


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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**FORGETING LESSONS LEARNED: THE UNITED STATES
ARMY'S INABILITY TO EMBRACE IRREGULAR WARFARE**



A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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INTRODUCTION

Irregular Warfare is the most widespread form of warfare today. In fact, irregular warfare has been the most prevalent form of warfare in history. Despite its prevalence, the US Army has a history of neglecting its irregular warfare and counterinsurgency doctrine in favor of focusing on conventional warfare. The tendency of under developing relevant doctrine and training for irregular warfare has left the United States Army unprepared to develop effective strategy and perform to its ability in some conflicts.

This paper will examine the evolution of US Army counterinsurgency doctrine from the Vietnam War to the current edition of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* developed during the Iraq War. It will examine the peacekeeping and stability operations that the United States conducted in El Salvador, Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia to analyze the lessons learned, and how those lessons drove the development of doctrine. It will also examine the Army's tendency to under develop stability and counterinsurgency doctrine in favor of conventional warfare doctrine and the effect that has had on operations. It is not the aim of this paper to advocate that the US Army focus solely on fighting irregular and counterinsurgency warfare, but to advocate that the US Army prepare for multiple forms of warfare through clear thinking about warfare and the development of relevant doctrine and training. The United States must be prepared to fight the type of warfare that presents itself, not the type of warfare it wants to fight. As military professionals, we must continue to develop and improve our doctrine and training in all forms of warfare.

Following the Vietnam War, the US Army did not incorporate the lessons learned from that conflict into its doctrine; instead, the Army turned its focus on preparing for conventional warfare in Europe against the Warsaw Pact. Throughout the 1970's and 1980's

counterinsurgency doctrine was forgotten while the Army was focusing on armored warfare in Europe and the development of its new doctrine, Air Land Battle.

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are ending, the United States is once again in danger of forgetting the lessons learned from fighting thirteen years of irregular warfare. The world is becoming more unstable as “regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure to reform, introduce uncertainty in the future.”¹ To protect the interests of the United States around the world, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen well trained in stability operations and counterinsurgency techniques will be needed. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* states,

In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.²

History, studied in depth and breath, will show that the United States has repeatedly been dragged into counterinsurgency campaigns that were unforeseen or misunderstood.³ As military professionals, we may end up conducting large-scale stability and counterinsurgency operations in the future, even though, as the last sentence in the quote above states, we will not be designed or sized to do so. We must think about how we will still conduct these operations when they arise. As H.R. McMaster stated in a recent article in the *New York Times*, “clear thinking about warfare costs nothing”,⁴ we must continue to study the operational environment, assess potential threats and continue to develop relevant doctrine and training that will address those threats.

PART I: US ARMY COIN DOCTRINE AND PRACTICES IN VIETNAM

The end of World War II saw an eruption of insurgencies across the globe as former colonies sought independence and autonomy in the post war environment. The Soviet Union employed partisan warfare against Germany during World War II. The United States fully expected the Soviet Union to employ partisan warfare in any conflict that arose. With the threat from the Soviet Union and insurgencies erupting around the world, the United States Army began to develop doctrine to combat guerilla warfare. The Army assigned LTC Russell Volckmann to write the initial doctrine.

LTC Volckmann was the best qualified person in the Army to write the initial doctrine. He was stationed in the Philippines when the Japanese invaded in 1941. He escaped from Bataan and spent 3 years in the mountains north of Luzon organizing guerilla forces to fight the Japanese.⁵ LTC Volckmann began working on the doctrine in 1949 at Fort Benning, Georgia. In 1951, the Army published LTC Volckmann's work in two manuals on guerilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. The two manuals written by Volckmann would become the foundation of all future Army counter-guerrilla doctrine.

The first manual the Army published was FM 31-20, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*. FM 31-20 was largely written on the experiences of LTC Volckmann during World War II. He also drew lessons from the German Army's basic counter-guerrilla treatise, the 1944 manual *Fighting the Guerrilla Bands*.⁶ LTC Volckmann decided to focus the manual on two types of situations. The first was conflicts conducted by irregular forces to bring about social-political change within a country; the second was operations conducted by irregular forces in conjunction with regular forces as part of a conventional war.⁷ Volckmann believed that guerrilla forces needed to establish cross-border sanctuary and required help from an external

actor for supplies, intelligence, propagandists and other support personnel. He also felt that guerrilla forces needed the support of the population for recruits, food, intelligence, and provide legitimacy for the political agenda of the guerrilla movement.⁸

Eight months after the release of FM 31-20, the Army released FM 31-21 *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*. FM 31-21 described the nature, organization, and methods of guerrilla warfare with an eye toward the use of such techniques by U.S. forces during a conventional war.⁹ In addition to the two manuals issued, the Army added a section about guerrilla warfare to its capstone warfighting manual, FM 100-5 in 1952. The ten page section reflected the Army's growing concern over the threat of guerrilla and partisan warfare. After the Korean war ended, the Army's emphasis on guerrilla warfare began to dwindle. By 1955, the Command and General Staff College and the Infantry School at Fort Benning cut their instruction in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare in half.¹⁰ The Army spent the rest of the 1950's focusing on nuclear warfare doctrine.

In the early 1960's communist insurgencies were breaking out across the globe. President Kennedy's strategy to prevent the spread of communism included providing military advisors to countries that were at risk for communist rebellion. In response to the President's strategy, the Army published FM 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces* in 1961. FM 31-15 opened "with the premise that guerrilla warfare was merely the outward manifestation of public disenchantment with certain political, social, and economic conditions. The manual developed two conclusions: first, a guerilla movement required at least some degree of public support to flourish, and second, that the only permanent solution to an insurgency was to rectify the conditions that had given rise to it in the first place."¹¹ FM 31-15 also emphasized that

police, combat, and political operations had to be conducted simultaneously throughout the campaign to achieve the end state.

