



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**TURKEY'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE
FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK: HOW HAS THIS
UNCONVENTIONAL TASK AFFECTED THE
CONTROL-EFFECTIVENESS BALANCE?**

by

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September 2016

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 2016		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE TURKEY'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK: HOW HAS THIS UNCONVENTIONAL TASK AFFECTED THE CONTROL-EFFECTIVENESS BALANCE?			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Yildirim Isik				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The roles and missions of militaries around the world are expanding into new areas. This, inevitably, affects the existing concepts of civil-military relations, and forces us to rethink those concepts in light of new roles and missions for the military. These issues are pertinent particularly to recently democratized countries such as Turkey. Since its path to democratization in 1946, Turkey has endeavored to develop democratic civil-military relations. Starting in the 1980s, Turkey's civil-military relations have been particularly influenced by an internal security threat—the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK). The Turkish governments have utilized a concerted action of the police and gendarmerie forces, affiliated under the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) against this terrorist organization, with the Turkish Armed Forces as the leading actor. This thesis assesses the effects of the non-traditional roles and missions assigned to the TAF within this context on democratic civilian control. Even though there have been minor changes at the institutional level, the TAF's intense involvement in the fight against the PKK has created a cultural shift from confrontation to cooperation between the civilians and the soldiers, and thus has increased the level of cooperation. This harmony has provided the actors with an opportunity to lay firm foundations for democratic civilian control without provoking the TAF, and increased military effectiveness without creating a sense of threat over civilians still being haunted by memories of past coups.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS civil-military relations, democratic civilian control, military effectiveness, Turkey, PKK, counter-terrorism			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 91	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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PKK: HOW HAS THIS UNCONVENTIONAL TASK AFFECTED THE
CONTROL-EFFECTIVENESS BALANCE?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

The roles and missions of militaries around the world are expanding into new areas. This, inevitably, affects the existing concepts of civil–military relations, and forces us to rethink those concepts in light of new roles and missions for the military. These issues are pertinent particularly to recently democratized countries such as Turkey. Since its path to democratization in 1946, Turkey has endeavored to develop democratic civil–military relations. Starting in the 1980s, Turkey’s civil–military relations have been particularly influenced by an internal security threat—the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK). The Turkish governments have utilized a concerted action of the police and gendarmerie forces, affiliated under the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) against this terrorist organization, with the Turkish Armed Forces as the leading actor. This thesis assesses the effects of the non-traditional roles and missions assigned to the TAF within this context on democratic civilian control. Even though there have been minor changes at the institutional level, the TAF’s intense involvement in the fight against the PKK has created a cultural shift from confrontation to cooperation between the civilians and the soldiers, and thus has increased the level of cooperation. This harmony has provided the actors with an opportunity to lay firm foundations for democratic civilian control without provoking the TAF, and increased military effectiveness without creating a sense of threat over civilians still being haunted by memories of past coups.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CGS	Chief of General Staff
CMR	Civil–Military Relations
DP	Democrat Party
EU	European Union
HEC	Higher Education Council
KCK	Koma Civakên Kurdistan/Kurdistan Communities Union
MoD	Minister of Defense
MoE	Ministry of Education
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NUC	National Unity Committee
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan/Kurdistan Worker’s Party
RP	Refah Partisi/Welfare Party
RPP	Republican People’s Party
RTSC	Radio and Television Supreme Council
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TAK	Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kürdistan/Kurdistan Freedom Falcons
UN	United Nations

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like present my most sincere gratitude to my thesis advisors, Professor Anne Marie Baylouny and Cristiana Matei, for their invaluable guidance, patience, and motivating support and assistance throughout this process. I would not have been able to complete this thesis without their professional and insightful help. I would especially like to thank my beautiful wife, Deniz, and lovely son, Koray, for their never-ending love, constant support, and sacrifices. Lastly, I would like to thank the Turkish Armed Forces for granting me the opportunity to study at Naval Postgraduate School, and all my professors and Naval Postgraduate School staff, who have not spared any effort to provide me with all I needed as a student.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The current security context is dynamic, complex, and unpredictable, dominated more by non-state, network-like, actors, versus traditional states' acts. In 2015 alone, 416 terrorist attacks happened in Turkey, claiming the lives of 488 and leaving 1099 people injured.¹ All of this calls for network-like government action and response, and reveals that one agency (or even one country) is virtually unable to face these threats alone. The roles and missions of militaries around the world are expanding into new areas, such as countering terrorism and organized crime, fighting gangs, and supporting natural disasters. This, inevitably, affects the traditional concepts of civil–military relations, which attribute one role to the armed forces—fight and win external wars—and forces us to re-think those concepts in the light of new roles and missions for the military. These issues are pertinent to both established and developing democracies, including Turkey.

The evolution of the field of civil–military relations (CMR), which defines the relationship between the soldiers holding the authority to use power in the name of the nation and the civilians designating and checking the limits of this authority, dates back to the 19th century, when standing professional militaries emerged, and a division between the roles of military leaders and state officials (civilians) occurred.² This relationship turned into a problematic power struggle in a comparatively short time, for the following two reasons: first, “fear of the threat a large standing army poses,” and hence the “need to keep it subordinate—that is, under civilian control,”³ and second, the idea that security and liberty were competing demands.⁴ As Rifat Ucarol argues, the first

¹ “Global Terrorism Database. Search Results:Turkey,” accessed August 3, 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&country=209&asmSelect1=&dt2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.

² Salih Akyurek et al., *Sivil-Asker Iliskileri ve Ordu-Toplum Mesafesi (Civil-Military Relations and Civil-Military Gap)* (Ankara: Bilgesam Yayinlari, 2014), 1.

³ Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” *Democratization* 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 911.

⁴ Ibid.

reason can be observed in the dispatching of Napoleon Bonaparte to an expedition on Egypt by the Directoire in 1798, partly in an effort to keep an illustrious general away from mainland France and thus reduce the threat from soldiers under his command.⁵

Clausewitz offered a solution to this problematique, by defining the war as “a mere continuation of policy by other means.”⁶ He argued that “political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception,”⁷ and thus advocated for the supremacy of the politicians over soldiers—that is civilian control of the military. This civil–military relations concept has been developed and improved over time by many scholars and thinkers, including Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel E. Finer. The civilian control concept has been utilized by many countries ever since. The countries have adapted and applied the concept of civilian control of the armed forces, based on their specific geo-strategical locations, intrinsic threat perceptions, domestic and international security developments, as well as with their level of democratic consolidation.

Matei argues that the focus on civilian control of civil–military relations concept was “concerned primarily with the armed forces, ... military intrusions in domestic politics thorough *coups d’état*, [and] ... with asserting civilian control of the military”⁸ and adds that “it is not sufficient to describe civil–military relations in the twenty-first century in terms of control alone.”⁹ Having realized this insufficiency, scholars such as Thomas C. Bruneau, Douglas Porch, Paul Shemella, and Cristiana Matei have identified a second dimension, more appropriate for the conceptualization of the Civil–Military Relations in the current security context: effectiveness of security forces (military, police, intelligence) in fulfilling the roles and missions assigned by the civilian decision makers.

⁵ Rifat Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih (Political History): 1789–2014* (Istanbul: DER Yayinlari (DER Publications), 2015), 92.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J.J. Graham (Project Gutenberg, 2006), 100.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁸ Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil - Military Reations,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 26.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Such roles include fighting internal wars, combating terrorism, and fighting crime, which depart from the traditional defense role.¹⁰

Basically, these scholars do not rule out the necessity of civilian control; instead, they argue that “civilian control is basic and fundamental, but it is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfill their roles and missions.” There are two important elements of this concept. First, national security is no longer the sole focus of the armed forces’ roles and missions and because of the overall complexity of security context “military forces (focused primarily on external threats), police forces (focused primarily on domestic threats), and intelligence agencies (focused on both) are increasingly compelled to support each other, share roles, and cooperate, sometimes at the international level.”¹¹ Second is the redefinition of roles and missions in accord with the increasing “network-centricity and network-like traits of new security threats and challenges ... [and] the blurring of boundaries between domestic and external security threats.”¹²

Within this context, Matei introduces six roles and delineates the agencies’ (military, police, and intelligence) partaking in the implementation of these roles: (1) wars (armed forces, military intelligence), (2) internal wars (special forces, police, intelligence), (3) terrorism (intelligence, police, armed forces, special forces), (4) crime (police, police intelligence, back-up support from the military), (5) humanitarian assistance (military, police, back-up support from intelligence), and (6) peace operations (military, police, intelligence).¹³ Defense Diplomacy, which is defined as “the nonviolent use of military forces ... to further a country’s international agenda”¹⁴ was suggested by Capt. Stifani Micky Rori as an emerging role for the militaries.

¹⁰ Ibid., 31.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 31.

¹⁴ Gregory Winger, “The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy,” *IWM*, May 15, 2014, <http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxxiii/the-velvet-gauntlet/>.

Since its path to democratization in 1946, Turkey has endeavored to develop democratic civil–military relations.¹⁵ Turkey’s civil–military relations have been particularly influenced by an internal security threat—the existence of Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK). The PKK, was officially founded on November 27, 1978, as a political party with a goal of promoting the idea of an independent Kurdish state and later on “to establish a left-wing Kurdish state which would serve as a platform for the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the creation of a series of allied Marxist-Leninist states, throughout the Middle East.”¹⁶ The PKK is considered a terrorist organization by many countries, including the United States.¹⁷

The Turkish government has utilized a concerted action—of the police and gendarmerie forces, affiliated under the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), against this terrorist organization—with the Turkish Armed Forces as leading actor. A critical question could be raised in this context: How has the democratization of civil–military relations in Turkey (conceptualized by democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the military) been affected since the assignment of the TAF with non-traditional roles, such as domestic, counter terrorism duties? Has the involvement of the TAF in domestic security affected, negatively, positively, or both, the democratic civilian control of the military in Turkey? Has this non-traditional role of the TAF had any impact (positive, negative, or both) on the effectiveness of the TAF?

¹⁵ In 1946, Turkey adopted the multi-party system, which, eventually, transformed Turkey into an electoral democracy.

¹⁶ “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK),” last modified 05 August 2015, accessed 15 September 2015, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1320763&Pubabbrev=JWIT>.

¹⁷ Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State. The Office of website Management, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Other Release, *U.S. Department of State*, (May 8, 2009), <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

As David Pion Berlin argues in his foreword to *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil–Military Relations*; to survive in today’s world, democracies need to accomplish a sustainable balance between the control of the armed forces by civilians and the effectiveness of the very same armed forces.¹⁸ Although the methods to accomplish this sustainable and “proper balance between democratic civilian leadership and military effectiveness in achieving roles and missions”¹⁹ vary from country to country and region to region, politicians in a majority of the countries have predominantly been concerned about keeping the armed forces under control—through limits on the mission, size, and budget—or at least keeping them out of the “political sphere.”²⁰ The common rationale used to justify this policy has been that “any armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take it over.”²¹ Thomas-Durrel Young gives an example to this:

Britain, because of its long history of internal conflicts between monarchs and nobles, traditionally has been suspicious of a standing army and has maintained only a small force, usually deployed or stationed abroad. Even today the British-dominated NATO Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters and the First UK Armoured Division remain stationed in Germany, fifteen years after the end of cold war.²²

All these, together with the fact that most of the fundamental principles in the field of civil–military relations date back to 19th century when the idea of standing professional armed forces was yet burgeoning and the threats were predominantly external, make the civil–military relations policies shaped within this context impractical,

¹⁸ Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), ix.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁰ This refers to David Pion Berlin’s concept of political sphere which includes human rights, internal security, and intelligence.

²¹ Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil - Military Relations,” 30.

²² Thomas-Durrel Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 25.

even detrimental in extreme cases, in countries that face both internal and external threats.

My thesis aims to draw attention to the “network-centricity and network-like traits of new security threats and challenges (such as terrorism and organized crime), and ... the blurring of boundaries between domestic and external security threats,” and thus analyze the impacts of the new roles, dictated by this transformation, on civil–military relations in Turkey—with a particular emphasis on control and effectiveness balance. I expect the findings of this thesis will be useful to policymakers in Turkey, when shaping and reshaping policies related to effectively fighting the PKK.

