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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**WINNING THE WAR AT HOME: STABILITY
OPERATIONS STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY**

by

Joshua Shaughnessy

March 2016

Thesis Advisor:
Co-Advisor:

Stanley Supinski
Patrick Miller

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**WINNING THE WAR AT HOME: STABILITY OPERATIONS STRATEGY FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY**

Joshua Shaughnessy
Sergeant, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
B.S., Indiana University, 2000

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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March 2016**

Approved by: Stanley Supinski, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor

Patrick Miller
Co-Advisor

Erik Dahl
Associate Chair of Instruction,
Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

While much progress has been made in American homeland security, there remains a lack of strategic consensus for state and local agencies. Communities are increasingly outspoken in their expectations of unified homeland security efforts. Remarkably, the U.S. military has a long history of using stability operations strategy to execute similar missions in foreign and domestic settings. Stability operations strategy is a non-traditional U.S. military approach emphasizing community collaboration to restore order. Despite similar objectives, stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs forces do not appear to have been studied as a possible model to unify state and local homeland security activities.

This research uses a case study and policy options analysis to explore the questions: Is the U.S. military's stability operations strategy a useful consideration for domestic homeland security applications? If so, how could military stability operations strategy be implemented in homeland security efforts?

The research recommends adopting the strategy and organizing state and local homeland security initiatives into six stabilization sectors: civil security, civil control, essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and information management. Stability operations strategy offers state and local decision makers a comprehensive, community-focused model for homeland security initiatives.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
C3	Counter Criminal Continuum
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CONTEST	Counter-Terrorism Strategy (British Government)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
NRF	National Response Framework
NYPD	New York City Police Department
S/CRS	Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
WWII	World War II

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

State and local jurisdictions have been challenged to develop comprehensive homeland security strategies. While progress has been made since 9/11, many improvements have centered on disaster prevention and response. Other areas of homeland security lack consensus in methodology, and leaders employ a wide variety of methods to protect citizens.

Perhaps homeland security agencies need not reinvent the wheel. The U.S. military has developed a formal methodology for stabilizing foreign environments across the range of conflict. Stability operations strategy is unique in military strategy, as it emphasizes collaboration with community stakeholders to restore order. The strategy provides a framework for balancing conventional military power with cooperative initiatives. Stability operations strategy has been examined throughout numerous foreign deployments, and is designed to address systemic issues with a long-term commitment of resources. Given these traits, stability operations strategy can be a useful approach toward unifying homeland security initiatives.

According to the U.S. Army's stability operations field manual, the strategy is designed to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate civil, government, and military operations.¹ The military uses civil affairs personnel to execute stabilization strategy. Their job can be described as armed social work—building relationships with public and private stakeholders to achieve stability objectives. The U.S. Army's civil affairs field manual also describes its suitability for supporting domestic authorities within the United States.² Indeed, contemporary homeland security efforts demonstrate significant civil-military collaboration in supporting domestic authorities. Given this precedent and the desire for

¹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

² Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2011), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.

community-focused policies, civil affairs' execution of stability operations strategy is most relevant for homeland security consideration.

The pursuit of domestic tranquility is undoubtedly complex. Stability operations strategy suggests organizing homeland security efforts toward specific objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests. Civil affairs' twelve principles of joint operations also provide a strategic guide for state and local homeland security initiatives:

1. Objective: ensure stakeholders share a clearly defined and attainable purpose supporting primary stability tasks.
2. Offensive: maintain the initiative toward addressing systemic issues.
3. Mass: leverage the benefits of collective capability from a wider spectrum of resources.
4. Economy of force: prioritize resources toward key objectives, with fewer assets dedicated to secondary efforts.
5. Maneuver: shift collaborative resources to support homeland security objectives.
6. Unity of command: for every activity, ensure a clearly defined organizational command structure.
7. Security: prevention efforts should prepare for the unexpected, and respond to critical incidents.
8. Surprise: be creatively proactive in protecting and engaging the public.
9. Simplicity: stability operations strategy for homeland security should be clear and uncomplicated.
10. Perseverance: ensure practitioners have the commitment necessary to achieve homeland security objectives.
11. Legitimacy: develop rapport with the community to help maintain stable neighborhoods.


12. Restraint: emphasize institutional patience, and balance use of force with soft power strategies.³

Some communities do not feel their government responds adequately to their needs. In these cases, the twelve principles may provide some clarity for evaluating existing methods. Many jurisdictions continue to search for a strategy to unify homeland security efforts and meet public expectations. Leaders should innovate and adapt existing models rather than invent anew.

Stability operations strategy provides a reasonable blueprint for organizing collaborative homeland security efforts into six primary stability task sectors: civil security, civil control, essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and information management. One example of this concept is illustrated in Figure 1.

³ These are adapted from the twelve principles of joint operations found in Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-11.

Figure 1. Stability Lines of Effort for Homeland Security



Adapted from Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-10, Appendix D, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/epository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

Current approaches to homeland security should be improved. Given these demands, stability operations strategy offers a template for engaging communities and developing partnerships for homeland security initiatives. Particularly given continued trends toward civil-military collaboration, the commonalities between stability operations strategy and homeland security initiatives are worth considering in state and local jurisdictions.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Stability operations strategy is a non-traditional military approach that utilizes its assets to restore order and maintain stability. The strategy emphasizes collaboration with civilian stakeholders to achieve regional stability.¹ Historically, the military has executed this strategy through civil affairs units to establish security, build trust with local populations, and transition to civil governance.² Despite extensive use during international deployments, stability operations strategy and its civil affairs elements have not been considered as a possible model for American homeland security efforts. The objective of this research is to conduct a comparative policy analysis and consider stability operations as an alternative strategy for organizing homeland security efforts.

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

This thesis primarily utilizes a predictive paradigm to explore the following research questions:

1. Is the U.S. military's stability operations strategy a useful consideration for domestic homeland security applications?
2. If so, how could military stability operations strategy be implemented in homeland security efforts?

This author expected to find the military stability operations strategy useful for consideration in domestic homeland security efforts. Specifically, the author believes the strategic approach may provide a framework for public-private collaboration based upon community-focused stability objectives. Operational elements of stabilization strategy such as civil affairs may be particularly

¹ The term "stability operations" has been resurrected in 21st-century U.S. military literature. The vernacular was perhaps first used in the 1967 U.S. Army Field Manual 31-23, *Stability Operations*, but fell into relative disuse during subsequent decades of military lexicon.

² Although the term "civil affairs" appears to predate formal references to "stability operations," civil affairs forces were historically used in a manner consistent with contemporary stability operations strategy.

advantageous to compare with homeland security applications such as law enforcement.

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite notable contrasts, stability operations and civil affairs share some common traits with domestic efforts to stabilize the American homeland. Many of these tactics, such as community engagement and infrastructure development, are key to ensuring domestic security, but often fail to be fully integrated into homeland security strategies. This thesis studies military applications of stability operations strategy, the execution of that strategy by civil affairs assets, and the potential applications of those models in homeland security initiatives.

While the lack of prior research on this topic presents some limitations, it also affords opportunity for novel research. Existing research has examined the military's use of stability operations and civil affairs abroad, and additional data has been collected on similar homeland security topics. Despite some comparable similarities, this author has not identified significant research that examines the topics in the same context. The outcomes of this research are uncharted and provide an important opportunity for graduate-level study on an unexplored homeland security topic.

The primary audience for this research is state and local homeland security executives and policy decision-makers. For example, a city manager or mayor could use military stability operations strategy as a framework to integrate homeland security efforts in his or her jurisdiction. Within the context of stability operations, civil affairs may also provide a model to direct law enforcement or other homeland security efforts on community-focused objectives. These concepts may provide some clarity to existing "whole community" efforts designed to provide a comprehensive, mission-focused plan for domestic

homeland security operations.³ Based upon initial research, this author believes stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs offer a unique approach for state and local agencies to unify homeland security efforts under a comprehensive methodology.⁴

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Stability Operations Strategy

The term “stability operations” evolved from refinements in earlier broad concepts of “military operations other than war.”⁵ Military manuals and doctrine shed light on strategic intentions, while other sources offer a more critical examination of particular aspects of stability operations or strategy. The concept of stability operations encompasses specific elements (such as civil affairs), which are used to reach defined goals. Objectives for stability operations are customized to the needs of local communities.⁶ Case studies or examinations of stability operations often focus on specific phases in which the strategy is applied, such as a pre- or post-conflict environment. Figure 1 illustrates military literature’s differentiation between stability operations and other types of military strategy.

³ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), *FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2011–2014* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2011), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-25045-3227/fema_2011_2014_strategic_plan.pdf.

⁴ Harry Lewis Coles and Albert Katz Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1964), 86.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War* (Joint Publication 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995).

⁶ James A. Russell, “Into the Great Wadi: The United States and the War in Afghanistan,” in *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan*, eds. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga, and James Russell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 54.

Figure 1. Examples of Military Operations

• Stability operations • Civil support • Foreign humanitarian assistance • Recovery • Noncombatant evacuation • Peace operations • Combating weapons of mass destruction	• Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management • Foreign internal defense • Counterdrug operations • Combating terrorism • Counterinsurgency • Homeland defense
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Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), I-15, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

In the broader set of military plans, stability operations strategy is unique in its focus on local issues. Assessments of stability operations often attribute increased efficiencies and effectiveness to its community-oriented emphasis.⁷ However, some of the same sources note complications from the strategy's dependence on consensus-building. Stability operations strategy relies on a coordinated effort across multinational or interagency coalitions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteers. Given the challenging relationship dynamics between these parties, some experts contend that a military organization is not the ideal model from which to develop consensus.⁸

These more skeptical assessments offer some insight in the suitability of stability operations for domestic application. For example, the administration of stability operations may be less ideal for the type of paramilitary design of many homeland security agencies, such as fire and police departments. Some literature argues that stability operations' holistic, consensus-building emphasis is better administered in a non-traditional, decentralized command structure.⁹

⁷ Jeffrey M. Shanahan, "Decentralized Stability Operations and Mission Command," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 79 (4th quarter, 2015): 28. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/ifq-79/ifq-79_27-35_Shanahan.pdf.

⁸ Davis S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, *Command Arrangements for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 14.

⁹ Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, *Command Arrangements*, 14.

Certainly, atypical aspects of military stability operations strategy reflect this concept through partnership with the Department of State and its emphasis on diplomacy and negotiation. In any case, stability operations literature underscores the importance of a planning framework that is flexible to community needs. The implications of these ideas on domestic implementation are explored in this research.

2. Civil Affairs

Within this research, civil affairs practices are an intriguing component of stability operations that share similar goals and functionalities with many homeland security agencies. After all, many local and state governments share the principal mission of “Public safety [as] job number one.”¹⁰ Civil affairs activities and homeland security agencies are similarly focused on regional security and stability, and share broad commonalities in prevention and response frameworks.¹¹ Thus far, no sources have been found that specifically explore the potential use of the civil affairs model in homeland security applications. Initial research identified several primary fields of information, including stability operations, civil affairs, and homeland security initiatives and organization.

Much of the literature on civil affairs approaches the topic from a military perspective. Civil affairs activity has been studied extensively for decades, with history, research, and methodology assessing effectiveness. As World War II (WWII) progressed, the United States began training military officers for “military government duty,” which eventually evolved into formal civil affairs programs.¹² In 1966, the British government published a summary of civil affairs and military

¹⁰ City of Indianapolis Mayor Greg Ballard, accessed January 14, 2015, <http://www.mayorgregballard.com/ballard-rules/public-safety.html>.

¹¹ Donald F. Kettl, *System under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics* (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), 12.

¹² Edwin J. Hayward, “Co-Ordination of Military and Civilian Civil Affairs Planning,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 267 (January 1950): 19–27. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1026724>.

governance activity during WWII.¹³ Another contemporaneous source, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, offered an American perspective focusing on the intricacies of armed forces acting in roles normally occupied by civil governments.¹⁴ Both volumes summarize the military framework for civil affairs through roles traditionally regarded as civilian responsibilities, such as law enforcement, food or medical assistance, financial market management, and protection of cultural monuments or art treasures.

Field manuals and other sources describe civil affairs initiatives such as community engagement, infrastructure development (i.e., building schools, providing clean water, etc.), and traditional use of military force to support regional security missions.¹⁵ Recent iterations of civil affairs field manuals advocate strongly for collaboration between military forces and civilian populations: “Properly executed civil affairs operations reduces the friction between the civilian population and the military force, and accelerates the return of civil functions to indigenous control.”¹⁶

Literature from military sources on civil affairs is fairly extensive. The U.S. Army’s field manual on civil affairs provides extensive information on establishing and maintaining long-term regional stability.¹⁷ Although analyses on civil affairs vary in scale of approach, they demonstrate a consistent evolutionary structure emphasizing diplomatic collaboration with civilian populations to achieve stability and security objectives.

¹³ F.S.V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: Central Organization and Planning* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1966).

¹⁴ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*.

¹⁵ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (FM 3-05.401) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 2007).

¹⁶ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2011), 1-1, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), iv, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

3. Homeland Security Initiatives

Homeland security remains an emerging industry and research continues to explore its rapidly changing role in American society. There is room in these ongoing discussions for consideration of a civil affairs model, perhaps especially in the fields of criminal justice and law enforcement. Some homeland security researchers advocate for broad, essential goals and flexibility in organizational design.¹⁸ Other research focuses on recommendations to leverage civic partnerships more effectively in support of homeland security efforts.¹⁹ Author Jerome Kahan argues for decentralizing federal homeland security efforts and increasing partnerships with local and state agencies.²⁰ Several federal agencies, including the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), have embraced strategies similar to those recommended by Kahan. NORTHCOM and FEMA have progressed toward regional decentralized organization, collaboration with civilian institutions, and increased public engagement.²¹ Comparable themes are found in contemporary public dissatisfaction with police-community relations. Stability operations literature emphasizes community needs and may complement these discussions.

¹⁸ Glen Woodbury, "'Learning' Homeland Security—How One Executive Education Program Engages State and Local Officials," *Homeland Security Affairs* II, no. 3 (October 2006), <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/681>.

¹⁹ Stephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto, "Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security," *Council Special Report (CSR)*, no. 13 (March 2006), <http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/NeglectedDefenseCSR.pdf>.

²⁰ Jerome Kahan, "It's Never Too Late: Restructuring the Department of Homeland Security's Regional Framework," *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 10, no. 1 (2013): 353–369, <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jhsem.2013.10.issue-1/jhsem-2012-0030/jhsem-2012-0030.xml>.

²¹ Collaborative efforts, including NORTHCOM's Vibrant Response and FEMA's National Exercise Programs, are discussed in Chapter IV. "A Short History of United States Northern Command," U.S. Northern Command, December 31, 2013, <http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/Documents/A%20Short%20History%20of%20USNORTHCOM%20%28current%20as%20of%20March%202014%29.pdf>.

FEMA's 2011–2014 strategic plan directs the organization's resources to "foster a *whole community* approach to emergency management nationally."²² Although focused primarily on disaster response and emergency management issues, FEMA's whole community approach identifies strategic needs including manmade disasters, terrorist events, and technology changes. FEMA's national preparedness goals incorporate the whole community approach and provide an interesting comparison to the civil affairs model. For example, FEMA's homeland security preparedness goals offer five key missions: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.²³ A recent civil affairs field manual further outlines a six-step methodology for use in civil affairs operations: assess, Decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate, and transition.²⁴

One area of distinction in homeland security research is the anticipated operational environment. Whereas stability operations and civil affairs models are focused toward applications in foreign theaters, homeland security research (such as FEMA's whole community approach) is largely intended for application on American soil. The intrinsic characteristics of American homeland security efforts provide unique distinctions from military models. Generally, the typical audience for homeland security literature is American government employees and citizens.

Although the intended audiences differ, military strategies for stability operations and civil affairs broadly align with homeland security objectives of community collaboration as a means to strengthen and support security missions. It is worth noting, however, the significant opposition to even the appearance of militarizing portions of homeland security efforts such as law

²² FEMA, *FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2011–2014*.

²³ "Learn about Presidential Policy Directive-8," FEMA, last updated October 2, 2015, <https://www.fema.gov/learn-about-presidential-policy-directive-8>.

²⁴ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57).

enforcement.²⁵ Stability operations strategy may help soften such concerns by laying a foundational methodology for community partnership. However, numerous other instances of civil-military coordination have been welcomed, particularly during disaster response efforts.²⁶ Further research is needed to examine the impact of using the civil affairs model within stability operations to assuage concerns about militarization of homeland security assets.

There appears to be a research information gap on the usefulness of stability operations and civil affairs for domestic homeland security applications. However, there is ample research on the distinct topics. Within military literature, stability operations strategy and civil affairs policy provide contrasts for consideration in homeland security. Literature in the emerging field of homeland security provides adequate guidance on possible implications for a civil affairs model. Given the lack of existing research, this area is worthy of further analysis.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

1. Object of Study

Significant study has been devoted to the strategic purpose and design of stability operations and civil affairs models within their military context. Of particular interest is analyzing the military approach to stabilizing an area of responsibility amid complex circumstances. Specifically, this research examines the role of stability operations in unifying diverse interests such as community engagement, law enforcement, infrastructure development, and public health initiatives.

Historical case studies of stability operations and civil affairs were studied to determine how they have been applied in international environments. To this end, secondary research explored non-traditional domestic approaches with

²⁵ American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing* (New York: ACLU, June 2014), <https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf>.

²⁶ These topics are explored further in Chapter IV.

potentially parallel goals such as community-oriented homeland security or “whole community programs in American jurisdictions. The novel focus of this research is identifying common goals and functions—or lack thereof—between stability operations, civil affairs, and homeland security efforts.

2. Selection Criteria and Rationale

Conceptually, this author hypothesized that it may prove useful to apply stability operations and civil affairs methods to state or local homeland security efforts. The military uses these methods to achieve regional security objectives; many domestic government agencies engage in homeland security activities with similar strategic goals, but without a definitive model to unify planning. This line of thinking logically progressed into consideration of how stability operations and civil affairs might apply to homeland security efforts.

The next step in the selection process included a comparative case study examination of the British use of civil affairs techniques in stability operations. Civil affairs forces have been used across a range of conflict and disaster response to meet stability objectives. These and other notable similarities are potentially applicable, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. Application of Stability Operations for Homeland Security

Traits of Stability Operations	Potential use in Homeland Security
Clarity of mission and goals	Framework for unity of effort
Use of military force	Disaster response, law enforcement
Force protection / Intelligence activity	Data collection and analysis
Infrastructure development/protection	Transportation, utilities, cyber-security
Engagement of indigenous populations	Community-oriented homeland security and whole community initiatives
Mission-focused budgetary decisions	State/local budgetary allocation

Table 2. Civil Affairs Methodology and Homeland Security Goals

<u><i>Civil Affairs Methodology</i></u>		<u><i>National Preparedness Goals</i></u>
Assess	→	Observe
Decide	→	Prevention
Develop and Detect	→	Protection
Deliver	→	Mitigation
Evaluate	→	Response
Recovery	→	Recovery

Civil affairs methodology adapted from Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2011), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.

National preparedness goals adapted from "Learn about Presidential Policy Directive-8," FEMA, last updated October 2, 2015, <https://www.fema.gov/learn-about-presidential-policy-directive-8>.

