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MISSION COMMAND IN AN AGE OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT:
HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO
DEVELOPING MISSION COMMAND

by

Bryan J. Bonnema, MAJ, USA

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Advisor(s): Dr. Kenneth G. Johnson

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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Abstract

To better prepare the U.S. military to meet future challenges, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey published his *Mission Command White Paper* in 2012. In it, Dempsey provides guidance highlighting the importance of ‘mission command’ in the execution of operations at all levels of war, as well as the requirement to train and educate leaders on its proper implementation. Analysis of how other militaries have adopted mission command and the theoretical underpinnings of mission command’s key components demonstrates that the U.S. military needs to fundamentally change its culture by adapting a more outcomes-based approach to its training and professional education. The experiences of the Prussians, Israelis, and U.S. Army during the Cold War demonstrate that military culture is malleable, particularly through changes in training and education. By implementing an outcomes-based model for training and education, it will be possible to develop the trust, communication and critical thinking skills necessary for the adoption of mission command.

*Our Army serves in a period of dynamic uncertainty...The unpredictability so prominent in the contemporary security environment will almost certainly remain a characteristic of the future.*¹

General Raymond T. Odierno, 38th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

General Odierno is not alone in his assessment of the challenges that the U.S. Army will continue to face in the future. In October 2007, the 36th Chief of Staff of the Army, General George W. Casey, stated that he foresaw the army entering into a decades-long era of “persistent conflict” in which the army must be restructured to meet the challenges that lay ahead.² After nearly thirteen years of continuous conflict, the army is realizing that the time is now to maximize the effects of the combat experiences of its Soldiers and leaders. Along with recognizing the value of the experience gained by Soldiers at all levels during these conflicts, it is also recognized that the way in which the army develops its Soldiers and leaders for operating in this environment must change as well.

To better prepare the U.S. military to meet future challenges, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Martin Dempsey published his *Mission Command White Paper* in 2012. In it, Dempsey provides guidance highlighting the importance of ‘mission command’ in the execution of operations at all levels of war, as well as the requirement to train and educate leaders on its proper implementation. Analysis of how other militaries have adopted mission command and the theoretical underpinnings of mission command’s key components demonstrates that the U.S. military needs to fundamentally change its culture by adapting a more outcomes-based approach to its training and professional education. Understanding the benefits of mission command and how to develop it within the military is vital to achieve success in the foreseeable future. Failing to do so will force the military to re-learn painful lessons of its recent past at great cost to not only the U.S. military, but to the nation as a whole.

While there are proponents calling for a change in the military's culture and training, they are not without their critics. These critiques focus on a fundamental argument that states that the military's culture is incapable of exercising the decentralized execution of operations. Furthermore, critics claim that when given the choice, American commanders prove time and again that they will centralize control at the highest level and demonstrate a propensity for micromanagement.³ The historical study of two very different armies provides poignant examples of the successful implementation of mission command. The Prussian Army of the late 19th Century as well as the establishment of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) offers the military leader case studies in the successful adaptation of mission command within each respective military culture. While the context behind each respective army developing these principles are drastically different, each case illuminates the fact that mission command can be applied along a wide range of instances to solve a multitude of complex military problems. In each case, the implementation of the key aspects of mission command drove the cultural change required to promulgate the decentralized execution of operations. Thus, by developing desired behaviors, those behaviors drove the cultivation of commanders that espoused the characteristics conducive to mission command resulting in a dramatic shift in the culture of the aforementioned armies.