My thesis also seeks to serve as an empirical case study for the literature, and politicians and senior military personnel in countries that are dealing with both domestic and external threats. In addition, I aspire this thesis will be useful to policymakers and military personnel of the United States, in that it will provide an insight on civil–military relations in an important North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Feroz Ahmad argues that the military in Turkey “was an institution which never changed its world view, [and] that it stood above society and acted independently of it.”²³ This was a reality for a long time in the history of the modern Turkish Republic and this reality could still be observed when the PKK started its terrorist activities in the first half of the 1980s. As a result of this reality, counter-terrorism operations were initially more security oriented. This security oriented approach then evolved into a semi-militaristic approach, and ultimately into a multidimensional approach. Within the context of the first approach, a security oriented strategy, based on military-police-intelligence cooperation, has been adopted and the main focus of efforts has been fighting the armed terrorists.²⁴ The intelligence agency and police forces were placed under the leadership of the TAF during the period this approach was adopted, yet no civilian institution was

²³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 3.

²⁴ M. Sadi Bilgic, *Dunden Bugune Kurt Sorunu ve PKK (Kurdish Problem and the PKK: The Past and Present)* (Istanbul: Bilgesam Yayinlari, 2014), 64.

systematically included in the process. During the second period, “the focus shifted from fighting the armed terrorists to taking preemptive actions against them.”²⁵ The main concern during this period was efficiency. Again, no civilian institution was included in this process. Within the context of multidimensional approach, though, in addition to intelligence agency and police forces, “many civilian actors and institutions like the universities, media, business and finance, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and even the public were incorporated”²⁶ in the process and the efforts of all those actors were coordinated by civilian politicians or bureaucrats. The growing inclusion and increasing dominance of civilians indicate that the TAF’s inclusion in the fight against PKK has positively affected the civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey. By the time PKK terrorist activities started, the main factor affecting the roles and missions of the TAF was communist threat—both as a neighbor of the Soviet Russia and a member of NATO. By assuming the responsibility to fight against PKK, the TAF just added another mission to the list but the major roles of the TAF remained the same and this embarkation had no adverse effects on other responsibilities. This stability in roles and flexibility in missions not only helped TAF maintain its effectiveness but also added to it. Overall, I hypothesize that, together with other changes happening in a broader sense, the TAF’s role in the fight against PKK and the mutual cultural exposure of institutions involved in the process have positively affected both the civilian control and effectiveness of the armed forces in Turkey.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research will predominantly rely on empirical evidence for both civilian control and military effectiveness aspects of CMR. For empirical evidence I will extensively use secondary sources. Available statistical data (defense budget, acquisition, etc.) will also be used in related sections of both civilian control and effectiveness.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis will be organized into five chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter will provide theoretical background on CMR, roles and missions, and democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Third chapter will provide a historical background of CMR in Turkey, including the role of the armed forces in fighting PKK. The fourth chapter will test the hypotheses by providing an analysis of the civil–military relations in Turkey, in the context of the military taking in new leading roles in domestic security. The fifth chapter will provide a conclusion of the research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is rich literature on civil–military relations in a democracy. In this chapter, I will first draw attention to the penchant of CMR scholars towards civilian supremacy, present the reciprocal relation between CMR and democratic consolidation, define military effectiveness from a CMR perspective, and finally present the views of the scholars calling for the inclusion of military effectiveness in CMR.

The main concern of CMR literature is the power relation between the civilians and soldiers. Scholars such as Clausewitz, Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer raised the questions of “Who has the authority to make what kinds of decisions? Who is accountable to whom? How are roles defined and resources allocated? And how is labor divided up, information shared, and blame assigned?”²⁷ The efforts of the abovementioned scholars themselves and the scholars following in their footsteps have been directed towards answering these questions.

A. GENERAL CONTEXT AND PENCHANT TOWARD CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

Clausewitz, in his seminal book *On War*, argues that any effort directed towards the goal of finding a practical answer to the abovementioned questions must take civilian supremacy as a prerequisite. He states that

the only source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.²⁸

Basically, he considers war a political process in which the military is included as an additional means, argues that the principles of politics still prevail, and claims “that the ends of war must be shaped by the political forces that began the conflict and continue to

²⁷ Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians?*, x.

²⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, “On Military Genius,” in *On War* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1962), 605.

operate throughout”²⁹-which essentially means the civilian supremacy or the civilian control of the militaries.

Clausewitz’s idea of civilian supremacy has been adopted by many scholars like Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Samuel E. Finer and has been the basic principle of many contemporary CMR concepts.

Huntington, one of the leading scholars in the field of CMR, approaches the issue of CMR through a national security policy perspective, argues that national security policy exists in three forms (military security, internal security, and situational security) and two levels (operating level and institutional level), and defines CMR as the principal institutional component of military security policy.³⁰ He further argues that “the objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil–military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values,”³¹ which is an implicit reference to a proper and sustainable balance between civilian control and military effectiveness. At this point, he defines officers as professionals in the “management of violence,”³² narrows the focus of CMR down to an adviser-client relationship between officer corps and the state—which is represented by the civilian politicians, and suggests that military officers, as service providers to the state, “cannot impose decisions upon [their] client which have implications beyond [their] field of special competence.”³³

For the accomplishment of both civilian control and military effectiveness, though, Huntington places the prime responsibility on the officer corps and tries to justify this through the introduction of three distinguishing characteristics of the profession: “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.”³⁴ He defines expertise as “knowledge and

²⁹ Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Political Control over the Use Of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective,” *Library of Congress*, 2001, 12, <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps12076/00338.pdf>.

³⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

³² *Ibid.*, 11.

³³ *Ibid.*, 16.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

skill in a significant field of human endeavor”³⁵ and concludes that expertise of the professional officership is “the management of violence.”³⁶ Huntington builds his concept of responsibility on the notion that “the client of every profession is society”³⁷ and that the professional man is to “perform his service when required by the society.”³⁸ For responsibility of the professional officership, he argues that “the expertise of the officer imposes upon him a special social responsibility. The employment of this expertise promiscuously for his own advantage would wreck the fabric of society,”³⁹ therefore “the management of violence [should] be utilized only for socially approved purposes.”⁴⁰ Huntington’s concept of corporateness is a broader form of *esprit de corps*⁴¹ and suggests that “the interest of a profession requires it to bar its members from capitalizing upon professional competence in areas where that competence has no relevance.”⁴² Having drawn the context of officership as a profession and having set the ideals for this profession, Huntington argues that “officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal”⁴³ and thus implicitly argues that both civilian control and military effectiveness are predominantly dependent on how close the officer corps gets to this professional ideal. Despite frequent references to military effectiveness, Huntington predominantly addresses the issue of civilian control.

Samuel E. Finer, on the other hand, approaches the issue of CMR from a different perspective. He argues that professionalism is not enough for the military to stay away

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., 11.

³⁷ Ibid., 9.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid. Huntington argues that “the members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group.”

⁴² Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 10.

⁴³ Ibid., 11.

from politics, and emphasizes the relevance of the acceptance by the armed forces of civilian “supremacy” as key in this context.⁴⁴

Finer, like Huntington himself, predominantly focuses on the civilian control aspect of CMR, only from a different perspective (military interventions), and places the prime responsibility on the military. He argues that the militaries have absolute superiority over civilians and once the opportunity to intervene appears it is up to the militaries to decide whether to intervene or not—a decision highly dependent on the disposition of the military.⁴⁵

Morris Janowitz, also like his contemporary colleague Samuel P. Huntington, considers the officer corps a professional group but his concept of professionalism does not confine the military in its occupational sphere. Instead, he argues that “the military have accumulated considerable power, and that power protrudes into the political fabric of contemporary society.”⁴⁶ Thus, he argues that the military is not completely detached from political sphere, that it also has political behaviors, and introduces five hypotheses (“changing organizational authority,” “narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites,” “shift in officer recruitment,” “significance of career patterns,” and “trend in political indoctrination”) to “understand the changes that have occurred in the political behavior of the ... military.”⁴⁷ Later on, Janowitz adds another aspect that conditions the political behavior of the military: social and economic functions. He argues that “even where armies are limited in their political role, they have economic and social functions which influence political change.”⁴⁸ Having defined the officer corps as a professional group with political tendencies, Janowitz argues that civilians accomplish civilian control of the armed forces by acting as a “pressure group”—that is political pressure.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 28–29.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 6–10, 23–60.

⁴⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), viii.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 8–12.

⁴⁸ Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 151.

⁴⁹ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 347–71.

Janowitz's conceptualization of CMR incorporates new elements like inherent political, economic, and social functions of the militaries but cannot divorce itself off the preoccupation with civilian control.

B. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Scholars, whose studies have been summarized above, have predominantly focused on the civilian control of the armed forces in an established democracy, and have placed the prime responsibility on the armed forces themselves. There is also a developed body of literature of civil–military relations and democratic consolidation.

Adam Przeworski, for one, notes the relevance of civilian control of the military for democratic consolidation.⁵⁰ Within this context of consolidated democracy; the military is just one of the many democratic institutions, and civil–military relations is just an interplay between the military and other democratic institutions, and the results of this interplay are subject to absolute compliance—that is civilian control.

Phillippe C. Schmitter emphasizes the relevance of the military variable in democratic consolidation, when he specifically links the “Negotiation of a Military Pact” and “Submission of Military to Civilian Control” to successful democratic consolidation.⁵¹ Alfred Stepan introduces the military prerogatives and links the degree of these prerogatives with the effective institutionalization of democratic civilian control, and democratic consolidation.⁵²

⁵⁰ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 37.

⁵¹ Geoffrey Pridham, *Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe* (Dartmouth: University of Bristol- Centre For Mediterranean Studies, 1995), 536–537, 541–564.

⁵² Alfred Stepan introduces the military prerogatives model to explain the interplay between the two aspects which results in civilian control in varying degrees and which ultimately decides establishment and consolidation of democracy. He further adds that no democracy in the world is theoretically or empirically immune to a crisis that might eventually upset a once-consolidated model of civilian control. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 98–101.

Bruneau and Tollefson point out to the “centrality of civil–military relations in the transition to functioning democracy,”⁵³ and define the issues of civil–military relations in all new and old democracies as an “ongoing conflict, negotiation, and compromise between those who hold power by virtue of free and fair elections and the organizations to which society has granted a monopoly on the means of violence.”⁵⁴ They highlight the similarity between the civil–military relations challenges in both newer and older democracies, and further argue that “how these challenges are defined and resolved is fundamental for democratic consolidation and civil–military relations.”⁵⁵

Bruneau and Matei continue the study of the nature of civil–military relations in the process of democratic consolidation, and note the role of the armed forces before, during, and after the transition to democracy. For example, with regard to the particular case of Argentina, they argue that because of the “repressive and brutal”⁵⁶ military dictatorship, “for decades the military carried the stigma of the non-democratic regime’s abuses,”⁵⁷ and for this reason “much of the political energy and efforts of the democratic transition period between 1983 and 1990 were to deal with the military.”⁵⁸ Same patterns occurred in the other military dictatorships in Latin America, which transitioned to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. Under these circumstances, it can be argued that militaries partaking in or supporting the dictatorships, and militaries hindering the transitional process are either immediately forced out of the ‘political sphere’ and placed under strict civilian control by the politicians in the consolidation process, or disposed of these prerogatives in a phased process.⁵⁹

⁵³ Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians?*, 2.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, “Asserting Civilian Control: Argentina,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 151.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ In all three case studies of Argentina, Slovenia, and Spain under the ‘Control’ section of *The Routledge Handbook of Civil – Military Relations*; Bruneau, Matei, and Olmeda draw attention to a common course of action: the establishment of MOD as a control mechanism over the armed forces.

C. DEFINING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS FROM A CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE

Another set of literature of civil–military relations includes the element of “effectiveness.” Brooks and Stanely, for example, argue that the fact that “cultural and societal factors, political institutions, and pressure from the international arena all shape how a state uses its resources,”⁶⁰ imposes the inclusion of effectiveness in civil–military relations as an imperative.