3. Study Limitations

This author is not a subject-matter expert on stability operations or civil affairs. New research will not exhaust existing, meticulously detailed literature on these topics. The scope of this research is limited to only some portions of each strategy. Because the suitability of stability operations and civil affairs for domestic application has not been previously evaluated, there are many unknowns. Some portions may not be suitable for implementation due to

nuances in American law, cultural practices, and domestic policies, and are therefore outside the scope of this research.

The research also accepts certain limitations in comparing incongruous subject matter. For example, military actions in warzones are clearly much different than American law enforcement operations. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan are subjected to different dynamics than infrastructure development in the United States. This author acknowledges that the research does not compare “apples to apples,” but rather attempts to identify commonalities in areas where the models may be useful within the context of American homeland security efforts.

4. Instrumentation

The sample areas used in this thesis were selected based upon a review of available literature on stability operations strategy, its use of civil affairs resources, and homeland security initiatives. This inquiry examined military literature, and academic research provides significant sources of information. For example, the U.S. military’s field manuals on stability operations and civil affairs are hundreds of pages long. Similarly, there are large amounts of research into various facets of homeland security. This author has not used interviews or surveys, but relies on voluminous material available on the primary subject matter.

5. Steps of Analysis

A hybrid approach—combining case study and policy options analysis—is used to answer the primary research questions. Although a greater emphasis has been placed on the review of policy options, case studies examine strategic approaches and specific applications of policy. The combined analysis approach is intended to enhance practical recommendations for real-world applications. In addition to using case studies as examples for specific policy options, the following steps were taken in this analysis:

1. Define the problem (context, assumptions, goals).
2. Identify possible solutions (no change, moderate change, drastic change).
3. Evaluative criteria (realistic, legality, comparative effectiveness).
4. Identify projected outcomes for possible solutions (policy options matrix).
5. Discuss advantages and disadvantages of potential outcomes.
6. Select and explain the best solution.
7. Provide recommendations for implementation.
8. Share drafts with known stakeholders for discussion.
9. Revise and repeat steps as needed.

6. Intended Output

Because the topic is unique, this research offers ample opportunity for additional inquiry. This paper concludes by answering the primary research questions and providing a recommendation for state and local practitioners. Using stability operations strategy and the civil affairs model, this author provides a framework for implementation. The goal is to provide political leaders and/or agency executives with a unified model for protecting their citizens. Such a strategy may provide clarity and guidance for domestic homeland security objectives.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter II discusses stability operations from a strategic perspective, examines its historical evolution, and identifies key elements of stability operations methodology. Chapter III explores the role of military civil affairs forces in stability operations, recognizes fundamental principles of civil affairs operations, and provides a case study of the British approach to civil affairs.

Chapter IV shifts focus to domestic homeland security efforts in which stability operations strategy may be helpful, including disaster response, law

enforcement, and civil-military operations. Chapter V provides several policy options: maintaining current methods, implementing small-scale stability operations strategy, and implementing comprehensive regional stability operations strategy. Chapter VI concludes with a thesis summary and suggestions for future research.

II. STABILITY OPERATIONS STRATEGY

Never tell people *how* to do things. Tell them *what* to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

—General George S. Patton

Although governments exist to provide stability and security for their citizens, history is littered with examples of their related shortcomings. In many cases, the American military has responded to instability, conflict, or disasters by executing a community-focused stability operations strategy in support of U.S. national security interests. This strategy has been most often deployed in foreign territories during post-conflict and disaster relief efforts.

This chapter provides an historical context for the development of stability operations strategy and describes its methodological design. Primary stability operations tasks are identified and discussed in later chapters for their applicability in domestic homeland security initiatives.

A. ASSUMPTIONS

Although designed with broad scope, stability operations strategy is not a universal resolution to *all* military situations, disasters, or humanitarian crises. This research accepts that a one-size-fits-all solution is unrealistic to address the complexities of military and homeland security environments. Certainly the U.S. military recognizes that other tactics are sometimes required.²⁷ Stability operations strategy offers military commanders or—in the case of homeland security efforts—state and local leaders a decentralized option for resolving community problems. At times, other methods will be necessary.

²⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), I-15, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

B. EVOLUTION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS STRATEGY

The U.S. military uses its assets to support American national security goals.²⁸ Throughout history, the majority of U.S. military activities could be characterized as peacetime operations focused on regional stability, interrupted by periodic episodes of conventional warfare. In the late 1780s, President George Washington directed U.S. Secretary of War Henry Knox to develop military plans to guard settlers, regulate trade, and enforce laws. This trend continued into the 19th century as the American military continued to defend settlers and enforce treaty agreements with Native American tribes.²⁹

During the mid-1840s occupation of Mexican territory, American General Winfield Scott gained widespread support from the indigenous population. Gen. Scott ensured his troops protected local economic interests, started programs to remove trash and repair war damage, and hired local workers.³⁰ The post-Civil War period of Reconstruction in southern states is perhaps the most publicized example of U.S. stability operations. American forces established security throughout the country's southern territory and organized efforts to restore new state governments in accordance with national policy. U.S. military forces assumed three types of roles during the unique era of Reconstruction:

A post-war occupation force supporting presidentially appointed civilian government (1865–1867)

A military government (Reconstruction Acts of 1867)

A supporting force for elected state governments (until 1877)³¹

These distinct strategies provided a precedent for future stability operations in other parts of the world. At the turn of the 20th century, the United States began to expand its international military influence. In Cuba, an American military

²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0), I-14.

²⁹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-1.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 1-1 – 1-2.

government was imposed in conjunction with health, security, and public works initiatives. Similar efforts in the Caribbean and Latin America led to long-term insurgencies or armed opposition and were unable to establish successful democratic governments.³² In 1902, conflict subsided in the Philippines and the United States used a decentralized military strategy to deploy hundreds of units through the islands.³³ The widespread deployment strategy in the Philippines was successful. The success of stability operations strategy was attributed to relationships formed between soldiers and Filipino citizens.³⁴

After WWII, Allied occupations of Germany and Japan became models for stability operations in the modern era. In Germany, a multinational effort helped restore order and stability to the region. American military assets, particularly the U.S. Army, were reoriented from combat operations to peacetime missions. In Japan, the initial phase of U.S. occupation focused on securing and demilitarizing the country. Within sixty days, the U.S. strategy shifted to implementation of military governance; democratic principles were gradually introduced into Japanese society. Subsequent military oversight focused on monitoring and facilitating the rehabilitation of Japanese territories in support of American national security needs.³⁵

The success of ensuing U.S. stability operations was less convincing. In 1958, the United States deployed 14,000 troops to Lebanon for three months to assist with civil unrest and support a pro-Western regime, with mixed results.³⁶ A few years later, America became involved in the Vietnam War and was unable to duplicate its earlier successes in the Philippines. Operationally, the U.S. military's traditional combat operations struggled to succeed against a significant

³² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-2.

³³ Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* (Winter 2005–2006): 43.

³⁴ John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Kraggs: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 288–289.

³⁵ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-2.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

insurgency and failed to establish regional stability despite a sizeable advantage in strategic resources.

Stability operations strategy in Vietnam was expected to be successful as it had been elsewhere. The Vietnam War's unpopularity and failures had a profound impact on future U.S. stability operations.³⁷ Some stability operations in Vietnam, however, were actually quite effective. The U.S. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program, which organized small teams of civil and military assets throughout South Vietnam, is viewed as one of the conflict's few successes.³⁸

America was ill prepared for defeat in Southeast Asia. For the next several decades and throughout the Cold War, support for stability operations waned significantly, burdened by Vietnam's hard lessons. American military posture shifted dramatically in favor of preparing for conventional means of warfare. As Communist threats subsided, the U.S. military pivoted from a military superpower competing for dominance to an international partner in peacekeeping missions. During the intervening years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks on September 11, 2001, stability operations once again took a prominent role. American troops were committed to fifteen different stability operations in the Caribbean, the Balkans, the African continent, and elsewhere.³⁹

Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, similar cycles have continued. The United States has engaged in a variety of efforts to mitigate the effects of government collapses, significant insurgencies, and humanitarian crises. As these trends endure in contemporary events, stability operations have taken a prominent role in U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴⁰ Historically, traditional combat operations have been a primary U.S. military mission. In 2005, during an era of persistent conflict in the Middle East, the Department of Defense (DOD)

³⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-2.


³⁸ McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction," 44.

³⁹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-2.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

formally recognized the importance of stability operations strategy. The DOD issued Instruction 3000.05, marking stability operations a “core U.S. military mission.”⁴¹ This instruction specifically noted that “stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations.”⁴² This dramatic shift placed the role of stability operations on par with defensive and offensive military efforts, as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Spectrum of Stability Operations



Source: Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008) <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>, 2-1.

Stability operations strategy incorporates a flexible model to accommodate the range of conflict and determine the posture needed for mission objectives. The increasing prevalence of stability operations in modern doctrine suggests they will play an integral role in future military engagements.⁴³ Future defense budgets, however, may not fund stability operations at the levels experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴⁴ Fiscal concerns may cast some uncertainty on the future role of stability operations as a core U.S. military strategy.

⁴¹ Department of Defense (DOD), *Stability Operations* (DODI 3000.05) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 2, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.

⁴² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), vi.

⁴³ McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction,” 34.

⁴⁴ Nick Simeone, “Hagel Outlines Budget Reducing Troop Strength, Force Structure,” DOD News, February 24, 2014. <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121703>.

C. STABILITY OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY

In executing stability operations, the DOD's military directives are guided by the *National Security Strategy*.⁴⁵ Within this framework, Field Manual 3-07 is the U.S. Army's official doctrine for stability operations.⁴⁶ This strategy evolved from earlier concepts of "military operations other than war."⁴⁷ The manual provides a regularly updated guide for military leaders to plan and execute stability operations and establishes a foundation for related military doctrine.⁴⁸ Further, the manual pivots military resources toward post-conflict peacekeeping strategies focused on "achieving unity of effort through a comprehensive approach" specifically using a "whole of government" approach.⁴⁹

U.S. stability operations, in their essence, aim to provide time to restore public order and rebuild government institutions that encourage peace and stability.⁵⁰ Military forces' role in stability operations is to support other government efforts by focusing on the local population's needs:

Stability operations is an umbrella term for various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted *outside the United States* in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. [Emphasis added]⁵¹

Like most American military plans, stability operations strategy is intended for application outside the United States. Field Manual 3-07 is unique among

⁴⁵ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 2-4.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, iv.

⁴⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Military Operations Other than War* (Joint Publication 3-07), V-33.

⁴⁸ Like other military doctrine, FM 3-07 is updated periodically in response to contemporary issues. The most recent version was published in June 2014, with additional attention given to transitional governments. This author relied on the 2008 version, in part for its more concise charts and potential relevance to homeland security issues. The 2014 update is available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_07.pdf.


⁴⁹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), iv.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, vi.

⁵¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0), v-4.

military manuals; it has a wide scope that merges diverse U.S. military assets across a range of theaters. For example, the manual describes the benefits of leveraging military assets to establish safe environments in combat theaters and transitioning to civilian governance. Conversely, it also describes how the same methodology can support allies through peacetime military engagement prior to conflict. Both applications are focused on long-term endeavors to achieve stability and maintain peace.⁵² Figure 3 illustrates the interconnected relationship between various aspects of stability operations strategy.

Figure 3. Relationships Impacting Stability Operations



Source: Department of the Army, *Stability Techniques* (ATP 3-07.5) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 2012), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_07x5.pdf.

In stability operations, these relationships can be improved through unified actions: “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration” of civil, government, and military operations.⁵³ Field Manual 3-07 provides an integrated

⁵² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), vii.

⁵³ Ibid., 1-3.

framework for the “spectrum of conflict”—from environments of peace to war.⁵⁴ The manual provides examples of its flexible goals, which include:

Peacetime support of allies

Limited intervention in humanitarian disaster response

Peaceful enforcement of international ceasefire agreements

Support of friendly governments during irregular warfare

Preparation for post-conflict actions in combat operations

Facilitation of stable civil governance in post-conflict phase⁵⁵

As operations are executed, plans are re-evaluated and can be adjusted to respond to mission variables.⁵⁶ For stability operations to succeed, Field Manual 3-07 describes the need for a measured, scalable response through coordinated civil and military resources. Each action is influenced by the nature of threats and factors unique to the situation. Successful stability operations need a conflict assessment that accounts for diverse factors and merges them into a comprehensive plan with deliberate objectives.⁵⁷

1. Unity of Effort

To navigate the intricacies of collaboration, stability operations use a layered methodology to manage complex goals and work toward unity of effort.⁵⁸ Specifically, stability operations strategy uses a “whole of government approach” to manage collaboration between government resources and a “comprehensive approach” to integrate all government, multinational, and private partnerships

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 2-1.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 1-3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1-3 – 1-4.

toward a common goal.⁵⁹ The comprehensive approach comprises four foundational principles:

Accommodate: determine resource priorities through accommodation of participant concerns

Understand: strive for collective knowledge of situation and shared goal

Base on purpose: shared efforts committed to common goal

Cooperate: work together with trust, sharing, and transparency⁶⁰


It is difficult to determine when unity of effort has been achieved. Since WWII, every U.S. presidential administration has implemented a program or issued a directive designed to ensure inter-agency coordination. For example, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, formalizing interagency cooperation between intelligence and political advisors. President Eisenhower began to unify policy development and implementation in the armed forces. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Clinton each took executive actions to provide unity of effort for overseas military activity, including stability operations. With each new presidential administration, policy directives designed for inter-agency collaboration also changed, with varying degrees of success. The cycling political change every four to eight years has challenged consistency in integration and made long-term unity of effort an elusive goal.⁶¹ Figure 4 depicts the current U.S. stability operations strategy to organize unity of effort and the delegation of stability tasks.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 1-4.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 1-5 – 1-6.

⁶¹ Ibid., 1-13.

Figure 4. Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations



Source: Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 1-5, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

To address unity of effort challenges in stability operations, in 2005 President George W. Bush signed a directive that officially declared stability operations a “necessary capability” of federal government. The directive designated the Department of State as the lead agency responsible for stability operations and mandated synchronization between the secretaries of state and defense in planning and operations throughout conflict phases.⁶² The Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is responsible for coordinating stability operations strategy and ensuring adaptability in scale and scope for mission needs.⁶³ In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, the S/CRS unifies the execution of five stability task sectors:

⁶² Ibid., 1-13 – 1-14.

⁶³ Ibid., 1-14.

Security
Justice and reconciliation
Humanitarian and social well-being
Governance and participation
Economic stabilization and infrastructure⁶⁴

Recent efforts in Afghanistan demonstrate the challenge to unify efforts. Collaboration with civilian elements was disjointed and ultimately proved to be an elusive goal. Perhaps this was due, in part, to early U.S. expectations that the United Nations (U.N.) or a coalition of other countries would ultimately play a greater role in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Because of these unrealistic expectations, the United States believed its role in Afghanistan's nation-building would be fleeting.⁶⁵ The Afghan president, however, thought the United States would maintain a stabilizing presence for decades to come.⁶⁶ In spite of U.S. stabilization efforts, Afghanistan was left without a strong alliance to unify stability efforts with civilian and international interests.⁶⁷ One lesson from Afghanistan is a need for increased engagement of civilian interests to balance military and civilian sectors.⁶⁸

2. Conflict Transformation

Field Manual 3-07 recommends transferring the momentum of combat into productive peacekeeping efforts, although this is easier said than done. However, this is not an insurmountable task, as demonstrated by the rapid pivot

⁶⁴ Ibid., 2-5.

⁶⁵ Michèle A. Flournoy, "Nation-Building: Lessons Learned and Unlearned," in *Nation-Building beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, 86–104 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 86.

⁶⁶ Barbara J. Stapleton and Michael Keating, *Military and Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan 2001–14: An Incoherent Approach* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2015), 3. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150722MilitaryCivilianAssistanceAfghanistanStapletonKeating.pdf.

⁶⁷ Stapleton and Keating, *Military and Civilian Assistance*, 2.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 10.

from combat posture to stability operations in post-WWII Japan.⁶⁹ Even while hostilities are ongoing, elements of stability operations must begin to identify root causes of conflict, regional dynamics, and potential solutions via a detailed analysis. These efforts should be narrowly focused on “imposing order, reducing violence, delivering essential services, moderating political conflict, and instituting an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord.”⁷⁰ Military force is often needed in these situations, but lasting peace will necessitate strong cooperation with civilian institutions and/or international partners.⁷¹

3. Legitimacy and Rule of Law

For stability operations to be successful, it is essential to gain citizens’ trust and confidence in the mission. Accessible government organizations and stability partners are important for developing citizen confidence and crucial to gaining consent from the governed. Establishing an equitable system of justice in compliance with international law builds internal and external legitimacy.⁷² Fairness in the rule of law and the government’s accountability is vital to promoting peace and establishing legitimacy.⁷³ According to Field Manual 3-07, effective government does not “go to war against its population,” and successful legitimacy requires four basic traits:

Supports basic human rights and freedoms

Is submissive to the will of citizens, particularly in election results

Preserves sovereignty by maintaining effective law and order

Protects societal rights by limiting government intrusions⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 7.

⁷⁰ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-6.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., 1-7.

⁷³ Ibid., 1-9.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 1-7.

Obviously, these traits represent an American perspective on successful governance. Other forms of government, however, are also capable of establishing effective stability in their jurisdictions. In either case, legitimacy is dependent on well-trained professionals successfully executing core stability tasks.⁷⁵ Most often, legitimacy requires the consent of the host nation. Exceptions to this rule generally require a widely acknowledged mandate, such as an international response to regimes that jeopardize other nations' security or intentionally create humanitarian crises. In order to maintain legitimacy in stability operations, citizens' expectations of judicial fairness must be met.⁷⁶ According to Field Manual 3-07, rule of law is established when:

Government controls the use of force in settling disputes.

Citizens and their property are safe.

Government operates within fair legal boundaries.

Citizens are provided an effective and impartial system of justice.

Government protects fundamental rights and freedoms.⁷⁷

4. National Security Interests

Stability operations strategy manifests U.S. policy perspectives into humanitarian missions, disaster relief, military intervention, and other foreign affairs in fragile states.⁷⁸ Environments that require external resources to achieve stability can present significant challenges to American interests.⁷⁹ To meet these challenges, American stability operations are designed to support U.S. interests by improving safety, security, and stability throughout the world.⁸⁰ Reconstruction efforts, engagement with local populations, and other strategies

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-7.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 1-9.

⁷⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0), I-14.

⁷⁹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-10.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

emphasize international partnerships and coordination to establish “favorable long-term security conditions,” but must always support U.S. national security interests.⁸¹

Fragile states inherently attract destabilizing dynamics that aggravate already tenuous circumstances. Particularly in these troubled regions, American national security strategies guide stability operations and counter regional volatility by promoting democratic principles. America’s national security policies focus on long-term conflict prevention and resolution by establishing stability and promoting democracy and economic viability.⁸²

When military force is deemed necessary to restore order, the U.S. national security strategy remains focused on reinstating local institutions such as law enforcement, courts, utilities, and basic government services. At their conclusion, successful stability operations leave the target area safe and secure with an established rule of law, stable government, and viable economy.⁸³ The population must also be left with basic essentials: “food, water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care.”⁸⁴ These needs are often the initial focus of disaster response and humanitarian aid. Long-term transformation also requires an educational system, leadership accountability, and peaceful coexistence of citizens.⁸⁵ Stable regions are generally more favorable to U.S. national security interests.

D. PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS

By design, military units are intended to be well organized, properly trained, versatile, and ready for combat in uncertain environments. The success of these forces often hinges on military commanders’ ability to properly identify

⁸¹ Ibid., 1-12.

⁸² Ibid., 1-11.

⁸³ Ibid., 1-16.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 1-17.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

and prioritize mission-critical tasks. Diversity in support organizations and the host nation's capacity for change are also critically important. In the unpredictable theaters necessitating stability operations, military forces are often the only steadying presence. Upon arrival, military personnel must establish and maintain order while meeting the host-nation population's critical needs. In disaster response, for example, the military may help facilitate access to aid organizations in order to ease the burden on military resources.⁸⁶

Planning, coordination, and execution of successful stability operations depend on a contextual familiarity of the culture.⁸⁷ While U.S. military forces operate under the authority of the president, the Departments of Defense and State formally coordinate their national security issues and areas of responsibility through the National Security Council.⁸⁸ Situational analysis accounting for an accurate cultural perspective should inform critical decisions in early phases of stability operations. Indeed, U.S. stability operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and elsewhere demonstrate the need for strategies informed by cultural nuances to avoid regrettable decisions.⁸⁹ Resources from the Department of State and other collaborative partners provide historical and region-specific context to stability operations planning.⁹⁰ Proper appraisal of the culture can help minimize potential conflict. In post-conflict stages of stability operations such as humanitarian assistance and peace operations, the Department of Defense may rely more significantly on coordination with Department of State resources to develop cultural awareness.⁹¹

This strategic reliance on coordinated actions, cultural understanding, and financial resources can be challenging. Critics of U.S. stability operations in

⁸⁶ Ibid., 3-1.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., A-1.

⁸⁹ Matthew Dombroski et al., "Risk-based Methodology for Support of Operations Other than War," *Military Operations Research* 7, no. 1 (2002): 1.

⁹⁰ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), A-1 – A-2.

⁹¹ Ibid., A-6.

Afghanistan argue these policies allow corruption to continue and contend a lack of cultural understanding ultimately de-stabilized the region. Similar criticisms are leveled toward stability operations strategies that incorporate counter-insurgency tactics intended to wield economic resources.⁹² The significant economic resources needed to stabilize Afghanistan, for example, caused the U.S. Army to develop a handbook entitled *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System*.⁹³ Despite these efforts, some research suggests contradictory military and civilian interests negatively impacted stability operations in Afghanistan.⁹⁴ The skeptical views of these strategies may underscore limitations or competing dynamics in stability operations collaboration. These vulnerabilities may be countered with detailed objectives designed to avoid ambiguity and by ensuring sufficient resources are dedicated to accomplish the mission objectives.⁹⁵

Some research indicates the advantages of a decentralized command structure in stability operations may lessen any unfavorable ambiguity in mission objectives.⁹⁶ Particularly in post-conflict settings, an accurate cultural assessment remains key to developing successful stabilization strategy and reinforces the importance of collaboration between stakeholders. Regardless of the environment, stability operations are designed to accomplish specific tasks such as addressing root causes of conflict, repairing damage caused by disasters, or helping to resolve government failures.⁹⁷ According to the U.S. Army, stability operations will encounter one or more of the following challenges: “fragile states, conflict, poverty and non-functioning national/local markets,

⁹² Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love,” *Foreign Policy*, December 1, 2009, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/12/01/money-cant-buy-america-love/>.

⁹³ “Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” Department of the Army, April 30, 2009, <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/09-27.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Stapleton and Keating, *Military and Civilian Assistance*, 1.

⁹⁵ Shanahan, “Decentralized Stability,” 30–31.

⁹⁶ A.L.W. Vogelaar and E.H. Kramer, “Mission Command in Ambiguous Situations,” in *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*, ed. Crol McCann and Ross Pigeau (New York: Springer, 2000), 420.

⁹⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-2.

belligerents, and corruption.”⁹⁸ Stability tasks are designed to resolve these types of issues.

In ideal stability operations, the host-nation’s civil government structure remains functional and stakeholders quickly engage in collaborative support tasks. For cases in which security has deteriorated or government service is inadequate, military personnel may begin to deliver services normally provided by civil government or aid organizations. Even the United States uses military support to assist civil authorities during disasters and civil disorder.⁹⁹ To clarify scope, Field Manual 3-07 describes three different categories of tasks in stability operations:

Tasks for which the military retains primary responsibility

Tasks for which civilian groups are primarily responsible, but military forces are ready to perform if necessary

Tasks for which civilian groups are primarily responsible without support from military resources¹⁰⁰

Accurately identifying, prioritizing, and executing stability tasks is the key to successful stability operations. These processes require support with partners and the host population, and require some knowledge and sensitivity to the host nation’s culture.¹⁰¹ If, for example, the military commander misidentifies a task and subsequently misallocates resources, the mission will fail. If the task is identified properly but the execution lacks needed support, the mission will still fail. The pace of progress will vary, but mission success in stability operations requires significant planning and coordinated action by all parties. Generally speaking, these plans emphasize non-lethal action to achieve mission

⁹⁸ Department of the Army, *Stability Techniques* (ATP 3-07.5) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 2012), 1-5, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_07x5.pdf.


⁹⁹ U.S. civil-military operations are discussed further in Chapter IV.

¹⁰⁰ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-2.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 3-1.

objectives:¹⁰² Figure 5 depicts the cooperative role of stability “lines of effort” or tasks used to guide strategy and allocate resources.¹⁰³

Figure 5. Examples of Stability Lines of Effort



Adapted from Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-10, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

¹⁰² Ibid., 2-3.

¹⁰³ Figure 5 is included in Appendix D to provide an accessible comparison to Appendix E.

For obvious reasons, the methodology for stability operations deals only with areas of military responsibility and does not address solely civilian tasks. Stability tasks are categorized with an emphasis on meeting final objectives within a specified time period.¹⁰⁴ Individual tasks are likely more complicated than they appear. For example, to ensure a safe environment for a population, other objectives must first be achieved. Providing security may involve resolving long-standing disputes, restoring law and order, eliminating life-threatening hazards, etc. As time goes on, each of these primary stability task sectors will become increasingly complicated.¹⁰⁵

1. Civil Security

U.S. military policy acknowledges that protecting civilians from harm during every operation is important.¹⁰⁶ Stability operations strategy goes a step further—it includes tasks focused on developing stable civil organizations and securing a safe operational environment.¹⁰⁷ Each situation is unique and civil security strategies have been implemented in a variety of stabilization environments.¹⁰⁸ Layers of civilian protection vary by mission, and may be interpreted differently by stakeholders. Figure 6 depicts layers of civil security options that may be used across a range of conflict environments.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 3-2.


¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2015), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_07x6.pdf.

¹⁰⁷ It is worth noting that military policy differentiates between protection of civilians as a primary mission and preventing civilian casualties during operations. See Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6), 3-1.

¹⁰⁸ Sebastian AJ Taylor, “Fragile and Conflict-affected States: Exploring the Relationship between Governance, Instability and Violence,” *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 3, no. 1: 28, 1, [doi: 10.5334/sta.dy](https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.dy).

Figure 6. Layers of Civilian Protection



Source: Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2015), 1-2, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_07x6.pdf.

In post-conflict environments, stability tasks focus on civil security and reorienting military resources toward demobilization efforts. The goal is to eliminate hostilities through negotiations and other peacekeeping processes. During this phase, disarmament of combatants is likely to occur in conjunction with efforts to reintegrate belligerent fighters' sympathetic supporters. Ideally, support from diplomatic and military resources fosters an environment of restoration for those willing to engage in peaceful reorganization.¹⁰⁹ Even the threat of lethal alternatives may compel adversaries to a peaceful compromise. Although stability operations rely primarily on nonlethal actions, the possibility of traditional military force can be leveraged to achieve stability objectives.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-3 – 3-5.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

After the combat environment is demobilized, effective border control and internal freedom of movement for the population are important indicators of stability. The resumption of public health monitoring, tax collection, and other essential government functions are also important stability tasks. In order for these services to be restored, forces must be able to ensure the protection of civil reconstruction groups and facilities.¹¹¹ U.S. homeland security agencies face similar challenges and frequently respond to dangerous environments. For example, police and fire agencies must remove hazards from unstable scenes before civilians or other stakeholders can safely return.

Civil security objectives in stability operations can also be subject to sudden change, particularly in political situations. This was evident in Afghanistan when the primary U.S. security mission shifted quickly from defeating an insurgency to finding a graceful exit strategy for U.S. forces. As Americans became more skeptical about military involvement in Afghanistan, political pressure influenced plans for troop withdrawals.¹¹² The new civil security objective may have been politically expedient, but it was a dramatic departure from earlier stability tasks to which America had been strongly committed.¹¹³ A lack of long-term consistency challenges the effectiveness of civil security efforts.

2. Civil Control

Regulating behavior and safety is challenging, even in relatively peaceful cultures. In places where stability operations are necessary, instituting rule of law under civil control can be a complicated process. Stability forces and other government advisors will also be called upon to assess the host nation's security capabilities and leadership competency. In failed states, foreign military police

¹¹¹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-4 – 3-5.

¹¹² Frank Newport, "More Americans Now View Afghanistan War as a Mistake," Gallup, February 19, 2014, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/167471/americans-view-afghanistan-war-mistake.aspx>.

¹¹³ Tommy J. Tracy, "Afghanistan Army Development: What Went Wrong," *InterAgency Journal*, 6, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 3–9, <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/IAJ-6-1Winter-2015-3-9.pdf>.

forces may be the logical choice for crowd control and other, typically civilian, police services, as well as for re-establishing judicial courts and evaluating the correctional system.¹¹⁴ Prior systems of justice may have been abusive or corrupt, resulting in strongly held feelings of inequality. Rather than simple intervention, civil control encompasses plans to build peace by addressing systemic inequalities.¹¹⁵ Resolving these core issues has proven challenging in places such as Kosovo, where local populations still struggle to resolve judicial inequality and historical injustices.¹¹⁶

As the criminal justice system is reintroduced, vulnerable populations need protection and new legal systems will need to be accepted as legitimate. In cases of war crimes against humanity, stability operations personnel and their international partners oversee the investigation and subsequent tribunals. After these steps have been taken, it is essential to ensure community outreach programs are in place to encourage reconciliation and open communication with the host nation's government and its partners.¹¹⁷ Ensuring fair and effective law enforcement is a difficult but necessary task to maintain order.¹¹⁸ Civil control looks beyond intervention to transformative peace-building processes that addresses systemic inequalities.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-6 – 3-7.

¹¹⁵ Lauren Hutton, *Considering the Relevance of Peacebuilding within External Interventions in Africa* (ISS Paper 281) (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, February 2015), 1, <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper281.pdf>.

¹¹⁶ Maria Derks-Normandin, *Linking Peace, Security and Durable Solutions in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014), 11–16. <http://brook.gs/1PYEPth>.

¹¹⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-8 – 3-9.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-7.

¹¹⁹ Hutton, *Considering the Relevance of Peacebuilding*, 6.

3. Restoration of Essential Services

War, disaster, and other humanitarian crises interfere with public services. Affected populations must have access to food, water, shelter, and medical assistance for stability operations to be successful.¹²⁰ Meeting immediate humanitarian needs and avoiding worsening crises is a primary objective of stability operations.¹²¹ In fulfilling this objective, military commanders must balance strategic needs and logistical decisions, such as the means of delivery.¹²² In regions prone to famine or food scarcity, military support for emergency food relief, famine prevention, or public health programs and education can be crucial.¹²³

Civilian aid organizations may be more beneficial in long-term relief efforts, but military forces are often called upon to support or provide food or medical aid when others are unable to. Patchwork arrangements for basic necessities may be less than ideal, and corruption remains problematic; in Afghanistan, for example, electrical power infrastructure remains unreliable despite four billion dollars of international investment.¹²⁴ Although not yet a true success, the investment in infrastructure may still represent significant progress relative to the region's prior state.¹²⁵

After a conflict or disaster, the realities of human suffering may exceed military forces' immediate capability. In some cases, citizens may have been dislocated from their homes by force or circumstance. Stability operations personnel may encounter refugee camps or need to establish sites for these

¹²⁰ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 2-7.

¹²¹ Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6), 4-3.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 4-6.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 4-8 – 4-15.

¹²⁴ Mohsin Amin, "Power to the People: How to Extend Afghans' Access to Electricity," Afghanistan Analysts Network, February 3, 2015, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/power-to-the-people-how-to-extend-afghans-access-to-electricity/.

¹²⁵ Amin, "Power to the People."

civilians.¹²⁶ Long-term, collaborative relationships between government and NGOs are the key to overcoming complex crises. The presence of stability operations personnel must not weaken the rule of law or worsen the exigent circumstances. Efforts to reinstate essential services are oriented toward restoring utility services, public health initiatives, and educational opportunities, and cessation of historical patterns of abuse.¹²⁷

Sustainable, long-term recovery is dependent on financial stability and maintaining restored services. Economic and infrastructure development should be scaled to local capacity and designed to stimulate their commercial markets. The military can play a significant role in generating employment opportunities and rebuilding infrastructure. Care should be taken to avoid worsening the situation for locals by upsetting the local economy. Enterprises generated by residents to provide goods or services create a means for sustainability after the departure of stability operations resources.

4. Support to Governance

Conditions for civil governance must be established in a manner that is supported by the local population. Early phases of force deployment focus on civil control while later stages are better suited for transitioning to civil governance.¹²⁸ Legitimacy is needed for a successful transition to civil authorities after military operations cease.¹²⁹ Whatever the form of civil governance, the chosen political structure must be acceptable to stakeholders.¹³⁰ Ideally, the strongest consensus should be among the local population to be governed. In some cases, such as Kosovo from 1999–2008, an international governing body was used until self-government was possible.¹³¹ During this phase, support for

¹²⁶ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-9–3-11.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 3-12 – 3-14.

¹²⁸ Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6), 5-2.

¹²⁹ *Stability Operations: Field Manual 3-07*, 3-13.

¹³⁰ Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6), 5-2.

¹³¹ Derks-Normandin, *Linking Peace*, 3–5.

civil authorities is formalized and transitions to civilian governance may begin. When shifting to local control, appointed local authorities should be vetted in a manner that fosters legitimacy with the local population and reduces corruption when possible.¹³²

5. Support to Financial Institutions and Public Investment

A nation's economic health has a direct impact on its ability to effectively govern. Stability operations support economic growth in local markets and a strong central banking system to strengthen national economies.¹³³ Stability operations forces may support tasks designed to ensure the success of the host-nation's financial markets and currency exchange. Government revenue streams such as tax collection and trade organizations may need to be reestablished to resume generation of revenue.

Local economic development should be integrated with long-term planning to minimize unintended consequences from sudden, dramatic investments. In many areas, supporting the agricultural sector is important for domestic food production and trade. Stability operations work toward developing transportation and market infrastructures that ensure an effective food distribution network.¹³⁴ Maintaining infrastructure—such as a rebuilt electrical grid, sanitation system, or clean water system—will strengthen regional vitality and stability.¹³⁵ Even in the United States, poor maintenance of critical infrastructure can have serious homeland security implications. For example, President Obama recently declared a state of emergency in Flint, Michigan, after shortcuts in critical infrastructure investment led to a “man-made water disaster.”¹³⁶ Ignoring critical infrastructure

¹³² Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6), 5-2 – 5-11.

¹³³ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 2-9.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 3-17 – 3-18.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 3-14 – 3-15.

¹³⁶ Ashley Southall, “State of Emergency Declared over Man-made Water Disaster in Michigan City,” *New York Times*, January 17, 2016m <http://www.nytimes.com/>.

is unacceptable in community-oriented stabilization strategy, and can have dire consequences for U.S. homeland security.

Stability operations stakeholders evaluate investment priorities in coordination with other government agencies and private aid organizations. For example, public investment in educational institutions, healthcare, and effective management of natural resources may develop transformative private sector opportunities.¹³⁷ Employment initiatives, banking institutions, national treasury and financial markets stabilization, and natural resources protection support long-term economic stability and eventual independence.¹³⁸ Investments designed to address food shortages or improve malnutrition rates are not areas of traditional military interest. However, these areas have a significant correlation to civil unrest and instability. Initiatives to address these issues are increasingly vital for economic development in “fragile and conflict-affected” states.¹³⁹

6. Information Engagement

Stability operations will be ineffective without proactive communication and engagement with the affected population. Information engagement and outreach efforts are incorporated into each stability sector. Throughout phases of operations, situations are reevaluated through detailed, formalized risk assessments. Military public affairs, psychological operations, and similar efforts are designed to develop local support.¹⁴⁰ Rather than simple outreach, information engagement is designed to improve credibility and legitimacy through continued dialogue with often-skeptical audiences.¹⁴¹ These forms of interaction

¹³⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-16 – 3-17.

¹³⁸ Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6), 6-3 – 6-11.

¹³⁹ Taylor, “Fragile and Conflict-affected States,” 1–3.


¹⁴⁰ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 2-14.

¹⁴¹ Jamal Bennor, “A Model for Dialogue and National Reconciliation in Libya,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February 2015, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/b7009480c1aabde0afe56b482b92f8cd.pdf.

may be particularly important with the advent of social media and other communications technology.

The success of stability operations is often contingent on the local populace's positive perceptions. Friendly activities in each stability sector enhance information engagement and credibility.¹⁴² The mission of stability operations relies on gaining the community's confidence and developing collaborative relationships. Engaging communities by sharing information, listening to their concerns, and meeting their critical needs builds trust and provides shared goals and objectives for the overall mission.¹⁴³ Figure 7 depicts the integration of information engagement into specific stability tasks.

Figure 7. The Role of Information Engagement in Primary Stability Tasks



Source: Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 3-19, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

¹⁴² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 2-4.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 3-19.

E. ANALYSIS

The long history of stability operations strategy and readily available methodology provides a strong basis for consideration. The approach has been tested in a variety of theaters across a range of conflicts and disasters. Throughout its history, stability operations strategy remains focused on the local population to achieve mission objectives.¹⁴⁴ Without support from the affected community, success is not possible.

The U.S. government publishes significant information outlining stability operations strategy. While the outcome of stability operations strategy has been thoroughly studied, there are few studies that demonstrate a reliable assessment of their cost-benefit. For instance, ample statistics demonstrate improvements in Afghanistan stability objectives such as education, healthcare, and civil security.¹⁴⁵ Although it is clear that significant expenditures were committed to obtain those results, no research assesses the effectiveness of the investment.¹⁴⁶ Such analysis would be beneficial, but lies outside the scope of this inquiry as well.

Some research contends that stability operations and peacekeeping efforts may *not* be ideal for conflicts involving civil war.¹⁴⁷ One study examined civil wars between 1946 and 1999 and found peacekeeping intervention efforts during created impediments to long-term mediation.¹⁴⁸ Although military forces in stability operations were generally beneficial, the study found the dynamics of

¹⁴⁴ Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6).

