Strong Instrumentalism about Normative Reasons for Action

Abstract

What is the relationship between our normative reasons for action and our motives? can one have a normative reason, say, to eat broccoli even if one does not have motivation to do so? Are matters any different if we ask about reasons for, e.g., saving a child from drowning? Can anything count in favor of taking action in the absence of motivation to do so? Instrumentalism, at least on a first approximation, answers these and similar questions as follows: An agent has a normative reason to do a particular action in a given set of circumstances only if the agent is related in the correct way to her motivate to do the action.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 22, 2013
Accession Number
AD1029759

Entities

People

  • Leonard Kahn

Organizations

  • United States Air Force Academy

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Behavior And Behavior Mechanisms
  • Death
  • Diseases And Disorders
  • Drowning
  • Human Behavior
  • Memory Devices
  • Motivation
  • Pathologic Processes

Fields of Study

  • Philosophy

Readers

  • Applied Combinatorial Optimization and Logic Circuit Design.
  • Gender and Food Studies
  • Military Leadership and Professional Education.