Risa A. Brooks, who has strongly advocated for the inclusion of effectiveness in civil–military relations concepts and extensively studied on ways to accomplish military effectiveness, argues that civilian control is a facilitating prerequisite for the effectiveness of the armed forces, which she describes as the level of translation of the armies’ “basic material and human strength into fighting power.”⁶¹ Having noted this, Brooks argues that military effectiveness is not only about having basic resources but also about the effective utilization of those resources, depending on the context, and is measured

according to the degree to which a military exhibits four crucial attributes: the *integration* of military activity within and across different levels; *responsiveness* to internal constraints and to the external environment; high *skill*, as measured in the motivation and basic competencies of personnel; and high *quality*, as indicated by the caliber of a state’s weapons and equipment. An effective military is one that exhibits high levels of these four attributes.⁶²

Brooks further explains the process of creating an effective military through “The Causal Chain of Military Effectiveness,” which is illustrated in Table 1. She basically argues that an effective military can be described as one that have attained a high level of integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality through a process shaped by independent variables and military activities. Florina Cristiana Matei argues that the change in the overall security context, network-centricity and network-like traits of new security threats and challenges, the blurring of the boundaries between external and internal threats, and

⁶⁰ Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds., *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007), 1.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 9,10.

the inclusion of police forces and intelligence agencies in fields that used to be exclusively dominated by the militaries in the past have made the need for the inclusion of effectiveness more acutely felt.⁶³

Table 1. The Causal Chain of Military Effectiveness⁶⁴

Independent Variables →	Military Activities →	Military Effectiveness
Culture	Strategic assessment processes	Integration
Social structure	Procurement	Responsiveness
Political institutions	Strategic command and control	Skill
Civil-military relations	Intelligence and internal monitoring	Quality
Interstate competition	Officer selection, promotion, and rotation	
Global norms	Tactical command and control	
International organizations	Training and education	

The aforementioned four factors (cultural factors, societal factors, political institutions, and pressure from the international arena), together,

constitute the environment in which a state's military activities take place ... By influencing these activities, a state's society and its international environment affect how well it uses its material and human resources in the process of organizing and preparing for war and therefore its ability to create military power.⁶⁵

⁶³ Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil - Military Reactions," 26.

⁶⁴ Brooks and Stanley, *Creating Military Power*, 9.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 1.

Paul Shemella, another civil–military relations scholar who is predominantly concerned about the effectiveness aspect of the problem, argues that “clearly defined military roles and missions are fundamental to the”⁶⁶ accomplishment of military effectiveness in any given country.

Having introduced this concept of roles and missions, Shemella draws attention to three crucial distinctions to be made within this context; (1) “distinction between roles and missions,” (2) “determining which roles are generally appropriate for military forces and which are not,” and (3) “the identification of roles and missions appropriate for the armed forces versus the police,” and further argues that “the inability to make this distinction clear enough, and to define the conditions under which those forces should work together, has often led governments to military and political failure.”⁶⁷

Shemella argues that “roles operate at two different levels;” macro and micro roles. He defines macro roles as “roles given to the armed forces collectively, and relative to nonmilitary instruments of government power,” and the micro roles as “operational roles assigned to [individual services].”⁶⁸ Table 2 shows the macro roles of the armed forces and the micro roles assigned to individual services in accord with those macro roles.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 122.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 123–124.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁶⁹ Shemella introduces a comprehensive list but cautions that this list is by no means exhaustive and that different macro and micro roles could be added to the list.

Table 2. Attributes of Military Effectiveness⁷⁰

Integration	Responsiveness	Skill	Quality
Consistency within and across levels and areas of military activity	Ability to tailor military activity to the state's own resource and environmental constraints and opportunities and to its adversary's strengths and weaknesses	Military personnel's capabilities and motivation to perform essential tasks in preparing for and executing war	Properties of weapons and equipment a military is able to provide for itself
<i>Indications:</i> Integration of tactics with broader political and strategic goals (e.g., tactics that do not compromise attainment of broader political objectives) Integration of training system with tactical concepts and quality (literacy, experience, etc.) of personnel Logistical systems support force deployments; procurement supports tactical concepts; operational plans support strategic objectives	<i>Indications:</i> Tactics tailored to exploit specific weaknesses of an adversary Modifications of force structure are promptly made in response to new threats and challenges Internal evaluative processes reflect rigorous efforts to evaluate and analyze military activity	<i>Indications:</i> Fluid assimilation of technology Highly motivated soldiers and units Proficiency at executing sophisticated doctrine (combined arms, maneuver, etc.)	<i>Indications:</i> Nature of weapons procured (e.g., speed, low failure rates) Ability to minimize trade-offs in mobility, firepower, etc.

Having drawn the context for the roles, Shemella introduces a distinction between “traditional” and “nontraditional” missions, and argues that “missions can be synchronized more easily with the roles they support from such a perspective.”⁷¹ Shemella maintains that sustaining the connection between roles and missions, and accomplishing stability in roles and flexibility in missions is key to military effectiveness.⁷²

Basically, both scholars argue for the necessity to include effectiveness in civil–military relations concepts and they all maintain that civilian control is a prerequisite for

⁷⁰ Brooks and Stanley, *Creating Military Power*, 15.

⁷¹ Shemella, “Roles and Missions,” 136.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 130.

effectiveness and those two aspects cannot be divorced off. While Matei is predominantly concerned with the balance, or tradeoff, between democratic civilian control and effectiveness, Brooks and Shemella are primarily concerned with effectiveness itself. Brooks describes military effectiveness as a high level of integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality and primarily focuses on ways to accomplish this effectiveness. Shemella, on the other hand, focuses on sustaining military effectiveness. He makes a distinction between roles and missions and argues that effectiveness can be sustained through stability in roles and flexibility in missions.

D. ACQUIRING AND SUSTAINING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

As also mentioned by Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, “there are no easy answers, no quick fixes, no simple formulas for the achievement of military effectiveness.”⁷³ The fact that “military effectiveness [still] remains an ill-defined concept,” further adds to the challenge.⁷⁴ Yet, despite its challenging and ambiguous nature, there is a consensus among scholars on the definition of military effectiveness. Millett, Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman define military effectiveness as “the process by which the armed forces convert resources into fighting power,” and argue that “a fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from resources physically and politically available.”⁷⁵ Brooks provides a similar definition and describes military effectiveness “as the capacity to create military power from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital.”⁷⁶ Both definitions define effectiveness as a conversion process and focus on the creation/acquisition of effectiveness. Shemella, on the other hand provides a roadmap for the sustainment of military effectiveness through the concept of roles and missions. In this section, I will first focus on accomplishment/acquisition of military effectiveness through the ‘causal

⁷³ Allan Reed Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, Merishon Center Series on International Security and Foreign Policy (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

⁷⁴ Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” in *Military Effectiveness: Volume I (The First World War)*, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 1.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷⁶ Brooks and Stanley, *Creating Military Power*, 9.

chain of military effectiveness' introduced by Brooks, and then focus on the sustainment of military effectiveness through the roles and missions concept of Shemella.

Brooks' causal chain of military effectiveness basically represents the translation process of the afore mentioned resources into a high level of integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality (which together form military effectiveness) under the influence of independent variables ("culture, social structure, political institutions, civil-military relations, interstate competition, global norms, international organizations"⁷⁷) and through the utilization of military activities ("strategic assessment processes, procurement, strategic command and control, intelligence and internal monitoring, officer selection-promotion and rotation, tactical command and control, training and education"⁷⁸).

The most crucial parts of Brooks' theory are the four properties of an effective military. Brooks argues that "all four properties—integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality—are essential to military effectiveness. A state that has shortcomings in just one attribute is likely to be handicapped in generating power in the event of an interstate dispute."⁷⁹ These four attributes, though, are the end products of Brooks' causal chain. The initiators/causes of this chain are "culture, social structure, political and economic institutions, and international factors, including global norms, competition, and international organizations."⁸⁰

Having defined the resources, the end products those resources are translated into, and the causes that start the process, Brooks introduces a set military activities as a "translation mechanism": (1) strategic assessment and coordination processes, (2) weapons and equipment procurement process, (3) strategic command and control, (4) intelligence and internal monitoring, (5) officer selection, rotation, and promotion procedures, (6) tactical command and control, and (7) training and military education.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 13.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 16–17.

⁸¹ Ibid., 18–22.

Basically, the causal chain of military effectiveness seeks to find an answer to the question of how states create military power. Despite the inclusion of a set of resources, Brooks acknowledges that “the sources of military power are ... far more diverse.”⁸² Still, the processes and procedures included in this concept provide a roadmap for the creation of military power/effectiveness, with slight differences depending on the resources, independent variables, and military activities included.

As for the sustainment of military effectiveness, Shemella argues that “clearly defined military roles and missions are fundamental to the structuring of any state’s defense establishment and to decision making about the use of armed force.”⁸³ He draws attention to three acts of distinction, which are the distinction between roles and missions, the necessity to determine “which roles and missions are generally appropriate for military forces and which are not,”⁸⁴ and the “identification of roles and missions appropriate for the armed forces versus the police”⁸⁵

In addition to the above-mentioned distinctions, Shemella makes a distinction between macro and micro roles—also shown in Table 3. He defines macro roles as the “roles given to the armed forces collectively, and relative to nonmilitary instruments of government power,” and argues that “macro roles operate at the policy level, where governments decide how military forces will be used generally in domestic and foreign affairs.”⁸⁶ As for micro roles, Shemella defines them as roles individually assigned to services, and argues that “micro roles determine how national security organizations will be used relative to one another, and which types of forces are appropriate for such uses.”⁸⁷

⁸² Ibid., 228.

⁸³ Shemella, “Roles and Missions,” 122.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 124.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Table 3. Micro Roles for Armed Forces and Law Enforcement⁸⁸

<i>Macro Role</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Air Force</i>	<i>Coast Guard</i>	<i>Police Force</i>
War Fighter	Ground component in joint warfare	Maritime component in joint warfare	Air component in joint warfare	Augments navy for combat operations	Enforces the law at home
Defender	Ground component in joint warfare	Maritime component in joint warfare	Air component in joint warfare	Augments navy for combat operations	Enforces the law at home
Peacekeeper	Conducts peace support operations (PSOs) ashore	Conducts PSOs in coastal and riverine areas	Provides logistic support to ground troops	Conducts maritime law enforcement at home	Trains indigenous police during PSOs
Fire Fighter	Conducts military support to civilian authorities (MSCA)	Conducts MSCA in coastal and riverine areas	Provides air service to remote areas	Conducts maritime law enforcement	Enforces the law at home
Police Officer	Enforces the law in rural areas and cities	Enforces the law in coastal and riverine areas	Provides logistic support to ground forces	Conducts maritime law enforcement	Augments the army in law enforcement

Shemella also makes a distinction between traditional and nontraditional missions, which he argues “comes from the field, where military missions are performed.”⁸⁹ He further argues that “missions can be synchronized more easily with the roles they support from such a perspective.”⁹⁰ Table 4 shows a list of traditional and nontraditional missions. It is important to note here that this list is not rigid and can be changed depending on a variety of factors. Shemella argues that this non-rigid nature of the list has become even more apparent in the wake of Cold War.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 136.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

Table 4. Mission Characteristics⁹²

<i>Traditional</i>	<i>Nontraditional</i>
External security functions	Internal security functions
Lethal force	Nonlethal force
High-profile, large-unit operations	Low-profile, small-unit operations
Nonpermissive environment	Permissive environment
Heavily armed	Lightly armed
National control	Local control
Little civil-military interaction	High civil-military interaction
Centralized command and control	Diffuse command and control
Warrior mentality	Law enforcement mentality

Overall, Shemella argues that it is imperative to make a distinction between roles and missions, but at the same time establish a hierarchical link between them. Once accomplished, effectiveness can be more easily sustained if the missions are shaped in accordance with the roles they support. Basically, stability in roles and flexibility in missions is key to the successful sustainment of effectiveness.

E. THE INCLUSION OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS CONCEPTS

This literature on democratic consolidation and civil–military relations also predominantly focuses on achieving civilian control, and very little on the issue of military effectiveness. Having realized this, several scholars of democratic consolidation and civil–military relations, point out the need to include effectiveness in the civil–military relations conceptual framework. In his article “Making Strategy: Civil–Military Relations after Iraq,” Hew Strachan draws attention to this necessity and argues that

the principal purpose of effective civil–military relations is national security; its output is strategy. Democracies tend to forget that. They have come to address civil–military relations not as a means to an end, not as a way of making the state more efficient in its use of military power, but as an end in itself. Instead the principal objective, to which others become

⁹² Ibid.

secondary, has been the subordination of the armed forces to civil control.⁹³

Basically, he argues that democratic civilian control of the armed forces is not the ultimate goal, but rather a means to accomplish other goals—including effectiveness.