¹⁴⁵ Ian S. Livingston and Michael O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, November 2015), 22–28, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index/index20151130.pdf?la=en>.

¹⁴⁶ Livingston and O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index*, 29.

¹⁴⁷ Duu Renn and Paul F. Diehl, *Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: Tradeoffs in Peacekeeping Deployment versus "Letting Them Fight"* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, October 2015), 7, http://pksoi.army.mil/Publications/Papers/PKSOI_Papers-Diehl_Pay-Me-Now.pdf.

¹⁴⁸ Renn and Diehl, *Pay Me Now*, 7.

civil war prevented similar achievements.¹⁴⁹ When applied to civil war conflicts, stabilization strategy may enjoy short-term successes but are at higher risk for long-term failure without significant investment in stability operations.¹⁵⁰

“Unity of effort” may be a popular axiom in government literature, but Field Manual 3-07 and other stability operations literature does provide some specificity in unifying stability task sectors.¹⁵¹ One area of concern is considering political influences on the overall strategy. Misunderstood political expectations in Afghanistan led to execution missteps in the overall U.S. strategy to stabilize the country.¹⁵² Continued uncertainty in that part of the world proves the importance of long-term strategic commitment.

F. CONCLUSION

The use of U.S. stability operations strategy has been successful more often than not. Although research shows the approach may be less effective during civil wars, it is reasonable to assume that such environments represent a most significant challenge to any positive resolution. While not an exact comparison to modern homeland security efforts, it is interesting to note that early military stabilization strategies were used successfully in southern states after the American Civil War.¹⁵³

Plans for domestic application should involve long-term commitments, which may bode well for the applicability of stability operations as a homeland security strategy. Given stability operations’ strategic focus on resolving systemic issues, the investments needed to execute the strategy are equally long-term and significant.¹⁵⁴ Interagency cooperation, such as the partnership between the

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 8.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 23.

¹⁵¹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 2-5.

¹⁵² Stapleton and Keating, *Military and Civilian Assistance*, 1.

¹⁵³ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-2.

¹⁵⁴ Livingston and O’Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index*, 30.

Departments of Defense and State, may provide beneficial guidance for cooperation between federal, state, and local homeland security agencies.¹⁵⁵ As a strategic model, the breakdown of stability sectors and tasks offer other useful considerations for homeland security that are explored further in later chapters.

An early evaluation of stabilization doctrine during military occupation was titled *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, this title echoes modern assessments of stabilization strategy: “During stability operations, leaders and Soldiers *become governors* in a much broader sense, influencing events and circumstances normally outside the bounds of the military instrument of national power.”¹⁵⁷ Chapter III examines the role civil affairs forces play in executing stability operations strategy.

¹⁵⁵ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), A-6.

¹⁵⁶ Coles’ and Weinberg’s 1964 publication is regarded by many as a formative work on civil affairs, military governance, and the execution of stabilization strategies. See Harry Lewis Coles and Albert Katz Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1964).

¹⁵⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 5-8.

III. CIVIL AFFAIRS

If our intent is to avoid war, then at the end of a conflict we must create the conditions for peace, rather than for subsequent strife. If we are to overcome strategic myopia, we must address the civil sector.

—Colonel Kurt E. Müller

Civil affairs has been aptly defined as “armed social work.”¹⁵⁸ In its infancy, civil affairs was synonymous with military occupation, but its meaning has changed significantly.¹⁵⁹ In this research, “stability operations” has referred to a comprehensive strategy for stabilization. The term “civil affairs” describes military units and methods designed to execute stabilization strategy.¹⁶⁰ According to the U.S. Army, civil affairs workers are “specifically trained and educated to shape foreign political-military environments by working through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations.”¹⁶¹ American civil affairs resources are now organized within the U.S. Special Operations Command and deploy across all phases of combat and response environments.¹⁶²

Civil affairs forces engage populations and local institutions to “shape the civil environment” by mitigating or defeating threats and assuming responsibilities typically belonging to civil governments.¹⁶³ U.S. civil affairs methodology even describes its suitability for supporting civil authorities “within the United States

¹⁵⁸ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” *IOSphere* (Summer 2006): 33–34, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf.

¹⁵⁹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, vii.

¹⁶⁰ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-1.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Department of the Army, *Special Operations* (ADRP 3-05) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 2012), 3-14, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_05.pdf.

¹⁶³ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-2.

and its territories.”¹⁶⁴ This chapter introduces twelve principles guiding civil affairs activities and examines the British approach to civil affairs as an alternative strategic method. The impact of these ideas on homeland security efforts is discussed further in subsequent chapters. This chapter explores the role of civil affairs policy in stability operations and provides recommendations for consideration in homeland security.

A. ASSUMPTIONS

This author recognizes that military activities (such as civil affairs) and homeland security applications are not “apples and apples.” Given a research gap on the topic and the nature of predictive inquiry, some latitude is extended in considering the broad characteristics of civil affairs. This area of research on civil affairs generally focuses on strategic objectives that demonstrate potential cohesion with homeland security efforts. Tactical functionalities may be discussed briefly, but generally fall outside the scope of this research.¹⁶⁵

B. THE ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS WITHIN STABILITY OPERATIONS

As the United States prepared to enter WWII, the American military recognized it was ill prepared to successfully occupy parts of Europe, Asia, and North Africa.¹⁶⁶ Because its officers knew little about government functions and local laws or customs, the U.S. military began training officers for military government duties in 1942.¹⁶⁷ Although all prior successful American occupations were coordinated by the U.S. Army, President Franklin Roosevelt believed the Department of State was more suitable for “civilian matters.”¹⁶⁸ By 1943, however, the coordination of civil affairs stakeholders had proven difficult

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 3-21.

¹⁶⁵ A brief table from Field Manual 3-57 provides more information on specific civil affairs functions and capabilities, and can be found in Appendix A of this research.

¹⁶⁶ Hayward, “Co-Ordination,” 19.

¹⁶⁷ Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1943): 694, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2745638>.

¹⁶⁸ Hayward, “Co-Ordination,” 19.

for the Department of State, and President Roosevelt reverted responsibility for civil affairs back to the military.¹⁶⁹ The U.S. Army—coordinating with non-military agencies and resources—remains the dominant overseer of civil affairs activity.¹⁷⁰

In its early developmental stages, civil affairs was regarded primarily as an option for post-conflict environments of military occupation. The world has changed, and the U.S. military has an increasingly significant role in disaster relief and humanitarian missions.¹⁷¹ Some civilian aid workers may view collaboration with military organizations as a “last resort,” but generally still recognize the benefits of leveraging government assets in crises.¹⁷² Civil affairs forces are now vital to the success of stability operations strategy across the spectrum of military conflicts; their primary task sectors include:

Populace and resources control

Foreign humanitarian assistance

Nation assistance¹⁷³

Support to civil administration

Civil information management¹⁷⁴

Organizationally, contemporary civil affairs units comprise both active and reserve members; reserve members make up the majority of civil affairs forces,

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 20–21.

¹⁷⁰ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 2-1.

¹⁷¹ Charles-Antoine Hoffman and Laura Hudson, “Military Responses to Natural Disasters: Last Resort or Inevitable Trend?” *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* 44 (September 2009), <http://odihpn.org/magazine/military-responses-to-natural-disasters-last-resort-or-inevitable-trend/>.

¹⁷² Hoffman and Hudson, “Military Responses.”

¹⁷³ The U.S. Army describes nation assistance as “FID (foreign internal defense), security assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance; antiterrorism; DOD support to counterdrug operations; show-of-force operations; and arms control.” Department of the Army, *Special Operations* (ADRP 3-05), 1-4.

¹⁷⁴ Department of the Army, *Special Operations* (ADRP 3-05), 3-14.

bringing specialized skills from their civilian professions.¹⁷⁵ Reservists with training in civilian law enforcement, engineering, medical care, and other fields may be assigned civil affairs positions that leverage their expertise.¹⁷⁶ These proficiencies align with common host-nation vulnerabilities in six areas of “functional specialty”: “rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.”¹⁷⁷ Personnel are then further assigned into civil affairs task sectors based upon their specialties. Elements of this strategy could be useful for homeland security agencies (subsequent chapters provide recommendations for similarly leveraging employee specialties).

1. Civil Affairs Methodology

Civil affairs techniques blend traditional military and counter-insurgency methods to support stability objectives and influence local populations. The U.S. Army field manual for civil affairs operations notes “nine principles of war” established in 1947 with the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁷⁸ Subsequent conflicts led to the addition of “three principles of operations,” and together they form the “twelve principles of joint operations”:

Nine Principles of War

1. Objective: “direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.”
2. Offensive: “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”
3. Mass: “concentrate the efforts of combat power at the decisive place and time.”
4. Economy of force: “allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.”

¹⁷⁵ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8.

¹⁷⁶ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-20.

¹⁷⁷ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 1-8 – 1-11; Joint Publication 3-0 provides similar information on all twelve principles of joint operations, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations* (Joint Publication 3-0), Appendix A, A-1 – A-5.

5. Maneuver: “place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.”
6. Unity of Command: “for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.”
7. Security: “never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage...minimize cultural conflict with the civil population.”
8. Surprise: “strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.”
9. Simplicity: “prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.”¹⁷⁹

Three Principles of Operations

10. Perseverance: “ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.”
11. Legitimacy: “develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national strategic end state.”
12. Restraint: “limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.”¹⁸⁰

As noted in its U.S. Army field manual, civil affairs forces use these twelve analytical tools to plan and assess the success of civil affairs activities in stability operations.¹⁸¹

These principles are foundationally important to civil affairs strategy and share commonalities with homeland security themes, as discussed in subsequent chapters. The principles help describe civil affairs’ emphasis on the needs of the local population, and on meeting their objectives while accommodating for cultural nuances.¹⁸² Further, the principles evaluate the state of infrastructure and civilian institutions, and the host government’s ability to provide conventional services. Civil affairs forces may support the host nation’s military or form a transitional military authority until a new legitimate government

¹⁷⁹ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-10.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 1-11.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 1-8.

¹⁸² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-20.

is firmly established.¹⁸³ This differs from U.S. domestic environments in which governmental structures are generally more predictable and stable. The challenges faced by civil affairs may arguably be greater than those confronting homeland security agencies. Figure 8 provides some examples of the vulnerabilities encountered by U.S. civil affairs forces during stability operations and available response options.

Figure 8. Civilian Vulnerabilities and Civil Affairs Response Options

Vulnerability Dimensions	Vulnerabilities	Potential Assistors	Possible Mitigations
Scale the number of affected civilians Severity level of civilian depredations Duration and Frequency length of time and rate of occurrence Accessibility ability of outside actors to learn about civilian vulnerabilities and provide assistance Others location, time, activity, gender, age, disability, group identity	Physical Insecurity exposure, required activities that increase exposure Lack of willing and able protectors Lack of medical care, food, water, shelter, livelihood Lack of Access to Essential Services Property Loss vandalism, arson, theft, forcible displacement	National, Regional, Local Governments Host Nation Security Forces Military Police Non-State Security Actors Paramilitaries Militias International Military Forces International Organizations United Nations Non-Governmental Organizations Neighboring Countries Private Organizations and Individuals	Humanitarian Assistance Military Security Police Security Human Rights Monitoring Advocacy Development Diversity Management Compensation Mobilization and Self-Defense

Source: Department of the Army, *Protection of Civilians* (ATP 3-07.6) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2015), 2-2, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_07x6.pdf.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

2. Civil Affairs Challenges

The responsibilities of civil affairs forces mimic primary tasks for stability operations: establishing civil security and control, and restoring essential services. These goals become more narrowly focused as military commanders delegate task-specific assignments to support broader objectives.¹⁸⁴ In coordinating their stabilization efforts, civil affairs forces must consider the implications of their actions, particularly in the following areas:

- Overview of available resources

- Constraints on their use

- Alternatives for economic development

- Resources for immediate and long-term needs

- Interface among resource providers, indigenous government officials...and the peacekeeping force.¹⁸⁵

Civil affairs activities are decentralized by design, and impactful decisions are often made far below the command level. Civil affairs soldiers may be granted authority to take administrative actions, such as approving contracts for services, without the red tape typically found in government contracting.¹⁸⁶ Military commanders laud the method as enabling a more expedient delivery of services and financial support. Most NGOs and charitable groups do not possess the resources to maintain long-term response in stability operations.¹⁸⁷

As in other areas of interagency and international military operations, coordinating civil affairs activities is a significant challenge.¹⁸⁸ The circumstances that necessitate stability operations are chaotic, and there is often competition for

¹⁸⁴ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-20.

¹⁸⁵ Müller, "Concept of Strategic Civil Affairs," 80.

¹⁸⁶ Shanahan, "Decentralized Stability Operations," 30.

¹⁸⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-20.

¹⁸⁸ Hedieh Mirahmadi et al., *Empowering Pakistan's Civil Society to Counter Global Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, January 2015), 8, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2015/01/us-islamic-world-forum-publications/empowering-pakistans-civil-society-to-counter-violent-extremism-english.pdf>.

limited resources. Navigating complex, long-standing rivalries and cultural strife is no simple task. In some cases, extremist groups working against NGOs may have better funding sources and may be more organized.¹⁸⁹ Civil affairs actions intend to mitigate these effects. The collaborative, decentralized design of civil affairs strategy encourages mutually beneficial partnerships with NGOs. Particularly in an environment of limited resources, collaboration in civil affairs aims to avoid duplicate effort and shifts responsibilities to suitable NGOs whenever possible.

The decentralized approach to civil affairs is not without criticism. Notably, the methods are susceptible to corruption or incompetence. In Iraq, one aid group contended, “Soldiers are not development workers. There is industry skill, a body of knowledge that goes with it. You can’t just say ‘There’s a pothole over there and get it filled’ and fix a country.”¹⁹⁰ The military cannot achieve long-term stabilization objectives alone. Civil affairs forces may be forced to operate outside their specialties, and collaboration can be a difficult art to master in unfamiliar territory. Even in domestic homeland security efforts, collaboration is often tenuous and elusive.

3. Civil Affairs Benefits

Stability operations are most effective when civil affairs units successfully collaborate to accomplish mission objectives. Commanders recognize citizens and NGOs are often more ideally suited for many tasks. One such leader, Lt. Col. Hank Arnold, stated, “At the end of the day I’m not a doctor, I’m not a construction expert. I’m an infantryman.”¹⁹¹ Nonetheless, Lt. Col. Arnold acknowledged potential benefits in local partners who are motivated by the presence of armed civil affairs forces acting as project managers.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Mirahmadi et al., *Empowering Pakistan's Civil Society*, 8.

¹⁹⁰ Ariana Eunjun Cha, “Military Uses Hussein Hoard for Swift Aid,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 2003. <http://wpo.st/NSh21>.

¹⁹¹ Cha, “Military Uses Hussein,” 2.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 2.

By minimizing the negative effects of military occupation on the local population and providing quality-of-life improvements, civil affairs forces contribute significantly to improving the host government's legitimacy.¹⁹³ Not unlike community partnerships with homeland security agencies, civil affairs forces must develop rapport with individuals and groups in the operating area to develop trust, gain credibility, and meet objectives. These relationships are leveraged through long-term collaborative security and stability objectives identified by the military commander and civilian advisors.¹⁹⁴

Given the complexity of interconnected affiliations, predicting the resources needed for civil affairs activities can be difficult.¹⁹⁵ In fact, the number of civil affairs forces needed for stability operations is likely to exceed those required for traditional combat operations. Executing the long-term "hearts and minds" strategy generally requires more resources than armed combat.¹⁹⁶

Urbanization in fragile states and increasingly large population centers creates challenging deployment environments for civil affairs forces in stability operations.¹⁹⁷ Because of these challenges, civil affairs troops are most effective in smaller, regional deployments. Some countries are simply too large for civil affairs forces to effectively execute a stability operations strategy.¹⁹⁸ The impact of this principle on local homeland security efforts is discussed in Chapter IV.

¹⁹³ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-20.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Dombroski et al. provide a useful differentiation between *strategic* and *operational* levels of stabilization planning and outline a series of helpful questions to guide decision-making in each. See Dombroski et al., "Risk-based Methodology," 30–32.

¹⁹⁶ James T. Quinlivan, *Force Requirements in Stability Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP479.html>.

¹⁹⁷ Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (AOC 525-3-1) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2014), 10, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/TP525-3-1.pdf>.

¹⁹⁸ Quinlivan, *Force Requirements*, 7.

C. CASE STUDY

1. The British Approach to Civil Affairs

The British use of civil affairs in stability operations is similarly intended to organize, restore, and maintain basic government functions through collaboration with local citizenry.¹⁹⁹ An early summary of British civil affairs methodology described its design: “In the broadest of terms the object was to create and put into the field a temporary administrative pyramid, military in person, outlook, and loyalties, but predominantly civil in function.”²⁰⁰

The origins of British civil affairs tactics can also be traced to military plans for the Allied occupation of Europe during WWII. Prior to WWII, British military personnel often built roads or engaged in other temporary support missions. These tasks were carried out independently as an informal response to imminent needs, and soldiers resumed traditional military duties after completing the temporary assignment.²⁰¹ The nature of conflict in WWII compelled the development of civil affairs specialties to meet vital security objectives—particularly the need for civil governance in occupied European territories.²⁰² Allied strategy was influenced by the British desire to distinguish between methods for overseeing friendly and hostile territories.²⁰³ Many friendly territories had civil governments in exile, and Allied stabilization efforts in those areas were based on the people’s consent rather than forceful occupation.²⁰⁴ British civil affairs troops in WWII were assigned a wide range of tasks: medical, agricultural,

¹⁹⁹ Edward R. Flint, “The Development of British Civil Affairs and its Employment in the British Sector of Allied Military Operations during the Battle of Normandy, June to August 1944” (Ph.D. diss., Cranfield University, 2008), i.

²⁰⁰ Donnison, *Central Organizing and Planning*, 400.

²⁰¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, viii.

²⁰² Flint, “Development of British Civil Affairs,” 1.

²⁰³ Harry Lewis Coles, “Civil Affairs Agreements for Liberated Territories,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 267 (January 1950): 131–139, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1026735>.

²⁰⁴ Coles describes formal Allied civil affairs agreements in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and even Italy. See Coles, “Civil Affairs Agreements,” 131.

administrative, logistical, cultural (such as securing art), and protective (of communications infrastructure).²⁰⁵ Their assignments were intended to resolve significant civil issues before they complicated military activities. They accomplished these goals through formal interactions and partnerships between civilian populations and military forces.

As noted previously, U.S. civil affairs administration during WWII was sometimes beleaguered by confusion between the Departments of State and Defense. In contrast, the British clearly defined “where responsibility should lie for the administration of territories” within a formal military chain of command.²⁰⁶ However, British civil affairs forces were granted wide discretion and day-to-day activities were notably decentralized.²⁰⁷ In contrast, U.S.-led civil affairs efforts in Italy emphasized civilian political oversight that was deliberately separate from military supervision.²⁰⁸ The approach in Italy supported continuity in public policy through civilians with experience in political governance rather than military command.²⁰⁹

The British found the Italian approach to civil affairs untenable and crafted their policy differently. British civil affairs efforts demonstrated a commitment to military governance in collaboration with local populations. Specifically, the British wanted to improve accountability, make better use of limited resources, and use military administration to minimize political meddling.²¹⁰ Rather than creating redundant civilian organizations, British civil affairs would be administered through a military chain of command.²¹¹ In the U.S. military, the role of civil affairs has progressively evolved and remains a key tactic in stability

²⁰⁵ Coles, “Civil Affairs Agreements,” 132.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 133.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Donnison, *Central Organizing and Planning*, 319.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 320.