A new edition of FM 100-5, *Operations* was published in 1962. Counterinsurgency related subjects accounted for over twenty percent of the manual. Most of the content reiterated principles that had previously been released in FM 31-15, but it sent a message to the Army. Having counterinsurgency doctrine published in the Army's capstone combat manual helped solidify counterinsurgency's place as an important mission within the US Army. The Army developed a supplementary counterinsurgency manual in 1963, FM 31-16, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. FM 31-16 mostly described various counter-guerrilla tactics and techniques and emphasized the importance of intelligence to assist the commander in acquiring a coherent picture of a region's political, social, and military topography.¹² FM 31-16 also established the Brigade headquarters as the basic operational command element in an insurgency.

In addition to publishing new doctrine, the Army established counterinsurgency courses and made counterinsurgency training part of Professional Military Education (PME). In 1961, the army established its first school that focused exclusively on counterinsurgency. The Counter-guerrilla Operations and Tactics Course was established at Fort Bragg to train advisors headed overseas.¹³ The course trained over 7,000 officers by the end of 1965.

In 1961, the Continental Army Command mandated that counterinsurgency be introduced into every level of officer education. The mandate did not specify a curriculum, which left it up to each school commandant to develop its own curriculum. Training varied widely between schools across the Army. To develop a common understanding across the Army, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) reviewed counterinsurgency doctrine and developed a

common curriculum. By 1964, CGSC provided a curriculum that included 42 hours of direct counterinsurgency instruction, with another 171 hours of related material.¹⁴

Doctrine Applied

Going into the Vietnam War, the US Army had relevant doctrine and recent examples of successful counterinsurgency strategies from around the world. By the time that the U.S. conventional combat troops entered Vietnam in 1965, they faced a dual guerilla-conventional threat. To counter the dual threat, General Westmoreland developed a “two-handed” strategy. American forces would keep the North Vietnamese main forces at bay, while the South Vietnamese government and military would be responsible for pacifying the countryside and protecting the rural population from the Viet Cong.¹⁵ Under General Westmoreland’s attrition strategy, U.S. forces were “conducting offensive operations against major VC base areas in order to divert and destroy VC main forces.”¹⁶ All units were constantly on the offensive, seeking to make contact with the enemy. When contact was made, Westmoreland’s tactics were to “pile on” as many troops supported by close air support and artillery that were available, to kill as many Viet Cong or North Vietnamese fighters as possible.¹⁷

There is a great divide among scholars over the narrative of the Vietnam experience. Authors such as John Nagl and Lewis Sorley claim that General Westmoreland focused on fighting the wrong war. While fighting a conventional war against the North Vietnamese, they claim that General Westmoreland neglected to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Lewis Sorley describes “A Better War” that took place after General Creighton Abrams command in Vietnam. The “Better War” narrative claims that pacification worked, but it was too little, too late. With dwindling public and political support, time ran out before the pacification effort was able to win the war. Andrew Birtle claims that General Westmoreland had to fight a war focused

on destroying the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) because they posed the greatest threat. Birtle claims that not until after the Tet offensive of 1968, were the PAVN forces weakened enough to pursue a pacification program. General Abrams took command of Vietnam after the Tet offensive, which set the conditions where he could focus on pacification. Although General Westmoreland focused primarily on offensive operations, there were pacification efforts that took place during his command.

Combined Action Platoons (CAPs)

Major General Lew Walt, commander of the III Marine Amphibious Force, integrated marine rifle squads into Vietnamese Regional Forces platoons. These "Combined Action Platoons" lived in the villages of I Corps and focused on pacification while regular marine battalions divided their time between platoon-sized patrols and civic programs.¹⁸ The CAP lived, worked and fought in a designated village until the Vietnamese were capable of providing their own protection. The concept for the CAP was to conduct pacification from the bottom-up. Once an area was secure, a CAP could be established in a new area. This program showed success on a small scale but was unable to develop into a country-wide strategy. General Westmoreland did not embrace the concept. He said "I believe the Marines should have been trying to find the enemy's main forces and bring them to battle, thereby putting them on the run and reducing the threat they posed to the population."¹⁹

By 1967 the increasing North Vietnamese threat compelled the Marine Corps to reduce their pacification efforts that hindered the goals of the CAP program. Prior to the Tet offensive, none of the CAPs achieved goals that allowed Marine units to withdraw. By 1970 however, 93 villages achieved enough security that allowed Marines to withdraw.²⁰

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)

The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, commonly referred to as “CORDS”, was established in 1967 under Robert “Blowtorch” Komer. As the director of CORDS, Robert Komer was also the deputy commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). CORDS would centrally plan all pacification activities and replace the chaos of multiple programs from multiple agencies.²¹ The programs incorporated personnel from the CIA, USIA, AID, the State Department, the White House, and all the military services. A deputy for pacification was assigned to the four Corps Commanders and civil-military teams were added to the 250 districts and forty-four provinces in Vietnam.²² With multiple organizations under one unified command, the effectiveness of operations nested with pacification efforts lead to more efficient use of resources to achieve objectives. Once CORDS was established, it was effective. But in the end, as Komer himself puts it, “The greatest problem with pacification was that it wasn’t seriously tried seriously until too late, or if not too late certainly very late in the day.”²³

General Creighton Abrams “Better War”

General Creighton Abrams took command of US Military Command Vietnam in June 1968. General Abrams made some significant changes after he took command from General Westmoreland. Rather than pursue Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition, he preferred to emphasize his “One War” concept – that there was not one war against enemy main forces units, one war to pacify the countryside, and one war in the air against North Vietnam, but that all these operations were deeply intertwined and would be treated as such in the future.²⁴ General Abrams introduced more restrictive rules of engagement; he ordered a reduction of artillery ammunition expenditure and praised units that emphasized small unit, intelligence-led

operations.²⁵ General Abrams promoted the Accelerated Pacification Program (APC), developed by William Colby, after taking command. The objective of the APC was to reestablish the South Vietnamese government's presence into the countryside after the Tet offensive. It employed techniques that were already established, but operationally placed the emphasis on pacification versus major unit operations. The main objectives were to use the Regional Forces and Popular Forces to secure hamlets, establish the Peoples Self Defense Force. A program called Phuong Hoang – known as Phoenix in English and designed to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure – would also serve as an essential tool of the APC.²⁶ Even though General Abrams put an emphasis on pacification operations, searching for and destroying enemy forces still played a significant role in the war.