The idea of decentralized operations originated in Prussia with Frederick the Great. As such, Frederick routinely chastised his senior leaders for failing to take independent action on their own. Furthermore, the defeat of the Prussian Army at the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt by Napoleon led several Prussian reformers to adopt the decentralization of command at the operational level and combined arms tactics practiced by the French. Consequently, Prussian military leaders began to implement new training techniques which focused on problem-solving and executing intent-based orders.⁴

Helmuth von Moltke was the first Prussian leader to coin the term *Auftragstaktik*, the origin of the phrase “mission command.” Moltke appreciated that understanding a commander’s intentions is a prerequisite for success. In 1858, he remarked that “as a rule an order should contain only what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on his own.”⁵ Moltke recognized that the only way to decentralize operations and allow subordinates to exercise initiative was through intent-based orders. Thus, Moltke and his contemporaries built upon the foundation established by Frederick the Great, which allowed for changes in other institutions within the Prussian military system. From the publication of the *Instructions for Large Unit Commanders* (1869), to maneuvers, war games, and annual staff rides, Moltke oversaw the permeation of *Auftragstaktik* across Prussian Army culture. During this training, officers conducted a simulated war over actual terrain. Each commander was given a scenario, intent-based orders, situation reports, and were required to conduct an analysis of each force’s actions. Failing to take independent action or act with initiative severely limited a commander’s advancement.⁶ This training and education allowed Moltke to cultivate leaders who not only understood *Auftragstaktik* but could grow and employ it.

Furthermore, Moltke identified that once orders were published and operations were set in motion it was incumbent upon commanders to allow their subordinates to develop the situation and act decisively. “It is an illusion if the commander thinks that his continuous personal intervention by a commander into the responsibilities would result in some advantage” warned Moltke. “By doing so, a commander assumes a task which really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys.”⁷ Moltke understood Clausewitz’s maxim on the nature of war, where friction inherently hinders the local commander’s actions and fog limits the operational commander’s perspective. Therefore, Moltke determined to allow those leaders at the

lowest levels to develop the situation and act decisively so long as they did so within the commander's intent.

While it is easy to espouse a shift in doctrine, the codification of that policy is a major endeavor. Moltke understood that if mission command principles were to have the desired effect on the army, those principles needed to be codified in its doctrine. Thus, he ensured that they were incorporated for the first time in the German Army's infantry drill regulations of 1888. In it, commanders were directed to give their subordinates general directions of what must be accomplished, but the determination as to how to accomplish those directions was left to the subordinate commanders. This guidance was further described in what the Germans coined the five principle elements of *Auftragstaktik*: mission, situation, commander's intent, freedom to act, and initiative.⁸ These principles provided the basis for which commanders ensured they empowered their subordinates to make decisions and seize the initiative. Moltke asserted that the mission and situation were most important as they allowed a commander to determine how to protect one's own weaknesses and exploit the enemy's.⁹ Additionally, the commander's intent allowed subordinate commanders to exercise their initiative within the confines of the stated mission and intent. It became not only a prerequisite for independent actions by a subordinate commander, but provided the flexibility to think and act faster than the adversary.¹⁰ Furthermore, subordinate commanders were provided with the freedom to take action within the intent. This freedom of action allowed subordinates the ability to deviate from the assigned mission due to the ever-changing situation on the battlefield. With this freedom to act came ownership of the operation by the subordinate, but also an inherent responsibility of one's actions.¹¹ Finally, initiative played a vital role for the successful execution of the mission. Moltke surmised that every officer must be allowed the greatest possible independence in times of peace to cultivate

the aforementioned principles. Only then would commanders appropriately exercise their initiative and freedom of action while solving the problems they faced on the battlefield.¹² Consequently, Moltke's army possessed the culture, framework, and principles to successfully implement his *Auftragstaktik*.

The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 illustrates Moltke's successful implementation of *Auftragstaktik*. When Moltke was ordered to mobilize and deploy forces on 2 June 1866, he found himself behind Austria's mobilization by several weeks. Moltke expertly incorporated new technologies, such as the railroad and telegraph with the flexibility of *Auftragstaktik* to quickly and efficiently deploy his forces and provide the general orders under which the Prussian Army's doctrine operated.¹³ In just seven weeks, the Prussians fought the Austrians on two separate fronts and inflicted nearly five times the casualties they sustained.¹⁴ Additionally, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, *Auftragstaktik* again proved effective and provided Moltke with similar decisive results.¹⁵ In these examples, Moltke centralized the use of national-level resources and technology to deploy his forces to the field, but then decentralized operations once his forces took the field. Thus, Moltke instilled flexibility and resisted the temptation to micromanage his operational commanders.