Likewise, a comprehensive study that addresses the issues of civilian control and effectiveness of the armed forces is provided by Bruneau and Tollefson. The authors place a special emphasis on the institutions⁹⁴ and highlight their importance in determining civil–military relations.⁹⁵ After introducing the actors and institutions partaking in civil–military relations and their contributions to the processes and procedures, the authors respectively address the issues of roles and missions—which directly relate to effectiveness- and democratic civilian control of the militaries.

The idea of effectiveness of the military is based on distribution of tasks accepted by all parties, and clearly defined roles and missions within the context of this distribution. The tasks of politicians are to “define threats, determine political objectives, set the broad parameters of strategy, build coalitions, and provide resources” while that of the soldiers are to “argue their case, take the resources allocated to them, and apply force to achieve the political goals as defined by the political leaders.”⁹⁶ Arguing that “macro roles help governments create a vision, micro roles determine which military forces will be used to achieve that vision, and missions are the vehicle by which they do it,” and highlighting the importance of continuous synchronization between missions and roles, Paul Shemella makes a further distinction between missions; traditional and

⁹³ Hew Strachan, “Making Strategy: Civil–military Relations after Iraq,” *Survival* 48, no. 3 (August 3, 2006): 66, doi:10.1080/00396330600905510.

⁹⁴ Authors define the institutions as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” and cite “ministries of defense, legislatures, the military as a profession, control of the military budgets, the means by which intelligence is gathered and applied, military education, and the recruitment system” as the main institutions determining civil–military relations.

⁹⁵ Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians?*, 6.

⁹⁶ Douglas Porch, “Strategy Formulation and National Defense: Peace, War, and the Past as Prologue,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 101.

nontraditional.⁹⁷ Nontraditional missions have been dictated by changing domestic and international conditions but are not a substitute for traditional missions. Militaries might have to perform both traditional and nontraditional missions at the same time. Although Shemella claims that this obligation places the militaries under the risk of becoming less capable, he argues that sustaining the connection between roles and missions, and accomplishing stability in roles and flexibility in missions is key to military effectiveness.⁹⁸ Bruneau and colleagues have divided the issue of democratic civilian control into different subsets (intelligence, defense budget, recruitment, and professional military education) and tried to bring an explanation through the conduct of politicians and militaries in those subsets.

The single focus of the literature on civilian control and negligence of effectiveness has been noted by Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei. They argue that the “almost exclusive focus on civilian control in literature is a significant impediment to understanding the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy and security forces, particularly when we consider the very wide spectrum of roles and missions,” and add that the contemporary challenge to CMR is “not only to assert and maintain control, but also to develop effective militaries and other security instruments to implement a broad variety of roles and missions.”⁹⁹ Within this context, they introduce “a new conceptualization with three dimensions: democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency,”¹⁰⁰ and six categories of roles and missions: “(1) fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars, (2) fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies, (3) fight global terrorism, (4) fight crime, (5) provide support for humanitarian assistance, (6) prepare for and execute peace support operations.”¹⁰¹ Having listed the roles and missions, Bruneau and Matei argue that “democratic control depends less on the roles and missions that are assigned, such as the armed forces doing police work, than on the mix

⁹⁷ Shemella, “Roles and Missions,” 128.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 130, 136.

⁹⁹ Bruneau and Matei, “New Conceptualization of Democratization,” 910, 915.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 911.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 917.

of security instruments and how the control mechanisms are institutionalized.”¹⁰² Thus, Bruneau and Matei argue that

the three elements of CMR must be assessed as interdependent parts of a whole in a democratic context. Each of the three is necessary, and individually none is sufficient. Civilian control is basic and fundamental, but is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfil their roles and missions. And, both control and effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost or they will vitiate other national priorities.¹⁰³

As observed in the studies of contemporary CMR scholars, a proper balance between civilian control and effectiveness of the armed forces better conceptualizes democratic civil–military relations.

Matei and Bruneau add another aspect to this new conceptualization; efficiency, that is “fulfilling the assigned roles and missions at a minimum cost.”¹⁰⁴ Bruneau argues that efficiency is one of the third requirements for effectiveness but highlights the challenges in assessing or measuring the efficiency in areas of national security, defense, and civil–military relations—in the sense that it is done in other areas.¹⁰⁵ He cites three reasons for these challenges:

first, measuring the efficiency of the security forces is complicated by the wide variety of roles and missions as well as the difficulty in establishing measures of effectiveness for any one, let alone a combination of one. Second, because security is a public good or activity, where the so-called bottom line does not apply, there is no market mechanism to assign a value to whether an activity is being done efficiently, that is, making profit or not. Third, competition, in the form of a peer government within the same territorial boundaries, is not at work.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Ibid., 916.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 920–21.

¹⁰⁴ Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil - Military Relations,” 26.

¹⁰⁵ Thomas C. Bruneau, “Efficiency in the Use of Resources,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil - Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Matei (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 39.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Having noted that, Bruneau argues that applying the concept of efficiency, in its traditional sense, to the process of the “use of resources for national security and defense is ... misleading” and that “what governments require, at a minimum, is some kind of oversight mechanism to monitor the budget and spending.”¹⁰⁷

This thesis aspires to complete these bodies of literature. It hopes to provide a discussion and assessment of current the civil–military relations and democratic consolidation in Turkey, utilizing both elements of civil–military relations: control and effectiveness.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 45.

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III. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

In this section, I will analyze the state tradition in Turkey, the exact position of the TAF within this traditional framework, and the shifts in both the state tradition and the position of the TAF throughout history.

Absolute monarchy has been the traditional government type in the Asiatic culture (Turkish, Chinese, Indian, Russian, Persian, and Arabian).¹⁰⁸ The only state in this group that has successfully completed its transition to democracy in the last century is Japan. Turkey, on the other hand, is an important example of a country in the late phases of this transition.¹⁰⁹ The distinguishing aspect of the Asiatic type of absolute monarchy (which calls for the rule of a single person (emperor) with unlimited administrative, legislative, and judicial authority) is the “necessity for the monarch to be a civilian” and Turkey (Ottomans and Seljuks back in history) is no exception.¹¹⁰ Ataturk’s resignation at the outset of the war of liberation and his partaking in the fight as a civilian leader from that time on, is a decision partly dictated by this tradition.

In order to be able to analyze the state tradition, its effects on civil–military relations, and the exact position of the armed forces within this context more accurately, the Turkish history should be divided into two separate parts: (1) the Ottoman Empire era, and (2) the modern Turkish Republic era.¹¹¹

A. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

During the Ottoman time, the armed forces were traditionally considered one of the main assets of the monarch (emperor); therefore, with the exception of the years of decline, “the armed forces had never been the dominant party in CMR.”¹¹² But, as Feroz

¹⁰⁸ Akyurek et al., *CMR in Turkey*, 131.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 132.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

Ahmad argues, during the years of decline, the same army, in collaboration with the *ulema* (men of religion), got actively engaged in palace politics and became the main hindrance in front of reforms.¹¹³

This threat posed by the conduct of the military during the years of decline led the reformist emperors to start every modernization process with the military, which led to the introduction of Nizam-i Cedid (New Order) in the 19th century. Within the context of these efforts, “military schools and academies based on the western model were set up,” many officers and cadets were sent abroad for education and teams of foreign advisors (predominantly French and German) were invited to the country, and “out of these ... emerged a new generation of reformist officers dedicated to the salvation of their state and empire.”¹¹⁴ This new generation of reformist officers not only aspired to lead the nation through a modernization process but also started to question and challenge the state, which was embodied in the persona of the emperor. Along with many benefits both for the armed forces and the civilians, this self-assumed leadership role also caused a detachment that eventually created an isolated military community and thus a civil–military gap.

B. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE MODERN TURKISH REPUBLIC

The previously-mentioned role “assumed by the armed forces in the mid-19th century became even stronger in the first years of the modern Turkish Republic,”¹¹⁵ and together with its “sacred mission,”¹¹⁶ “created a deep respect for and confidence in the TAF.”¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Ahmad, *Modern Turkey*, 2.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Salih Akyurek et al., *Sivil-Asker Iliskileri Ve Ordu-Toplum Mesafesi* (Ankara: BILGESAM Yayinlari, 2014), 135.

¹¹⁶ Turkish word used for sacred in this occasion is “kutsal,” which conveys the message that the power and the mission of the TAF is not derivative of any earthly power or figure, but of the creator.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

The TAF played an “inevitably effective role”¹¹⁸ during the War of Liberation and made vital contributions to the state and nation building process after the war.¹¹⁹ Along with the heritage from the Ottoman Empire, this role it assumed at a “time when foreign policy, domestic policy, and military issues were all interwoven,” helped the TAF acquire an influential position over the politics.¹²⁰ To explain this situation, Feroz Ahmad argues that “the emphasis on the army’s role in Turkish history and politics, from Ottoman times to the present, suggests a continuity which seems plausible. It assumes that the army was an institution which never changed its world view, that it stood above society and acted independently of it.”¹²¹

Yet, this continuity mentioned by Feroz Ahmad witnessed a short break during the single-party period under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü. Both leaders were well aware of the opposition from the prominent commanders of the War of Liberation (Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele, and Kazım Karabekir) and the substantial support to these figures from the military. The main disturbances of these prominent commanders were the proclamation of republic and designation of Ankara as the new capital—both of which were considered to be acts of disrespect to the imperial heritage.¹²² Thus, in an effort to stem this perceived serious threat from the military, the prominent generals were forced to retire from the military and also disqualified from politics during Atatürk’s lifetime.¹²³ This attitude of Atatürk towards the military was sustained by İnönü and

throughout the single-party period (1923–1945) the army was completely isolated from political life. Officers were told to retire if they wanted to enter politics ... those who chose to serve the republic in uniform were not even permitted to vote. The army was given a place of honour in the

¹¹⁸ Akyurek et al., *CMR in Turkey*, 136.

¹¹⁹ Here, with the word ‘inevitable’, the author argues that the roles assumed by the TAF both before and after the War of Liberation were, in part, dictated by the absence of a Turkish bourgeoisie.

¹²⁰ Akyurek et al., *CMR in Turkey*, 136.

¹²¹ Ahmad, *Modern Turkey*, 3.

¹²² Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 166, 167.

¹²³ Ahmad, *Modern Turkey*, 9.

republic but it was also removed from the mainstream of the social and political life of the country.¹²⁴

To ensure the civilian control of the military during the single-party period, along with “traditional mechanism of civilian control (limits on the mission, limits on the size, limits on the budget, constitutional and legal limitations, culture of professionalism, societal norms, and free press),”¹²⁵ both Ataturk and Inonu adopted three additional precautionary methods: (1) highlighting their military background as prominent generals, (2) appointing allegiant generals to key positions,¹²⁶ and (3) “satisfying the self-esteem of the officer corps by making the Chief of General Staff (CGS) a more influential figure than Minister of Defense (MoD).”¹²⁷ The exclusion of the officer corps from the mainstream social and political life as a result of the control mechanism imposed on them, created a considerable civil–military gap and a plausible detachment on the part of the soldiers, which only started to fade away as the Cold War brought the TAF back into the mainstream.

After the end of the Second World War, numerous internal and external factors forced the Inonu administration to initiate a transitional process to multiparty system. Zürcher argues that Turkey’s growing concerns in the face of explicit Russian demands for correction of borders; Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, which were aimed at supporting the defense of free nations who were under the threat of foreign pressure or militant minority violence inside their borders; and Turkish leadership’s efforts toward fully profiting from the American military and political support through the adoption of political and economic ideals championed by the Americans (democracy and free enterprise) could all be cited as external factors facilitating the transition to multiparty system.¹²⁸ In addition to the abovementioned factors, Turkey’s partaking in the 1945 San

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians?*, 24–29.

¹²⁶ Feroz Ahmad argues that Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, an old school soldier who strictly disapproved any non-military pastime of officers and effectively isolated the military from politics, was kept in office as CGS for 19 years (1925-1944) just for this reason.

¹²⁷ Ahmad, *Modern Turkey*, 9.

¹²⁸ Zürcher, Erik J., *Modern History of Turkey*, 208,209.