The US Army had relevant doctrine prior to the start of Vietnam and had the opportunity to examine the lessons learned from the British experience in Malaysia and the French experience in Indochina. Despite having this doctrine and information available, the US Army chose to fight the Vietnam War by emphasizing mobility and firepower. The Vietnam War could have been won if the Army had done a better job at conducting the counterinsurgency war. General Westmoreland may not have been ignorant of counterinsurgency, but he chose to fight the war he was comfortable conducting. General Abrams made a strong effort to understand the type of war he confronted but also came up short in his counterinsurgency effort. With popular support evaporating in the United States in the mid-1960's and funding cut under the Nixon administration, General Abrams and the US Army ran out of time and were not able to see the effects of their pacification program. The failures of counterinsurgency in Vietnam meant that the Army would not attempt to build on the developed doctrine, but turn away from counterinsurgency and return to what it was comfortable with, conventional warfare.

PART II: POST VIETNAM COIN DOCTRINE

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, how the Army chose to interpret the lessons learned from the war would dictate what doctrine it would develop and publish as the Army re-built itself. The U.S. Army failed to incorporate the lessons learned from Vietnam to form a doctrine that would address its shortcomings or reinforce successful aspects of the war. The Army wanted to focus on the war it wanted to fight, the conventional war in Western Europe. The senior leaders “responsible for the rehabilitation of the post-Vietnam Army created a force that was cautious about intervention, skeptical about the promises of nation building and, above all else, anxious to avoid repeating the Vietnam experience.”²⁷ The lack of change or inclusion of counterinsurgency doctrine in the US Army following Vietnam reinforced that counterinsurgency was not the kind of war that the Army wanted to fight.

The Army established the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 to help reimage the Army through education and doctrine following the Vietnam War. The first issue for TRADOC and its first commander, General William E. DePuy, was to address the most effective way to apply the tremendous firepower of the United States on the modern battlefield.²⁸ In July 1976, the Army published a new edition of its capstone doctrine, Field Manual FM 100-5, *Operations* (FM 100-5), but doctrine changes influenced by lessons from Vietnam and counterinsurgency were not added. DePuy wrote most of the manual himself. The basis of the new edition addressed “how to fight and win on an armor-dominated battlefield against an enemy who enjoyed vast quantitative superiority in both men and equipment.”²⁹ The manual was designed to retrain the Army after its Vietnam experience; the preface stated: “Battle in Central Europe against the forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding mission the US

Army could be assigned. Because the US Army is structured primarily for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the realities of such operations.”³⁰ The Vietnam War, along with counterinsurgency, were barely mentioned in the 1976 version of FM 100-5, which led the Army to an institutional identity of focusing on conventional operations. Throughout the 1970’s, with the focus of the Army on conventional war against the Warsaw pact, counterinsurgency doctrine was nearly eliminated from Army doctrine and the curriculum at service schools such as the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC). By 1977, only 40 hours were dedicated to the study of low-intensity operations in its one-year curriculum. Two years later, the low-intensity conflict course had been reduced to eight hours.³¹ The development and training of the Army’s new doctrine, *Air Land Battle*, in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, focused only on conventional warfare. The deliberate attempt by the Army to put Vietnam behind it left the Army without a doctrine that could fight in combat operations spanning the complete spectrum of warfare. As Robert Citino, the author of *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm* wrote about the development of Air Land Battle: “the U.S. Army never did come to grips with the problems of guerrilla warfare, never reformed itself into a force that could successfully prosecute a guerrilla war and outside its Special Forces components, and never regarded irregular warfare as normative in any way.”³² Instead of addressing the shortcomings in counterinsurgency doctrine, the Army attempted to ignore it all together. While the Army prepared for a war with the Warsaw Pact in Western Europe, other contingencies and conflicts would arise that the Army was unprepared to effectively deal with due to a lack of doctrine and training.

Central America

Despite nearly a decade of neglect in doctrine and training, the US Army would participate in a counterinsurgency operation in El Salvador to assist their government in a civil war against the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). The involvement of the United States in El Salvador's civil war between 1980 and 1992 was America's longest foreign intervention between Vietnam and Afghanistan in 2001.³³ The Vietnam War was still fresh in the minds of many Americans, so politically, President Reagan was unable to deploy large units of U.S. forces there. Along with military aid, such as weapons, equipment and intelligence, the US sent an advisory team of 55 personnel, whose mission was to "emphasize the importance of reform and civic action-oriented counterinsurgency."³⁴ This mission meant that the Army could no longer ignore counterinsurgency. Colonel John Waghelstein, the Chief of the US Military Group in El Salvador in 1982, expressed his concern with the lack of doctrine and emphasis in counterinsurgency by the US Army in a 1985 *Military Review* article: "Since the US role in Vietnam ended, the attention given to counterinsurgency matters has declined. At the present time, the Army is unable to handle all of the challenges it could face in that environment. Recent improvements have been made, but they fall far short of what is needed."³⁵ Despite the need for counterinsurgency doctrine, the United States used the term "low-intensity conflict" (LIC) to describe the events in El Salvador. The term was less controversial than counterinsurgency and it encompassed other missions other than the Vietnam-style warfare. General John R. Gavin, the commander of US Southern Command from 1985 to 1987 was a strong proponent of LIC. In an article that he wrote in *Parameters*, the Journal of the US Army War College, Gavin stated "the general historical trend toward the type of war that involves more and more of the populations of the warring factions. These trends have been obvious for a long time; there is little indication that we have understood the need for adapting

our doctrine to take into account the whole spectrum from low to high intensity. We have not grasped the new environment.”³⁶ General Gavin’s comments were not in-line with the Army’s post-Vietnam caution about counterinsurgency. With a General Officer speaking out and drawing lessons from El Salvador, the Army began re-looking at its doctrine.