To Moltke and the Prussian Army leaders of the day, the principles of *Auftragstaktik* were not skills that could be turned on in times of war. From training, to education, while on-duty and off, and during the execution of operations in times of war, the principles of *Auftragstaktik* were the expectation, not the exception. There was no room for indecisiveness or inaction. The understanding and employment of this doctrine not only honed tangible war-fighting skills within the Prussian Army, but developed intangible skills such as judgment, initiative, responsibility, competence, and confidence within the leadership of the army. Under

this construct, as evidenced in the successes of the late 19th Century, the Prussian Army overcame multiple challenges and enjoyed unmatched success.

Born out of conflict and turmoil, the IDF offers another example of the success of mission command in a modern military. Due to its geostrategic situation, Israel has always found itself facing persistent conflict. On par with the effectiveness of the Prussian Army in its operational conduct, the IDF was arguably the most militarily capable and effective military in the world from 1948 and 1973.¹⁶ However, the similarities between the Prussian Army and the IDF seem to extend only to the actual conduct of operations on the battlefield. The origins and traditions of mission command found within the IDF are strikingly different from those of the Prussians, but no less impressive.

The IDF and its leaders never placed the same importance on the development of theory and doctrine as Moltke and his contemporaries. Within the IDF, the development of mission command was born out of necessity rather than the contemplation of military theory and doctrine. From its beginnings, the IDF had a penchant for practical solutions vice theory, and mission command provided the framework to solve the problems the Israeli military faced. The decentralized command approach that the IDF adopted enabled the strategic initiative and maneuver warfare that both dealt with Israel's strategic challenges and capitalized on its ingrained warrior-ethos.¹⁷

The foundation and traditions of the IDF was an amalgamation of the different origins of its leaders. Part of the IDF culture is rooted in the elite units of the underground Jewish Defense Force, or *Haganah*, and specifically within the *Palmach*, or storm company, which operated in Palestine prior to Israeli independence. Additionally, Jewish officers who served in the British

military in World War II brought British professional traditions to the IDF.¹⁸ From these traditions, the decentralized command structure of the IDF was created.

During and following World War II, most IDF commanders were educated in the ways of the *Haganah* and the *Palmach*. As such, the basic tenets of those organizations, such as decentralization of operations, the importance of intent, flexibility, and decision making permeated the culture of the IDF. The father of these tenets was former Soviet Army officer Yitzhak Sadeh, who transformed the tactics used by the *Haganah* and the *Palmach* to one of active resistance in the 1930s.¹⁹ Though different terminology was used, there is no mistaking the similarities between Sadeh's tenets of military operations and those of mission command.

Sadeh's operational tenets are strikingly similar to the principles of *Auftragstaktik*. Sadeh described his concept of the art of war as part of an entire philosophy:

“Our maneuvering in the field was always faster. Commander's intent cascaded from one observant person to another....We always took into consideration that the enemy will outnumber and outfire us, and we will not be able to achieve a decision in our favour through physical power alone, but through maneuvering and operating against the enemy's weakness.”²⁰

Therefore, Sadeh placed a premium on understanding the mission, the commander's intent, and developing the situation. Within this construct, subordinate leaders at all levels were expected to seize upon the initiative and make independent decisions. Subsequently, the members of the *Haganah* and *Palmach* were able to overcome their overwhelming numerical and resource inferiority. With the establishment of the IDF, these principles remained constant. With the incorporation of former British Army officers into the ranks of the IDF, its leaders infused basic military organization, structure, and tactics into the organization. Additionally, a premium was placed on the study of military tactics. During the last years of the *Haganah*, prior to the formal establishment of the IDF, several command courses were developed which were designed to

train platoon commanders and non-commissioned officers. Three factors led to the success of these command courses with regards to leader development within the *Haganah* and *Palmach*, and by extension the IDF: the instructors of these courses were self-taught leaders who studied military theory and doctrine independently; the material studied was derived from British and German military sources; and graduates were exposed to the leadership of battalions and brigades to afford them an understanding of the challenges their higher commanders faced.²¹