Francisco conference as a founding member of the United Nations (UN) and commitment to democratic ideals through the signing of UN charter can also be counted among external factors. As for the domestic factors, Zürcher argues that; the estrangement between the single-party regime and the masses (peasants and industrial workers), the lack of improvement in the standard of living, excessive taxing of the government over country-side, rising cost of living, the withdrawal of the support of Young Turk Coalition, and the suspicion inflicted by the *varlik vergisi* (wealth tax)¹²⁹ on the Turkish bourgeoisie are all the domestic factors facilitating the transition process.¹³⁰

In the first multi-party elections held in 1946, Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*) (DP) was able to win only 62 of the 465 seats; yet, as Zürcher argues, this was mainly the result of massive vote rigging and administrative frauds in the electoral process on the part of Republican People's Party (RPP)—a claim he supports with the immediate destroying of the actual ballot boxes after the results were announced.¹³¹ After the adoption of the open counting of votes and supervision of the elections by the judiciary, DP gained a sweeping victory in the 1950 elections, which Feroz Ahmad argues was brought by DP's successful exploitation of "the public's memory of past grievances"¹³² towards RPP, and repetitive promises of democratic and economic development. Yet DP failed to fulfill the promises and meet the expectations of the public. Their self-perception of "themselves as the architects of contemporary Turkey who alone understood what was best for the country"¹³³ and the growing feeling of insecurity despite successive electoral victories, led to their adoption of oppressive and exclusive policies towards opposition parties and other state institutions (including the TAF), which were deemed as the extension of RPP.

The military was also going through a transformation process during this period. In addition to structural changes made possible through foreign military aids, Turkey's

¹²⁹ Wealth tax was particularly imposed on minorities, but the Turkish bourgeoisie was concerned that the same policy could be directed towards them by the regime dominated by bureaucrats and the military.

¹³⁰ Zürcher, Erik J., *Modern History of Turkey*, 208–9.

¹³¹ Zürcher, Erik J., *Modern History of Turkey*, 212.

¹³² Ahmad, *Modern Turkey*, 108.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 109.

accession to NATO in 1952, and growing number of officers being trained abroad, or at least being exposed to the realities of foreign armed forces, and thus being “brought out of political shade into the limelight (especially during the Korean War)”¹³⁴ created conditions highly reminiscent of *Nizam-i Cedid*. It is important to note here that those changes were predominantly happening at junior level.

Despite all those structural and intellectual changes happening in the TAF, the DP leadership adopted the same techniques as Ataturk and Inonu, and thought that changing the commanding generals in the armed forces would suffice to keep the TAF under control. This, together with the explicit hostility of DP leadership against *officer corps* (prime minister Adnan Menderes once “threatened to run [the TAF] with reserve officers if the regular officers failed to behave responsibly”¹³⁵), led to the 1960 coup which, in a rare fashion, happened out of the command structure. Even the CGS “became aware that a military coup d’état had taken place at three o’clock in the morning of 27 May 1960 only when a declaration read by Colonel Alparslan Turkes was broadcast on Turkish radio.”¹³⁶

Thus, ten years after its first electoral victory, DP rule came to an end through a military coup in 1960. “This coup started a period throughout which the TAF acted as the primary political actor that shaped all political processes”¹³⁷ and thus enjoyed the ultimate liberty of “ruling but not governing.”¹³⁸ As Yaprak Gursoy argues; with every intervention after the 1960 coup, the autonomy of the TAF increased and through legal safeguards (especially constitutional regulations in 1971 and 1980) that autonomy evolved into an unnamed veto power, which severely limited the authority of the governments.¹³⁹ “It was only after 1999 that the political autonomy of the TAF started to

¹³⁴ Ibid., 9.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 112.

¹³⁶ Zürcher, Erik J., *Modern History of Turkey*, 241.

¹³⁷ Akyurek et al., *CMR in Turkey*, 138.

¹³⁸ Steven A. Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2007), 9.

¹³⁹ Yaprak Gursoy, *Türkiye’de Sivil-Asker İlişkilerinin Donusumu (The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey)*, ed. Mustafa Aydın (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 2012), 7–8.

decrease.”¹⁴⁰ Karen Kaya also acknowledges the year 1999 as a turning point in civil–military relations in Turkey and argues that in 1999, Turkey’s bid for European Union (EU) candidacy was approved, and with this approval a process of harmonization of Turkey’s laws according to EU regulations was started, among which civilian control of the armed forces was one of the most important.¹⁴¹

Despite the sincerity of the members of National Unity Committee (NUC) to hand power back to the politicians after a general election; the 1961 “constitution ... gave the military High Command a role in the government”¹⁴² through the National Security Council (NSC). Although the council’s function was limited to assisting the cabinet in matters related to national security, the generals had a say in almost every issue because back then “from rice price to roads and touristic sites, there [was] ... not a single problem in this country which [was] ... not related to national security.”¹⁴³

Ahmad argues that, with the Bill passed in March 1962, “the power and influence of the NSC was increased [to a level that] allowed the body to interfere in the deliberations of the cabinet through regular consultations and participation in preparatory discussions.”¹⁴⁴ Under these circumstances, the TAF gained the upper hand in civil–military relations, and became both a partner of the government in the executive process and the legitimate guardian of the state.

The return to democracy after a short period of military rule, and the level of freedoms introduced by the 1961 constitution increased the political, social, and physical mobility of people. Things that would normally increase the quality of democracy in any country, created a chaos in Turkey. A short description of the situation during that time is provided by Ahmad:

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Karen Kaya, “Changing Civil Military Relations in Turkey,” *Military, OE Watch*, (April 2011), 7, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/>.

¹⁴² Ahmad, *Modern Turkey*, 129–30.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 130.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

By January 1971, Turkey seemed to be in a state of chaos. The universities has ceased to function. Students emulating Latin American urban guerillas robbed banks and kidnapped U.S. service-men, and attacked American targets. The homes of university professors critical of the government were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike and more workdays were lost between 1 January and 12 March 1971 than during any prior year. The Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National Order Party, openly rejected Ataturk and Kemalism, infuriating the armed forces.¹⁴⁵

Zurcher argues that; in order to stem the ongoing anarchy and “forestall a coup by junior officers on the pattern of that of May 1960,”¹⁴⁶ on 12 March 1971 the CGS handed an ultimatum in the form of a memorandum to the prime minister, which demanded the formation of a strong and credible government to end the anarchy.¹⁴⁷ As a result most of the freedoms introduced by the 1961 constitution were either completely abolished or curbed. Yet this could not stop anarchy form evolving into political violence.

In the face of growing violence and failure to restore order by the politicians, the TAF took “over the administration of the country in accordance with its Internal Service Act which assigns to them the responsibility of safeguarding and protecting the Turkish Republic.”¹⁴⁸ In his foreword to *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, General Kenan Evren argues that

it is incorrect to interpret the Armed Forces’ take-over of the state administration in 12 September 1980 as their entry into the political arena. This action was carried through as an obligation, for there was no other way of preventing the breakdown and destruction of the nation and the state. The whole operation, however, was conducted within the framework of the existing chain of command, based on the principle of absolute obedience, to ensure that the Armed Forces themselves did not get stuck in the quagmire of politics.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 147.

¹⁴⁶ Zürcher, Erik J., *Modern History of Turkey*, 258.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ General Secratariat of National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey: Before and After* (Ankara: Ogun Kardesler Printing House, 1982), ix.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Yet, in stark contrast with this argument, “the military leaders did not forget to take steps that would ensure the continuing presence and influence of their institution at the highest level of political decision making.”¹⁵⁰ Unlike the 1960 coup, following the end of junta regime in 1983, a general, Kenan Evren, took over the presidency, after simultaneously serving as both the president and the general chief of staff for one year. Thus, the military, under Kenan Evren’s presidency and through NSC, became “the highest, non-elected, decision making body of the [Turkish state].”¹⁵¹

Gerassimos Karabelias argues that civil–military relations in Turkey passed through three stages in the post-junta period: “first when Kenan Evren was the President and Turgut Ozal the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic (1983–89), the second when Ozal occupied the seat of the President (1989–93), and the third, the post Ozal period (1993–95).”¹⁵² With the exception of the presidency of Turgut Ozal, the military continued to have the upper hand in civil–military relations and this continued up until 1999.

In 1997, the military, through a NSC resolution, forced the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to accept the implementation of certain steps aimed towards the stemming of Islamic radicalization. These steps included:

1. the transfer of all schools, student lodgings and foundations affiliated with Islamist groups to the Ministry of Education (MoE)
2. the implementation of eight year compulsory education and the placement of all courses teaching Quran under the authority of MoE in order to protect new generations from the impacts of groups with Islamist agendas
3. the cessation of all activities of the groups that have been banned with Law no. 677—that is Islamist denominations
4. the introduction of necessary precautions to end the manipulation of the cases of officers that have been sacked from the TAF due to their Islamist affiliations in a way to present the TAF as opposed to religion

¹⁵⁰ Gerassimos Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-War Turkey, 1980–95,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (October 1999): 135.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., 136.

5. the adoption of the precautions that have been used by the TAF to prevent Islamists from infiltrating into the armed forces by other government institutions
6. the inhibition of Iran's pro-Islamist activities in Turkey
7. the prohibition of the activities of all radical Islamist groups
8. the banning of practices that would undermine Turkey's modern identity
9. the prohibition of the donation of sheep hides to Islamist groups in order to provide them with financial support
10. the strict implementation of Law no. 5816 to prevent disrespectful acts and statements against Atatürk¹⁵³

These steps, which were specifically designed to target the majority of Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) constituency, eventually led to the resignation of Erbakan. The similarity between the 1971 intervention and the 1997 "postmodern coup" shows how less the power balance between the military and the civilians had changed.

The EU membership process requirements, though, cushioned the impacts of the 1997 "postmodern coup." Unlike the two other enlargement countries at the time (Malta and Cyprus), Turkey was not granted the opportunity to start accession negotiations until 2005, and the opening of accession negotiations was made conditional upon the fulfilment of "the Copenhagen political criteria for membership."¹⁵⁴ Between 1999 and 2005 the main focus of all political efforts was the harmonization of Turkish laws and regulations with the Copenhagen Criteria, which are categorized into three different groups:

1. political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities
2. economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces

¹⁵³ "Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Karari: Karar Sayisi 406 (National Security Council Resolution: Resolution Number 406)," Commercial, *Hukuk Ajansi*, accessed August 6, 2016, http://www.hukukajansi.com/images/dosyalarim/DAVALAR/28_SUBAT_KARARLARI/28_UBAT_KARARLARI.pdf.

¹⁵⁴ Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown," Policy Paper, Turkey Project (Washington: The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings, November 2014), 2, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Turkey-and-the-European-Union.pdf>.

3. administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the *acquis* and ability to take on the obligations of membership¹⁵⁵

Nilufer Narli argues that with the beginning of European Union (EU) negotiations, civil–military relations went through significant cultural and political changes. Cultural changes include the following: (1) changes in political and security culture, (2) changes in the mindset and socialization process of the officer corps, and (3) changes decreasing the informal influence mechanisms of the military.¹⁵⁶ Political changes include the following: (1) media criticism of military transparency and increasing number of academic studies on civil–military relations, (2) public opinion against military existence in political sphere, (3) increasing narrative of conscientious objection, and (4) the transfer of the task of protecting the democracy and secularism from military to civilian institutions.¹⁵⁷ Thus, through these cultural and political changes, partly made possible by the EU membership negotiations, “the autonomy and political authority of the TAF has been significantly curbed, and as a result of this, a more democratic civil–military relations context has been established.”¹⁵⁸

In order to better analyze the curbing effect of this negotiation process on the autonomy and political authority of the TAF, Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt focus on the institutions and practices used by the TAF and the effects of “harmonization packages”¹⁵⁹ on these.

The first institution they analyze is the NSC, which they consider “the main obstacle in Turkey’s DECAF.”¹⁶⁰ Through “an amendment to the Constitutional Article 118, the role of the NSC was limited to develop recommendations. The government

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Nilufer Narli, “Changes in the Turkish Security Culture and in the Civil-Military Relations,” *Western Balkan Security Observer English Edition* 14 (2009): 71.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 71–72.

¹⁵⁸ Gursoy, *Transformation of CMR in Turkey*, 2.

¹⁵⁹ The term harmonization package refers to legal and administrative amendments introduced within the context of “Europeanization” process, which Toktas and Kurt define as “the development of a new paradigm for ‘ways of doing things’ in accordance with global EU decisions.”