The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 paid attention to the problems of LIC for the first time since Vietnam. The manual stated that the Army must be prepared to operate “on the unique battlefields of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).”³⁷ The manual mainly focused on the Army’s new conventional doctrine, Air Land Battle, however, the inclusion and acknowledgment of LIC as a possible mission of the US Army brought the debate about the utility of counterinsurgency doctrine amongst Army leaders and the pages of *Military Review*, the Army’s professional journal.

Army doctrine began to reflect this new orientation when it updated FM 100-20 *Low Intensity Conflict* in 1986. The focus of FM 100-20 was to emphasize the importance of security assistance programs to support and improve the host nation’s capabilities to fight insurgencies, as the US Army had done in El Salvador. Even though the new manual focused on advising, it did not rule out a commitment of US Army combat units, the manual states: “Should the insurgency continue to escalate to a war of movement, expanded US assistance may include selected and specially tailored US combat forces.”³⁸ Although LIC was still unpopular and less prestigious than conventional warfare throughout the Army, the updated manual showed that the Army was open, for the first time since Vietnam, to involvement in counterinsurgency operations. Because of the success of the Army experience in El Salvador, the Army felt it could win a counterinsurgency campaign and that intervention in a third world country was possible.³⁹ Major General Gordon R. Sullivan, the deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff

College, saw the events in Central America as evidence that the school needed to focus more heavily on LIC. General Sullivan had a significant influence over both Army doctrine and education. From 1983 to 1986, CGSC increased the amount of hours of instruction in LIC from thirteen to thirty-two hours.⁴⁰

The Army's experience in LIC in Central America brought the concept of counterinsurgency back into the thoughts of the Army. The evolution of US Army doctrine in the 1980s showed that the Army was willing to revisit counterinsurgency operations, although the Army's primary focus remained on conventional warfare. Officers that served in Central America understood counterinsurgency and applied it well. Their writings and discussions in professional military journals such as *Military Review* and *Parameters* continued to discuss how LIC should fit into the Army's overall doctrine and culture. At the end of the Cold War, the Army was still focused on conventional warfare and the role of the counterinsurgency mission remained an afterthought. The decade of the 1990's would bring the role of LIC and other operations short of conventional war back to the forefront of Army doctrine development.

Operations Other Than War and the Powell Doctrine

The Army began to develop a new doctrine for the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), such as peacekeeping, stability and support operations and interventions it expected to conduct throughout the 1990's. In 1994, the Army released a new manual, FM 100-20 *Peace Operations* and the Command and General Staff College increased its MOOTW curriculum to forty-six hours. This doctrine emphasized restraint, legitimacy, and improving relations with the local populations in general, in many ways owed a debt to classical counterinsurgency doctrine.⁴¹ Although the Army was developing this doctrine to address the conflicts it was expecting intervene in, there were opponents to these types of operations.

General Colin Powell, a veteran of the Vietnam War, became the top military aide to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the 1980's. Together they developed what would become known as the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, a checklist for conditions to deploy and commit U.S. forces into conflict:

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed – their size, composition and disposition – must be continually reassessed and adjusted as necessary.
5. Before the United States commits forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
6. The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.⁴²

The Weinberger/Powell doctrine was an attempt to prevent the United States from engaging in an open-ended conflict that had little impact on US national security interest. Despite this informal doctrine that many military leaders believed in, the U.S. Army would find itself in a number of intervention operations throughout the 1990's. A 1994 study by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) showed that between January 1989 and December 1993 the US military participated in no fewer than forty-eight "named military operations".⁴³ While most of these operations provided relief for the victims of natural disasters and humanitarian efforts, some of these operations would turn deadly and shape how the United States would intervene in such conflicts in the future.

Somalia

In November 1992, the United States embarked on a humanitarian mission to feed the starving people of Somalia. Due to drought in the prior years, foreign aid and workers arrived to provide assistance to the Somali people. The military and government had long collapsed leaving local gangs and militias controlling the city of Mogadishu. The militias pillaged the relief supplies and terrorized the international aid workers. The danger to the aid workers and the growing number of refugees that were facing death caused the United Nations to act. A joint army-marine task force along with other U.N. nations had no trouble securing much of Somalia and ensuring the delivery of food and other aid in December of 1992.⁴⁴ The United States, along with the U.N. delivered aid but did nothing to disarm the local gangs and militias. By May of 1993, the United States withdrew 26,000 troops, leaving a small contingent of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, and turned the mission over to the U.N. With the large troop draw down, the militias and gangs began challenging and attacking U.N. peacekeepers, which resulted in the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers along with over 50 wounded.⁴⁵ While serving as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell deviated from his doctrine and sent Task Force Ranger, a special operations unit consisting of Army Rangers and Delta Force, to Somalia. Their mission was to kill or capture Mohammed Farah Adid, the warlord that was responsible for most of the attacks on the U.N.⁴⁶ The mission in Somalia turned to failure in October of 1993, when a raid to capture some of Adid's commanders resulted in two Blackhawk helicopters shot down and the deaths of eighteen Americans. Following this incident, President Clinton announced the withdraw of US forces in Somalia.

