷⁹ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 5-0. Joint Operation Planning*, II-11, III-9.

¹⁸⁰ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, 157-158, 163, 191. Nagl described how the USMC used combined action patrols with South Vietnamese forces to secure the population and gradually eliminate insurgents surrounding the populated settlements. This "ink spot approach" was effective because it was based on cultural and linguistic knowledge of the operating environment supplied by the Vietnamese forces. Arguably, the United States military bureaucracy is resistant to such innovations because it may become symbiotic with host nation forces and lose autonomy. However, it is an effective means to obtain operational intelligence and locate insurgents who blend into the population due to their cultural and linguistic familiarity with the human and environmental terrain. Nagl said the British demonstrated such an approach in Malaysia. He stated "the British army slowly evolved a combined civil-military-political strategy that defeated the insurgency with small unit military tactics derived from a supportive local population."

¹⁸¹ Peter Van Buren, *We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose Battle for Hearts and Minds of Iraqi People*, 208-214. Van Buren described small development projects in Iraq which were not based in the Iraqi population's true needs (which were electricity, water, sanitation, and housing), including pastry classes for disadvantaged women, children's calendars, bicycles, weight-lifting equipment, sports murals, medical equipment, internet services, art projects, Baghdad yellow pages, and a zoo. They were generally ad hoc and uncoordinated with coercive military operations. Needless to say they were not successful because they did not meet the needs of the population; and Blaufarb and Tanham, *Fourteen Points: Framework for Analysis of Counterinsurgency*, EX 1-2. Blaufarb et al. contended there were two methods of influencing populations, persuasive and coercive. They stated: "popular support is defined as ranging from withholding cooperation from the insurgents to willingness to sacrifice one's life on behalf of the government" and that "neither side can succeed without it. They said, The guerillas depend on [the population] for the intelligence which permits them to operate in secrecy and exploit the factor of surprise and for other vital matters, such as recruits, finance, and supply. The government must gain popular acquiescence/support to deprive the guerillas of these critical elements and also to gain intelligence essential to its operations." Thus according to Blaufarb et al. the population is a strategic center of gravity and success in COIN cannot be achieved without its support.

¹⁸² David Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of Big One*, 15, 100, 112, 114, 181, 270-271, 289. Kilcullen said "an indirect, highly localized approach-working by, with, or through genuine alliances and local partnerships wherever possible-would probably be much more successful than a policy of direct U.S. intervention." He also emphasized whole-of-government assistance "with aid agencies, educators, charities, departments of foreign affairs and state, intelligence, services, economic development agencies-truly full-spectrum assistance."