²¹⁰ F.S.V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe, 1944–1946* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961), 22–23.

²¹¹ Donnison, *Central Organizing and Planning*, 320–321.

operations.²¹² By contrast, British civil affairs was mothballed in the 1950s, when it was deemed either unnecessary in a post-WWII context or redundant to other multi-national efforts. Civil affairs operations were nevertheless reintroduced to the British military in the 1990s as part of stability operations in Bosnia.²¹³

British civil affairs troops are drawn from both reserve and active forces and are deployed together; this contrasts with American civil affairs, in which the two elements remain separate.²¹⁴ U.S. stabilization doctrine places stability operations strategy and its civil affairs forces on equal footing with other, more traditional, offensive and defensive military elements.²¹⁵ The role of civil affairs in British stability operations strategy is more ambiguous.²¹⁶ Despite this, the post-9/11 rise of Iraq insurgencies led to heightened interest in successful British strategies.

Some research examines the success of British counterinsurgency strategy during the Malayan Emergency in the mid-20th Century as a potential model for civil affairs forces in Iraq.²¹⁷ Favorable views of British operations in Malaya highlight sensitivity to local cultures and topography, integration of civil-military interests, and an inclination toward “strategic patience” as a means of building legitimacy with minimum force.²¹⁸ Similarly, counter-insurgency strategy has been deliberately applied in U.S. domestic law enforcement, exemplified in

²¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Publication 1) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013).

²¹³ Peter Caddick-Adams, “Civil Affairs Operations by IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, 1995–97,” *International Peacekeeping* 3 (Autumn 1998): 142–154.

²¹⁴ Flint, “Development of British Civil Affairs,” 10.

²¹⁵ See Figure 2 in Chapter II, Section B.

²¹⁶ Stuart Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British Military Doctrine: From Counterinsurgency to Stabilization,” *International Affairs* 87, no. 2 (March 2011): 323.

²¹⁷ The British fought a Communist-influenced insurgency within its Malayan colony in Southeast Asia from 1948-1960. See <https://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/malayan-emergency/>; Wade Markel, “Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control,” *Parameters* (Spring 2006): 35.

²¹⁸ Markel, “Draining the Swamp,” 35.

the Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing model in Massachusetts.²¹⁹ British and U.S. civil affairs incorporate counter-insurgency techniques to win hearts and minds in a manner similar to the C3 policing model. Regardless of its military or domestic application, key to the civil affairs strategy is recognizing and adapting to cultural nuances. Civil affairs activity in Iraq is different than in Haiti or Afghanistan, as would domestic applications in New York City be different from those in rural America. Different populations have different needs; local operations and objectives tailored to the citizens.

One U.S. Army strategist, Lt. Col. Wade Markel, examined British strategies in Malaya, commenting: “There is nothing controversial about combating an insurgency by improving the lot of the population.”²²⁰ However, as with any military action, “success” depends on perspective, and British counterinsurgency strategies in Malaya were prone to maltreatment. While the British endeavored to win “hearts and minds” in Malaya, they also interred the minority Chinese population from which insurgents arose. Similar to its activities in Malaya, British counterinsurgency strategy during uprisings in Kenya led to the imprisonment and abuse of ethnic minorities. Although these actions successfully defeated the insurgency, the ethnic abuses caused scandals that accelerated independence from British colonialism.²²¹

Despite the potential for abuse, physical population control remains a favorable practice in British civil affairs and counterinsurgency tactics. Control measures may range from identity cards and other administrative methods to forced internment. Lt. Col. Markel suggests that British actions in Malaya and Kenya could be applied to contemporary stability operations in Iraq, provided they are adjusted to the cultural environment and international laws.²²² However,

²¹⁹ More information on C3 Policing can be found at <http://mspc3policing.com/what-is-c3-policing/> and is discussed in Chapter IV.

²²⁰ Markel, “Draining the Swamp,” 38.

²²¹ Ibid., 36–37.

²²² Markel, “Draining the Swamp,” 37.

he also contends that the British experience in Kenya “supports the troubling conclusion that it is control of a given population, and not cultural sensitivity toward it, that was the decisive aspect of the British practice of counterinsurgency.”²²³ This conclusion is at odds with civil affairs strategy, and with many homeland security efforts designed to gain support from citizens. However, Malaya and Kenya represent extremely dire circumstances not often experienced in American domestic history.²²⁴

Lt. Col. Markel asserts that the British strategy of “winning hearts and minds” may be less consequential than suppressing dissent.²²⁵ This recommendation is tempered by the realization that these methods are most effective when an uprising is isolated to a small segment of the population. Even then, success is by no means guaranteed. Contemporary examples demonstrate the challenge of population control in fragile states. One such example is South Sudan, an area rocked by civil war and continued instability despite U.N. attempts at “voluntary internment” as a means of population control. Critics of U.N. actions in South Sudan cite a lack of civilian engagement and exit strategy, a forte of British civil affairs methodology.²²⁶

These lessons appear to have influenced present iterations of British civil affairs. The modern-day British civil affairs renaissance blends distinct elements of “counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state-building” into stability operations.²²⁷ Within that doctrine, the British reintroduced civil affairs forces with four primary motivations:

²²³ Ibid., 41.

²²⁴ In the event of significant disaster or crises on American soil, the U.S. military coordinates with and/or supports civil authorities. The implications for civil affairs in these circumstances are discussed further in Chapter IV.

²²⁵ Markel, “Draining the Swamp,” 41.

²²⁶ Lucy Hovil, *Protecting Some of the People Some of the Time* (Kamapal, Uganda: International Refugee Rights Initiative, December 2015), 4–7, <http://www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/Papers/2015/ProtectingSomeofthePeopleFINAL.pdf>.

²²⁷ Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan,” 317–333.

1. The complexity of responding to civilian problems in areas where the military operated with other elements
2. A necessity to engage humanitarian and community improvement organizations in operational theaters
3. A stable administration of government would provide an acceptable exit strategy
4. A political need for credible humanitarian efforts as part of military operations²²⁸

While U.S. civil affairs policy emphasizes military priorities, British civil affairs design stresses the tactical benefits of relationships that support humanitarian needs and principles.²²⁹ The method for achieving this goal is working more effectively with “local, national, and international civil agencies.”²³⁰ Similar to U.S. civil affairs, the British approach helps set goals and redeploy resources once an area of responsibility has improved.

Present-day British civil affairs policy reflects a “comprehensive approach” for stabilizing civilian areas through “cost-effective, plausible, and feasible operations.”²³¹ Unlike its Italian equivalent, which uses a civilian-led approach, British civil affairs strategy manages the diverse disciplines through a military chain of command and operates under a centralized stabilization policy.²³² British civil affairs strategy continues to be used in recent conflicts and operates under a mandate to demonstrate “a holistic, politically focused strategic approach

²²⁸ Flint, “Development of British Civil Affairs,” 10.

²²⁹ Ibid., 11.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Myriame TIB Bollen and Sebastiaan JH Rietjens, *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013).

²³² Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* (JDP 3-40) (Wiltshire, England: Ministry of Defense, November 2009), 2, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/jdp3_40a4.pdf.

to intervention.”²³³ British civil affairs methods are intended to reflect the value of negotiation with civilian partners within the context of stability operations.²³⁴

2. Analysis

The evolution of British stability operations policy and subsequent refinements in civil affairs practices are relevant to our own security discussions.²³⁵ British civil affairs methods are rooted in counterinsurgency strategy. Some aspects of these practices have been beneficial, while others offer a cautionary deterrent. The British approach to stabilization through civil affairs is pragmatic, and offers a flexible model for regional stability. However, particular methods, such as wholesale internment and selective protection, are not ideal for consideration in U.S. society. British civil affairs practices focus on political goals at home and abroad. This attention to public perception may be useful for consideration in an American system of homeland security.

While British civil affairs began as a system of military governance, it evolved into one component within a system of stability operations. The current British approach to counter-terrorism strategy provides an interesting analogy with its civil affairs practices. Current British counter-terrorism policies, referred to as CONTEST, are designed around four key objectives: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare.²³⁶ These goals note a foundational obligation to “human rights and rule of law” and transparency in protecting the United Kingdom, although similar commitments are not accentuated in British civil affairs or counterinsurgency strategy.²³⁷ Perhaps such emphases are understandable, but the inference is that protection of British interests is tantamount. While there has been some

²³³ Griffin, “Iraq, Afghanistan,” 317–318.

²³⁴ Deborah Goodwin, *The Military and Negotiation: The Role of the Soldier-Diplomat* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

²³⁵ Flint, “Development of British Civil Affairs,” 1.

²³⁶ Home Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, March 2013), 13, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170644/28307_Cm_8583_v0_20.pdf.

²³⁷ Home Office, *CONTEST*, 19.

debate about the success of British prevention efforts, CONTEST touts the lack of attacks during the London Olympics with anecdotal evidence of arrests and foiled terror plots.²³⁸

The British experiences in Malaya and Kenya are useful comparisons to engagements in Iraq and elsewhere. The methods used in these countries highlight the challenges in exporting military systems to a system of American democracy. British civil affairs strategy does provide a beneficial contrast for organizing collaboration into local homeland security efforts. Domestic efforts to stabilize communities and respond to disasters may be more effective by considering the British approach to citizen engagement. However, it must be recognized that these successes often came at the expense of minority populations and in a manner unacceptable for U.S. homeland security practices.

As a result of extensive deployments and lessons learned, British civil affairs tactics have changed. Refinements resulted in nine primary objectives for civil affairs forces supporting stability operations:

1. Place political purpose first: political goals guide planning and desired outcomes.
2. Understand the context: situational awareness is necessary for success.
3. Focus on the population: the needs of the population must be met to promote security and gain consensus.
4. Foster civil authority and indigenous capacity: empower community ownership in their own security.
5. Unify effort: force is only one element to achieve security and stabilization objectives, and coordinated operations are vital to security.
6. Isolate and neutralize irregular actors: reduce opposition to irrelevancy.
7. Exploit credibility to gain support: foster sentiments of legitimacy and credibility toward government.

²³⁸ Ibid., 5–10.

8. Prepare for the long term: sustainable stability will take considerable time and requires an early commitment to persevere.
9. Anticipate, learn, and adapt: complex challenges and adversaries demand preparation and versatile responses.²³⁹

These nine objectives share many similarities with U.S. civil affairs doctrine. Table 3 compares current British civil affairs objectives with joint operations principles used by U.S. civil affairs forces.

Table 3. British Civil Affairs Objectives and U.S. Joint Operations Principles

British Civil Affairs Objectives	U.S. Joint Operations Principles
Primacy of political purpose	Objective
Understand the context	Maneuver
Focus on the population	Security
Foster governance, authority, and civil capacity	Economy of force
Unity of effort	Unity of command
Isolate and neutralize irregular actors	Offensive, Mass, Surprise
Exploit credibility to gain support	Legitimacy, Restraint
Prepare for the long haul	Perseverance
Anticipate, learn, and adapt	Simplicity

British objectives adapted from Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* (JDP 3-40) (Wiltshire, England: Ministry of Defense, November 2009), 59–67, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/jdp3_40a4.pdf.

U.S. principles adapted from Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2011), 1–8 – 1–10, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.

²³⁹ Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation* (JDP 3-40), 59–67.

Two of the British recommendations offer strongly worded but noteworthy distinctions from U.S. civil affairs methodology. The “primacy of political purpose” succinctly ascribes the strategic intent toward political accountability, whereas U.S. civil affairs strategy avoids overt political influences. The British commitment to “isolate and neutralize irregular actors” may indicate a willingness to go beyond the limits of U.S. strategy.²⁴⁰ Perhaps these semantics suggest lingering effects influenced by British successes in Malaya and Kenya and desire to duplicate similar victories in Iraq.²⁴¹ These two recommendations should be approached cautiously, but offer an interesting contrast to U.S. civil affairs policy.

D. CONCLUSION

Subtle differences between the U.S. and British approaches to civil affairs offer suggestions for American homeland security applications. Developing an exit strategy, for example, intends to establish British legitimacy not only with the local population and other stakeholders, but also with British citizens.²⁴² This modest nuance may be beneficial to a U.S. culture that values inclusiveness. U.S. civil affairs strategy is focused on its role within stability operations and does not appear overtly concerned with the opinions of American citizens. U.S. civil affairs policy concentrates on the community in which it is deployed.

Less subtle is the concept that internment or wanton control of minority populations may be beneficial to stability operations. While these types of physical control may be tolerated in times of war, they certainly warn ethical sensibilities and would likely violate American laws. Perhaps the British recognize this also. While their civil affairs objectives offer some latitude in foreign deployments, British counter-terrorism strategies reflect a more conservative approach in their own territories; as the policy states, “We do not believe it is possible to resolve the threats we face simply by arresting and

²⁴⁰ Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation* (JDP 3-40) 57, 63–64.

²⁴¹ Markel, “Draining the Swamp,” 46.

²⁴² Flint, “Development of British Civil Affairs,” 10.

prosecuting more people.”²⁴³ These sentiments are analogous to ongoing debates about U.S. homeland security practices, particularly in state and local law enforcement, which is explored in the next chapter. Gaining civilian support is paramount in both civil affairs and homeland security.

Although U.S. civil affairs forces are most often deployed in foreign environments, there appears to be some basis for civil affairs’ applicability in domestic homeland security efforts. Specifically, the “twelve objectives for joint operations” provide a helpful framework for stabilizing American communities, and are revisited in policy recommendations for homeland security efforts. U.S. military policy notes that civil affairs forces can be deployed domestically to support civil authorities.²⁴⁴ Chapter IV examines civil-military operations and other areas of homeland security in which stability operations strategy and the civil affairs model may be relevant.

²⁴³ Home Office, *CONTEST*, 9.

²⁴⁴ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 3-21.

IV. HOMELAND SECURITY INITIATIVES

The quest for homeland security is heading...toward the quasi-militarization of everyday life.... If danger might lurk anywhere, maybe everything must be protected and policed.

—William Greider, national affairs correspondent, *The Nation*

U.S. homeland security remains an industry in flux, responding to outside threats and inside changes in public expectations.²⁴⁵ Private citizens, NGOs, politicians, businesses, and public safety agencies continue to debate the best options for protecting our country. In that context, a significant number of citizens believe government is not sensitive to public expectations and safety needs. Response efforts during natural disasters have been criticized. Police agencies have been particularly scrutinized for inadequate community outreach and controversial use of force. On the other hand, critical infrastructure may not be given enough attention in homeland security deliberations. Organization of state and local homeland security efforts varies significantly by jurisdiction, with no common methodology. In February 2001, a government commission assessed America's homeland security strategy, finding:

The U.S. government is not well organized, for example, to ensure homeland security. No adequate coordination mechanism exists among federal, state, and local government efforts...Strategic planning is absent in the U.S. government...nor can resources be allocated efficiently to reflect changes in policy priorities.²⁴⁶

Although much has changed since 9/11, a similar assessment could be made of present-day homeland security efforts. After 9/11, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created to improve the coordination of federal,

²⁴⁵ Kahan, "Never Too Late."

²⁴⁶ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, February 15, 2001, <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf>.

state, and local government agencies against security threats.²⁴⁷ Significant strides have been made in national homeland security prevention and response plans through DHS and its component, FEMA. However, state and local homeland security agencies generally lack a comprehensive strategy to unify their efforts.

Homeland security leaders should be willing to consider all legal options to protect citizens. This chapter discusses some of these possibilities, including better coordination between U.S. military and homeland security resources. The intent is to demonstrate an ongoing precedent for incorporating military strategy into homeland security efforts. Given trends toward civil-military collaboration, stability operations strategy may be an even more reasonable alternative for homeland security. Further, this chapter examines areas of state and local homeland security efforts in which the decentralized, community-focused model of stability operations strategy may be beneficial. Specifically, this chapter discusses homeland security initiatives and domestic lines of effort within the context of four major stabilization objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests.²⁴⁸ Aspects of each area translate into policy option recommendations in Chapter V.

A. ASSUMPTIONS

This chapter accepts that the pursuit of domestic tranquility is undoubtedly complex. The execution of military stability operations strategy is similarly challenging. This author realizes that volumes have been written on homeland security, civil-military cooperation, and related topics. This chapter does not reveal new secrets; it aims simply to highlight areas of homeland security in which stabilization strategy may be beneficial.

²⁴⁷ David Stout, "Bush Proposes Restructuring of Homeland Security," *New York Times*, June 6, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/>.

²⁴⁸ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-3.

This author also assumes that securing our homeland remains a principal responsibility of the government, and the execution of related duties will never be perfect. Although this chapter certainly does not resolve the challenges facing homeland security, it accepts there is room for improvement. Many critics agree; for instance, journalist William Greider published an article in 2004 criticizing post-9/11 homeland security efforts:

So far more than \$120 billion in new spending has been devoted to constructing domestic protections, but each new project merely demonstrates how incomplete the homeland security system is—and how impossible an airtight defense would be for an open and free society...So government is pushed to formulate larger and more grandiose plans...to ward off more of the infinite possibilities, just in case.²⁴⁹

Greider and other skeptics underscore the gargantuan task of homeland security, and other cynical descriptions of homeland security affairs could be made today. Much has been done, but there remains a startling lack of consensus—particularly in prevention strategies. This chapter does not intend to suggest yet another grandiose plan. Instead, this author assumes existing military strategy may be able to unify and leverage current resources more successfully than present-day methods.

Many unsettled questions remain, even regarding what activities fall within the purview of “homeland security.”²⁵⁰ This chapter does not attempt to resolve such debates, but suggests initiatives that may be incorporated into a comprehensive homeland security stabilization strategy. The chapter paints with an admittedly broad brush, and assumes a decentralized strategy such as stability operations may be more palatable to homeland security critics.

Certainly, the nature of American democracy presents challenges for homeland security organizations. Safeguarding the public within the confines of

²⁴⁹ Greider, “Under the Banner,” 14.

²⁵⁰ Fire services, police departments, and emergency management may be widely accepted as homeland security efforts. The inclusion of other professions (public health, cyber-security, schools, code enforcement, utilities, etc.) varies significantly by jurisdiction.

U.S. laws while balancing community expectations is demanding work. However, the use of military strategy in homeland security activities is not a novel concept; this author assumes history provides a reasonable precedent. The chapter begins with an abbreviated summary of U.S. civil-military collaborative efforts to stabilize the homeland.