Haiti

In 1915, Smedley Butler and 3,000 Marines invaded Haiti and quickly pacified the entire island. Eighty years later, the United States sent troops there again, this time to restore its President, Jean Bertrand Aristide, to power. In the aftermath of Somalia, the United States approached Haiti with caution. Instead of using the same size force Smedley Butler had in 1915, the United States deployed over 20,000 troops. Many of these troops were from the Army's 10th Mountain Division, the same unit that served in Somalia and participated in the firefight and rescue of Task Force Ranger. The 10th Mountain Division focused on force protection, living in large operating bases and barely leaving them. When they did patrol it was in a platoon formation with 30-40 personnel often accompanied by a senior leader. The Task Force in Haiti became so obsessed with force protection with an emphasis on minimizing U.S. casualties, that nation building and securing the local populace became secondary. President Aristide was restored to power and the United States left Haiti in just as much disarray as when it arrived. The focus of force protection and casualty aversion inhibited them from making any other progress. The mindset of force protection and self-preservation would come into play again in the United States' next humanitarian mission in the Balkans.

Bosnia

The United States found itself involved in another peacekeeping operation in Bosnia in 1995. Serbian forces were committing genocide in Bosnia and killing hundreds of thousands of people. American politicians and military leaders were reluctant to get involved in this conflict. General Powell was perhaps the most opposed when he stated "No American President could

defend to the American people the heavy sacrifice of lives it would cost to resolve this baffling conflict.”⁴⁷ After limited NATO airstrikes, the Serbs agreed to a peace treaty that ended the conflict and sent NATO peacekeepers to enforce the rules of the treaty. U.S. troops had very restricted rules of engagement and had to wear their body armor at all time, even while on their own bases.⁴⁸ The emphasis on force protection carried over from the conflicts earlier in the decade.

While in Bosnia, US forces did a better job of interacting with the population than they had done in Haiti. Commanders began conducting weekly meetings with “local power brokers to kick-start reconstruction projects and to deal with any potential grievances and establish protected marketplaces, where different ethnicities could intermingle and trade without fear and violence.”⁴⁹ The officers that practiced these techniques would become generals and shape counterinsurgency doctrine later during the Iraq War.

Revolution of Military Affairs

Commanders throughout history have envisioned the day that the “fog of war” would be lifted and the commander could see and hear everything on the battlefield. Throughout the development of Air Land Battle in the 1980’s and 1990’s, the U.S. Department of Defense envisioned “a style of warfare that relied not on human contact or ground troops but on high-tech sensors and smart bombs.”⁵⁰ The use of precision munitions and swift victory in the 1991 Gulf War fueled this thinking, that through technology, a type of war can be waged that was cheap in the cost of dollars and human life. This type of thinking would shape Army transformation to a “network centric” force that was light and focused on mobility. After becoming Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld pushed a transformation agenda that “promoted network-centric warfare, a way of war deeply dependent on sensor platforms, communication systems, and

remote weapons.”⁵¹ Rumsfeld pushed this agenda in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Rumsfeld hoped that with airpower, precision munitions and mobility, the United States would be able to fight wars quicker and cheaper, which would favor public support for future conflicts. This type of force and policy would become what David Fitzgerald would call the “Rumsfeld Doctrine” in his book *Lessons Forgotten*.

The Army’s doctrine changed slightly in 2001, but not due to transformation. The Army’s capstone doctrine FM 100-5 was renumbered to FM 3-0 to reflect the joint doctrine numbering system in 2001. The Army changed the term “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW) to Stability Operations and made it one of the Army’s core competencies along with the offense and defense operations. Conventional warfare was still the primary focus of the Army, however, the contingencies conducted by the Army in the 1990’s were acknowledged and now considered a core competency. Although the administration did not think that the military should conduct “nation building” and that the military was designed to “win the nations wars”, the Army acknowledged the lessons learned in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and other contingencies throughout the 1990’s and would not be able to avoid these types of operations in the future. Army doctrine was slowly adapting to a world where stability operations were inevitable.

PART III: IRAQ

The planning for the invasion of Iraq began in 2002. The commander of Central Command, General Tommy Franks developed a plan that called for a ground force of 380,000 personnel to conduct the invasion and follow-on occupation of a post-Saddam Iraq. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, quickly disregarded General Frank’s invasion plan and chose a plan that involved a smaller invasion force. The United States had toppled the Taliban in

Afghanistan with a small special operations footprint and airpower. Donald Rumsfeld was set to do the same in Iraq, this time with a small conventional force. The plan approved called for an invasion force of 150,000. While the force was adequate to decisively overthrow Saddam and his government quickly, the United States quickly realized that they were not prepared for the stability and support operations that were to follow.

FM 3-07 *Stability and Support Operations* was published in February 2003, one month before the invasion of Iraq. Due to its release date, the principles from the doctrine were not incorporated into the Iraq invasion plan, nor read by the subordinate commanders conducting the invasion. Although the US Army conducted stability operations throughout the 1990's, the lessons learned from those operations were not incorporated into the Iraq invasion plan. The United States found itself in its first large-scale counterinsurgency campaign it had been in since Vietnam. The lack of institutional knowledge or doctrine in counterinsurgency would result in the US Army reacting slowly to the rising insurgency and its senior leaders failing to issue a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan for the first few years of the occupation of Iraq. With no issued strategy, commanders were free to conduct what they perceived as the proper strategy for their area of operations. Most commanders resorted to enemy centric tactics that were in-line with the conventional warfare doctrine that they had studied most of their careers.

Examples of the difference in tactics is found by studying the difference in the way the 101st Airborne Division, commanded by David Petraeus and the 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Ray Odierno conducted operations. In Mosul, General Petraeus adopted a population centric strategy. One of the first things Petraeus did was set up a civil-military operations center to restore basic services and institutions.⁵² Petraeus looked for experts within his ranks. The commander of his signals battalion was responsible for rebuilding the city's

communications infrastructure. His assistant Division Commander spoke Arabic, so he had him organize the city's merchants to re-establish the local economy. He recruited English-speaking students from Mosul University to serve as interpreters. Within a few months, gas stations were re-opened, and electricity was operating at about 90 percent. General Petraeus also enthusiastically pushed his commanders to stabilize Mosul by providing security for the local population. The intent he gave to his commanders and staff was that, "the idea was not to get the people of northern Iraq to love America; rather, it was to get a critical mass of these people to develop a vested interest – to feel a stake of ownership – in the new Iraq, because unless that happened, the country would spin out of control."⁵³

General Odierno adopted an enemy centric approach with the 4th Infantry Division operating north of Baghdad around Samara and Tikrit. His commanders launched large-scale sweeps and operations targeting insurgents and Ba'athist leaders.⁵⁴ Unobserved indirect or interdiction fires became routine, further alienating the population. As insurgent activity increased, the lethality and "heavy handedness" of the 4th Infantry Division increased.