At these courses trainees were encouraged to demonstrate initiative and to seek and accept responsibility. Instead of providing standardized textbook solutions and checklists for students to memorize, the courses gave trainees complex problems to solve fostering creative thinking. As such, trainees were afforded the necessary tools needed for independent thinking and the assumption of greater responsibility. Ultimately, these courses led to the development of strategy which hinged upon maneuver warfare capabilities, decentralized command, and maintenance of the objective in the context of the provided intent. While the general plan would be provided, details of those plans were left to subordinates to determine. Thus, subordinates were empowered to creatively solve problems, make decisions and take bold action without having to wait upon their higher headquarters.²²

The IDF's performance from 1948-1973 demonstrated the effectiveness of this training. During its campaign against the Egyptian Army in 1948, the IDF employed mission command with great success. In command of the operation against the Egyptians, Yigal Allon, was the archetypical IDF commander who embodied the approach to operations that the *Haganah* and *Palmach* trained so expertly. During *Operation Yaov*, a division-sized task force relied on maneuver and the indirect approach to conduct operations deep behind Egyptian lines. The mission directive provided by Allon consisted of one page. The "method" section he provided

his subordinate commanders consisted of one word, *Beatzmecha*, meaning “at own discretion.”²³ Thus, commanders were provided general direction and intent, and were expected to analyze the situation, exercise initiative and make decisions at their level to take advantage of their situation.

The Prussian and Israeli styles of mission command offer examples demonstrating that the fundamental principles of mission command transcend differences found in cultures and approaches to military operations. Key to their success was the codification and implementation of mission command within their field manuals, doctrine, and training and education. These principles must be ingrained in leaders at all levels and permeate the entirety of the military’s culture to be effective.

While the benefits of implementing the key aspects of mission command in the U.S. military may seem transparent, such efforts must overcome several obstacles stemming from long-rooted cultural norms developed during the Cold War. Faced with a numerically superior adversary, and sure of their tactics, Cold War planners and strategists envisioned a decisive showdown with the Soviet Union across the plains of Central Europe. To counter the enemy’s order of battle, the Western allies desired to synchronize combat power by combining various weapons and systems thus magnifying the effect of each. Given this scenario, a premium was placed on efficiency. There stood little room for error and failing to employ weapon systems properly or to disrupt the enemy’s formations would assure destruction. Additionally, believing that the next war would be decided quickly, a determined effort was made to avoid any disastrous mistake. Subordinates were required to execute their missions in accordance with the training they had received and avoid actions that proved detrimental to the implementation of pre-planned operations.²⁴ Thus, the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Army, developed a model of centralized control to maximize efficiency and avoid making fatal mistakes.

As a result, the training that leaders and Soldiers received was directive, simplified and standardized. This allowed the army to synchronize every aspect of the application of combat power and restrict subordinate commanders' flexibility in favor of offering more centralized direction. To measure success during training, leaders created elaborate checklists that spelled out not only what to do but how to do it. Those commanders who could implement the checklists the best achieved success in training and received rewards and promotions, which ingrained a culture of efficiency and mistake avoidance throughout the army. Thus, the army not only succeeded in shaping its force structure to accomplish its mission, it shaped its culture to succeed in that environment.²⁵ Therefore, this change in army culture proved that it is malleable and that if leaders want to shape it in the future, they must do so through training and education.

Currently, the army is in an advantageous position to make the cultural shift to mission command. In contrast to the predictable environment afforded by the Cold War, today's operations evolve rapidly and present different challenges within time and space. Commanders can no longer plan for or predict the problems that their subordinates will face; therefore the ability to standardize solutions is gone. Thus, rapidly evolving battlefields require innovative and adaptable leaders with the ability to solve complex problems. Therefore, leaders at all levels must think through their actions, rely on principles, understand their situation, master fundamentals, and be given the flexibility to experiment with solutions.²⁶ Focusing on these tangible and intangible skills, instead of well-drilled responses to specific situations, will prepare leaders to face the challenges of today and the future. The implementation of mission command provides the framework to cultivate those skills.