B. CIVIL-MILITARY COLLABORATION

The American system of democracy embraces an intrinsic tension between co-existing federal, state, and local governments. One might think homeland security agencies are less inclined to cooperate with U.S. military assets, as noted by researcher Donald Kettl:

At the core of the problem are two issues: America's historical tradition of local self-government...and the technical difficulty of setting and enforcing standards, for intergovernmental programs in general and emergency services in particular.²⁵¹

Despite these views, the U.S. military remains an active partner in homeland security efforts and actually has a long history of supporting domestic agencies.²⁵² American military strategy and resources may be well suited for use in homeland security, yet underutilized by state and local homeland security agencies.²⁵³ While military assistance is often welcomed during disaster response or public health crises, military commanders and civilian officials have generally been reluctant to deploy American armed forces in law enforcement roles on U.S. soil.²⁵⁴ Nonetheless, a perceived hesitancy to utilize military resources domestically may be a relatively recent phenomenon.²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ Donald F. Kettl, "Contingent Coordination: Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland Security," *American Review of Public Administration* 33, no. 3 (September 2003): 253.

²⁵² There are, of course, different categories of U.S. military forces (e.g., active, reserve, National Guard) with varying nuances, responsibilities, and commanders. For the purposes of this brief narrative, the term "military" is used broadly.

²⁵³ Hoffmann and Hudson, "Military Responses."

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ John. R. Brinkerhoff, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforcement Title* (Suffolk, VA: Department of the Army Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2004), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-16/ch_11.asp.

Prior to the advent of professional law enforcement agencies, American military personnel served as the primary community peacekeeping force.²⁵⁶ President George Washington personally led an army of thirteen thousand to quell civil disorder during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.²⁵⁷ U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Diehl describes the expanding role of our military on the Western frontier:

The Army build roads, bridges, and frontier communities, it fought with Indians, outlaws, and terrorists; it kept the peace across enormous expanses of territory, settled labor disputes, and assisted communities in the wake of natural disasters.²⁵⁸

The role of the U.S. military has continued to expand. Since the end of WWII, the United States has maintained a larger domestic military presence, whose role evolved to include support for civil authorities.²⁵⁹ Contemporary American military policy affords significant latitude for supporting homeland security activity, particularly for National Guard troops; state governors have frequently used their legal authority to activate National Guard troops for homeland defense.²⁶⁰ During the 2012 fiscal year, for example, National Guard troops responded to more than one hundred natural disaster missions and conducted at least seven thousand different counterdrug operations with federal, state, and local homeland security partners (see Figure 9 for an example).²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ Robin D.S. Higham, *Bayonets in the Streets: the Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1969), 23.

²⁵⁷ Higham, *Bayonets in the Streets*, 23.

²⁵⁸ James G. Diehl, *The Cop and the Soldier: An Entangling Alliance?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1997), v.

²⁵⁹ Seth Cropsey, "Supporting Civil Authorities at Home and abroad," in *Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in Post-Cold War Era*, ed. James R. Graham (Washington, DC: DIANE, 1993), 8.

²⁶⁰ "Legal Basis of the National Guard," Department of the Army, accessed November 29, 2015, www.army.mil/aboutus/history/Pages/ConstitutionalCharteroftheGuard.aspx.

²⁶¹ National Guard, *2014 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: Sustaining an Operational Force* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), [http://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2014 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement.pdf](http://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2014%20National%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf).

Figure 9. Louisiana National Guard and Civilian Police Joint Exercise



Louisiana National Guard and civilian police participate in a joint disaster-response training exercise. Source: Rashawn Price and Tarell Bilbo, "La. Guard Participates in Disaster Response Exercise," Louisiana National Guard, accessed March 19, 2016, <http://geauxguard.la.gov/la-guard-participates-in-disaster-response-exercise-state-agencies-conduct-joint-training-in-new-orleans-area-hackberry/>.

These activities represent a significant level of support to civil authorities, particularly law enforcement agencies. The *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, published by the DOD's Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlines policies for all American military personnel:

We also have a long history of **military support for national goals short of war**, ranging from general military service to the nation (such as surveying railroads and waterways in the 19th century) to a wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all military operations other than war, our purpose again is to promote the national security and protect our national interests.²⁶²

²⁶² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January, 1995), I-1.

A 2013 update of the same publication notes the importance of DOD agencies operating with “associated civilians supporting governmental and private sector workforces.”²⁶³ American laws also provide explicit allowances for military involvement in disaster response, law enforcement activities, and other homeland security functions.²⁶⁴ Some of these roles continue to be scrutinized, particularly when military units are deployed during civil disturbances.²⁶⁵

Similar to U.S. stabilization and civil affairs strategy, military assets in civil-military operations are ideally restricted to support roles.²⁶⁶ During disaster response, it may be less controversial for military assets to take a primary role. Tasking military personnel with domestic law enforcement missions has been problematic, and they are more ideally limited to roles supporting federal, state, and local initiatives.²⁶⁷

The importance of civil-military coordination is also evident in other areas of homeland security policy. Public Law 100-707, commonly referred to as the Stafford Act, provides statutory authority for FEMA and other agencies during disaster response with civil authorities.²⁶⁸ NORTHCOM was established in 2002 to organize DOD “homeland defense efforts and coordinate defense support of

²⁶³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare*, i–ii.

²⁶⁴ Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 243, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf.

²⁶⁵ Monica Davey, John Eligon, and Alan Blinder, “National Guard Troops in Ferguson Fail to Quell Disorder,” *New York Times*, August 19, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/>.

²⁶⁶ William H. Harrison, *Assessment of the Performance of the California National Guard during the Civil Disturbances in Los Angeles, April and May 1992* (Sacramento, CA: State of California, October 1992), 5.

²⁶⁷ William W. Mendel, *Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operations Rio* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, July 1996), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/rio.htm#4a>.

²⁶⁸ *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and Related Authorities as of April 2013* (2013). Pub. L. 93-288, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.

civil authorities.”²⁶⁹ Both NORTHCOM and FEMA conduct annual collaborative exercises with federal, state, and local agencies.²⁷⁰

The United States has a long history of—and clear domestic mandate for—military support of homeland security agencies. Civil-military collaboration may be particularly visible during disasters and unrest, but regular support for ongoing homeland security initiatives is not uncommon.²⁷¹ While these efforts may be more widely accepted during large-scale crises, the integration of military strategy and homeland security activity occurred long ago. This civil-military collaboration precedent makes the possibility of incorporating stability operations strategy into homeland security activities more plausible. The remainder of this chapter briefly examines homeland security initiatives using four major stability operations objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests.

C. STABILITY OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Unity of Effort

The term “unity of effort” appears frequently in homeland security and military literature, but is often an elusive goal.²⁷² Stability operations and civil affairs strategy are impossible to execute if stakeholders act independently and without coordination. Unity of effort through shared collaboration is foundational to stability operations, civil affairs activities, *and* successful homeland security strategies. In 2003, the DHS was created primarily to unify FEMA and twenty-one

²⁶⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, “A Short History of United States Northern Command.”

²⁷⁰ “National Exercise Program,” FEMA, September 25, 2014, <https://www.fema.gov/national-exercise-program>.

²⁷¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities* (Joint Publication 3-28) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs_jp3_28.pdf.

²⁷² The term “unity of effort” appears frequently in research and government documents. For the sake of brevity, the phrase describes collaborative efforts without attempts to evaluate the success of such activity. It is assumed that inter-agency cooperation is generally beneficial.

other agencies into a single entity.²⁷³ Stability operations and civil affairs suggest an alternative strategy for coordinating and unifying homeland security efforts, particularly for state and local jurisdictions.

As noted previously, civil-military cooperation in homeland security is ongoing, but more significant partnerships are possible. The U.S. National Guard's mission is to "defend America at home and abroad," and homeland security agencies could likely increase collaboration in support of their shared domestic objectives.²⁷⁴ In 2006, researcher Glen Woodbury noted the scarcity of shared prevention plans in homeland security, commenting, "It is impossible to 'train' to a standard, practice, or precedent that does not exist."²⁷⁵ Similarly, author Donald Kettl notes the ongoing challenges in creating a balanced, unified approach to homeland security strategy.²⁷⁶ By 2014, every U.S. state and territorial government had created an agency intended to unify state and/or local security efforts.²⁷⁷ Training drills such as FEMA's National Exercise Program and NORTHCOM's Vibrant Response represent some progress in preparative collaboration between federal, state, and local homeland security resources. Denoting further advancement in homeland security models, FEMA developed the National Preparedness System to provide a model for disaster preparedness, as illustrated in Figure 10.²⁷⁸

²⁷³ Walter Anderson and Bert Tussing (eds.), *Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities: The U.S. Military's Role to Support and Defend* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 40.

²⁷⁴ National Guard. *2014 Posture Statement*.

²⁷⁵ Woodbury, "'Learning' Homeland Security," 3–4.

²⁷⁶ Kettl. *System under Stress*, 12.

²⁷⁷ "State Homeland Security and Emergency Services," Department of Homeland Security, accessed November 20, 2015, <http://www.dhs.gov/state-homeland-security-and-emergency-services>.

²⁷⁸ "Components of National Preparedness System," FEMA, accessed February 19, 2016, <https://emilms.fema.gov/IS230c/FEM0101300text.htm>.

Figure 10. National Preparedness System



Source: “National Preparedness System,” FEMA, accessed March 19, 2016, https://emilms.fema.gov/IS230c/assets/THIRA_s26.png.

However, many other efforts to unify homeland security strategy emphasize response rather than prevention. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a template for managing incidents, and is widely used by many homeland security agencies.²⁷⁹ The National Response Framework (NRF) provides a “scalable, flexible, and adaptable” guide for coordinating civilian and government responses to “all types of disasters and emergencies.”²⁸⁰ FEMA intends for the NIMS and NRF to help the “whole community...save lives, protect property and the environment, stabilize communities, and meet basic human

²⁷⁹ FEMA, *National Incident Management System* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, October 2015), <https://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system>.

²⁸⁰ FEMA, *National Response Framework* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, May 2013), 1–2, <http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final-national-response-framework-20130501.pdf>.

needs following an incident.”²⁸¹ FEMA provides guidance for unified “whole community” efforts, which logically focus on community response and resiliency during disasters.²⁸² In military terms, most of these plans are designed for a post-conflict environment. While the NIMS, NRF, and whole community models provide useful recommendations for disaster *response*, they generally do not include suggestions for long-term *prevention*.²⁸³

The NRF and whole community models are designed to improve community resiliency, which, if successful, may provide some preventative benefits in deterring future attacks.²⁸⁴ These FEMA models distinguish between response and prevention plans. In contrast, Israeli models use rapid crisis response as a preventative deterrence strategy. The Israeli response to terror attacks intends to restore community routines as quickly as possible to discourage additional attacks and demonstrate its population’s resiliency.²⁸⁵ Stability operations strategy has been used in a wide range of environments, and could incorporate existing FEMA prevention and response efforts into a unified strategy.

Unity of effort in homeland security activities may have some limitations. For example, from 2002 to 2012, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted joint intelligence operations intended to “thwart terrorist activities.”²⁸⁶ Some community members felt this type of collaborative relationship was improper, commenting that “the CIA is

²⁸¹ FEMA, *National Response Framework*, 1-9.

²⁸² FEMA, *A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, December 2011), 1–10, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1813-25045-0649/whole_community_dec2011_2.pdf.

²⁸³ Appendix B illustrates coordination between NRF and NIMS response activities.

²⁸⁴ FEMA, *National Response Framework*, 4.

²⁸⁵ Nir Hasson, “Jerusalem Adapts to Strange Terror Routine, Again,” *Haaretz*, December 7, 2015, <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-1.690497>.

²⁸⁶ “Review of the CIA-NYPD Relationship,” CIA, December 27, 2011, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/717864/cia-nypd-ig.pdf>.

teaching NYPD an unwarranted counterinsurgency mentality” (see Figure 11).²⁸⁷ Although the program was determined to be legal, both agencies concluded the “close and direct collaboration” led to a perception that the CIA had “exceeded its authorities.”²⁸⁸ In this case, there was *too much* teamwork.

Figure 11. Protest against NYPD-CIA Surveillance Program



In 2013, protestors alleged NYPD-CIA surveillance operations targeted Muslim communities. Source: Faiza Patel, “Brooklyn Is Not Baghdad: What Is the CIA Teaching the NYPD?” Defense One, August 2013, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-cia-teaching-nypd/68789/>.

In other cases, homeland security agencies have been criticized for *too little* collaboration. A recent after-action assessment of civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, highlighted a lack of “proactive strategy” which contributed to a lack of continuity in policing.²⁸⁹ The report sharply criticized the lack of a unified law enforcement strategy and failure to operate according to NIMS guidelines, and concluded multiple agencies failed to focus on key objectives.²⁹⁰ Some of these

²⁸⁷ Faiza Patel, “Brooklyn Is Not Baghdad: What Is the CIA Teaching the NYPD?” Defense One, August 2013, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-cia-teaching-nypd/68789/>.

²⁸⁸ “Review of the CIA-NYPD Relationship,” Central Intelligence Agency.

²⁸⁹ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri* (Washington, DC: Institute for Intergovernmental Research), xiv.

²⁹⁰ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Ferguson, Missouri*, xvi.

criticisms could be improved with a unified stability operations strategy and implemented preemptively using the civil affairs model. Identifying the proper collaborative balance remains a challenge. Specific goals and objectives must be defined early, or it will be difficult to ascertain the impact of unified efforts.

2. Conflict Transformation

Increased collaboration in homeland security can have varying results. Transforming communities struck by disaster or fraught with violence is a difficult task, and each locale presents unique circumstances and challenges. The community-focused stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs suggests key objectives for transforming conflict and disaster environments through homeland security intervention. Early civil affairs methodology notes several principles worthy of consideration in the context of transformative homeland security efforts:

The primary purpose is restoration of long-term political and economic vitality.²⁹¹

“Military and humanitarian considerations are not necessarily opposed to each other, though they may be so at times...at those times military necessity must be the prime consideration.”²⁹²

“Military government is best which governs least.”²⁹³

These principles echo similar emphases in homeland security efforts to bring communities affected by violence or disaster back to peace and stability. Effective homeland security efforts and community expectations require balancing the natural tension between “hard” and “soft” power strategies.²⁹⁴

²⁹¹ Harris, “Selection and Training,” 700.

²⁹² Ibid., 700.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ In common military vernacular, “hard power” refers to traditional military use of force (i.e., weaponry, infantry, etc.). “Soft power” describes more diplomatic, non-combat approaches to achieving the mission by winning hearts and minds. Broad correlations can be made in domestic homeland security activity.

Stability operations strategy prefers civilian rather than military governments, and the similar goal of homeland security is for communities to sustain themselves.²⁹⁵ As suggested in the civil affairs model, the necessity of hard and soft power actions can be alleviated through community partnerships.²⁹⁶ Contemporary homeland security agencies are often fundamentally dedicated to resolving conflict or tragedy. These values could be incorporated into a stability operations strategy to ensure transformative efforts are measured and assessed in keeping with stabilization objectives.

There have been many different approaches in the United States to stabilize neighborhoods, improve a floundering economy, or reduce violent crime. In their “broken windows” theory, criminologists James Wilson and George Kelling suggested police departments address low-level crimes and blight to transform troubled communities.²⁹⁷ Community policing evolved to address problems identified by citizens, but still demonstrates an inherently narrow focus on crime-related issues.

Contemporary homeland security efforts have also expanded to include other strategies. NIMS merged tactics from fire service, military operations, and emergency management.²⁹⁸ In Massachusetts, military counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy was used to develop the C3 Policing model.²⁹⁹ The plan adapted U.S. military COIN techniques for use in civilian policing, emphasizing community relationships. Similar to community policing, the C3 model uses “hard power” COIN strategies to “separate gangs from their cause and support.”³⁰⁰ C3 Policing differs from traditional community policing by using existing resources in

²⁹⁵ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-20.

²⁹⁶ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-10.

²⁹⁷ James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken windows,” *Atlantic Monthly* 249, no. 3 (1982): 29–38.

²⁹⁸ FEMA, *National Incident Management System*.

²⁹⁹ Michael Cutone, “Counter Criminal Continuum Policing,” Massachusetts State Police, accessed September 12, 2015, <http://mspc3policing.com/>.

³⁰⁰ Cutone, “Counter Criminal Continuum Policing.”

a long-term approach to attack root causes and reduce crime “through citizen involvement” (see Figure 12).³⁰¹ The C3 crime-fighting methodology also concentrates on relationships with other police departments and community groups. Understandably, this model focuses on transforming crime-plagued neighborhoods from a law enforcement perspective. Generally speaking, the C3 model does not appear to integrate other homeland security stakeholders in efforts to resolve conflict.³⁰²

Figure 12. Police and Community Discuss C3 Policing Strategy



Community stakeholders and Massachusetts police plan collaborative initiatives in 2013. Source: Massachusetts State Police, accessed March 19, 2016, http://mspc3policing.com/wp-content/gallery/c3-policing_1/anvil-4-0-web-001.jpg.

³⁰¹ Ibid. Appendix C depicts the contrasts between community policing and C3 policing principles.

³⁰² More information on C3 Policing is available via <http://mspc3policing.com/the-origins-of-c3-policing-2/c3-policing-an-unconventional-approach-to-an-unconventional-problem/>.

When applied to homeland security initiatives, stability operations strategy and civil affairs move a step further than C3 Policing. While the shared focus remains on long-term sustainable transformation, stability operations strategy offers a broader, more scalable framework for incorporating other homeland security areas. C3 aims to change hearts and minds using COIN techniques adapted for civilian application, but this tactic may not be sufficient. Similar homeland security efforts to counter violent extremism and dissuade youths from gang involvement suggest a more integrated approach is necessary.³⁰³

There are many examples of efforts to address poverty, education opportunity, racial injustice, and unemployment in order to transform challenged communities. Indeed, civil affairs strategy uses many of these same initiatives. However, some argue these efforts are likely to succeed only when they are part of a comprehensive framework.³⁰⁴ Researchers Shannon Green and Daniel Runde contend that successful efforts must focus on systemic challenges and be “designed intentionally, with deep knowledge about the local drivers and specific interventions targeting those risk factors.”³⁰⁵ Stability operations strategy uses civil affairs personnel to address these types of localized issues.³⁰⁶ Recommendations made in the Ferguson after-action report, for example, cite poverty, racial prejudice, systemic inequality in legal proceedings, and unsatisfactory community engagement.³⁰⁷ Much like the British approach to counter-terrorism, systemic issues are not resolved simply by making more

³⁰³ Shannon Green and Daniel Runde, “Preventing Violent Extremism: Promise and Pitfalls,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2, 2015, <http://csis.org/publication/preventing-violent-extremism-promise-and-pitfalls>.

³⁰⁴ Green and Runde, “Preventing Violent Extremism.”

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8.

³⁰⁷ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Ferguson, Missouri*, xvi–xvii.

arrests.³⁰⁸ Efforts to reform policing may be needed, and communities have demanded a more comprehensive overhaul.³⁰⁹

The U.S. military has placed stability operations strategy on par with offensive and defensive activity. Stability operations strategy offers a model for conflict transformation and for addressing systemic problems. Homeland security has similarly shifted its focus toward systemic issues and conflict prevention. For example, some jurisdictions have chosen to direct resources toward food insecurity, abandoned homes, or the mental health system as part of their security strategy. Traditional homeland security services, such as law enforcement, remain intact but are linked more closely with other community initiatives.³¹⁰ Contemporary homeland security agencies may have similar objectives as in years past, but are perhaps open to more comprehensive approaches in transforming affected communities.