While looking at these two case studies one might wonder why two units took such different approaches in operations. While insurgent activity was higher in General Odierno's area, the 4th Infantry Division made little effort to secure the population. The lack of appropriate doctrine and institutionalized training on how to conduct counterinsurgency, forced both Generals to fall back on the existing doctrine and their experiences to conduct operations. General Petraeus spent the summer of 1985 working for SOUTHCOM in Panama, he served as the chief of operations for the US-led multinational peacekeeping mission in Haiti in 1995, and as part of the Stabilization Force in Sarajevo (SFOR) in 2001. These experiences played a major role in how he led operations in Mosul from 2003 into 2004. General Odierno's limited

experience in peace keeping or stability operations limited his ability to adapt to the situation and caused him to escalate what he did know, enemy centric, kinetic operations.

There were efforts to train commanders about counterinsurgency and campaign plan development. General Casey, the Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) Commander, “lectured each incoming battalion commander on the fact that Iraq was a counterinsurgency war and opened the counterinsurgency academy in Taji that was made mandatory for all incoming commanders.”⁵⁵ General Casey also established the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which offered commanders the ability to fund construction and stability operations quickly without having to go through a bureaucratic process for approval. General Peter Chiarelli, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division, recognized that conducting combat focused operations hindered progress and often strengthened the insurgency.⁵⁶ General Chiarelli realized that the areas with the highest violence also had the poorest services. He developed SWET (sewage, water, electricity, trash), to help restore essential services to neighborhoods with the hope that it would win their cooperation.

While there were some success stories of commanders who developed successful strategies in their area of operations, the US Army was slow to adapt to the insurgency in Iraq. The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California began modifying its training scenarios from conventional warfare rotations to counterinsurgency scenarios in 2005-2006 involving 250 Iraqi-Americans and increased cultural training.⁵⁷ There was little to no improvement in Professional Military Education (PME) during this time. This was mostly due to the slow development of doctrine. This would change in the summer of 2005, when General Petraeus became the commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Development of FM 3-24 and the Surge

As the commander of CAC, General Petraeus had the opportunity to change the Army from the inside out. He established a team of PhDs and experienced Army officers to begin developing a counterinsurgency field manual. General Petraeus held “counterinsurgency workshops” that included representatives from other government agencies and journalists in order to gain buy-in on the concepts that the manual promoted. The inclusion of media personalities helped promote the manual and improve public relations in time when the Iraq war was going poorly. FM 3-24 is written with a broad and reflective focus, which engages on both strategy and political conditions. The writers of the manual were heavily influenced by early counterinsurgency practitioners as David Fitzgerald writes, “the intellectual foundations of the manual were deeply rooted in the writings of the 1960s theorists who attempted to reshape Western militaries then. The experiences of Robert Thompson in Malaya and Vietnam, Frank Kitson in Kenya, and David Galula in Algeria were all strong influences.”⁵⁸ The manual was highly anticipated and popular; it had over two million downloads after the first two months it was released.⁵⁹

In addition to the field manual, he made changes to scenarios at the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), where units were conducting their pre-deployment training. Scenarios now included working with the local population and local security forces. Over the next year, Petraeus held conferences and workshops on what should be included in the new counterinsurgency field manual. The manual, FM 3-24 was

released in December of 2006, just before General Petraeus returned to Iraq as the Commander of US forces. He was able to go into command, implementing the doctrine that he had just published.

When General Petraeus became the commander of MNF-I, he implemented a campaign plan that meant a radical overhaul to the strategy in Iraq. With the announcement of additional Brigades being committed for the “Surge”, the strategy of “clear, hold, and build” would become the priority, only with a more explicit focus on the population.⁶⁰ Prior to the Surge, U.S. forces would clear neighborhoods from insurgents and then return to big Forward Operating Bases (FOB), which would allow insurgents to reclaim the area after U.S. forces left.

As the Corps Commander of Soldiers in Iraq, LTG Odierno stated that “the aim of military operations in 2007 were to create stability and security to protect the Iraqi people in Baghdad. The population and the government of Iraq are the center of gravity.”⁶¹ This statement, along with the arrival of General Petraeus as the Commander of Iraq, was a significant turn in the Iraq war. Generals Petraeus and Odierno developed a campaign plan and Lines of Operations (LOOs) that focused on securing the population and defeating the insurgency. According to historian Kimberly Kagan, “General Odierno is likely to be remembered in military history as the man who redefined the operational art of counterinsurgency with a series of offensives in 2007 and 2008.”⁶² General Odierno planned and conducted three successive, large-scale military operations (Fardh al Qanoon, Phantom Thunder, Phantom Strike) in 2007, and a fourth (Phantom Phoenix) in early 2008. These successive operations struck multiple enemy safe havens and lines of communication that kept pressure on AQI, denied them sanctuary, and did not allow them the time or space to regroup. These operations were different from previous operations that focused primarily on one objective at a time.

The first operation, Fardh al Qanoon, was the Baghdad security plan. During this operation, U.S. forces established joint security stations, combat outposts and patrol bases in neighborhoods in order to facilitate the new strategy of securing the population and defeating the insurgency. In addition to securing the population, efforts were made to divide the population. Barriers were erected between Sunni and Shia neighborhoods, restricting access between the two communities to attempt to reduce sectarian violence. The large sweeps to gain access to neighborhoods during the clear phase, resulted in a large spike of heavy firefights with insurgents initially, but once insurgents were cleared from an area, they had trouble gaining access to the area.