¹⁶⁰ Sule Toktas and Umit Kurt, “The Turkish Military’s Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF),” *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 3 (September 2010): 390.

became only responsible for evaluating the recommendations rather than giving them priority consideration,”¹⁶¹ and thus “the role of the NSC was reduced to that of an advisory/consultative body.”¹⁶² Toktas and Kurt list the other important changes regarding the NSC as the change in the number of civilian and military members from 5–5 to 9–5, in favor of the civilians; the lifting of the obligation for NSC Secretary General to be a military person; and the abrogation of provisions in various laws and articles giving the NSC the authority to nominate members to different boards such as the Higher Education Council and the Supreme Board of Radio and Television.¹⁶³

State Security Court System is another institution that Toktas and Kurt label as the symbol of “the shadow of the military authority over civilian agencies.”¹⁶⁴ There was a military judge in these courts, which were tasked with overseeing cases related to terror and political crimes. Through this structure, State Security Courts legalized the presence of the armed forces in the judiciary. Although not directly related to the State Security Courts, the Article 11 of the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts, which authorized the military courts to try in civilians for “criminal offense[s] ... such as inciting soldiers to mutiny and disobedience, [and] discouraging the public from military duty and undermining national resistance,” also provided the TAF with a legitimate presence in the judiciary. Both were abolished through amendments made within the context of harmonization packages.

The harmonization packages did not only seek to break military dominance over civilians but also enhanced civilian control mechanism. Toktas and Kurt argue that the decision to appoint a court of auditors to “audit the accounts and transactions of all types of organizations, including the state properties owned by the TAF”¹⁶⁵ was a step taken to enhance the transparency of defense expenditures, and thus establish a mechanism of civilian control over the military.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 391.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 390–92.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 391.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 392.

As also argued by Toktas and Kurt, “all these reforms challenged the status quo under which the military had occupied a privileged position and consolidated its hegemony over Turkey’s civilian governments,” and eventually curbed the autonomy and political authority of the TAF.¹⁶⁶

C. BACKGROUND ON THE PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND ITS IMPACTS ON CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

Starting from the early years of 1980s, the PKK gradually became the most determinative factor in civil–military relations in Turkey, because it was a direct threat to the integrity of the state and the ‘defender’ role of the TAF forced it to assume the leading role in the fight against the PKK. Therefore, it is important to analyze the PKK at this point.

Since “the strategic introduction of terror to the political sphere as a proto-polity in the modern sense ... following the French Revolution,”¹⁶⁷ the world has witnessed different types of terrorism in different regions. The PKK promotes one of these types or forms of terrorism. The PKK, which was officially founded on November 27, 1978 was no exception. It was founded as a political party with a goal to promote the idea of an independent Kurdish state and later on “to establish a left-wing Kurdish state which would serve as a platform for the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the creation of a series of allied Marxist-Leninist states, throughout the Middle East.”¹⁶⁸ Yet this appeal of PKK and its armed violence could not gain much support among the predominantly Sunni-Muslim Kurdish population, and this eventually made the Kurds living in the region the main victims of the PKK violence.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ “The PKK as a Marxist-Terrorist Organization? A Discursive Analysis of PKK Violence in Turkey.” last modified 23 October 2012, accessed 08 September, 2015, http://www.bilgesam.org/en//incele/1465/-the-pkk-as-a-marxist-terror-organization--a-discursive-analysis-of-pkk-violence-in-turkey/#.VfcS_PIViko.

¹⁶⁸ “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK),” last modified 05 August 2015, accessed 15 September 2015, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1320763&Pubabbrev=JWIT>.

PKK's "main area of operations has been the predominantly Kurdish provinces of southeast Turkey where it conducts a rural insurgency targeting security forces and state officials, and institutions. A primary area of operations is the provinces along the border with northern Iraq, such as Hakkâri and Sirnak, which the PKK use to infiltrate into Turkey from bases and staging areas in the Qandil mountains area of northern Iraq."¹⁶⁹ Along with terrorist attacks in the aforementioned region against both the security forces and local population, the PKK, through TAK (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kürdistan/Kurdistan Freedom Falcons), which is an offshoot of the PKK operating in urban areas, has carried out indiscriminate bombings and suicide attacks in urban regions. In addition to the existing organs, the PKK leadership founded KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan/Kurdistan Communities Union), which is an umbrella organization for all PKK affiliates,¹⁷⁰ in an effort to both "display the image of a political structure"¹⁷¹ and "transfer the armed struggle to cities."¹⁷² The structure of the KCK is illustrated in Figure 1.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, "Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria," Research, Middle East Report (Brussels: International Crisis Group, May 8, 2014), 5, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarius-rise-in-syria.pdf>.

¹⁷¹ "The Structure and Activities of the KCK Terrorist Organization," last modified 14 October 2011, accessed 15 September 2015, 2015, <http://www.bilgesam.org/en//incele/1415/-the-structure-and-activities-of-the-kck-terrorist-organization/#.VfhtuPIViko>.

¹⁷² Ibid.




Figure 1. The Structure of KCK¹⁷³

¹⁷³ Serkan Kekevi, "System of Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK): An Assessment of State, Federalism, KCK Practices and International Developments," *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences* 10, no. 2 (2015): 121.

Despite being recognized as a terrorist organization by many international bodies (NATO, EU) and countries, the PKK has enjoyed a continuous support in the international arena.

In the period 1984–1998, the PKK maintained training bases in Syria and then Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, particularly the Bekaa Valley, as well as ideological training and indoctrination bases in Greece and western Europe, primarily in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Some PKK units operated out of Iran, although the camps on Iranian territory were mainly used for rest and recuperation rather than for military or ideological training. The PKK also had a presence in the Caucasus, Russia, North America, and most countries in Europe, where sympathizers conducted propaganda and fundraising activities.¹⁷⁴

Today the training camps and logistical bases have been confined to the Qandil region in Northern Iraq, yet the organization still has functional support bases in Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium and also recruitment bases in France.¹⁷⁵ From 1980s to the 2000s, PKK enjoyed substantial amount of support from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Armenia, and Russia.¹⁷⁶ In addition to these, intelligence sources name 31 countries, providing weapons to PKK, some of which are NATO members; Italy, Germany, the UK, Spain, Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.¹⁷⁷

In order to fund its terrorist activities PKK uses a wide range of methods: Forced donations and fund raisings in both south-eastern Turkey and Europe, human and narcotics trafficking, extortions, robberies, and foreign funding.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK),” last modified 05 August 2015, accessed 15 September 2015, 2015, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++1320763&Pubabbrev=JWIT>.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

D. IMPACTS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MISSIONS ON MILITARY AUTONOMY AND DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE TAF

Military autonomy is not essentially affiliated under democratic civilian control yet it is closely related to it. For this reason, I have included military autonomy in this section where I will provide a background on the effects of the fight against PKK on the democratic civilian control of TAF.

Military autonomy, which basically is the “authority and roles left on the military side of the distinction line between civilian and military authority,”¹⁷⁹ has been described to have two aspects: (1) professional autonomy, (2) political autonomy.¹⁸⁰ The functions in each sphere of autonomy, as framed out by David Pion-Berlin, are illustrated in Figure 2.

¹⁷⁹ Akyurek et al., *CMR in Turkey*, 79.

¹⁸⁰ David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (October 1992, 1992a), 87.




Figure 2. Spheres of Professional and Political Autonomy¹⁸¹

Although not completely clear in any given country, this distinction between these two spheres is even more ambiguous in Turkey. The TAF has traditionally been assertive in the Political Sphere throughout the history of the modern Turkish Republic and at certain times (through coups and interventions) has tried to institutionalize its intrusion in the Political Sphere through the changing of constitution and foundation of bodies like the NSC. With the assignment of the task of the fight against the PKK, which falls under Internal Security and extensively incorporates Intelligence, the TAF has become even more involved in the Political Sphere. As also argued by Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, with the assumption of the leading role in the fight against the PKK, the TAF has combined “external defense with an internal security function” and thus has, inevitably, become more involved in political processes related to national security—mostly through the NSC.

¹⁸¹ Adapted from David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (October 1992, 1992b), 93.

Although the encouraged and aspired course of action for armed forces of any given country, including Turkey, is to stay out of the Political Sphere, the duties assigned to the TAF made this impossible. As also seen in Figure 2, “Internal Security” and “Intelligence Gathering” are two of three things left for the exclusive authority of civilians. It was argued in previous sections that the PKK was a direct threat to the internal security and that, in the face of inadequacy of other government institutions (the police and gendarmerie); it was obliged to assume the leading role in the fight against the PKK and thus became the prime actor in the shaping of internal security policies. As for intelligence gathering, Sakallioğlu argues that,

in addition to the military’s own intelligence operation units, the National Intelligence Agency of Turkey (NIA) serves as the civilian-based intelligence center subject to prime ministerial control. Despite its civilian character, the head and key cadres of NIA have always been recruited from officers and generals, either retired or active.¹⁸²

Essentially, the need for credible intelligence forced the TAF to cooperate with the NIA and the need for more efficient cooperation led to a growing military presence within the NIA. This, eventually, resulted in a quasi-monopoly of the TAF over intelligence gathering, which is supposed to be under the exclusive authority of the civilians.

E. CONVENTIONAL CMR METHODS (INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES) IN TURKEY

CMR are carried out through both formal and informal methods. In countries with robustly institutionalized armed forces, civil–military relations methods tend to be predominantly formal; given that both the politicians and the military have respect for professional and political spheres of autonomy.

During the Ottomans and Seljuks the armed forces lacked institutional identity. Just like any other state entity, the armed forces were considered to be the emperor’s personal asset and therefore civil–military relations in this era, if any, were

¹⁸² Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,” *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 2 (January 1997): 161, doi:10.2307/422077.

predominantly informal. All the orders and directives from the emperor were perceived as sacred decrees and obediently carried out. All the feedbacks to the emperor, on the other hand, were presented in the form a withdrawn and courteous petition, with no expectation of consideration by the emperor. The only exceptions to this fashion were the sporadic revolts and coups of the *Janissaries*, which were not against the regime but the persona of the emperors.

A similar type of relationship can also be observed in the first decades of the modern Turkish Republic, under Ataturk and Inonu, both of whom were prominent former generals with illustrious military careers. Although the military was institutionalized to a certain level and was no more considered the personal asset of any individual, both Ataturk and Inonu were perceived as the honorary commanders, and therefore their authority, even as civilians, was never challenged by the military. With the advent of multi-party system and the affiliation of the CGS under the ministry of defense, however, CMR started to shift toward a relatively formal context.

At a time when the TAF had directed all its efforts toward establishing formal foundations for civil–military relations; such as inclusive decision making processes, established procedures, and permanent bodies facilitating cooperation, Adnan Menderes, the head of the ruling DP, was trying to emulate a relationship similar to the one between the TAF, and Ataturk and Inonu. As discussed earlier, both Ataturk and Inonu had illustrious military careers to capitalize on. In addition to that, they had another prominent commander, Fevzi Cakmak, ready to serve as the CGS with firm loyalty to his comrades in arms. Lacking both - that is an illustrious military past and a loyal partner, Adnan Menderes still insisted on sustaining the same practice, even without the consent of the officer corps. This persistent and conflicting stance by Menderes paved the way for the first coup in the modern Turkish history, which was followed by two interventions and another coup. With every coup and intervention, CMR in Turkey acquired a more formal and institutionalized identity through the establishment of bodies like the NSC and the laying of legitimate basis for the inclusion of the military in certain decision-making processes. On the other hand, the TAF became disproportionately autonomous through the exclusion or passivation of civilians in decision making processes related to “Senior

Personnel Decisions,” “Internal Security,” and “Intelligence Gathering.” The TAF’s intentions throughout this process were quite ambivalent: while trying to keep the politics and politicians out of the Professional Sphere, it simultaneously tried to secure its gains in the Political Sphere.