3. Legitimacy and Rule of Law

In stability operations, achievements in unity of effort and conflict transformation should result in improved community sentiments regarding government legitimacy and rule of law. Civil affairs strategy has been referred to as “armed social work,” as it focuses on non-combat initiatives and emphasizes support for local efforts to improve legitimacy.³¹¹ Skepticism about homeland security efforts is particularly robust in regards to law enforcement and other areas of the U.S. criminal justice system. Law professor Craig Futterman, an expert on police misconduct, explains: “If we have even the slightest chance of

³⁰⁸ Home Office, *CONTEST*, 9.

³⁰⁹ Ferguson is cited as a well-publicized example, but similar expectations have been expressed in other U.S. cities (e.g., Baltimore, San Francisco, Chicago, Miami, and elsewhere).

³¹⁰ The City of Indianapolis is an example of one city engaging in this type of approach. A short summary of their efforts is available at <http://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2016/01/02/how-mayor-joe-hogsett-and-chief-troy-riggs-plan-fight-indys-public-safety-crisis/78122534/>.

³¹¹ Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles,” 33.

being effective and solving violent crime, getting cooperation and help and partnership from people in the community, there's got to be trust.”³¹²

This critique is not a recent phenomenon. In 1974, criminologist Paul Tagaki warned that the United States was becoming a “garrison state” and argued police officers should be disarmed to prevent disproportionate killing of minorities.³¹³ Similar current criticism argues for “mutual de-escalation” between citizens and police with improved government accountability.³¹⁴ Recent community protests have challenged legitimacy in homeland security by alleging that minorities are “systematically and intentionally targeted.”³¹⁵

Debates regarding legitimacy in law enforcement often highlight the difficult task of balancing security needs and public perception. For example, President Obama's Task Force on 21st Century Policing released a 116-page report outlining key recommendations to improve legitimacy in policing, including:

Establish community-based initiatives to address fundamental issues such as poverty, education, health, and safety.

Make the community safe while at the same time building trust.

Establish a culture of transparency and accountability.

Reduce crime by improving relationships, increasing community engagement, and fostering cooperation.

Focus on positive non-enforcement activities as a way to reach out to the community.

Use community policing as a “guiding philosophy.”³¹⁶

³¹² Jeremy Gerner, “For Chicago Cops on the Street, More Scrutiny Brings Lower Morale, Fewer Stops,” *Chicago Tribune*, February 26, 2016, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/>.

³¹³ Paul Tagaki, “A Garrison State in ‘Democratic’ Society,” *Social Justice* 40, no. 1-2: 118–130, http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/archive/131_40_1-2/132_09_Tagaki.pdf.

³¹⁴ Noah Berlatsky, “The Case for Disarming America's Police Force,” *Quartz*, January 27, 2016, <http://qz.com/602682/the-case-for-disarming-americas-police-force/>.

³¹⁵ “Guiding Principles: We Affirm that All Black Lives Matter,” Black Lives Matter, accessed January 17, 2016, <http://blacklivesmatter.com/guiding-principles/>.

³¹⁶ President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015), 1–26, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

The renewed call for community-focused policing methods take a skeptical view of traditional policing methods. These proposals specifically challenge law *enforcement* organizations to focus on *non-enforcement*, akin to civil affairs' deference in nontraditional military outreach to communities.³¹⁷ As homeland security continues to evolve, there have been robust criticisms of "militarization" in domestic law enforcement. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other community organizations have been critical of perceived military-style tactics and equipment. In their report *War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing*, the ACLU argues, "Militarization of policing encourages officers to adopt a 'warrior' mentality and think of the people they are supposed to serve as enemies."³¹⁸ Notably, the title of the ACLU report seems to infer that perhaps *some* militarization may be acceptable, provided it is not "excessive."

Other areas of homeland security are being similarly stretched beyond their customs. These types of challenges may be ideally suited for a strategic community-focused framework such as that offered by stability operations. Discussions of legitimacy in homeland security often highlight changing community expectations of practitioners and redefined agency missions.³¹⁹ For example, various groups continue to demand increased oversight and debate whether police officers should be "warriors" or "guardians."³²⁰ Some have called for law enforcement to emphasize a defensive posture, offering, "While [police] must acquire the skills and capacity to be a warrior in some occasions, their primary focus is to build relationships with the community they serve."³²¹

³¹⁷ President's Task Force, *Final Report*, 14.

³¹⁸ ACLU, "War Comes Home."

³¹⁹ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Ferguson, Missouri*, xiv–xx.

³²⁰ Dave Smith, "Warriors or Guardians?" *Police Magazine* (January 2016): 96.

³²¹ Seth Stoughton, Geoffrey Alpert, and Jeff Noble, "Why Police Need Constructive Criticism," *Atlantic*, December, 23, 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/officer-porter-mistrial-police-culture/421656/>.

Even police organizations and practitioners disagree among themselves about appropriate use of force policies and their impact on legitimacy.³²² One police professional was unhappy with the presidential task force recommendations, describing the report's findings as "fantasy that law enforcement causes criminality...if only we can change the police we can stop poverty, crime, gangs, etc."³²³ The International Association of Chiefs of Police argues that police policies should align with legal standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court.³²⁴ The Police Executive Research Forum contends law enforcement best practices should reflect even higher standards than legally required to improve community perceptions and legitimacy.³²⁵

Using a stability operations strategy, homeland security agencies could use existing organizational structures to identify community needs, develop and implement outreach efforts, and improve legitimacy. Civil affairs activities are based upon critical needs identified by the community, similar to what some U.S. communities are demanding.³²⁶ Homeland security agencies can also positively impact legitimacy by supporting efforts of NGOs rather than depleting limited homeland security resources with duplicative efforts. Strategic partnerships allow homeland security agencies to focus on their primary missions while improving relationships with stakeholders and enhancing the rule of law.

³²² Tami Abdollah, "Police Officials Quarrel over Effort to Raise Bar on Force," Madison.com, February 5, 2016 http://host.madison.com/news/national/government-and-politics/police-officials-quarrel-over-effort-to-raise-bar-on-force/article_68370bf5-c974-5488-b63b-864884256bf7.html?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=user-share.

³²³ Smith, "Warriors or Guardians," 96.

³²⁴ "Statement of the International Association of Chiefs of Police on Law Enforcement Use of Force," International Association of Chiefs of Police, February 9, 2016, <http://us2.campaign-archive1.com/?u=01a61aed1b7184b33174080d0&id=275d6548e8>.

³²⁵ "Use of Force: Taking Policing to a Higher Standard," Police Executive Research Forum, January 29, 2016, <http://tinyurl.com/qod86rn>.

³²⁶ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-20.

4. Security Interests

Particularly at the state and local level, homeland security agencies provide some of the most visible government services. As in other parts of the world, the United States views certain basic services as essential for the security of its population. Government leaders are often mandated to provide services or maintain infrastructure in keeping with community security interests and expectations. In some cases, government functions may be unnecessarily redundant or better suited for partnership with NGOs who provide similar services. Critical infrastructure is often provided or regulated by government entities. For example, water and electric utilities may not play a prominent role in homeland security discussions—until a critical failure occurs. As in civil affairs, U.S. homeland security leaders should assess the security interests of their stakeholders and engage them in a unified homeland security strategy.³²⁷

U.S. homeland security agencies engage in a wide variety of activities to improve community relations, build legitimacy, and improve neighborhoods. As depicted in Figure 13, journalist Paul Myers opined that the United States should be more committed to security interests in its own communities before engaging in stabilization efforts abroad.³²⁸

³²⁷ Müller, “Concept of Strategic Civil Affairs,” 80.

³²⁸ Paul Myers on Twitter, accessed February 12, 2016, <https://twitter.com/pulmyears/status/101065729817841665>.

Figure 13. Internet Meme Pans U.S. Commitment to Domestic Stability



This Internet meme was based upon a tweet by journalist and author Paul Myers, see <https://twitter.com/pulmyears/status/101065729817841665>. Source: <http://tinyurl.com/h24cnz>.

Myers' sentiments demonstrate one perspective in a wide opinion spectrum about American security interests. Military researcher and author Dr. Doug MacGregor takes a different standpoint, believing there is consensus in the United States for a new national strategy "focused on protecting Americans, American territory, and core American commercial interests."³²⁹ In a break from U.S. military trends, Dr. MacGregor argues that U.S. military funding should *not* fund stabilization missions such as "flood relief, humanitarian assistance, nation building, or combating Ebola."³³⁰ Dr. MacGregor asserts that U.S. defense spending should only support assets whose purpose is fighting and destroying America's enemies.³³¹

³²⁹ Doug MacGregor, "Five Rules for Defense Spending," Breaking Defense, January 26, 2015, <http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/five-rules-for-defense-spending/>.

³³⁰ MacGregor, "Five Rules."

³³¹ Ibid.

Homeland security researchers Dr. Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby contend the United States needs to develop a “national strategic narrative” to sustain vital American security interests.³³² Philosophically, they argue America must clarify national values to support our security interests and “achieve sustainable prosperity and security.”³³³ Their research argues that American foreign and domestic policies have historically favored containment and deterrence strategies. Dr. Porter and Mykleby advocate for a strategic shift from containment to sustainability through civic engagement and a renewed focus on vital security interests.³³⁴ While these authors come to different academic or political conclusions, they all support the idea that U.S. homeland security efforts must be based upon vital security interests.

Stability operations strategy forces stakeholders—whether public or private—to determine their role in supporting security interests and objectives. The circumstances, setting, and political environment may each contribute to different conclusions about what constitutes a vital security interest. Homeland security and government leaders may have differing interpretations of what qualifies as a security interest in their areas of responsibility.

Criminal justice reform, unemployment, neighborhood blight, or quality education may be viewed as a critical security interests in some jurisdictions, but prioritized less significantly elsewhere. Providing food, water, and basic necessities after a natural disaster may be a critical homeland security matter, but deemed less of a priority in everyday life. As evidenced in Flint, Michigan, taking “normal” services for granted (i.e., clean water) can suddenly erupt into a manmade disaster for government leaders.³³⁵ Accurately evaluating homeland

³³² Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, *A National Strategic Narrative by Mr. Y* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2011), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf>.

³³³ Porter and Mykleby, *A National Strategic Narrative*.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Southall, “State of Emergency.”

security interests is more art than science, and remains a challenge for leaders and executives without a comprehensive strategy.

D. ANALYSIS

Homeland security agencies, particularly non-federal entities, lack a comprehensive strategy to unify their prevention and response efforts. Many jurisdictions engage in a wide variety of initiatives and working relationships, but generally lack a cohesive strategy to direct these efforts toward common objectives. Stability operations strategy requires stakeholders to identify their appropriate roles in supporting community-focused objectives.

Existing collaboration in civil-military operations and the development of whole community initiatives demonstrate some progress toward achieving better unity of effort.³³⁶ Despite some negative perceptions about civil-military collaboration, the DOD and other military assets offer significant logistical support to areas of homeland security. A more public acknowledgement of military support for homeland security agencies—particularly in disaster response—may be helpful in generating community support for such efforts.

Military professionals have been able to use stabilization strategy and civil affairs forces to unify operations in numerous theaters. It is also worth noting that many civil affairs personnel are military reservists with civilian duties in homeland security fields.³³⁷ Their civilian agencies may be able to leverage their professional military expertise in adopting stability operations for their jurisdictions. The prevalence of ongoing civil-military collaboration and support from the DOD for homeland security operations may improve the feasibility of implementing stabilization strategy domestically.

The NIMS, NRF, and whole community models have generally been accepted as useful collaborative models for managing response efforts. Despite

³³⁶ Anderson and Tussing, *Introduction to Homeland Defense*, 41.

³³⁷ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8.

the prevalence of response plans, there is a lack of consensus on prevention methodology. The latter is likely more challenging than the former, which may partially account for the struggle to identify proactive, preventative solutions. While no single plan is likely to garner 100 percent participation or support from all homeland security stakeholders, community and government expectations signal that progress is needed.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter explored civil-military collaboration and homeland security initiatives using four major stability operations objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests. The nature of many homeland security responsibilities aligns with these primary stabilization objectives. This author believes stabilization strategy does offer a useful—albeit broad—strategy for unifying prevention and response strategies. In fact, the breadth of the methodology may offer significant benefits in its ability to incorporate the efforts of NGOs, homeland security agencies, and community members.

As noted by Dr. MacGregor, there seems to be a swell of public opinion supporting a national strategy focused on protecting American security interests.³³⁸ Homeland security agencies are being asked to assist in resolving long-standing societal ills through prevention initiatives. Simultaneously, the same agencies must be prepared to respond to crises and disasters, both manmade and environmental. Homeland security agencies may be most effective in partnering with NGOs or community groups to resolve these types of systemic problems. Homeland security can be strengthened by clarifying long-term roles and allowing each stakeholder to focus on their primary mission.

There does appear to be a demand for strategy that unifies homeland security prevention and response efforts. In considering alternative models, we

³³⁸ MacGregor, “Five Rules.”

should innovate and adapt rather than invent.³³⁹ Chapter V contains several policy option suggestions for considering stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs as a template in homeland security activities.

³³⁹ This axiom paraphrases a similar recommendation from Dr. MacGregor's "Five Rules for Defense Spending": "When modernizing, spend to innovate, don't invent."

V. POLICY OPTIONS

Our current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats.

—The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*

The above quote from 2006 delivered a damning assessment of the U.S. government response to Hurricane Katrina. In the subsequent decade, FEMA and other federal homeland security agencies have endeavored to improve comprehensive efforts to stabilize communities. As noted in Chapter IV, these efforts have improved disaster prevention and response methods while other areas of homeland security continue to utilize a variety of approaches. This chapter compares several options for state and local decision makers to consider stability operations as a possible homeland security strategy. Specifically, this chapter suggests an adaptation of civil affairs' twelve principles of joint operations for homeland security efforts.³⁴⁰ This chapter also briefly explores policy options for organizing homeland security strategy using the primary stability task sectors: civil security, civil control, essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and information management.³⁴¹

Although this chapter does not include all possible strategic options, it offers alternatives for state and local homeland security officials and elected leaders. Option A assesses the possibility of continuing existing methods, and provides guidance on evaluating current efforts based upon stabilization principles. Option B expands the first alternative and examines how stabilization strategy could be implemented on a small scale. Option C incorporates the

³⁴⁰ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-11.

³⁴¹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-2.

benefits of the previous two choices and illustrates how the model could be implemented to unify regional homeland security efforts.

A. ASSUMPTIONS

The primary audience for this research is assumed to be state and local executives with homeland security responsibilities. The policy recommendations in this chapter are provided within that context, and suggest options for unifying efforts toward domestic stability. Politicians and civil leaders sometimes raise comparisons with combat by describing the “war on drugs” or defending cities “under siege” by violence or poverty. However, this author assumes homeland security and military activities share both similarities and differences. Domestic efforts to use stabilization strategy may face collaborative challenges similar to civil affairs forces, but without the benefits of armed military occupation.³⁴²

Given the lack of consensus in strategic approaches to state and local homeland security, this chapter assumes another alternative may be helpful. For stability operations strategy to be successful, state and local homeland security agencies must allow significant time for planning and preparation. Regardless of the methodology, this author assumes each stakeholder understands his or her role and contribution toward shared homeland security goals. The models discussed in this chapter assume that objectives will be planned before implementation with appropriate, long-term evaluative measures identified.³⁴³

This author does not underestimate the challenges in coordinating homeland security activities, and assumes the vast response capabilities inside the United States will continue to be scaled as needed. The proposed options are decidedly general to leverage the methodology’s flexibility in accommodating unique jurisdictional nuances.

³⁴² Cha, “Military Uses Hussein,” 2.


³⁴³ Although specific measures of performance are outside the scope of this research, Drs. Robert Beeres and Paul van Fenema provide a useful evaluative guide in chapter 12 of *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability* (2008).

B. STABILITY OPERATIONS MODEL FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Option A: Maintain Current Methods

As discussed in previous chapters, there is general agreement that current approaches to homeland security strategy should be improved, particularly in U.S. law enforcement practices.³⁴⁴ Although disaster response plans are more unified, other areas of homeland security strategy lack consensus. State and local leaders who resist community expectations are unlikely to succeed in their missions, and face an uphill struggle against contemporary challenges and expectations. Communities increasingly express dissatisfaction with the existing efforts, and demand more involvement and oversight in homeland security matters.³⁴⁵ Stability operations strategy focuses on community engagement and identifies six primary stability task sectors, as illustrated in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Primary Stability Tasks



Source: Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 3-19, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

³⁴⁴ Police Executive Research Forum, "Use of Force."

³⁴⁵ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Ferguson, Missouri*, xvii.

As noted in Chapter II, effective information engagement must be woven into other tasks to gain community support.³⁴⁶ Of course, some communities are satisfied with the performance of homeland security professionals. If homeland security agencies have demonstrated success in each of these six areas, perhaps no dramatic changes are needed. In those circumstances, the model could be useful comparatively, to gauge the success of existing organizational strategy.

Civil affairs methodology suggests twelve principles for joint stability operations.³⁴⁷ Based on the similar goals of homeland security and stability operations strategy, this author believes the principles can be revised for homeland security efforts. If state and local homeland security agencies demonstrate success in these areas, maintaining current methods may be reasonable. As modified for homeland security, the twelve principles are:

1. Objective: ensure stakeholders share a clearly defined and attainable purpose supporting primary stability tasks.
2. Offensive: maintain the initiative toward addressing systemic issues.
3. Mass: leverage the benefits of collective capability from a wider spectrum of resources.
4. Economy of force: prioritize resources toward key objectives, with fewer assets dedicated to secondary efforts.
5. Maneuver: shift collaborative resources to support homeland security objectives.
6. Unity of Command: ensure a clearly defined organizational command structure for every activity.
7. Security: focus prevention efforts on preparing for the unexpected, and respond to critical incidents.
8. Surprise: be creatively proactive in efforts to protect and engage the public.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 2–4.

³⁴⁷ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-11.

9. Simplicity: establish clear and uncomplicated stability operations strategy for homeland security.
10. Perseverance: ensure practitioners have the commitment necessary to achieve homeland security objectives.
11. Legitimacy: develop rapport with the community to help maintain stable neighborhoods.
12. Restraint: emphasize institutional patience, and balance use of force with soft power strategies.³⁴⁸

2. Option B: Small-Scale Implementation

Consideration of this option should also include the twelve principles for homeland security efforts noted in Option A. Given contemporary demands for change in homeland security, even small-scale implementation of stabilization strategy is a worthwhile consideration. Small-scale implementation should not be confused with limiting stabilization strategy to a single stakeholder.

For example, civil affairs forces deploy across the spectrum of conflict to execute stability operations strategy.³⁴⁹ In the United States, emergency management and law enforcement agencies engage in prevention and response activities in struggling environments across a comparable spectrum. In Massachusetts, the C3 Policing model narrowly applied military COIN strategies to law enforcement and community activities.³⁵⁰ Applying community-focused stabilization strategy into these types of agencies might seem a logical response to civic expectations.

However, attempts to confine stabilization strategy in single agencies could leave communities vulnerable to whims and viral incidents. Collaborative stabilization strategy distributes responsibility among stakeholders, as evidenced in civil-military operations. Unity of effort and collaboration remain key objectives

³⁴⁸ These are adapted from the twelve principles of joint operations found in Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-11, and discussed in Chapter III.