Mission command is founded upon three key attributes: understanding, intent, and trust. Understanding harkens to the *coup d'oeil* that Clausewitz eloquently spoke of.²⁷ As such, *coup*

d'oeil is the ability of the commander to not only gauge the military problem that he is to solve, but also rests in his ability to accurately comprehend the state of his forces, the enemy's forces, and the effect of the environment that he is operating within. The sharing of this understanding is accomplished through the commander issuing his intent. This is practiced by focusing on two primary goals; defining the actions that subordinates must accomplish to achieve success, and establishing the conditions that subordinates are expected to set within their area of responsibility. Finally, inherent when conducting operations in a decentralized manner is the trust that must be present between commanders and their subordinates. While conducting decentralized operations, it is imperative that commanders trust that their subordinates understand the situation and are operating within their intent.²⁸ When implemented, these three aspects empower subordinates to solve complex problems while operating in challenging environments.

Given the nature of mission command as described above, the commander is of the utmost importance in establishing the climate necessary to allow it to thrive. To be successful, the commander must effectively integrate mission command into all phases of an operation, to include both planning and execution.²⁹ What is more, senior leaders must strive to develop these aspects of mission command during the execution of all tasks, from training to education, in garrison and in the field. While this approach to training and education may seem commonsensical to some, its implementation remains elusive. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how best to develop these key components by grasping the theory that underlies each aspect.

To empower subordinates to act decisively and to provide the flexibility required to overcome the challenges of today's battlefields, commanders must trust their subordinates. In its

most basic definition, trust is a belief in the integrity of other people. Furthermore, trust implies judgments about the likely risks and benefits posed by the interaction between people.³⁰

Additionally, as scientific research has shown, trusting relationships assist in producing desired outcomes and trusting people enter relationships with the presumption that others can be trusted until they prove otherwise.³¹ Thus, commanders must identify the outcomes they wish to achieve and shift their focus away from attempting to minimize risk and maximize efficiency. To build trust, a focus on the outcomes must become paramount and a penchant for innovation must be encouraged. Only then will subordinates feel empowered to display the initiative that is required to solve the complex problems within the context of mission command.

The commander's intent is paramount in successfully accomplishing a stated mission, as well as ensuring that subordinates understand the desired effects that the commander wishes to achieve. Thus, communication is vital to understanding the higher commander's intent, which leads to the successful outcome of the mission. Compounding the importance of communication is its effect on the derivation of values and attitudes that it instills in members of a group.³²

Furthermore, in the military context two key components of communication directly affect the successful understanding of the commander's intent; the first is the specificity of the intent, and the second is the authenticity of the communication. In military operations the commander must provide the subordinate with a commander's intent that is specific with regards to the limits of the operation and the desired effects that are to be achieved. In this highly specific communication scenario, the communication that takes place is "interpreter" or "receiver" centric. In other words the commander must define the "what" and the "why" of an operation, but leave the "how" to the subordinate to figure out. Furthermore, the commander must provide his intent with a high degree of authenticity. The allusion here is that if the commander expects

the subordinate to execute operations in a decentralized, mission command-type manner, the subordinate must accept as reality that the commander will support this type of approach to conducting operations.³³ Stated differently, mission command must be practiced and ingrained in the command in training or the subordinate will hesitate when employing it in the operational environment.

Thus, ensuring that the communication between a commander and subordinate is explicit with regards to the effects to be achieved and a constant focus on the aspects of mission command are paramount. This is achieved through conducting routine operations, training, and education in this manner. When this occurs, trust is developed between the commander and subordinate because the actions of the commander match the verbal cues provided by the same. This positive cycle of communication and trust can be developed and grown, but it must be consciously done so to be effective.