At no time in the history of the modern Turkish Republic, did the TAF tried to dictate policy; instead, “it preferred to make recommendations.”¹⁸³ Yet, all those recommendations were made “in the expectation that these would be applied, or at least not contradicted” by the civilian authorities.¹⁸⁴ Both formal and informal “methods used to communicate these recommendations varied according to the policy area, the nature of the perceived threat, its importance or urgency, and the responsiveness of the civilian authorities.”¹⁸⁵

The most important and frequently used method, or institution, was and still is NSC, which is chaired by the president and comprises four representatives of the government (the prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of interior, and defense minister) and five members of the military (chief of general staff and commanders of the army, navy, air forces, and gendarmerie). The apparently equal composition of the NSC and the advisory feature of its decisions might make the NSC look like an ineffective body; yet the military, despite the numerical equality, has been able to dictate the issues to be discussed. Furthermore, “the article 118 of the 1982 constitution upgraded the NSC, so that it was no longer a merely advisory body; now the Council of Ministers should give ‘priority consideration’ to its views.”¹⁸⁶ This coupled with the qualitative superiority of the TAF, made NSC an important CMR tool at the disposal of the TAF.

In addition to NSC, the TAF has been able to communicate with the civilian authorities “through participation in a number of other government bodies, such as

¹⁸³ Gareth Jenkins, “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007a), 343.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Gareth Jenkins, “Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” *International Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2007b), 344.

holding seats on the boards of Higher Education Council (HEC) ... and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTSC).”¹⁸⁷ The TAF “also supplied one of the three judges on the panels responsible for hearing cases at the National Security Courts, which handed cases related to security.”¹⁸⁸ Above all have been the high level weekly meetings between the chief of general staff and the prime minister.

As mentioned above, there were also informal methods utilized within the context of CMR. These methods included “private meetings between leading generals and government ministers and officials, and public pronouncements.”¹⁸⁹

F. CMR METHODS (INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES) UTILIZED IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PKK

All the afore-mentioned CMR methods (both institutions and practices) were already in place when the fight against PKK started in 1984 to the date of the first terrorist attack by the PKK. The TAF’s role in the fight against PKK has been nothing more than responding to the requests of the governors in accordance with the Provincial Administration Law (Il Idaresi Kanunu). Yet, in effect, the TAF has been the leading actor in the fight against PKK and at certain periods and places has practically administered the regions being threatened by the PKK. This, in addition to other issues that the TAF was intensely involved in, created a need for effective communication between the military and civilians. A variety of methods, depending on the policy area, the nature of the perceived threat, its importance or urgency, and the responsiveness of the civilian authorities, was utilized in this process.

It was mentioned in previous sections of this paper that during the tenures of Ataturk and Inonu, the civilian leaders, thanks to their military background, were able to effectively run both the government and the TAF. Yet, with the advent of the multi-party system and the transfer of power from RPP to DP, a need for means to communicate occurred on both sides-the TAF and the government. As a result, Supreme Council of

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

Defense, the forerunner of NSC, was founded in 1949 “to coordinate policy and facilitate communication between the armed forces and the government.”¹⁹⁰ This body proved ineffective and Turkey experienced a coup in 1960. With the 1961 constitution, which was put in effect one year after the 1960 coup, the NSC was founded and its influence was further enhanced with the 1982 constitution, which was also drafted after a coup. Starting from the day it was founded, the NSC has been the most effective CMR institution in Turkey. Since “the PKK’s tactics sought to weaken Turkish authority through a combination of destroying state infrastructure and coercing the Kurdish public to support the PKK” and called for concerted political and military action, the NSC, as the only existing body to make that possible, have continued to remain the most effective CMR institution in the fight against PKK. Although the 2003 amendments in the NSC and NSC General Secretariat Law-especially the requirement of the Secretary General of NSC to be a civilian and the appointment of the military personnel to positions within NSC through the consent of the Secretary General of NSC and CGS- seems to have made the TAF less influential in the council; the unmatched experience of the TAF, its strong institutional identity, and its intense involvement in the fight against PKK have minimized the effects of the amendments on its dominance. The transfer of intelligence duties to the National Intelligence Service (NIS/MIT), along with the personnel, equipment, and infrastructure, though, had a far more negative impact on TAF’s influence.

The Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board and Under Secretariat of Public Order and Security, although founded to serve as a coordinating body for the “shaping of counter-terrorism policy and strategy and the coordination between the involved institutions,”¹⁹¹ soon evolved into a civil–military relations tool because of the predominance of TAF in the fight against PKK. Both bodies are currently affiliated under the Ministry of Interior. The under-secretariat, through an amendment of the related law in 2011, was directly put under the supervision of the Prime Minister and in 2014 was

¹⁹⁰ Steven A. Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2007), 102.

¹⁹¹ *The Law on the Structure and Duties of the Under Secretariat of Public Order and Security*, Public Law 5952, (2010): 1.

affiliated back under the Ministry of Interior. The under-secretariat also functions as the secretariat of the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board. The structures of both bodies are as shown in Figure 3.

The distinguishing feature of these two bodies is their purpose of foundation, which is to oversee the fight against terrorism. These two bodies were, indeed, *ad hoc* institutions founded with the sole purpose fighting the PKK, yet both bodies have failed to yield the expected effectiveness.

Along with the formal CMR methods mentioned above, there are also informal CMR methods; the most important and effective one being the weekly meetings between the Prime Minister and the CGS. Although the public knowledge about the meetings are confined to the limited press releases and the meetings happen in the format of the summoning of the CGS, it is obvious that important exchanges happen during these meetings between the Prime Minister (head of the civilians) and the CGS(head of the military).

Among all the formal and informal methods, the NSC has proven to be the most effective and frequently utilized CMR institution so far. This is a natural outcome of the high-profile attendance to the meetings of NSC, strong legal framework and high level of institutionalization.




Figure 3. Structures of the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board and the Under Secretariat of Public Order and Security¹⁹²

¹⁹² Adapted from “T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Kamu Düzeni Ve Güvenliği Mustesarlığı,” Ministry of Interior, accessed 16 September, 2015, <http://www.kdgm.gov.tr/?ax=1B45F8FD-6213-4103-9B6F-62EF8EB636E2>.

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IV. ANALYSIS

Gareth Jenkins argues that in cases where the government has been unable to provide the desired or expected performance in the face of serious problems, the Turkish public has turned to the military “either to intervene directly or to provide leadership in applying pressure to the government.”¹⁹³ When faced with a terrorist threat feeding on “fissiparous nationalism”¹⁹⁴ and targeting the integrity of the state, the Turkish public once again turned to the TAF. In response to this welcoming expectation and in accord with its traditional tendency of limiting its influence over politics with issues related to security, the TAF has been intensely involved in the fight against the PKK and thus has assumed the primary role in the fight against the PKK.

In this chapter I will analyze the impacts of this role on the democratic civil–military relations in Turkey (conceptualized by the democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the military). In the first section, I will present the existing situation with regards the democratic civilian control of the TAF by the time the PKK started its terrorist activities and then analyze the impacts of the TAF’s new role on the conditions shaping this situation. In the second section I will analyze the impacts of counter-terrorism tasks on the effectiveness of the TAF and then assess the overall impact on the control–effectiveness balance within this context.

A. THE IMPACTS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK ON THE DEMOCRATIC CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY

In sum, I argue that the impact of the fight against the PKK on the democratic civilian control of the TAF can best be observed through the changes in the informal authority of the TAF, rather than the formal, legislative changes. As such, the impact of the fight against PKK on the democratic civilian control follows Bilgic’s three categories. He categorizes the fight against PKK into three different approaches; (1) security oriented

¹⁹³ Gareth Jenkins, “Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics,” *The Adelphi Papers* 41, no. 337 (January 2001): 6, doi:10.1080/05679320108449651.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

approach, (2) semi-militaristic approach, and (3) multidimensional approach.¹⁹⁵ Since the start of the fight against the PKK the Turkish state has adopted one of these approaches either as a response to the changes in the strategy used by the PKK or as a result of adjustment of its own strategy.

During the period the first approach was adopted, which lasted until the early 1990s, a security-oriented strategy, based on military-police-intelligence cooperation was utilized, in order to fight the armed terrorists.¹⁹⁶ It is important to note at this point that the main focus was on the armed terrorists themselves-that is the fighting power of the PKK. Political, financial, and logistical activities of the PKK, on the other hand, were either neglected or left to the own initiative of related institutions, which had neither the capacity nor the will to assume a full-fledged struggle. As a result, the efforts during the time the first approach was adopted were limited to the imposing of emergency law and conducting of military operations in areas where the PKK was active. Although Bilgic states that the NIA and police forces were also used along with the military, the fact that the majority of the NIA personnel come from the military, and that only special operations units from the police forces were accepted to join the operations and that they were placed under the command of the military during those operations, indicates that the TAF was the primary actor during the time this approach was adopted. As Zuhail Ay Hamdan argues, “as the traditional guardian of Turkish security in broadest sense, the military played a dominant role both in the execution and shaping of policy” throughout this period.¹⁹⁷ So, basically, the TAF’s role in the fight against the PKK in this period enhanced its autonomy, as well as its grip on the domestic politics, and thus adversely affected the democratic civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey.

During the period the second approach was adopted, which lasted from early 1990s until the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, “the focus shifted from fighting the

¹⁹⁵ M. Sadi Bilgic, *Dunden Bugune Kurt Sorunu ve PKK (Kurdish Problem and the PKK: The Past and Present)* (Istanbul: Bilgesam Yayinlari, 2014), 64.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Zuhail Ay Hamdan, *A Critical Analysis of Turkey’s Fight against the PKK : The Governmental Policies and Military Methods against the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in the 1990s / by Zuhail Ay Hamdan*. (LAP, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2011), 12.

armed terrorists to taking preemptive actions against them,”¹⁹⁸ which “specifically aim[ed] to prevent and/or reduce the future incidents of terrorist violence”¹⁹⁹ and included “intelligence activities and terminating safe havens.”²⁰⁰ As also argued by Mustafa Unal Cosar, the main concern during this period was to bring terrorist attacks to a halt by simply “incapacitating the terrorist leadership.”²⁰¹ Since the top level PKK leadership were in neighboring countries like Iraq and Syria, the influence of the TAF in the period the second approach was adopted extended beyond security related issues and the TAF started to influence the shaping of foreign policy through formal and informal mechanisms. The most effective and frequently used formal mechanism continued to be the NSC. As for informal methods and mechanism, military exercises along borders and press releases by high-ranking generals can be given as examples.²⁰² The TAF’s role in the fight against the PKK in this period further enhanced its autonomy and extended its influence over issues other than security, such as foreign policy, and thus adversely affected the democratic civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey.

During the periods the first two approaches were adopted the main concern was security, which made the TAF the primary actor making all the calls, and limited, even hindered, the inclusion of civilian institutions that was necessary for the extension of the fight into areas such as politics, finance, and logistics. As also argued by Hamdan, during the periods the first two approaches were adopted “the Turkish state successfully followed up the military dimension of the insurgency, but unfortunately failed to cope with its political implications.”

¹⁹⁸ Bilgic, *Kurdish Problem and the PKK*, 64.

¹⁹⁹ Mustafa Cosar Ünal, *Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy Choices and Policy Effects toward the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)*, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. Routledge Research in Extremism and Democracy 15 (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2012), 31.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Back in 1998, the Chief of the Army, in an effort to force the Syrian government to deport the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, inspected the troops deployed along the Syrian border and told to the press that “some of our neighbors, especially the ones like Syria, are exploiting our good intentions and all the evil things are originating from these countries. We have every right to take the necessary precautions in the absence of reciprocity to our good intentions, and our patience has been depleted.”

Realizing the failure of the first two approaches and in the face of recurrence of the terrorist acts of the PKK in 2005, as well as newly adopted political activities aimed at gaining support from both the Kurds and the international community,²⁰³ the Turkish state adopted a multidimensional approach, which called for the incorporation of “many civilian actors and institutions like the universities, media, business and finance, NGOs, and even the public,”²⁰⁴ and thus facilitated the extension of the fight against the PKK into formerly neglected areas. Within this context,

in the early 2000s, the Turkish Government adopted and implemented socio-cultural, political, and criminological reforms. In addition, the Turkish Government has changed its rhetoric towards the Kurdish issue and has engaged in a transformation in its approach since the early 2000s. Most importantly, Turkey has switched from a military rule of law to a civilian rule of law in its struggle against the PKK and its legal/illegal apparatus. In other words, the leading role of the military that had been granted since the inception of PKK violence was changed and the major responsibility in countering PKK violence and activities has been granted to law enforcement units.²⁰⁵

Basically, in an effort to counter the changing strategy of the PKK (that is the adoption of political activities) and also learning from the experiences of the past; instead of a security based militaristic approach, in which the military was the leading actor making all the calls, the Turkish state adopted a multidimensional approach, in which the military was one of the primary actors acting in close coordination with civilian law enforcement units. The intense interaction caused by this close coordination created a cultural change within the TAF, yet it is not this cultural change itself which made *de facto* democratic civilian control possible; instead, it minimized the resistance against the EU harmonization process, for which civilian control of the TAF was one of the major issues.

