

Information Security Is a Business Continuity Issue: Are You Ready?

Dr. Nader Mehravari

Cyber Risk and Resilience Management Team
CERT Division
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
nmehravari@sei.cmu.edu
<http://www.cert.org/resilience/>

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Four Key Functions of a Modern CISO

Focus of
Today's Discussion

Protect / Shield



Monitor / Hunt



Recover / Sustain




Manage / Govern



Key Issues

- What are the real-world insights from recent cyber incidents?
- How does preparedness planning for cyber incidents differ from traditional BCM planning?
- How can organizations align BCM with their cybersecurity efforts?

The background of the slide is a photograph of a stage. It features heavy red curtains with a scalloped top edge, hanging from a central point. The curtains are pulled back slightly on the sides, revealing a light-colored wooden floor with a vertical grain pattern. The lighting is soft, creating a professional and formal atmosphere.

Setting the Stage:

- What are the real-world insights from recent cyber incidents?
- Why is the subject important?

Cyber Intrusions are a Fact of Life



U B E R



JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.



Forbes



Anthem



Prevention Activities Fall Short

- Is necessary
- Is not Sufficient
- Fails too frequently

Protect / Shield



Monitor / Hunt



Recover / Sustain



Manage / Govern




*...there are only two types of companies:
those that have been hacked and those that
will be...*

*...and even they are converging into
one category: companies that have
been hacked and will be hacked
again...*

*Robert S. Mueller, III
Former Director of FBI
March 1, 2012*

Prevention Activities Fall Short

- Is necessary
- Is not Sufficient
- Not immediate
- Takes too long



Targeted Attacks are Hard to Detect

- How are compromises detected?
- How long before the compromises are detected?

69%

of victims were notified
by an external entity


205

median number of days
before detection

SOURCE: Mandiant® “M-Trends® 2015: A View from the Front Lines” Report


Most Frequent Cyber Attacks Fallouts

- Disclosure of operationally sensitive information
- Disclosure of privately identifiable information
- Theft of intellectual property
- Theft of user access credentials
- Loss of credit card information
- Disclosure of classified information
- Revealing of company proprietary information
- Exposure of corporate email messages
- Identifying oppositions and enemies
- Leak of trade secrets
- Nuisance
- Reputation damage
- Hacktivism - Delivering political or social message
- Blackmailing



However, adversaries are interested in more...

- Deleting and destroying data
- Causing operational havoc
- Physical harm to people
- Physical damage to infrastructure
- Destruction of physical goods
- Damaging critical infrastructure
- Affecting delivery of products and services
- Shutting down day-to-day business operations




Example: Sony Pictures Cyber Incident

- Reputation
- Revenue Loss
- Data Exfiltration
 - Over 100 terabytes
- **Business Operations**
 - Damaged information technology infrastructure
 - Hackers implanted and executed malware that destroyed data
 - Malware with capability to overwrite master boot records and data files
- Legal
 - Employees have filed four lawsuits against the company for not protecting their data
- Breach Expenses
 - In its first quarter financials for 2015, Sony Pictures set aside \$15 million to deal with ongoing damages from the hack.



and therefore...






Guidnace:

- How does preparedness planning for cyber incidents differ from traditional BCM planning?
- How can organizations align BCM with their cybersecurity efforts?

Considerations for...



Consider This Scenario

- Adversary's long-term and established presence in your environment has been confirmed (e.g., through investigative and forensic activities).
- Adversary has been observing and learning your environment for some extended time.
- Adversary has proliferated customized malware on strategic elements of your IT and operational technology (OT) infrastructure.
- Adversary has exfiltrated confidential information.
- Adversary has just made operationally disruptive moves, for example
 - Physical and logical damage to IT infrastructure
 - Physical and logical damage to OT infrastructure
 - Data destruction
- Day-to-day business operations have negatively been affected

i.e., it is time to execute one or more of your preparedness plans

Things to Consider (i.e., Dilemmas)

Do you try to get the adversary out of your environment before starting recovery and restoration activities?

Yes?

- Have you finished investigative and forensic activities before disturbing the adversary?


Things to Consider (i.e., Dilemmas)

Do you try to get the adversary out of your environment before starting recovery and restoration activities?

Yes?

- Is there a chance that the adversary may try to do major damage if it notices that you are trying to kick it out?

Example: Cyber Attack on



<http://web.archive.org/web/20140619124721/http://www.codespaces.com/>

We are experiencing massive demand on our support capacity, we are going to get to everyone it will just take time.

Code Spaces : Is Down!

Dear Customers,

On Tuesday the 17th of June 2014 we received a well orchestrated DDOS against our servers, this happens quite often and we normally overcome them in a way that is transparent to the Code Spaces community. On this occasion however the DDOS was just the start.

An **unauthorised** person who at this point who is still unknown (All we can say is that we have no reason to think its anyone who is or was employed with Code Spaces) had gained access to our Amazon EC2 control panel and had left a number of messages for us to contact them using a hotmail address

Reaching out to the address started a chain of events that revolved around the person trying to extort a large fee in order to resolve the DDOS.

Upon realisation that somebody had access to our control panel we started to investigate how access had been gained and what access that person had to the data in our systems, it became clear that so far **no machine access had been achieved due to the intruder not having our Private Keys.**

At this point we took action to take control back of our panel by changing passwords, however the intruder had prepared for this and had already created a number of backup logins to the panel and upon seeing us make the attempted recovery of the account he proceeded to randomly delete artifacts from the panel. We finally managed to get our panel access back but not before he had removed all EBS snapshots, S3 buckets, all AMI's, some EBS instances and several machine instances.

In summary, most of our data, backups, machine configurations and offsite backups were either partially or completely deleted.

Things to Consider (i.e., Dilemmas)

Do you try to get the adversary out of your environment before starting recovery and restoration activities?

Yes?

➤ How long will it take you to get the adversary out?

(What did you say was your RTO?)

Things to Consider (i.e., Dilemmas)

Do you try to get the adversary out of your environment before starting recovery and restoration activities?

Yes?

- How will you be sure that the adversary is no longer around?

Things to Consider (i.e., Dilemmas)

Do you try to get the adversary out of your environment before starting recovery and restoration activities?

No?

- Is your enterprise systems (e.g., email, Internet access, file shares, printers, PBX, VoIP) available?
 - YES:
 - Then the adversary is most probably monitoring (listening) to every move you make.
 - How will you keep your execution plan a secret?
 - NO:
 - Do you have alternative system (not on your infrastructure) that you can use to manage the incident?

Things to Consider (i.e., Dilemmas)

Do you try to get the adversary out of your environment before starting recovery and restoration activities?

No?

- While rebuilding damaged/destroyed/corrupted systems, how would you ensure that the adversary won't get into these newly built infrastructure while building them on your currently (infected) environment?

In Closing



Modern Cyber Attacks Can Disrupt...



People Assets



Technology Assets


Information Assets



Facilities Assets



Supply Chain / Raw Material Assets



... not just information assets


Therefore,

All preparedness planning activities...

- IT Disaster Recovery
- Business Continuity
- Continuity of Operations
- Emergency Management
- Incident Response
- Crisis Communications
- Workforce Continuity
- Etc...

... must explicitly incorporate matters related to cybersecurity risk, cyber attacks, and cyber-enhanced incidents into their planning, testing, and execution processes.

Factors Affecting Cost of Data Breach



Business continuity management reduced the cost of a breach. For the first time, the research reveals that having business continuity management involved in the remediation of the breach can reduce the cost by an average of \$8.98 per compromised record.

SOURCE: Ponemon 2014 Cost of Data Breach Study



Thank you for your attention.