Understanding the environment, the mission, and the effects that are to be achieved is vital in the implementation of mission command. As such, it is required that commanders and their subordinates are able to think critically regarding complex problems. Critical thinking provides a framework for the problem solver with regards to how to approach a problem.³⁴ It encompasses good and logical thinking that results in thoughtful judgments or reflective decisions being made. Ultimately, when combined with creative or innovative thinking, critical thinking leads leaders to new insights, novel approaches, and fresh perspectives when solving problems.³⁵ This type of thinking is what is required of military leaders today as they face the complex challenges of the future.

Critical thinking is a skill that can be developed if approached in the right manner. To develop critical thinking, certain cognitive skills must be developed; these are: interpretation,

analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation.³⁶ By interpreting a developing situation, analyzing possible courses of action, evaluating the situation, inferring the best possible action to take, explaining that decision to others, and assessing or reflecting upon that decision, military leaders at all levels practice critical thinking. Improving upon these skills enables leaders to quickly solve the complex problems they are presented.

As reinforced in *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, understanding the key aspects of mission command is the first step in changing the culture of the army and preparing it to operate in an ambiguous environment.³⁷ One approach to train adaptive, innovative, flexible problem-solvers who act with responsibility and good judgment, is through Outcomes-Based Training and Education (OBT&E). This training is based on leaders implementing those practices that they believe best prepare Soldiers and leaders to face the complex problems of the future based on their combat experience. OBT&E best supports the principles of mission command because it operates with a focus on outcomes while leaving the determination on how to achieve those outcomes to the subordinate. The effect of this experiential training are leaders who are able to frame complex, poorly defined problems and make effective decisions under stressful conditions.³⁸ This training methodology requires leaders who can think critically and decisively; precisely those skills that will be needed to win the future conflicts that these leaders will find themselves in.

This type of training methodology is developmental in nature. By employing OBT&E in the training of a military task, leaders build three essential elements when achieving an outcome: tangible skills, intangible skills, and the provision of context.³⁹ Although tangible skills of a particular task are still trained, such as rifle marksmanship, the manner in which these tasks are trained leads to a growing of intangible skills such as judgment, responsibility, confidence and

competence. For example, instead of a coach providing the necessary adjustments for a rifleman on the firing line, teaching the rifleman about the weapon system and how to make the adjustments himself builds competence in his ability to adjust the weapon. Similarly, understanding cycles of function with the M4 rifle as well as types of malfunctions will allow the rifleman to work through malfunctions and problems incurred when employing the weapon system far more than memorizing certain malfunction correction steps that may or may not work. Finally, scenario-based training on the rifle range provides skills such as teamwork and problem-solving that Soldiers and leaders will be required to use in the future. While situations will undoubtedly change, these experiences provide data points for the leader or Soldier to draw from and apply when solving future problems. These are small examples that underscore the importance of not only training certain skills, but highlight the importance of providing the appropriate context that will also grow those intangible skills that will prove beneficial in the future.⁴⁰

To maximize the benefits of OBT&E, the army should continue to develop two existing training techniques that are currently used in some army training environments: the Combat Applications Training Course (CATC) and the Adaptive Leader Course (ALC). CATC trains individual Soldier tasks, such as rifle marksmanship, land navigation, and urban operations, while ALC focuses on problem solving and development of strength of character.⁴¹ CATC was developed by the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) to include scenario-based exercises that introduce teamwork and activities focused on problem-solving. ALC was developed by Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Forward focusing on situational exercises in a tactical and operational environment to stress effective decision making and adaptability through experiential learning.⁴² Both courses place a premium on the development of effective decision

making skills at all levels and prepare leaders and Soldiers to operate in ambiguous, poorly defined environments.

Vital to the successful implementation of OBT&E is the competency of the instructors involved in the training. In OBT&E, the instructor is required to adjust the conditions of the environment based on the ability of each student to produce the desired level of proficiency.⁴³ The key with this approach is for the instructor to remain focused on the outcomes to be achieved and to continually reassess the performance of the trainees in achieving those outcomes. Fortunately, due to the high operational tempo and experiences of our most recent wars, the army can take advantage of a ready-trained pool of cadre to employ this training methodology. However, high caliber trainers must be cultivated to ensure that OBT&E remains relevant and useful in the future.