All in all, during the periods the first two approaches were adopted, the TAF acted as the leading actor, enhanced its informal authority, became disproportionately

²⁰³ Mustafa Unal Cosar argues that the PKK, having realized the impossibility of success through guerilla warfare, has modified both its goals and ways to accomplish these goals. It has even “dissolved itself twice (to become KADEK and KONGRAGEL) to escape the PKK’s bloody legacy and to avoid the connotations of terrorist violence against civilians to obtain political support in the international arena.”

²⁰⁴ Bilgic, *Kurdish Problem and the PKK*, 64.

²⁰⁵ Ünal, *Counterterrorism in Turkey*, 154–155.

autonomous, and thus consolidated its role as the guardian of the state. As a result of this enhanced authority and autonomy of the TAF, its influence over politics extended into areas such as foreign policy. The adverse effects of these two periods on democratic civilian control of the TAF, though, were minimized during the period a multidimensional approach was adopted. Although it was the EU harmonization process that made democratic civilian control of the TAF possible, the cultural change the TAF went through during the period the third approach was adopted acted as a facilitating factor.

B. THE IMPACTS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK ON TAF EFFECTIVENESS

The effects of the fight against the PKK on the overall effectiveness of the TAF follow the concepts proposed by Brooks and Shemella.

Brooks' causal chain of military effectiveness, which is basically the translation process of the resources of a nation into a high level of integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality under the influence of independent variables, such as culture, social structure, political institutions, civil-military relations, interstate competition, global norms, international organizations and through the utilization of military activities. In the context of Turkey, being founded by a military genius, that is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, after an all-out war against the major superpowers of the early 1900s that were trying to invade the homeland of the nation, the Turkish state and nation has always been aware of the need for an effective military. As a result of the aspiration to have a strong army and thanks to the military heritage of the Ottoman Empire, the TAF had already attained high levels of integration and responsiveness. The strict hierarchy and command and control structure, together with clearly defined threats and assets to counter those threats indicates that TAF's objectives at tactical, operational, and strategic levels were already consistent. As for responsiveness, which is defined "as the ability to tailor military activity to a state's own capabilities, its adversaries' capabilities, and external constraints."²⁰⁶ The TAF's ability to adjust its force structure, which was designed under

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 11.

the conditions of Cold War and the influence of NATO, in a way to fight against a terrorist organization using guerilla tactics indicates that the TAF had already attained a high level of responsiveness. So basically, the TAF had already attained high levels of integration and responsiveness by the time the fight against the PKK started.

The real impact of the fight against the PKK, though, was on the skill and quality levels of the TAF. Brooks argues that skill “is reflected in small units’ ability to adapt to a constantly changing battlefield and to exploit opportunities,” and “is especially important in modern warfare, which is complicated by the assimilation of new technologies and weapon systems.”²⁰⁷ As for quality, she argues that it is a military’s “ability to provide itself with highly capable weapons and equipment.”²⁰⁸ Obviously skill and quality are closely related. I argue that the ability of the TAF to adapt to counter terrorism operations and its complex nature at small unit level increased the skill level of the TAF at both personnel level and institution level. As for quality, the most important indicator is the procurement of highly capable weapons systems and equipment. As shown in Figure 4, the ratio of military spending to GDP in Turkey has increased at times when the conflict has intensified.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 13.




Figure 4. Military Expenditure (% of GDP)²⁰⁹

All in all, the fight against the PKK has further enhanced the levels of integration and responsiveness, and has considerably increased the levels of skill, and quality of the TAF and thus has had a positive effect on the overall effectiveness of the TAF.

As for the sustainment of effectiveness, Paul Shemella's "roles and missions concept" provides a road map. As also mentioned in previous sections, Shemella argues that stability in roles and flexibility in missions is key to the sustainment of effectiveness. It has been argued that the TAF has traditionally been perceived as the guardian of the state, which clearly assigns it a defender role as described by Shemella's conceptual framework. This defender role is explicitly stated in Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act. Although this defender role is limited to external threats, the Provincial Administration Law allows the utilization of the TAF against the internal threats at the request of city governors. So basically the Provincial Administration Law extends the defender role assigned to the TAF by the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act and draws a legitimate context to use the military against internal threats. In

²⁰⁹ "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)," International Organization, The World Bank, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=TR&start=1988>.

the light of this, I argue that the TAF's involvement in the fight against the PKK is not a new role by itself, but rather an extension of the already assigned defender role, and thus perfectly conforms with idea of stability in the roles.

As for missions; Shemella, argues that it is imperative to make a distinction between roles and missions, but at the same time establish a hierarchical link between them. Once accomplished, effectiveness can be more easily sustained if the missions are shaped in accordance with the roles they support. The TAF has been able to preserve the hierarchical link between its defender role and traditional missions while carrying out the non-traditional missions assigned within the context of the fight against the PKK—that is “internal security functions, non-lethal force, low profile, small unit operations, permissive environment, lightly armed, local control, high civil–military interaction, diffuse command and control, and law enforcement mentality,”²¹⁰ which indicates a flexibility in missions.

Basically the TAF has been able to preserve and sustain its effectiveness in the fight against the PKK through stability in its legally assigned role of defender, and flexibility in traditional and non-traditional roles.

Under these circumstances, one could argue that before 1999, when harmonization process of Turkish laws with the Copenhagen criteria started, upon the approval of Turkey's bid for EU membership, civilian control component of the democratic civil–military relations in Turkey were characterized by high military autonomy and influence. In this context, Fotios Moustakis, in a rather forced interpretation,²¹¹ argues that the Turkish constitution, which assigns the TAF the task of making

the timely and correct identification of threats to the unity of the country and the nation...and to protect the territory against internal threats which may necessitate the use of the Turkish armed force within the framework

²¹⁰ Paul Shemella, “The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 137.

²¹¹ Moustakis himself acknowledges that this is an interpretation rather than an explicit statement by arguing that this conclusion can be reached if the constitution is “read in one way.”

of the Constitution and law against any overt or covert attempt to destroy the democratic parliamentary system...and the indivisible integrity of the Turkish nation, regardless of the source of the threat,²¹²

has provided the TAF with legitimate power to intervene and play an important role in domestic political processes related to security “whenever they feel necessary, or are ordered by the NSC.”²¹³ So basically the 1981 constitution, which has been drafted after the 1980 military coup, has been the main source of legitimacy for such actions by the military. The fact that the 1981 constitution was not considerably changed until 1999, suggests that the fight against the PKK has had little impact on the democratization of civil–military relations in Turkey. Nevertheless, Jenkins challenges this idea and argues that when the TAF attempts to influence political processes in Turkey it “depends on its informal authority, based on a combination of its historical role and its public prestige, rather than any officially defined legislative or executive powers.”²¹⁴

Nevertheless, the privileges granted to the TAF by the Constitution(s) and other legislation were taken away by legislative changes introduced within the context of EU harmonization process. Yet, since the TAF has historically depended on its informal authority—that is its historical role as the defender of the country and its public prestige feeding on this historical role, the changes in legislation were not expected to have a considerable impact on the democratic civilian control of the TAF. At the minimum, however, they seem to improve democratic civil–military relations, in that the civilians acquired more power over the armed forces. As such, legislative changes were welcomed and willingly adopted by the TAF. Although the legislative changes themselves were a result of the EU membership process, the willingness of the TAF to cooperate and adopt the changes, and hence, accept more input and influence by the civilians, is the result of the cultural change the TAF has been going through, which I argue is the by-product of the intense interaction with other government institutions within the context of the fight against the PKK. This cultural change is best observed in the words of the General Chief

²¹² Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (London ; Portland, Ore: Frank Cass, 2003), 113.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Jenkins, “Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics,” 7.

of Staff Hilmi Ozkok himself; “We are respectful to the prevalent opinion of the public that the TAF should, even must, express its position regarding important issues by saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and share it with the public yet the TAF should not be expected to take sides in all issues or share everything with the public.”²¹⁵ So basically, by the time the country was getting ready to lay the foundations for democratization through harmonization laws and regulations, the TAF, which otherwise would have been in favor of sustaining the status quo and hinder the process, had already gone through a cultural change as a result of its involvement in the fight against the PKK.

On the other hand, TAF’s involvement in the fight against PKK has positively affected the second component of democratic civil–military relations—the military effectiveness. Essentially, then, TAF’s taking on the fighting terrorism role (in parallel with NATO membership and prospect for EU integration) has had a modestly positive influence on democratic civil–military relations in Turkey.

²¹⁵ “Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Özkök - Derleme - AB BAKANLIĞI (2004-04-14),” Government, accessed August 31, 2016, <http://www.ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=34870&l=1>.

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis assessed the impacts of counter terrorism missions on the democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the TAF, as well the balance between civilian control and effectiveness. It found that civil–military relations in the modern Turkish Republic was nothing more than an absolute sub-ordinance to the civilians until 1949—thanks to the presidency of influential military figures like Ataturk and Inonu, and their strict control of the TAF through allegiant senior commanders like General Chief of Staff Fevzi Cakmak. Civil–military relations in this era were rather an extension of hierarchy beyond the military. With the foundation of the Supreme Council of Defense, though, civil–military relations in Turkey started to take a more formal context. Successfully capitalizing on its informal authority, the TAF gained dominance over the civilians within time, and by the time the fight against the PKK started, the TAF had gained a high level of autonomy within a state structure shaped by a constitution drafted after a military coup—that is the 1982 constitution. So basically, by the time the fight against the PKK started, the TAF not only had the upper hand against the civilian but literally controlled all political processes.

The thesis also found that the abovementioned superiority of the TAF continued through the periods when security oriented and semi-militaristic approaches were adopted. It was still the TAF making all the calls and the civilians were simply responding to the requests made by the TAF through formal and informal mechanisms, most frequently through NSC resolutions. The main reason for the sustainment of the TAF’s superiority during these periods was the lack of competent civilian institutions included in the fight against the PKK. Basically, the TAF was the only actor rather than the primary actor during these periods, and this consolidated the TAF’s image in the eyes of the public, as well as its own perception of itself as the guardian of state.

It also found that during the period the multidimensional approach was adopted many civilian actors and institutions like the universities, media, business and finance, NGOs, and even the public were incorporated in the fight against the PKK. Although it might be argued that the inclusion of the civilian themselves was the result of a change in

civil–military relations, the TAF still continued to dictate policies and occasionally control political processes. But the interaction and cultural exchange between the TAF and other civilian institutions partaking in the process created a considerable cultural change in the TAF and it was this cultural change that made it possible for the TAF to adapt to the reforms introduced through harmonization process.

So basically, the TAF's involvement in the fight against the PKK did not create a significant change in the civilian control of the TAF but it rather created a cultural change that made it possible for Turkey to make reforms that facilitated democratic civilian control over the TAF. As for effectiveness of the TAF, I argue that its role in the fight against the PKK helped TAF improve its skill and quality levels, and thus increased its effectiveness. Furthermore, the TAF, by accomplishing a stability in its roles (that is the defender role), and a flexibility in its missions (that is performing non-traditional roles along with traditional roles without significant changes in the force structure) the TAF was able to sustain the level of effectiveness it has attained.

The control and effectiveness balance, on the other hand, was favorably affected by the TAF's primary role in the fight against the PKK. The TAF, which was disproportionately autonomous and operated on a rigid force structure shaped by the conditions of cold war, attained a more flexible force structure so as to adapt the new non-traditional missions. This increase in effectiveness, though, did not adversely affect the democratic civilian control of the TAF; instead, the TAF became more content with civilian control, which was made possible by the cultural exchange with civilian institutions partaking in the process.

Overall, the TAF's involvement in the fight against the PKK increased the level of effectiveness of the TAF and created a cultural change that made it possible to establish democratic civilian control over the TAF through EU harmonization process.

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