After insurgents were pushed out of Baghdad, the second operation commenced. Operation Phantom Thunder cleared al Qaeda sanctuaries in the belts around Baghdad. The belts outside of Baghdad had previously served as a support zone and sanctuary where al Qaeda held caches, IED and VBIED factories. As U.S. forces were focused inside of Baghdad until this operation, al Qaeda enjoyed freedom of movement and sanctuary. Operation Phantom Strike was the third Corps offensive. It was designed to destroy al Qaeda operatives that fled the belts of Baghdad during Operation Phantom Thunder and attempted to regroup in other areas throughout Iraq.⁶³

Another major factor to the success of the Surge and decline of violence in 2007 was the Awakenings and the Sons of Iraq. By the middle to end of 2007, the population of Iraq generally rejected al Qaeda, Shia extremists, and other terrorist groups.⁶⁴ As al Qaeda gained power throughout Iraq prior to 2007, they began a brutal campaign against the people of Iraq. In areas they occupied, they collected taxes, enforced sharia law, and conducted force marriages. As U.S. and Iraq government operations began having success, Iraqi tribal leaders began to mobilize their

populations to reject AQI and deny their populations of AQI influence. Some of these population were reconciled insurgents, who decided to side with the Iraqi government versus allowing AQI to continue to gain power. The citizens who patrolled and protected their villages and neighborhoods to deny AQI access became known as the Sons of Iraq.

There is debate on whether the decrease in violence in Iraq from 2007 to 2008 was due to the success of the Surge, or whether it was due to Moqtada al-Sadr's decision not to contest the Surge. With no evidence from Moqtada al-Sadr about his decisions, the drop-off in violence coincided with General Petraeus's increased emphasis on counterinsurgency. With the success of the Surge, FM 3-24 effectively reintroduced counterinsurgency to the Army's doctrine for the first time since Vietnam. Had the Surge not succeeded in reducing violence in Iraq, it is likely that counterinsurgency doctrine within the Army would have been dismissed, just as it was after Vietnam.

PART IV: RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Army abandoned counterinsurgency and irregular warfare doctrine after Vietnam and vowed never to fight that kind of war again. As the war in Iraq has ended and the war in Afghanistan is winding down, we are again looking to the future in an attempt to decipher what threats we will face and what conflicts we may be involved in, and how to shape our forces to meet those threats. As military professionals, we have to turn to our strategic documents and guidance on how to prepare our forces to meet the needs of the United States. The latest National Security Strategy states, "Our military must maintain its conventional superiority. It must also prevent and deter threats against the United States, its interests, and our allies and partners; and prepare to defend the United States in a wide range of contingencies

against state and non-state actors. We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.”⁶⁵ Simply put, the United States expects the military to be prepared to fight and win in every type of conflict. This is hard to do as budgets for modernization and readiness are reduced after more than a decade of war. In order to train for these conflicts, Commanders will have to prioritize their training and tailor it to meet the operational environment and threat that they feel they will face next.

While no one has ever correctly predicted the conflict that the United States will participate in next, an examination of the environment does merit that irregular or asymmetrical warfare will continue in the short term. One of the leading scholars in strategy, Colin Gray states, “At least for several decades into the twenty-first century, all warfare involving the American superstate cannot be other than highly asymmetrical in character...as no belligerents closely resemble the United States.”⁶⁶ The U.S. Army must continue to take the lessons learned from recent conflicts and continue to develop relevant training and doctrine that codifies counterinsurgency and irregular warfare as a core competency. The Army should make changes to doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), to institutionalize the experiences and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, so that the Army does not have to re-learn those experiences in the future, as we did after Vietnam. The Army cannot afford to repeat the same mistakes it made in the post-Vietnam era, and focus on just focus on the form of warfare we would like to fight. Although irregular warfare may be the United States’ most likely form of warfare in the near-term, we must continue to prepare for all forms of warfare. Army units must be prepared to transition between decisive action and

counterinsurgency to meet the nature of the conflict that presents itself. Prior to examining changes needed in DOTMPLF, we must closely examine the operational environment to focus changes on winning future conflicts, not the last conflict.

The world environment is never static. As it constantly evolves, our doctrine, training and preparation for future conflicts must also continually evolve and adapt to the present challenges. This will require the U.S. Army to be a learning organization with the ability to adapt quickly in order to be successful in future conflict. An intelligent look at the operational environment and world we live in can expose potential drivers of instability that threaten U.S. interests, and give indications on when and how the United States Army may be employed to meet future security challenges.

David Kilcullen provides a good example of how to examine current world trends that may cause instability and conflict in his latest book, *Out of the Mountains*. In this book, Kilcullen examines the challenges and opportunities that population growth, coastal urbanization, and escalating connectivity are creating across the planet. The analysis of the environment and the trends identified by Kilcullen may provide indications of potential conflict in areas accessible to ports, airports and other transportation nodes that affect the world economy and trade. He also believes that future conflicts will take place in urbanized, coastal cities where populations are increasing and resources are decreasing. Kilcullen makes a strong case, based on scientific evidence that conflict is likely in this environment and his findings merit further examination of the potential problems the world faces. At the least, his theories give military professionals a starting point for a dialogue on future conflicts and environments that may be engaged in.

As military leaders study the operational environment, our doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities must be continuously reviewed to ensure it can meet the security challenges of the nation. The following recommendations in doctrine, organization, training, and leadership education are provided improve the Army's capability to institutionalize counterinsurgency lessons learned over the past 13 years, and to improve capturing future lessons learned.

1. Doctrine: The Army must establish a timeline for the periodical review and update of its doctrinal manuals. FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, was published in 2006. It is currently under revision, but it has taken over eight years to analysis, and incorporate lessons learned in counterinsurgency since 2006, which is unacceptable to our Soldiers. The Army's doctrine is not keeping pace with current conflicts. While doctrine does not provide a description for success in future conflicts, it does drive training, and provides a basis for thought and further selective study and reading. In order to prepare our combat leaders for future conflict, we must provide them with relevant doctrine that incorporates analysis from the lessons learned in recent conflicts in a timely manner.