Recent combat experience has shown that the army must change its approach to training and education to better prepare Soldiers and leaders for future conflicts. The experiences of the Prussians, Israelis, and U.S. Army during the Cold War demonstrate that military culture is malleable, particularly through changes in training and education. By implementing an outcomes-based model for training and education, it will be possible to develop the trust, communication and critical thinking skills necessary for the adoption of mission command. Failing to do so will force the army to re-learn painful lessons of its recent past at great cost to not only the army as an organization, but the nation as a whole. Furthermore, this approach to training and education can be adapted to all military organizations. Implementing these changes successfully will provide the initiative and competitive edge that the United States military requires to continue to do what has become expected of it: fight and win our nation's wars and do so with honor, integrity and discipline.

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- ¹ GEN Raymond T. Odierno, 38th Army Chief of Staff, to U.S. Army personnel e-mail, 16 October 2013.
- ² Elizabeth M. Lorge, "Chief Sees Future of 'Persistent Conflict'," *Army News Service*, 10 October 2007, <http://www.army.mil/article/5516/chief-sees-future-of-persistent-conflict/> (accessed 13 March 2014).
- ³ MAJ Demetrios A. Ghikas, "Taking Ownership of Mission Command," *Military Review* 93, no. 6 (October-November 2013): 26.
- ⁴ Donald E. Vandergriff, "Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and can the U.S. Army Make it Work?," *The Land Warfare Papers*, no. 94 (February 2013): 3.
- ⁵ Quoted in Jorg Muth, "Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II," in Donald E. Vandergriff, "Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and can the U.S. Army Make it Work?," *The Land Warfare Papers*, no. 94 (February 2013): 4.
- ⁶ Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas), 150.
- ⁷ Milan Vego, "Operational Commander's Intent," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 57 (2010): 139.
- ⁸ Ibid., 139-143.
- ⁹ Ibid., 139-140.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 140.
- ¹² Ibid., 143.
- ¹³ Vandergriff, *Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and can the U.S. Army Make it Work?*, 11.
- ¹⁴ Citino, *The German Way of War*, 170.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 188-189.
- ¹⁶ Eitan Shamir, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011), 82.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 82-83.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 83.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 84.
- ²¹ Ibid., 83-85.
- ²² Ibid., 86-87.
- ²³ Ibid., 87.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 2-6.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 8-9.
- ²⁶ Casey Haskins, "A Good Answer to an Obsolete Question: The Army's Culture and Why It Needs to Change" (U.S. Army War College Fellowship Paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010), 9.
- ²⁷ Military genius, in Clausewitz's view, manifests itself in both coup d'oeil and determination; the former consisting of a commander's "inward eye," or ability to observe the truth that leads to victory even in the most dire of circumstances; the latter consisting of the courage to relentlessly follow this truth wherever it may lead. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 100.
- ²⁸ Gen Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mission Command White Paper*, memorandum for record, 03 April 2012, 5.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 8.
- ³⁰ Catherine M. Ross, "Collective Threat, Trust, and the Sense of Personal Control," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 52, no. 3 (September 2011): 288.
- ³¹ Ibid., 288.
- ³² Littlejohn, *Theories of Human Communication*, 3.
- ³³ Franklin Fearing, "Toward a Psychological Theory of Human Communication," in *Foundations of Communication Theory*, ed. Kenneth K. Sereno et al. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), 48-49.
- ³⁴ Peter A. Facione, "Critical Thinking: What it is and Why it Counts," *Insight Assessment*, 2010, 2.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 9-12.

³⁶ Ibid., 5.

³⁷ Army Operation Concept 2016-2028, 12.

³⁸ Vandergriff, *Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and can the U.S. Army Make it Work?*, 13-14.

³⁹ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁰ This example is derived from the personal experiences of the author while assigned as the Marksmanship Committee Chief and Military Science Instructor in the Department of Military Instruction at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY from 2010-2013.

⁴¹ Ibid., 15.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 16.



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