³⁴⁹ Department of the Army, *Special Operations* (ADRP 3-05), 3-14.

³⁵⁰ Cutone, “Counter Criminal Continuum Policing.”

when considering the viability of small-scale stabilization strategy implementation. This author believes the unifying nature of stability operations strategy does not support a similarly limited application.


Given the variations in public organizations, it is possible some jurisdictions may find value in a gradual introduction of stabilization strategy. Stability operations strategy may also be implemented differently in various parts of the country, but is a useful consideration for urban or rural jurisdictions. The methodology remains community-focused, regardless of the population setting. The strength of application for small-scale homeland security implementation remains its community-focused, collaborative traits.³⁵¹ Homeland security leaders in rural or non-metropolitan areas might utilize stability operations strategy as a means to improve their more modest prevention and response capabilities.

Like civil affairs forces, homeland security practitioners could use stability operations strategy to develop collaborative relationships with utility providers, critical infrastructure agencies, military partners, community groups, and other stakeholders. The viability of cooperative efforts could be assessed based upon stability objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests.³⁵² Figure 15 depicts how the U.S. military integrates lines of effort into support for stability operations.

³⁵¹ Alberts and Hayes, *Command Arrangements*, 14.

³⁵² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-16.

Figure 15. Examples of Integration in Stabilization Objectives



Source: Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-11, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

Even in rural areas, public and private providers deliver the type of critical services illustrated in Figure 15. Many of these lines of service are essential to homeland security efforts, as demonstrated anecdotally by the ongoing clean water crisis in Flint, Michigan.³⁵³ As suggested by some researchers, a military-style organization may not be ideal for administering post-conflict stability operations strategy.³⁵⁴ This could be challenging in jurisdictions where law enforcement or fire departments are the primary homeland security agencies. For example, consider how non-metropolitan counties might implement stabilization strategy. While each state has a homeland security organization, non-metropolitan areas often have limited resources commensurate with their

³⁵³ Southall, "State of Emergency."

³⁵⁴ Alberts and Hayes, *Command Arrangements*, 14.

population.³⁵⁵ Police and fire services may be the primary homeland security resources, and access varies by community. Using Figure 15 as a template, smaller communities could organize a small task force comprising a representative from each line of effort. Stability operations strategy provides a scalable template useful for small or larger implementation. For communities without collaborative partnerships, stability operations strategy offers a useful guide for unifying homeland security efforts.

3. Option C: Comprehensive Regional Implementation


Befitting its military origins, stability operations strategy is perhaps most ideal for metropolitan jurisdictions with access to significant resources. In the context of a significant regional application, homeland security responsibilities tend to be more specialized and distributed broadly among public and private organizations. A unifying strategy is needed.

Building upon the recommendations in Options A and B, stabilization methodology provides flexibility for adapting to cultural distinctions and unifying community stakeholders in regional homeland security initiatives. Particularly in urban communities, there is a demand for increased transparency in homeland security activities.³⁵⁶ Figure 16 offers one suggestion for organizing community-focused stability tasks in homeland security efforts.

³⁵⁵ "State Homeland Security and Emergency Services," Department of Homeland Security.

³⁵⁶ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Ferguson, Missouri*, xvi–xvii.

Figure 16. Stability Lines of Effort for Homeland Security



Adapted from Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri* (Washington, DC: Institute for Intergovernmental Research), xvi–xvii.

Figures 15 and 16 offer examples for integration of homeland security objectives into a stability operations strategy. While stakeholder participation may be voluntary or encouraged by regulation, stabilization strategy is built upon the premise of willing cooperation. If partnerships crumble or fail to reach expectations, the state of homeland security efforts may be no worse than it was before stabilization strategy was introduced. Stakeholders will continue to provide services as before. However, existing plans and new initiatives benefit from being integrated into an organized, comprehensive strategy.

Metropolitan areas have existing regional homeland security organizations, and stability operations methodology offers a guide toward implementing a comprehensive yet complex strategy. Whereas the C3 Policing model limited COIN tactics to law enforcement applications, stabilization strategy offers a more inclusive, community-focused blueprint for regional homeland security efforts.³⁵⁷ Like the C3 Policing model, stabilization strategy emphasizes the integration of existing resources rather than duplicating current efforts. Such a strategy could incorporate existing local efforts such as criminal justice reform, public health initiatives, community engagement, and disaster preparedness.

Regional commitments to stability operations strategy may also benefit from sustained trends toward greater civil-military collaboration. Earlier chapters discussed the DOD's significant commitment to stability operations strategy and support for homeland security efforts.³⁵⁸ Metropolitan regions often have greater access to military assets, and continued civil-military collaboration may benefit from a shared stabilization methodology. Also, a significant number of military civil affairs reservists serve in civilian homeland security roles.³⁵⁹ Metropolitan agencies may unwittingly have a number of active military personnel with expertise in stability operations. Their military proficiency and experience may be

³⁵⁷ Cutone, "Counter Criminal Continuum Policing."

³⁵⁸ DOD, *Stability Operations* (DODI 3000.05); Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces* (Joint Publication 1).

³⁵⁹ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8.

ideal for implementing the strategy in homeland security affairs, and would be consistent with the goal of maximizing existing resources. The regional implementation of stability operations strategy may offer a beneficial model to encourage further civil-military cooperation in domestic homeland security objectives.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

State and local homeland security agencies should consider the viability of stability operations strategy for their jurisdictions. The military model offers sufficient flexibility to adapt homeland security efforts while offering a framework to guide decision-making. Stability operations strategy provides a strategic blueprint for organizing homeland security efforts while incorporating community involvement and public/private partnerships. For leaders wishing to maintain current methods, the strategy may offer a useful evaluative measure for existing efforts. In these cases, this author suggests homeland security agencies utilize the twelve principles for stability adapted from civil affairs methodology.

Previous chapters describe the historical use of stability operations strategy in a variety of foreign theaters. The precedent supports a scalable framework for homeland security leaders serving varied population densities and environments. Figures 15 and 16 exemplify how the strategy might be implemented, although other variations may be equally valid. Homeland security agencies would do well to consider stability operations strategy as a means to unify collaborative efforts in their jurisdictions. Implementing stability operations strategy seems preferable to the lack of consensus currently found in many areas of homeland security.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

A. CONCLUSIONS

Stability operations strategy has been implemented with varying degrees of success in extremely complex environments. The challenges facing domestic homeland security are no less difficult. While progress has been made in developing disaster response plans, there is no unifying prevention and response strategy in other areas of state and local homeland security. Stability operations strategy offers a community-focused methodology for unifying prevention and response efforts. In that context, this thesis set forth to answer two primary research questions:

1. Is the U.S. military's stability operations strategy a useful consideration for domestic homeland security applications?
2. If so, how could military stability operations strategy be implemented in homeland security efforts?

1. Stability Operations Strategy

To investigate these queries, this thesis began by examining the U.S. military's stability operations strategy. The non-traditional, decentralized approach is unique in military doctrine due to its focus on civilian issues.³⁶⁰ Stability operations methodology evolved through centuries of American military history and is now prominently on par with traditional defensive and offensive operations.³⁶¹ Modern stability operations strategy has been executed across the "spectrum of conflict," using four objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and national security interests.³⁶²

³⁶⁰ Shanahan, "Decentralized Stability Operations."

³⁶¹ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 2-1.

³⁶² Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-3.

While stability operations strategy has been lauded for its collaborative emphasis, some have suggested that military forces may not be an ideal means for consensus building in non-combat environments.³⁶³ These researchers contend such stabilization efforts should be overseen by non-military, civilian organizations.³⁶⁴ However, the U.S. military uses stability operations strategy to organize collaborative efforts to resolve community issues. The military designates six primary stability task sectors:

1. Establish Civil Security
2. Establish Civil Control
3. Restore Essential Services
4. Support Governance
5. Support Economic and Infrastructure Development
6. Manage Information³⁶⁵

The strategy emphasizes the value of community engagement and civilian-run initiatives in post-combat environments.³⁶⁶ Perhaps most relevant to homeland security considerations, military methodology provides examples for organizing lines of effort into the six primary stability task areas.³⁶⁷ The sixth category—information management—is designed to be woven throughout the other task sectors and support community outreach efforts.

2. Civil Affairs

This research also studied the use of civil affairs forces to execute stability operations strategy. Similar to some aspects of homeland security efforts, civil affairs has been referred to as “armed social work.”³⁶⁸ Civil affairs forces step in

³⁶³ Alberts and Hayes, *Command Arrangements*, 14.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 3-19.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., A-1 – A-2.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 4-10.

³⁶⁸ Müller, “Concept of Strategic Civil Affairs,” 80.

to perform duties normally performed by civilian governments in order to restore regional community-led administration.

Civil affairs forces are guided by “twelve principles of joint operations” during combat and non-combat actions.³⁶⁹ These principles provide the basis for civil affairs operations in unstable foreign deployments. The research noted that homeland security efforts function in a domestic environment that is generally more predictable and stable. Civil affairs units are most effective when these principles are used to guide successful, collaborative relationships with community stakeholders. The twelve principles suggest guidelines for translating theoretical stabilization strategies into real-world applications useful for homeland security.

3. Homeland Security Initiatives

This thesis proceeded to examine homeland security initiatives relevant to comparisons with stability operations strategy and its use of civil affairs. U.S. homeland security efforts vary significantly by jurisdiction, particularly at the state and local levels. Homeland security leaders may find stability operations methodology offers a flexible framework for integrating existing initiatives and resources. U.S. citizens have expressed dissatisfaction with disaster response and law enforcement efforts. In light of demands for change, the research considered homeland security initiatives within the context of four stabilization objectives: unity of effort, conflict transformation, legitimacy and rule of law, and security interests.³⁷⁰ To do so, this author briefly described examples of cooperation between civilian and U.S. military assets in support of homeland security operations. The history of civil-military collaboration may be surprisingly extensive, including thousands of joint operations each year. Military support for homeland security activities is not unusual, and provides some context and precedent for using military stabilization strategy in domestic efforts.

³⁶⁹ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-10 – 1-11.

³⁷⁰ Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07), 1-3.

Efforts to unify homeland security response capabilities have improved, although there remains room for improvement. FEMA's National Preparedness System, National Incident Management System, and other strategies represent significant progress toward engaging the whole community and coordinating disaster response efforts. But these models understandably focus on unified disaster response plans rather than prevention. Recent criticisms of American policing may demonstrate limitations in unity of effort between law enforcement agencies and other collaborative partners.

This research examined several strategies that were intended to transform communities decimated by disaster or crime. Much like the challenges faced by civil affairs forces, homeland security efforts and community expectations are often challenged to balance so-called "hard" and "soft" power strategies.³⁷¹ While civil affairs strategy prefers the softer, diplomatic approach, it maintains military use of force as a viable option when necessary. Similarly, various efforts in homeland security have attempted to incorporate alternative strategies such as NIMS and the C3 Policing model. These methods aim to engage the community to identify root problems and partner in solving the related issues. Such efforts are designed to improve legitimacy and community sentiments about homeland security initiatives. Of course, many homeland security efforts—particularly those of law enforcement—generate a significant level of skepticism. The research provided several examples of suggestions for a national strategy reflecting a shift toward supporting domestic security interests. These criticisms are not a new phenomenon, but do suggest a renewed call for community-focused homeland security efforts. Stability operations strategy proposes such a strategy for unifying homeland security prevention and response efforts.

4. Policy Options

In light of the research findings, this thesis suggests three different policy options for considering stability operations strategy in the homeland security

³⁷¹ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57), 1-8 – 1-10.

enterprise. Option A considered maintaining current methods. Generally, community expectations and best practices demand homeland security agencies continue to evolve. This author adapted civil affairs' twelve principles of joint operations to suggest similar tenets for homeland security efforts. The goal was to allow homeland security executives and policy decision makers to use stability operations strategy in deciding whether or not to maintain current methods.

Subsequent policy options built upon each preceding suggestion. Option B considered the implications of applying stabilization strategy on a smaller scale, such as in non-metropolitan areas. This section also briefly discussed the challenges of implementing stability operations strategy in a single agency. Non-metropolitan areas were used as a general example to demonstrate that stabilization strategy could still be used to incorporate lines of effort into a homeland security strategy. In fact, stability operations strategy may offer a template for areas with limited resources to engage community partners and unify homeland security prevention and response capabilities.

Lastly, Option C considered the possibility of comprehensive regional implementation. Given the complexities of metropolitan regions and layers of specialized homeland security responsibilities, a unifying strategy is needed. Figure 16 demonstrates how lines of effort might be integrated into regional homeland security efforts.³⁷² This proposed design offers current homeland security organizations an alternative for incorporating existing resources toward a comprehensive, unified strategy.

B. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Much more could be said on the topic of stability operations strategy in homeland security. This author readily acknowledges other parties could contribute more significantly in advancing inquiry on the subject. The lack of existing study on the suitability of military stabilization and civil affairs methodology for homeland security is curious. While there are certainly political

³⁷² This graphic is included in Appendix E.

ramifications outside the scope of this research, homeland security may be improved by a more public acknowledgement of past and present civil-military collaboration. Given decades of historical military application and the search for homeland security strategies, the dearth of research on the matter is a bit surprising.

While this thesis does not resolve questions about what activities qualify as “homeland security” activities it does propose a new alternative for organizing existing and future efforts within a unified framework. For example, the DHS has determined that climate change is a key homeland security threat.³⁷³ This research does not settle debates about the efficacy of such threat prioritizations. However, stability operations strategy does offer a flexible model for agencies to organize their own strategic prevention and response efforts in accordance within defined stabilization objectives.

In fact, utilizing stability operations strategy may force agencies to identify their organizational objectives and roles within the six stability task sectors. The stabilization approach encourages homeland security agencies to stop, collaborate, and listen to community stakeholders. This may be a new experience for some homeland agencies, but is a reasonable response to contemporary demands for transparency. In the event a proposal does not fit into a specific stability task sector, it may indicate an effort is outside the scope of homeland security activities.

Based upon the research, some criticisms of homeland security efforts could be appeased with successful adaptation of stability operations strategy. In broad terms, stabilization strategy may help homeland security practitioners:

Clarify the homeland security mission—focus on community.

Connect strategic vision (community) to operational initiatives.

Improve coordination of resources through unity of effort.

³⁷³ Lisa Anderson, “US Homeland Security Moves to Tackle Climate Change Risks,” *Reuters*, September 25, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-foundation-climate-security-idUSKCN0HK2PW20140925>.

Prepare a response plan for success, inaction, or failure.

Learn from mistakes—no plan is perfect.

Identify community expectations and measures of performance.

Evaluate efforts.³⁷⁴

Future research opportunities could explore the operational and organizational implications in any of these areas. One of the most appealing qualities about stabilization strategy is its flexibility to adapt to cultural and regional nuances. This author debated the merits of using a specific agency as a hypothetical example for implementing stability operations strategy. After much consideration, this activity seemed limited primarily to those who would be familiar with that specific agency. In the end, it seemed more prudent to allow readers to apply the strategy to their own professions.

At the conclusion of this research, there remains much opportunity for additional study. Subsequent research may find value in approaching stability operations from an operational or organizational approach rather than strategic. Stability operations strategy could be studied from a variety of other perspectives—public/private partnerships, community engagement, legitimacy in homeland security, or military defense support of civil authorities. This last idea is perhaps most intriguing, as reflected by the attention it was given. Examples of military activity and collaboration provide some basis for precedent, and the subject matter would benefit from additional study.

Given the U.S. military's strategic commitment to homeland security operations, practitioners may be well served by a detailed analysis of opportunities for cooperation between military resources and their own agencies. These types of partnerships already exist in disaster response and other areas of homeland security. The commonalities between stability operations and homeland security strategies are worth exploring further. Expanding these efforts

³⁷⁴ These objectives are adapted from general principles found in Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57); Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation* (JDP 3-40).

toward a shared strategic methodology seems a logical progression. Particularly given trends toward continued civil-military collaboration, stability operations strategy remains a viable topic for future homeland security research.


APPENDIX A. CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

Level of Support	Focus of Function	Focus of Capabilities	Operational Scope	Interagency Coordination
Geographic Combatant Command—Strategic	• Enable IPI and OGAs • Shape operations • Promote development	• Develop and build capacity of IPI to provide locally sustainable solutions	National to international	• American Embassy • USAID/OGAs • International partners/donors • IGOs/NGOs
Corps—Operational to Strategic	• Short-term civil administration • Stabilization, reconstruction, and development • Planning, assessment, and implementation	• Reconstruction and development • Enable civil administration • Plan/enable/shape/manage • Regionally focused	Subnational to national	• American Embassy • USAID • OGAs • IGOs/NGOs
Division—Tactical to Operational	• Short-term civil administration • Enable HN and OGAs • Stabilization and reconstruction • Planning and assessment	• Conduct stabilization and reconstruction • Enable civil administration • Plan, enable, shape, and manage (execution oriented)	Province or large city to subnational	• USAID • Reconstruction teams • OGAs • IGOs/NGOs
BCT—Tactical	• Plan, assess, and enable local stabilization activities	• Immediate HA to prevent crisis • Enable local civil administration • Plan, enable, shape, manage (execution oriented)	Large city to province	• Disaster assistance response team • OGA • IGOs/NGOs
Legend: HA Humanitarian Assistance USAID United States Agency for International Development				

Although this graphic depicts some functional civil affairs capabilities, the Army field manual provides a more extensive blueprint for organizing civil affairs activities. Source: Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 3-57) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2011), 1-7, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf.

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APPENDIX B. NRF/NIMS COORDINATION STRUCTURES



Source: <http://image.slidesharecdn.com/a3mattbernard-120725184952-phpapp01/95/national-incident-management-system-update-14-728.jpg?cb=1343245806>.

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APPENDIX C. COMMUNITY POLICING VERSUS C3 POLICING



Difference between Community Policing vs C3 Policing[©]


<u>Principles of Community Policing</u>		<u>Principles of C3 Policing[©]</u>
1. Philosophy and Organizational Strategy		1. Legitimacy is crucial to achieving our Goals
2. Commitment to Community Empowerment		2. You Must Understand the Environment <i>(must know the ground truth)</i>
3. Decentralized and Personalized Policing		3. Unity of Effort is Essential
4. Immediate and Long-Term Proactive Problem Solving		4. Intelligence Drives Operations
5. Ethics, Legality, Responsibility and Trust	VS	5. Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment
6. Expanding the Police Mandate		6. Local Factors are Primary
7. Helping Those with Special Needs		7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential
8. Grassroots Creativity and Support		8. Gangs Must be Separated from Their <u>Cause</u> and Support
9. Internal Change		
10. Building for the Future		
Philosophy		Actual Strategy
• More resources needed		• Utilizing existing resources
		• Working smarter

C3 Policing methods protected by Copyright

Source: Massachusetts State Police, accessed March 19, 2016, <http://i1.wp.com/mspc3policing.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/difference1.jpg?w=960>.

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
APPENDIX D. STABILITY OPERATIONS LINES OF EFFORT



Source: Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-10, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

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APPENDIX E. STABILITY LINES OF EFFORT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY



Adapted from Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-10, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

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