The Army should update every doctrinal manual within a five-year timeline or sooner as needed. The first year after publication the doctrine should be reserved for the distribution and digestion of doctrinal changes that need to be made to training plans. The second and third years the doctrine will be executed in training to include Combined Training Center (CTC) rotations and deployments. The fourth year after action reviews and lessons learned are drafted and sent to doctrine writers that issue updates or changes to the doctrine based on unit feedback in year five. Doctrine can be updated within the five year timeline as needed. For example, during or after a conflict, doctrine may prove inadequate and need updated sooner based on new

information. While this is a very simplistic timeline, a forcing function is needed to ensure that there is not a significant gap in doctrine development.

While it has taken a significant amount of time for an updated edition of FM 3-24, with lessons learned since the manual's first edition in 2006, it is a sign that the U.S. Army has learned from the past and has not elected to dismiss counterinsurgency doctrine as it did forty years ago. This is a good sign that the Army will remain a learning organization and will focus, at least intellectually, on all forms of warfare. As the new edition of FM 3-24 and other doctrine is published, it is the responsibility of the military professional to examine it with a critical eye, continue to think about warfare, and provide recommendations on how to continually improve doctrine and training to meet the national security challenges of the future.

2. Organization: The Army must make the Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST) part of the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). Company intelligence support teams played a vital role in Iraq and Afghanistan with gathering and analyzing intelligence that supported bottom-up intelligence gathering and dissemination. Having a trained intelligence team working at the lowest level provided commanders at the company through brigade level a better intelligence picture of the operational environment. These teams debriefed patrols, conducted sensitive site exploitation, and gave intelligence updates to squads and platoons prior to conducting combat operations. The COIST can be conducted by 3-5 individuals and would not result in a drastic change in manpower within Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) but would provide an incredible amount of value to commanders at all levels.

3. Training: The United States Army must increase its foreign language capacity and cultural training to ensure our Soldiers are successful in conducting Security Force Cooperation as part of a regionally aligned Brigade Combat Team. Currently, there are no

requirements to have linguist within the maneuver battalions of a BCT. BCTs rely on contracted interpreters when they deploy outside of the United States to conduct training or combat operations. Wherever the Army deploys to train or fight, they will interact with the local population. The Army must develop its own organic ability to interact with the local population. While contracted interpreters may be able to provide a local perspective with culture and customs, interpreters can often prove unreliable and at times, hurt the Army's mission. Language training can be conducted within a BCT at little costs. A Defense Language Institute instructor can train a class of Soldiers at the BCTs installation on a Temporary Duty Status (TDY). While the TDY costs may seem high, the impact of having 30 Soldiers that can speak the language of the local population can prove invaluable. By having a large population of Soldiers that can interact with the local population and local Army, can have strategic implications on improving foreign relations.

4. Leadership and Education: The Army needs to review and re-balance the amount of instruction hours spent on decisive action versus counterinsurgency in PME. Changes in how we educate leaders is where the Army can have the most effective impact for preparing for future warfare. Even after thirteen years of conducting irregular warfare, it receives very little attention in PME compared to decisive action or conventional warfare. In order to prepare future leaders to succeed in future warfare, they have to have a balanced and diverse background in all forms of warfare. Irregular warfare is harder to study because the causes of most irregular warfare are complex and hard to decipher. Irregular warfare case studies provide excellent opportunities for leaders to conduct critical thinking about the political, social, economic, and cultural reasons that lead to conflict. In studying warfare, it is important to study non-U.S. case studies also. Studying non-U.S. case studies help leaders remove their bias and emotion from the

conflict, which allows for a more objective analysis and study of the conflict. There are many ways to improve the education of leaders in PME and outside of PME. Even in a time of constrained budgets, thinking about warfare remains free. We need to do a better job, at all levels, of challenging leaders to think clearly about warfare and how to win future conflicts.

CONCLUSION

As the Army reduces its force structure and budgets are reduced, it must place an emphasis on preparing for future conflict. While tough decisions will be made regarding what equipment and programs will last or will be cut, the Army must ensure that it invests time and energy in capturing the counterinsurgency lessons learned during Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether we believe we will participate in another counterinsurgency operation or not, we owe it to the generation of military professionals that follows us to produce a relevant and coherent doctrine that can be used in future conflicts. Many U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Marine and Airman were killed from 2001-2006 when the United States did not have a relevant counterinsurgency doctrine to draw from. This was due to our military's ignorance following Vietnam by not continuing to develop relevant doctrine because they believed we would never fight that type of war again.

Warfare would be easy if we were able to choose when, where and how we fought. However, throughout history, the United States has repeatedly been involved in conflicts it was unprepared to fight. As military professionals, it is our duty to prepare the military and our Army for any type of warfare the nation calls it to perform. If we fail to develop a successful strategy to capture the counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, to develop relevant doctrine, education, and training for our Soldiers, we will repeat the mistake of the post-Vietnam Army.

NOTES

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⁷ *Ibid*, 134

⁸ *Ibid*, 134

⁹ *Ibid*, 142

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 152

¹¹ *Ibid*, 234

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¹⁶ Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, 154

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 154

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 157

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 157

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²¹ *Learning to Forget*, 22

²² *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 165

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²⁴ *Learning to Forget*, 23

²⁵ *Learning to Forget*, 28

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- ³³ Greentree, Todd. *Crossroads of Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America.* , 73
- ³⁴ *Learning to Forget*, 65
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- ³⁸ *FC 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict*, sec. 5-34
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- ⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 76
- ⁴¹ *Ibid*, 87
- ⁴² *Ibid*, 88-89
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- ⁵⁰ Kaplan, Fred, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2013, 46
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